

**Building Resilient Communities through Community Managed  
Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes**

A Case study of CARE Haiti's operation in Carrefour District

By

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*This master's thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this education. However, this does not imply that the University answers for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.*

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## Abstract

*The connections between natural hazards, natural disasters and human vulnerabilities have become common features of disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes since the adoption of The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015. A series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and community managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) in order to enhance the capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover from a disaster with little or no external assistance.*

*This thesis explores whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) programmes, and to see if such programmes can generate sustainable development. The thesis investigates what the underlying vulnerabilities are, through the Pressure and Release (PAR) model, whilst also taking into account the particular historical and political context in Haiti. Vulnerability is evaluated in the three levels: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions on the social side. The component on the natural side is the 2010 earthquake itself. The CMDRR process are analysed by applying Cordaid's (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system. I also address the relationship between International non-governmental organization (INGOs) and the community members in general, and the relationship between CARE and the community members in particular.*

*The research draws on qualitative data, mainly from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and participant observation of the CMDRR process. My findings suggest that people can possess characteristics that make them both vulnerable and resilient. The CMDRR process made the community members resilient in the sense that it had increased their awareness and knowledge capacity in regards to natural disasters, disaster-resilient construction and climate change. The women in La Grenada also felt empowered after the CMDRR process, and used their knowledge to educate the wider community. The CMDRR workshops had strengthened community ties, both within the community and with neighbouring communities. Despite human progress, the opportunities brought through the CMDRR process is not able to contribute to the long-term prosperity. Consistent with the PAR model and the numerous vulnerabilities identified, my findings suggests that resilience building is about good governance: it is primarily and fundamentally political, with its success depending on citizen power, genuine participation and a good relationship between the INGOs, the Haitian population and the government. As such, building resilient communities involves something more from simply dealing with preparedness measures through CMDRR interventions.*

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## List of Abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CBDRR	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMDRR	Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction
DfID	Department for International Development
DPC	Haitian Government’s Department of Civic Protections
DR	Dominican Republic
DRMC	Disaster Risk Management Cycle
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGNI	Gross National Income
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
GVB	Gender Based Violence
HDI	Human Development Index
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IMF	The International monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRDR	Integrated Research on Disaster Risk.
IRIS	Interim Risk Management Plan
MINUSTAH	the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MSPP	Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population
NACLA	The North Americas Congress in Latin America
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PDNA	The Gender Shadow Report a response to the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SIDS	Small Island Developing States

SNGRD	Haitian National System for Risk and Disaster Management
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States Institution of Peace
WB	World Bank

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## Chapter 1 Introduction

### 1.1 The context

The escalation of severe disaster events triggered by natural hazards such as earthquakes, droughts, floods, storms and tropical cyclones, wild land fires, and volcanic eruptions have caused major loss of human lives and livelihoods, the destruction of economic and social infrastructure, as well as environmental damages (UNISDR, 2002). Kofi Annan emphasizes that natural hazard events by themselves do not cause disasters, but that it must be seen in relation to an exposed, vulnerable and ill-prepared population that exacerbates the effects of disasters (ISDR, 2008 and UN/ISDR, 2002). IFRC defines natural disasters as “sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources” (Manyena, 2009 and IFRC in Kumar, 2011:2). Vulnerability is a concept that focuses on “limitation or lack of access to resources” (Bradshaw, 2004:10).

As natural disasters are increasingly posing a substantive threat to both sustainable development and poverty-reduction initiatives, the need to reduce disaster risks and social vulnerabilities have increasingly become more urgent than ever before (UNISDR, 2002). For that reason, a series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and community managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) in order to enhance the capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover from a disaster with little or no external assistance (GTZ, 2002, and Cordaid 2009). CMDRR places the communities at the heart of decision-making processes and in the management of disaster risk reduction measures (Cordaid, 2013). The ultimate goal of CMDRR interventions is to build resilient communities.

In this context, Haiti is a particular interesting country to examine. Haiti has endured political instability, frequent regime shifts, and chronic challenges in governance since colonial times. The decades of neglect has not only lead to a lack of faith in the political system, but has also left the Haitian people in extreme poverty with 80 per cent of the population living under the poverty line and 54 per cent in severe poverty (Webersik and Klose, 2010, and CIA, 2014). In effect, the Haitian people have learned to look to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than the government for provision of essential services (USIP, 2010 and Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Haiti is also situated in the middle of a hurricane belt and the land is bounded by major faults and changes in topographic and geographic structure, creating an unsolid bedrock that increases the risk of storms and earthquakes (Iris, 2010). In addition, Haiti lacks absorptive capacity to buffer impacts of natural hazards due to



extreme deforestation, making the country more prone to natural disasters (Eichler, 2006). On 12<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010 a 7.0-magnitude earthquake further caused destruction to this vulnerable population as more than 200,000 people were killed. The disaster further resulted in immense humanitarian crisis, highlighting long-lasting development challenges (ALNAP, 2010).

## 1.2 Main Objective and Research Questions

This study is directly focused on the rebuilding situation in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, more specifically on the CMDRR programme implemented by CARE. CARE is an international non-governmental organization (INGO). When referring to INGOs in this paper, I mean those NGOs that are global in reach, and operate in a range of different countries. The fact that they are “international” does not imply that the staffs are “international”, it simply refers to the organisation being a part of a larger international entity legally as well as financially (Ghimire, 2003). I also refer to local NGOs in this paper. By local NGOs, I mean formal organisations of people who are engaged in local activities that are not primarily for their own benefit (Ghimire, 2003). The overall term NGOs will be applied when I am referring to both INGOs and local NGOs.

Although the major catastrophe of the 2010 earthquake is the catalyst for this research, I also recognize that Haiti is susceptible to multiple natural hazards such as storms and floods, in addition to earthquakes. The scope of this study was limited to Carrefour district and the two (neighbourhood) communities: Ti-Sous and La Grenade. I chose this district because it was severely damaged in the 2010 earthquake. However, as a mean of gaining a greater understanding of the complexities regarding the CMDRR process, and to understand the broader picture of INGO interventions a set of key informants outside of the CARE organization and the two neighbourhoods were also identified and interviewed. This way, I was able to present a more objective and critical analysis of my case, in addition to strengthening the credibility of my findings. They included Project Haiti; operating in Delmas and PLAN Haiti; operating in Croix-des-Bouquets.

The main objective of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to see if such programmes can generate sustainable development. The case study from Carrefour district was engaged in answering these research questions:

1. What are the root causes of people’s vulnerability within the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade in Carrefour district, as perceived by the community members and the CARE staff before and after the 2010 earthquake?

2. What types of community knowledge and local structures existed in regard to disaster preparedness in these two communities prior to CARE's operation?
3. How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, addressed the needs of the community members and what processes of empowerment is traceable to the local participation in the CMDRR programme after the 2010 earthquake?
4. How does the people living in the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade, in Carrefour district, perceive INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it comes to rebuilding the two communities?

The starting point of this investigation was to identify and analyse the underlying vulnerabilities that both caused the disaster following the 2010 earthquake, and that continued to challenge the community members living in Carrefour district. In this investigation, the PAR model of Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis (2003) was used as a simple tool for assessing people's vulnerability to earthquakes, whilst also taking into account the particular historical and political context in Haiti. Vulnerability was evaluated in the three levels: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions on the social side. The component on the natural side was the earthquake itself. My findings demonstrated that the community members had a high level of awareness on vulnerability, and that both CARE and the community members had a clear understanding of the social, political, economic and environmental factors that increased risks and vulnerabilities in Carrefour district. In the case of Carrefour district, reducing vulnerability was essentially about dealing with the issue of poverty, the lack of resources and the lack of employment opportunities, and to overcome the public-private divide that existed between the government and the community members.

Next, I focused on the CMDRR process, implemented by CARE. In order to evaluate if such programmes could contribute to sustainable development I found it necessary to address the general relationship between CARE and the community members. I also addressed how the community members perceived INGOs in general. The perception of INGOs and local NGOs as actors before and after the 2010 earthquake were widely contested amongst my respondents. Most of my respondents saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a difference, as the government was considered weak and corrupt. Local NGOs were considered as more corrupt and exploitive compared to INGOs. However, my findings also suggested that many viewed INGOs as profit motivated and as self-interested actors. Some community members were also concerned about the overwhelming role played by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the importance of a stronger civil society and a stronger government. Despite the previous perception my respondents had against local NGOs and INGOs,

there seemed to be an agreement that CARE had managed to include, rather than exclude, the community members in the CMDRR process.

The CMDRR process was analysed by applying Cordaid's (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system. Based on the evaluation of these four components and the outcomes of the CMDRR process, my findings suggested that resilience building went beyond CARE's capacity as it involved something more than simply dealing with preparedness measures. These findings are important because they enable a deeper understanding of the particular case in question and the cooperation between CARE and the community members in Carrefour district. It also allows us to suggest some analytical generalizations regarding how CMDRR functions in practice and provides greater insight into how the CMDRR process can strengthen local communities to decrease vulnerability and risks.

### **1.3 Methodology in Brief**

My empirical research was based on qualitative methodology as I wanted to adopt a research strategy and a methodology that "answer the whys and how's of human behaviour, opinion and experience" (Guest, Namely and Mitchell, 2013: 1). One goal was to understand what the participants really thought, felt and did in vulnerable situations. Both primary and secondary data sources were collected over a one-month period, January 2015 to February 2015. The primary method of data collection was in-depth interviews and FGDs with community members and CARE staff. In addition, I was able to observe and participate in two workshops concerning CMDRR initiatives. I also reviewed a range of relevant documents, in particular evaluation reports from CARE. Lastly, I also used a self-completion questionnaire developed by CARE as a supplement to the qualitative data collection techniques in order to get clarification of some issues raised.

### **1.4 Thesis outline**

This study is presented in eight (8) chapters. Chapter 1 presents an introduction that sets out the context of the study. It outlines the main purpose and focus of the research, and presents the main objective and research questions. It also presents a brief introduction of the methodological approach applied for this study. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the national and historical context of Haiti, and the local context of Carrefour district. A particular focus was given on the presence of INGOs, as it was important to provide an understanding on the different ways they have shaped Haiti's development path. The history reflects upon the mindset people have acquired over the many years of political instability and foreign exploitation. In addition, the government has repeatedly failed in

securing the economic and social security for its people, which may help explain the lack of trust people have had towards the state. Chapter 3 offers some clarification of key concepts relevant to this thesis, and present the framework for analysis, which forms the basis of my thesis. This is followed up by my methodology approach in Chapter 4, which describe and justify the main methodological approach applied for this study, including; choice of research strategy and research design, sampling, methods of data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations. In Chapter 5, all the organisations included in this case study are described. In Chapter 6, the key findings from my fieldwork in Haiti are presented, whereas the theory is brought into the analysis in chapter 7, followed by concluding remarks and reflections in Chapter 8.

## Chapter 2 Study Area: Port au Prince, Haiti

The main objective of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to examine if such programmes can generate sustainable development. An important starting point for this examination is to get a better understanding of the particular context in which this relationship and development takes place. This chapter will therefore provide an overview of the key characteristics of Haiti in regards to the political, economic, social and environmental reality dating back to colonial times. There will be a focus on the main contributing factors to vulnerability, including internal factors such as political instability, economical challenges and social oppressions, and external factors, including environmental problems, foreign interests and development assistance. A particular focus has been given on the presence of INGOs, as it is important to provide an understanding of the different ways they have shaped Haiti's development path.

### 2.1 National Context

#### The Land

Haiti is located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, and shares the island of Hispaniola with Dominican Republic (DR). Its terrain consist mainly of mountains interspersed with small coastal plains and river valleys (CIA, 2014).



Figure 1: Map of Haiti (Source: CIA, 2014)

## Social and economic indicators

Based on UNDP's Human Development Report of 2014, Haiti's Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2013 is 0.471, which is positioning the country at the low human development category of 168 out of 187 countries and territories. Table 1 reviews Haiti's progress in each of the HDI indicators, including the three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Between 1980 and 2013 Haiti's life expectancy at birth increased by 12.3 years, mean year of schooling increased by 3.5 years and expected years of schooling increased by 2.5 years. In Haiti the GNI<sup>1</sup> per capital decreased by about 36.5 per cent between 1980 and 2013 (UNDP, 2014).

	Life expectancy at birth	Expected years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	GGNI per capital (2011 PPP\$)	HDI value
1980	50.8	5.1	1.4	2,576	0.352
1985	52.6	6.5	2.2	2,345	0.392
1990	54.5	7.0	2.7	2,209	0.413
1995	56.1	7.1	3.3	1,569	0.414
2000	57.5	7.3	3.9	1,660	0.433
2005	59.3	7.4	4.5	1,574	0.447
2010	61.9	7.6	4.9	1,494	0.462
2011	62.3	7.6	4.9	1,561	0.466
2012	62.7	7.6	4.9	1,636	0.471
2013					

**Figure 2: Haiti's HDI trends based on consistent time series data and new goalposts (Source: UNDP, 2014, p.2)**

Haiti also has the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere, with 80 % of the population living below the poverty line and 54 % in severe poverty (Webersik *et al*, 2010, and CIA, 2014). This has generated an unemployment rate of about 70 per cent, low-income rates, weak government institutions, and lack of public infrastructure, all in which contributes to violence and related security

<sup>1</sup> PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Source: The World Bank (2015): <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD>.

problems (Webersik *et al*, 2010, and ALNAP, 2010). Gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual exploitation against women and girls is exacerbated by poverty and poor security (PDNA, 2010).

About two-fifths of all Haitians work in the agricultural sector, which consist mainly of small-scale subsistence farming. The country has experienced little formal job creation over the past decade, although informal economy is growing. According to the Central intelligence Agency (CIA, 2014), poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, deforestation and low level of education for much of the population are among Haiti's most serious impediments to foster economic growth.

Another and maybe a more severe impediment that hinders economic growth is Haiti's distribution of wealth. The country is the most unequal in the region where 1 percent of the population controls half of its wealth (Hallward, 2007). Haiti also suffers from a lack of investment, partly because of weak infrastructure. The government relies on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, where over half of its annual budget coming from outside sources (CIA, 2014). The country is also heavily aid-dependent with 70 % of the state budget coming from external financing in 2010 (Zanotti, 2010). Social services such as health and education are often provided by INGOs and according to The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) no other country in the world has as many NGOs per capita as Haiti, with an estimated 10 000 being present previous to the 2010 earthquake (World Bank, 2014 and Edmonds, 2014).

Another contributing factor to Haiti's vulnerability is its increased population growth that has forced many people to settle down in hazard prone areas, including Port-Au-Prince (Webersik *et al*, 2010).

### **The land and environmental issues**

The poorest country of the Americas is also the one that is most disaster prone, especially to disasters such as floods, landslides, storms, hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes (ALNAP, 2010). The figures below provide the data related to human and economic losses from disasters that have occurred between 1980 and 2010. Based on the numbers it becomes evident that most of Haiti's suffering can be directly attributed to major storms and flooding. However, the 2010 earthquake is at the top of the list of disasters in terms of the number of people affected and killed, and the magnitude of economic losses.

<b>Disasters</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Affected</b>
Earthquake	2010	3,700,000
Storm	1994	1,587,000
Storm	1980	1,167,000
Drought	1992	1,000,000
Storm	1988	870,000
Storm	2004	315,594
Flood	2003	150,000
Storm	2008	125,050
Storm	2007	108,763
Drought	1980	103,000

**Figure 3: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People Affected) (Source: Herard, 2011:3-4)**

<b>Disaster</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Killed</b>
Earthquake	2010	222,570
Epidemic	2010	2,761
Storm	2004	2,754
Flood	2004	2,665
Storm	1994	1,122
Storm	2008	529
Storm	1980	220
Storm	1998	190
Storm	2007	90
Storm	2008	85

**Figure 4: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People killed) (Source: Herard, 2011:3-4)**



Disaster	Date	Cost (US\$ x 1,000)
Earthquake	2010	8,000,000
Storm	1980	400,000
Storm	1998	180,000
Storm	1988	91,286
Storm	2004	50,000
Storm	2005	50,000
Storm	1994	50,000
Flood	2002	1,000
Storm	2004	1,000
Storm	2005	500

**Figure 5: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (Economic Damages) (Source: Herard, 2011:.3-4)**

### **Haiti's vulnerability to seismic activity**

Haiti's geographic location makes it highly vulnerable to seismic activity. Haiti is part of the Caribbean Plate, which is, as explained by Interim Risk Management Plan (Iris) (2010), a section of the earth's crust that is bounded by major faults and changes in geological structure. Within these plates, there have been detected two major faults of concern for earthquake risk. The first is the Enriquillo fault, which crosses the southern peninsula from east to west, and the second is the Septentrional Fault, which runs east to west along the northern coast of Haiti. Both of these faults have generated earthquakes over the centuries (Iris, 2010, p 8). However, as the country had not faced an earthquake in over two centuries, Haitians never saw earthquakes as a threat. Thus, little was invested in establishing a system to monitor seismic activity before the 2010 earthquake. After the 2010 earthquake there has been developed eight seismic stations in order to improve the understanding of seismic risk and thus enhance the national resiliency (Herard, 2011).

On a smaller scale, topography is also directly linked to earthquake vulnerability in Haiti. Haiti has three layers of geology: The bottom layer, Jurassic/Cretaceous, consists of old metamorphic rocks that form the backbone and basement of the island. Variable layers of more recent and loose sediments such as limestone follow these rocks, creating an unsolid bedrock, and thus, increase the risk of earthquakes (Iris, 2010).

## **Climate change**

With regards to climate change, Haiti ranks fourth out of 200 nations on the Climate Change Vulnerability Index created by Maplecroft-a risk management firm- in 2013 (Maplecroft, 2013). This evaluation is based on three factors. The first factor is the exposure to extreme climate-related events, including sea level rise and future changes in temperature, precipitation and specific humidity. The second factor is the sensitivity of populations, in terms of health, education, agricultural dependence and available infrastructure. The third factor is the adaptive capacity of countries to combat the impacts of climate change, which encompasses amongst other economic factors, resource security and the effectiveness of government (Maplecroft, 2013).

In addition, scientists have noted significant increase in the wind speeds and precipitation intensities of Atlantic hurricanes over the past decades as a result of rising ocean temperatures. As climate change is accepted to be a real treat, it is predicted more destructive storms in the future (Herard, 2011). Haiti's environment is also extremely degraded, where for instance clearing trees to make charcoal, the main fuel in the country, is a way of surviving in extreme poverty. Thus, Haiti also lacks absorptive capacity to buffer impacts of natural hazards making the country more prone to natural hazards and climate change (Eichler, 2006).

### **2.2 Local Context: Carrefour district**

There is little information online about the specific neighbourhoods, in which I conducted my main research, the information provided below is based on interviews with CARE officers, and the facts given are taken from a CARE's project website.



**Figure 6: Map of Carrefour district (Source: Weather-forecast, 2015)**

My study was conducted in Carrefour district in the South-West part of Port au Prince. More specific, I carried out my research in Ti-Sous and Grenada, which are a part of the four neighbourhoods- including Aztek and Sapodilla-in the 11th section in Carrefour. These four communities are situated in a very poor area, where the population are highly vulnerable to risks and natural hazards.

Carrefour district was particularly affected by the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 as it was situated near the earthquake's epicentre. In these four quarters, 3,687 homes were identified as severely damaged or beyond repair. In addition, 2,416 people still lived in camps (Akvorsr, 2015).

Today, the access to basic services are very limited, the economic sector is small, the unemployment rate is high, and there are not enough houses to hold the increasing population, which in turn makes it difficult for families to return from the camps to the area in which they came from (Akvorsr, 2015). In addition, these neighbourhoods are extremely vulnerable in the rainy season as the canals, which were built to evacuate the excess water and hinder flooding from occurring, are filled with garbage, pigs and goats. As such, the lack of a sustainable trash collection system makes the area vulnerable to floods and landslides (Akvorsr, 2015).

### **2.3 Historical context**

In order to understand the current challenges in Haiti and why development efforts has fallen short in rebuilding the country after the 2010 earthquake, it is important to shed light on some of the main historical events.

## **Conquest, slavery and resistance**

In 1492, Christopher Columbus landed on the northern coast of what he then called island Hispaniola. The island became the first European settlement and the starting point for European conquest in the Americas. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Hispaniola's indigenous populations of perhaps 500 000 to 750 000 people were almost eliminated through war, slavery and diseases. Hispaniola remained a Spanish colony for more than two hundred years, until the French settlers from the famous pirate haven of Tortuga, an island north of Hispaniola, moved in on Spanish territory and took control of its western half in 1697 (Dubois, 2012).

The French renamed it Saint-Dominguez. The territory became one of the key point of the "triangle trade", in which created the Atlantic economy of the eighteenth century: manufactured goods were shipped from Europe to Africa, slaves were brought from the central African region to the Americas, and slave produced crops, including sugar, cotton and coffee were sent from the Caribbean back to Europe. The slaves worked under harsh conditions within a well-ordered system referred by Sidney Mintz (in Dubois, 2012) as a combination of "field and factory". This system brought advanced technology and carefully designed labour management, ultimately making Hispaniola the most profitable colony in the world by the late eighteenth century. However, despite the economic growth, the effective system of labour also exhausted the soil through one cane harvest after another, and began the process of deforestation (Dubois, 2012).

An official estimate of the colony's population in 1789 reported that Saint-Domingue contained 55 000 free people, both white people and coloured people, and 450 000 slaves. The free coloured made up a larger portion of the local police, where the main task was to protect the territory from its potentially overwhelming enemy within the "slave majority". The French managed to control Saint-Domingue until August 1791, when a large rebellion spread throughout the colony. Toussaint L'Ouverture emerged as its leader and slavery was officially abolished in 1793 (Dubois, 2012).

