REDD+ and the Collaboration between Practitioners and Experts.

Lessons Learnt about Safeguarding and how to Define Results, from Norway's Bilateral Agreements with Brazil and Indonesia.

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Abstract

REDD+ is a response to the growing urgency of mitigating climate change and hindering the deforestation of tropical forests. The simple thought of "making trees worth more standing up, then cut down" and therefore storing carbon in trees, has proven to be quite complicated and complex, especially as bilateral agreements are based on result-based payments. However, what is considered a result can be much more than just the amount of reduced carbon-emission. Brazil is the country with the most tropical rainforest in the world, and Indonesia is home to the world's third largest tropical forest, and therefore important partners in the work towards reducing GHG emissions. These two countries and their bilateral agreement between Norway will be in focus in this thesis. After over 13 years, the programme has met many challenges, including miscommunication and inconsistent approaches in the bilateral agreements. Another concerns safeguarding, a requirement to have a system for in REDD+ agreements. This has proven to be almost impossible to monitor and report on. Further, the funding from Norway comes through the ODA budget, which presents additional requirements which have caused difficulties. The programme goes through evaluations, and the government does use research in their strategic planning and in the development of REDD+. Still, there are lessons learned after these years which suggests that better understanding and collaboration between researchers and practitioners is beneficial. This thesis investigates the issues with REDD+ agreements being funded through the ODA budget, and the difficulties of safeguarding as part of the requirements to receive result-based funding. Further it explores how practitioners and experts in Norway collaborate towards REDD+ today, how they share knowledge, how they interact with each other and if they have the same understanding of what the programme is trying to achieve - and what is necessary to achieve the set goals. It argues that more informal collaboration between practitioners and experts to create a common understanding and connection is necessary and would be beneficial in gaining more information regarding national contexts before mapping out plans or setting goals, which could be part of resolving issues found in connection with having safeguarding and ODA finds connected with result-based payments.

Keywords: climate change, REDD+, NICFI, Norway, safeguarding, collaboration, ODA, bilateral-agreements

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFOLU - Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
ART - The Architecture for REDD+ Transactions
CDR - Carbon Dioxide Removal
COP - Conference of the Parties
FCPF - Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP - World Bank´s Forest Investment Programme
FPIC - free prior and informed consent
GHG - Green House Gas
INDC – Intended National Determined Contribution
INPE - Brazil's National Institute for Space Research
IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JR - Jurisdictional REDD+
LoI - Letter of intent
MoU - Memorandum of understanding
MRV - Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NDC – Nationally Determined Contributions
NICFI - Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NORAD - Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OAG - The Office of the Auditor General
ODA - Official development assistance
PA - Protected Area
PES - Payment for Environmental Services
RBP – Results based payment
REDD+ - Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries
RFN - Rainforest Foundation Norway
RL - Reference level
SfEP - Science for Environment Policy
TREES - REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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1.0 Introduction

The world's forests play an important role for maintaining the climate, ecosystems, and human welfare. As forests store huge amounts of carbon and are important to biodiversity, deforestation has become a political issue in almost all parts of the world (Olesen et al. 2018). Austin et at. (2019) discuss how the high deforestation rate of the primary natural forest in Indonesia is mainly caused by timber and palm oil plantations, conversion of forest to grassland and mining. According to Weisse (2020), the loss of tropical forests has been ongoing over the past decade, with 2016 to 2018 having the highest rates of primary forest loss since the last century. Canineu and Carvalho (2020) refer to a study undertaken by Brazil's national space research agency (INPE) that warns that these accelerated destructive activities will drive the Amazon towards a tipping point from which it cannot recover, potentially turning it into a dry savannah and releasing billions of tons of stored carbon. In order to meet the Paris agreement goal of limiting climate change, global emissions need to be effectively halved by 2030. How we handle tropical forest emissions will be critical in this task.

The global environment of the earth has changed and will continue to change due to human impact during this Anthropocene era. From the mid-nineteenth century, the global average temperature has increased by 0.8° C. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warns of a total rise by the end of this century of between 1.2°C and 6°C depending on political responses. Scientists consider a rise of 2°C in relation to the pre-industrial level to be a danger threshold, and without proper mitigation tactics, climate experts predict a rise of 3.7°C to 4.5°C by 2100 which will cause huge meteorological disasters and deterioration of human life quality (Bonneuil et al., 2016). Scholars started four decades ago to write about how it was very likely that deforestation was one of the most significant causes of rising levels of carbon in the atmosphere (Woodwell et al. 1983) and that reforestation could be part of the solution to reduce the amount of carbon in the atmosphere alongside the reduction of carbon-heavy emission activities brought out by the industrial economy (Dyson 1976).

States have responded in a range of ways to the threats of climate change and deforestation, with Norway becoming an important player in the international response throughout the past decade. This first started when the then Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, announced during the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bali 2007 that Norway would grant 3 billion NOK per annum towards the protection of tropical rainforests (Hermansen et al., 2017). Funding would be channelled from the official development assistance (ODA) budget through Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), who were to become the main funder for the program "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation" (REDD) also including sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries along with conservation, (which has come to be known as "REDD+").

The aim of REDD+ was to make tropical forests more profitable standing than cut down, by compensating the owners and users of the forests for the carbon stored within the trees. At first, this was presented as mutual beneficial, where wealthy countries could fulfil their climate commitments by buying cheap mitigation elsewhere, poor countries and farmers could be compensated by getting an income on leaving their trees standing, and this would combine would contribute to the planet benefitting from the reduction in emission from deforestation which had been avoided (Angelsen, 2019). The announcement was met with excitement and motivation, as it was viewed as a solution to cost-efficiently method to work towards a carbon-neutral economy by paying to preserve the forests (Angelsen et al., 2018).

Long into its 10+ years, REDD+ have failed to meet its goals. Even though they have seen positive outcomes, the initiative has earned some criticism. Critics allege that the concept of compensating developing countries to not cut down their trees has not been simple or cheap (Angelsen, 2019). Land tenure needs to be better clarified towards safeguarding, and the complexity of REDD+ context is exacerbated by the complexity caused by so many different governmental, civil society and market actors from different sectors, such as climate, forest, conservation, and community rights, and scientists from different disciplines involved in developing and implementing REDD+ mechanisms at different levels. This makes identification of common priorities difficult as there are very different views on what REDD+ ought to be. However, the necessary complexity of REDD+ influences the pace of its development and implementation (Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012). Further, there are

disagreements between recipients and donor countries on what a result is and how to measure aspects of the results these payments are intended for (Van der Hoff et al. 2018).
In the grant scheme rules presented from NICFI, it is stated that "Potential grant recipients must have a policy in place for combating and counteracting sexual harassment and discrimination and ensure that this policy is implemented in practice. The applicant must have safeguards in place against corruption and negative impacts on women's rights and gender equality, human rights and climate and the environment." (kld, 2018, p. 3). This means that there must be a safeguarding system in place for in the agreements before they can receive payments for results. However, as this is result-based payment, based and calculated on actual numeric results, for example x tons Co2 saved. Experts in topics relating to the issues REDD+ is trying to solve, and experts on countries like Brazil and Indonesia inhabits valuable information for the practitioners, and there is quite a lot of independent research on REDD+ in Norway, and internationally. I want to explore how (or if) practitioners and experts share knowledge and collaborate towards the initiative. My research questions are therefore:

- How is safeguarding being monitored and secured under the verification of "results"?

- How do the Norwegian ODA rules and regulations affect progress towards results in the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia and Norway and Brazil?
    - What led to the ending of the agreement between Norway and Indonesia?

- How are REDD+-related practitioners and experts in Norway interacting or collaborating in terms of sharing knowledge and building a common understanding?

In order to examine this, I will focus on Norway's bilateral agreements with Brazil and Indonesia. Brazil is the country with the most tropical rainforest in the world, and Indonesia is home to the world's third largest tropical forest, and therefore important partners in the work towards reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. The agreements between Norway and these two countries were set on different terms, where the agreements with Brazil were frozen and the first agreement with Indonesia were ended. For this reason, I believe that they provide a valuable starting point to examine the different ways in which REDD+ has developed.

Chapter 2 will treat the evolution of REDD+, exploring its successes and controversies with a consistent focus on Norway's involvement. It will give an insight into the conceptual framework surrounding safeguards, results and collaboration between practitioners and experts.

Chapter 3 will outline the social research design of this project explaining the research goals and how and why the project has been designed.

Chapter 4 investigates how practitioners are working with safeguarding, one of the criteria for receiving result-based payments, in the programme. It investigates how safeguarding is being monitored and reported, and the different perceptions between expectations and reality.

Chapter 5 discusses the different views on what can be called a 'result'. In the result-based payments under REDD+ the rules can at first be seen straight forward enough. One receives payments after the agreed amount of carbon has been reduced. Still, the criteria of having a safeguard system in place, and this being monitored and reported on has caused discussions. There is also a need to have the right policies in place before payments can be made.

Lastly, chapter 6 discusses how there is a lot of research being conducted on various subjects under REDD+. Experts often have a deeper insight and understanding of different countries' situations and processes, and they conduct research that lasts over a longer time. This gives critical and useful information for practitioners when developing the programme or assessing results. Critical research disconnected from practical matters may have abnormal outcomes for practitioners who are, in the end, working towards similar goals, and uncritical practice-oriented research has the potential to lead to a dilution of main values of environmental justice and conservation. In contrast, methods of practical critique add ways of researching REDD+ that have practical value while maintaining critical understanding (McGregor et al. 2014). The discussion then on how practitioners and experts collaborate and share information between each other, and if there is a common understanding of the purpose of REDD+.

2.0 Literature Review

This section provides a critical overview of scholarly work which relates to the emergence and development of REDD+. The opening sections outline the relevant background information regarding deforestation and climate change, and how REDD+ was developed as a response to these issues. In section 2.2 I will focus on Norway's involvement, in particular its collaborations with Brazil and Indonesia, in order to illustrate the reality of REDD+. In 2.3 I will move on to explore how this reality differs to how REDD+ was envisioned prior to its implementation. I will provide an overview of the uncertainties, challenges and criticisms that experts have raised, as well as delving into some of the outcomes that have emerged as a response to these challenges. These three sections will provide the reader with the necessary background understanding of REDD+ needed for the in-depth conceptual analysis in section 2.4. Here, I will critically explore safeguarding, results and collaboration as concepts inherently linked to the success and/or failure of REDD+.

2.1 The Climate Crisis

Climate change is defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes as: "a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or because of human activity" (IPCC 2007, 30).

Experts started to write about how it was very likely that the increase of carbon in the atmosphere was due to deforestation (Woodwell et al. 1983) and that reforestation could be part of the solution of reducing the amount of carbon in the atmosphere alongside the reduction of carbon-heavy emission activities brought out by the industrial economy (Dyson 1976). Despite this, it appears that the threat of climate change is not on the highest agenda with all the leaders of the world. Even if the Paris Agreement displays encouraging ambition, reaching the goal of keeping the global temperature below 1,5 °C of preindustrial temperature is not being reflected in current practices. According to IPCC (2018), if the current activity is being kept up at the same pace, global warming is on a fast track towards 1.5 °C between

2030 and 2052. It has been projected that future global heating from 1.5°C to 2°C is likely to cause exposure to further compound risks across the energy, food, and water sectors, with the largest proportions of people susceptible in Africa and Asia (IPCC 2019). Climate and biodiversity disaster mitigation policies have been launched alongside around the world. Particularly in the Global South, seemingly to meet these challenges, including ecosystem-based adaptation and restoration, and avoided deforestation and forest degradation measures (IPCC 2018).
IPCC produces a comprehensive overview of climate science once every six to eight years and divides its findings into three reports. The last report indicated that "harmful carbon emissions from 2010-2019 have never been higher in human history, and it is proof that the world is on a "fast track" to disaster, António Guterres has warned, with scientists arguing that it's 'now or never' to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees" (UN News, 2022). The UN Secretary-General insisted that unless governments everywhere rethink their energy policies, the world will become uninhabitable. Further, the UN chief added that there is a massive gap between climate pledges and reality (UN News, 2022).

Solutions have been proposed by scientists on how we can avoid a scenario like this that is evident that this is complicated and difficult to comprehend. Angelsen et al. (2018) explains how emissions from agriculture and deforestation must be majorly reduced, as well as the need for massive amounts of carbon to be removed from the air. An initiative towards trying to find a solution to this issue is the REDD+ programme.

2.1.1 Drivers and Effects of Tropical Deforestation Globally

If we want to identify the best policies to hinder deforestation, it is crucial to identify the causes of deforestation through monitoring (Duchelle, et al. 2015; Romijn et al. 2015; Zelli et al. 2014). Understanding the many forces motivating deforestation and forest degradation that REDD+ schemes must deal with and learning to minimise to reach their goals, requires comprehending the answers to two further questions discussed by Lele and Kurien (2011): what drives or causes changes to forestlands? And, what are the consequences of changes like these for society? In a review of the causes of tropical deforestation using 152 subnational case studies, Geist and Lambin (2002) found institutional governance factors to be the main drivers of deforestation. Further, Contreras-Hermosilla (2000) identifies

interdependent actions by several agents as the main causes of forest land use changes. Sengupta and Maginnis (2005) distinguish between proximate and underlying causes of forest-related land use change. Other causes include infrastructure development, wood extraction, forest fires, alien invasive species, agricultural expansion, and climate change. Underlying causes are market failure, demographic factors, institutional and government policies, and poverty. Palo (1994) lean on the neo-Malthusian tradition among biologists and ecologists to look at the influence of population pressure on deforestation. Observing that a fundamental feature of high deforestation levels is that the causal factors of deforestation are linked together where one part affects the other. Palo initiated multiple regression analysis of 60 tropical countries and found that population pressure was related to the extent of forest cover.

Repetto and Holmes (1983) have argued that population growth in line with open access, forest commercialization, asymmetric land tenure and increasing international demands leads to faster deforestation than population growth alone. Further causes of tropical deforestation have been noted to also be inappropriate market valuation of the global goods such as carbon sinks/sequestration that tropical forests provide. Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017) undertook an extensive analysis of drivers of deforestation in 121 studies from 1996-2013 where they found that deforestation levels are higher in places with more economic returns to agriculture and easy transportation to the market. In addition, they find that the places with the least deforestation are natural parks and areas where the law is enforced. Gibson et al. (2000) compared different studies which identified that the drivers of deforestation are quite conflicting. While analysis has mostly been conducted on a macro level, the drivers of deforestation on a local level have not been included. As the local institutions may adjust the effect of variables that cause deforestation, the augment is that factors on a local level is crucial. This section provides the context we need to understand the emergence of REDD+ and the complexities related to making such funding work.

2.1.2 The Emergence of REDD+

The World Bank and some global environmental NGOs began seeing climate change and forest ecosystem loss in connection, after observing that unsustainable levels of deforestation were caused by policy failures or a failure to properly account for economic externalities

(Hein 2013, McAfee 1999 and 2012). The awareness and attention around rainforests- and the issues around the climate became larger and on top of the international agenda in the 2000s. While the roots of REDD+ were laid down in the Kyoto Protocol, the idea of a compensated reduction of deforestation started at the COP 11 in Montreal in 2005, where it was officially discussed (Hermansen, 2015). Further, the Stern report was launched where there was a call for swift global response and action reduce deforestation and to the current threat of climate change (Stern, 2007). This report depicted how loss of natural forests accumulated to large emissions yearly. The report went on to discuss how curbing deforestation was a highly cost-effective way to reduce emissions, and that large-scale international pilot programs should explore the best ways to do this (Stern, 2007). In 2007, IPCC fourth report argued that forest degradation and deforestation represented 17 percent of global GHG emissions alone (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). Therefore, actions to reduce GHG emissions from tropical forests were expressed to be fast-acting and cost-effective when compared to other existing initiatives towards the climate (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

REDD+ emerged as a global initiative and is implemented in various national, provincial, and local contexts, to ensure that the still-standing forests are preserved as carbon sinks, with the users of the forests being compensated for preserving them (Angelsen et al 2009). The larger and denser the forest preserved is, the greater amount of carbon is stored that would be released into the atmosphere and contribute to global heating otherwise. Following this, a country who wanted to participate could apply to the UNFCCC to establish a REDD+ scheme. However, establishing a REDD+ scheme is not something which can be achieved overnight. REDD+ implementing agencies established three separate and defined activity phases (UN-REDD, 2016): (i) The “readiness” phase: which is where countries design national strategies and action plans, build capacity to implement REDD+, work on policies which are relevant and measures and design demonstration activities; (ii) the “demonstration” phase: which is where the national strategies, policies and action plans suggested in the first phase are demonstrated and tested, potentially including results-based demonstration activities and necessary additional capacity building, technology development and transfer; and (iii) the “implementation” phase: which is where results-based actions (i.e. forest conservation) are implemented at the national level and results fully measured, reported and verified (MRV), where countries are accessing results-based payments when they have completed a reporting, assessment and analysis process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Within each of these three phases, stakeholder engagement is viewed as crucial (UN-REDD Programme 2016) towards the success of REDD+ interventions for several reasons. First, UNFCCC decisions have formally called on all parties to ensure full and effective participation and engagement of relevant stakeholders in the design and implementation of REDD+ national strategies. Second, high demand has been expressed for important stakeholder engagement from a field of actors, from donors, Indigenous Peoples, civil society groups and REDD+ implementing governments. And third, due to REDD+ can require transformational reforms in areas not only related to forestry, but its success also depends on functional partnerships across large sections of society. According to the UN-REDD Programme (2016), stakeholder engagement for REDD+ is not only a matter of merging the views of different actors that are focused on REDD+, is also about creating partnerships, consensus and inclusive, gender-sensitive policies that will make REDD+ transformational, attainable, and permanent. At the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Warsaw, in December 2013, specific methodological and financing guidance for the implementation of REDD+ activities in the form of the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ was provided. REDD+ was also recognized in Article 5 of the Paris Climate Agreement signed in 2016, where parties reiterated encouragement to implement REDD+ activities. After years of evolving discussions and tough negotiations, efforts to address climate change by saving trees were now firmly enshrined in the United Nations Climate Accord (Hermansen, 2015).

Countries were to define a results-based payment mechanism to make sure that the users and owners of the forest were compensated and incentivised for the carbon confined and stored in the forests that they owned and protected. Angelsen et al. (2016) claims that this would primarily be financed through carbon markets, which were met with open arms and globally optimism, since there was a need to build bridges towards a carbon neutral economy by making trees still standing of higher value than cut down (Angelsen et al., 2018). It would be a system for international and national payment for environmental services (PES) as illustrated below:

Figure 1: Angelsen (2018)

The model illustrates how international actors and donors would transfer funds to nations for environmental services, which would then pay land users, communities, and local governments for reducing emission or taking action to mitigate or reduce emission (Angelsen, 2008).

This section has provided an understanding of why, and how, REDD+ emerged as a response to increasing deforestation as a part of the broader climate crisis. With this in mind, the following section focuses on Norway's role and collaborations, in particular the bilateral agreements with Indonesia and Brazil.

2.2 Norway's Role in REDD+

Norway follows the international framework set by the UNFCCC, but they also have their own terms set in their bilateral agreements and additional rules and regulations as the funding comes from the Norwegian ODA funds, which can cause disturbances which will be addressed in the finding's chapters.

During the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) 13 on Bali a decision was included to encourage developing countries to undertake efforts to address the drivers of deforestation relevant to their national circumstances (UNFCCC, 2007). Further, NICFI's contribution was announced by Norway's prime minister Jens Stoltenberg during the COP 13 in Bali in 2007 (Hermansen, 2015). According to Hermansen (2015), two months prior to this, two Norwegian NGOs wrote a letter to leading Norwegian politicians urging them to establish a climate initiative for protecting rainforests. Then, two months later at the United Nations climate summit in Bali, Norway committed to donate NOK 3 billion annually to prevent tropical deforestation, which made Norway the leading global donor in what has become the REDD+ mechanism. This was going to be financially supporting the establishment of multilateral REDD+ programmes: the UN-REDD Programme and the World Bank´s Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).

Lars Løvold, the general manager of Rainforest Foundation Norway and the chair of Friends of the Earth Norway, Lars Haltbrekken, met in September 2007 to write a letter to Jens Stoltenberg, and other ministers in the government of the time. This letter focused on how climate action was critical, and how one driver of the increasing GHG emission were from tropical deforestation and degradation. Further, it focused on how the prevention of tropical deforestation was a cheap and important mitigation effort option. Hermansen (2015) argued that close contact with policy makers in the process ensured legitimacy and credibility for the proposal. Another important aspect for the initiative's rapid progression was that it came in the middle of the run-up to the negotiations of a cross-political climate settlement in the Norwegian Parliament. Haltbrekken and Løvold engaged in raising awareness regarding the climate issue, collaborating with media to shape the public opinion towards this issue (Hermansen, 2015). This was part of shaping national attitude towards taking action that would put pressure on Norwegian politicians to act (Hermansen, 2015). In addition, a lot of resources and time would be used to raise their case politically, which included going between meetings and communicating with political parties and ministers (Hermansen, 2015). In spring of 2007, a political disagreement rose in the then red-green coalition government, as they were negotiating on climate policies. Here, the Socialist Left party wanted a more ambitious plan, and the Labour party were the ones who wanted to slow it down. When the paper was ready and presented, it became clear that the opposition wanted a more ambitious climate settlement (Hermansen, 2015). The opposition insisted that three billion NOK be set aside annually to preserve rainforests. In an addendum to the press release the parties

presented a list of measures, where the rainforest issue was among the most important (Hermansen, 2015). The opposition was the first to move towards a large commitment to rainforest policies which is interesting, as the letter was originally sent to politicians in power. Hermansen (2015) argues that there is much to suggest that the comprehensive lobbying Lars & Lars invested in through these months, especially aimed at the opposition, was highly important. This all happened in record time. In other terms, the negotiations about a climate settlement caused a unique policy window to open and make NICFI possible (Hermansen, 2015). The rainforest commitment is one of the most important parts of the climate settlement, at the UN climate summit in Paris December 2015 NICFI was extended to 2030.

All events must be seen against the background with 2007 being a year when public concern and media coverage about climate issues was on top. People wanted action, and the politicians were under pressure to act. The hype began as early as 2006, when the climate documentary film 'An Inconvenient Truth' was released, which was based on former US vice president Al Gore's tour to put the climate issue on people's attention. The same year the Stern report was published. The rainforest proposal was a perfect fit with the Norwegian climate mitigation main approach, which was pursuing large-scale cost-effective emission cutbacks abroad and made it pass swiftly through the governmental machinery (Hermansen, 2015). Knowledge played an important role in making this proposal a reality. Løvold and Haltbrekken appointed themselves to synthesise the knowledge base that the letter depends on, and they chose and mixed knowledge in a way that would fit with their point of view, often referred to as 'cherry picking'. Further, they chose to use some of the most robust, thorough, and formalised knowledge sources to be found, such as the reports by the IPCC and the Stern report (Hermansen, 2015). The funds were taken from the growth in Norway's Official development assistance (ODA) budget, and NIFCI became almost identical to the original proposal from the letter, and the swift response and commitment was initiated and influenced from the outside of the government.

Norway is the largest donor for REDD+ globally. NOK 27,9 billion was allocated to the initiative from 2008 to 2019, mainly channelled through the bilateral and multilateral partners, in addition to civil society organisations (Riksrevisjonen, 201; Norad, 2020). The organ for this is NICFI, and they work towards supporting initiatives and efforts in the REDD+ programme (Regjeringen.no, 2015). This is the largest international climate initiative in Norway, and Norway has pledged to donate up to 3 billion NOK a year towards REDD+

(Riksrevisjonen, 2018; Government of Norway, 2020). Norway has established a framework for REDD+ through NICFI, as they contributed to the negotiations in the UNFCCC and supported efforts to make room for and implement REDD+ in developing countries with tropical forests. As well as accumulating experience and lessons learned from these efforts, the funding is meant to contribute to achieving efficient and effective emission reductions (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). The funding from NICFI main objective is to "reduce and reverse loss of tropical forests contributes to a stable climate, protects biodiversity and enhances sustainable development. The main objective has two sub-goals; (i) contribute to sustainable land use and (ii) contribute to reduced pressure on forests from global markets. ” (The Norwegian Government, 2020).

It is not only Norway who is supporting REDD+. In 2007, the UNFCCC, under the heading of REDD+, included the conservation of forests as a critical factor towards limiting global heating to 1.5 to 2°C (Angelsen 2016). In total, the donors have pledged around USD 10 billion to fund this effort, with over 20 donor countries financing 80 recipient countries (Norman and Nakhooda 2014). However, funding for REDD+ is mainly from Norway, the USA, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom together providing around 77% of funding, with ten countries receiving most of the financing. Norman and Nakhooda (2014) reported that Indonesia and Brazil combined received 35% of allocated funding, and 20% was allocated to global programmes or international research, and just 17% supporting REDD+ activities with the remaining recipient countries. Indonesia, Brazil, Tanzania, and the countries of the Congo Basin (the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo) have been the ones receiving the most. Still, the UN-REDD Programme and World Bank´s FCPF have formally supported 64 national REDD+ strategy processes around the world (Angelsen 2016).

