What's wrong with the adequacy-argument? A pragmatic diagnosis
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/139637Utgivelsesdato
2011Metadata
Vis full innførselSamlinger
Originalversjon
Zackariasson, U. (2011). What's wrong with the adequacy-argument? A pragmatic diagnosis. Sophia, 50(1), 11-23. doi: 10.1007/s11841-009-0153-0Sammendrag
When confronted with the question of which philosophical conception of religion to consider most adequate, many philosophers appeal to what I call the adequacy-argument: that we should prefer the one that looks most adequate from the perspective of religious believers. In this paper, I provide a critique of the adequacy-argument based on a pragmatic analysis of adequacy-judgments according to which reflective adequacy-judgments are forward-looking, and hence include considerations of the consequences of adopting different judgments as guides for conduct. It is this forward-looking character that is virtually absent within the current adequacy-debate. The major advantage of a pragmatic analysis of adequacy is itself forward-looking: it would enable philosophers of religion to play a more critical and constructive role vis-A -vis religious practices than presently.
Beskrivelse
Published version of an article in the journal: Sophia, 50(1), 11-23. Also available from the publisher at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0153-0