## **The Post-Revolutionary period**

After securing its independence on January the 1<sup>st</sup> 1804, Jean- Jacques Dessalines renamed the nation Haiti and proclaimed a new independent nation, making it the first independent black republic in the world and the second independent republic in the Western hemisphere. However, as with many successful revolutions, victory was followed by drawbacks, civil unrest and war (Flood, 2010 and Dubois, 2012).

There have been 32 coups, most arising from the ruling class and the various foreign business groups. Apart from these, Haiti was not to be recognized as an independent state by France until 1825, after

Haiti managed-with the help of the US- to repay 150 million French franc for “lost profits” from the slave trade. In effect, Haiti was paying twice for its freedom; first with blood, and second with money. The money borrowed was still being repaid by Haiti as late as 1947 (Flood, 2010).

Spain and France were not the only countries that took control over Haiti. In 1915, a contingent of US Marines landed in Haiti, launching a 20-year long occupation, during which time they killed, officially, over 3000 Haitians who resisted US occupation. The US occupation also imposed a new constitution in which foreign companies were allowed to own land. In effect, the new constitution generated good opportunities for American investments. In fact, these advantages for US corporations grew so that the 13 companies operating in 1966 had become 154 by 1981, accounting for more than 40 per cent of Haitian exports (Flood, 2010).

### **The father-son Duvalier dictatorship**

For nearly thirty years, the father-and-son Duvalier dictatorship increased Haiti’s external debt and continued its underdevelopment. By 1957, Haiti’s economy, infrastructure, and political institutions were ineffective. Duvalier’s initial targets were the army and the labour unions, however, this latter were crushed quickly. Duvalier soon replaced and diminished the power of the army with his own private security group, known as The Tonton Macoutes. At Duvalier’s command the army of 300 000 terrorised and intimidated the citizens, and by 1964, Duvalier had effectively eliminated any meaningful oppositions within Haiti (Ferguson, 1987). By the time Duvalier died in 1971, state-sanctioned terrorism had killed an estimated 30 000 to 60 000 Haitian citizens. Before his death, Papa Doc appointed his son, Jean Claude Duvalier, who took over the presidency in 1971 at the age of 19. Jean Claude Duvalier, also known as Baby doc, continued his father’s work (Schuller, 2006).

The UN held a favourable view of the Duvalier’s reign, and the country garnered significant foreign aid during these two presidential periods. The amount of aid was staggering: between 1972 to 1981 alone it amounted to US \$584 million, with 80 percent of that coming from the US (Dubois, 2012). Despite aid assistance, large-scale corruption meant that this money never reached the Haitian people. On December 5, 1980, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave “Baby Doc” US \$22 million in aid. James Ferguson (in Schuller, 2006: 2-3) notes that:

*Within weeks, \$20 million of this amount had been withdrawn from the Haitian government’s account; of this, the IMF stated, \$4 million had gone directly to the VSN [the tontons macoutes, a paramilitary organization responsible for as many as 30,000 killings in the Duvalier period], while the remaining \$16 million had seemingly disappeared into Duvalier’s various personal accounts. An IMF report concluded almost euphemistically that its analysts “attributed excessive unbudgeted spending as the most important cause of Haiti’s financial crises” (Schuller, 2006: 2-3).*

Mark Schuller (2006) highlights two basic reasons for why so much foreign money were poured into the Duvalier dictatorship. The first reason was geopolitical, as US feared that Haiti would follow Cuba's example and turn to communism during the Cold War. Baby Doc made it clear that his loyalty to the US was for sale, and got the money he asked for. He repeated this performance and got more aid when the US wanted to block Cuba's entry into the Organization of American States in 1962 (Schuller, 2006: 3). The second reason for the inflow of aid to Haiti was, according to Schuller (2006), economic. In the early 1970s, unstable oil prices caused a financial shock. In addition, President Nixon removed the dollar from the gold standard, causing extreme fluctuations in its value. As wealthy investors needed to spend their liquid assets, they poured money into international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB). The investors convinced the WB to increase its lending profiles to governments in the Global South, which they did. Initially, these loans were given at a low interest rate, but President Reagan responded to the inflation crisis differently and increased the interest rate in 1982. After adjusting for inflation, interest rates were -3.4% in 1970, but shot up to 27.5% in 1982 for the same loans (Schuller, 2010).

In early 1986, a protest was initiated in the city of Gonaives, which grew into a series of revolts throughout the Haitian countryside. Within a matter of days, the revolt had intensified and reached Port au Prince. Jean Claude Duvalier and his family were forced into exile, leaving behind a country that in 1985 was the poorest country in the western hemisphere (Ferguson, 1987).

### **The republic of NGOs**

Despite the fact that the global community were aware of the corruptive regime of the Duvaliers, aid money continued to pour into the country. However, the donor countries found an elegant solution, namely, channelling more and more of their aid into what were then called private voluntary organizations (PVOs), which now largely go under the name of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the money given bypassed the government while still promoting stability, decreasing poverty and developing a better health care and educational system. It did not take long for Haiti to become a magnet for evangelical religious groups and secular relief agencies alike. By 1984 there were at least four hundred PVOs operating in the country, and soon a new aid group was arriving Haiti every day. In time, this period has become to be known as the "Republic of NGOs" (Dubois, 2012).

### **Neoliberalism**

After the brutal regime of the Duvaliers, Haiti began its second shot at independence broke and isolated. In desperate need for money, the ruling military junta entered into negotiation with the IMF

for development loans. As access to credit was dependent on the reduction of tariffs and the privatization of the remaining state industry, public funding decreased substantially. Five different governments marked the period between 1986 and 1990, each attempting to gain the favour of the international community by implementing neoliberal policies (Dubois, 2012). Neoliberalism can be understood as economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can be best advanced by liberal individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within a free market (Lewis *et al*, 2009: 5). By the time of the 1990 election, the IMF and the WB wanted more control. With the democratic election of a populist priest named Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti's first ever free and fair elections in 1990, the Haitian people voted overwhelmingly against neoliberalism and the USA candidate; the former WB staffer Marc Bazin (Edmonds, 2012). However, less than eight months after Aristides inauguration, he was taken hostage in a military coup. Aristide managed to escape to the US while the army carried out brutal reprisals against his supporters, killing over twelve hundred over the following days, and even more people were killed in the two years of military rule. During this period, the economic situation in Haiti worsened as an embargo put in place after the military coup had taken a deep economic toll. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 20 per cent, and unemployment rose to 75 per cent between 1992 and 1993, as the textile and assembly plants - which constituted over three-quarters of Haiti's exports - were closed, the tax collection system collapsed, and infrastructure crumbled (Ramachandran and Walz, 2012). Americas Watch and The National coalition for Haitian Refugees (1993: 1) argued that the military forces that overthrew Mr Aristide also suppressed Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil society with acts of killings, arrests, intimidations and beatings.

Aristide returned to presidency in 1994 with the help of the US under Bill Clinton. As a condition of their support, international financial institutions insisted that Aristide should follow the neoliberal economic doctrine and remove all protectionist tariffs. Even though Aristide attempted to resist, he found himself facing the threat of withheld aid and loans. This policy, as Clinton himself would later admit, devastated Haiti's rice growers and deepened the country's dependency on imported food. In addition, this generated a massive exodus of farmers to urban centres (Edmonds, 2012). Once back in office, Aristide disbands the murderous Haitian army. Foreign troops from the US and later from a UN mission took over some of the army's duties, which set the foundation for a long-term foreign military presence in the country (Dubois, 2012 and Edmonds 2012).

Several years later, Aristide was again elected President, with 92 per cent of the votes. However, the turnout was low due to an opposition boycott of the elections. The US used this as an excuse to cut off much needed aid. This economic situation led to many disgruntled government workers, unpaid

teachers, and poorly supplied hospitals. In this period, NGOs began, yet again, to spring up all over the country, creating a parallel NGO state in Haiti (Dubois, 2012 and Edmonds 2012).

In spite of the aid embargo, under the two Aristide administrations, more schools were built in Haiti than during the period of 1804-1990. Aristide and his Lavalas party also began a universal schooling program and the country's first free public medical school with the assistance from the Taiwanese and Cuban governments. It was estimated that the schools would produce over 600 doctors during its first 12 years of existence. However, when the coup occurred three weeks later, the schools were shut down and turned into barracks for the US Marines. Despite modest progress, Aristide was being viewed as a threat to the Haitian elite and American hegemony. On 29<sup>th</sup> of February 2004, he was overthrown once again and exiled to the Central African Republic (Edmond, 2012).

### **The UN stabilization mission: MINUSTAH**

After Aristides departure, Boniface Alexandre, President of the Supreme Court, was inaugurated as interim President in accordance with the Haitian Constitution. He immediately requested international assistance as the political situation had failed to stabilize. Responding to this emerging humanitarian crisis, UN authorized a multi-national interim force with the UN stabilization Mission in Haiti, known as the MINUSTAH. This mission was dispatched to provide a secure and stable environment that in turn could support a peaceful and lasting political state (Better World Campaign, 2014). Since their arrival, however, Haiti has experienced human rights violations under the banner of stabilization, where MINUSTAH's has been implicated in numerous crimes, including sexual exploitation of minors, prostitution and rape (Guzman, 2015). During this period, MINUSTAH and the government struggled to restore law and order, particularly between illegal armed gangs and the police. These challenges followed under the Rene Prével administration in the period between 2006 until 2011. Even though the new administration faced numerous challenges, including the need to reign in endemic crime and gang violence, restore public services, and foster economic growth and poverty reduction, Prével managed to establish relative internal stability and a period of economic growth (Taft-Morales, 2013).

### **Natural disasters halt a period of political and economic progress**

During the period of relative political and economic stability, Haiti experienced a series of tropical storms, which killed more than 800 people and leaving more than 1 million people homeless or in need of aid (ALNAP, 2010). In addition, a worsening food crisis emerged that led to violent protests and the removal of Haiti's prime minister in 2008. This further complicated the governability.



Without a prime minister, Haiti could not sign certain agreements with foreign donors or implement programs to address this crisis for over four months (Taft-Morales, 2013).

However, it was the earthquake that hit the island in January 2010 that really left the country in ruin. The earthquake resulted in more than 200,000 deaths and destroyed over 80% of the capital Port-Au-Prince (ALNAP, 2010). Political stability was especially uncertain after the disaster as 17 per cent of the country's civil servants were killed, and the presidential palace, the parliament building and 28 of 29 ministry buildings were destroyed. Michel Martelly, a popular musician without any previous political experience, was sworn into office as president on May 14, 2011 (Taft-Morales, 2013).

### **President Martelly administration and current challenges**

The country's tumultuous political history continues to challenge President Martelly. According to the Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated (2012), the President needs to overcome six principal challenges in order to carry out sustainable development.

The first obstacle was to find and keep a Prime Minister that could manage the President's policies. During Martelly's first year in office, Haiti was without a prime minister, which limited the government's ability to act and the international community to move forward with reconstruction effort after the earthquake. It also took five months to form a government because of a dispute with the opposition party (Taft-Morales, 2013). On January the 17<sup>th</sup>, 2015, Martelly had to announce a new prime minister again, in order to defuse a crisis over long-delayed election. The announcement of Evans Paul as Prime minister followed the one-month earlier resignation of Laurent Lamothe (Capital News, 2015.)

The second challenge was to relocate the 390,000 Haitians that continued to live in the 701 tent camps around Port au Prince to permanent shelters. This has however proven difficult because of a substantial decrease in aid money

The third challenge was to contain a cholera epidemic that has been going on since October 2010. However as noted; the Haitian government has received only a fraction of requested aid money, which has forced numerous NGOs to cease the operations of health stations (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).

The fourth challenge was to demobilize the 10,000-member MINUSTHA force with the belief that the Haitian Armed Forces is better to secure national sovereignty. However, some international organisations and donors are apprehensive about restoration of the Armed Forces as they claim that the resources should be devoted to improve the MINUSTHA. In addition, the Armed Forces claim that

the country does not face a significant foreign threat (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).

The fifth challenge was to attend to a desperate poor and unemployed population, and reducing crime and inequalities (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).

The last challenge was the Mitigation of Volatile Political Loyalties. Haiti's political system has since the Duvaliers been deeply entwined with political loyalties that has resulted in conflict and violence. In turn, this has fostered a lack of faith in the state-apparatus, weakening the already fragile state-society synergy (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).

In addition to these six challenges, the President and his government must also improve the working relationship with Parliament, in which only 3 out of 129 members belong to his party (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).

I also find it relevant to add a seventh challenge, namely the country's vulnerability to natural hazards, which will continue to influence Haiti's development. If history is any indication, the President will not have an easy time ruling the hemispheres poorest and most vulnerable country.

## 2.4 Summary

This overview of the political situation and history in Haiti illustrates some important elements that are of particular relevance to this thesis.

Firstly, Haiti has endured political instability, frequent regime shifts, and chronic challenges in governance since colonial times. The decades of neglect has not only lead to a lack of faith in the political system, which threatens the effectiveness, fairness and growth of policies and social projects, but has also left the Haitian people in extreme poverty.

In order to stay afloat Haiti has received massive influxes of aid, which leads to the second important element; foreign interests and humanitarian assistance. Throughout different periods, Haiti's development has been dependent on external aid and assistance, mainly from the US (Dubois, 2012 and Schuller, 2006). By looking at the historical context, it becomes evident that aid was often given either as a reward or as punitive measure to influence Haitian politics. The implementation of the neoliberal economic doctrine and removal of all protectionist tariffs in the 1990s provides a good example of this (Dubois, 2012). The dominant role of NGOs in Haiti has created a parallel state said to be more powerful than the government itself (USIP, 2010 and Lewis *et.al.* 2009). In effect, this means that the aid-dependency and limited capacity of the state has led to foreign donors increasingly stepping into the government's shoes. Zanotti (2010) and Ramachandran *et.al.* (2012) argue that the

weakness of government institutions is largely due to the history of aid dependence and foreign interventions. The country is heavily aid-dependent with 70 % of the state budget coming from external financing (Zanotti, 2010). Most of the services such as health and education are therefore provided by INGOs or local NGOs (Zanotti, 2010 and World Bank, 2014).

Thirdly, Haiti is situated in the middle of a hurricane belt and the land is bounded by major faults and changes in topographic and geographic structure, creating unsolid bedrock that increases the risk of storms and earthquakes (Iris, 2010). In addition, Haiti also lacks absorptive capacity to buffer impacts of natural hazards due to extreme deforestation, making the country more prone to natural disasters (Eichler, 2006).

Lastly, if a country has experienced political instability over time, as Haiti has, the country is also more prone to natural disasters as this increase social vulnerability (Webersik *et al*, 2010).

Based on the aforementioned factors, it can be argued that the current challenges in Haiti are a product of its history where political instability, weak institutions, environmental vulnerability, extreme poverty and inequalities continues to influence Haiti's development. These factors have also had implications for how Haitian people understand democracy and accountability<sup>2</sup> today.

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<sup>2</sup> Accountability can be understood as the procedures requiring officials and those who seek to influence them to follow established rules defining acceptable processes and outcomes, and to demonstrate that they have followed those procedures. Johnston, M. (n.d:2): *Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and Accountability*. Available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010193.pdf>.

## Chapter 3 Clarification of concepts and literature review

The first part of this chapter offers some clarifications of key concepts relevant to this thesis, including; climate change, natural hazards, natural disasters, risk, vulnerability, sustainable development, resilience, and participation. Furthermore, it reviews some general literature on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives, with a particular focus on the CMDRR process, and the Pressure and Release (PAR) model. The second part provides background information on the 2010 Haitian earthquake and the phases of the response and the recovery process, focusing on the actual role of the government, civil society and NGOs. In considering CARE's potential as capacity building agents for the CMDRR process in Carrefour district, I also find it necessary to study their origin and nature as forms of social organization. The last part highlights the importance of INGOs in development, but also engages with the criticism that the increased profile of INGOs now attracts. Throughout this chapter, literature on Haiti will be referred to and included, when available. The chapter ends with a presentation of the framework for analysis, which forms the basis of my thesis

### 3.1 Clarification of concepts

#### 3.1.1 Natural disasters and vulnerability

When disasters happen, popular and media interpretations tend to focus on their naturalness, as in the phrase 'natural hazards, including geophysical events such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, erosion, wildfires, tornadoes, and volcanic eruptions. Although their destructiveness are part of the natural system, it is an inadequate way of understanding the disasters that are associated with natural hazards (Wisner *et al*, 2003). As such, the term "natural disasters" which involve the interaction of natural hazards and social systems have emerged in the last thirty years (Johnson, 2006). IFRC defines natural disasters as "sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community's or society's ability to cope using its own resources" (Manyena, 2009 and IFRC in Kumar, 2011:2).

In his foreword to “Living with Risk,” the United Nations’ Secretary General, Kofi Annan <sup>3</sup> raised awareness to human-induced conditions that increase vulnerability to natural disasters:

Communities will always face natural hazards, but today’s disasters are often generated by, or at least exacerbated by, human activities... At no time in human history have so many people lived in cities clustered around seismically active areas. Destitution and demographic pressure have led more people than ever before to live in flood plains or in areas prone to landslides. Poor land-use planning; environmental management; and a lack of regulatory mechanisms both increase the risk and exacerbate the effects of disasters.

Kofi Annan (quoted in UN/ISDR, 2002: 2).

In this statement, Kofi Annan recognizes the difference between natural climate change and human induced climate change. Natural climate change is known to be related to changes in ocean currents, solar activity, volcanic eruptions and other natural factors not caused by human activities (non-anthropogenic), whereas human induced climate change (anthropogenic) are when humans are causing climatic changes through fossil fuel burning, clearing forests and other practices that increase the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. The current concentration of GHG in the atmosphere is now the highest it has been for the past 500,000 years (ISDR, 2008). This situation is in line with the official definition by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that climate change is the change that can be attributed “directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (ISDR, 2008: 1).

Kofi Annan also emphasizes that hazard events by themselves do not cause disasters, but that it must be seen in relation to an exposed, vulnerable and ill-prepared population that exacerbates the effects of disasters (ISDR, 2008 and Annan, 2006:1). Similarly, Wisner *et al* (2003: 7) argue, “to understand disasters we must not only know about the types of hazards that might affect people, but also the different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people”. Vulnerability is a concept that focuses on “limitation or lack of access to resources” (Bradshaw, 2004:10). The converse of

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<sup>3</sup> Annan, K, (2002): Foreword to Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, (UN/ISDR). Quoted in UN/ISDR, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. (2002): *Disaster Reduction and Sustainable Development Understanding the links between vulnerability and risk to disasters related to development and environment*. Available at: <http://www.gdrc.org/uem/disasters/disenvi/DR-and-SD-English.pdf>. Accessed: 24.02.2015.

vulnerability is the capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from hazard impacts (DfID, 2005). The current description of the nature of disasters is, thus, that they are “complex interactions of the natural and human world-encompassing both human, social, economic, political and environmental dimensions” (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 4).

### 3.1.2 The distribution of risk within and between countries

Risk<sup>4</sup> is differentially distributed between and within societies, as some groups, people and countries are more prone to damages, loss and suffering in the context of various disasters. Risk is also captured by the term vulnerability, where typically social characteristics, including; class, occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, health status and the nature and extent of social networks, explains the variation of impact in relation to natural hazards. Other key factors that are highlighted in the literature are economic resources such as secure income, access to savings or credit, employment with social protection, marketable job skills, education and training, and control over productive resources (Bradshaw, 2004 and Enarson, 2000).

Empirical evidence has shown that people living in developing countries are more exposed and vulnerable to effectively cope with disasters (Webersik, 2012). An estimated 97 per cent of natural disaster related deaths each year occur in developing countries, and the percentage of economic loss in relation to the GNP in developing countries far exceeds the ones in developed countries. This fact becomes even more relevant for small island developing states (SIDS) (UNISDR, 2002:3). Webersik (2012) illustrate this by comparing two similar cases: “the 2010 earthquake in Chile was stronger than the 2010 Haiti earthquake; the death toll in Haiti was almost 500 times larger” (Webersik, 2012).

There are several reasons for this. First, the geological location in developing countries is often exposed to extreme natural phenomenon. An explanation to this is that hydro meteorological, seismic, volcanic and other natural events are more frequent and severe in the subtropical and tropical regions of the South, and poses a permanent ongoing threat to the people living in these regions (GTZ, 2002).

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<sup>4</sup> Risk can be understood as the possibility of harmful consequences or expected losses resulting from interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. It is “the combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences”. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) (2009): *UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction*, UN/ISDR, Geneva. Pp. 25.

Second, there is a comparatively lower level of development, which is evident in the often fragile infrastructure, the poor building fabric of housing, the vulnerability of productive activities, the low level of political and social organization and the absence of warning systems (GTZ, 2002). In turn, this vulnerability creates a “downward spiral of deepening poverty and increasing risk” (Vathana, Oum, Kan, and Chervier, 2013).