Norway being a wealthy OECD and European Economic Association country with an extensive contemporary extractive industry and having a historically important logging industry and large renewable energy sector, has been recognized as the primary instigator and funder of REDD+. Being the single largest funder of REDD+ (Norman and Nakhooda 2014),

2.2.1 Bilateral Agreements

There are a wide range of individual and institutional actors involved in REDD+, from global to national level, and from the national level into provinces and locals in the recipient countries (Angelsen et al 2009). Bilateral and multilateral development agencies, national ministries of environment, research institutions and individual academics, in addition to private firms, NGOs and journalists have all engaged with REDD+ in the financing countries.

In recipient countries, actors involve: national parliaments and individual members of parliament; presidential offices; ministries of agriculture, energy, planning, forestry and environment; universities and individual academics; provincial-level executives and forestry/national park authorities; national and local NGOs and civil society organisations; individual activists and journalists; consultancy firms and business lobbyists; in addition to the forest owners and users intended to directly benefit via REDD+ payments. This also includes actors scaling from large-scale corporate owners of forestland to villages and individuals holding customary rights to portions of forest. This very wide range of societal actors involved in REDD+ is a massive reason why highly functioning stakeholder communication, coordination and engagement have been considered central to the schemes´ overall success (Angelsen et al 2009). This is also a reason why critics have argued that political disputes at multiple levels hold potential to undermine REDD+ goals.

Below, we will look at the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia, and Norway and Brazil, exploring the similarities and differences between the agreements to see how they have affected the outcomes and results.

2.2.2 REDD+ in Brazil and Indonesia

The bilateral partnership with Brazil was established in 2008, which was the first year of the Norwegian initiative. By the end of 2016, Brazil had received a total of NOK 7.4 billion from NICFI, equivalent to 39 percent of the total payments made through the initiative (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). In March 2004, the Brazilian government initiated a wide range of policies and enforcement actions, which was under the Action Plan for Preservation and

Control of Deforestation in the Amazon, that brought sharp reductions in the deforestation rate. In 2008, Norway and Brazil signed an agreement to receive payments during a 5-year period where the intention was to reduce GHG emissions from deforestation compared to their set reference level. Norway pledged up to US$1 billion in the bilateral agreement. This was a less complicated and hand-off agreement, which included mostly result based results as the country started in phase 3 after having initiated these policies and enforcement actions (Birdsall et al. 2014). However, as a result of this, the agreement lacked guidelines regarding the spending of the funds from Norway compared to the agreement with Indonesia where a third party would have to verify the reduction registered. The funds would be donated to the Amazon Fund, which is managed by the Brazilian National Development Bank and invested in a result-based system to prevent deforestation and to promote the conservation and sustainable use of the Amazon biome (Angelsen,2013).

Brazil is the country with the most tropical rainforest in the world. The Amazon biome stretches nine countries and a total area of 6.4 million km2, where nearly two-thirds (63%) is located within Brazil's national boundaries (May et al. 2016). Since 1988, Brazil's National Institute for Space Research (INPE) has organised an analysis to assess the annual deforestation rate caused by clearcutting in the Legal Amazon via remote sensing and the interpretation of satellite data (INPE 2015). According to this monitoring, annual deforestation rates in the Amazon reached approximately 29,000 km2 in 1995, which represented around 0.8% of the remaining forest cover of nearly 3.7 million km2 (May et al. 2016). Brazil is the country with the most GHG emissions from tropical rainforests (mostly in the form of deforestation) and between 2001-2012 the yearly amount was 1,1 Mt CO2 (Harris and Mann, 2015). Around the time of the agreement, there is a possibility that the ideological view of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was in line with a radical and a left-wing government in Norway. In addition, the Rainforest Foundation acted as an intermediary between the countries. In recent years, Brazil had made changes that showed credibility, such as deforestation having been reduced by 70 percent since 2004 (Angelsen,2017). In 2015, Norway fulfilled its agreement with a payment of NOK 6 billion to Brazil. Brazil and Norway extended the original agreement (2008-2015) until 2020 at COP21 in Paris in 2015. This was due to pleasing deforestation figures in Brazil, with a reduction in deforestation of 75 percent, and the extension was to be based on Brazil's ambitions for continued reduction. Norway would continue its financial support at the current level, and the agreement is conditional on Brazil continuing its success with lowering deforestation (Regjeringen, 2015). As of 2018,

Norway had paid out NOK 8.3 billion (kld, 2018) and is the country with the largest received payment. Brazil can be considered a successful country for REDD + globally as they have managed to reduce deforestation as stated from the Office of the Auditor General (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). This may indicate that the agreement with Brazil has been effective in the first agreement period (2008-2015). Later, on the other hand, deforestation in Brazil increased. Norway is therefore currently withholding NOK 300 million for results in 2018/2019. It can be discussed whether Norway has given Brazil too few guidelines, as a third-party verification of the results is still missing in the agreement between Norway and Brazil. In addition, the national ownership of REDD+ may be weakened by the political change in Brazil and low payments in relation to the forest cover.

The REDD+ bilateral agreement between Norway and Indonesia, came about following the 13th Conference of State Parties of the UNFCCC held in Bali in December 2007 (Glover and Schroeder 2017). Norway launched a flagship initiative to try to halt, or at least slow, the excessive deforestation that for many, many years has haunted Indonesia in 2010, when they were considered as one of the world's current top carbon emitters from land conversion (FAO 2010). The Norwegian government signed an agreement with Indonesia that said Norway would provide up to USD 1 billion if they could prove they had reduced their high carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests and peatlands (Letter of Intent, 2010). In 2009, the Indonesian President Yudhoyono held a speech to G20 leaders in Pittsburgh stating that the Indonesian government would work towards cutting carbon emissions by 26% by 2020 from the business-as-usual levels. It was planned to be done through a mix of policies to invest in renewable energy and curb deforestation and land use changes (Williams, 2021). The deal between Norway and Indonesia was referred to as the "single most significant game-changer for the Indonesian forest sector in the past 25 years" (Seymour 2012), as the Norwegian Letter of Intent provided tangible and necessary foreign financial support for Indonesia´s ambitious carbon emission cuts.

Indonesia is home to the world's third largest tropical forest area after the Brazilian Amazon and Congo Basin (NICFI 2018). UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) statistics for 1990 shows Indonesia's forests covering just over 118 million ha (FAO 2018). Notwithstanding the vast scale of this forest area, the fast rate at which it has been converted to other land uses over the past three decades has caused alarm among scientists, NGOs and policymakers alike. A simple comparison of the same FAO data from 1990 with that from

2015 neatly demonstrates the scale of the deforestation challenge. By 2015 Indonesia´s forest cover was down by approximately 27 million ha to around 91 million ha (FAO 2018). In terms of carbon emissions from net forest conversion, the FAO calculates that in 1990 Indonesia emitted just over 1 million gigagrams of CO_2 equivalent (FAO 2018). By 2015, the FAO calculated carbon emissions from net forest conversion had fallen, but to place Indonesia´s apparent recent reductions in carbon emissions specifically from forest conversion in their proper perspective, it is important to recognize that the country still ranks among the world's highest overall producers of greenhouse gas emissions (NICFI 2018).

In this section I have used existing literature to show how Norway became an important contributor and part of REDD+ after pledging to donate 3 billion NOK yearly. NICFI was established after political and public pressure, as the focus on deforestation was high on the agenda, and the two experts hit an open window into stressing the importance of funnelling funds towards the fight against deforestation. Norway has several collaborations with tropical forests, where they are making agreements directly with the receiving countries, where their regulations and rules are integrated into bilateral agreements. We have seen how the bilateral agreements with Brazil and Indonesia were developed differently. Brazil could demonstrate a decrease in deforestation initially, and developed an agreement which had fewer guidelines and rules, compared to Indonesia who was at the very start of getting policies towards deforestation in place.

2.3 How REDD+ has Evolved (Compared to How it was Planned)

As the programme receives more funding from ODA budgets, it fell into line with developmental aid, and not environmental aid. The debate surrounding this, and what kind of aid REDD+ is, is addressed in this section. Further, the trend of deforestation during the time that REDD+ has been running is presented, along with the achievements, and lack of them for the programme. Lastly, it looks at the issues with carbon leakage connected with reference levels, and how they are constructed, and the need for political stability attending countries to ensure progress. This section will lay out how REDD+ has been implemented and evolved, often in contrasting ways to how it was envisioned. This is important to understand so that future programmes can be better structured or can be made more efficient. A controversial, and often problematic, feature of Norway's REDD+ funding is the fact that it has come from developmental aid budgets.

Traditionally, developmental aid has been aimed at securing key necessities, increasing economic growth and reducing poverty (Gibson et al. 2005). Over the years, new varieties of aid have been brought to life, Hicks et al. (2008) argues that an essential debate from the 1990s has been on how environmental aid could be placed into the broader context of aid. Official Development Assistance (ODA), it the commonly known term for aid today (Tarp, 2010). There has been a debate going since the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, regarding that the environmental aid should not be taken from the ODA budget, which is mainly focusing on welfare and poverty reduction (Hicks et al. 2008). Environmental aid would come in addition to this. It sparks a discussion if a developing country should prioritise economic development or environmental safeguarding, which is a complicated discussion as environmental aid confronts challenges such as deforestation and climate change and fighting this is of global interest. However, an issue is that economies in developing countries often depend on the natural resources available such as forests and mines, meaning that economic growth can be hindered by forest conservation (Hicks et al. 2008; Dunlap and York 2012). As there is a close link between economic growth and environmental protection. It has inspired a great deal of scholars to look for a middle ground, where an ideal situation is to create economic growth while sustaining environmental protection. Environmental aid includes climate change which is one of the fastest growing forms of environmental aid over the last years (Hicks et al. 2008).

Angelsen (2017) claims that REDD+ has developed into result-based aid (RBA) which stems from conditional aid. This has been used as a tool to induce policy reform (Angelsen, 2016). Today the programme is funded by carbon markets and international funding primarily from development aid budgets (Angelsen, 2016). This is result-based aid, where funding is not transferred until after proven results (UN REDD, 2021). One of the aims of this is to signal that the forest and natural resources are worth more unmined and standing, in the hope that the private sector will see opportunities or green investments and themselves become part of the solution. The plus sign (+) is an indicator that a forest has more to offer than just storing carbon, it has many goods, so REDD+ would be part of the solution to lifting people out of poverty.

Previous programs and projects that targeted reducing deforestation and degradation failed to meet their goals when they focused on a biophysical outcome and had paid no attention to the

social, institutional, and political surroundings in which the programs and projects were being implemented (Sunderlin et al., 2016). The primary focus of the REDD+ implementation is on the carbon benefits, but to have any impact, attention needs to be given to equity concerns and benefits to the local population. The policies for marketing of forest carbon, results-based payments and large-scale financing are innovative and in addition to the previously existing policy measures like prohibition of illegal logging (Sunderlin et al., 2016). But the outcome of these new policies is still very uncertain. Angelsen (2016) claims that the issues experienced with result-based aid have hardly been addressed in REDD+, and that advantages do not have enough empirical research. Sunderlin et al. (2016) also claim that REDD+ is experimental and that not much is known about what results it will generate and how.

More than a decade after the programme started, substantial impacts of reduced forest loss have been difficult to document. The REDD+ idea has prompted huge expectations regarding a method which included results-based incentives for reducing deforestation and degradation. The hope was to succeed in areas where other methods had failed. Many countries, over 50, have initiated REDD+ strategies and subnational governments have experimented with jurisdictional REDD+ programs, and more than 350 REDD+ projects have been implemented over the world (Duchelle et al.,2018). Meaning that a lot of money has flooded to and from the programme. Looking at it from the outside, it could look like a success. However, it is hard to find measurable impacts of deforestation (Angelsen et al. 2016; Angelsen, 2019). The global forest rate has slowed, but forest cover globally is decreasing (FAO, 2020). FAO (2020) estimates a worldwide forest loss of 420 million ha through deforestation since 1990, and also discusses that the rate of forest loss has declined. The annual rate of deforestation was estimated at 10 million ha from 2015 to 2020, a decrease from 12 million ha in 2010–2015 (FAO, 2020).

Deforestation is continuing to be a serious problem and slowing it down is a massive challenge and task. The global forests are shrinking by an average of 4.7 million hectares per year (FAO, 2020). Research done towards REDD+ suggests that there are both strengths and weaknesses linked to the programme. Sassi (2014) argues that there are many measures that have led to optimism and pessimism towards the capacity to fulfil the programmes multiple goals. Still, it has been a kind of stimulant for more research and capacity building for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). Further, REDD+ has enhanced the efforts to define forest tenure and motivate evolvement of national regulations on the rights and

distribution of carbon revenue (Sassi et al., 2014). REDD+ became a part of the Paris Agreement (Angelsen, 2019), which was a goal for NICFI and can be viewed as a huge milestone as this kept the discussion around forest conservation a hot topic amongst the world leaders. This is the case as REDD+ has massively contributed to raising tropical forest awareness in the international climate agenda and the program can be viewed as being a valuable contribution to developing national policies towards forest conservation in developing countries. Even though the national policy reforms and individual projects have varied in positive and negative results, it has led to some moderate and positive effects in relation to forest conservation (Angelsen, 2019). Even with these positive results, Angelsen et al. (2018) argue that there is broad consensus that REDD+ has not met the global expectations. Angelsen et al (2018) further explains that evaluations show that forest loss is high and on the rise. Results-based payments has proven to not be quick and easy to implement, another issue being that REDD+ have not received the funding it needs. Still, REDD+ has catalysed other approaches to protecting and restoring tropical forests and has improved forest governance in many developing countries. REDD+ has provided a platform for indigenous peoples and other marginalised groups to voice their concerns and ideas and gain more visibility on the domestic and global stage (Angelsen et al, 2018).

In a study to identify the enabling conditions for achieving progress in the implementation of an effective, efficient and equitable REDD+, Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2017) examined national policy settings in a comparative analysis across 13 countries with a focus on both institutional context and the actual setting of the policy arena. The evaluation revealed that participating countries were showing some progress, but some face backlashes in realising the necessary transformational change to tackle deforestation and forest degradation. Brockhaus (2017) argues that the main benefit of REDD+ was the creation of forest monitoring capacity. It was proved that this reduced risk for indigenous people and civil society organisations, due to them no longer having to monitor and report physically from the forest. It made it easier to hold leaders obliged for their responsibilities. Still, Brockhaus claims that REDD+ has due to tackling of deforestation yet to deliver on more accurately avoided carbon emissions (Devschooluea, 2017).

2.3.1 Criticism of REDD+

In a report from the Office of the Auditor General, it states that the results generated from REDD+ to this date have been uncertain and how they are delayed (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). One issue of concern is directed to the main motivation of the REDD+, impeding the evaluations of its outcome, which is carbon leakage. To be able to measure emission reductions under REDD+, a national reference level (RL) needs to be set as a benchmark when evaluating results. Every developing country is invited to submit their national reference level to the UNFCCC based on IPCC Reporting Guidelines which needs to be in accordance with national circumstances and capabilities (Hargita et al., 2015). There are no standard methods on how to calculate each country's RL, meaning that each country who submits their national RL to the UNFCCC - guided by the IPCC reporting guidelines, has some flexibility on how they choose to do so.

Carbon leakage is a universal phenomenon in climate mitigation which appears at all levels of implementation. This is of particular concern in the case of REDD+, where reduced deforestation in one geographical area can lead to an increase in forest loss in another area (Streck, 2021). It happens when destructive activities with economic gains are moved to other locations due to local REDD+ projects, a common one being that logging is transferred to another part of the forest which is not included in the REDD+ project. Streck (2021) explains how going into a national REDD+ program could limit the risk of this occurring within the country. The issue of carbon leakage is being raised in the report from the auditor and viewed as a big risk. Up till 2018, the implementation of REDD+ has unfortunately been proven to be weaker on a national level in countries with tropical forests (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). There is a case study from the report, which discusses how the Brazilian part of the Amazon has been receiving payment for emission reductions, even though forests across much of the country are not included in the calculations (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). This creates a general widespread concern over the real climatic impact of REDD+ and Norway’s contribution. A research report from 2016 shows that the Cerrado, representing half of the Amazon in terms of area, had greenhouse gas emissions from changes in land use and deforestation equal to those of the Amazon. However, the Brazilian authorities could not provide any detailed information concerning deforestation in the Cerrado or other forested areas in Brazil (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

Another challenge is linked to the sustainability of results gained by the programme, due to carbon being captured in the trees temporarily. Unfortunately, there is no real guarantee that this stored carbon will not be emitted due to potential economic destructive activities or natural hazards. Leakage must be managed and monitored at different scales:nationally through well-designed REDD+ policies and internationally through demand-side standards in countries importing forest-risk commodities and locally through avoided deforestation projects that address local drivers of deforestation (Streck, 2021).

A further issue is the program's dependence on funding from donor countries, meaning that it becomes reliant on political stability within the donor countries to ensure continuity. If there are political changes within a donor country, it may lead to cuts in funding for forest countries. Further, if there are political changes in the recipient countries, it may cause a huge risk to the continuity of the results. Brazil is a good example of this. Butler (2020) reports how deforestation began to reverse in 2004 up to 2010 in the Amazon rainforest due to increased law enforcement, monitoring, protected areas and microeconomic trends. A turning point was when the hard-right Jair Bolsonaro became president in Brazil in 2019, which was bad news for the indigenous people and the environment (Wallace, 2019). His anti-environmental discourse and focus on economic growth are destroying the Amazon. His mindset is that Brazil's indigenous people control too much of the land which is filled with rich resources, and this hinders economic development. Silva jr. et al. (2020) illustrate how political processes from 2019 had a severe impact on Maranhao, a state in northeast Brazil. The region experienced an increase in illegal deforestation and fire rates, 25% of its remaining forest cover (6,038km2) had already been degraded by these activities between 2007 and 2019 (Silva jr. et al, 2020). Canineu and Carvalho (2020) refer to a study undertaken by Brazil's national space research agency (INPE) that warns that these accelerated destructive activities will drive the Amazon towards a tipping point from which it cannot recover, potentially turning it into a dry savannah and releasing billions of tons of stored carbon. They threaten the security of the indigenous people, who now need to defend their forest in the absence of appropriate laws (Canineu and Carvalho, 2020).

REDD+ policies and local governance for green development may be changed or affected in a negative way when there is a change in political leadership if not sufficiently institutionalised (Sassi et al., 2014). The uncertainties in connecting with what the programme provides or adds is linked to what REDD+ should be credited for, and to the potential risk that the

reduced carbon emissions would have provided if there were no REDD+ payments (Bayrak & Marafa, 2016). One issue is that Brazil as early as in 2008 had already reached a substantial decrease in deforestation, a time prior to Norway starting their REDD+ bilateral agreement (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). In the years to follow deforestation stabilised during the partnership, however, there have been difficulties to further reduce deforestation. To pinpoint in an exact way how much of Brazil's decline in deforestation that can be credited to REDD+, is therefore almost impossible to state.

2.3.2 ART-TREES

As a response to the difficulties and issues the original programme has experienced with carbon leakage and the result based payments, new rules and framework have been developed even further. The new ART-TREES standard has come as a result of this, also referred to as Jurisdictional REDD+.

Jurisdictional REDD+ programs (JR) are designed to reduce emission over the full political jurisdictions of nations, states or provinces where governments have an important role. Jurisdictional REDD+ has hitherto been financed through results-based-payments, bilateral agreements, contracts with the government donors. The jurisdictions' payment is dependent on the verified emissions reductions measured against a jurisdiction-wide baseline. After the jurisdictional REDD+ standards called ART-TREES was completed, the market for verified JR emissions reduction credits could generate a new source of funding for tropical forest jurisdictions that are making the effort towards transition to forest-friendly development.

The Architecture for REDD+ Transactions (ART) wants to incentivize and motivate governments to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), as well as restore forests and protect intact forests (+), similar to the "standard" REDD+ (ART REDD, 202). The main aim is still to recognise countries with emission reductions from slowing, halting and reversing forest cover and maintaining forest carbon stocks. Further, be steady with the decisions, framework and standards from the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP), including Paris agreement, Cancún Safeguards and Warsaw Framework for REDD+. Including promotion of national ambition to Paris Agreement goals towards the fulfilment of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). And demonstrate environmental integrity

through accounting for uncertainty of data, risk of leakage and reversals, avoid double accounting and results in issued units that are compatible with the units from other sectors. Finally, set a credit baseline for deforestation and degradation that originally reflect historical emission levels and consequently decline periodically to require higher ambition over time (ART REDD, 2020).

The requirement is set out by the REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard (TREES) for "the quantification, monitoring, and reporting of GHG emissions and removals, presentation of implementation of the Cancún Safeguards (described below under safeguards), and verification, registration, and issuance of TREES credits. TREES has been designed to ensure that all TREES credits issued are real, measured, permanent, additional, net of leakage, verified by an accredited independent third party, and are not double counted. TREES credits will therefore represent high quality while still making room for flexibility for implementation of REDD+ programs at a national level or subnational as an interim measure" (ART REDD, 2020). Here, "ART is the institution. It means "Architecture for REDD+ Transactions" and was established in 2018 to produce a viable standard for REDD+ carbon credits at a jurisdictional scale. It is backed by Norway and runs as an independent organisation within the Arkansas-based non-profit Winrock International. It has a secretariat, a board, and technical committees staffed by many of the world's leading experts on deforestation and forest finance. TREES is the rulebook. It means "the REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard" and is ART's raison d'être, a framework that seeks to lay down rigorous, clear guidelines for quantifying, monitoring, and verifying carbon credits across large swaths of land" (ART REDD, 2020).

REDD+ is a step further than traditional conditional aid, as it focuses on the social and political aspect as well as forest conservation. During the lifespan of the programme, many countries have contributed with funding and initiated REDD+ strategies, however, it has been hard to find measurable impacts of deforestation. Deforestation rates are high and result based payments have been difficult to implement due to many conditions and regulations. On a positive note, REDD+ has improved forest policy in many countries. To measure and verify results, there was a need to set reference levels. This was developed unevenly, with different conditions, which has led to carbon leakage. Political instability has also provided some issues, when Bolsonaro became president in Brazil he had a different view on forest policy which increased deforestation. The new ART-TREES standard was created as a response to

the insecurities with carbon leakage, where the main idea is to ensure quality and verified carbon credits.

Safeguarding is an important part of the REDD+ programme, integral to ensuring that projects do what they set out to do. However, this is a difficult task, and it is a widespread theme. The next section will therefore discuss the literature on safeguarding and the importance of secure land.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

As this topic is relevant, I have focused on concepts. There are three main concepts discussed in this thesis, safeguarding, defining what a result is and collaboration between practitioners and experts in the context of REDD+. This section will define and describe the three different ideas for the analysis. I have chosen to focus on these concepts because I thought both safeguards and results are two integral parts of REDD+ which are difficult to measure and wanted to discover more about how these created complications in agreements. I have also focused on collaboration because I was interested in discovering the extent to which experts and practitioners work together, and how better collaboration could lead to more effective projects.

To understand the role of safeguarding in REDD+, certain linked factors need to be highlighted. How are these safeguards being implemented, and what does a country need to secure, to be able to ensure conservation of the natural forest and the rights of the local communities and the indigenous people, which are central in the safeguards.

2.4.1 Defining Safeguarding

For this thesis, I have defined forest carbon and REDD+ safeguards, and safeguard system, as "a set of principles, rules and procedures put in place to achieve social and environmental goals" (World bank, n.d). Principles and rules are towards safeguards' substantive elements, for example protection of indigenous rights and biodiversity. The procedures define the task of implementing, monitoring, and enforcing safeguards, like compliance assessments or safeguard information systems. Safeguards in the context of foreign assistance and investment

are most associated with planning and implementing investment projects by multilateral development banks (MDBs). The World Bank's safeguard policies "…require that potentially adverse environmental impacts and selected social impacts of Bank investment projects should be identified, minimised, and mitigated." (World bank, n.d). Safeguards provide a mechanism for integrating environmental and social matters into decision-making, and the World Bank's safeguard policies states:

"(a) potentially adverse environmental impacts affecting the physical environment, ecosystem functions and human health, and physical cultural resources, as well as specific social impacts, should be identified and assessed early in the project cycle;

(b) unavoidable adverse impacts should be minimised or mitigated to the extent feasible;

(c) timely information should be provided to stakeholders, who should have the opportunity to comment on both the nature and significance of impacts and the proposed mitigation measures" (World bank, n.d).

