Offentlig-Privat Samarbeid: Transaksjonskostnader i Anbudskonkurransen og Insentiver for Deltakelse

Abstract

Kristiansand municipality decided to procure Justvik school through public-private partnership (PPP). The idea was to utilize private sector´s efficiency, management and expertise to design, build, finance and operate a public school through a long-term contractual arrangement. The model is debated as the desired efficiency gains are not proved to exceed the costs of the model. Previous research indicate that there is significant use of resources associated with PPP tendering. This paper examines the transaction costs in tendering for a PPP project. The research provides no basis for comparison with other procurement models. Special for the PPP model is that part of the transaction costs have shifted from public to private sector. Participation in a tender may therefore lead to losses for the private actors. On the contrary, winning such a competition can contribute to higher profit, improvement of the company´s position, and added value through new partnerships. Contractors´ ability to choose the right contracts is important for their success. The purpose of this study was to investigate the amount of transaction costs involved in a PPP project, and why private actors wanted to participate. Agency theory and transaction cost theory was used as a theoretical foundation in order to answer the research question. The research method used for this study was a case study of Justvik school. What makes this case interesting is the access to key actors from the public and private sector. Semi-structured in-depth interviews and focused interviews was carried out, triangulated with key documents, providing an opportunity to conduct a deep and rigorous analysis. Twelve public and private actors were carefully chosen in order to ensure a holistic picture with multiple perspectives. The results showed that there were significant transaction costs involved in the tender. 70- 80ipercent of the total tender costs were transaction costs. These costs are explained by the relatively long and extensive competition, presented in nine stages. Despite these costs, bidders seemed to find it attractive to participate in the tendering because of the incentives present. These constituted both pecuniary incentives like higher expected profit, but also non-pecuniary incentives like being allowed to influence the project to a larger extent. The work with the thesis resulted in two scientific research papers that was accepted for presentation and inclusion in the conference proceedings at International Conference on Project Management (ProjMAN).