The third reason for the increased vulnerability is that the rapid rise in the world population has altered the distribution pattern of human settlements and land use. In developing countries the transition from a pre-modern or traditional society to a modern society goes on without the necessary safety precautions (e.g. when building bridges and houses), which increases the vulnerability to and risk of adverse impacts, resulting from a natural event (GTZ, 2002). Like other countries in the region, Haiti has experienced an uncontrolled increase in urban settlements. As in sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti is experiencing what is called “premature urbanization”, where the agricultural sector is not productive as it has long surpassed its capacity and at the same time, the urban areas are not generating economic growth. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan comprised in 2007 one-fourth of Haiti’s entire population. As argued by USAID (2007:3): “ given the sheer scale of settlement in coastal flood plains, predicted deaths due to catastrophic flooding in Port-au-Prince would far surpass all other disasters in Haiti’s meteorological record”. They conclude in the same report that; “the root causes of environmental disaster in Haiti are acute poverty, rapid population growth and unplanned urbanization” (USAID, 2007:3).

Similarly, Wisner *et al* (2003) considers how the spatial variety of nature provides different types of environmental opportunity and hazards. For example: ‘flood plains provide ‘cheap’ flat land for businesses and housing; the slopes of volcanoes are generally very fertile for agriculture; poor people can only afford to live in slum settlements in unsafe ravines and on low-lying land within and around the cities where they have to work’ (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 6).

Another aspect regarding the social construct of risk is addressed by Dr. Elaine Enarson, a sociologist in the field of gender relations in disasters. She highlights in her working paper “Gender and Natural Disasters” how women face multiple gender discrimination- physical, social, economic, psychological discrimination- and how these factors exposes them to higher rates of poverty and violence compared to men. She further points out how gender relations are culturally and historically bound, where social conditions and traditional expectations often leave millions of women around the globe in substandard housing, socially marginalized, impoverished or economically insecure, overburdened with care giving responsibilities, and lacking social power and political voice (Enarson, 2000).

A report prepared by Michel Frost, a specialist on the human right situation in Haiti, illustrates that there was an increase in cases of violence against women by 150 per cent in the months following the earthquake (Isis International, n.d).

Although some groups are more prone to disasters, Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) remind us that no vulnerability exist in isolation- to a large extent, they are shaped by dynamic pressure that are rooted in development failures, both at a national and international level. Vulnerability is, thus, a reflection of development level, and plays a critical role in all aspects of sustainable development.

### **3.1.3 Sustainable development**

The international leader and chairman of the World Commission of Environment and Development (WCED), Gro Harlem Brundtland defines sustainable development in the report, "Our Common Future: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (UNDP, 2013:1).

The definition contains within it two key concepts:

- The concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
- The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

(UNDP, 2013: 1)

Brundtland further highlights that: "Sustainable development includes human progress, improvements, and involvement of people in decision-makings." (Brundtland, 1987: 7). The concept of sustainable development is constructed in three pillars as seen in figure 7: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental balance (UNDP, 2013).






Figure 7: The three pillars of sustainable development (Source: ECEFS, 2013)

### 3.1.4 The Pressure and Release (PAR) model

Wisner *et al* (2003) approach the study of disaster from the risk and vulnerability perspective. Inherent to their claims in “At Risk” is the contention that social vulnerability and multifarious forms of risk are the root cause of disasters. They have developed a model that explains disaster risk in a broad perspective. The PAR model is internationally accepted for the analysing of progression of vulnerability (USAID, 2011 in Wisner *et al*, 2003). The PAR model (figure 8) is based on the commonly used equation:

$$\text{Risk (Disaster)} = \text{Hazard} \times \text{Vulnerability.}$$

This formula represents the Wisner *et al* view that disaster risk is directly affected by the hazard produced and the degree of hazard vulnerability experienced by exposed persons in a particular period of time and space (Wisner *et al*, 2003). See figure 8 below.




Figure 8: The PAR model (Source: Wisner *et al*, 2003)

The figure shows the risk of climate or anthropogenic disaster as the intersection between socio-economic pressure on the left and physical exposure from natural hazards on the right. Increasing pressure can come from either side, but to relieve the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 50).

The PAR model distinguishes between three components on the social side and one component on the natural side. The three forces on the social side are defined as follows: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. The component on the natural side is the natural hazards itself (Wisner *et al*, 2003).

Root causes include economic, demographic and political processes within a society (including global processes) and distribution of resources between different groups of people. They reflect the distribution of power in a society, and are connected to the function or dysfunction of the state, and ultimately the nature of control exercised by the police and military and the capabilities of the administration (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 53). Wisner *et al* (2003) further highlights that people who are economically marginal, such as urban squatters, or people who live in environmentally 'marginal' environments, for example flood-prone urban locations, tend to be of marginal importance to those who hold economic and political power (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 53). One outcome of this is that people are likely to be a low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazard mitigation. People that are viewed as economically and politically marginal are also more likely to stop trusting their own methods for self-protection, and to lose confidence in their own local knowledge. Even if they still have confidence in their own abilities, the 'raw materials' needed or the labour time required may have disappeared as a result of their economic and political marginality and low or uncertain access to resources (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 53).

Dynamic pressure convert the effects of economic and political processes in local circumstances and has to be considered in relation to the different hazards people face. These dynamic pressures include amongst other epidemic diseases, rapid urbanization, violent conflicts, foreign debt and structural adjustment programmes (Wisner *et al*, 2003)

Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in which people's vulnerability is expressed in time and space. Examples put forward by Wisner *et al* (2003:55) includes people having to live in hazardous locations, being unable to afford safe buildings, lacking effective protection by the state (for instance in terms of effective building codes), having to engage in dangerous livelihoods, or having minimal food entitlements, or entitlements that are prone to rapid and severe disruption. Wisner *et al* (2003: 55) also exemplifies the lack of disaster planning and preparedness, and a harmed environment.

In the PAR model, the community defines its own vulnerabilities and capabilities. They also decide what risks are acceptable to them and which are not. As Morrow (1999, in Wisner *et al*, 2003: 84) remarks:

The proposed identification and targeting of at-risk groups does not imply helplessness or lack of agency on their part. ... Just because neighbourhoods have been disenfranchised in the past does not mean they are unwilling or unable to be an important part of the process. There are many notable examples of grassroots action on the part of poor, elderly and/or minority communities..., and of women making a difference in post-disaster decisions and outcomes.... Planners and managers who make full use of citizen expertise and energy will more effectively improve safety and survival chances of their communities.

### **3.1.5 Facing the humanitarian challenge of natural disasters**

Confronting the horrors of natural hazards, a series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR). The United Nations (UN) has long argued that we must address the root causes of disasters, not merely their symptoms. Kofi Annan (in GTZ, 2002:20) has also explicitly demanded a paradigm shift from the prevalent 'culture of reaction' to a 'culture of prevention'. Devising preventive strategies that work, however, requires that we have a clear understanding of the underlying causes of vulnerability (UN, 1999). As I showed in the previous section, vulnerability to extreme natural events comprises various factors that bear a close relationship to the development of a country or a region. Nevertheless, the connection between underdevelopment and vulnerability is complex and a difficult task to enforce, especially in regards to building a culture of prevention. One of the reasons for this is that in many developing countries, the government and the private sector see preventive measures as cost factors rather than profitable investments (GTZ, 2002). The UN (1999:3) also acknowledges this aspect by stating 'while the costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in the distant future'.

#### **DRR initiatives**

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a component of the Disaster risk management cycle (DRMC)<sup>5</sup> and can be defined as "the systematic development and application of policies, strategies and practices to

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<sup>5</sup> GTZ (2002:19) defines DRM as "a series of actions (programmes, projects and/or measures) and instruments expressly aimed at reducing disaster risk in endangered regions, and mitigating the extent of disasters". The

minimise vulnerabilities, hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout a society, in the broad context of sustainable development ” (Gero, Meheux and Dominey-Howes, 2011: 102). As identified by Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR), a good management of today’s risk is a “starting point for facing tomorrows changed risk, whether from climate change, globalization or development. These three policy arenas share interests in monitoring changing risks, reducing exposure and vulnerability and advancing the transformation to resilience and sustainability” (IRDR, 2014:2).

## Resilience

It can be argued that the antithesis of vulnerability is resilience. Just like disaster and vulnerability, resilience is difficult to define, as there are discussions on whether the concept is a process leading to a desired outcome(s) or a desired outcome(s) in itself (Manyena, 2009). However, a general understanding is that resilience refers to the ability of an individual or a community to “bounce back” from the impact of hazards or disasters (Wildavsky *et al*, 2007 in Barley, 2011). Cordaid (2013: 4) defines resilience as “the capacity of an individual and/or a community to survive and bounce back from a hazard event, to go back to normal functioning, and to improve her or his condition towards full enjoyment of being an empowered human being and/or community”. However, Manyena (2009:24) argues that disaster resilience must be understood as the ability to “bounce forward” rather than “bouncing back” following a disaster. While “bounce back” implies the capacity to return to a pre-disaster state, “bounce forward” relates to a community or an individual’s ability to continue within the context of changed realities as a result of the disaster (Manyena, 2009:24). Thus, “bounce back” fails to capture the “new” reality created by disasters. It is also important to note that although resilience can be argued to be the opposite of vulnerability, Manyena (2009) claim that people can possess characteristics that both make them vulnerable and resilient. In addition, resilience building occurs at any phase or multiple phases of the DRM cycle (Manyena, 2009).

Manyena (2009) also examines the interrelationships of resiliencies. She emphasize that resilience should also include infrastructure and other external aspects that can be beneficial to increase our understanding and application of the concept to wider frameworks. One example is *“if buildings crumble to the ground in an earthquake, a community's resilience may be jeopardised, as roads are impassable due to debris (which hinders emergency response and the delivery of aid)”* (Manyena, 2009: 33). She also highlights that a community can be considered unsafe because its organization is

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traditional DRMC can be understood as a sequence of three main stages; 1) The Normal/Risk Reduction Stage 2) The Emergency response Stage and 3) The Recovery Stage (Piper, 2011).

deficient, its economy is weak, that is, it has low capability to absorb the impacts, it has low capabilities to recover, would be another way of viewing resilience (Cardona, 2005 in Manyena, 2009: 33).

The connections between disaster recovery and the resilience of affected communities have become common features since the global DRR framework i.e. Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This framework focused on the capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover with little or no external assistance following a disaster (Manyena, 2009). It has been noted that DRR is most effective at community level where specific local needs can be met (Cordaid, 2009).

### **3.1.6 Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR)**

The CMDRR process is rooted in communities. In Cordaid (2013:4) conceptualization, “a community can be taken as a group that shares one or more things in common, such as place of residence, disaster risk exposure, or having been affected by a hazard event”.

In the literature, a distinction is often made between two major DRR approaches at the community level. These are Community Managed DRR (CMDRR) and Community Based DRR (CBDRR). One of the fundamental differences is that CMDRR emphasize people’s participation during the entire project cycle, while in CBDRR information from the community is gathered to determine interventions, which are primarily dependent on external facilitators. In addition, in CMDRR the community implements the project while the external facilitator provides guidance. In the case of CBDRR, the facilitators implement the project while the community participates (Cordaid, 2013).

As a disaster is localized and it happens in a community, I find it important that the community members are included to participate during the entire project. As stated by Cordaid (2013: 4): “CMDRR is strategically important: its approach has communities become resilient and self-reliant, so that development initiatives are safe, secure and sustainable through time. CMDRR creates a sustainable intra-community working relationship, geared towards building group and community cohesiveness in achieving the task of risk reduction”. Therefore, my focus in this study is on CMDRR as this approach is viewed more sustainable and inclusive.

#### **The CMDRR process**

Rustico “Rusty” Binas, Cordaid’s Global Advisor on Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction, sees CMDRR as

“A process that mobilizes a group of people in a systematic way towards achieving a safe and resilient community/group. Its end view is a dynamic community that equalizes power relations, binds the group cohesively in the process of making decisions, deals with conflicts, resolves issues,

and manages individual and collective tasks through addressing and bouncing back from hazard events” (Cordaid, 2013: 3).

According to this definition, CMDRR is recognized as a “bottom-up” process because solutions are generated through local knowledge and expertise, and not in the form of a request from higher authorities. Thus, CMDRR supports communities to empower themselves through taking control over their own destinies, rather than being passive recipients of aid (Cordaid, 2009). However, for CMDRR to work, people have to understand and appreciate this bottom-up approach, including their own agency in the process. This further implies that the process requires some time in relationship building (Cordaid, 2009).

Cordaid (2009) further identifies the components of the CMDRR process to be: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) Self organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system.

Within the first step, the community members themselves can identify community vulnerability and risk and start to prioritize a course of action in order to cope and adapt to disaster risk. One of the main challenges in this step is to ensure that CMDRR is truly participative and prevent selected groups from taking over the process while excluding other community members. Consequently, those with resources, power and knowledge can turn participatory processes into their advantage, whereas the excluded and marginalized often are unable to do so (Young, 1989:258).

The second step is to make concrete plans and activities, which are usually based on traditional knowledge and activities that have been practised and handed down from generation to generation (Cordaid, 2009).

The third step is self-organization, which entails that the community jointly implements these plans and activities, with support provided by the partners and sometimes the government or other agencies. The intervention is community owned and managed, and this empowers communities in their quest to further increase their own resilience. Even though it is the community’s responsibility to acquire the resources needed to carry out these activities, partner organizations can provide financial support for community-led-activities (Cordaid, 2009).

The last step of the CMDRR process focuses on participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning. While there has been noted that such activities are still being developed, there exist an agreement that lessons learnt by communities and partners needs to be shared with others as it inspires and stimulates replicable and effective resilience building strategies (Cordaid, 2009).

The ultimate goal of CMDRR interventions is to build resilient communities. Communities can be considered resilient when they can pass through all the phases of the CMDRR process by themselves (Cordaid, 2013:4).

The DRR formula for CMDRR is offered by Cordaid (2013), and can be translated into three areas of community-managed activities as seen below.

<b>Disaster risk (DR)= Hazard (H)x Vulnerability (V)</b> <b>Capacity (C)</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1. Prevention and mitigation of hazards</b></li> <li><b>2. Reduction of vulnerabilities to hazards</b></li> <li><b>3. Strengthening capacities to cope and bounce back from hazards</b></li> </ol>

**Figure 9: The three areas of community managed activities (Adopted from Cordaid, 2013:4)**

Hazard, coupled with vulnerability and lack of capacity to cope, translate into communities with high levels of risks. If disaster risk is reduced, the probability of the hazard event turning into a disaster is less (Cordaid, 2013).

### **3.1.7 Genuine community participation in CMDRR**

The issue in which community members are invited to participate and the way their participation is elicited is of importance for how CMDRR provides positive development outcomes (Cordaid, 2009). Anisur Rahman, a development theorist defines public participation as:

“Participation is justified because it expresses not only the will of the majority of people, but also it is the only way for them to insure that the important moral, humanitarian, social, cultural and economic objectives of a more humane and effective development can be peacefully attained” (Sachs 2005: 121).

The key element in this definition is to create a human-centred development, in which people are given the opportunity to organize themselves in a manner that is best suited to meet their desires. Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Martha Nussbaum’s Human Development Approach further expand this view, where freedom, engagement, affiliation – the ability to engage in social interaction and have the freedom (capabilities) and supportive institutions to do so – is seen as essential components of the development of any society. The capability approach includes both material and non-material needs, as poverty is not only the lack of income and material goods, but also the lack of

rights to live a life full of possibilities and influence one's own lives and development path. It also includes the concept of "functioning", which indicates the broadening of human capacity to achieve things in life through self-actualization, education and access to healthcare (Robeyns, 2003 and Nussbaum, 2011:33–34).

It has been observed that many DRR programmes have failed to be sustainable at local level after the completion of the project because effective community participation and capacity building has been lacking. Without participation, DRR efforts will not preserve and become sustainable (Pandey and Okazaki, 2005).

## **3.2 Building back better: The lessons of Haiti**

### **3.2.1 The 2010 earthquake**

On 12<sup>th</sup> of January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti at a shallow depth of 13 kilometers. The epicenter was near Léogâne not 25 km from Port-au-Prince, the capital (Patrick, 2011). The earthquake killed approximately 220,000 people, injured 300,000 and left over one million homeless. The disaster further resulted in immense humanitarian crisis, highlighting long-lasting development challenges, as more than 60 per cent of government and administrative buildings, and 80 per cent of schools were destroyed (ALNAP, 2010). The earthquake also left 1.5 million people in various camps around the country. Four years later, many people continue to suffer the consequences. In 2014, 280,000 people were still displaced in various camps in and around the capital (UNHCR, 2014).

While the natural dimensions to the 2010 earthquake was a tractable factor to the crisis that followed, the social construct of risk and vulnerability cannot be underestimated. Following the destructive earthquake, the response was made more difficult by severe underlying vulnerabilities including systematic poverty, fragile governance, insecurity and a continual threat of natural disasters (Patrick, 2011). (See section 2.1 and 2.3 for more information).

The response to Haiti's earthquake also involved a large number of actors including various UN agencies (including MINUSTAH), international and national civil society, the US and other international military as well as the Haitian government (Patrick, 2011:6). The capacities of many of these actors were severely affected as a consequence of the earthquake.



## **The national response capacity**

Haiti has frequently been categorised as a fragile and instable state. The weakness of the state apparatus and decades of poor governance are the main factors that explain the level of devastation caused by the earthquake as well as the slowness of the recovery (DEC, 2011 and ALNAP, 2010). On top of this limitation, the loss of important government personnel and severely damaged infrastructure, made it much more difficult for the government to respond to the following the earthquake (ALNAP, 2010). In addition, the National Disaster Risk Management System, Emergency Operations Centre and the Direction de la Protection Civile, Port au Prince's main fire station and innumerable government vehicles were badly damaged or destroyed. However, even the most devastated governments retain capacities. The Haitian government made some important steps in resuming some core functions within the first days, such as making fuel available, repairing two of the four damaged electric plants, and reopening banks and paid public sector workers soon after (Patrick, 2011).

When it comes to the recovery phase, NGOs are said to have taken on many of the responsibilities that would normally be that of the government, and according to some, to have more power than the state itself (DEC, 2011). One senior civil servant interviewed by DEC (2011) after the earthquake stated, "this response has further weakened national structures. The people who have come in have a very limited knowledge of the field, which is why we see little impact from the investments that have been made" (DEC, 2011:7).

However, collaboration has worked better with certain technical ministries, for example Merlin's work with the health ministry, the Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP) regarding working within government guidelines to train 'agents de santé' and community health workers. It was also reported that some agencies were working with local authorities, including Action Aid who held regular meetings to improve coordination, and CARE who reported working with the Mayor of Carrefour's office to support needs assessments and coordination activities (DEC, 2011: 7).

## **Local NGOs and INGOs**

NGOs were also slow in the immediate aftermath, and once in place, the coordination between NGOs and their national and local counterparts within the Haitian government and civil society was not sustained or extended to lower tiers of Haitian national or local government. Most individual agencies conducted their own need assessments, where each followed different standards, methodologies and focus thus limiting the usefulness of the results for an overall analyses or

strategic planning. Largely missing from these assessments were contextual analyses and capacity assessments of Haitian stakeholders (most notably the Haitian government), which would have allowed the humanitarian community a greater understanding of Haitian social and political dynamics and of the capacities of their natural Haitian partners across government and civil society to engage with and even lead recovery (Patrick, 2011). In addition, Haitians were largely excluded and poorly consulted from assessments, design, planning and delivery of the response that would have allowed a more joined-up approach both between stakeholders and with the transition to recovery (Patrick, 2011). This further disempowered the Haitian society. A recent report made by Kathrine Haver (2011: 17) after the 2010 earthquake notes “people’s frustration is increasing as a result of the communication gap”. This has led to security incidents and more demonstrations against INGOs (Haver, 2011).

### **The civil society**

Haitians dominated the early emergency response. Neighbours, friends, family and strangers helped each other, saving thousands of lives as they dug out the vast majority of people buried under the rubble. Building social capital was a key determinant, as solidarity between neighbours has proven important in helping cope with crises after the 2010 earthquake and on previous occasions (DEC 2011). In a report carried out by DEC (2011) some organizations sought to do this in the relief stage through good programming approaches, for example working with street food vendors to enhance food security.

However, as previously stated, the affected population was not consulted, informed or included in the humanitarian response (Patrick, 2011). Consequently, the affected people and local NGOs interviewed after the 2010 earthquake often underlined that they had often felt that they were not respected by INGOs (GPPI, 2011).

GPPI (2011) highlights some reasons as to why people often were excluded from partaking in the planning and implementation of the humanitarian response. First, humanitarian agencies often commented on low levels of social capital and a weak sense of community engagement after the earthquake. They also saw Haitians as victims who had other things to do than rebuilding their country. Second, many humanitarians lacked knowledge about the Haitian context and culture, and could not speak Creole or French. This made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to understand the situation. Third, humanitarians emphasized speed over inclusiveness. The local committee of Bristout-Bobin showed, however, that inclusive implementation could be much more efficient than if international agencies did it alone. Third, the government did not effectively communicate with the population, which only upset people more. Finally, during the workshop organized with local NGOs

they recognized that it is difficult for international organizations to work with the very heterogeneous Haitian civil society sector (GPPI, 2010:42).

### **3.2.2. Addressing future risks through DRR initiatives**

The Haitian National System for Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD) - a network consisting of the Haitian Government's Department of Civic Protections (DPC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA), and various civic groups- have engaged in natural disaster preparedness and response before the 2010 earthquake. However, the agencies have been hampered by limited resources, which in turn undermined its ability to coordinate disaster-related efforts effectively (Grunewald, Binder and Georges, 2010). Herard (2011: 12) also points out that political strife and instability has often left the government of Haiti in a position where it could only react to disasters when they occurred rather than being able to address the root causes of disaster in a comprehensive manner. In addition, DRR featured low on Haiti's development agenda prior to the 2010 earthquake. As the 2010 earthquake was the first of its kind experienced by the country in over two hundred years, the focus was rather on mitigating the effects of its most common natural disaster: hurricanes. As such, there was no civil guidance on what to do in the event of an earthquake and no modern building codes to minimise damage and a weak enforcement capability in any case (GPPI, 2010: 11).