REDD+ safeguards and forest carbon projects were created to make sure that a certain project or program does not conflict with its own long-term climate and forest goals in addition to maximising wider sustainable development and social and environmental protection benefits. The REDD+ safeguards have been developed, and with that their purpose and detached criteria of 'do no harm' underlying much of the environmental impact assessment requirements from private financiers, national legislation and the public, has evolved to more proactive 'do good' principles to shine a light on the long-term social and environmental co-benefits of REDD+ (Roe et al. 2013).

There are different opinions regarding the correct emphasis of REDD+ safeguards. 'Do no harm' defenders argue that the main goal of REDD+ is climate change mitigation, therefore safeguards should serve to mitigate risks – that includes social risks to populations living in affected areas, legal risks to the state or responsible project developers and certifiers, environmental risks to the forest areas and linked ecosystems and biodiversity, or financial risks to funders and/or investors. This kind of approach will give countries the flexibility to manage decisions related to positive social and environmental co-benefits instead of mandating them. However, 'do good' defenders think that REDD+ should not only reduce net greenhouse gas emissions, but also improve the welfare of forest communities and

biodiversity, having the mindset that REDD+ will not succeed or get legitimacy otherwise (Roe et al. 2013).

Finally, the jurisdictional mechanisms that refer to REDD+ and forest carbon initiatives that target a national or subnational governance unit, such as a region or a province. Jurisdictional systems are usually implemented in coordination with public sector entities. In the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia, and Norway and Brazil, conditions and rules related to safeguards have been negotiated. In addition to this, for a country to be eligible for receiving result-based payments, they must have implemented the Cancun safeguards in the required way.

When undertaking REDD+ activities the following safeguards should be promoted and supported:

1. *That actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements;*
2. *Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty;*
3. *Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;*
4. *The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this decision;*
5. *That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, ensuring that the actions referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits, taking into account the need for sustainable livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries, reflected in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as the International Mother Earth Day.*
6. *Actions to address the risks of reversals;*

7. *Actions to reduce displacement of emissions.*

UNFCCC (2011) Decision 1/CP.16, Annex I, paragraph 2.

Secure and fixed land tenure rights is viewed as one of the key elements for successful conditional payment schemes targeted at conservation of forests. Not only to compensate the ones who are directly protecting the forest, but also to protect the local communities and the ingenious people and avoid insecure land distribution (Larson et al. 2013; Andersson et al. 2018). In an evaluation conducted by Sassi et al. (2014) 23 sites working with REDD+ projects were included; tenure was identified as the critical challenge toward getting the projects established. There are many diverse difficulties and challenges in connection to tenure. Firstly, the main point of REDD+ is to get important shareholder to protect tropical forests through the arrangement of result-based winnings. It is therefore of high priority for REDD+ to determine the rightful managers of owners of the land. Structures and system make this central as it is a characteristic element of many tropical forests countries that tenure is insecure and contested (Sassi et al. 2014). This outcome resulted from previously stated state allotments of rights to forests, alongside a legacy of powerful actors taking advantage of forests lands and resources at the expense of the people living there (Sassi et al., 2014).

REDD+ has been met with controversy. Larson et al. (2013) discusses how focused attention to the drivers of deforestation requires challenging interests towards keeping things as they are, that lead to forest conversion. There is a wide range of interests that seek to preserve commercial access to forest lands and resources and therefore often promote forest transformation (Larson et al. 2013). Some of these actors have been interested by the possible economic benefits of REDD+, still, it is not surprising that others resist the change. Indigenous and other rural communities and their supporters have raised objections, particularly in relation to the potential risks of land grabbing by outsiders and loss of local user rights to forests and forest land (Larson et al. 2013). Larson et al. (2013) states that important factors in connection with REDD+ are:

•*The essence of REDD+ is to reward those who maintain or enhance the carbon sequestration of forests and compensate them for lost opportunities; this includes direct payment schemes, which require not only clear rights to land but also the ability to*

demonstrate exclusion rights, which includes the right and means to prevent third parties from changing land cover.

•The right holders to forest carbon must be held accountable in the event that they fail to fulfil their obligation – the 'conditional' part of conditional incentives.

•When tenure is unclear or not formalised, forest people may be excluded from forests and/or from participation in REDD+ benefits; also, if REDD+ increases the value of standing forests, it may lead to a resource rush that places the rights of current residents at risk.

•REDD+ will inevitably prohibit certain uses of forest resources; this must be done with due process and compensation, and without increased hardship, for poor forest peoples" (Larson et al., 2013).

This is an important requirement for REDD+, and significant attention should be given to resolving tenure conflict and clarifying tenure rights in REDD+ strategies. However, research suggests that progress is not at the pace it should be (Larson et al. 2013).

Andersson et al (2018), did household survey and collected data from 130 villages in 6 countries, here they assessed how the current wealth inequality relates to tenure security and benefit flows from forest use. They found that villages which had higher wealth inequality would report lower security in tenure and unequal distribution of forest income and externally sourced income. They also found that richer people within villages took an excessively large share of the forest benefits available to each village, while external income often benefitted poorer individuals more. These findings suggest that unless future forest conservation interventions actively work to mitigate inequalities linked to existing forest benefit flows, there is a risk that activities under REDD+ will reproduce or even aggravate pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities within user groups, potentially undermining both their economic objectives and conservation (Andersson et al. 2018).

This next section discusses the theory behind the role of knowledge in policy processes and formalisation and separation. As this thesis focuses mainly on collaboration between practitioners and experts, it allows for an insight into what certain methods of collaboration look like.

2.4.2 Results

REDD+ has shown us that 'results' are not necessarily easy concepts to define or measure. It is difficult to define what a result is in this context as the result-based payment is connected to the amount of reduced or saved carbon, but the agreement also says something about safeguards. There is also the fact that the receiving country has to be in phase 3, meaning they are eligible to receive result based payments. Further, they have the right policies in place before one can progress towards the payments. Here, I am going to explain how one can view a result, in the context of REDD+, and if funding from the ODA budget could be in the way of reaching the desired results.

Several factors and expectations have been corrected since the program was first agreed on in 2007. Angelsen et al. (2016 and 2018) discuss how one factor is that the carbon market did not manifest as hoped, which led to bilateral and multilateral development ODA budgets becoming the main source of funding. And also, REDD+ has developed from its original where it was first being only focused on carbon, to further include concerns about poverty, livelihoods, adaptation, indigenous rights, biodiversity, and good governance included as relevant parts (Angelsen et al. 2016). Finally, the focus has been adjusted from Payment for Environmental Services (PES) towards a wider set of national policies linked to forest conservation over time. This has been important and critical to make actual change, but it has proven to be extremely tricky to create and implement a functional system which rewards the rightfully groups or individual directly for their effort towards reducing emissions and protecting the forest (Angelsen et al. 2016). Result- based payment is viewed as one of the main significant concepts in REDD+.

To be able to measure emission reductions under REDD+, a national reference level (RL) needs to be set as a benchmark when evaluating results. Every developing country is invited to submit their national reference level to the UNFCCC based on IPCC Reporting Guidelines which needs to be in accordance with national circumstances and capabilities (Hargita et al., 2016). There have been no standard methods on how to calculate each country's RL, meaning that each country who submits their national RL to the UNFCCC - guided by the IPCC reporting guidelines, has some flexibility on how they choose to do so.

At this point, most countries focus on deforestation, and are mostly estimating emissions based on carbon stocks per unit area and the area of land changing from forest to non-forest

(FAO 2019). Certain countries estimate emissions from forest degradation, and some are estimating carbon sequestration from reforestation or forest management. Maniatis et al. (2019) explains how the forest reference levels are normally created by estimating and calculating an historical average level of emissions and further using this as a proxy for expected future emissions. For countries to receive results-based payments, they must report their calculated reduced emissions below their set reference level. Further, Williams (2021) discusses that a measure to avoid over-crediting is to use values or assumptions for conservative estimates that are more likely to underestimate, rather than overestimate, emission reductions. Scholars argue that the uncertainties in estimates of net emissions in the forest sector can be at decent size, which makes it difficult for countries to show performance statistically detectable from the reference level (Williams, 2021).

The majority of the results-based payment incentives include mechanisms that deducts payments due to uncertainty in emissions estimates, meaning that payments are created for a certain amount of estimated decrease in emission (Angelsen 2017). Still, to keep the incentives for countries alive to continue mitigation efforts, at the same time as working for transparent reporting, these programs will conduct payments even when huge uncertainties are present. At times, the focus of the penalties is only to try to motivate efforts towards reducing underlying uncertainties. To prove that deforestation levels have been reduced is complicated. There are guidelines regarding how to report and verify results in connection with carbon reductions, but these do not always consider other relevant aspects, such as changes in political willingness towards creating important policies, or shifts in overall attitude towards deforestation in important forest countries. This is further complicated by REDD+ being funded through aid budgets meaning it becomes not only about paying for results, but also the conditionalities and rules associated with aid. This prompts discussions related to what a result is, and if being funded by the ODA budget could hinder desired results, which will be addressed in the result chapters.

2.4.3 Knowledge's Role in Policy Processes - Collaborative Models

Collaborate agreements come in a number of different forms. Understanding the model(s) at play in REDD+ agreements will help us to analyse successes and failures. According to Young et al. (2002), there are five sets of assumptions or models which discuss knowledge's

role in policy processes. The ones who will be addressed here are called the interactive model, political/tactical model, and the enlightenment model. These models are of varying significance to REDD+ agreement but are nonetheless useful to understand in order to contextualise the findings or my interviews with experts and practitioners.

The interactive model contrasts strongly with both in presenting a much more subtle and complex series of relationships between decision-makers and researchers. It portrays research and policy as jointly influential, and that certain researchers will be influential. The archetype is the academic who grasps and understands policy problems which enable them to propose new solutions. In my interviews with experts, it was easy to get an idea regarding who could see issues and goals of the initiative from the practitioner's standpoint. More than half would explain what would be challenging or what opportunities that were present for the practitioners due to them understanding the policy problems.

The political/tactical model sees policy as the outcome of a political process. This model looks at the research agenda as politically driven. The studies are commissioned to support the position adopted by the government of the time, or a certain minister. Every four or eight years, Norway gets a new government with different political priorities. This also affects how funding towards research is targeted and what field that is being prioritised. This means that when funding towards research is in a way earmarked and awarded to relevant research proposals in line with the political priorities, research agenda can become politically driven. It has been discussed that the bureaucracy can influence evaluation processes and results through a narrow assignment description, frameworks for the data basis, and input during the process and comments on completed draft reports (Thue et al., 2022). Further, it is being discussed how politicians and practitioners can in various ways influence the result of the work of public committees (Hesstvedt & Christensen, 2021). This can happen in connection with the balance of committees, where politicians can assign experts who have views in line with the government's own priorities. The practitioners can in turn influence the work of the expert groups through an unclear distinction between professional guidance and political interests. In a review of the quality of government studies from 2019, ministries and underlying entities believe that political guidance is one of the greatest challenges in terms of the quality of the reports. The report concludes that the greatest weakness in government

studies is related to the requirement in the assessment instruction to consider several alternative measures (Thue et al., 2022).

The enlightenment model is one that portrays research as standing or at least a little distant from the midst of immediate policy concerns. The benefits of research are indirect instead of handing it directly to policy agendas. This kind of research does not address a problem directly, but sort of in the landscape and context for decision makers. Later we will see how this is relevant for issues concerning deforestation and protecting the rainforests.

These models will prove useful in later sections for understanding the collaboration between researchers and policy makers in Norway's REDD+ agreements between Brazil and Indonesia and will help to explain how these collaborations differ under varying circumstances.

2.4.4 Formalisation and Separation

Formalisation and separation can be seen as a systematic basis for interpreting approaches to summarising science for climate policy. Formalisation and separation provide important possibilities for how collaboration between practitioners and experts could work in the context of REDD+. When conducting research in connection to REDD+, important findings and recommendations should be summarised and presented to the practitioners. In this section I will lay out these as concepts and will in later chapters refer back to this when discussing issues raised in my research. To try to understand how science and research are being presented for policy and development purposes, I will use the method presented by Sundqvist et al. (2015). Here the idea is to bring together the discussions that usually take place in parallel, the question of how to deal with formalisation and separation. Formalisation refers to efforts at structuring and controlling the procedures adopted in this domain of practice by means of standards, guidelines, and protocols. The other part, Separation, concerns the boundary between science and policy that is established when research is summarised for policy purposes regarding who should be involved, and in what capacity.

Sundqvist et al. (2015) discusses how formalisation and separation are two fundamental dimensions of any attempt to summarise science for policy purposes. They provide the example of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),

which demonstrates the challenge of transforming the research findings assembled by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) into practical policies. The absence of policy response might be seen as indicating that the scientific evidence is not presented persuasively enough to policymakers (Hulme et al., 2010). This shows that there is a need for a more informal, closer collaboration to gain a common understanding, both for researchers who are creating scientific evidence for policymakers, and for the policymakers to clearly state what they need.

Sundqvist et al. (2015) argues that there are varied arguments for and against formalisation and separation. Separation, for example, might be viewed as arguing that scientific expertise should be kept away from contact with the policy world, until the best scientific view has been set; at which stage the two sets of actors ought to be brought together. Still, it is recognised that policy actors pay more attention to certain people's work which they know and trust. Also, scientists and experts who have a certain close contact with the policy world could be expected to have a level of insight and be able to communicate effectively with policy audiences. Sundqvist et al. (2015) discuss how these considerations imply that separation may be self-defeating, in the way it is separating scientists off from their policymaking peers. The situation can be said to be similar for formalisation. Formalist approaches appear to have the benefit of being more uniform, reliable and universalistic (Sundqvist et al. 2015). Not all knowledge can be formalised to the same degree, and it might be more instructive for policymakers faced with non-routine phenomena to turn to the expert judgement of an experienced scientist than to a regular scientific professional following a codified procedure (Sundqvist et al., 2015). Haas (2007) has claimed that scientific standpoint should be kept apart from policy deliberations until they have reached a certain stage. The institutional framing of the science–policy interplay should be characterised by separation before this. Science needs to be detached from policy when setting its research agenda and when establishing consensus for it to be effective and influential (Haas, 2007). Haas (2007) argues the IPCC work of this is a good example of this. In the moment when separation between policy and science is lost, scientific controversies are fed, leading to science losing a lot of its value.

A relevant example of summarisation in practice is how, in 2010, the EU stepped up its programme on climate change, establishing a Directorate-General for Climate Action under the Directorate-General for the Environment (DG Environment). The EC has initiated many

measures to summarise environmental research for policy, from ‘Science meets policy workshops’, ‘Bridging the gap conferences’ and ‘Science for Environment Policy’ (SfEP). The latter being a news and information service ‘designed to help the busy policymaker keep up-to-date with the latest environmental research findings needed to design, implement and regulate effective policies (Sundqvist et al., 2015). SfEP may be referred to as ‘abstracting and indexing services’ or to as secondary sources, where abstracts and summaries of primary publications available to users are made. Sundqvist et al., (2015) discuss how the SfEP review process starts with an editorial team from the Science Communication Unit at the University of the West of England in Bristol, who scan a range of reviewed journals for potential studies suitable for the service. In order to ensure quality and policy relevance, the proposed articles are evaluated by a scientific advisory group containing 15 scientists whom are responsible for making the decision to include an article in the news alerts. If the articles are found to be fitting, science writers popularise their content into brief summaries like factsheets at a length of approximately one page, including a link to the original publication. Finally, authors are asked to approve the summary written for their article (Sundqvist et al., 2015).

This last example highlights a successful case of collaboration between researchers and policy makers. This, and other forms of collaboration are vital for the success of policy, and realising such collaboration in practice is, as we will see in later chapters, not always easy.

The above discussion of safeguarding, results, and collaborative models will be used as a collaborative framework for analysing REDD+ in the discussion of my qualitative research below. These concepts relate directly to my chosen research questions, and the understanding I have gained from carrying out this review of the academic discourse surrounding these important areas has shaped the direction my research project has taken. These concepts will provide a constant framework for understanding the findings of my qualitative research.

3.0 Qualitative Research Design

The above discussion of existing academic theory shaped the direction my research would take. The three research questions that I aim to address in this thesis are;

- How is safeguarding being monitored and secured under the verification of "results"?

- How do the Norwegian ODA rules and regulations affect progress towards results in the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia and Norway and Brazil?
    - What led to the ending of the agreement between Norway and Indonesia?

- How are REDD+-related practitioners and experts in Norway interacting or collaborating in terms of sharing knowledge and building a common understanding?

I choose to conduct a qualitative research design due to the aim to analyse perceptions and understandings among experts and practitioners. The practitioners and experts who work closely with the REDD+ initiative practically and through research are involved in various parts of the programme. They all come from different disciplines and departments and have different backgrounds. A few of the other participants were from an advisory board and one from an NGO. A quantitative study would have reached far more people, but it would probably not give me an in-depth understanding of their understandings and perceptions. This is supported by Berg & Lune (2012) who argue that qualitative techniques allow researchers to share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how people structure and give meaning to what they do.

3.1 Reflection

I have always been interested in tropical rainforests, and I have also been lucky enough to spend some time in the Amazon rainforest for a short period of some years ago. In that little time, I got to know some of the local people who lived, in my opinion, in harmony with the forest. I saw them respect the trees, animals, and the river. I was taught that they respected the land as they were dependent on it, and they would be for as long as they lived, and if their children would live there. This is a simplification of reality, a utopia that does not exist. I understand there are factors that are problematic. Still, it was such a contrast to what I saw in

a different part of the forest. After a long hike in the Andes, I entered the rainforest, after walking for 60 minutes I was met by huge machines cutting down the trees. This is also not new, I had heard and read of this. One can also walk into a forest in Norway and find large machines cutting down trees. This was such a massive contrast to my probably naive first impression of the whole ideology of the people of the Amazon village. How could the rainforest be treated so differently? and why were people allowed to cut down something that we all are dependent on? These are some of the things I wanted to find out, as well as what is being done about it. That is when I heard of the REDD+ programme, where Norway was the biggest financial contributor. When narrowing in I understood how complex this whole topic was, and I started thinking that collaboration and common understanding was necessary for this initiative to make a bigger difference. The biases, motivation and reflection around this programme will be addressed further down. I therefore wanted to explore this topic further, and a qualitative research design was the best option for this.

3.1.1 Changes

When I first started this thesis, I wanted to investigate how practitioners used results from research in the development of REDD+. I started out looking at carbon leakage and the monitoring of forest cover. I was interested in, when assessing results, if evidence from heavier rain periods or increased illegal deforestation was taken into the equation. I quickly learned that this was not as relevant for my analysis as I thought. Reasons being technology for monitoring forest are advanced into it being difficult to deforest or move deforestation (also known as carbon leakage) without it being noticed. This is not considering the cost of the monitoring and other issues as it is not detecting the drivers of deforestation to mention some (Guadalupe et al., 2018, Köhl et al., 2019).

I focused on how countries set their reference level, and how that can be problematic when assessing results. This ended up being a smaller part of the analysis than I expected, but it guided me to learn about the newly developed ART-TRESS standard and how the programme has developed from lessons learned, like the issues with different ways of setting reference levels. I eventually realised that I should focus on if there were any collaboration between the practitioners and experts, and if there was any, what that collaboration looked like. Were both sides motivated, and how did they initiate this? The reason why I wanted to look into this is

due to the fact that the funds being spent on this programme, and on research conducted comes from the tax-payer of Norway. I therefore think that practitioners should take research and experts' advice into their development of the programme, and planning. Research and experts can illustrate how the initiatives are progressing and give important advice and information before initiatives are put into place. The safeguarding aspect became more central when I learned that countries had to have safeguarding systems into place before being able to receive result- based finance. I wanted to look into how they were approaching this in their bilateral-agreements. And finally, as I learned this comes from the official development assistance (ODA) funds, I knew I wanted to look into how the ODA rules that follow these funds affect the agreements and the progress.

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

According to Bryman (2016), qualitative interviews tend to be less structured and allow for the questions to follow the conversation and to what I would find relevant for the data collection. And for the interviewee to answer from their point of view. The reason being that I want to find out how practitioners and experts collaborate, in their own opinion, if they believe that the Norwegian aid-rules are a hindrance for the desired outcome of the programme, as well as how they view a result. Further, I also wanted to know how the practitioners were evaluating and monitoring safeguarding, and if there were any differences in opinions regarding how safeguarding should be handled. This is why I chose semi-structured interviews. I made an interview guide with the questions I wanted to ask, but I would pick up and dig into certain topics in the various interviews and ask questions in a different way when necessary.

I managed to schedule the first interview with one of the practitioners in NICFI through one of my co-workers who used to work at the Ministry of Climate and Environment. From there I used the “snowball method”. My first interviewee gave me a different name of someone they thought were relevant for my data collection, and so on. I sent a request for an interview

through email to one of the experts, who agreed to participate. That person would recommend someone else, and it was easy from that point as I was allowed to refer to the already interviewed expert when I contacted other experts.

A total of seven interviews were conducted with the Ministry of Climate and Environment and Norad concerning the management and collaboration of Norway's international climate and forest initiative. I had one interview with the Rainforest Foundation which was later followed up with an additional interview with the same person for further information. Further, I had four interviews with researchers in Norway and two interviews with international experts. Finally, I had one interview with one of the ART secretaries. As this was conducted during the covid pandemic, it made travelling impossible. All interviews were therefore digital and around 45 - 60 minutes long. By conducting these digitally and not in person, I was unable to get the informal information that one often gets 5 minutes before starting a meeting, or 5 minutes after. In my experience, key information, which might not seem relevant to the other part, could end up bringing more insight into a subject.

In my analysis, I will be addressing people from the Ministry of Climate and Environment and Norad as practitioners. The national, and international researchers, the Rainforest Foundation, and the ART secretary will be addressed as experts. This method will help me to answer the research questions as I will hear from the one working directly with the REDD+ programme, and the experts who conduct research on the programme.

3.2.2 Document Analysis

There is a distinction between personal documents and official documents in social research, where the first is considered to be private (not meant for social research) and the latter being state documents (Bryman, 2016). Bryman (2016) argues that documents from the state produce a great deal of information and statistics for social research. In this analysis, I have used official documents from the state, such as Indonesia's letter of intent (LoI) and Brazil's agreements, which will be investigated with a descriptive part and an analysis of how these agreements were developed and the outcome of these agreements. The agreements have been chosen due to the size of the country, hence the importance of creating an agreement that is efficient, and agreements that have been dissolved and the reason why. I want to investigate

why the agreement between Indonesia and Norway was abruptly ended and to assess if the same thing could happen to the collaboration between Norway and Brazil.

In the grant scheme rules presented from NICFI, it is stated that "Potential grant recipients must have a policy in place for combating and counteracting sexual harassment and discrimination and ensure that this policy is implemented in practice. The applicant must have safeguards in place against corruption and negative impacts on women's rights and gender equality, human rights and climate and the environment." (kld, 2018, p. 3). This means that there must be a safeguarding system in place for Indonesia and Brazil before they can receive payments for results. However, as this is result-based payment, based and calculated on actual numeric results, for example x tons Co2 saved, I am curious to learn where safeguarding fits into this, and how this counts towards the end results.

I used the Norwegian International Climate and forest initiative strategy as presented in the Norwegian state budget (prop. 1). This was chosen as it presents results, progress and development from the initiative, and it will give me an insight into if they mention safeguarding or collaboration with experts. I wanted to see what kind of instructions they were given from the government, and where their flexibilities were. Further, I used the NICFI's strategy as presented on their website. I could not find a pure strategy document, hence the reason for using the Norwegian state budget. A part of the method was to try to analyse how the funding, being ODA funds, harmonised or clashed with the international frameworks. The fact that the payment for results is from the development aid fund means that it comes with certain strings attached.

In addition, I used an evaluation from the Office of the Auditor General of Norway to look at their findings and how that finding correlated with the statements of development from the interviews.

3.2.3 Motivation for the Selection

The reason for interviewing the practitioners was to get an insight into how they collect their information, and how they use that information in their bilateral agreements and in the development of the initiative. All the practitioners had different roles and responsibilities and

could give different perspectives concerning my questions. I wanted to understand what rules they were bound by, and where their flexibilities were in terms of answering the question about safeguards and results. To address the research question about collaboration I asked all the interviewees to reflect on the value of closer research - practitioner exchange of knowledge and finding in a more informal way. I ask them to draw on their own experience to provide a fuller picture of current problems and challenges, but also opportunities. Here when I say informal, I mean in the sense of outside yearly conferences or yearly meetings. In addition to this I was interested in how they worked with the challenging theme of safeguarding and how they followed the international frameworks and criteria in their own bilateral agreements. My motivation for talking to both national and international researchers was to get a more varied viewpoint on Norway's contribution to the work related to REDD+. I learned that the Norwegian researchers have had frequent opportunities to work with the practitioners, but I also knew that NICFI had worked with international researchers through evaluations done on the programme. This would give me viewpoints from researchers who had done "ordered" evaluations and research, and researchers who had done independent research.

