Informal compliance mechanisms in the EU ‘development’ and ‘integration without membership’ association agreements: a quest for capacity and ownership?

Abstract

Association Agreements between the EU and third countries lie at the heart of the EU’s foreign policy. The Association Agreements the EU concluded with Eastern Neighbours and the Caribbean Forum and Central American countries are marked with partner countries’ ambitious obligations, and the multi-instrument toolbox the EU applies to ensure partner countries’ compliance, including official consultations and dispute settlement. Nevertheless, the EU has demonstrated to prefer informal compliance instruments, such as statements or informal meetings in both the ‘integration without membership’ and ‘development’ contexts. The article focuses on the rationale behind the EU’s preference for ‘soft’ compliance instruments. It isdemonstrates that the European Commission and Delegations may in many cases prioritize partners’ commitment to and ownership of change over a particular result (compliance), despite being able to make use of the asymmetries of its power relations with partner countries. The confluence of the EU’s or Member States’ strong interest in a partner country’s compliance with a specific obligation and the persistence of non-compliance will, nonetheless, lead to the recourse to formalized compliance mechanisms. The focus on the management perspective of compliance in isolation from formal enforcement mechanisms is presented as hardly possible, notwithstanding the EU’s quest for ownership.