It has been stated, by amongst others Herard (2011), that the 2010 disaster could have been averted had sound construction practices been adhered to throughout the region. While many, including Herard (2011) and DEC (2011), recognizes the importance of building seismic resistant homes, it has been noted that much of the reconstruction is being done as it had always been done. This has much to do with people's desire to "put things back together" as they were before the earthquake, even if that means re-establishing old risks. The issues surrounding reconstruction do not just involve how to rebuild, but also where to rebuild (Herard, 2011). The issue of DRR concerning the structural safety of buildings is, thus, perceived vitally important given the seismic risk in Haiti (DEC, 2011).

While the document *Urban Disasters—Lessons from Haiti* calls for long-term DRR to be a vital component of the post-disaster relief and recovery effort in order to avoid building back with the same mistakes as before, it also acknowledges that long-term solutions are best led by an effective and accountable government. However, the absence of a supportive and strong government in Haiti has made this process rather challenging. In effect, disaster coordination is predominately done by INGOs, which affects the DPC role to adequately serve as the lead entity in disaster response and recovery (Herard, 2011). The role of INGOs in Haiti is further examined in the next section.

### 3.3 Introducing Non-governmental organization- some diverging views

NGOs have risen to prominence in the development field. There are several reasons for this spectacular growth. One reason can be linked to the emergence of what has been termed the theoretical impasse within development thinking. For example, the ideas on development vary over time, with later reports engaging in the language of freedoms and capabilities more often (Alkire, 2010). Health, education and living standards have been mentioned without exception, and since 1990 the environment and ecosystem have received significant attention in most human development reports<sup>6</sup>. Particular attention has been given to the global water crisis and global warming (Alkire, 2010). Another set of reasons are related to the perception among many development agencies that governments of both the North and South have performed poorly in the fight against poverty, and that NGOs can form an alternative to the status quo. Fisher (1998: 2 in Lewis 2007:39) speaks of the increasing inability of the national state to develop as it confronts the long-term consequences of its own ignorance, corruption and lack of accountability. A third set of reasons has less to do with the way NGOs are viewed by outside agencies, and more to do with the ways in which NGOs themselves have contributed to this new profile. As traditional economic and political concerns of development shifted in the 1990s to include debates about the importance of environment, gender and human well-being, a growing NGO presence and policy voice became apparent (Lewis, 2007).

As previously stated, Haiti is increasingly threatened by disasters that require rapid response and preparations for future disruptions and failures among a variety of actors and organizations. In Haiti, such response has mainly been carried out by INGOs and local NGOs. Since the 2010 earthquake, the development sector has been engaged in vigorous debate concerning the failure of aid and the INGOs response and reconstruction efforts.

#### 3.3.1 INGOs in Haiti

As briefly explained in Chapter 2, fears of corruption have caused foreign donors to bypass the Haitian government, and as such, they often channel financial and material assistance through

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<sup>6</sup> United Nations Development program (UNDP) defines human development as: development aims to enlarge people's freedoms to do and be what they value and have reason to value. In practice, human development also empowers people to engage actively in development on our shared planet. At all levels of development, human development focuses on essential freedoms: enabling people to lead long and healthy lives, to acquire knowledge, to be able to enjoy a decent standard of living and to shape their own lives. Many people value these freedoms in and of themselves; they are also powerful means to other opportunities. (Alkire, 2010:43)

INGOs. In effect, the Haitian people have learned to look to NGOs, both INGOs and local NGOs, rather than the government for provision of essential services (USIP, 2010 and Lewis and Kanji, 2009). On one side, NGOs might expose the limitations of the status quo (Lewis *et al*, 2009). On the other side, this could undermine democratic accountability, and thereby undermine the aims of aid itself in terms of contributing to enhance accountability (Mkandawire, 2010:1149– 1158 in Moss, Pettersson and Van de Walle, 2006: 14). It is even argued that aid itself helps the government “escape” accountability from their own citizens, as donors often fund and implement projects that the government fail to undertake, thereby easing popular frustration as well as freeing up government resources (Moss *et al*, .2006:18).

Another consequence, addressed by USIP (2010), is the “brain drain” from the Haitian government to organizations funded by international donors. USIP (2010: 2) argues that private agencies are able to out-recruit the Haitian government by offering higher wages, benefits and better working condition. In this way, the best-educated Haitians were often enticed away from working for the government, practically immobilizing an already-demoralized bureaucracy.

Many voices are also critical to INGOs suggesting that they impose their own development agenda, and as such become self-interested actors at the expense of the people they are in theory supporting (Lewis, 2007). This view, if it is correct, is in opposition to the values of the social capital concept, which is defined by Putnam as the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:167). Even Michael Edwards (2000 in Lewis, 2007:11), a long-standing writer and activist sympathetic to NGOs, writes:

...few NGOs have developed structures that genuinely respond to grassroots demands. Although NGOs talk of ‘partnership’, control over funds and decision-making remains highly unequal ... The legitimacy of NGOs (especially those based in the North) is now an accepted topic of public debate ...

There have also been strong criticisms of INGOs that have not lived up to expectations in providing assistance in and after emergencies. This critic is relevant for Haiti as the country is a long way from realizing the goal of “building back better” five years after the earthquake. The criticism has been directed towards the lack of coordination, which in turn has led to duplication of efforts, limited understanding of local circumstances among INGOs, and a somewhat naive approach to the underlying causes of conflict and instability (Cunningham, 2012 and Lewis *et al*, 2009).

### 3.4 Theoretical framework

The purpose of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to examine if such programs can generate sustainable development. This section aims to summarize the theories and concepts from the literature that are used to analyse the empirical data.

This study drew on the work of Wisner *et al* (2003) to define natural disasters. They understand natural disasters as a product of social, political and economic environments. This thesis recognises that the natural and the social cannot be separated from each other: to do so invites a failure to understand the additional burden of natural hazards, and it is unhelpful in both understanding disasters and doing something to prevent them. Examples of natural hazards that can be turned into natural disasters include floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, erosion, wildfires, tornadoes, and volcanic eruptions (Wisner *et al*, 2003). This study focus mainly on the 2010 earthquake, but I also recognize the on-going threat that for example storms and floods possesses within these two communities in Carrefour district.

As natural disasters are linked to a country's, community or individuals political, socioeconomic and environmental dimension, I found it important to understand the concept of vulnerability. In the case of Haiti, these vulnerabilities are according to the literature attached to geological location, deforestation, political instability, acute poverty, rapid population growth, unplanned urbanization and social inequalities among other factors (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 4 and USAID, 2007:3). In this paper, vulnerability is seen as a concept that focuses on "limitation or lack of access to resources" (Bradshaw, 2004:10). However, this paper also supports Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) perception that no vulnerability exist in isolation as they are shaped by dynamic pressure that are rooted in development failures, both at a national and international level.

In this study, the PAR model is applied as a simple tool for assessing people's vulnerability to earthquakes through the social components of root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. I recognize that the generation of vulnerability is not adequately integrated with the way in which the earthquake affected people; it is a static model. It exaggerates the separation of the earthquake from social processes in order to emphasise the social causation of the disaster that followed (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 90-91).

A natural hazard that turns into natural disasters also needs to be seen in relation to climate change. This thesis acknowledge that due to the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, our climate is, and will continue to change, despite efforts to curb emissions (ISDR, 2008). It is therefore

necessary to brace ourselves to some extent for coming changes, particularly with regard to vulnerable populations and those likely to experience proportionally more negative impacts.

For that reason, a series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and community-based disaster risk reduction to generate sustainable development. Kofi Annan (in GTZ, 2002:20) has explicitly demanded a paradigm shift from the prevalent 'culture of reaction' to a 'culture of prevention'. Although I recognize that all components of the DRM cycle is critical to the overall success and sustainability, my focus in this study is on the DRR stage at a community level, also known as CMDRR. CMDRR is understood in this paper as “a process that mobilizes a group of people in a systematic way towards achieving a safe and resilient community/group. Its end view is a dynamic community that equalizes power relations, binds the group cohesively in the process of making decisions, deals with conflicts, resolves issues, and manages individual and collective tasks through addressing and bouncing back from hazard events” (Cordaid, 2013: 3). However, this thesis adopts the view that resilience refers to the ability of an individual or community to “bounce forward” after a disaster, as “bounce back” fails to capture the “new” reality created by disasters (Manyena, 2009:24). I also recognize that people can possess characteristics that make them both vulnerable and resilient.

Further, CMDRR is recognized as a “bottom-up” process because solutions are generated through local knowledge and expertise, and not in the form of a request from higher authorities. Thus, CMDRR supports communities to empower themselves through taking control over their own destinies, rather than being passive recipients of aid (Cordaid, 2009). This approach has been acclaimed as the most effective and sustainable in environmental and developmental management (Cordaid, 2009).

An assessment of CARE Haiti’s operation in Carrefour district will be carried out within Cordaid’s framework for CMDRR. (See section 3.1.5). Considering the crucial role that public participation plays to strengthen CMDRR programmes, I find it essential to say that the quality of such programs are directly connected to the quality of its public engagement and involvement. In other words, civil society engagement throughout public participation can help keep the entrusted NGO (in my case CARE) accountable for their actions. However, evidence suggests that in the case of Haiti, many people felt excluded from the planning and implementation process. I will examine if this is the case for the people living in Carrefour district.

Building a culture of prevention has shown difficult in Haiti. One of the main reasons for this is that the government see preventive measures as cost factors rather than profitable investments (GTZ, 2002). In effect, the aid-dependency and limited capacity of the state has led to foreign donors

increasingly stepping into the government's shoes (USIP, 2010 and Lewis *et al*, 2009). Zanotti (2010) and Ramachandran *et al* (2012) argue that the weakness of government institutions is largely due to the history of aid dependence and foreign interventions. The country is heavily aid-dependent with 70 % of the state budget coming from external financing (Zanotti, 2010). Most of the services such as health and education are therefore provided by INGOs or local NGOs (Zanotti, 2010 and World Bank, 2014). The dominance of NGOs in Haiti has created a parallel state said to be more powerful than the government itself (DEC, 2010). As already pointed out in the Chapter 1, it is important to note that a distinction is made between INGOs and local NGOs. When referring to INGOs in this paper, I mean those NGOs where the senior staff originates from other countries (Ghimire, 2003). INGOs such as CARE are the main subject of this study. By local NGOs, I mean formal organisations of people who are engaged in local activities that are not primarily for their own benefit (Ghimire, 2003). The term NGOs will also be applied when I am referring to both INGOs and local NGOs.

Based on the literature INGOs are seen as having an important (although not necessarily always positive) role to play in development. When it comes to the relevance of INGOs in a Haitian context, strong criticisms of INGOs has been given as they have not lived up to expectations in providing assistance, especially after the 2010 earthquake. The criticism has been directed towards the lack of coordination, leading to duplication of efforts, limited understanding of local circumstances among INGOs, and a somewhat naive approach to the underlying causes of conflict and instability.

In considering CARE Haiti's potential as capacity building agents for the CMDRR process in Carrefour district, I find it necessary to study the relationship between CARE and the recipient community. In order for INGOs to create an interdependent relation, it is essential that they are aware of the social and environmental interests of the community members. This aspect will be evaluated throughout my investigation, as to address if CARE has responded to the interests of the local community.



## Chapter 4 Methodological approach

This chapter will describe and justify the main methodological approach applied for this study, including; choice of research strategy and research design, sampling, methods of data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations. In this chapter, I will give a particular emphasis on the various challenges encountered during my study in Haiti and my role in the field.

### 4.1 Qualitative methodology with a case study design

As previously stated, the key purpose of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to examine if such programmes can generate sustainable development. On a practical level, this means going into depth in terms of understanding the relationship between these actors, and how this relationship influence development outcomes. In terms of epistemology, an interpretive standpoint is therefore adopted, mainly because I want to adopt a research strategy and a methodology that “answer the whys and how’s of human behaviour, opinion and experience” (Guest *et al*, 2013: 1). As better explained by Geertz (1973 in Guest *et al*, 2013:6);

“To look at the symbolic dimensions of social action—art, religion, ideology, science, law, morality, common sense—is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas of life for some empyrean realm of deemotionalized forms; it is to plunge into the midst of them. The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said”.

In regards to ontological considerations, a constructivist standpoint is adopted, which challenge the suggestion that organisation and culture are pre-given factors, but rather understands the social world and social entities as created by and dependent upon the actions of human beings, actions in which are a constant state of revision. In effect, this means that the researcher (me) presents a specific version of a social reality, rather than one that can be regarded as definitive (Bryman, 2012).

Based on these considerations, a qualitative research strategy is seen as the most appropriate. Qualitative research aims to obtain in-depth understanding of cultural phenomenon and human behaviour in a natural setting. Qualitative research can be defined this way:

“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings,

attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 2).

## Research design

According to Bryman (2012:50), there are five main types of research design: Experimental design, cross-sectional or survey design, longitudinal design, case study design, and comparative design. My research is a case study design that is concerned with the complexities and particular nature of a single organization (CARE Haiti) and its operation (CMDRR programme) in Carrefour district, in Port au Prince. The case study design is chosen, as it is particularly helpful in the “generation of an intensive, detailed examination of a case” (Bryman, 2012: 68).

## 4.2 Sampling

In qualitative research, the discussion of sampling revolves around the notion of purposive sampling- a non-probability form of sampling- with the direct reference to the research questions being asked (Bryman, 2012: 416-418). My research is no exception in this regard, as my research questions provided a strategic guideline as to what categories of people that need to be the focus of attention. My research questions suggested that the two main categories to be sampled should be participants that were implementers (CARE Haiti) or recipients (community members) of the CMDRR programme.

It was important for me that those who participated could provide their knowledge, experiences and opinions in an expressive and reflective manner. Even though critics might argue that a sample of this nature may not be representative enough, and suggest probability sampling as an alternative, my aim was rather to select a sample that would give me the broadest and most comprehensive understanding (Bryman, 2012).

Using Care as a starting point was an obvious choice, considering that CARE was engaged with different DRR projects in and around Port au Prince. Julie Razongles, project manager of the Neighbourhood Beautification project at CARE, functioned as a door opener. She introduced me to Valery Simeon-the one responsible for the implementation of the CMDRR programme in four neighbourhoods in Carrefour.

Together with CARE, I selected two neighbourhoods; Ti-Sous and La Grenade. The first neighbourhood was in its initial phase of implementing a workshop on CMDRR initiatives, while the second neighbourhood had just finished the workshop on CMDRR. By participating in the different steps in the CMDRR process, I was able to observe; who participated, what role the participants had,

both within the community group and within the organization. In addition, I was able to explore the level of success as perceived by the implementers (CARE) and recipients (community members).

Within CARE, I interviewed one person in a leadership position, and two persons working directly on programme implementation. I also had an interview with the gender advisor, which has proven to be important in the understanding of gendered vulnerability in natural disasters. The sample also involves 72 respondents (from both individual interviews and FGDs) living in the two neighbourhoods; Ti-Sous and La Grenade; where 25 were women and 47 were men. I have in total conducted four FGDs; one with only women and three mixed FGDs; with both women and men. In addition, I have conducted 12 in-depth interviews, as it was important for me that the respondents had the opportunity to express themselves without being questioned by others. Often when people are in a group setting, the dominant opinion of the “strongest” person may persist and dominate (Bryman, 2012). Each of the in-depth interviews lasted for more than one hour.

Another important aspect while conducting my research was to gain information from different social levels, as the people affected can experience vulnerability and the relationship with CARE differently based on their educational level, ethnical, geographical and social background. However, despite the fact that the participants were both educated and uneducated, and that their jobs ranged from being a DJ and a rapper to a master student in humanitarian administration, they all seemed to have similar if not equal perceptions of their social and environmental reality. This was also evident when it came to gender (male and female) or differences in age (adult and children).

As a means of gaining a greater understanding of the complexities regarding the CMDRR process, and to understand the broader picture of NGO interventions a set of key informants outside of the CARE organization and the two neighbourhoods were also identified and interviewed. This way, I was able to present a more objective and critical analysis of my case, in addition to strengthen the credibility of my findings. They include Project Haiti; operating in Delmas and PLAN Haiti; operating in Croix-des-Bouquets. I did not include these interviews in the data collection as such, but rather used them as a baseline to discuss my findings and to reflect and compare upon different realities. In this sense, these informants became more of a “reality check” on my part, to see if my interpretations of the Haitian context were misguided, and to get a better understanding of the context CARE were operating in.

I spent one day with Project Haiti, interviewing 7 children and 14 women. I was also able to talk with Luc Edwin Ceide, the director and project coordinator for Project Haiti. He was also our host while living in Haiti, which meant that I was able to create a more solid relationship with him and gain

access to his personal viewpoints. This was important for my investigation as it allowed me to ask questions that were more personal.

I also spent two days with PLAN Haiti, where I conducted two FGDs; one with ten girls and one with 10 boys. I also talked to the DRR manager and the organization manager.

Organization	Number of participants	Method of data collection
CARE Haiti	75	12 in-depth interviews, 4 FGDs and Participant Observation
Project Haiti	21	1 in-depth interview and 2 FGDs
PLAN Haiti	22	2 in-depth interviews and 2 FGDs
Act Alliance	1	In-depth interview
Total respondents: 119		

**Figure 10: An overview of organisations, number of participants and method of data collection involved in my study (Figure made by author, 2015)**

### 4.3 Data collection methods

In order to undertake ethnographic research, different data collection techniques are used to comprehend different realities. These techniques include amongst others participatory observation, interviews, focus groups and video/photographic (Crang and Cook, 2011: 7). The primary method of data collection in this study was in-depth interviews and FGDs with community members and CARE staff. In addition, I was able to observe and participate in two workshops concerning DRR initiatives. I also reviewed a range of relevant documents, in particular evaluation reports from CARE. However, they were mainly used for triangulation purposes; to compare and detect misunderstandings or inconsistencies in the information I received from the interviews and the FGDs. Lastly, I also used a self-completion questionnaire developed by CARE as a supplement to the qualitative data collection techniques in order to get clarification of some issues raised.

### 4.3.1 In-depth interviews

Through in-depth interviewing, detailed information about people's thoughts and behaviours can be explored. In this sense, interviewing people provided me with more detailed information than what was available through other data collection methods, such as surveys (Thagaard, 2011).

Thagaard (2011) presents three interview forms that fall into the categories of structured, semi structured and unstructured interviews. The semi-structured interview is the one mostly used in qualitative research, and the form I have employed in my study. The themes are often prepared beforehand, but the order of themes is determined during the interview. Flexibility is especially important for this form, as the researcher must be able to tie new questions to what the respondents deem important (Thagaard, 2011). I had prepared an interview guide before I entered the field. However, this interview guide changed as new information was obtained. (See the interview guide under appendices).

My individual interviews with PLAN and Project Haiti were conducted together with my fellow researcher, Maria Sjuve, as we had a similar approach to our study and because it was more convenient for us as we had to pay for a driver and a car. We had both prepared an interview guide and took turns in asking questions. For Maria and me it was a good way of crosschecking the information collected.

My main worry before the fieldwork started was whether people would feel restricted to speak to me. My background including elements such as gender, age, educational level and cultural norms not only affect the way I positioned myself in the field, but the way people perceived me. In addition, I was with an organization that funds some of their activities. I was made aware of the fact that many who have been interviewed by NGOs often say what they think "we" want to hear in order to receive more benefits.

In the case of CARE and Project Haiti, these aspects were, however, not a hindrance. In all of my interviews and FGDs, I presented myself as a master student eager to learn about their reality and life. They seemed to appreciate that somebody came to hear their views and document their perception of things. Furthermore, they were not afraid to express criticism and frustration over their situation, and when talking about sensitive things, including their relationship and perception of NGOs in general and CARE Haiti in particular, they would use their whole bodies to carry forward their points of view, which was often negative.

The main challenge with conducting interviews was, however, the language barrier, which required the use of a translator. There are implications when sensitive information goes through a third

person, which may lead to misunderstandings and losing important details. In my case, the use of a translator proved to be efficient in accessing and comprehending data, even though I recognize that some information might have bypassed me. Through an acquaintance of our host, I was introduced to my translator. He grew up with his family in Carrefour, in a neighbourhood close to where I collected my data. He was a student and worked as a translator for other humanitarian organizations. I quickly developed a friendship with my translator, he was my age and we shared similar interests, which made the communication between us easier. Seeing that his family had been affected by natural disasters, he felt the need to broaden his knowledge about my research topic. He worked as my translator in all my interviews with CARE Haiti. We were able to discuss and reflect upon the different situations afterwards. My interpreter explained and contextualized the cultural codes, which I would not have been able to understand without his support. Therefore, his role was beneficial for my fieldwork, since culture is embedded in language. I used a different translator in my interviews with Project Haiti and PLAN Haiti. He also functioned as a supportive actor during the interviews, and had much experience with being a translator for students and aid workers.

#### **4.3.2 Focus group discussion (FGD)**

In order to investigate my research questions, FGDs were also employed. The focus group technique is essentially a group interview, involving more than one, usually more than four interviewees. In comparison with semi-structured interviews, that span very widely, focus groups typically emphasize a specific theme or topic in depth, a topic that the respondents deem important or significant (Bryman, 2012). Some of the themes discussed in the FGDs included; social vulnerability to natural disasters, DRR, climate change, the government's role, aid dependency and their perception of NGOs and CARE Haiti.