I work as a bureaucrat myself, where I work with programmes that grant funds. It is on a different scale, but we follow the same rules and regulations as NICFI as it is all public money. I have experienced that the rules and regulations that we must follow, for good reasons, can sometimes get in the way of achieving the desired results. Sometimes it can make it take a lot more time than planned, and at other times it can completely stop a project. I am not going to question the rules and regulations themselves. But I want to know if the rules for development aid funding from Norway can hinder the progress to achieving the goals set in the strategies. Working with programmes has allowed me to understand how practitioners must work, and how things move at a high pace.

Before I started my research, I was interested in exploring how researchers and the government worked together. The Norwegian government, through the Norwegian research council, spends NOK 11 423 million every year on research and innovation (Forskningsrådet, n.d.). This means that the Norwegian government is funding a lot of the research in Norway, and I wanted to know how they make use of the knowledge that is being produced through that research. Further, I wanted to know how they use research in general in their work.

I also wanted to explore how the researchers understood the government's point of view. For research to be useful for policy and development, it should be conducted from a standpoint of common understanding of what the programme aims to achieve. That is why I decided to investigate how researchers, here the experts, and the practitioners from the government communicated and interacted with each other in the REDD+ programme. Further, I wanted to explore the safeguarding element of the programme.

I am also part of a research group at CMI, attending as a master's student, which has let me talk to researchers and given me a better understanding of what it is like to work as a researcher and how they work with the government. I have in addition through my job benefitted from dependent, as well as independent research. I would appreciate having a closer collaboration of some kind with academia, as I see it as a tool to be used in strategic planning and learning about an area one is working in.

3.3 Strong Objectivity

The idea of an objective researcher is quite interesting in this analysis. According to Bryman (2016) some could think that social sciences researchers are free of beliefs and therefore stay objective while doing their research. Still, this kind of view is becoming less common (Bryman, 2016). The theory of 'strong objectivity' from Harding (1995) has been practised in this research. This drifts away from the idea of being value-neutral, which would be weak objectivity, an idea which Harding (1995) argues that this is not helpful or necessary, and that it is also hindering one's ability to maximising objectivity. The aim of using this is to find a method to maximise our ability to block out 'might makes right' in the sciences and work towards not being "captured" by what has been set by directives (Harding, 1995). The concept of strong objectivity has been developed to enable science to not be influenced by own interests and general impressions one might have previously (Harding, 1995). I have also practised reflexivity, which in its simplest terms has been termed a "turning back on itself" (Fook 1999). According to Fook (1999) it is an ability to "*locate yourself in the picture, to understand, and factor in, how what you see is influenced by your own way of seeing, and how your very presence and act of research influences the situation in which you are researching. Here we recognise ourselves wholistically, that we as researchers are whole*

people, who experience in context, then reflexivity quite simply becomes the influence of any aspect of ourselves and our context which influences the research" (Fook, 1999 p. 12).

By practising reflexivity, I acknowledge that I cannot be completely neutral in this thesis. I have many different roles which have given me various experiences I carry with me and have shaped my view and understanding of society. I am a mother, a student, and a practitioner working under many different strategic frameworks, political priorities, rules and regulations. I can sympathise and relate to the practitioners as I have understanding for what is expected from them. Spending time with the researchers, and talking to many of them, has given me insight and understanding of their expectations and qualities. So, when speaking to both sides, I have taken these experiences with me. More than that, I am a Norwegian citizen and taxpayer. Something that is directly linked to the theme of the thesis, at least on trying to understand how a small part of the Norwegian taxpayer's money is being spent.

According to Harding (1995) cultural beliefs shape research projects, but the different conditions are being adjusted to each other during the process so that one aspect of objectivity is composed with the lack of complete neutrality (Harding, 1995). We are all part of some sort of community, at work or at home, at school or where we do volunteer work. Strong objectivity tells us to recognise this. People can only be partial as they are limited by having a particular historical location. I have come to understand this more and more when talking to the different actors and have understood how their different viewpoints and understandings have been shaped based on their social relations. I wanted to understand how the practitioners worked with REDD+ and how they analysed and developed the programme. I knew that they had closer collaborations with researchers, or research institutions abroad, but I wanted to understand if they took advantage of the research that is being done in this field at home. How could they gain a mutual understanding of the intention with REDD+ and how the local experts could give insights prior to pledging money towards an initiative.

Dominant ideology can often restrict how one sees things and shape their awareness. Women and men have learned that sexual harassment is a violation of people's civil rights. Strong objectivity can be achieved from starting to think from the point of individual groups in society, combined by gender, sexuality, class, etc. This should not be from a personal standpoint, but from their history, where they are placed within social relations, policies and practices formulated away from one's own position from the start (Harding, 1995). Another

aspect in this thesis is to understand how they address safeguards. Even though this is focused on the result-based payments, one of the criteria from NICFI, and the UN is that safeguarding is in place before any results can be approved as valid. At the same time as acknowledging my ethnic background and my culture, I have aimed at keeping in mind that I do not understand the thoughts of the different groups. Harding's suggestion for striving for a strong objectivity, which may be more adaptable for knowledge projects who are confronted with the problem of sciences that have been comprehended by the values and interests of many of the powerful groups in society, have been adapted (Harding, 1995). During the interviews, I was thoughtful not to indicate agreement or to disagree with the interviewees. I would repeat what they said to make sure that I understood correctly, or I would ask other questions building on an answer I had gotten. It was also necessary to not agree or disagree as I was after their perception and understanding.

Building rapport with the interviewees was decisive, as it was favourable for the study to manage to get them to explain their attitude towards experts and practitioners, and the motivation for working with REDD+. As pointed out by Bryman (2016), one needs to balance rapport, one cannot be too friendly as it might result in the interviewee giving the answer, he or she thinks you might want. I was clear in the interviews that I was after their points of view from their experiences, and it was not me questioning how the practitioners worked with the programme, or the experts on how they did their research. My experience was that many thoughts were triggered during the interviews, and many expressed how they found the conversation interesting. I would use my background from where I work when interviewing the practitioners, and the fact that I am doing research for my thesis when talking to the experts to build rapport.

3.4 Data Analysis

All the practitioners and experts signed an information and consent letter, confirming their participation in the study, and agreeing to me using the information. The consent and information letter were first approved, with the outline of the project proposal by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). All of the interviews were conducted on zoom in English, recorded on a recorder and manually transcribed in an online password protected

folder provided by the University of Agder (UiA). After they were transcribed, the interviews were reviewed several times with audio and further analysed.
While reviewing the transcription, certain thoughts presented itself, and were formed due to issues and ideas that stood out. At first, I look for similarities and differences as well as patterns in the data (Berg & Lune, 2012). I would then extract main themes that could be distinguished both within and between transcripts (Bryman, 2016). Next step was to place data into different index sheets and colour coded into different categories from the collected data. The index sheet was helpful when navigating through the information in the data, and for providing a way to count the types of feedback to get an idea of the degree of response sets and to then start the content analysis of different determined themes and categories (Berg & Lune, 2012) further. From here I could draw similarities between ideas and understandings, as well as how harmonised or not the respondent was with the idea of benefitting from each other's knowledge and information.

3.4.1 Challenges

I had to conduct all the interviews digitally due to the covid-19 pandemic. I personally think that one might lose interesting information in the more informal pre-interview and post-interview chat. The five minutes small talk about something that one might think is not important or relevant to the topic but could potentially be interesting and important information. I did manage to have a few informal chats digitally before recording, where I managed to get some good names to contact. Still, it is more limiting to do interviews through a screen than in person. But in all it went well, and I managed to get the information I needed, and I even managed to talk to people in Brazil, Finland and the US, which would not have happened had it not been for the fact that the interviews were digital. And by the time I did my interviews, people were already used to the new way of collaborating, and it made this way of collecting data quite efficient.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

For this thesis, all the participants are anonymous. This was the original plan from the start and was conveyed to participants' pre-interview, as the REDD+ community is quite small and

participant would be willing to share more if they were anonymous. As my research revolved around national agencies and experts, public people, there were less areas to be concerned about if I were to make them not anonymous. But as I was analysing the data, I could see that there was no need for that for the purpose of this thesis, as the focus is more on the overall collaboration in general between practitioners and experts. Further, it appears to be a small community working towards REDD+, most of the people participating know each other and the interviewees were more willing to share their thoughts, impressions and viewpoints after making sure that it would stay anonymous. The guidelines of the Norwegian National Research Ethics Committees (NSD, ND) says that subjects of research have the right to have their personal information treated confidentially. The researcher must also avoid sharing information that can cause harm to the individuals who are the subjects of the research.

Bryman (2016) argues that one should aim to minimise disruption to the participants. It is not easy to regulate what could end up causing harm to the participants, or if it was a possibility that it could happen at all. The participants were all professionals and established in academia or in the public sector. They were all used to talking to researchers or evaluators, as well as discussing similar topics in public spheres. Still, one should pursue protection from harm to the participants (Bryman, 2016). Further, it was essential to link statements from participants to relevant literature to back up and make sense of the information they provided. The purpose is more towards understanding interactions and how to build common understanding between academia and the public sector in Norway. As well as the perception regarding how the fact that this is ODA funds affects results and room for manoeuvres. Here the participants shared their views. How safeguarding is considered, and why and how the programme has been developed is also relevant.

The result of the analysis and study showed how complex and nuanced REDD+ is. It became clear that a lot of "lessons learned" from evaluations and research in the field regarding drivers of deforestation and safeguarding have had a role in the development. This led me to make some changes to the theory and focus of the thesis. It was also clear that experts and practitioners on both sides wanted to establish a closer and beneficial collaboration, to gain a common understanding of the purpose of REDD+. The experts and the practitioners do have slightly different views and methods on how they work with or towards the REDD+, but there is good reason to believe that they all have good ethical and moral motivations for what they want to achieve.

4.0 The Complexity of the REDD+ Safeguards

This, and the subsequent two chapters, are the present and discusses results from the data analysis. This first chapter focuses on safeguarding, and the research question on how these are being monitored and reported. The following chapter analyses what results in being viewed as under result-based payments, and how this being classified as ODA funds affect that. The final chapter looks at how practitioners and experts collaborate towards REDD+ and draws this to 3 of the collaborative models introduced earlier. These topics were selected from issues raised during the interviews that were conducted. The analysis in the result chapters comes from data collected from the interviews, documents analysis and literature which is inspired from findings from the interviews. The discussion of the results is shaped by findings from the interviews, with findings from these interviews playing a prominent role. When I mention "experts" or "practitioners", I am referring to findings from these. I interviewed the key practitioners and experts within this field, which is relatively small, and have therefore decided not to use direct quotas, as people easily can be identified.

Having a safeguarding system in place is mandatory before receiving any form of payments, as discussed earlier. But is it enough to only have a certain framework or plan of action written down in a document to ensure that local communities and indigenous people are being safeguarded? A good safeguarding system should include transparent and effective national forest governance structures, respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples, participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, actions consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity to mention some. This section will look at the complexity of safeguards, the requirements, how local communities and indigenous people are being included and safeguarded. It also looks at funding, if it reaches the local community and the amount targeted towards this topic. It looks at how safeguarding is being monitored and reported on under the name of REDD+, with a focus on Indonesia and Brazil.

4.1.1 Inclusion of the Local Communities and Indigenous People

As discussed earlier, it has been argued that land tenure is important to secure and that fixed land tenure rights have been identified as one of the key elements for successful conditional payment schemes promoting forest conservation. Scholars who have worked a lot with Tanzania with nature conservation, national parks and how they work in relation to the local population have been critical of REDD+. When it first launched it was a new method for nature conservation, where a study in Tanzania with the first nine pilot projects was conducted. The intention and interest of the study was to see how it was implemented in practice. Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2018) argue how REDD+ projects in Tanzania have led to climate colonialism in the Kondoa district in Tanzania. The claim is that Norway is using financial muscle to present measures for climate change mitigation in developing countries, where costs fall upon the local communities and their people (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2018). There was a project in Kondoa, called a "fortress conservation", meaning an area that have been closed from being used by the locals, and where there are strict conservation practices being imposed and enforced. For the locals in Tanzania, it means that if they came to the forest, they could face fines or imprisonment (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2018). Some local farmers would be trained in conservation agriculture as a way to compensation for the loss of resources from the forest. However, the training was not sufficient, there were not enough resources and the loss they experienced from not being able to enter the forest was far greater than the compensating (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2018). It does demonstrate how tenure is a complex matter, especially when sufficient and vital information for decision makers is not complete. Many practitioners disagree on the claim that this can be called "climate colonialism" as the funding is from the aid budget, and Norway cannot account for the potential reduction in carbon. Still, it shows how REDD+, in this case, has led to harm. These safeguards are a measure to protect or avoid risks, while promoting benefits. This harmonises with the "do no harm", a necessary statement which could be viewed as impossible to reach completely.

Sassi et al. (2014) discuss how responding and dealing with the issues around land tenure is critical as the current set up towards tenure have secured actors who has interest other than to secure forest conservation or the climate change affairs. Tenure arrangements in many countries can be said to mirror a long history of granting honoured entry to the forest and valued resources to actors with power in agro-industrial, logging, livestock and mining

companies, following through command from the state towards economic development (Sassi et al., 2014). Naturally, local farmers and communities will act with scepticism and resistance when foreign actors come into countries to work on conservation. Howson (2018) explained how local people in Indonesia claim that the reserve has been established without discussion with them. Causing violence and destruction and resulting in farmers becoming embroiled in other ongoing processes, pushing them towards illicit livelihood strategies, sometimes with devastating outcomes. Experts and practitioners all agree that including the local communities and indigenous people in planning, implementing, and monitoring REDD+ activities is key.

Safeguard 3 "respecting the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and communities" is dialogues, processes, and actions surrounding free prior and informed consent (FPIC) and land, tree, and carbon tenure. FPIC is known as when consent has been granted prior, freely, and when full information has been given without coercion. The affected parties are to know the scope, duration, and potential impacts of the activities (Jagger et al. 2014). Discussions around this topic have taken place in both Brazil and Indonesia, for example, as part of building consensus on REDD+ safeguards. Civil society organisations in Brazil have been speaking out about how FPIC should be carried out among traditional populations affected by REDD+ projects in their territories and adjacent lands (Jagger et al. 2014).

Indigenous groups occupy around 22% of the Brazilian Amazon, and 77% of indigenous lands had completed a formal process of recognition before 2014. Indigenous lands were, and still are, under pressure from loggers, ranchers, and miners. Borders have been largely respected due to monitoring by the groups themselves and with legal assistance from indigenous organisations. In 2012, there was optimism regarding collaboration between the local communities in the Amazon and the government. The World Bank (2012) found that through the Amazon Protected Areas Program (ARPA), some synergies were created due to the government travelling around, listening, and collecting information from the various rural communities, and the communities were part of the planning of the structure of projects. Information was used towards protective land and management policies, and they made conservation units represented by the government, local administration and civil society. The protected areas (PAs) benefitted from assets and services that were needed for the implementation of certain activities done by the communities and supported by the government (Arpa, 2012). In 2017, over 60 million hectares in the Amazon was under the program for protection, conservation, and sustainable use of tropical forest (WWF, 2017). Butler (2020) reports how deforestation began to reverse in 2004 up to 2010 due to increased

law enforcement, monitoring, protected areas, and microeconomic trends. In 2014, Brazil was by far the most advanced compared to other participating countries, having created a first draft of a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Brazil and Indonesia have both benefited from progress which have occurred from strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC), benefit sharing and participation. There is a highly decentralised system of forest governance in Brazil, which includes granting licensing and enforcing responsibility to Amazonian states and municipalities. The state and municipal councils are responsible for issues concerning the environment and forestry and conclude responsibility for ensuring transparency and accountability among local government agencies involved in REDD+ (Jagger et al. 2014). Still, major issues are lack of funding, human resources, corruption, elite capture, and lack of transparency within the government agencies at all levels.

According to the practitioners, safeguarding has been an important part of Brazil's deforestation strategy which has been supported through the Amazon Fund. NICFI has its own assessment of safeguarding in their agreements. It has been claimed that the Norwegian government has such a large indigenous program as it has been observed as the most vulnerable, and where it is the most difficult to secure what is being done by the Amazon Fund. It has been difficult for indigenous organisations to get funding for their measures. Further, it has been claimed that Brazil has a very modern constitution that ensures safeguards, but the actual implementation of it is difficult and where large budget cuts are experienced. The indigenous directorate in Brazil, Funai, experienced large budget cuts after Bolsonaro came into power, threatening not only the rainforest, but the indigenous lives as well (semi-structured interview, 2022). When Jair Bolsonaro became president in Brazil in 2019, it was bad news for the indigenous people and the environment (Wallace, 2019). His anti-environmental discourse and focus on economic growth are destroying the Amazon. His mindset is that Brazil’s indigenous people control too much of the land which is filled with rich resources, and this hinders economic development. Silva jr. et al. (2020) illustrate how political processes from 2019 had a severe impact on Maranhao, a state in northeast Brazil. The region experienced an increase in illegal deforestation and fire rates, 25% of its remaining forest cover (6,038km2) had already been degraded by these activities between 2007 and 2019 (Silva jr. et al, 2020). It threatens the security of the indigenous people, who now need to defend their forest in the absence of appropriate laws (Canineu and Carvalho, 2020).

Rorato, et al. (2020) gives an insight into how the Amazon indigenous people's land is now at risk after the government sent a bill to congress regarding the regulation of commercial mining. One of the new processes proposed by the government was a new policy to reduce the legal reserve in this region. Wallace (2019) reports how illegal activities on indigenous land have increased as the criminals now have no fear of authority. This bill allows commercial mining and threatens the already threatened communities who struggle with illegal logging and wildcat miners and increase deforestation (Guardian, 2020). Villen-Perez et al. (2020) point to other scholars who claim that illegal activities increase violence and confrontations between miners and tribes. Posey (1985) early report on how the Kayapo Indians are effective managers of the forest, and how their knowledge is extremely important in development strategies as it can improve the productiveness of certain ecological systems. Being unsupported has, according to Hanbury (2021), pushed many of the indigenous people to breaking point, and community leaders like Henrique Iabaday Suruí, a Paiter Suruí leader in Rondônia state who voiced how they are afraid that indigenous people will get tired of white non-profits and the government receiving a lot of money, but the ones who are risking their lives and protecting the area is left unrewarded. Schipani (2019) reported on how the indigenous community Kayapo declared Bolsonaro as their enemy after the proposal of the new bill and were preparing for battle against him and his views. Hanbury (2021) refers to a report on Swedish national radio in 2020 about a Kayapo village within the Territory in Pará state had left its environmental commitments after the government stopped funding Indigenous monitoring projects, the villagers instead signed a deal with gold miners. Their action was initiated by the desire to have better care and food, they grew tired of carrying the responsibility of the protection of the forest, which benefits the whole world, without receiving any support or benefit from the state.

This illustrates the importance of hearing from the local community and indigenous people, as well as providing sufficient funding for them to protect the rainforest.

4.1.2 Safeguarding of Indigenous People

In Indonesia, the forest area for indigenous people and communities under statutory ownership and access rights in Indonesia is quite small, when compared to Brazil (Sunderlin et al. 2008). Forests have historically been used politically and as an economic advantage by

the elites, where indigenous and other local forest communities have been marginalised and deprived of their forest resources and source of living (Jagger et al. 2014). Forest governance has been decentralised in Indonesia since 1999, still, provincial and district governments have issued licences for agriculture and mining development in forest areas that have indiscriminately affected forest communities. Related to REDD+, there have only been a few national policy changes that aim to clarify forest tenure and, at least in part, lay an appropriate foundation for the implementation of the programme. One of them being the Indonesia's One Map Initiative, which began in 2010, which aims to resolve longstanding overlapping land claims among ministries and departments (Jagger et al. 2014). In May 2013, there was a landmark decision by Indonesia's Constitutional Court that laid the basis for providing an acknowledgement for statutory ownership rights of indigenous people to a significant area of the forest (Jagger et al. 2014). There are many big advances, but there is still a hindrance in the recognising of the rights of indigenous people and communities in Indonesia. The REDD+ policy process and dialogues has a focus on benefit sharing and developing legal frameworks, equity, and concerns about corruption and transparency in Indonesia (Jagger et al. 2014).

The period between Indonesia´s 2010 commitment to reduce its emissions and forest degradation and the announcement of the first payment-for-results under the Norway-Indonesia REDD+ partnership in early 2019 saw major policy and practice shifts. Broadly, this period can be divided into two main sections: a first part (from 2010 to mid-2014) under the leadership of President Yudhoyono in which provisions under the 2010 Norway-Indonesia Letter of Intent were largely adhered to, a Forest Moratorium was established, and REDD+ demonstration activities undertaken; and a second part under President Jokowi from mid-2014, during which a newly-formed Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) took control of REDD+ and a series of other forest-related policies emerged, namely commitments linked to Customary Forests, a Social Forestry Programme, and the One Map One Data initiative (Williams, 2021).

An important arrangement of the 2010 Letter of Intent was that the Indonesian government would commit to a two-year suspension of all new concessions for conversion of peat and natural forest (Letter of Intent 2010). So, in 2011, the government introduced a moratorium prohibiting the conversion of primary natural forests and peatlands for palm oil, pulpwood and logging concessions (Williams, 2021). This was initially intended to run for only two years; however, the moratorium was extended three times during 2011-2017 and in June

2019, the Minister of Environment and Forestry, Siti Nurbaya, announced that it would be made permanent, pending presidential approval (Williams, 2021).

Williams (2021) discusses how there are some winners and losers under the REDD+ in Indonesia. From 2010 to the end of 2014 he claims that the winners were national and local civil society groups due to increased funding and engagement with REDD+ policymaking, national REDD+ Agency due to new powers in high-profile cabinet-level agency, local communities able to successfully navigate REDD+ readiness activities, SBY´s presidency for being able to point to REDD+ in answering domestic and international policy critics and Norway as they were able to point to 2010 Letter of Intent as evidence of its green credentials, and landholders able to avoid enforcement of the Forest Moratorium through converting existing land holdings. The losers were the Ministry of Forestry due to being bypassed as policy lead for REDD+, local communities subject to poor implementation of REDD+ readiness activities, landholders unable to avoid enforcement of the Forest Moratorium through converting existing land holdings. From 2015 to 2021 Williams (2021) argue that the winners are: the Ministry of Environment and Forestry who took control of REDD+ and downgraded its importance, Norway as they were able to point to post-2016 deforestation data as evidence of REDD+ impact, national and local civil society groups and others benefitting from REDD+ spin-off initiatives. The losers were: National environment focused civil society groups who were less involved in REDD+ policy, National REDD+ Agency (disbanded in 2015), Local communities who engaged in REDD+ readiness activities but have yet to see tangible benefits and landholders unable to avoid enforcement of the Forest Moratorium (Williams, 2021).

There has been a major progress at the national and sub-national scales towards developing policies and processes for addressing FPIC in Indonesia. FPIC materials and guidelines have been developed, and the recent draft of the National REDD+ Strategy includes discussion of FPIC with Pillar 5 calling for “Effective involvement of the community through implementation of FPIC, safeguards, and fair and transparent benefit sharing” (Jagger et al. 2014). The inclusion of Civil-society organisations has provided critical input in various national and sub-national forums, giving voice to local customary and design. However, there is still a lack of clarity regarding who will give consent and how FPIC will be operationalized (Jagger et al. 2014).

Indigenous peoples have been given a much more important place than they had in the beginning, when REDD+ first started. According to one of the practitioners, the initial thought was that they are affected regardless as they live off and in the forest. Therefore, direct contact and representation of indigenous peoples became central in the incentive and in the REDD+ design. What NICFI has gained through research is a greater confidence that those who claim that indigenous peoples are better forest managers have been right. Experts and practitioners see that this is more or less correct. Different management models for forests show that where deforestation is lesser and where there is the least risk of deforestation, it is in areas where indigenous peoples have strong rights and strong traditions and good systems in place. This cannot be completely confirmed with research, but the hypothesis has been reinforced the last couple of years. This has led to a more important premise for NICFI in designing strategy and gives insight into who they should focus on as change agents locally. Like indigenous people's territories and indigenous people's organisations and societies.

According to experts and practitioners, the indigenous people need a sufficient budget to continue to protect the rainforest. A response from NICFI has been to increase their financial support for the indigenous community (semi-structured interview, 2022). This is a necessity, as they need a sufficient budget for protection and patrollers to take care of the forest. Moreover, they need support from the national agencies. Going on, the actual indigenous territories that the indigenous people are entitled to under their constitution must be issued and new protected areas must be created. Another important aspect is to start to push down on illegalities efficiently again, as almost all deforestation that is going on is illegal.