By collecting data through FGDs, I was able to work more efficiently, as I had a limited timeframe. In addition to the limited timeframe, I had to travel from Petionville to Carrefour, which often was time consuming because of the chaotic traffic and the many street protests. More importantly, I was interested in how the individuals respond to each other's views and opinions, and how they build up a view out of the interaction that took place within the group. As such, a wide variety of different views in relation to a specific topic was provided, where the respondents challenged each other's views. My main interest was to generate a good discussion about issues that the participants deemed important, without me asking about it. One of the themes that often generated a discussion amongst the participants was disempowerment, as they often felt deprived from influencing their own development. This way, I felt that FGDs was more naturalistic than one-on-one interviews, and I

ended up with a more realistic account of what the respondents thought, as they were in charge of the discussion.

It is important to note that all respondents in Carrefour district and in Delmas 33 had heard about the term DRR and climate change from other NGOs, or from Project Haiti. The high knowledge level generated vivid and constructive discussions. I also think that more people wanted to voice their opinion because they knew something about the topics and issues that were being discussed. In a sense, I think FGDs made people feel empowered. However, in the case of PLAN Haiti the participants had not heard about the term DRR, which I found strange considering the vulnerable state of Haiti and PLAN's operational focus on education. I see this as a limitation that needs to be addressed internally within this organization. These aspects will be elaborated in the following chapters on findings and analysis.

Another argument that is relevant to my case is that a FGD has a further role in allowing the voices of highly marginalized groups of women to surface. As such, focus groups constitutes an opportunity for women to empower themselves by making sense of their experience of vulnerability and subjugation. I therefore had one separate FGD in La Grenada with only female respondents in order to ensure gender sensitivity. This proved to be a good approach as male domination over women was evident in Carrefour. However, in a few mixed FGDs some women took eagerly part in the discussions.

The focus groups sessions were tape-recorded and after each session I transcribed the interviews. I always made sure that I had informed consent before I taped the sessions. I did find this process to be more time consuming as compared to regular interviews as I had to take into account that was talking in the sessions. In addition, the FGD lasted longer; some discussions lasted up to several hours.

The main challenge with FGDs was that the number of participants was high, ranging from seven participants to twenty participants. In two CMDRR workshops, it was 35 participants. However, in these workshops I only observed the participants and the CARE staff. Morgan (1999 in Bryman, 2012: 507) recommends that a typical group size should be six to ten members. It was evident that in the FGDs that had most participants a few people dominated the discussions compared to those groups consisting of 7 or 10 participants. However, as I also conducted smaller FGDs, in-depth interviews and had a two-day observation of the CMDRR workshops I feel confident in that the different methods compensates for the challenges of being many participants.

Another challenge that occurred was during my field visit to Croix-des-Bouquets. I felt like the participants in the two FGDs were worried about how the information they gave me would affect

future funding to the schools, and considering that the PLAN staff was present during the interviews, I decided to discard some of the suspect data to maintain a truthful study. In addition, PLAN had promised the respondents (children) something in return for speaking to us (Maria was also present). PLAN first wanted a lot of money, 30 000 gourdes, which is around 4500 NOK, to buy food for the 20 children themselves. We found this to be obscene, as it does not cost this amount of money to buy some refreshments. In addition, we felt uncomfortable paying for food and drinks to gain information. It became clear in later discussions with Plan that it used to be common for the organisations to give people money, food or other resources in order to motivate them to talk or participate in various activities. Although they had stopped this kind of “direct benefits” ten years ago they have faced major challenges with staff on the ground that was not loyal to this new policy and kept up the old policies of giving people incentives.

### **4.3.3 Participant observation**

Data obtained through interviewing and FGDs can contradict with their behaviour. Given the frequency of human inconsistency, observation can be a powerful check against what people report about themselves. Through participant observation, researchers can take part in people’s activities and work to gain a greater understanding of relations and interactions between people in different social settings in which study participants live (Thagaard, 2011). According to Bryman (2012: 494), the participant observer or ethnographer is in much closer contact with people for an extended period of time, observing behaviour, learning the native language, gaining a foothold on social reality.

Even though observation was not the main source of data in my study, I participated in two out of eight of the DRR workshops initiated and carried out by CARE. The same community members participated in both meetings. It was truly educational to be part of the participation group as I gained valuable insight into how these workshops functioned in practice. More importantly, I was able to see how people behaved within these specific settings, and how the relationship and communication between the CARE staff and the participants unfolded in a natural setting throughout the processes. An example of my observation was how honest the participants were towards CARE. The community members were at first sceptical to the CMDRR workshops as other interventions had, in their opinion, been a waste of time. The main reason for the participants concern was that they had felt excluded from partaking in these interventions. (See section 6.2.3. for more information about local perception about CARE and other INGOs).

One of the activities during the first day of the workshop was that the participants should write down on a post-it note what their motivation for this DRR training was, and moreover, what they wanted



from of the training. After the participants had written down their opinions, the post-it notes were collected and shared on the blackboard. The answers given generated a good discussion for me to observe, and I gained a lot of information about their concerns and hopes.

#### **4.3.4 Documents as a source of data**

There is a lot of documentation within CARE that has been of interest. I focused primarily on annual reports, mission statement, press releases and evaluations where these were available. I was also able to gain access to documents used in the DRR workshops as well as memos from the meetings. These documents were mainly used in order to provide context, as well as to compare my findings from the interviews and focus group discussions to the documents for the purpose of triangulation. In effect, the documents were not analysed in depth, but used to compare specific information.

When assessing the documents, it has been important for me to keep in mind Scott's four criteria for assessing the quality and usefulness of documents; namely authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2012: 551) The criteria of credibility is particularly important, especially when it comes to assessing documents from organisations. According to my experience, organisations and internal evaluators often have a tendency to downplay criticism and inflate positive findings, as they are eager to please their respective funders and to maintain the operations. These aspects will be examined in the following chapter, under my findings.

#### **4.3.5 Self-completion questionnaire**

In addition to the data collection techniques mentioned above, CARE had also developed a standard self-completion questionnaire, which the community members participating in the CMDRR workshop had to fill in before and after the training program. This was an important part of the workshop, namely to see the rate of a person's progress in gaining knowledge and new skills regarding DRR. The main advantages of this technique are that it is cheaper and quicker to administer compared to interviews (Bryman, 2012). It is also important to measure the educational level of the participants in order to see if the CMDRR process had been successful.

As I was only able to participate in the first two out of eight workshops, CARE Haiti have therefore sent me the results after the final test. (An overview of the interview guide and the standard test is to be found under appendices).

## 4.4 Data analysis

Qualitative data consist of people's perceptions of the world and observation of their behaviour in a social setting, and not numbers (Powell and Renner, 2003). As such, in my analysis I focused on the text from my transcripts of interviews and FGDs, and my notes from the participation observation sessions. This reflective process began as the data was collected and continued after the data collection had ceased. My main goal was to understand what the participants really thought, felt and did in vulnerable situations. Based on the texts I was able to "get behind the numbers" and to see the richness of people's real social experiences. From a theoretical standpoint this means that "qualitative data analysis tends to be inductive as the analyst identifies important categories in the data, as well as patterns and relationships, through a process of discovery" (Guest *et al*, 2013:322). There is no straightforward way of doing this, and the process will depend on the questions asked, the information provided and the researcher's resources (Powell *et al*, 2003). However, according to Guest *et al* (2013:322) a good qualitative data analyses are "distinguished by their focus on the interrelated aspects of the setting, group, or person under investigation—the case— rather than breaking the whole into separate parts". In effect, the whole is understood to be greater than the sum of its parts, and so the social context of events, thoughts, and actions becomes essential for interpretation (Guest *et al*, 2013).

Within this framework, I have applied a progressive focus, which is understood as a process by which a researcher interacts with the data and gradually refines the focus (Guest *et al*, 2013:322). My initial research objective was modified early on in the study as new issues that I deemed important and interesting became apparent. Initially, I was going to conduct a research on "how the local government promotes and includes community members in DRR programs". However, as I gained information about this topic I learned that the government had not been present in these communities, neither before nor after the 2010 earthquake. As such, I began to listen and observe selectively, focusing on those events that the participants deemed important, and topics I found interesting. Eventually, the data became the starting point for the development of codes, concepts and theories, and thus, the data formed my research.

### The technique applied for my data analysis

Powell *et al* (2003) have given some useful guidelines on how qualitative data can be analysed. I found the five-step process developed by Powell *et al* (2003) helpful in order to manage and systematize my data.

In the first step, I had to understand the data, and consider the quality of data provided from the individual interviews and FGDs. This meant that I had to re-read the text and listen to the recordings several times in order to understand the content and the meanings expressed. In the second step, I had to identify a few key questions that I wanted to analyse and to answer. I focused on one topic or question at a time, and put all the data about that specific topic from different respondents together. In the next step, I had to organize the data into categories and subcategorise. In this step, themes, patterns and connections were identified; both similarities and differences. In step four, I was able to see patterns and connections both within and between the categories. I was also able to address the importance of each category. In the last step, I used the themes and connections from the literature to explain my findings. By relating the findings from my case study to theoretical concepts, I was able to suggest some analytical generalizations beyond the particular case study of CARE's implementation of CMDRR programmes, in addition to their relationship with the community members. I believe that this approach will contribute to our overall understanding of how NGOs (in my case INGOs) influences people's participation in development. In addition to this, I included quotes and descriptive examples to illustrate my points and to bring the data to life (Powell *et al*, 2003).

One of the main challenges with this process was to minimize the way my preconceptions and pre-knowledge influenced both the data collection and data analysis. My educational background in development and my norms, values and culture influenced my perspective and the way I chose to position myself, but there is never only one truth or only one perspective. I was also in the field with CARE officers, which made me an "insider" of an organization. By working so close with CARE I might have had pre-conceived ideas of what I should look for and what I would find, and people might have felt restricted talking to me. However, as previously explained, this was not a hindrance as people were more than willing to speak openly with me about challenges and controversial issues. They even voiced criticism toward CARE's operation.

This aspect is embedded within the concepts of trustworthiness and authenticity, and influenced the quality of my data. Guba and Lincoln support this claim as they argue that there can be more than one and possible several accounts of truth about the social world. As I was active in the knowledge construction, I recognized and reflected upon my own agency and social distance to the respondents throughout the whole process (Bryman, 2012: 389-391). I have also addressed this challenge by applying several data collection methods.

## 4.5 Ethical considerations

Before I went to Haiti I asked myself, “What is the meaning of ethics and ethical behaviour? It seemed straightforward, as I have dealt with ethnical issues before, both in my daily life and in other studies. However, I was soon reminded that each case is different as it depends upon the context in culture, age and gender in addition to complex array of conflicting interests. For example, the interest of CARE did not always reflect the interest of the community members. Therefore, I found Diener and Crandall (1978 in Bryman, 2012:135)) four main areas of un-ethics in research valuable. These are harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception.

As some of the topics discussed were personal and difficult to talk about, it was increasingly important that I respected the participants at all stages of the process, especially in terms of the children participating. One way I ensured that no harm was made towards the participants was that all records of individuals were maintained confidential. Throughout my research, I also provided the participant with enough information that was needed to ensure that they could make an informed decision about whether or not they wanted to participate. This tactic also helped to ensure honesty amongst the participants as each person who was approached was given the opportunity to refuse to participate in the study.

I also presented myself, and my research, according to the truth. Over all, I tried my best to provide an environment that was trustworthy, and at the same time, I tried to avoid creating a top-down relationship, where I as a researcher held a form of power over the participants. I avoided this by presenting myself as independent from the organizations. This was particularly important for me in regards to the children.

Another important concern regarding ethics for me, as a researcher was simply to do my best to ensure that the presented findings in this thesis are consistent with how the participants experienced their social and environmental reality.

## Chapter 5 Introducing the organisations in this case study

In order to understand the roles, values and strategies of the organizations involved in my study and to have a meaningful discussion in next chapter, this chapter provides some relevant information about CARE, as well as Project Haiti and PLAN. The first two are leading international humanitarian organizations with a broad operational focus including both emergency relief and long-term development programs. Project Haiti is a family run charitable organization with a focus on education, capacity building and empowerment.

As explained in the previous chapter, my main collaboration for this study has been with CARE. CARE has been the major source of information, both in terms of putting me in contact with respondents, but also in giving me relevant information in regards to the topic in general. Since CARE was the main source of information, this chapter will mainly focus on them.

### 5.1 Introducing CARE and its operation in Carrefour district

#### About CARE

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) is a world leading humanitarian organization that delivers emergency relief and operate long-term international development projects. The NGO was founded in the aftermath of World War 2 (1945) to deliver food and supplies to war-torn Europe by the means of the “CARE Packages”. Since then, the organization has grown to become one of the largest humanitarian aid organizations in the world: working in over 87 countries and reaching over 72 million people in 2012 (CARE, 2013a).

Guided by the aspirations of local communities, the organization “strives to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world”. In order to reach their mission a broad range of topics are addressed. These includes amongst other emergency response, disaster relief, food security, water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, economic development, climate change, agriculture, education and health (CARE, 2013b).

#### CARE in Haiti

CARE began working in Haiti in 1954, following the Hurricane Hazel. What started as a relief assistance project quickly shifted to a development program in 1959 with a focus on maternal and child nutrition. In the 1970s, the organization broadened their focus to include a range of topics, and today CARE’s work in Haiti reflects an integrated approach, with project on HIV and AIDS,

reproductive health, maternal and child health, education, food security, emergency response efforts, DRR, and water and sanitation (CARE, 2013c).

CARE operates as an INGO in Haiti, as it is a part of CARE International where all its funding is generated by fundraising offices in developed countries, such as the UN, and channelled through CARE international to CARE Haiti (Personal interview, 2015).

After the 2010 earthquake, CARE launched a global appeal and immediately started the distribution of emergency relief supplies, providing food, clean water, temporary shelters and other services to more than 300 000 people. The organization focused on five key relief sectors; emergency shelter; sexual and reproductive health; water, sanitation and hygiene; education; and food security. They concentrated on the heavily affected areas of Carrefour and Léogâne, near the earthquake's epicentre, with additional interventions in indirectly affected areas. In the long term, CARE has been working to rebuild and improve livelihoods and helped Haitian communities to become more resilient in the face of future disasters. Their focus on local resilient building is imperative as rising food prices, climate change and disasters force families further into poverty (CARE, 2014).

### **Building resilient communities in Carrefour**

CARE has been working in the area of Carrefour since shortly after the 2010 earthquake. Within different neighbourhoods, in a community of 6000 households, CARE have made improvements in sanitation, disaster risk reduction, safer construction methods, adequate infrastructure, improved income options and improved governance. In order to rebuild the livelihoods a long-term vision and innovative approaches have also been developed. The main strategies includes components like job creation and income generation. Based on CARE's numbers, 529 livelihood have received grants for returnees in Carrefour accompanied by training in income-generating activities, and 90 families have received training and initial materials to start urban gardens in Carrefour (CARE, 2014).

### **The CMDRR process**

After the earthquake in 2010, CARE has implemented a neighbourhood-upgrading project in Ti-Sous and three other small areas bordering Ti-Sous, covering more than 100 households in Carrefour district. In this frame, CARE has started a CMDRR (Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction) projects on infrastructure, housing, reconstruction, housing repairs, capacity building and community organization. CARE has reported working with the Mayor of Carrefour's office to support needs assessments and coordination activities within this district (DEC, 2011: 7). CARE has also entered into a partnership with Cordaid regarding CMDRR initiatives. As elaborated by Julie Razongles, the project manager of the Neighbourhood Beautification project at CARE Haiti, "the CMDRR process aims to

provide the community with key elements to be able to better understand the risks associated with natural disasters and climate change, and/or reduce them. This project also includes the implementation of some mitigation measures such as the building of infrastructures in order to reduce the identified risks” (Personal interview, 2015).

Moreover, the CMDRR process consisted of eight workshop focusing on two main activities: 1) Education and information sharing and; 2) fiscal training on how to construct safe houses. During the CMDRR workshops and training, CARE followed an already planned and developed strategy for all four communities.

Among the expected results of the project were: 1) improved awareness and knowledge of vulnerability, risk and disasters; 2) Improved disaster preparation and mitigation and; 3) Improved community relations. (The final evaluation of the CMDRR process along with its results as perceived both by CARE’s staff and the community members are discussed and analysed in the following chapters on findings and analysis).

## **5.2 Introducing Project Haiti and its operation in Delmas 33 and in Saint-Louis-du-Sud**

### **About Project Haiti**

Project Haiti is a Norwegian non-profit, non-political and non-religious charitable organization that was initiated in 2000 by Ingvill Konradsen Ceide, Luc Edwin Ceide and Nina Bønå. The project is mainly administered and run by professionals from Norway where the central tasks include marketing and fundraising. Project Haiti rely heavily on volunteers and supporters in order to maintain operation.

Project Haiti’s primary goal is to improve the condition for poor children in Haiti, and as such, they have established two schools; Petit Troll Port au Prince, in Delmas 33, and one school in Saint-Louis-du-Sud. The project also organizes summer camps run by volunteer youth from Scandinavia and exchange of students and professionals from Norway and Haiti. The school in Port au Prince was operational before the earthquake. Despite the damages from the 2010 earthquake, the school was one of the buildings left untouched by the earthquake. In order to help the local community, the organization implemented a temporary station for emergency relief. In 2012-2013, 300 children were attending the two schools. In addition to following the national curriculum, the students also learn about such subjects as human rights, environmental issues, health, music and arts (Project Haiti, 2012c and Project Haiti, 2012d).

As reading and writing is also an essential prerequisite in order to be able to improve the situation for oneself and one's family, Project Haiti also offers reading and writing courses to women. This program is called Manman Troll, which offers two separate paths of education; “one academic path, aimed at women aspiring to master a profession, and one path for the women holding ambitions to start small companies on their own”. NORAD has contributed to the financing of Manman Troll since 2008 as a part of the Norwegian program “Sivilt Samfunn”. This financial support has also been used to build the school in Saint-Louis-du-Sud. However, the organization and its project is primarily dependent on locally mobilized resources through donations from organisations and schools in Norway as well as through child sponsorship from private donors (Project Haiti, 2012b). One of their main challenges is sufficient funding.

In addition, Project Haiti the organization also provides vaccinations to all of the students and information on health related issues in the schools. The organization has a plan to build a health clinic in connection with the school and youth club (Project Haiti, 2012a).

### **5.3 Introducing PLAN Haiti and its operation in Croix de Bouquets**

#### **About PLAN**

PLAN international is an independent, non-religious, non-political and non-governmental organization funded over 75 years ago. It is one of the largest children’s development organizations in the world operating in over 51 developing countries and with 86,676 communities across the world. Plan's vision is “a world in which all children realise their full potential in societies that respect people's rights and dignity” (PLAN, 2015a). In order to achieve their goal, PLANs work is based around eight main areas: education, health, water and sanitation, protection, economic security, emergencies/disaster relief, child protection and sexual health, including HIV (PLAN, 2015d).

#### **PLAN in Haiti**

PLAN has been operational in Haiti since 1973 and is an international NGO in Haiti . The organization has addresses issues related to extreme poverty, violence, maternal mortality, health, education and DRR. Their operation has been concentrated within eight main communities: Croix-des-Bouquets, Beudet, Frère, Jacmel, Lavallée, Cayes Jacmel, Trou du Nord, Ouanaminthe and Fort-Liberté.

Since the earthquake, PLAN has raised US\$43,500,000 and secured US\$13,000,000 in gifts-in-kind to help Haitians rebuild their lives (PLAN, 2015b).



## **PLAN in Croix-des-Bouquets**

PLAN's West Unit program is located 12 km northeast of Port-au-Prince, in an area called Croix-des-Bouquets. It was in this area that I participated in the two FGDs. The organization has worked in this area since 1976, and managed to sponsor 9,800 children (PLAN, 2015c).

## **5.4 UMCOR**

We (Maria and I) also interviewed one person working for the non-profit humanitarian aid organisation: The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). UMCOR's work includes programs and projects in disaster response, health, sustainable agriculture, food security, relief supplies, and more. UMCOR is mainly working in the earthquake-affected areas in western part of Haiti and is planning for longer-term involvement in three primary sectors including WASH-programs (water, sanitation and hygiene/health), Livelihoods and shelter and reconstruction. The main objective of UMCOR is to support the Government of Haiti in implementing sustainable post-earthquake reconstruction (UMCOR, 2015).

The information above is mainly provided through the organizations (CARE Haiti, Project Haiti, PLAN Haiti and UMCOR) web pages and information provided in interviews or in reports made by the organizations. Although their information seems valid, I have taken into account that the organizations might inflate positive findings in order to maintain operation. The information is therefore not considered to be objective and needs to be understood as such.

## Chapter 6 Presentation of empirical findings

In this chapter, the key findings from my fieldwork in Haiti are presented. These findings are based on data that was gathered from the 119 respondents, living in Ti-Sous and La Grenade (Carrefour district), Delmas 33 and Croix-des-Bouquets, including community members and NGOs staff (CARE, PLAN, Project Haiti and UMCOR). Since CARE and the community members living in Ti-Sous and La Grenade were the main source of information, this chapter will mainly focus on them.

My empirical research, as mentioned in Chapter 4, is based on a qualitative methodological approach, as I wanted to evaluate how CARE support to the communities in Carrefour district is influencing the process and outcome of CMDRR programmes, and if CMDRR is sufficient to build resilient communities. My four main research questions will be analysed separately, and different propositions will be discussed within these questions, whereas the theory is brought into the analysis in chapter seven.

### 6.1 Risk and vulnerability in natural disasters

As suggested in the literature (see for example UN, 1999), understanding vulnerability is crucial for devising preventive strategies that will work. Interviews and FGDs held with NGOs staff and community members pointed out mainly two explanations for the occurrence of the 2010 earthquake in Carrefour district. Causes that can be explained scientifically were perceived by most of my respondents as the cause to the 2010 earthquake. The explanation advanced by these respondents suggested that the geological location was responsible for the earthquake, while human activities like deforestation, industry and climate change were responsible for natural disasters in general. Many community members explained the earthquake based on their belief system.

In the next subsection, I will identify the root causes of vulnerability as perceived by my respondents, both the community members and CARE. I find it important to include what the CARE staff perceived as the root causes of vulnerability, as they are the one that has implemented the CMDRR program. If their program is to be successful, they need to understand the vulnerability context in which they operate.

#### 6.1.1 Understanding natural disasters: causes and effects

In this study, all respondents had experienced natural hazards. They understood natural hazards as “bad events” and mentioned storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts and earthquakes. Most of my respondents from Carrefour district showed an understanding regarding the terms natural hazards

and natural disasters, and could separate between them. Their awareness around these terms were amongst other a result of an awareness campaign carried out by different INGOs, including Red Cross, Bring Change and CARE, after the 2010 earthquake. The community knowledge was limited in regards to the earthquake as such, as they had not experienced this before.

### **What was the Cause?**

Understanding how people perceive disasters and vulnerability is vital in order to understand the nature of local coping strategies, as they will respond to what they believe to be the cause. Based on the empirical data collected in this study, the causes behind risks, natural hazards, catastrophes and natural disasters were understood and perceived differently amongst my respondents. Several factors were identified to influence people's perception, including the level of knowledge and believes.

### **Believes**

Some people believed that disasters were an act of God, an event outside human control for which no one could foresee or prevent the disaster. This was the case for a few women living in Ti-Sous and Delmas 33. They saw the 2010 earthquake as a consequence of humans abusing the earth, and were convinced that the earthquake was a direct result of humans misacting. They did not mention any other natural hazards. As stated by a woman living in Ti-Sous; *"the earthquake was a kind of divine retribution as we have disregarded our nature and forests for so long"*. She further argued that only God could save them from another earthquake.

This perception was also apparent amongst some women living in Delmas 33. However, the women in Delmas 33 recognized that even though the earthquake was an act of God, they could still do something to decrease the risks associated with natural hazards. As stated by a woman *"praying is praying, it can only get you so far. God cannot do anything unless people take actions themselves"*.

### **Knowledge**

Despite the fact that some women saw natural disasters as an act of God, most of my respondents, both men, women and children, viewed natural disasters as caused by natural hazards and other risks associated to human activity. The majority argued that natural disasters are a result of human activities such as deforestation and industry. However, as previously stated, their knowledge was a result of an awareness campaign carried out by INGOs after the 2010 earthquake, and as a result, they did not know what to do in the actual event.

In the two neighbourhoods Ti-Sous and La Grenade, most of the people knew the term climate change. They knew the difference between human induced climate change and natural climate change, although most of my respondents only referred to human induced climate change when talking to me. In the focus group meeting in La Grenade (only female respondents), they had learned about climate change and its effects from CARE. They all agreed that the climate is and will continue to get warmer due to human activities such as CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from cars and industries, which will increase droughts, hurricanes and rain. A woman also mentioned earthquakes, but she was “corrected” by another woman who stated; *“Maybe human activities indirectly causes earthquakes, but this is not the main cause. It is the geological location that makes us vulnerable to earthquakes”*. The respondents that did not know about the term “climate change” – its causes and effects- had recently moved to the community.

The children interviewed in Delmas 33 also mentioned that climate change was a real threat to their livelihoods. A young girl argued: *“Natural disasters and climate change happens because of deforestation. We cut down too many trees here. If we cut down a tree, we should replace it by five, but we don’t do that”*. A boy added that: *“We burn too much plastic, polluting our air and there is too much rubbish in the streets and oceans”*. *Our water resources are being blocked by rubbish”*.

All the children living in Delmas 33 were able to see the connection between human activities, climate change, increased natural hazards and the disasters that followed. In comparison, the children living in the more remote area of Croix-des-Bouquets had never heard about the term climate change. I found this to be strange as PLAN founded some of the schools activities.

### **What were the effects?**

The most frequently mentioned disasters were floods, storms and the 2010 earthquake. Flooding and storms were perceived as a recurrent problem, while all respondents mentioned the 2010 earthquake as the most devastating natural hazard they had experienced. As the community members interviewed experienced that repeated disasters increasingly and severely affected their livelihoods, I have also included the effects of storms and floods in addition to the 2010 earthquake. This way, we are better able to understand the risks that the community members were facing in regards to different natural hazards.

### **Floods**

In Carrefour district, where the two (neighbourhood) communities are situated in the hillside, floods were perceived as threatening the dwellings and livelihood of the population during the rainy season. The increased risks were associated with landslides. As stated by a man working in a Community

Based Organization (CBO) focusing on flood prevention in Ti-Sous; *We live in vulnerable areas where landslides and floods are frequent. The vulnerable location and unsustainable practices makes these landslides and floods more severe and devastating.* When I asked what sustainable practices he meant, the man further stated that it was *“because we have a lot of rubbish in the ravines and canals and when it rains, the rubbish blocks the water creating landslides and floods. If we continue to through rubbish in the streets and in the ravines, our troubles will continue”*.

This unsustainable practice related to rubbish was easy to observe all over Port au Prince. The massive canals, which looked like dried up rivers, were filled with garbage. In these canals, it was normal to see fat pigs and goats rolling around in decomposed food. (Ref. to picture from Carrefour district below).



**Figure 11: Picture of the unsustainable garbage situation in Carrefour district (Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015)**

Both landslides and floods were causing periodical displacement of people in all of my study areas. The effect of a vulnerable environment and an inadequate water draining system were seen as casual factors that increased the impacts of floods. When I asked what direct effects flooding had on their livelihoods, all of my respondents answered *“material damage on their houses and infrastructure”*. Consequently, many people lost their businesses, which initially served as their main

sources of income. In addition, some mentioned that their animals suffered and died, which also affected their businesses. Others also mentioned disease outbreaks as results of flood. The landslide often caused by flooding destroyed sanitation facilities such as latrines. There was also water contamination and some water sources were completely destroyed. According to a CARE official, this led to an outbreak of different diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera, and diarrhoea.

### **Storms**

Storms and hurricanes were also seen as “bad events”, and an overlapping issue to flooding. The effects of rain and storms were associated with heavy flooding and strong winds by all of my respondents. Many mentioned that heavy storms often destroyed their houses and that it was difficult for them to build up their homes again as they lacked the necessary materials to do so. In addition, many mentioned that storms happened so often that they did not managed to rebuild their homes before a new disaster stroke. However, none of my respondents mentioned anything about casualties.

### **The 2010 earthquake**

The 2010 earthquake was destructive in all the areas I visited, and all of my respondents were affected. As buildings and other structures were poorly built, and the epicentre was near the capital, many lost their home and their life or knew people how did. As shared by a woman living in La Grenade; *“My family lost everything in the earthquake, our home is buried in the rubble and we have no resources to rebuild”*. Another woman said that; *“I lost many friends and family members that day. Everyone lost someone”*.

They felt scared when the earthquake happened, as no one knew what to do. As stated by a woman living in La Grenade: *“We do not have any experience that equals the catastrophe of the earthquake. We also did not have any information or forecast about what was coming, so it was impossible to help ourselves at the time”*.

The effects of the earthquake were a huge number of casualties and a massive destruction of buildings and infrastructure. Because of the destruction of houses, many people were displaced. A great number of people were temporarily hosted by relatives and neighbours, or relocated to temporary shelters. During my fieldwork, I learned that some still lived in tents provided by NGOs. Other effects mentioned were the loss of small farms and animals, which has had a negative impact on their food security and income. Even though it is five years since the earthquake, many still suffered the consequences.



### 6.1.2 Different levels of vulnerability

When conducting the interviews it became clear that there existed different levels of vulnerability. Based on different discussions and interviews I found out that my respondents separated between social vulnerability, political vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and environmental vulnerability.

#### Social vulnerability

Valery Simeon, the one responsible for the implementation of the CMDRR process in Carrefour district, referred to social vulnerability as one of the most challenging level. He stated that:

*“Social vulnerability is a condition that affects everyone’s ability to prepare for and recover from an extreme event. This is because the government and the structures of society are unable to withstand the impacts of hazards. The people also feel socially excluded from the government’s decision. Social vulnerability has much to do with the social inequalities that exist within Haiti”. (Personal interview, 2015)*

In the discussion with Valery Simeon, social vulnerability was also seen as a result of limited government control and weak relations between the government and the civil society. He further noted that the lack of information, which should have been provided by the government, had made the Haitian society ill equipped to prepare and recover from disasters. As he claimed: *“The government rarely inform its citizens about what to do before a disaster, so when the disaster has occurred it is too late. Information sharing has become our jobs”* (Personal interview, 2015). The community members also acknowledged the weak communication between the government and the civil society. As a woman argued: *“We know we have a government and we know about the DPC. However, they have not been present in these communities before or after the 2010 earthquake”*. All of my respondents shared the perception that the government had been absent in regards to local development and prevention strategies.

Some of the respondents living in Delmas 33 said, however, that the government had informed them about natural disasters through flyers, radio, SMS and television, but that this information only said that a disaster was coming. As a woman living in Delmas 33 argued: *The government has informed us about some storms and hurricanes, but we need more preventive information, not only information about what is going to happen”* (FGDs, 2015).

Valery Simeon also highlighted the problems of urbanization and the fact that a huge proportion of the people live in urban slums, where poorly build buildings makes them more vulnerable. Several of my respondents also mentioned the aspect of population density and urbanization. A woman living

in Delmas said; *“One of the main problems in my neighbourhood is how close they build houses. Not so long ago there was a fire, and many lost their lives as it was difficult to escape”* (FGD, 2015).

### **Political vulnerability**

Throughout the discussion, Valery Simeon also argued that the government had been internally unstable, both before and after the earthquake. According to him, this had influenced the government’s ability to make sound policies that addressed the current needs of its population in regards to natural disasters. He highlighted that the country needed policies on building codes and information on how to build safer houses.

I quickly learned that there are almost a complete absence of building codes and regulations. I was told that construction companies often used expensive materials such as rebar, the steel bars used to reinforce the concrete. However, the concrete itself was cheap; cement mixed with salinized sand. In addition, in order to get more money, builder often added more water to the cement mixture.

The community members also emphasized political instability as a challenge to achieve development. All of them viewed the government as to unable to fill its responsibility to its citizens. As addressed by a young man participating in the workshop in Ti-Sous; *“The biggest obstacle of creating positive development and resilient communities is that a leadership is missing. We need both a national leadership and a community leadership that we can trust”*.

In effect, the lack of interaction between the government and its citizens has made individuals more reluctant to accept or even recognize a common set of rules, or to perform their own duties to the rest of the society. As a man living in Ti-Sous told; *“The government makes many rules and laws. However, the challenge is to make people listen and following these laws. If someone is breaking a law they are not punished”*. A woman agreed and added; *“The police officers and the government officers only act in their own interests and this won’t change anytime soon”*.

### **Economic vulnerability**

Valery Simeon acknowledged that the government was lacking the financial resources needed to implement long-term strategies to decrease human vulnerability. A CARE employee elaborated this perception: *“People need to understand that rebuilding the country takes time as also the government has limited resources”* (Personal interview, 2015).

My respondents referred the lack of economic resources as the main reason as to why they were so vulnerable. This challenge was seen in relation to unemployment and underemployment as many were struggling to find work. During the CMDRR workshops in Carrefour district, it was evident that



the issue of unemployment was a major concern, as the community members did not have a sufficient income to provide for their families. Almost all the participants asked the question: *“After this training will we have a better chance of getting a job?”* By training, they were referring to the CMDRR workshop. Another woman stated; *“The biggest challenge in this community is unemployment. We only have small businesses which is hardly enough to sustain ourselves or our families.”*

The lack of jobs also meant that the respondents did not have the adequate resources to build better houses and infrastructure. As a man living in Ti-Sous informed: *“Our biggest challenge is the lack of jobs. Most of us don’t have the money to buy materials to build safer homes nor the time as we need to concentrate our efforts on finding or keeping a job”*. A woman living in La Grenada also underlined the issue regarding limited resources when arguing; *“We have seen positive change when it comes to awareness around the danger of bad construction and we know more about the building back better principle, but lack, however, the money to make change in a big way”*. She further explained that they have the ideas on how to make change, but that without the resources to see things through, it was hard for them to do anything to decrease the impact of disaster.

### **Environmental vulnerability**

When it comes to environmental vulnerability all of my respondents mentioned that Haiti has severe problems in regards to deforestation and unsustainable practices related to garbage. They also acknowledged that people build houses in unsafe environments. For instance as explained by a young woman living in La Grenade: *“Most of the people living here have built their houses on unsolid grounds in the hillside. When it rains, some people end up losing their houses, their animals or even worse, their lives.”* Another woman living in Ti-Sous made a similar statement as she argued: *“The vulnerable environment and the fact that we don’t know what to do or where to build are the biggest challenges. We have poor living conditions, which makes us more prone to disasters”*. (See figure 7: picture of the houses build in the hillside below).



**Figure 12: A picture of the housing situation in Carrefour district (Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015)**

### 6.1.3 Different groups of people

#### Women

Many of my respondents argued that women were more vulnerable during a disaster compared to men. Again, most of my respondents exemplified this point by the 2010 earthquake. As claimed by a woman living in La Grenade; *“Women were more vulnerable in the earthquake because we stayed indoors”*. Women were also perceived to be more vulnerable as they had less access to resources; were victims of gendered division of labour; and were the primary caregivers to children, the elderly and disabled. Some also mentioned that women were more sensible and emotional, and that this affected the way they behaved after the 2010 earthquake.

All women interviewed stated that women were more vulnerable than men after the 2010 earthquake. They felt particularly vulnerable in the camps set up after the earthquake. As stated by a woman; *“we felt uncomfortable because we didn’t have safe places where we could take showers or go to the toilet privately”*. The women also argued that the number of rapes increased as a result of inadequate security in the camps. Valery Simeon also highlighted women as a vulnerable group in our discussions. He argued:

*“Women are vulnerable when it comes to all dimensions, including social, cultural, political, economic and domestic vulnerability. Social and cultural because the women takes care of the family, which equally affects their vulnerability... A woman that does not master reading has less power to talk to people, to feel included and empowered. If she do not have the money to support her family prostitution might occur. When it comes to politics women are not even heard” (Personal interview, 2015).*

CAREs gender advisor further emphasized that the biggest challenge of being a woman in Haiti is the lack of control over own life and body:

*“Women in Haiti don’t have control over their own lives. They do not control the family economy. They lack the education needed to understand the risk associated with natural hazards, and they have very little say in the public realm” .*

The gender advisor (Personal interview, 2015) also stressed that family responsibilities made it difficult for women to attend school and get an education. She argued that education is key to understand the risk associated with natural hazards and that if women attend school their vulnerability to natural hazards will decrease. In the FGDs held with only women, they all stated that the earthquake increased their workload. As expressed by one woman participating in the FGD in La Grenada;

*“Our responsibility in the household has increased after the earthquake. More things requires out attention, time and energy. Food, water and construction materials are more expensive, and we have to buy everything ourselves. Things have gotten worse for us and we feel more vulnerable”.*

The representative from UMCOR and Valery Simeon also highlighted that women were facing major challenges in terms of sexual exploitation by community leaders after a disaster. They argued that community leaders, who often were in charge of distributing essential resources after a disaster, were asking women and girls for sexual favours in return for resources or help. In addition, the representative from UMCOR claimed that the government representatives also took sexual advantage of women, making it hard for women to trust both the community leaders and the government. The gender advisor at CARE in a personal interview supported this perception. She also mentioned that after the earthquake they (CARE) saw an increase in abortions due to rape and sexual favours in camps. As abortions are illegal in Haiti, many women and girls died due to complications.

## Children

Before and after the 2010 earthquake, all respondents viewed children as a particularly vulnerable group. The adults thought children were more vulnerable in disasters since they lacked experience and the ability to resist disaster compared to adults. As stated by a woman living in La Grenade; *“Children cannot run as fast as adults and therefore not escape as easily”*. She referred to the earthquake and said; *“When the earthquake happened many children got scared and run into the houses to hide”*.

All the INGOs involved in this study also stressed that children were more vulnerable after a disaster. As argued by Valery Simeon:

*“After the earthquake, many children lost their parents and found themselves homeless. Without anyone to take care of them, they ended up on the streets, vulnerable and alone. Unfortunately, some people took advantage of this, and some children were illegally adopted, forced into labour or into prostitution”* (Personal interview, 2015).

The gender advisor also pointed out that girls were more vulnerable as compared to boys, because they were more likely to be exploited after a disaster. By exploited she meant sexually abused. She mentioned that the displacement camps set up after the earthquake made children more vulnerable. One aspect was how children were left alone in their tents when their parents had to pick up food and other resources.

The boys interviewed from Delmas 33 and from Croix-des-Bouquets also claimed that the girls were more vulnerable and in danger. The girls, however, claimed they were all equally in danger when a disaster occurs. On the other hand, both boys and girls said that girls were more vulnerable after a disaster because they can be raped and boys are more violent. The boys also stated that boys were naturally stronger than girls, making the boys less vulnerable after a disaster.

My respondents also mentioned that children’s wellbeing, particularly in terms of health and education were affected negatively after the 2010 earthquake. However, the adults underlined that these poor conditions existed before the earthquake.

## Other groups

In addition to the groups above, my respondent also mentioned the elderly and disabled people as vulnerable groups. In the case of the earthquake, many lost their life as buildings collapsed and elder’s responsiveness was slow. Many also mentioned that after the earthquake many died due to

injuries and diseases like cholera. The disabled were also seen as vulnerable in and after a disaster as their mobility and reaction-capability were limited.

## **6.2 The role of the civil society, the government and NGOs after the 2010 earthquake**

### **6.2.1 Response**

The responses of community members to the earthquake were largely influenced by the way they understood the causes and the extent of effect.

All community members were in shock immediately after the 2010 earthquake. This had much to do with the fact that they were unprepared and inexperienced. Almost all respondents mentioned that their number one concern after the quake was to find their families and to make sure that they were safe. The women often took their children to safer locations, while the men started the process of locating injured people and excavating dead bodies.

My respondents were also asked if they received help, and if so what kind of help and from who, during and after the earthquake. They all agreed that the government had, to a large extent, been absent, before, during and after the 2010 earthquake. My respondents claimed, in this context, that they had no access to the political or economic spheres of the Haitian society, and that the state apparatus existed only to serve themselves or the private interests of the ruling elite.

They all stated that INGOs (Action Aid, Save the children, CARE, and Bring Change) gave them resources like food and aqua tablets for cleansing the water. These resources were perceived as the most important resources given. In addition, they were after some time provided with tents; for shelter, flashlights and first aid kits. They all agreed that women received the most resources, and explained that the INGOs operating in Carrefour district were aware of women's needs. An example given, was that the food were distributed first to women and children, and that the INGOs made different lines; one for men, one for women and sometimes one line for single women with children. However, some pointed out that although women received most resources, the men often controlled the resources.

Despite the instant relief given by INGOs, the present of NGOs in Carrefour district have been close to none after the earthquake according to my respondents. They all expressed concerns for the future, as they did not receive help at the current stage, neither from the government nor from NGOs.

### 6.2.2 Disaster preparedness

Interviews with community members indicated that members from Ti-sous and La Grenada had not actively been involved in DRR prior to the earthquake. They all stated that the government had been absent after the 2010 earthquake, and that the community members had not received any information about preparedness strategies from them.

When NGOs came to help, community members revealed that their own and influence role was remarkably reduced as the operations were taken over by these agencies. As stated by a man living in Ti-Sous; *“We have so much potential, but the past government always called the NGOs to handle disasters. We would like to be prepared to tackle the next disaster ourselves, and maybe be the once the government calls to help other communities”*.

They further advanced that it is likely that some agencies assumed that the people did not have the needed capacity to participate in the rebuilding process. This was evident in the training the community members received from Bring Change and Red Cross, where my respondents felt excluded from partaking in decisions concerning their own lives. As stated by a woman from Ti-Sous; *“All the training we received in the past was wrong. We were not included in the decision-making concerning our lives. What is more, we did not agree on their way of teaching. Today, we don’t even remember the training we received a few years ago”*. Moreover, the previous training and workshops were arranged to include only information about what to do in an emergency, and were not focused on strategies that would allow the community at risk to better prepare for future disasters. As of 2015, all of my respondents still felt unsafe and unprepared for a new earthquake.

### 6.2.3 Local perception about CARE and other INGOs

It is important to note that my respondents’ perception of INGOs as disaster actors before and after the 2010 earthquake were widely contested. Some of the respondents, within both CARE and the communities, stated that the community members rarely knew the difference between different types of organisations, and therefore did not perceive them differently. Others, however, claimed that the community did know the difference, and some claimed that community members had more faith in the INGOs compared to local NGOs and CBOs. This was mainly because INGOS were viewed as less corrupt. As previously stated, women often faced challenges in terms of sexual exploitation by community leaders after a disaster. This aspect was also evident in relation to CBOs and local NGOs where community leaders often took advantage of the situation.