Difficulties and challenges have been experienced with several of the people working with the support which is supposed to reach the indigenous people. This is an issue as rules and principles set by the Norwegian government are not always met on the ground. There is a common agreement among the experts and practitioners that indigenous people are being promised more and more with time, and the more this programme develops. However, these promises are not reflected in the indigenous peoples' reality. A new study conducted by Rainforest Foundation Norway showed that Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs) tenure and forest management in tropical countries had received a small share of international donor funding over the last ten years, just $270 million per year on average. Only a small fraction of the total funding for IPLC tenure and forest management is likely to reach the Indigenous Peoples organisations and local communities, due to most of the funding flowing through large intermediaries or part of larger programs. Of all the projects that were

identified, only 17 percent included the name of an IPLC organisation in the project implementation description. This equals to an average of $46.3 million per year across the tropics (Gjefsen, 2022). In wanting to protect forests that bind carbon, you must increase the forest and reduce deforestation. If this means hindering the access for the local people who are depending on the forest, or leaving potential crop fields untouched, people who lose access to an area or potential income, must be compensated. One of the practitioners discussed one theory about why mutual benefit, in terms of money not being transferred to the local communities and indigenous people, is due to many of these people being almost unbanked. They are simply on the outside of the system and have leaders who represent them in major international conferences, like the big indigenous organisations.

Safeguarding and supporting the indigenous people and local communities was a hot topic at the COP 26 in Glasgow. During the conference, it was decided to earmark part of the funds for indigenous peoples and people who live in the forest, as the lesson had been that supporting indigenous peoples and helping them to protect the forest is what works, and they are the ones who need a large amount of the funding (semi-structured interview, 2022). In the main decision, governments recognized "the important role of civil society, including youth and indigenous peoples, in addressing and responding to climate change, and highlighting the urgent need for action" (UNFCCC, 2021). Targeted support for indigenous peoples instead of sitting with a carrot in the form of a donor pile could be more effective. It is important to target the drivers of deforestation, and the risk that the indigenous people take with being the protectors of the forest. In 2019, illegal loggers ambushed an indigenous group in the Amazon, who protected the forest, killing one young warrior and wounding another (Reuters, 2019). According to experts and practitioners, sadly, this is a known issue that needs to be addressed.

There has been a great deal of scepticism, at least in Brazil, about foreign intervention in their affairs. One nation needs to be very cautious about the requirements one puts forward for another country. Especially when it comes to policy making. When NICFI is increasing support for the Indigenous people, you can meet national forces that are portraying it as Norway trying to influence the country and the people (semi-structured interview, 2022). When asking practitioners about why safeguarding is not more in the focus when assessing results, the answer is that in Norway, they have had the opportunity to have informed decisions if they had ensured more dialogue. However, one should not go in to dictate a country's policy. That's why the result assessment was added to the Amazon fund in Brazil,

instead of to the World Bank. Brazil did not trust the World Bank, so it was added to Benes, which is the Brazilian development bank, which was fine for Norway because it is very secure, and free from corruption in a way. Having the hand on the steering wheel is important for many countries. It is a colonial history that is important to remember when discussing these topics.

This section has demonstrated the importance of clear land tenure, and the inclusion of local communities and indigenous people as they are seen as the best protectors of the forests. The issues identified are not enough funding, and funding not always reaching the indigenous people or local communities. It has also been identified that there is a safeguarding system in place in Brazil, whilst this is improving in Indonesia.

4.2 Monitoring and Reporting of Safeguarding

This next section will investigate the frameworks, routines and systems for the monitoring and reporting of safeguarding. It has already been identified that there are safeguarding systems and requirements in place, and will now look into how these are monitored, and reported on from the guidelines presented under the conceptual framework.

The Warsaw framework for REDD+ (WFR) establishes what a country needs to have in order create a system which will give information on how Safeguards are being "addressed and respected" throughout the implementation of REDD+ activities, commonly referred to as the Safeguards Information System (SIS) (UNFCCC, 2010). Further, UNFCCC Decisions settled, when seeking to ensure and receive RBPs, countries would have to provide information from their most recent Summary of Information (SOI) to depict how all the Cancun Safeguards have been addressed and respected in the context of results-based actions for the results-based payments (RBPs) which are being claimed (Christen et al. 2020). According to Christen et al. (2020) The UNFCCC says that the SOIs are to be submitted "periodically, including through national communications or other communication channels identified by the COP". Still, the UNFCCC has not presented any guidance on how methodologically consider, assess or verify the information being given through the existing information and reporting tools, which can determine that the implementation of REDD+ results-based activities has been done in

consistency with the Cancun Safeguards (Christen et al, 2020). Research was conducted on the early lessons from a Green Climate Funds' pilot programme connected to the assessment and verification of the degree to which REDD+ results-based activities had been implemented in consistency with the Cancun Safeguards, according to the methodological guidance for RBPs under the WFR. They conclude that assessing the degree of how and which REDD+ results-based activities have been consistent with Cancun Safeguards is quite a complex task. Moreover, by requiring countries to determine conformance with its interim safeguards in the context of REDD+ results-based finance, the GCF's pilot programme was seen as an important burden and hindrance to countries' abilities to access results-based financing (Christen et al. 2020).

The experts express how the safeguards are broad, which leaves a significant flexibility for parties to interpret what they mean in practice. A high level of country customization is required for REDD+ implementation to be consistent with the Cancun safeguards, national capacities, and national sovereignty (Christen et al. 2020). There are clear guidelines and methods for the measurement, reporting, and verification of carbon emissions; but there is none concerning the assessment of the social condition of REDD+ (Duchelle et al. 2017).The problem is that formal guidelines or binding policies with respect to social safeguards is lacking, and the ability of individual countries to "interpret and formulate" the governance, livelihoods, and sociocultural aspects of REDD+, means that REDD+ could end up having different impacts on forest-dependent communities, relying on how social safeguards are defined and implemented (Duchelle et al. 2017). Several experts agreed that there is some justified criticism towards the social inclusion in result-based carbon finance, where the world bank has different funds to get underprivileged to join, as they should be taken into account. An expert painted a good picture where he explained that what is striking is that the benefit sharing mechanism is like a "Christmas tree approach", where you have the Christmas tree that you decorate with some safeguards, social inclusion and gender and indigenous people. But you do not go into the very mechanism of the Christmas tree, what kind of criteria it has and who should be rewarded. "*What is the decision-making process for refining if you get payments at a village level? Who makes the decision on how the money should be used?*" (semi-structured interview, 2022).

The letter of intent (LoI) between Indonesia and Norway includes safeguarding and to include the indigenous people and local communities. On one hand, the feedback from some of the practitioners is that this has worked well. They have evaluations that allow them to keep track

of progress, and the evaluation report can give them some insight into what is working, what activities have resulted in, and what has not worked out well and needs improvement. On the other hand, some experts claim that a lot of what the evaluator is seeing, hearing, and reporting back is not always the true picture. One expert could tell about an evaluator who came and spent half a day in an Indonesian village, to report back how things were developing on the ground to the Norwegian government. The evaluation reported that the project in that certain village was going very well, how the local people were included and that there had been progress. However, there were Norwegian students living in this village for 6 months, on a student exchange, who reported back that during those 6 months, little to nothing happened during that time. This clearly shows how there is information that is brought back which is incorrect. It also shows how difficult it is to report back on this matter when an evaluator is not there to see how the safeguards are being implemented over time, and they only can rely on what they are told.

Another expert could tell a similar story from Tanzania, where evaluations were being done on the progress of a forest conservation project in Tanzania. The evaluator came in for a short period of time and did not spend enough time at the local site. The evaluator who came could only go by trust from what they were being told by the Norwegian embassy and the NGOs when they were out in the field. Safeguarding and the monitoring of compliance is incredibly difficult and complicated to report on. A few experts have expressed how they thought the focus should be on protecting and taking care of the local people. As it is them who are the main protectors of the forests. Further, as safeguarding is so complicated to report on, it makes it difficult to get a clear image of how this is being addressed. For one to gain a real understanding, one must go into their field themselves for a longer period.

Countries with bilateral agreements report to the UNFCCC, as well as to NICFI. Some experts argued that this can be viewed as some form of rubber stamping, as it is not followed up in a meaningful way, and therefore difficult to use in an analysis. The UNFCCC are the ones who have the multilateral negotiations, reviews and make assessments of baselines, results, and safeguarding. NICFIs mandate is very technical, as they look at method and use of data, and they can make recommendations for improvements. Still, the criteria from the Cancun safeguards still holds, an issue and concern are that these categories are not very measurable. One of the experts expressed that what it means in practice, on the ground and how one can measure compliance with them is challenging. In terms of measurement, one is dependent on several levels of indicators that can operationalize it or give on the opportunity

to say that they have complied with the criteria. Even if they are on the ground or been experienced by other NGOs or institutions. Practitioners discuss how it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of this due to the regulations given by the UN are relatively general. One is therefore dependent on the fact that there are grievances locally for one to be aware that it is not in line with the intention.

When discussing safeguarding and how to monitor this in the best possible way, the answers from experts and practitioners vary some. Some practitioners claim that they have pretty good measuring mechanisms both on how the situation is and how the changes in the use of the land are, due to a good collaboration with many indigenous organisations. This allows them to keep track of the development. There are concerns about how indigenous people have experienced less protection when working as a protector of the forest and having to enforce their own territories. Next to the pandemic, they have in addition experienced far more people entering their areas illegally, small- and large-scale mining, cattle farming to mention a few. The people who enter are often in larger groups, equipped with weapons which makes them dangerous. Conflicts quickly escalate if the protectors of the forests try to enforce their territory and find that they do not get help from the state or the federal government. Another issue is how people who report this become more exposed than they already are. This is not the same issue relating to where deforestation is taking place today, practitioners argue that the measurement system over where deforestation happens is very detailed, meaning if the authorities wanted to enforce this, they know where to go.

Environmentalists who operate on behalf of themselves and others who protect local communities and the environment are exposed to threats and harassment, and it creates a threshold to speak out when illegal activities occur as it involves a risk. Practitioners discuss how safeguarding is reported and informed with direct dialogue with partners, and through field visits. The partners largely work through partners that the government agree with and trust, who in turn have their own sub-partners. The Rainforest Foundation is a large and important ally according to many of the practitioners, and several civil society organisations that manage individual projects. The practitioners claim that they have a fairly good idea of whether the Rainforest Foundation or others succeed with their projects in one geography. However, there is no following of individual projects all the way down to the individual village from the practitioners themselves.

One thing is reports and evaluations, practitioners also stress the importance of dialogue, and the knowledge one can gain from communicating with partners, which govern how the government thinks about safeguarding. Discussion regarding what it is that works, what are the challenges, instead of only looking at written reports. The practitioners want to learn about who are the ones who succeed. Who succeeds in a way that is scalable? They have found that often it is the case that those who are successful, there has been a long relationship with learning and capacity building which makes safeguarding eventually work quite well. It has been acknowledged by practitioners that they are finding it difficult to find a good method to reach out to the indigenous people. Which is a prime example of knowledge that would be interesting, such as what characterises good models for collaborating with local organisations. There will always be a potential for improvement in how the implementation of how these security mechanisms will be measured. Politically, this is important, it is addressed in all conversations, and it is also addressed in the negotiations on the Norwegian result-based payments in some countries for example, and in the regulations in the international forms of governance, this is central. According to NICFI, they are dependent on REDD + having legitimacy both here at home in relation to those who allocate the money, but also globally about this is a program that does good and does not hurt. They depend on trust from the local communities and environments for this to be dealt with in a proper and fair manner.

This section highlights the issue of there not being any guidance on how to methodologically consider, assess or verify the information being given through the existing information and reporting tools, which can determine that the implementation of REDD+ results-based activities has been done in consistency with the Cancun Safeguards. And the fact that there are no guidelines concerning the assessment of the social condition of REDD+. It has also been identified that many indigenous people do not dare to report on breaches, as they fear for the consequences. This means that it becomes almost impossible to say if the reported results are in line with the Cancun safeguards.

4.3 Norwegian Safeguards Requirements

This section looks at Norway’s standpoint towards safeguarding, and how this is included in the bilateral agreements.

The Norwegian government supports that the long-term results of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative will have a strong sustainability if the people who live in and off the forest are allowed to share in the associated economic development. There is a strong belief amongst the practitioners that the countries who receive Norwegian climate and forest funding have to respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, and that income from forest conservation must benefit these groups. The purpose of the safeguarding mechanisms was acknowledged, and it was noted that Norway would have to follow up and work on all the platforms to make sure that the right procedures are adopted to ensure that the safeguarding mechanisms are followed up and that initiatives are initiated. It was also noted the importance of Norway prioritising controls to ensure compliance with the safeguarding mechanisms in the bilateral REDD+ agreements (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

Next to the requirement that the developing countries document reductions in carbon dioxide emissions from initiatives in forests, it also became a requirement to submit a summary setting out how the country has handled the safeguarding mechanisms in its REDD+ work. The efforts being made to safeguard the governments's prerequisites concerning compliance with the REDD+ safeguards have seemed to have faced obstacles. This was due to many parties considering the follow-up of the safeguards to be an internal matter, resulting in the guidelines from the climate convention having become general and overarching (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). One of the following consequences of this was lack of reporting from the REDD+ countries on compliance with the REDD+ safeguards. Further, there are some differences amongst the bilateral partnerships as to whether the NICFI requires reporting on compliance with the REDD+ safeguards in the agreements concerning results-based payments.

The payments which have been made to Brazil are only based on figures for deforestation, even though the rights of indigenous peoples are under considerable pressure in the country. It is the Amazon Fund who administers Norway's payments to Brazil, where safeguarding is followed up from NICFI through dialogue. Riksrevisjonen (2018) reports how NICFI requests greater transparency and more information concerning the compliance with the REDD+ safeguards in the yearly reports from the Amazon Fund. In addition, the audit shows that NICFI acquisition and use of information concerning the REDD+ safeguards are also deficient. It is of high importance to address the REDD+ safeguards in order to achieve long-term cuts in emissions through REDD+, the information towards the safeguards is crucial to precisely assess the effects of REDD+ and Norway's International Climate and Forest

Initiative. If not, it leads to a risk that Norway could end up paying for results that do not fulfil the requirements of the REDD+ safeguards (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

As for Norway's bilateral agreements, there have always been two levels of requirements. Norway has had its own baseline, as well as following the international standard of the Cancun safeguards. In addition to this you have the new developed ART standard, which is a standard under this topic as well. This is an even stricter standard that Norway wishes to apply in bilateral agreements, and which they are using in emerging carbon markets.

There has been an innovation in this landscape, where new independence standards which are not linked to the multilateral negotiation arena have been created. There is now an independent board, who has the mandate to assess results and a greater extent to decline countries who can be viewed as one who has not complied with safeguarding (Semi-structured interview, 2022).

This chapter provides answers to my first research question about how safeguards are being monitored. Through my interviews I have learnt that it is proving difficult to monitor safeguards, and that the system is flawed as it relies so heavily on trust. The safeguards have not been secured in a functioning way as there is no working way or guidelines in place of checking if safeguards are being enforced. The only requirement is that a safeguarding system is in place. We have also seen that indigenous peoples often do not report on breaches of safeguards as they are more concerned of repercussions than they are of the initial breaches. The combined outcome is that it becomes very difficult to say whether reported results are in alignment with safeguards.

This chapter has also highlighted the importance of collaboration with experts, as they can observe results over longer timeframes. This will come to light in the later chapter on collaboration.

5.0 Results-Based Payments with ODA Funds

NICFI came into being after Norway committed to provide funds towards reducing deforestation in countries with tropical forests, inspired by the cost-efficient theories at the time and significant political will in the Norwegian government. This was put together in haste, and the decision was to use aid funding. This section will investigate the consequences of choosing to use the aid budget. Following this I will discuss what a 'result' is, as it is classified as something measurable under REDD+, but as I have learned from comparing Brazil and Indonesia, a result can be much more than a visible entity. As we will see, these issues are related because aid funding demands tangible results. The third section in this chapter compares the agreements between Indonesia and Brazil, showing how and why Brazil was able to negotiate a better deal compared to Indonesia. Brazil is the only one who has received payments to this date, but both agreements have met challenges. This discussion will include a look at why they were negotiated differently, and the pre-work before the agreements were signed. Lastly, it discusses how the lessons learned from these agreements has led to the latest development in the standard work, where the new ART-TREE standard. This chapter functions as a response to my second research question, "How do the Norwegian ODA rules and regulations affect progress towards results in the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia and Norway and Brazil?"

5.1 Issues with Aid Funding Towards the REDD+ Initiative

Proving that deforestation levels have been reduced is complicated. Experts argue that this is furthermore complicated due to REDD+ funding being classified as an aid programme. It then not only became about paying for results, but also the conditionalities and rules associated with aid. According to Angelsen (2016) labelling REDD+ funding as aid helps donors to achieve international aid targets. In the case of Norway, tapping into aid budgets enabled significant funding for REDD+, because fresh and reallocated funding from the aid budget was subject to less scrutiny from the Ministry of Finance compared with other budgets. Experts claim that Norway has climate finance goals in the Paris Agreement, so it becomes easy to use aid funds if a government puts a climate label on them. Experts argue that the Norwegian government is very critical of spending a lot of money in the Norwegian economy,

in terms of inflation. As for the aid budget, this is money not meant for the Norwegian economy, and thus is already considered lost money. NICFI was set up outside Norad, which meant that people with slightly different backgrounds were involved. Experts explained how many of the people did not have the relevant experience and competence to be working with aid. This deficiency was solved by involving the rainforest foundation as consultants, as they had the required competence. The bureaucracy in Norad was therefore bypassed and this climate initiative went through in record time.

The discussion has been around if the strings attached with REDD+ being aid funded is working against what they are trying to achieve. Experts say that prominent people in the REDD+ community have arguments that one must avoid an aidification of REDD + funding. Meaning one must not fall into the logic of aid, but that one must have such heavy financial incentives which mobilise private sectors and this carbon mindset, resulting in an increasing number of objectives. One expert argued that the primary objective of aid is economic development and poverty alleviation. Even though these are good objectives, it is part of this dilution or crumbling of the original REDD+ objectives and the REDD+ focus of reducing carbon emissions. As these are under bilateral agreements, it becomes less in the interests of donor countries to have a universal standard to harmonise the classification of what characterises development aid, and that instead each and every donor will have their own procedures and aims.

The counterargument is that aidification was necessary to get the Norwegian money triggered. If it had not been for the fact that they could take it from the growth of the budget, NICFI would not have existed. It was suggested by NGOs that this had to be in addition to what Norway already did on climate and development, not take it from growth but take it in addition. Jens Stoltenberg and the Ministry of Finance were sceptical of any new use of money from the state budget, but the government had a goal of spending 1% of Gross National Income on development assistance. At this time the oil price was high, and the Norwegian economy was doing well meaning that there was a lot of fiscal room to think within the growth in the development assistance budget. A compromise was made and the growth in the development assistance budget was used for this. Norad did not argue against this, and experts claim that the reason for that was that Norad were barely consulted before it was pulled through.

5.1.1 A Paradox?

The complications with REDD+ funds being paid over the aid budget is due to the fact that funding through aid comes with its own rules and regulations. This means that the bilateral agreements have to follow both the rules and regulations that are applicable for REDD+ eligibility, but also the Norwegian rules and regulations for aid funds. Practitioners explained how they have a zero tolerance for corruption, meaning that if money transferred cannot be documented, it will be requested back. The paradox of this is that the whole purpose with result-based funding, is to receive payments after agreed results have been met. In theory, there should not be any reason to prove how the payment is distributed after, as the results, and the purpose, have been met. The initiative has given different results, where not all results can be counted or verified. Climate initiatives are growing in importance and are recipients of an increasing proportion of Norwegian aid budgets. Funding for REDD+ and classifying this as aid was necessary to get it through in the first place, also to get this past the Ministry of Finance's objections.

Experts have called the result-based payments from aid budget a paradox, where it is meant as development aid, but one also must comply with the aid criteria and everything else which follows. There is this socio-economic idea where one pays for a result and puts in an incentive so everything of politics and all that is needed to save the forest comes as a result of the incentive. But it can be argued that the only thing the donor country does is make sure the incentive exists. So based on that logic, there should be no reason to think about how the money is spent because the result ensures that what needs to be achieved will be. A cultivation thought is if the Amazon was saved, one should in theory not pay attention to if the government in Brazil spent the money to finance the military there. Still, there are the Warsaw regulations that count, which state that the money should be invested in REDD+, and that there should be benefit sharing. The guideline states that one cannot just give the money to anyone, and they are present regardless of where the money is transferred from.

Besides Brazil, there are few countries that have been paid based on results. What is difficult about result-based payment is that there should be no strings attached to the money, which is the idea. But then there are often some invisible stipulations anyway. Some of the reactions have been towards the fact that Brazil has been one of the largest recipients of aid from

Norway. When going through the top 10 countries who have received aid from Norway from 2015 to 2018 (see figure 2, 3,4 and 5), Brazil has been placed in this group. It was only in 2019 that Brazil was no longer the largest receiver, which is the same year the funds from Norway were frozen when Bolsonaro came into power (see figure 6). In 2015, they were the largest receiver of aid (Norad, 2015). One of the reasons why this has been criticised is due to the fact that Brazil is an upper middle-income country (Worldbank, 2022), and therefore does not have the same urgency for aid funds. The explanation is that Brazil has been high on the recipient list due to them receiving result-based payment under REDD+, still, it takes a respectable portion of the aid budget.

Figure 2: Norad (2016)



Figure 3: Norad (2017)



Figure 4: Norad (2018)



Figure 5: Norad (2019)



Figure 6: Norad 2020

5.2 What Can be Identified as a Result?

As shown in the section on results in the conceptual framework, 'results' as a concept are more difficult to define, and measure, than may at first be apparent. In this section I will review the discussions I had regarding this subject with the interviewees, with supporting literature.

When discussing if revising what is viewed as results under conditional payment to get a more realistic approach, experts explain how being too critical might not fit with the pace and scale that NICFI wants as they are under spending pressure from the government. As the head of a results-based organisation, your job is to create results. These results are wanted early so that funding does not decline due to a lack of perceived progress. Since the initiative is based on results, then policy makers do not have the time to listen to critical researchers who have a wider luxury of time. They might hear what the researchers are saying, but they do not have the time to wait for answers to questions.

As mentioned, Norway has their own criteria in addition as funding is classified as aid. Both experts and practitioners discussed how it would have been very good to get some research that challenges Norway on the type of flexibility it gives when entering such performance-based payments to evaluate the extent to which demands should be made on the recipients. One consideration is what the money is to be used for, but another is that there must be a trust-based relationship between the countries. It needs to be considered how far one can go in controlling how the funding is being handled. One can speculate that the best thing to do would be to trust the recipient, and release the funds in good faith, but the reality is that the rules governing aid funding do not allow this. According to the requirements for receiving aid funding, the recipients must document how the funds have been spent (UD, 2014). The Norway state budget says that every payment needs to report their achieved results in compliance with the signed agreements and the purpose of the funds. The recipient must have safety mechanisms towards corruption and negative social and financial consequences. All the payments are done through funds, where the funds are the recipient of the funding. It discusses how funds that delegate the funds from the Norwegian government may only target the funds towards initiatives that have been approved as official aid. There needs to be a system in place for safety mechanisms against corruption and negative social and economic

consequences when paying out to approved aid activities and that results are being reported (Regjeringen, 2020).

Experts and practitioners further agree that it is exciting to measure technicality against development. Questions such as whether a change in attitude towards forests should be classified as a result need to be considered. Experts and some practitioners do agree that a discussion around results-based schemes would be interesting, in many cases Norway would have paid for policy results and capacity building in phase 1 and 2. Which is a good thing as capacity must be built to handle issues related to deforestation. It is clearly necessary that an apparatus and different countries have different starting points. However, many practitioners say that one should not throw money into a black hole, but it should be based on results. REDD+ is difficult because it is context-based. Once they have done the job, and shown the receipts, they will be paid. In theory it has been a straightforward principle, but difficult in practice, especially when setting baselines and reference levels. The basic problem with REDD+ is the counterfactual conundrum of "what would have happened if REDD+ did not exist, and the status quo had been maintained. According to Duchelle et al. (2018) there is insufficient use of counterfactuals to attribute outcomes to REDD+. Without this counterfactual version of events, it's impossible to know how many tons of carbon were not emitted into the atmosphere and it's therefore impossible to know how many carbon credits can be issued from a national level REDD+ programme.