Most of my respondents saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a difference. A woman living in La Grenada stated; *“we trust and need the INGOs. We believe that we will need them for a long time, and that they will stay as long as we need them. They are telling people what to do in comparison to our government.”*

Many of the women interviewed saw INGOs as a good thing, as they helped keep them safe after a disaster. As stated by a women living in Delmas; *“The INGO gave me a tent to keep me safe after I lost everything in the earthquake. I still live in that tent”*. It is also important to note that the community members saw the INGOs as being very helpful especially in the immediate disaster of the 2010 earthquake.

Most of those who responded negatively to INGOs work and practices were, a bit unexpectedly, people that had worked or were currently working for local NGOs, INGOs and male respondents. As stated by a local NGO worker; *“NGOs does more harm than good, they come in and alter the prices, and when they leave we have to pay the price”*. A Haitian CARE employee said; *“organizations always want themselves to be the only ones working in the area and they put up signs everywhere to mark their territory. As a Haitian, I sometimes feel sad, even though I work for an international NGO, I would like to see this “NGO-ization” of the Haitian society gone”* (Personal communication, 2015).

Edwin Ceide, the director and project coordinator for Project Haiti, also viewed the “NGO-ization” of Haiti as negative for the general development in Haiti. He especially referred to INGOs as an exploitive force that had neglected to take into account the Haitian context in their development plans. He argued:

*“Most INGOs don’t know anything about Haiti, and they are rarely if ever in the field talking to the Haitian people about what they need. The INGOs come here with the answers, even though they have never been in Haiti before”*. He further stressed; *“What we need is foreign investments and a partnership between INGOs and the Haitian people. They have the equipment and we have the natural resources, so let’s make a deal”* (Personal communication, 2015).

The community members also saw INGOs as exploitive. As stated by a man living in Ti-Sous;

*Many INGOs came after the earthquake, and they are now claiming that there are fighting to rebuild Haiti. Now most of them are gone, and those who are left only take advantage of the situation, as they need the money. NGO is a business like all others.*

A similar argument made by a man living in La Grenada; *“working for a NGOs has become a prestige job, were people only care for a high salary*. Many viewed NGOs as profit-motivated and saw the NGO workers as a part of the elite. They found it difficult to trust people who were rich, and profited



on their misery. Many people also felt isolated and excluded from partaking in development activities.

Others were concerned about the overwhelming role played by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the importance of a stronger civil society. As stated by a woman living in Ti-Sous; *“in time we need to see a bigger role for civil society and local NGOs, and a smaller role for INGOs, but we are not there yet.”* She also addressed that INGOs in Haiti have worked to undermine the symbiotic nature of the social contract between the Haitian state and its citizens.

It was a clear agreement amongst the community members that the government should play a bigger role in development and in DRR programmes. When I asked about the reasons to why the government was absent in regards to DRR programs, the initial response from the community members was that the government did not care about anyone but themselves. As our discussions continued, it was expressed concerns that the government had their own agenda; to only develop areas in which they could gain financial support and votes. They referred to Petionville as an area where the government supported and responded to citizen needs because people there supported them. As my translator (Personal communication, 2015) explained to me; *“The government has used most of its resources to develop Petionville and to help the elite recover from the earthquake. This is visible in the infrastructure”*.

## **CARE**

CARE staff saw their own role as one of supporting and strengthening local civil society, especially in terms of building their capacity to decrease vulnerability and risk. They saw their relationship with the communities as one build on trust and partnership.

When I asked the community members in La Grenada about their relationship with CARE, the initial response was that CARE had contributed positively in creating awareness of the risks and vulnerabilities that existed in the community and most community members trusted CARE. As our discussions continued, it was however made complains that the funding was not sufficient, and that they needed more funding in order to implement and continue their activities.

As a rebuttal to this perception, Valery Simeon stated, *“our jobs is only to lead them in the right direction with this training. This means that they have to take responsibility for own lives and what happens when we leave. The goal is to make independent communities that can take care of themselves”*. Valery Simeon explained that the biggest challenge when it came to preventive activities was to make people understand that they are the agent of change. He said; *“Only people*



*can rescue themselves. We can only show them the way with providing information and some resources. Currently they rely too much on us (NGOs) to do the job”* (Personal interview, 2015).

However, in the interviews with CARE, they acknowledge that Haiti was still in the emergency stage of the DRMC. As stated by a CARE officer; “I don’t see a big shift towards preventive activities in Haiti”. Valery Simeon also acknowledged that the CMDRR workshop had its limitation. He stated; *“it is a difference between a good plan in theory and the implementations of this plan in practice. It is a good start, but we can’t do the job alone”* (Personal interview, 2015). He implied that the present situation had much to do with CAREs limited operational capacity.

### **6.3 Achieving the task of risk reduction through CMDRR**

The study on CMDRR in Carrefour district was premised on the four components of the CMDRR process as devised by Cordaid (2009). These being: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) Self-organization and; 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system.

In the succeeding discussion in chapter seven, focus will be laid on how these components were applied in the CMDRR process in Carrefour District. I have given a particular emphasize on how the community members perceived CAREs operation, and if they were given the opportunity to organize themselves in a manner that was best suited to meet their needs. As CMDRR plans and activities should be based on traditional knowledge and practices, I also found it essential to examine if local knowledge and practices were accounted for throughout this process.

#### **6.3.1 Cares’ operation in Carrefour District**

As previously explained in section 4.2, the people interviewed in La Grenada had gone through the CMDRR process, while the community members in Ti-souse were at its initial phase of implementing a workshop on CMDRR initiatives.

The community members in Ti-Sous and La Grenada were both approached by CARE and asked if they were interested in participating in a workshop aimed to reduce social vulnerability in disasters through information sharing and preventive tools. They all stated that this was a good initiative as they were eager to learn more about preventive strategies. As explained by Valery Simeon in a personal interview;

*“We have two different levels of training for this program. The first level is training from CARE, where the community members will learn more about vulnerability and risks in disasters. We will also*

*provide some resources aimed at building better houses. The other level focus on peoples own responsibility as a group, where they have to make the rest of the community aware of the risks”*

He further stated that everyone that do not know about preventive measures or have been trained before could participate in this CMDRR group. He explained that both men and women had the opportunity to participate in the CMDRR process. However, he acknowledged that in real life, women often had too many responsibilities during the day, and as a result, the majority of participants were men (Personal interview, 2015).

### **Ti-Sous: Implementing CMDRR**

Before the first CMDRR workshop began, everyone introduced themselves for the rest of the group. Valery Simeon stressed the importance of getting to know each other and that community cohesion decrease vulnerability. The community members could only call each other by first name, as last names created distance. This way, Valery said, would make people more sensitive towards each other, and make people help one another if a disaster happened again.

CARE started the CMDRR workshop by giving out a standard test to measure the level of knowledge. The purpose was to make a better orientation of what they knew and what they needed to learn more about. (See appendices). After the test, CARE handed out post-it notes where the participants could write down their motivation for the training, what they wanted to learn, the desired results from the training and general concerns and requests in regards to the CMDRR workshops.

Most of the community members stated that they wanted to learn how to decrease their vulnerabilities, so that they could be more prepared to tackle any future events. By events, they were referring to natural hazards in general. Many expressed concern over the lack of jobs in the community, and wanted this training to help them get a job. Some of the community members expressed concerns regarding the value of the CMDRR workshops implemented by CARE, as they claimed that past training programs from other INGOs had not helped them in any way. A woman said; *“We are so used to people coming to us saying what they want to do for us, but that has never worked so far, because they don’t listen to us. Our concern is that won’t work again with this workshop”*. As previously stated, the community members wanted to be the one that the government called in if a new disaster occurred. They wanted to participate more during and after a disaster.

Valery Simeon answered the participant’s questions and concerns. He stated that; *“Some disasters can be reduced. This depends on the capacity of the community. We can divide the capacity to prevent a disaster in two parts. The first part is material capacity and the second part is knowledge*

*capacity. Both part needs to co-exist in order to reduce vulnerability*". He further said; *"This training will help you become more aware of the risk within this community. Getting a job depends more on your education level and work experience"* (statement at workshop on CMDRR, 2015).

He continued the meeting by explaining different concepts, including: DRR, vulnerability, risk and climate change. He also addressed the relationship between disaster and development.

Valery Simeon also showed a movie that illustrated different examples of natural disasters all over the world. He explained; *"if people have the knowledge and comes together you won't need any help from NGOs"*. He exemplified this by saying; *"After the devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean, children came together to plant trees, which created buffer zones for future events"*. *This activity reduced their vulnerability"* (Statement at workshop on CMDRR, 2015).

The community members highlighted the fact that it was a difference between Haiti and other countries. Valery answered; *"we don't try to compare countries, but rather the emphasis is on what we can learn from each other on certain things"*. A community member interrupted and said; *"we don't have time to build back better or to invest in such activities. We need more jobs and money, than we can invest"*. More people got involved in the discussion. A man said; *"there is no government here, so even if we have requests or ideas on different activities, we are not able to change the situation"*. A woman continued this thread as she said; *"the government needs to make public laws on how and where we should build houses. As of now, people are building houses in unsafe areas"*.

The community members themselves identified community vulnerability and risk and the workshop continued with DRR activities in order to cope and adapt to disaster risk. Activities that was carried out was how to build houses by using better construction materials, and they also created a aid group that was trained to respond to emergencies. These activities also reflected what the community deemed important in order to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in a disaster.

Throughout the workshop, the community members focused on how CARE could help them. CARE, on the other hand, stressed the importance on how the community members could improve their own situation by being a part of a group, and taking a more active part in the development as well as the decision-making within their communities.

### **La Grenada: What have they learned?**

In the FGDs with women, they all agreed that the CMDRR process had been successful, as they now possessed the knowledge on what to do before a disaster occurred. In La Grenada, the women had been through a vulnerability assessment, i.e. a survey of an area to see what risks are and better understand what to be prepared for. They had learned that floods, landslides, storms and

earthquakes are imminent within the community, and that they need to be prepared before these events took place.

### **The construction of infrastructure**

A man expressed his gratitude as CARE had thought him how to build dams in order to decrease flooding from the local river. CARE had also provided him with some tools that he had used to restore the former roads near his house. This effort was, however, greatly weakened by limited resources. The man elaborated that the construction of houses and roads took time, as the community members had to buy the materials themselves.

### **Securing of belongings**

In the discussion, the community members also said that they now secured their belongings. An example given was that they had gathered all their important documents, like school diplomas and identification papers, and located them in a waterproof box. They had also made copies of important documents in case of a new earthquake. They had also bought some extra supplies like food and water, so if they were unable to go to the market, they could sustain themselves for days.

### **Information sharing**

The community in La Grenada had also developed a face-to-face network for information dissemination to alert people when a natural hazard was coming. As only some community members had access to a radio or a television, they were obliged to pass on any information regarding an impending disaster. They also had a community house where people could gather to share information. The men usually shared information in the evenings during social gatherings, while women shared it on the way to the market or church, or when they washed their clothes in the local river. Valery Simeon also addressed this aspect and added that women are more patient compared to men when it comes to information sharing. In this context, it was said that women often educated the wider community, while the men often had different responsibilities attached to physical labour like, for instance, construction. Based on these findings, the second level of training was perceived as successful. However, as expressed by a woman; *“Unfortunately, there is no early warning system in place at a national or local level for earthquakes, so we still feel unprepared and scared”*.

I found it strange that even after the CMDRR process the community had not developed any form for early alarms system and that they had not developed an evacuation route.

## Empowerment through knowledge

The women interviewed felt more self-confident, as they had received valuable knowledge that made them a resource for the rest of the community. The community unity was strong in La Grenada, and my respondents saw this as an advantage in tackling future disasters. They also argued that the CMDRR workshops had strengthened community ties, both within the community and with neighbouring communities. The men interviewed emphasized that the CMDRR had proved to be effective in building capacities towards disaster-resistant construction.

## Limitations of the CMDRR process

Despite some success made in the CMDRR workshops, my respondents all agreed that the CMDRR process was not enough to build resilient communities. As claimed by a woman in the FGD; *“we have the information, but there is no funds to see things through. We as women are a part of the CMDRR group here, but without additional resources it is hard to do anything”*.

This statement reflects one of the more important elements expressed by my respondents, namely the lack of access to a job and income. Even though the participants in the CMDRR learned how to build safer buildings, the resources needed to see the training through were lacking.

In addition, as the CMDRR workshop did not provide the participants with any income or the possibility to get a job, some claimed that the workshop was a waste of time. Most of my respondents acknowledged that economic security was one of the most important need of the community. It was emphasized that in the absence of public funds from the government and NGOs, CMDRR should also include human development issues such as, for instance, employment training. CARE also acknowledged that the need for employment activities were strong in Carrefour district.

### 6.3.2 Operational capacity

“Capacity-building” was a major buzzword that always influenced our discussions. The community members and CARE staff used the words “capacity” and “capacity-building” extensively, and it was consistently mentioned with reference to the organisations (CARE) lacking or needing resources to implement and monitoring development programmes and activities, and CARE having a role in terms of enhancing community capacity.

A challenge that emerged throughout the discussions was that “capacity” was used as a catch phrase to mean anything from administration staff, buildings, leadership skills, government capacity financial management skills, ability to generate resources and jobs, and so on. Through our discussions, I attempted to make them break it down to explain exactly what kind of capacity they

were referring to. The main types of capacity they focused on can be classified as knowledge capacity, material resources, financial resources and the ability to meet people's needs (INGOs and the government).

### **Knowledge capacity**

My research revealed that capacity building was an integrated element in CAREs operation in Carrefour district, and a main priority in their CMDRR programs. Valery Simeon and the CARE staff referred to knowledge capacity as the first essential component in the CMDRR process, where the participants learned about risk, natural hazards and natural disasters, vulnerability and climate change. As previously stated, many participants felt empowered as they now possessed important knowledge that they could share with others after the CMDRR process. In turn, information sharing had improved the relationships with neighbouring communities as well as within the community of La Grenada. The values of caring for and taking care of one another was according to CARE fundamental values in order to build resilient communities.

### **Material resource**

Consistently, the first type of capacity that was mentioned by all the respondents, was that of material resources – in terms of material resources they had, resources they lacked, and what they thought CARE should provide for them.

Among this, materials to build better houses were a recurring theme. This had much to do with the fact that most of my respondents saw inadequate housing and weak infrastructure as the biggest challenge to reduce the impact of future disasters. This perception was held both in relation to storms, floods and earthquakes.

After some discussion, it became clear that CARE and other INGOs had previously supported various project aimed at building better houses, but that the community members had not maintained the houses built. CARE saw the aspect of maintenance as a problem. As stated by a CARE staff; *"it is not sufficient to build better houses if people don't maintain what has been built"*. He further said; *"we don't live in this community, so if the people don't care about what has been built, why should we?"*

The women also mentioned the lack of other types of material resources, such as computers and information materials (TV, radio etc.). They also mentioned equipment needed for various social activities such as dancing, painting classes or football. As a woman said; *"It would be good to have some more social activities in this community for children. If children have more to do after school they will not get involved in something bad"*.

The men interviewed mentioned equipment needed for various livelihood activities such as pig farming and agriculture, reflecting that their focus was on economically empowerment rather on social empowerment.

### **Financial resources**

The aspect related to material resources was also discussed in regards to unemployment and the need to have a secure income in order to pay for the equipment needed for livelihood activities.

CARE and PLAN both mentioned the lack of financial resources as a challenge to implement more projects and to monitor old projects. Another challenge pointed out by the CARE staff was that even when CARE had agreed to provide financial support for specific activities, the money was often disbursed much later than it was planned for. As stated by Valery Simeon; *“the main problem is late disbursements, which causes delays in projects”* (Personal interview, 2015). This was seen as partly related to delays from donors, but primarily because of CARE’s own system of limitations; they require specific documentation, approval at different levels of the organisational hierarchy, and the involvement of the national-level accountant in the CARE office. The constant changing of employees was also a challenge mentioned. One CARE staff explained; *“There are always new people that we have to relate to, both inside this organization and in other organizations. The people who have received training is quitting their jobs, which affects the effectiveness of our programs, as we have to train new people all the time. Training also cost money”*.

### **The ability to meet people’s needs**

#### **INGOs**

One aspect pointed out by both CARE and PLAN was the challenge of pre-made plans and outdated plans of action in regards to DRR and DRM. As CARE acknowledged; *“there is little room for making changes to the CMDRR plan, and we cannot adopt to the current realities and needs as we are constrained to follow these plans as they are developed”*.

One aspect that seemed important to the community members was to expand the CMDRR to include CBOs. Valery Simeon said that this was a good request and that they would try to carry out a training program for the CBOs at a later stage.

Both CARE and PLAN acknowledged that NGOs is not good enough for preventing vulnerabilities.

### **The government**

Based on my interviews, FGDs and participation observation in the CMDRR workshop, the community members did not believe in the government’s ability to meet their needs. Some of my

respondents said that the infrastructure had improved after the earthquake as a result of government intervention. However, my respondents said that the government was not involved in any preventive activities within these two communities. Even though the government had enacted policies and laws on disaster management, often including regulations on DRR and climate change adaptation, these policies were according to CARE scarcely implemented due to insufficient budgets or because the responsible government staff lacked capacity and knowledge on the subject. An officer from UMCOR argued that corruption within the government body was a problem that effected the implementation of project. Even though my respondents held a negative attitude to government's efforts, some of the community members acknowledged that without the help and resources provided by the government, the rebuilding phase would fall short.

### **6.3.3 Local knowledge**

It was acknowledged by all respondents, especially CARE staff, that local knowledge was essential to identify local needs. In the FGDs held in Ti-Sous, the community members had clear thoughts on how to decrease vulnerability. Although local knowledge existed in regards to preventive activities, resource constrains had made it difficult for the community members to start their own projects. They felt dependent on INGOs to get started. As stated by a young woman from Ti-Sous; *"we have the ideas, but we need help to start, the NGOs or the Government should help us".*

The community members had many thoughts on prevention activities that should be done. They included waste management, reforestation and construction activities.

#### **Waste management**

The women in particular were eager for the people in their communities to come together and solve some of these issues instead of waiting for NGOs or the Government. Activities like waste management were emphasized as important. As stated by a woman living in La Grenada; *"Where I live there is a channel, where a lot of rubbish pills up, leaving the water to flood. I think that I can talk to my neighbours to do something about all that trash, so our houses becomes safer"*. They also expressed concerns over the burning of waste; *"since nobody is picking up the trash, people are burning it, releasing huge amounts of CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere. This smoke is very toxic for us"*.

Burning of garbage was practiced within both communities, but my respondents acknowledged that this was a bad and short-term solution to the problems of waste. Despite this awareness, they continued this practice. One of the reasons for this was that this practice was viewed as a fast solution to the problem of waste. Many also stated that they did not have time to be concerned



about the waste problem. Others saw the waste as too overwhelming for them to overcome, and wanted more action from the government.

Valery Simeon elaborated that waste management in Haiti had become an environmental concern and a serious hazard to nature and human health. He stated that he would include this aspect more in the CMDRR workshops, as to make people come together at a local level to address the aspect of waste removal (Personal interview, 2015).

The children from Delmas 33 also emphasized the aspect of waste management. A young girl stated; *“water resources are being blocked by so much garbage. We need to think about our garbage”*. This statement generated a discussion amongst the students. Many mentioned that they wanted to develop a youth group at their school that concerned waste management and environmental practices.

A CARE staff, previously working with waste management after the 2010 earthquake, saw the problems of waste management as one connected to poverty and the situation of unemployment;

*“There has been cases where the people hired to clear up the streets have stretched the work out as long as they could in order to keep being paid. Some workers cleared rubble from one area only to dump it in another. This way they were guaranteed work for months even years. In effect, we used so much time cleaning up the streets that little progress was made”* (Personal information, 2015).

Based on this statement, people saw waste management as a secure source to make an income, and did little to achieve long-term results. The extent of the problems regarding waste management must as such be seen within the wider picture of financial dependency and poverty.

## **Reforestation**

All my respondents mentioned deforestation as a big problem in regards to climate change and natural disasters. A young man from La Grenada said that they could plant more trees in order to reduce climate change.

The aspect of reforestation was also mentioned in my FGD with children in Croix-des-Bouquets. They said that PLAN should have a program so they could learn more about these things (referring to climate change and natural disasters). A boy said: *“the government should teach us about these things, but we don’t believe they will help us, only the organizations can help us”*. The boys wanted NGOs in the area to have project like reforestation to strengthen the community.

## **Construction**

The restoration of infrastructure and building safer houses were mentioned as the most important aspects of building better for the future, and thus to withstand the impacts of a new earthquake.

That the house foundation must be stronger and that the houses must be build further apart were some of the thoughts my respondents shared.

Local knowledge and expertise was not directly included in the CMDRR programme. CARE did address local knowledge in the first workshop, as they wanted to identify community knowledge in regards to local awareness and preventive strategies. The community members on their side did not address the aspect of promoting local knowledge. Their focus was rather set on what they needed help with, and which resources they lacked.

## Chapter 7 Emerging issues, discussion and analysis

This chapter analyses the key findings previously presented in Chapter 6, focusing on key themes and concepts identified in the literature review. I will first address how the community members perceived INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it comes to rebuilding the two communities. Next, the discussion and analysis centres on the CMDRR process implemented by CARE and addresses the underlying vulnerabilities as perceived by my respondents. The vulnerability context in Carrefour district will be analysed through the PAR model, whilst also taking into account the particular historical and political context in Haiti. The CMDRR process will be analysed by applying Cordaid's (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system.

A theoretical analysis of the empirical findings enables a deeper understanding of the particular case in question and the cooperation between CARE and the community members in Carrefour district. It also allows us to suggest some analytical generalizations regarding how CMDRR functions in practice and provides greater insight into how the CMDRR programmes can strengthen local communities to decrease vulnerability and risks.