The way REDD + is set up today, it is almost impossible to draw a causal link between what Norway has paid for and the results which have arisen. It is very difficult for NICFI to say that their payments have led to a certain result. According to some experts, there are examples of Norwegian politicians who claim that this certain contribution from Norway has reduced emissions of a certain amount of Norway's emissions in comparison. Additionally, policy documents show, amongst other things in the state budget, that Norway has paid emissions regressions 'x' amount. It is technically correct but in the political rhetoric it comes across as "Norway does this, and it has that effect" without any demonstrable proof that this is correct. The state budget (2020) reads:

"The climate and forest initiative shall contribute to reducing the loss of tropical forest, (see the strategic framework for the initiative in figure 6). In the countries that have made the most progress in managing their land in a sustainable manner, the Climate and Forest Initiative

pays countries retrospectively for documented reduced emissions from the forest. An indicator of target achievement for the Climate and Forest Initiative is therefore the number of tonnes of reduced emissions the initiative has paid for. In addition, the Climate and Forest Initiative supports efforts and investments to reduce emissions in the countries. From the Climate and Forest Initiative's start in 2008 to 2020, the initiative has paid a total of NOK 10 billion for 320 million tonnes of reduced emissions from tropical forests in Brazil, Guyana, Colombia and Ecuador. This result in emission reductions is equivalent to more than six years' emissions from Norway, at an average price of NOK 31 per tonne. Norway has only paid for a fraction of the total emissions countries have carried out in the period, total emission reductions from the forest amount to over 4 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalents. The largest part is from the Brazilian Amazon for results in the years 2007–2017. The reduction here amounts to more than 70 times annual Norwegian emissions. At the same time, we have mechanisms which mean that when countries stop delivering emission reductions, as has been the case in Brazil in recent years, the payments have stopped. Nevertheless, the support for reforms in Brazil has had a lasting effect: despite the decline under the Bolsonaro government, deforestation is still around 40 per cent lower than the level before the reform period began". Regjeringen (2020).

Problems and challenges with results-based incentives such as REDD+ are rooted in the fact that legitimacy is linked to the creation of results. Without verifiable results the programme lacks legitimacy. There is a risk that if a project fails, despite best efforts, funding recipients will feel forced to point to non-existent causal links in an attempt to legitimise their efforts and to ensure funding continues.

In the question of what we call results, this is necessary information as it shows if there has been a change in attitude amongst locals for example, or research that shows that the most efficient way to achieve results is through safeguarding and strengthening the local communities. The issue is that it is almost impossible to measure change in attitude towards how one values nature and safeguarding within authorities or how local communities are experiencing safeguarding from the authorities in the various countries. Even though there is a need for proven results through the amount of carbon, it cannot ensure a long-term solution. If the indigenous people and local communities are the best protectors of the forest, then shouldn't a strengthening of such kind be viewed as a result?

Experts and practitioners agree that how results are being measured and defined is complex. There have been many interesting discussions about what a result is, and how one should define it. Naturally this is difficult to define, as a result can mean so many different things in various settings and affected by different factors. When looking at Indonesia's case, one can say that the result there has been so much more than just reduced emission and stored carbon. From the signing of the latest LoI, and over the 10 year period the agreement was active, Indonesia has seen a drastic, positive reformation in government, in their laws and how they think about agricultural effectiveness and how to protect their forests (semi-structured interview, 2022), one can argue that this is a valuable result in itself. Most practitioners and experts interviewed for this project agree that one should look at how results are being defined. Having said that, in the earlier phases of REDD+, funds have been paid out on the basis of changes of laws and rules, processes or establishments of institutions. This is more policy-based. According to practitioners, counting emissions gives you a clearer indicator over time if emissions are actually going down in line with the incentives. If so, there are good reasons to continue to facilitate result-based payments. This is relevant towards giving incentives that go in the right direction. Some practitioners argue that Indonesia would not have achieved positive changes at the rate they have done had it not been for the cooperation they have had with Norway in the ten plus years. Through close cooperation with indigenous rights organisations, civil society and multilateral agencies, the incentive has contributed to strengthening the rights and voice of indigenous people both in the international climate negotiations and in national processes in the forest nations where they work. Indigenous people have been given control over large new rainforest areas in both Brazil and Indonesia (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

The report from Riksrevisjonen (2018) claims that Indonesia is among the countries with the highest emissions due to vast emissions from forests and peat moors. The forces fighting against reform are financially and politically powerful. Still, Indonesia has, with the support from Norway and as a direct consequence of the partnership agreement from 2010, introduced several vital rules and regulations. A decision from 2016 declared all deforestation on peat moors illegal could lead to annual emission reductions that correspond to as much as 10 times Norway’s annual emissions. Indonesia has not yet reduced deforestation, but the agreement, and Norwegian contributions since then, have contributed to a completely new political willingness to fight deforestation in a serious manner, and many specific reforms to ensure better law enforcement and stronger rights for indigenous people.

Indonesia provides an example of the difficulty of clearly identifying results. The next subsection will explore the challenges relating to REDD+ funding being subject to aid regulations in the Indonesian context.

5.2.1 Miscommunication Between Norway and Indonesia

Both experts and practitioners agree that, with time under REDD+, there has been a break with Indonesian culture, a country which is very process oriented. Here, that process and collaboration has had value. The Norwegian government has been focused on results, but has had differing expectations than Indonesian policy makers, a factor that has affected the relationship with Indonesia over time. Practitioners explain how the frustration on the Indonesian side could be identified with the progress they have had, but which is not shown in the form of results, has not been sufficiently recognized by the Norwegian side even though it has required great effort and adjustment from them. Indonesia underwent major changes over time, not just the forest management but the land used in a country that is spread over thousands of islands and time zones, cultures, levels of political control which is super complex. Experts argue that the mechanism that they set up in the agreement with Indonesia, which was built on only transferring funds when Indonesia had proven results towards deforestation, does not fit in with the expectations from the Norwegian government of how NICFI are to spend their yearly aid budget. NICFI had a large amount of funds that needed to be spent in a short time. This can be viewed as the extreme version of aid. This is something that the practitioners have agreed to to some extent as well.

The Indonesian government decided to end the $1 billion deal with Norway where Indonesia preserves its rainforests in the fight against carbon emission (Jong, 2021). The decision was made after the Indonesian government claimed that the payments from Norway were lagging. The Indonesian government says that they are still committed to reducing GHG emissions but will try to succeed without the funding. The Norwegian government says that the legal agreement for the transfer of funds was in discussion when the termination took place (Jong, 2021). Norway agreed the first “results-based” payment to Indonesia of US$56 million in 2019, based on Indonesia’s figures for carbon emissions from deforestation in 2016/2017. Still, two years later no funding was received due to what Alue Dohong, Indonesia’s Deputy

Environment and Forestry Minister claimed to be "lack of goodwill" from the Norwegian government (Lang, 2021). The deal stopped after 11 years of collaboration, where Norway was yet to transfer any "result-based" funding. The Indonesian government statement was based on: "the lack of concrete progress on the implementation of the obligation of the government of Norway to deliver the results-based payment for Indonesia's achievement in reducing 11,2 million CO2eq greenhouse gas emissions in 2016/2017, that has been verified by an international organisation." (Lang, 2021). The Norwegian government statement read:

"Our two nations have for more than a decade collaborated on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. During this time, Indonesia has become a world leader in combating tropical deforestation. A series of progressive regulations and policies to protect the nation's rainforests have been put in place. The results are impressive. Last year, Norway announced a contribution of NOK 530 million to Indonesia for its 2016/2017 deforestation results in line with the Letter of Intent. The contribution was intended to be disbursed to Indonesia's own financial mechanism, the newly established Indonesian Environment Fund (IEF). Recently, our two governments have been engaged in discussions on a legal agreement for the transfer of the results-based contribution. Up until today's termination announcement, discussions in this regard were ongoing and in Norway's view constructive and progressing well, within the frameworks set by our two countries' regulatory limits." (NICFI, 2021).

According to some experts, part of the problem with Indonesia is with the logic behind that there should be results-based support with a recipient discretion. This means that the countries themselves choose how they implement measurements. The recipient country will deliver some results which is one of the principles for international environmental agreements. However, it is Norway that sets the goals. NORAD required access to the premises in Indonesia in order to be able to go in and check the offices on how they had spent the money. Still, there are two logics with this. Norway should pay for the results but should also have an opinion on how the money is used and how to achieve results. It is in a way a basic clash between logics and a collision between what the countries expect from each other. Some experts believe that the agreement was aborted due to NICFI worrying about potential corruption and whether they could control where the money goes. Indonesians then felt that they were being subjected to the sort of conditions that were not appropriate to what was meant to be a payment for results. Practitioners repeat how the collaboration was ended due to

the development assistance aid rules which has meant that funding has some minimum requirements that must be met before NICFI can grant a transfer.

The regulations from Norway have, from Indonesia's side, been perceived as too hands-on and strict, so the work with finalising the transfer for approved results has taken longer than both parties anticipated. Practitioners explain how NICFI was waiting for Indonesia to complete a payout mechanism. Further they discussed how Indonesia largely had expectations that this would be a pure transaction where they document the result, NICFI would get it confirmed and verified by a third party, then transfer the money to be left to their disposal. However, as these funds come with security mechanisms and reporting requirements, it did not fit into the picture that Indonesia had. According to the practitioners, the Indonesian government was told as early as 2012 that they needed to have an account in place before the Norwegian government could transfer any money. So, when the Indonesian government claimed that Norway is unwilling to pay for their results, one of the responses from the Norwegian government is that they have nowhere to transfer the funds to. Brazil has the Brazilian Development Bank where the Norwegian government can invest the money gained from results. Indonesia does not have an equivalent.

It seems like there were different expectations to the process and the pace of it. Both parties have most likely not communicated sufficiently clearly regarding their expectations for each other. One practitioner claimed that they were close to closing the agreement before the break-up, and it therefore came as a surprise for NICFI. Indonesia wanted a different modality for REDD+ transfers than what they initially were able to offer. In other words, the regulations behind the funding have been misunderstood from the Indonesian side or not clearly communicated from Norway's side. Thus, the irritation has been clear from the Indonesian side as they have experience that they have to comply with a long list of requirements before they get paid even after they have delivered the results. NICFI have recognized the results and have confirmed the amount they would receive. In a large and important emerging economy like Indonesia, which is in the middle of a democracy-building project nationally, it seemed quite uncomfortable to be lectured by a small nation like Norway.

What happened in Indonesia was that for them money was not the most important thing. It might have been in 2010 to finance the shift, but in recent years they have engaged in

deforestation. Now, all this affects the original idea, and the value of there have been reforms and good results in the forest field. Practitioners argue that one important aspect has been that the attitude to land use has changed fundamentally. They would rather get recognition for this change politically for having turned that ship around, than get money for per ton of Co2. Measurement of efficiency will be more demanding here, with perhaps other factors than in 2010 where it was pure monetary value. The mechanism is understood differently in different countries and from different peoples, but also in different times.

When asking if what happened between Indonesia and Norway could happen again, the answers have differed. Some experts claim that it could. The main issue with Indonesia was the struggle with communication and expectation over time. Both parties need to reflect when these kinds of issues occur. Practitioners and experts concur that even though the agreement did not go according to plan, there is evidence that has shown over time that civil society was strengthened in the process of REDD+. However, this success was in something very unconcreted, but nonetheless, very important. Experts also argue that if experts had been further addressed by the practitioners before the agreement with Indonesia was created, it could have better foreseen what would need to be clarified and communicated between the parties to create some kind of common understanding.

This shows what rushed agreements, without creating a common understanding of expectations, and miscommunication can lead to. In addition, it demonstrates that results are viewed differently.

5.3 Agreement Between Norway and Brazil

This section and the next look at how the bilateral agreements between Norway and Brazil, and Norway and Indonesia were developed and their different starting points. This is to look more into the complexities of results and to explore the different aspects which need to be considered to enable an initiative to achieve its goals.

NICFI has collaborated with Brazil since 2008, where the main emphasis has been to pay for Brazil’s results. In this case, the money is transferred into the Amazon fund. The Amazon fund spends the funds on specific projects according to Brazil's strategy on how to reduce

deforestation. Practitioners explain how there is a steering committee that has developed the various calls for proposals and the criteria for how they want to use the funds.

The funding from the Norwegian government towards the Amazon fund was frozen two years ago, due to Brazil changing the management structure of the Amazon fund, which made it impossible for Norway to pay for results as there then was no one who could verify actual results. Brazil froze all voluntary organisations from the governance structures of the Amazon Fund. The projects that were already initiated have continued to be implemented. However, quite a lot of funding has been managed outside of the frozen funding, especially associated with indigenous organisations because it shows that it has been difficult for them to access funds in the Amazon fund. According to some practitioners, one of the criteria in the negotiation between Norway and Brazil is that Norway would only pay for results if there are results. Further, they explain how there have been no results over the last three years. The political dialogue between Norway and Brazil has been, and continues to be, difficult.

The Amazon Fund is a Brazilian invention, where Norway accepted the management structure as it was of quality and well-functioning. They did so as it was a representation of the volunteers and indigenous organisations to be involved in deciding how the funds should be used and where it should be used. When serious changes were made to the structure without consulting Norway according to the agreement between the two countries, Norway could not accept that. In addition, Brazil claimed that the strategy on how to spend the funds was no longer valid immediately prior to the freezing of the funds. Several interviewees explained that the Amazon fund wanted to create a new strategy that reflected the Bolsonaro government's policy. After three years, there is still no sign of a new strategy. Over the last three years, deforestation levels have skyrocketed and there are doubts about the sitting government's willingness to reduce deforestation (Semi-structured interview, 2022). Both experts and practitioners agree that a fruitful collaboration between Norway and Brazil is probably not possible until there is a new government.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Norway and Brazil was signed in 2008. It reads how to collaborate and share information around requirements on reporting, assessment, monitoring and verification. One practitioner could tell that this is an agreement with quite a bit of “slack”. Meaning that there is a lot of room for interpretation and trust. Between NICFI and the Amazon Fund, there has been created a framework that governs how

the money is to be spent and the rights that Norway have in relation to abuse of funds and other such breaches of terms, making it a comprehensive agreement. The agreement has only been updated slightly since it was signed. The updated MOU states that the deforestation strategy forms the basis of the fund's activities, wherein activities financed by the Amazon Fund are in addition to Brazil's own measures. There is a lot of room to update or change the strategy that determines how the money is to be spent without having to change the MOU, which is the underlying one.

The Brazilian Development Bank, which administers the Amazon Fund as part of its portfolio, is the largest recipient of funds from NICFI. At the end of 2017, Norway had transferred NOK 7.6 billion to the Amazon Fund (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). Of this, a total of NOK 1.2 billion was transferred during 2016 and 2017. The Ministry of Climate and Environment was in contact with the Amazon Fund in January 2016 in connection with media attention regarding an investigation of the bank concerning suspected fraud linked to project approvals. The investigation was not aimed at projects under the Amazon Fund but covered the bank's general internal controls. After being informed about the bank's internal control systems, the Ministry decided to sit back and keep a view of the developments in the situation. The investigation shows that, in its decision, the Ministry failed to take account of the fact that the investigation of the bank revealed a risk of weaknesses in the bank's internal controls and that these weaknesses impacted on the administration of the Norwegian funds paid to Brazil (Riksrevisjonen, 2018).

Experts claim that the Norwegian government essentially handed over the funds to Brazil with very low demands attached compared to funds sent to other countries. The Norwegian government has responded that they believe that substantial results have been achieved in the Amazon region and that developments in Brazil show that REDD+ is working. Practitioners argue that Brazil has considerably reduced its greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation relative to the reference level. Deforestation in the Brazilian part of the Amazon has reached a level where Brazil is entitled to receive payments from Norway under the agreement for the bilateral partnership (2008–2020). Nonetheless, the trend in the deforestation figures shows that the reduction in deforestation levelled out during the period of the bilateral partnership (Riksrevisjonen, 2018). Still, experts further argue that the government did not take into account that the reference level that was set in the agreement was quite inflated which might have resulted in an artificial emission reduction. This shows the discrepancies related to

results-based funding schemes like REDD+ and its designation as aid funding. The following section will compare in detail the differences between the Brazil and Indonesia cases, showing how these factors can have a great impact on the programme's success.

5.3.1 Indonesia vs Brazil

A big difference between the bilateral agreement between Norway and Indonesia, and Norway and Brazil is that Brazil had the Amazon Fund in place from the start of the collaboration, whereas Indonesia has attempted to set something similar up for ten years. Practitioners argue that this channel allowed them to transfer finances through a means in accordance with the Norwegian administrative regulations of how to use development assistance funds. The agreement with Brazil is that Norway pays for some of the results to Brazil, but the money from them will have to be used in a certain way already agreed upon. The Amazon Fund is located in the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), one of the largest development banks, and they have complied with aid regulations from many countries. The Norwegian regulations are similar to those enforced by other donor countries, meaning that BNDES is used to strict aid rules and requirements.

Indonesia has their Letter of Intent (LoI), a written agreement on what results that will generate payments. However, the practitioners interviewed agreed that the Indonesian government did not fully agree with the framework on how funding can be spent according to Norwegian development assistance regulations. Some claim that the Indonesian government wanted to have full control over how they spent the funds. The issue was that this could not be accepted by the Norwegian government as it goes against their set rules.

Several of the experts discussed how Brazil was able to get a more flexible agreement than Indonesia since Brazil inhabits the largest rainforest in the world and has more political influence and can therefore dictate more. In the negotiations, Brazil could set requirements. One example is the independent verification that Norway was to have in the agreement with Brazil. Brazil did not agree with the principle of having results, where the decision was to create a result-based mechanism where results are verified so that they could transfer funds to the Amazon Fund. Brazil had great results before the agreement which allowed Norway to have more confidence in Brazil. One of the practitioners informed that this view was

expressed by Lula Da Silva, who was present in the negotiation between Norway and Brazil, and he reflected on one of Norway's ruling parties at the time. This created a trust in the Amazon Fund, partly explaining why the agreement was able to allow flexibility. Further, according to experts, Brazilian negotiators were smart in the negotiation meetings where they admitted mistakes, and how they now were taking action and needed funding to create better results. According to experts, Indonesia needed some time before they changed the rhetoric about how to tackle the issue of deforestation. They had to have a different approach as well, as they needed to go through more phases of REDD+. There should initially have been a policy reform, where one should pick out one or two provinces that should have results-based support. So, when Indonesia first got to change tactics, they got to the agreement but with far more prescriptive measures. Norway was happy with the agreement where they followed the textbook and the phased approach.

At the time of writing, the deal between Norway and Brazil is frozen, whereas recent developments show that Indonesia and Norway have embarked on another REDD+ scheme that will see Norway pay the former to keep its forests standing, after a previous attempt failed due to the lack of payment (Jong, 2022). The new partnership was enshrined in a MOU signed by Indonesia's Minister of Environment and Forestry, Siti Nurbaya Bakar, and Norway's Minister of Climate and Environment, Espen Barth Eide, on September the 12th. NICFI will channel the payments directly to Indonesia's Environment Fund. The Environmental Fund Management Agency was officially formed in September 2019 and launched in October 2019 to bring multiple sources of funding together to be deployed through a variety of instruments across a number of different sectors, including forestry, energy and mineral resources, carbon trading, environmental services, industry, transport, agriculture, marine and fisheries (bpdlh, 2020). BPDLH is "an environmental funding mechanism for channelling and distributing environmental and climate funds to support Indonesia's vision to preserve the functions of the environment and prevent environmental pollution and degradation. This includes efforts to achieve Indonesia's commitment to reduce Indonesia's GHG emissions and to meet the Sustainable Development Goals" (bpdlh, 2020). This was therefore not available when the first LoI was signed back in 2010, but part of the solution towards how to channel the funding from Norway to Indonesia today. Further, the $56 million in outstanding funds that Norway had agreed to pay Indonesia back in 2019 will be paid under the new partnership. Eide said Norwegian payments for Indonesia's REDD+ achievements made from 2016/2017 to 2019/2020 will be based on the existing MRV

protocol, a system set up by Indonesia to account for its progress in reducing emissions. Payments for results generated from 2020/2021 onward will be based on a mutually agreed updated MRV protocol (Jong, 2022).

The new partnership is slightly different this time. According to Indonesia's environment minister Siti, it is not only about result-based contribution agreement, but also a broader engagement on forest and climate issues in Indonesia. The MOU emphasises the importance of deliverable, tangible and direct benefits for the community and progress in Indonesia. Indonesia's Environment Ministry, Dida Migfar Ridha, has said that to prevent this new deal from being abruptly terminated like the last one, it is based on mutual respect and mutual understanding, complete with an MRV protocol that's mutually agreed on by the two countries (Jong, 2022).

One can speculate that the programme with these bilateral-agreements would have ended up with a different result if it had been consulted better beforehand. According to experts, there are many people in Norad with expertise in the countries they work with. But there was no expertise at all about tropical deforestation and the drivers behind it at the time the programme was initiated. For this reason, the Rainforest Fund was involved early in the transfer of knowledge about what drives deforestation and how to program or plan the use of money in order for it to have an optimal effect. Experts speculate that if there were more studies before they started, it might have been done in a slightly different way. But there was a great impatience and a push to get started as early as possible, and expectations the results-based incentive would create results. The knowledge has been built up with experience on the way, and one has gradually understood how complex this is.

Some experts have criticised how little research has been done on how this works empirically. Far too little has been taken into account regarding if there is a reason why situations in the forest countries are the way they are. There are many dominant and powerful players who have benefited from having the system as it is today. And changing these structures with financial carrots does not work unless the incentives are so large that it becomes more attractive to go after that endeavour. It takes an enormous amount of time. Take the regime in Brazil for example, after Bolsonaro came into power, drivers of deforestation could begin to deforest. Research shows that in regime changes between two governments, a vacuum often arises in the government where they do not follow up on illegal deforestation and what is

happening on the ground. And the forces behind deforestation know how to make use of this window. In Brazil, a third of the bureaucracy is replaced within each change of president. So if you replace one third of the Ministry of Climate and Environment and replace them with a third new ones, then it will take time to get that experience in and get a grip on everything that needs to be followed up. In Brazil, there is very strong forest legislation on how to overcome deforestation. The question is how to enforce this law and follow up on that legislation (semi-structured interview, 2022).

Some of the practitioners completely disagree that the rules linked to the funding are preventing their partners from reaching their goals. Where some of the other practitioners are somewhat unsure of this and agree that it is worth discussing. What is interesting is that almost all of the experts agree that the fact that this is funding from the aid budget is problematic at some points. Interestingly, practitioners could tell that Norad and NICFI are now in the process of simplifying the rules for aid handling, and there are certainly a number of things that they are going to do there. According to practitioners, the rules are being simplified after general lessons gained over time. General rules are developed, and then new rules are created because of certain problems that arise. After a while, there are so many rules and regulations that one struggles with capturing the problems that need to be captured. By simplifying rules, the idea is to try to capture the important issues that can arise.

This and the preceding sections have highlighted the issues in the Norwegian REDD+ agreements with Brazil and Indonesia. These problems have been acknowledged and one of the responses has been the appearance of the ART-TREES standard.

5.4 ART-TREES Standard - Can a New Standard Solve the Problem?

As discussed in the literature review, there were some issues with the jurisdictional and bilateral agreements in the beginning, as the regulations negotiated were too flexible. Several experts discuss how this flexibility has been exploited in countries where unrealistic baselines have been created to measure results at the jurisdictional level as well. The new ART-TREES standard is an attempt to solve this problem.

Previously, a price was decided for how much emission reduction REDD+ quotas would cost, and then negotiated the standard for what would apply. With ART-TREES, they have tried to turn it around by enforcing the standard but negotiating the price. This means that if the results have been difficult to achieve due to a more demanding standard, then this achievement should result in a higher payment. Some experts claim that there is a lot in the ART-TREES that is a response to criticism or new evidence from research after ten years of testing REDD+. At such an overall level, one must look at what is changing the debate, and what is it that affects such costs as this. Still, there is a lot to learn from what is not working.

What is new with the ART-TREES standard is the fact that it works on a national level. The actual reference level for what happens with deforestation is found at the national deforestation level. This avoids the potential problem when working at a project level where smaller areas are chosen and a reference level is being made. This is something that is echoed by both the experts and practitioners, it is easy to reduce deforestation in a project area but you have no guarantee that the problem is only being transferred to a different area of the forest. Hence, called carbon leakage.

Carbon leakage is a problem, and a bigger problem when it comes to REDD + projects naturally, as it is in a smaller area. On a jurisdictional level, the standards have been deducted from leakage risks as there are built in incentives for a country to try to counteract that danger and to make it work at the greatest possible level. The ART-TREES standard will be stricter and have tougher demand for what triggers payment. Some experts fear that this will cause some negative reactions in forest countries as the standards will be more difficult to meet. Brazil has had so much deforestation lately that it is currently relatively easy to get results even with the ART-TREES standard. This made Norway and other countries make tougher demands on what should trigger payments, which is naturally getting some resistance as countries are used to the previous system.

NICFI took the lead in establishing this common international standard which could be used in other contexts. This standard includes all the elements to be able to round up for performance-based payment. It says something about how the reference level should be prepared, the requirements, what should be included in a goal, what requirements should be set for data collection and data analysis. Further, it says something about how to calculate emission reductions, how to take into account the risk of reversal, and how to take into

account uncertainty in the figures. According to practitioners, this is a fairly comprehensive standard that has been prepared, which was the subject of a final consultation process where there were separate expert groups that prepared the various parts. There is a separate board, an ART secretariat and then there is a board that consists of very reputable professionals from different institutions.

NICFI is now in the process of integrating their bilateral cooperation into this ART-TREES standard. This means that they are outsourcing the work that goes around this. They no longer have a bilaterally negotiated agreement but will pay on the basis that the emissions are verified in accordance with the ART standard (semi-structured interview, 2022). The ART board ultimately issues a certain amount of allowances and credits, customs and emission reductions that are verified and can be paid for.

With this new standard one will get equal treatment for the partner countries. However, there are other parties out there who also pay for emission reductions who want to use their own protocols. The purpose is therefore to create a common, high standard that will treat this kind of work equally. The ones who pay for emission reductions for reduced deforestation will build this initiative up to ensure a continuous increase in the level of ambition. This is natural under the Paris Agreement where commitments are made over 5-year periods. The next 5 year-period will then build on the previous one, and you move the whole duration. So reduced deforestation to a certain level has been achieved and there is a desire to continue into a new five-year period, the new goal builds on what has been achieved in the previous period. Thus, it is meant to help to propel ambitions (semi-structured interview, 2022).

The ART-TREES standard includes everything that is in the UN decisions about REDD+, meaning it contains all the requirements that must exist in systems that take care of safeguards, which are about distribution, social conditions, biodiversity, indigenous peoples' rights, and everything else that requires following up and reporting on in the ART-TREES standard. This is a prerequisite for finally obtaining a verification of tonnes of CO2. What they will be paid for in the end is tons of CO2, calculated on the basis of reduced deforestation. Still, there are also a number of requirements saying something about how you have implemented initiatives and how you have achieved that reduction in deforestation. It needs to have happened in a way that takes care of social considerations, biodiversity and

distributional considerations, because it is also one of the whole frameworks that has been adopted under the climate convention.

Under ART-TREES, a country must deliver 3 reports. First, they deliver a concept note in which they set the framework for what they are to implement in terms of a time period, and what they already have in place. This will include a safeguard information system which is something that has been developed under the UN climate convention, but is implemented in the countries themselves. This is something that they have had to build up. The next step is where the country delivers something that is a TREE registration document, and it is described in much greater detail what systems and schemes the country has to be able to follow up on all the different elements. It includes everything from indigenous peoples' rights and good distributions, to how their national forest monitoring is set up. Both of these documents are reviewed by the secretariat, which delivers follow-up questions which they then have to follow up and answer. And then the country delivers a monitoring report which is in a way the substance itself, where the telecommunications team is presented along with other information (Semi-structured interview, 2022). This is what forms the basis of the verification process. The verification must be carried out by an entity or company that is accredited to carry out the verification through ART-TREES. NICFI are then sent material, and then they carry out a form of consultation process with the country. This is done so that affected parties can provide input and say what they think or have experience with, or provide any additional information. According to the practitioners, there are no restrictions on who can submit input on this during the verification process. This is in the REDD + mechanism under the UN Climate Convention where it is stated that you should have an open process. A verification company who goes through all of this will also visit the country at some point during the verification and will then be able to follow up and get in touch and talk to affected parties who provide input. In some forest countries this will be more or less sensitive and difficult, it is therefore important to have a good process around this.

The intention has been a broad and open process to develop this standard by someone who does not have a financial interest in where the funding goes. ART-TREES has a professional and independent process on the inside, where no one is interested in making money on getting approved and verified. ART-TREES sets a standard that should cover jurisdiction, preferably an entire country, secondarily it can then be subnational, i.e., state. However, this is only until 2030. After that it has to be on the national level. Here it will be a requirement concerning

what a country reports. The idea is that a country reports on what they will apply and follow up their REDD+ plan under ART-TREES.

One of the things NICFI are concerned about is getting over to something that is an independent and high standard that is primarily used at the national level and by national authorities. One of the requirements is that the national authorities are the ones behind and drive the process under ART-TREES. This is something completely different from what has taken place in projects previously.

Experts say that it will be interesting to see what this involves, as there has not been sufficiently studied the politics of it and it is just the power of the donors who are determining the rules and the resistance at national levels, it is the politics between different ministries at national level and then you have the state level. One guess is that it is a way of saying that they are implicitly recognising that they had difficulties at national level and are now trying another approach. This means that when working with the national authorities, they are responsible. It is only in this way that one can get to the adjustment that you depend on in the long run for the forestry to go down. With REDD+, one is affected by national politics and the national political situation in each country. And one of the purposes of the countries is to develop a policy and an administration that is not favouring continental deforestation. Deforestation is illegal, still it is not being stopped (semi-structured interview, 2022). This is due to it being connected to other elements in the economy and the development of a country. When it comes to the commodity market, there are very few people involved in REDD+ have any control or influence over. What REDD+ can try to do is to bring out all the other benefits of forests being left standing and not being removed. After they started to gain a few years of experience, there are a number of countries that manage to show that they get a healthy economy with the restructuring that has been implemented. That one does not necessarily have to deforest in order to make a profit in the agricultural sector, for example (semi-structured interview, 2022). Practitioners argue that the most important thing with this is that if there is a body that creates a global standard that has an independent piece of criteria, it will be less subject to political pressure towards this.

The comparison between Norway's agreements with Brazil and Indonesia shed light on multiple elements of my research questions. We have seen that results are open to interpretation, and that what one party thinks is a result may not meet the expectations of the

other party. We have also seen that REDD+ funding coming from aid budgets adds a further complication. Experts interviewed for this project have highlighted many points at which miscommunication and misunderstandings have led to the breakdown in the Norway/Indonesia agreement. We have also seen that the agreement with Brazil progressed more smoothly due to Brazil's stronger starting point (compared to Indonesia). However, this agreement also met problems when a change of government meant a shift in the political will for the programme to succeed.

We have also seen how the ART-TREES standard has come about as a response to issues at a national level. The success of this standard is yet to be seen, but will be interesting to follow the developments of. What has become clear however, is the importance of the role of academic researchers in assessing the progress and success of REDD+. The next section will explore the importance of collaboration in greater depth.

6.0 REDD+ Collaboration Between Practitioners and Experts

In this section I will discuss how practitioners and experts collaborate towards sharing information and communicating. This is important as research can tell something about what is actually working through initiatives, and what is less effective. By sharing information and communicating, REDD+ would benefit from gaining insight over time, which research gives, and rearranging the course of the initiatives that practitioners can influence. However, to make this work there needs to be a common understanding of the goals and intention of REDD+. In studies of environmental issues, the question of how to establish a productive interplay between science and policy is broadly debated. Hurley et al. (2016) argue that researchers benefit from a better understanding of policy and political processes. Exchange between researchers and practitioners can be essential to the development of both disciplinary knowledge and professional practice. How can this be efficient and fruitful for both parties? What can or should be achieved, and how? In this section, I will discuss how the programme can benefit from new perspectives and a new understanding of problems and potential solutions flowing from strict, proper research. This should not be fused with a "linear and utilitarian view of research" (Davoudi, 2006, p. 14), rather, as with practice benefiting from

knowledge and evidence produced from research, research benefits from being informed by practice problems and practical knowledge, leading to broader issues of knowledge production in both sides and areas.

There are three key issues, identified from interviews and literature will be explored.

- Lack of a common collaborative platform, communication and funding for independent research.
- Independent research is viewed as too critical to use due to lack of common understanding between practitioners and experts towards the purpose of REDD+ and what they are trying to achieve.
- The role of research in policy processes

6.1 Lack of Common Platforms, Communication and Funding for Independent Research

To collaborate efficiently and realistically, there is a need for some sort of platform or meeting place where practitioners or experts can share their knowledge and discuss problems or ideas. Below, I have looked into how the practitioners and experts interact with each other and why it is important to collaborate and share knowledge. It also addresses the issue with funding. Independent research needs funding. The Norwegian government through Norad and NICFI has called for applications and evaluations towards issues represented under REDD+, who the main receivers for these funds are and how the role of the evaluations will be addressed.

Experts and practitioners have a few platforms where they collaborate towards REDD+. The biggest and main one is the. The Oslo Tropical Forest Forum, which is an important global conference which gathers policymakers and practitioners from civil society, the private sector, and public sector organisations who are working at global, national, and sub-national levels to reduce and reverse tropical deforestation. The conference is hosted by Norad on behalf of the NICFI (Norad, 2022). This event is only for people who are invited, and therefore not a meeting place one can sign up to attend if one feels like they can contribute. This is an important meeting arena as it creates a space to reflect on the last years of efforts to protect forests and chart a way forward. There are natural disasters which become more frequent and severe with climate change. Fires have burned large areas of Brazil and Indonesia over the

last few years (Seymore, 2018). Although degradation of forests through logging and fragmentation by roads give them less resilience to extreme weather events, there are restrictions to which forest-specific interventions can be effective in the face of a changing climate. While stabilising the global climate is contingent on saving the world's forests, saving the forests is also contingent on stabilising the global climate. All of these things are important to address as these forums. When asking experts if they have other natural or more frequent meeting places to share information, the answer is simply no. There are a few meetings organised by practitioners where experts are invited, however, this is not the norm. Further, all of the experts explain how they would be more than willing to have more frequent and informal meeting areas for sharing of information and experiences.

A lot of the research that has been conducted has been funded by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, through calls for proposals managed by Norad and NICFI. In the call for proposals from 2020 from Norad with a project period from 2021 to 2025, 39 new projects were granted. The total allocation was NOK 1,835 billion (Norad, n.d). CIFOR has received a significant amount of funding from NICFI and has done a lot of research on REDD+. A quick browse through their publications, and one can find a long list of research related to the initiative. Their project "Global comparative study for achieving REDD+ results - Giving an understanding of what works and what doesn't", was granted NOK 100 million from the period 2016 - 2020 (Norad, 2016). The project purpose was to work closely with research partners and stakeholders in all NICFI priority countries to ensure that REDD+ policymakers and practitioner communities had access to and used the information, analysis, and tools needed to design and implement REDD+; create enabling conditions; and assess to what degree REDD+ has delivered effective, cost-efficient and equitable carbon and non-carbon benefits. Experts have been divided in whether they believe that NICFI and Norad use research in their work and when developing the programme. Experts who do, believe that they use it selectively and claim that the government uses research that is useful to them. It is therefore difficult to know how the findings from research conducted by CIFOR for example is integrated into the development of REDD+.

The "tactical model" which was discussed in the theory section, can be illustrated by the relationship between The Centre for international forestry research (CIFOR) and Norad wherein CIFOR has received support under civil society funds from Norad. According to one of the experts, a lot of the funding from the first two Norad calls went to organisations based

in the US and partly in England, and some to civil society in the south. A respectable portion also went to the Rainforest Foundation, and the aforementioned CIFOR. When reviewing who received funding from Norad from 2016 - 2020 and then again in 2021 - 2025, it confirmed that the majority of the granted funds are towards international organisations (Norad, 2016;2021). According to experts, CIFOR has been an alibi in terms of research and there has been a lot of research that has been conducted as continuous research. At the same time as there has been a shift. In the beginning, the government wanted to have independent research, they wanted it to be useful for the ongoing work. The research should ensure that they reach their goal. The issue is that this is the opposite of action research where you must work to get results and take the socially critical distance to assess what is. So, one becomes both an actor and a neutral judge.

The REDD+ initiative has been through several evaluations. And according to several of the experts, the evaluations done by CIFOR are paid by NICFI. Experts I spoke to, even those who have been part of CIFOR, confirm that NICFI wanted CIFOR to find some understanding of what works and what does not in the REDD+ policy arena as this is important for decision makers. The process of REDD+ policy design would, according to the experts, benefit from policy learning. More findings from evaluation from CIFOR has been that CIFOR envisions international REDD+ arrangements that generate significant financial resources to foster the transition from unsustainable land management practices in forests and forest margins towards environmentally sustainable management practices that improves rural livelihoods and that respects and strengthens social safeguards. Further, Researchers from CIFOR and others have continued to show that most of the large-scale deforestation is not driven by the value of the tree and forest resources. Deforestation was being continued due to the demand for the land for conversion to various uses. Ranging from agriculture, livestock, timber plantations, mining, infrastructure and habitation (Norad, 2016). The increasing land demand in developing countries is connected to population growth and increased per capita consumption of natural resources. Here, the researchers task is designed to supply to REDD+ policy design, implementation and outcomes that improve the wellbeing of rural communities, including disadvantaged groups such as indigenous peoples and women, while conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and reducing land-based emissions. CIFOR, in collaboration with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, London), has completed the assessment on how well the Global Comparative Study (GCS) on REDD+ project has achieved its aim and

how it could be improved. The evidence collected from this assessment suggests that a combination of research, policy engagement and practical support on the ground has been an effective approach to secure the impact of the project (Norad,2016).

All the experts participating in this study agree that researchers should be involved in shaping REDD+ policy and in subjecting its results to scrutiny. Experts discuss how REDD+ projects underperform compared to their initial goals, leading to them being judged as having failed Such criticism is an example of projects being subjected to the "Nirvana approach", meaning that anything short of a perfect result is judged to be a failure, for the practitioner the reality is more nuanced. Experts claim that REDD+'s method of evaluating success creates confusion and difficulty in establishing and selling starting values. In REDD+ there is a comparison with a historical reference level. When a reference level is set, and then you have the business-as-usual scenario about what would happen. Where in a standard impact assessment one should not compare with the perfect scenario, but one should compare to see if it has made a difference. There is a curiosity from experts on why research has not been brought more to the field in the development of REDD+.

Part of the problem and explanation to why there is sometimes a disconnection between practitioners and experts, is that being critical means different to the experts and the practitioners. This can be problematic. Many researchers do not understand the practitioners' side and viewpoints. Leading to certain research becoming irrelevant because they do not have the same understanding as mentioned previously. However, some experts claim that experts who work closely with the directorates like NORAD or the ministries over some time develop some understanding for their position and try to mediate between the two. This is something that requires trust and is being expressed as easier to do in a casual chat instead of in a conference. Most of the experts agree that the practitioners should work with researchers who have a fair understanding of the realities of what NICFI, and Norad does. The experts should understand the policy and expectations linked to the initiative. Further, the practitioners should be open to share their knowledge and try to create a common understanding with the experts. It goes both ways, and it requires a common will to make this a reality. Experts have expressed that the best way of linking research and policy is for somebody in NICFI to contact someone in one of the universities or contacting a group of researchers. They want them to reach out. On the opposite side, the practitioners have

expressed they are open for the experts to reach out to them if they are doing research or have findings that could be relevant for their work arena.

There is some contact between experts and the practitioners, relating to the enlightenment model. People working with REDD+ have explained that they try to closely follow what emerges from research around REDD +, specifically focus areas. And also, on what drives deforestation, what happens inside the forest, the role of the forest in the climate system and so on. The practitioners use what is helpful in how they work, as well as what assessment and analysis they must have in the ministry in relation to this initiative. Some practitioners claim that they have contact with research environments that are focusing on tropical forests. Research on organisational processes or intergovernmental relations might not indicate action to be taken but can offer a deeper understanding of the circumstances under which various interventions might be effective or not. It resembles what might be termed `evidence informed' as a substitute to `evidence-based', policymaking. A lot of social research is inspired by a desire to understand, highlight and explain, rather than by an urgency to provide policy solutions. The idea that research can be problem-solving is based on a delusion of the nature of the policy process, which is rarely defined by rational decisions made on the ground of the best information. Information can be complicated and inconvenient, distracting the awareness of choices most easily made under conditions of relative obliviousness (Young et al., 2002). It is a question of what level the research should focus on for it to have a sufficient effect on what a satisfactory result is. The political level is a field where research has a lot to say. In policy formulation, research evidence is very important. Confirmed by the practitioners is that strategies and policies do use research concerning what drives deforestation, and who the best safekeepers of the tropical forests are - according to research. To look closer at how this is connected, I have had a closer look at NICFI's strategy below.

6.1.1 NICFI's Strategy

Safeguarding is a topic which is difficult to measure. Still, this is one of the mechanisms behind REDD+, and is mandatory before receiving result-based payments like mentioned previously. To discuss how to use research towards REDD+, I ve looked into how research has affected REDD+'s strategic framework. Practitioners have been clear how research has made an impact on their strategy towards safeguarding and on a policy level. This seems to be

accurate when looking at NICFI's strategic framework, one can see how elements like reduced pressure on the forest from the global market, sustainable land use, biodiversity is protected, to mention some.



Figure 7: Riksrevisjonen (2018)

As mentioned, practitioners have acknowledged how they have become aware of the importance of safeguarding the local community through research which has shown that indigenous people are the most efficient protectors of the forest (In-depth interview, 2022). I would argue that this is evident in their strategy. Under their strategy for right for the indigenous people, for example, it says:

"In addition to supporting the forest countries' efforts to protect the rights and livelihoods of indigenous peoples, NICFI works to ensure that indigenous peoples are heard in the international community, in global climate negotiations, and at national and local levels. That is why we support:

- Programs that will ensure indigenous peoples and local communities in our partner countries their right to own and own land, as well as to manage forests.
- Indigenous peoples' active participation in global climate negotiations and other multilateral environmental fora, and recognition of their traditional knowledge of climate and nature strategies
- Involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities in national political processes and in decisions affecting them, such as nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement
- Full and effective participation of indigenous peoples and local communities in financing reduced emissions from tropical forests" (NICFI, n.d.)

Under land use policies their strategy says:

> *"NICFI is perhaps most known for its large results-based bilateral partnership with the key forest countries, where we disburse payments for reduced deforestation verified by satellite imagery. The lion's share of our budget, diplomatic effort and human resources continue to go to such partnerships. Paying for results reduces the risk to Norwegian taxpayers – we only pay where we have a successful and committed partner. It is also targeted at the key result, and less politically intrusive, ensuring the ownership and sovereignty of our partner country. Beyond results-based partnerships, NICFI also supports capacity building efforts and improved land use policies through multilateral channels and civil society partners."*
> *(NICFI, n.d.)*

These two strategies concern safeguarding and the bilateral agreements. According to practitioners, these have been developed and adapted by using research findings. Still, it is not clear if they use independent research or research that has been produced through their calls for proposals. CIFOR has done research on "what does and does not work" in the context of REDD+, but there are independent researchers who seek funding towards generating findings in this area. However, it is understandable that the willingness to create a call for proposals

for independent research is low if the initial thought for the practitioners is that they will be too critical, and hence, unusable. There are experts who are very dismissive of REDD+, and others who are critical but constructive. When experts are too critical, then the willingness to have an inclusive discussion becomes less likely. Experts claim that NICFI has had a close collaboration with experts and think tanks in the US, like Meridian. To this date, there are not any collaborative environments for this in Norway besides the yearly Oslo Tropical Forest Forum, and the occasional meeting.

As this section depicts, there are few collaborative platforms between practitioners and experts in Norway. Further, there is not enough funding towards independent research. The funding that is available flows to international organisations and centres, where some of these actors do have a collaborative relationship with NICFI.

6.2 Critical Independent Research and the Lack of Common Understanding Between Practitioners and Experts Towards the Purpose of REDD+.

In this section I will explore the availability of research to the practitioners, and how useful this research is in terms of shaping policy. Could some of the research be too critical to be useful? It also discusses what being critical means to an expert compared to a practitioner. This is important to understand so that researchers and practitioners are on the same page in terms of what they expect from research.

Even though there is not an informal meeting place available, getting access to the right research is viewed as important to practitioners. But practitioners do express that not all research is relevant, and that some of the research being done on REDD+ is done on the wrong premises. Some of the experts believe that Norad is more interested in critical research and evaluations on how it works in real life than NICFI. It has been discussed that NICFI are more concerned with showing results and being more sensitive to criticism. As discussed, there have been evaluations done on the initiative and research on the impact of the programme.

Most of the experts and practitioners in this study suggest that a closer, more informal collaboration between researchers and the government should work, and would be beneficial.

Some did express their concerns regarding how it would work in real life as it would require a lot of resources. And this could be seen as part of the problem, as REDD+ is meant to be cost-efficient. According to Hurley et al. (2016), there are several factors which can make collaboration between experts and practitioners challenging. First is the access to information from research results. Besides the fact that there is little frequent contact, beneficial research might also be locked behind fees for access. Or written in a complicated language which makes distilling practical and localised implications difficult or time-consuming. Practitioners without the luxury of time prefer information which is precise and easily available. Experts can also often be characterised by the practitioners as too critical, and certain research as too "up in the sky", and to some extent irrelevant to what the practitioners do. Experts, on the other hand, can at times lack the drivers to invest time in communicating and disseminating findings to relevant audiences in an effective manner.

Further, several experts have discussed how it is difficult to get funding to perform independent research concerning REDD+. The response was a few times that the government did not want to fund it. The reason might be that they were not interested in hearing from the research that could be considered unhelpful or researchers who were too critical. Certain aspects could start to make a little sense if one includes the hypothesis that this is a political project, and if one thinks that it is being done so that Norway does not have to make reductions in their own country. According to some experts, the most critical researchers have a mindset that this is political and climate offsetting so that it can be justified with the fact that the Norwegian government has reduced more in other countries. However, the response from the practitioners to this is that this attitude shows a lack of understanding and misperception of goals of the initiative. For example, Benjaminsen and Hanne Svarstad (2018) discuss in his article about a study in Tanzania where the first nine REDD+ pilot projects were conducted, about the implementation in practice. Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2018) argue how REDD+ projects in Tanzania have led to climate colonialism in the Kondoa district in Tanzania. They argue that Norway uses its financial muscles to introduce climate change mitigation measures in poor countries, where the costs are being left to the local people. Climate colonialism is here viewed as the receiving country taking the cost of Norwegian climate policy (Benjaminsen and svarstad, 2018). Practitioners have mentioned this example, and claim that this is a clear misunderstanding as Norway uses aid funding, and can therefore not "account" for any results. Still, it is an interesting discussion about Norway's motivation. This topic will be discussed later further down.

One theory of why the incentives to get good research evaluations is based on that they might want to avoid risking that research will come to conclusions that are the opposite of what is desired from NICFI and the government. The repeating information is that experts have at certain times been perceived as being too critical and have noticed that one needs to be careful about how critical one can be before they are perceived as mostly negative. And many experts claim that researchers who have been given a stamp for being too critical have met the consequence of not being included in the development discussions. There is an intention to work closely with the academics, but it is also acknowledged that researchers need to be critical. However, the practitioners have expressed that they would benefit from research which is action-oriented even though it is not in a researcher's nature to tell anyone about how things should be done in a certain way.

One theory of why there are incentives from NICFI to get good research evaluations is based on the fact that they want to avoid risking independent research to come to conclusions that are the opposite of what is desired from NICFI and the government. Keynes reportedly said, ``There is nothing a government hates more than to be well informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult" (Solesbury, 2001P. 7). This is being echoed with some of the experts behind REDD+ who claimed that the decision makers would for the most time prefer information which agreed with their visions and expectations. Any other information which depicts all the issues and consequences from the initiative would make the whole thing very complicated and perhaps even demotivating. The Norwegian government want to show results generated from the time and money spent invested in saving the world rainforests, and it is more attractive to show the positive results above the negative external effect it might have, or other aspect which needs to be considered in order to assess if it is a result from the initiative or not. The recurring information is that researchers have at certain times been perceived as being too critical and have noticed that one needs to be careful about how critical one can be before they are perceived as negative. Many of the interviewed experts claim that researchers who have been labelled as too critical have been excluded from development discussions. This highlights a discrepancy between what practitioners desire from experts and what experts see their job as being.

Part of the problem and explanation to why there is sometimes a disconnection between practitioners and experts, is that being critical means different to the experts and the practitioners. This can be problematic. Many researchers do not understand the practitioners' side and viewpoints. Leading to certain research becoming irrelevant because they do not have the same understanding as mentioned previously. However, some experts claim that experts who work closely with the directorates like NORAD or the ministries over some time develop some understanding for their position and try to mediate between the two. This is something that requires trust and is being expressed as easier to do in a casual chat instead of in a conference. Most of the experts agree that the practitioners should work with researchers who have a fair understanding of the realities of what NICFI, and Norad does. The experts should understand the policy and expectations linked to the initiative. Further, the practitioners should be open to sharing their knowledge and try to create a common understanding with the experts. It goes both ways, and it requires a common will to make this a reality. Experts have expressed that the best way of linking research and policy is for somebody in NICFI to contact someone in one of the universities or contacting a group of researchers. They want them to reach out. On the opposite side, the practitioners have expressed they are open for the experts to reach out to them if they are doing research or have findings that could be relevant for their work arena.

It appears that both the practitioners and the experts are more than willing to bring these two worlds together but neither have taken the first step towards contact. Again, this is outside events like conferences or formal arranged meetings. Recurring information from both sides has been that NICFI has a good and more informal collaboration with the Rainforest Foundation. This has developed into a relationship where NICFI ask for information and advice from the Rainforest Foundation as they have deep knowledge and competence in the field and area where REDD+ is operating. To my understanding, NICFI will consult the foundation many times in their development work within the programme and before entering a field. According to experts, they have managed to create this kind of relationship due to the Rainforest Foundation being critical, but not too critical. And as it has been well known that they have this relationship, and that the Rainforest Foundation have NICFI’s ear, it is also interesting to ask why the experts has not turned to them if they work parallel in some of their research. The rainforest foundation themselves can confirm this, and have given examples of they have been consulted by NICFI due to their in-depth knowledge, especially towards the local communities in the areas they operate in. The Rainforest Foundation is present at the

yearly Oslo Tropical Forest Forums and confirms that other than that they have a more frequent dialog with the state. In Norway, the domestic demand for a more proactive climate policy started to increase from 2006, that was when The Rainforest Foundation Norway and Friends of the Earth Norway, exploited the window of opportunity that emerged from the tension between high domestic abatement costs and increasing domestic climate policy demands by proposing a large-scale Norwegian rainforest effort. By the end of 2007, these two NGO´s convinced a large majority in Parliament that a massive financial initiative needed to be taken to reduce deforestation globally and should become an important part of the Norwegian climate policy (Hermansen and Kasa, 2014). This demonstrates how they were present and influential from when it all started.

This section has shown how being critical and using critical research at times means something different to a practitioner than an expert. Researchers are not always creating research which is useful for policy, and practitioners do not always appreciate existing research when forming policy. Both experts and practitioners accept that greater collaboration will lead to better policy. The next section explores some of the ways this could be achieved.

6.3 Role of Research in Policy Processes

In the theory section I discuss formalisation and separation, and EU's SfEP designed to help the busy policymaker keep up-to-date with the latest environmental research findings needed to design, implement and regulate effective policies. Here they used research from other sources than evaluations or their own call for proposals. Experts argue that they did the same at the beginning of REDD+, more specifically with the first two interim reports in 2009 and 2011. The first was generally about the phased approach that was launched in a report. There were six experts who were working with REDD+ on a larger scale - central dealers. Here a report was written and discussed in a collaboration, this became a consensus report that Norway used and participated in (semi-structured interview, 2022). Here they summarise recently published data about forestry, agriculture, drivers of deforestation etc., it goes through consensus about REDD+ activities, and discusses deals with financing and distribution of benefits to mention some (Verchot and Petkova, 2010). This is important information when developing a programme and discussing what does and does not work in

reality. Further on, some of the impression from the experts is that the government commits substantial funds to research without it appearing to play much of a role in solving policy problems. Experts discuss how decision-makers appear to demand more analysis than they can go through and might end up using other sources of information that are more valuable. Interest groups, think tanks, and research institutes made a stream of reports and research valuable to the government that largely remain unread or unrecognised. It would be an interesting discussion to see if something like the EU's SfEP could be implemented into NICFI and Norad. If the claim regarding practitioners is that they have too much information available, one could argue that having committed people summarising relevant articles and research would be of great value to the overall goal which NICFI is trying to achieve.

According to Thue et al. (2022) experts, research and evaluations play a significant role in the political-administrative system in Norway. So, when research-based knowledge should form the basis for political decisions, the question of trust takes on new dimensions. On the one hand, it acts on confidence in the quality of the reports or the expertise of the experts to be used. On the other hand, it is about trust in the system's handling of knowledge, and the population's trust in the authorities' use of research-based knowledge will also be dependent on the general trust in the political system and central social institutions. Norway is a knowledge society: Theoretical knowledge has significance and authority in all parts of society, and knowledge is an integral part of political power struggle and governance (Stehr, 2015). There are studies that indicate that the political-administrative system in Norway has the practical benefit of the research-based knowledge it initiates (Breidahl et al., 2017; Høydal & Tøge, 2021). The Norwegian government often commissions assessments and evaluations before starting certain initiatives or projects.

Experts and practitioners' knowledge bases are different. According to Kieser and Leiner (2011), in communication regarding methodology and theory, the academics are the experts and the practitioners the laypersons. However, when it comes to communication about processes in practice, the roles are reversed. The partners in lay–expert communication cannot evaluate potential issues individually from each other in their explicit cognitive situation. A partner elects meaning to knowledge which has been introduced by the other partner by inserting it into their own respective cognitive frame of reference (Kieser and Leiner, 2011). The cognitive frame of reference consists of stable elements like prior knowledge, attitudes, views and stereotypes and of dynamic elements like the actual perceptions, circumstantial

information, and the path the communication takes. One can call communication between experts and practitioners a success if the individual cognitive frames of reference of the partners are brought into accordance to such a degree that the common ground is sufficiently large to reach the goal of the communication, for example, an informed decision (Kieser and Leiner, 2011). When an expert or practitioner is sharing their knowledge from their standpoint, the receiving part will interpret it the way they are able to with their prior understanding and prior knowledge. It is important then if collaborating practitioners are not familiar with the relevant theories or methods presented, that the experts introduce it to them so that they can discuss the different choices with the experts. The experts must become familiar with the problems the practitioners are working with in their specific environments. Information sharing between the experts and practitioners can increase and lead to a common ground and understanding and can also lead to its restructuring. Finally, it is the joint conviction that a sufficient degree of understanding between the partners has been reached which determines the necessary extent and intensity of the common ground. What could be problematic about this is that the absorption of others' knowledge into the context of one's own, can become very complex and quite a time-consuming process (Flavell, 1985).

Looking at REDD+ through these findings, one could argue that the NICFI will only give funding and steer their call for proposals according to the policy they are following. Meaning that in many cases it is the same institutions and organisations that conduct research for them as they will be familiar with each other. And research will be conducted on agreed terms and focus. Other independent researchers could conduct individual research with a different method and approach, which could be beneficial for NICFI, but somewhat out of reach as they are separated. Instead of having one "exclusive club", the whole formalisation of research for policy as discussed earlier, and then further integrated into policy, would be a much more inclusive and varied solution.

This section has added to the discussion regarding the importance of collaboration between practitioners and experts, both in shaping REDD+ policy and in assessing the success of projects, we have seen how it can be important to build a foundation of collaborative platforms and to build a common understanding of certain topics, aims and purpose of initiatives to mention some. All the practitioners gave me the same answer when I questioned them about the highly critical and dismissive research that has been done, more or less on the project side of REDD+. There was consensus that this research was being done on the wrong

basis, and that it depicted how some researchers had misunderstood what the initiative wanted to achieve. If research is being done on the wrong basis, and the wrong perception is not being picked up by the one conducting peer review, then it could in theory mean that a lot of research out there is useless. At least in the concept of using it for the development of an initiative like REDD+. Further, it means that wrong perception of the aim and purpose could be carried on to another research, building on something that is incorrect. I would argue that this is something that could potentially be avoided by building and allowing for a common understanding between practitioners and experts.

7.0 Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer three main research questions. These questions emerged from my exploration of existing scholarly work on the REDD+ programme, especially bilateral agreements funded by the Norwegian government. My reading made me curious about the safeguarding of these agreements and led to my first research question, "How is safeguarding being monitored and secured under the verification of 'results'?". Through semi-structured interviews with experts and practitioners I found that activities related to safeguarding are almost impossible to monitor, making it difficult to verify that the requirements in the agreements to receive result-based payments are met. One of the reasons is that this relies mostly on trust, and another being lack of guidance on how to methodologically consider, assess or verify the information being given through the existing information and reporting tools, which can determine that the implementation of REDD+ result-based activities and results has been consistent with the Cancun Safeguards. More than this, there is not enough funding to empower local communities and indigenous people to secure safeguards, and many indigenous people do not dare to report on breaches, as they fear for the consequences. This means that it becomes almost impossible to say if the reported results are in line with the Cancun safeguards. The only requirement is that a safeguarding system is in place. This highlights the importance of collaborating with experts, as they can observe results over longer timeframes.

The second question, "How do the Norwegian ODA rules and regulations affect progress towards results in the bilateral agreements between Norway and Indonesia and Norway and

Brazil?", came about from my reading of literature regarding Norway's REDD+ agreements with Indonesia and Brazil. I wanted to find out why these agreements evolved so differently, especially how the fact that Norwegian funding came from aid budgets affected these agreements. My interviews gave me an understanding of how context-specific agreements need to be to succeed. The comparison between Norway's agreements with Brazil and Indonesia shed light on multiple elements of my research questions, showing how quickly agreements can fall apart if they are based on supposed mutual assumptions, which later prove to give each side differing expectations. The use of results-based payments has been shown to be problematic, due to miscommunications and differing expectations. The designation of aid-funds to REDD+ projects has also created problems, along with how one chooses to define what a result could look like. ART-TREES standard has emerged as a response to problems with previous agreements, concerning results and safeguarding. These are well worked though rules and regulations, which aims to be universally adaptable and uniformity. The outcome from this is yet to be seen.

Through the collection of data, the difficulty of defining 'results' in the context of initiatives aiming to reduce deforestation rates became evident. This has shown to be problematic in many ways. It is clear that the amount of carbon stored or reduced compared to reference level is what REDD+ classifies as a 'result' under result-based payments. However, as this thesis has discussed, there are other elements to the guidelines and requirements which make defining what a result is more complicated. This became clear in the miscommunication between Indonesia and Norway, leading to the breach of their first bilateral-agreement. Indonesia had reached the results which were agreed upon, however, the payment could not take place before they had a proper payment system in place. This should have been communicated clearly from the start. Indonesia also had reached other results such as environmental policies and a shift in political attitude towards forest deforestation.

Through discussing safeguarding and results, it led me to the third research question, "How are REDD+-related practitioners and experts in Norway interacting or collaborating in terms of sharing knowledge and building a common understanding?". This further led me to discover that, despite wishes from both practitioners and experts for close and productive collaboration, this often proves difficult in reality. My research found that practitioners and experts would both benefit from having a closer collaboration in a more informal way, to gain a common understanding of what the REDD+ programme wants to achieve, and how to best

achieve the goals. Experts investigate over a longer period of time causes of deforestation, political situations in a country, attitudes towards deforestation and actual impacts of initiatives on the ground. They achieve a deep insight, which would benefit practitioners in their planning and development of the REDD+ programme. It will also be beneficial for the experts to get full information from the practitioners, and feedback on their research if their research appears to be too critical to use or if they have misunderstood certain aspects of the overall goals of the initiative. Both sides have expressed that they do want to have a closer collaboration, and that both sides think it will be beneficial. The main problem seems to be that no one is taking the first step to achieve such a collaboration. When the practitioners have read critical articles about REDD+, which appears to have some misunderstandings, they have not given any feedback to the experts. The experts who conduct independent research could in turn summarise and formalise their research for the practitioners to use.

It is important to note that I have not interviewed everyone who conducts research on REDD+ in Norway, or all the practitioners working towards REDD+, so there may be ongoing collaboration that I am unaware of. Further, it has been brought to my attention that there is work in progress in Norad to simplify their rules and regulations, which could be beneficial to the programme, addressing some of the concerns raised in this thesis in the process. It is also important to note that this is written from my understanding and interpretation of the data and findings, and I am not expecting everyone to agree with my recommendations or my understanding of the data.

Conducting this research has been very beneficial to me in my understanding of the importance of collaborating to see the bigger picture of things, and in my job. When I started this thesis I worked in a directorate, so I could relate to many of the practitioners. However, while writing this thesis I have started a new job as a sustainability manager at a research institution, and I am now working with researchers. I have and will continue to use the knowledge I gained from this process and will use my own recommendations when it comes to collaborating with (now) practitioners and policy makers, and always strive to see the whole picture, and how things are interconnected.

My interviewees raised concerns about breaches of safeguards, in particular where indigenous people were affected but did not report the breaches to the authorities. This needs to be further

explored and addressed in order to both protect the indigenous peoples and their lands and ensure effectiveness of the programme.

In terms of further research, I believe that there needs to be further explorations around how to define results. This thesis has shown that REDD+ has led to intangible, and potentially unforeseen results in certain circumstances. Research into how such results can be factored into future initiatives will be very useful and will allow the agreements greater freedom and flexibility, especially when funding is dependent on results being achieved.

With this thesis I hope to have contributed to the discourse surrounding REDD+ and similar climate funding. The most concrete recommendations I can make, based on my findings, relate to collaboration between experts and practitioners. I recommend that both sides make contact with relevant people. These communities of experts and practitioners are small, and they know who each other are. An hour meeting every three to six months could even keep both sides up to date on relevant topics and updates, and would lower the threshold to get in contact, or raise concerns. Building networks and relationships between experts and practitioners will lower the threshold for keeping each other informed in relevant updates, leading towards better information sharing and greater approachability. Greater collaboration and knowledge sharing will in addition mean that safeguards and discussions around results will be more effective.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

List of Interviewees

Interview 1: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 25th of January 2022. Bergen.

Interview 2: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 27th of January 2022. Bergen.

Interview 3: Experts from Oslo Met, Conducted on Zoom 2nd of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 4: Employee, The Rainforest Foundation, Conducted on Zoom 4th of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 5: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 4th of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 6: Expert from NMBU, Conducted on Zoom 8th of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 7: Practitioner form Norad, Conducted on Zoom 9th of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 8: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 14th of February 2022. Bergen

Interview 9: Expert from UiO, Conducted on Zoom 4th of March 2022. Bergen

Interview 9: Expert from UiO, Conducted on Zoom 8th of March 2022. Bergen

Interview 10: Expert from the University of Helsinki, Conducted on Zoom 25th of March 2022. Bergen

Interview 11: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 31st of March 2022. Bergen

Interview 12: Expert from ART-TREES, Conducted on Zoom 15th of April 2022. Bergen

Interview 13: Practitioner from NICFI, Conducted on Zoom 25th of April 2022. Bergen

Interview 14: Employee, The Rainforest Foundation, Conducted on Zoom 4th of May 2022. Bergen

Appendix 2

Interview guide experts

1. Tell me about yourself. What do you do in your work?

- Ask directly for a job title and role in any REDD+ working groups or initiatives or research field.

2. Some people say that there exist four different approaches/visions of REDD+. Which one do you think should be the main goal of REDD+?

a. Carbon emissions reduction with no conditions (economic, social, environmental);

b. Carbon emissions reduction with safeguards (no economic, social, environmental harm);

c. Carbon emission reductions with livelihood/poverty improvements for forest people;

d. Improvements in livelihoods and tenure security for local people, with carbon emissions reductions as a secondary goal;

e. The informant is not sure, or he/she finds it controversial. Explain

3. In your opinion, who are the main actors in the Amazon basin (or other) who are:
- a. Contributing to deforestation, forest degradation, and other activities that generate carbon emissions from land use?

Explain. Use information they've already brought up about different actors.

- b. Involved in activities such as forest conservation, reforestation, transitioning from agriculture to agroforestry, or REDD+ projects?
- c. How did this actor become so influential?
- d. Why does this actor have so much/little influence?

4. Are there alliances/coalitions between different actors (of those you have mentioned?) (for example, between producers associations and NGOs).

- Keep in mind any coalitions the respondent has already mentioned to avoid redundancy.

5. Of the actors that you've mentioned, and also other actors, which ones does your institution communicate with? What is your relationship with them?
    - Do you frequently communicate? (daily, monthly, annually)
    - What is the nature of the relationship, and what do you depend on each other For?

6. If there is a professional work relationship or government relationship, then ask: Expectations (informal relation)/Obligations (formal relation): In your relationship with (XXX), are there shared expectations/obligations between you?
- Accountability: What could you do if they didn't meet these expectations/obligations?

7. How is the benefit sharing being monitored, evaluated and reported?

8. In your opinion, are reported results and evaluations influential on the assessment of the programme based on reports from the projects/audits?
    - Does your institution have any agreement with agents/decision-makers or developers of the REDD+ programme to supply a critical view and supporting evidence from research done? (Carbon leakage, impact, efficiency, benefit sharing, monitoring, evaluation).
    - How is the risk of carbon leakage and misinformation being handled?

9. In your opinion, what is important to emphasized more, equity or efficiency when evaluating results?
    - Is it more relevant to achieve results in a less costly way, or is the benefit sharing (which can be more expensive) placed higher?

10. Should information about the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the projects be the focus when evaluating the programme?
    - On what evidence are results being assessed (reports, research articles, evaluations etc).

11. If relevant: In your opinion, how is the process behind designing/developing or re-negotiating the REDD+ framework?

- How should the process behind the development of the design and framework be? If relevant: Should there be a joint scholarly collaboration and method when evaluating and developing the programme?

12. To what extent do you believe the design and framework are addressing the underlying causes of deforestation?

- Anything else you think is relevant that you would like to add?

Appendix 3

Interview guide practitioners

1. Tell me about yourself. What do you do in your work?

- Ask directly for a job title and role in any REDD+ working groups or initiatives.

- If necessary: Are you part of the designing, development or evaluation of REDD+?

2. In your opinion, what is the purpose of the results-based payments in REDD+?

- Do you believe it to be efficient and include equity?

3. In your opinion, who are the main actors in the Amazon basin who are: - a. Contributing to deforestation, forest degradation, and other activities that generate carbon emissions from land

Explain. Use information they've already brought up about different actors.

- b. Involved in activities such as forest conservation, reforestation, transitioning from agriculture to agroforestry, or REDD+ projects?
- c. How did this actor become so influential?
- d. Why does this actor have so much/little influence?

4. Are there alliances/coalitions between different actors (of those you have mentioned?) (for example, between producers associations and NGOs).

- Keep in mind any coalitions the respondent has already mentioned to avoid redundancy.

5. Of the actors that you've mentioned, and other actors, which ones does your institution communicate with? What is your organization's relationship with them?

- Do you frequently communicate? (daily, monthly, annually)
- What is the nature of the relationship, and what do you depend on each other for?

6. If there is a professional work relationship or government relationship, then ask: Expectations (informal relation)/Obligations (formal relation): In your relationship with (XXX), are there shared expectations/obligations between you?

- Accountability: What could you do if they didn't meet these expectations/obligations?

7.How is the benefit sharing being monitored, evaluated and reported?

8. Are reported results and evaluations based on reports from the projects/audits?

- Are reported results supplied with supporting evidence from research or other sources (external monitoring, evaluations, observation).
- How is the risk of carbon leakage and misinformation being handled?

9. What is emphasized more, equity or efficiency when evaluating results?

- Is it more relevant to achieve results in a less costly way, or is the benefit sharing (which can be more expensive) placed higher?

10. Where and how do you get information about the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of the projects?

- On what evidence are results being assessed (reports, research articles, evaluations etc).

11. If relevant: How is the process behind designing/developing or re-negotiating the REDD+ framework?

- If relevant: Should there be a joint scholarly collaboration and method when evaluating and developing the programme?
- Anything else you think is relevant that you would like to add?

Appendix 4

Information and Consent Letter

Are you interested in taking part in the research project

"Report-processes, evidence and result-based payments; is the REDD+ programme design allowing for efficiency and equity"**?**

This is an inquiry about participation in a research project where the main purpose is to research how the Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) programme assesses reported results, and if the design allows for efficiency and equity.

In this letter we will give you information about the purpose of the project and what your participation will involve.

Purpose of the project

The purpose of the project is to research how the institutions and decision-makers in the REDD+ programme include evidence from reported results and research into the design of the programme, and how the evidence about inefficiency from assessed results is being shared and handled between the institutions on different levels and sectors. The aim is to investigate if there is a common scholarly approach, and if the evaluation and re-designing of the program includes academic work in the process.
I am focusing on the last step in REDD+, which is result-based transfer of funds. To receive the funding the projects and countries will have to meet a list of criteria and report on achieved results.
I will be looking into the funding transferred from Norway to Brazil and Indonesia, where Brazil will be my main focus on how research from the impact, efficiency, equity, reporting, monitoring and carbon leakage from implementation has been considered.

This is a master thesis, and the data collected will only be used for this research project.

Who is responsible for the research project?

University of Agder is the institution responsible for the project.
I am also part of the Climate and natural resources research group at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), who will read through my thesis and have a copy at the end, but they are not responsible for the project.

Why are you being asked to participate?
I want to talk to experts in the field to get an insight into the scholars view and experiences. I have also asked the people responsible or involved in the administration and funding of the programme to gain an understanding of the programme and the processes, as well as to get their opinion and experiences. I have asked 7 experts and 6 people involved with administration, involvement, and funding of the programme.

What does participation involve for you?

If you choose to take part in the project, this will involve a digital interview. This will take approx. 45 minutes. The interview questions will differ to some extent from the experts to the agents working with the programme. Main questions with the experts will include issues around equity and efficiency. The main questions for the agents working with the programme will include how decisions are being made, and the design/re-designing of the programme. The answers will be recorded on a voice recorder and saved electronically.

Participation is voluntary
Participation in the project is voluntary. If you chose to participate, you can withdraw your consent at any time without giving a reason. All information about you will then be made anonymous. There will be no negative consequences for you if you chose not to participate or later decide to withdraw.

Your personal privacy – how we will store and use your personal data
We will only use your personal data for the purpose(s) specified in this information letter. We will process your personal data confidentially and in accordance with data protection legislation (the General Data Protection Regulation and Personal Data Act).

- Only the student and the supervisor of the project will have access to any personal data.
- I will replace your name and contact details with a code. The list of names, contact details and respective codes will be stored separately from the rest of the collected data, and I will store the data on a research server only accessible with a password. The voice recorder will be stored in a locked space and will be deleted after completion of the project.

What will happen to your personal data at the end of the research project?
The project is scheduled to end 15th of December 2022. All personal data will be completely anonymised at the end of the project.

Your rights

So long as you can be identified in the collected data, you have the right to:

- access the personal data that is being processed about you
- request that your personal data is deleted
- request that incorrect personal data about you is corrected/rectified
- receive a copy of your personal data (data portability), and
- send a complaint to the Data Protection Officer or The Norwegian Data Protection Authority regarding the processing of your personal data

What gives us the right to process your personal data?
We will process your personal data based on your consent.

Based on an agreement with the University of Agder, NSD – The Norwegian Centre for Research Data AS has assessed that the processing of personal data in this project is in accordance with data protection legislation.

Where can I find out more?
If you have questions about the project, or want to exercise your rights, contact:

- University of Agder via Lene Kristin Hansen by email: lenekha@uia.no or Morgen Storm Scoville-Simonds by email: morgan.s.scoville-simonds@uia.no.
- Our Data Protection Officer: Ina Danielsen by email: personvernombud@uia.no
- NSD – The Norwegian Centre for Research Data AS, by email: (personverntjenester@nsd.no) or by telephone: +47 53 21 15 00.

Yours sincerely,

Lene Kristin Hansen
(Researcher)

Consent form

Consent can be given in writing (including electronically) or orally. NB! You must be able to document/demonstrate that you have given information and gained consent from project participants i.e. from the people whose personal data you will be processing (data subjects). As a rule, we recommend written information and written consent.

- *For written consent on paper you can use this template*
- *For written consent which is collected electronically, you must chose a procedure that will allow you to demonstrate that you have gained explicit consent (read more on our website)*
- *If the context dictates that you should give oral information and gain oral consent (e.g. for research in oral cultures or with people who are illiterate) we recommend that you make a sound recording of the information and consent.*

If a parent/guardian will give consent on behalf of their child or someone without the capacity to consent, you must adjust this information accordingly. Remember that the name of the participant must be included.

Adjust the checkboxes in accordance with participation in your project. It is possible to use bullet points instead of checkboxes. However, if you intend to process special categories of personal data (sensitive personal data) and/or one of the last four points in the list below is applicable to your project, we recommend that you use checkboxes. This because of the requirement of explicit consent.

I have received and understood information about the project *[insert project title]* and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. I give consent:

- to participate in *(insert method, e.g. an interview)*
- to participate in *(insert other methods, e.g. an online survey) – if applicable*
- *for my/my child's teacher to give information about me/my child to this project (include the type of information)– if applicable*
- *for my personal data to be processed outside the EU – if applicable*
- *for information about me/myself to be published in a way that I can be recognised (describe in more detail)– if applicable*
- *for my personal data to be stored after the end of the project for (insert purpose of storage e.g. follow-up studies) – if applicable*

I give consent for my personal data to be processed until the end date of the project, approx. *[insert date]*