### 7.1 The relationship between CARE and the local communities

#### 7.1.1 Local perception about other INGOs

The perception of INGOs and local NGOs as actors before and after the 2010 earthquake was widely contested amongst my respondents. Some claimed that community members had more faith in the INGOs than in local NGOs. This was because INGOs were viewed as less corrupt and exploitive towards women. Most of my respondents saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a difference, as the government was considered weak and corrupt. This was especially evident amongst the women who claimed that INGOs kept them safe after the 2010 earthquake. This is also mentioned in the literature review, where USIP (2010) and Lewis *et al* (2009) claims that the Haitian people have learned to look to INGOs rather than the government for provision of essential services.

Most of those who responded negatively to INGOs work and practices were people that had worked or were currently working for local NGOs, INGOs, and male respondents. As one Haitian CARE employee said: *“organizations always want themselves to be the only ones working in the area and they put up signs everywhere to mark their territory. As a Haitian, I sometimes feel sad, even though I work for an international NGO, I would like to see this “NGO-ization” of the Haitian society gone”*.

His statement supports Lewis (2007) perception, that some INGOs have imposed their own development agenda, and as such become self-interested actors at the expense of the people they are in theory supporting. This view, if it is correct, is in opposition to the values of the social capital concept, which is defined by Putnam as the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam *et al*, 1993:167). Some community members were also concerned about the overwhelming role played by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the importance of a stronger civil society and a stronger government. Luc Edwin Ceide stressed the importance of a partnership where the Haitian population should be more in control over decision-making. As such, Luc Edwin Ceide supports Even Michael Edwards (2000 in Lewis, 2007:11) perception that few NGOs have developed structures that genuinely respond to grassroots demands.

Many people also felt isolated and excluded from partaking in development activities, and viewed INGOs as profit-motivated. They found it difficult to trust people who were rich, and profited on their misery. Their perception supports Patrick (2011) and Haver (2011) empirical research; that DRR programs after the 2010 earthquake have often fallen short in Haiti as the communities concerned were excluded and poorly consulted from partaking in the recovery process, and because outsiders with limited local knowledge came in and decided a course of action without understanding the local realities and contexts.

### **7.1.2 Local perception about CARE**

The previous operations carried out by other INGOs (including Bring Change and Red Cross) in Carrefour district were characterized by a lack of trust towards INGOs by the community members as they felt excluded. However, when asked about their relationship with CARE, the initial response was that CARE had contributed positively in creating awareness of the risks and vulnerabilities that existed within the communities. The community members I interviewed showed a general acceptance of the opportunities CARE brought with them as they had invested considerable funding and resources into strengthening the local capacities. There also seemed to be an agreement that CARE had managed to include, rather than exclude, the community member’s needs in the CMDRR process. Considering this, it can be argued that CARE responded to the two communities’ needs. Moreover, CARE’s role in Carrefour district can be seen as one contributing to foster development. In some instances, it can be said that the community members were able to influence their own lives and development path, which is in line with the capability approach; including both material and non-material needs. It also includes the concept of “functioning”, which indicates the broadening of human capacity to achieve things in life through self-actualization and education (Robeyns, 2003 and

Nussbaum, 2011: 33–34. It was, however, made complains by the community members that the funding from CARE was not sufficient in order to continue their DRR activities after the CMDRR workshops. The aspect of limited funding's explains to some degree the strong criticism carried out by amongst other Cunningham (2012) claiming NGOs have not lived up to expectations in providing assistance in and after a disaster in Haiti. The lack of financial and material capacity will be further analysed and discussed in the next section

## 7.2 Achieving the task of risk reduction through CMDRR

In this study, the PAR model of Wisner *et al* is used as a simple tool for assessing people's vulnerability to earthquakes. The PAR model distinguishes between three components on the social side and one component on the natural side. The three forces on the social side are defined as follows: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. The component on the natural side is the earthquake itself. I recognize that the generation of vulnerability is not adequately integrated with the way in which the earthquake affected people; it is a static model. It exaggerates the separation of the earthquake from social processes in order to emphasise the social causation of the disaster that followed (Wisner *et al*, 2003: 90-91). It is a qualitative assessment, which has the advantage of identifying areas in need of further focus. The PAR model could give disaster managers a framework for understanding vulnerability to disasters and for reducing it.

### 7.2.1 Step 1: Risk assessment and analysis

The first step in the CMDRR process carried out by CARE was risk assessment and analysis. CARE acknowledged that vulnerabilities and needs could only be identified through a process of direct consultation and dialogue with the communities concerned. As such, CARE supported Wisner *et al* (2003:84) who claims; "it is in the hands of local people that the logic of their situation, the phenomenology of their living with risks, forces them to be aware of and to discuss their strengths and capacities, as well as their weaknesses and needs".

The key factors causing vulnerability after the 2010 earthquake were according to my respondents, attached to social vulnerability, political vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and environmental vulnerability. These findings accord with the results of the previous studies of amongst other Wisner *et al* (2003:4) who states that the nature of disasters are "complex interactions of the natural and human world-encompassing both human, social, economic, political and environmental dimensions".

## **Root causes**

**The economic system and the poverty situation:** According to the community members living in Carrefour district, the main obstacle for creating resilient communities was the high level of poverty and unemployment. As such, the local perception of the root causes to risks and vulnerabilities were primarily viewed in connection to livelihood security and occupational activities as they claimed that they did not have the adequate resources to decrease their vulnerability. By resources, they were mostly referring to financial or material resources. In all of my interviews and FGDs, it was also stated that it was difficult for them (community members) to start a community project after the 2010 earthquake on their own because they were financially incapacitated. Indeed Wisner *et al* (2003) notes that people who are economically marginal and/or who lack the raw materials needed are more likely to stop trusting their own methods for self-protection, and lose confidence in their own local knowledge. Based on my observation this was the case in Carrefour district prior to the CMDRR process; the community had not developed any form for preparedness strategies.

Webersik (2012) explains that those at low economic levels tend to have less power over their socio-political and physical environs compared to the rich. Haiti has the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere and the most unequal distribution of its wealth; one per cent of the population controls half of its wealth (Webersik *et al*, 2010, CIA, 2014, and Hallward, 2007).

**The political system:** Many scholars, amongst them, Herard (2011) acknowledges that long-term solutions are best led by an effective and an accountable government.

My respondents recognized the need for a good and trustworthy government at a national level, and good leadership at the local level, in order to build resilient communities and to decrease vulnerability. However, in this study, the community members expressed concerns regarding an ineffective and unaccountable government. Many also claimed that the government was corrupt and existed only to serve themselves or the private interests of the ruling elite. Based on the interviews and FGDs, it became evident that the community members saw their relationship to the government as almost non-existing, and as such, they did not support the government by paying any taxes aimed at social projects. The community members were also reluctant to accept or even recognize a common set of laws. In the face of a deep divide between the Haitian government and the society, corruption, crime, and prostitution had emerged as common alternatives to legal economic activities within these communities.

CARE addressed the fact that Haiti was faced with tackling so many fundamental development issues that disaster preparedness simply remained a "luxury problem" that the government could not

afford. They recognized that this had much to do with the political history of corruption and self-interests.

The overview of the political situation and history in Chapter 2 illustrates some important elements that are of particular relevance to understand the vulnerability context in Carrefour district. First, Haiti was forced to pay enormous reparations to France in turn for “lost profits” from the slave trade and for diplomatic recognition. The money borrowed, 150 million French francs, was concluded as late as 1947 (Flood, 2010). Second, Haiti has endured political instability, frequent regime shifts, and chronic challenges in governance since colonial times. The governments have primarily focused on ensuring their own allowances, which has led to a lack of faith in the political system among the people. This is also compounded by the way in which political leaders have not been held accountable for repression and brutalities after dictatorship, especially after the father-son Duvalier dictatorship, which left Haiti in heavily external debt and aggravating its situation of underdevelopment.

The weakness of the state apparatus and decades of poor governance has had implications for how democracy and accountability were understood by the community members living in Carrefour district, and what opportunities they had to hold those in power accountable, and moreover, how they have been involved in development. According to my respondents, democracy remained dysfunctional; as the majority of the people had very limited access to the political or economic spheres of society. As such, they were not able to hold the government accountable, as a real social contract between the leaders and the people was non-existent. I will therefore argue that the poor perception of the government has created a vicious circle of distrust. Haiti have thus end up in a situation that Øyhus characterize as “a great divide” between the state and the civil society (Øyhus, 2013). I also support Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) perceptions that no vulnerability exist in isolation and that the root causes to Haiti’s vulnerability are connected to development failures at a national level.

**Gendered vulnerability:** Risk and vulnerability are also differently distributed between different categories of people. One aspect addressed by my respondents was how women were more affected during and after the 2010 earthquake compared to men due to their more vulnerable situation. Women were perceived to be more vulnerable as they had less access to resources and as they were victims of a gendered division of labour. They rarely participated in the public arena, as they were responsible for household tasks. In turn, family responsibilities made it difficult for women to attend schools and to get education. They were also perceived as more vulnerable to forms of violence and discrimination, and all my respondents mentioned rape and abuse as core factors of gendered

vulnerability after the 2010 earthquake. These findings are in line with Dr. Elaine Enarson's (2000) perception that as women face multiple gender discrimination as they are more exposed to higher rates of poverty and violence.

### **Dynamic pressure:**

**The lack of policies:** The issue of DRR concerning the structural safety of buildings is viewed by amongst others Heard (2011) and DEC (2011) as vitally important given the seismic risks in Haiti. The literature indicates that the 2010 disaster could have been averted had sound construction practices been adhered to throughout the region (Heard, 2011). My respondents addressed the lack of sound policies on building codes and information on how to build safer houses as urgent in order to decrease risks and vulnerability and to build resilient communities. Most of my respondents saw weak infrastructure and unsafe buildings as a causal factor as to why the 2010 earthquake claimed so many lives. Based on their statements and my observations in the field, I understood their concern, for instance that there seemed to be little or no urban planning in the Port au Prince area, and no institutions to control settlement development. Without sound policies on how and where to construct safer buildings, escaping the current vulnerabilities and preparing for a new earthquake seems as an unrealistic quest.

**Rapid urbanization and dynamic pressure:** As building resilient communities also involves focusing on sustainable livelihoods and natural resource management, the CARE staff and the community members also mentioned rapid urbanization and dynamic pressure as important factors to address in order to decrease the vulnerability within these communities.

### **Unsafe conditions:**

**Housing development in vulnerable areas:** My respondents acknowledged that in many instances people build houses in unsafe environments such as unstable hillsides and slum settlements. They underlined that these problems were connected to poverty, as people did not have the materials needed to build safer houses, but also a lack of policies on where to build. Their statements supports Wisner *et al* (2003) consideration on how the spatial variety of nature provides different types of environmental opportunities and hazards. In the case of the community members in Carrefour district, they could only afford to live in slum settlements in unsafe ravines and unstable hillsides.

**The lack of disaster preparedness:** The community members also said that they had not been prepared in any way by the government or INGOs for an event like the 2010 earthquake. For most of them, the first time they saw INGOs in their locality was after the disaster had struck. Because of the lack of preparedness, the effects of the earthquake were devastating for these communities. It



must be noted that there has been carried out awareness campaign by other INGOs after the 2010 earthquake, but that these programs did not address DRR strategies.

It is important to highlight that while these vulnerabilities are attached to root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions, I recognize that there is no single component that determines people's vulnerability, nor should these components be addressed in isolation from the range of factors and processes that have created the vulnerable situation in Carrefour district.

These findings regarding the different vulnerabilities imply that vulnerability to natural disasters in the case of Carrefour district are a result of various internal and external factors such as physical, economic, political and social exposures or predisposition of an individual or a community to natural hazards and natural disasters. Attention therefore needs to be given to the political and economic determinants of vulnerability: most of the community members were vulnerable because they had inadequate livelihoods, which were not resilient in the face of the 2010 earthquake, and they were poor. They were poor because they suffered specific relations of exploitation and discrimination within the political system, and there were limited occupational activities that made the community members feel financial incapacitated. Even though most of the respondents had confidence and expressed their own ideas, the financial and material resources to make any real change through for example local preparedness activities were limited. I also support Webersik and Klose's argument (2010) that if a country has experienced political instability over time, as Haiti has, the country is more prone to natural disasters as this increases vulnerability.

### **7.2.2 Step 2: Activities**

As previously presented in Chapter 3, in order to create a human-centred development, people must be given the opportunity to organize themselves in a manner that is best suited for meeting their desires and interests. Amartya Sen's Capability Approach and Martha Nussbaum's Human Development Approach further expand this view, where freedom, engagement, affiliation – the ability to engage in social interaction and have the freedom (capabilities) and supportive institutions to do so – are seen as essential components of the development of any society (Robeyns, 2003 and Nussbaum, 2011:33–34).

Similarly, Cordaid (2009) emphasize that concrete plans and activities should be based on traditional knowledge and activities that have been practised and handed down from generation to generation. Although local knowledge existed in regards to preventive activities, resource constrains and the weak relationship with the government made it difficult for the community members to start their

own projects prior to the CMDRR process. They felt dependent on CARE to get started. As such, CARE identified communities' needs and thought the community members about "best practices".

Based on my participatory observation of the CMDRR workshops in Ti-Sous, and my FGDs and interviews in La Grenada, I will argue that CARE managed to create a good environment where the community members were actively involved in the identification and analysis of the risks and the vulnerabilities that existed. Based on the risks and vulnerabilities identified, CARE and the community members agreed upon some important preparedness activities, including education and information sharing, and physical training on how to construct safer houses and roads. They had also created an aid group that was trained to respond to emergencies and they had developed a face-to-face network for information dissemination to alert people when a natural hazard was coming. As previously mentioned the activities carried out were not only focused on earthquake preparedness, but also preparedness activities in regards to other possible natural events such as storms and floods. CARE had for example provided information and tools to the community members in order to decrease flooding from the local river in Ti-Sous.

The high focus on including all members of the community has also been highly appreciated by all of my respondents. It must however be mentioned that CARE followed a pre-made CMDRR plan where there was little room for making changes to the CMDRR process. CARE acknowledged this limitation, and viewed resource constrains as a challenge in order to incorporate some of the requests from the community members. Based on this, I will argue that the CMDRR program cannot be viewed as a bottom-up process because the solutions regarding preparedness measures were generated from CARE.

### **7.2.3 Step 3: Self- organization**

The third step of the CMDRR process was self-organization, which entailed that the community jointly implemented the DRR plans and activities. As addressed by Cordaid (2009), the CMDRR intervention is supposed to be community owned and managed as this empowers communities in their quest to further increase their own resilience. Even though it is the community's responsibility to acquire the resources needed to carry out these DRR activities, the two communities were financial dependent on CARE to implement these activities (Cordaid, 2009).

For that reason, it can be argued that even though CARE engaged in capacity-building efforts to make the people more independent of CARE, the community members were not able to resolve issues and manage individual and collective tasks without the continued support from CARE. Therefore, while

the knowledge capacity generated through the CMDRR process contributed to positive development outcomes, the community members were not able to self-organize without the help of CARE.

#### **7.2.4 Step 4: Participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning**

The last step of the CMDRR process focused on participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning. As explained by CARE such activities were still being developed, both in La Grenada and in Ti-Sous. However, as La Grenada had gone through the CMDRR process, some lessons can be shared.

Based on the FGDs and interviews in La Grenada, showed that the approach to risk and vulnerability communication contributed significantly to developing a "culture of safety". This is a positive development outcome, especially the way that the community members have changed their attitudes from seeing disasters as mainly an act of God to realise that they had the power to cope with disasters themselves. The community members, especially the women, felt more self-confident as they had received valuable knowledge that made them a resource for the rest of the community. In turn, this knowledge had helped stimulate replicable efforts towards resilience building to the wider community in La Grenada as preventive information was shared between individuals. The CMDRR workshops had also strengthened community ties, both within the community and with neighbouring communities.

There was thus a clear change in attitude, skills and knowledge among the community members in La Grenada on issues related to DRR after the CMDRR workshops. It can then be argued that the majority of the community members were resilient in the sense that they possessed awareness regarding natural disasters and climate change. In this context, resilience can be viewed as a process leading to desired outcomes. In a way, the community members had managed to "bounce forward" after the 2010 earthquake, as the new reality created by the earthquake had generated new "learning", which was facilitated through DRR education and training.

However, the opportunities brought through the CMDRR process in relation to education and capacity building strategies have not been able to contribute to the long-term prosperity as both CARE and the community members in La Grenada lacked the financial and material resources to make real change. The community members still felt vulnerable after the CMDRR workshops.

I therefore support Manyena (2009) who recognize that people can possess characteristics that makes them both vulnerable and resilient. These findings are important because they imply that vulnerability to earthquakes and other natural hazards in the case of Carrefour district are not connected to a lack of awareness, but must be seen in the interrelationships of resiliencies (Manyena 2009).

Based on the identification of the numerous vulnerabilities it becomes evident that building resilient communities involves something more from simply dealing with preparedness measures through the CMDRR process. Consistent with the PAR model, my findings suggests that resilience building is about good governance: it is primarily and fundamentally political, with its success depending on citizen power, participation and a good relationship between the Haitian population and the government. It is, thus, important to overcome the current public-private divide- the civil society on one side and the state authorities on the other side- in order to create a state-civil society synergy for sustainable development (Evans, 1996 and Øyhus, 2013). Similarly, vulnerability or lack of resilience to disasters partly lies in the Haitian history. It is therefore likely that ongoing disaster risks are reproduced in Carrefour district in the absence of an accountable government, and without the adequate financial and material resources to make real change. Consequently, the CMDRR programme implemented by CARE and the community members cannot be viewed as sustainable.

## Chapter 8 Concluding remarks and reflection

In relation to my attempt to examine if CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes, and to see if such programmes can generate sustainable development, my findings suggest that the conclusion is twofold.

In terms of human progress, improvements in knowledge capacity and involvement in decision-making, the community members were able to bounce forward after the CMDRR process in the sense that the 2010 earthquake had created opportunities for sustainable development through new learning and DRR training. The community members possessed important knowledge in regards to natural disasters (storms, floods and earthquakes), disaster-resistant construction, and climate change after the CMDRR programme. They were also given some tools aimed at building safer houses and roads. Another aspect of human progress was that women in La Grenada felt more empowered. Based on these improvements, I have argued that the majority of the community members were resilient in that sense that they had increased their awareness and knowledge capacity. I have suggested that resilience can be viewed as a process leading to desired outcomes. By viewing disaster resilience as a process in this case study, I have recognized the human role in disasters and the process in which the community members were driven by the CMDRR programme outcomes. Viewing resilience as an outcome may be necessary where radical change has been made (Manyena 2009).

In terms of sustainable development, the opportunities brought through the CMDRR process in relation to capacity-building strategies had not been able to contribute to the long-term prosperity as both CARE, and the community members in La Grenada lacked the financial and material resources to make real change. The underlying vulnerability attached to root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions had attributed to the shortcomings of the CMDRR process. These findings provide confirmatory evidence that people can possess characteristics that makes them both vulnerable and resilient.

In this case study, the main social factors that contributed to Carrefour's high susceptibility to the 2010 earthquake were:

- Poverty and unemployment
- Inequality
- An ineffective and unaccountable government
- A deep divide between the Haitian government and the society
- Poor construction and the lack of planning and building regulations and policies
- Lack of awareness that earthquakes are a significant threat

Despite a higher level of awareness that earthquakes are a significant threat, the remaining factors were still present five years after the 2010 earthquake, and after the CMDRR process.

Poverty and unemployment largely determined the way in which the 2010 earthquake turned into a disaster. The devastating effects from the earthquake were mostly attached to unsafe construction and the lack of information. Poverty was not only perceived as a challenge to be able to cope with natural hazards, but also made the residents in Carrefour district less confidence in their own abilities to create preparedness activities to withstand future hazard impacts. Even if they had confidence, inadequate resources made it difficult to turn ideas into actions. It is therefore critical that natural disasters be seen through the lens of reducing risk of and building resilience to disasters. In the future, CMDRR interventions in Haiti should recognize the importance of building seismic resistant homes. The issues surrounding reconstruction do not just involve how to rebuild, but also where to rebuild (Herard, 2011). In order to eliminate the use of hazardous areas such as the steep hillsides of Carrefour district, no-build zones must be clearly outlined and strictly enforced. Specific targets should also be related to other relevant development objectives such as education, livelihood security and occupational activities.

These strategies have to be primarily led by the Haitian Government. Consistent with the PAR model, my findings suggest that resilience building is about good governance: it is primarily and fundamentally political, with its success depending on citizen power, participation and a good relationship between the Haitian population and the government.

Drawing upon the mixture of my own observations and the theoretical and empirical materials, it became evident that INGOs have in some instances had a negative effect on the state-society relationships, even if this was not intentional. Both the government and the civil society in Carrefour district have had little to say in how to use the funds, and the allocation made by INGOs had not necessarily corresponded to Haiti's needs or priorities. My findings suggested that there was a significant disconnection between INGOs, the government and the two communities both in regards to the response following the 2010 earthquake, and in regards to disaster preparedness activities after the 2010 earthquake. Although it is viewed unlikely in the present situation, what is needed is a nationwide dialogue and a commitment from both the state and the Haitian society to a common project concerning DRR in which they themselves are recognised. I also acknowledge that a joint effort and a strong partnership between the government, the INGOs and the Haitian civil society are needed to build resilience at a sufficient scale to make a difference.

As a concluding remark, Haiti might be one of the best examples in recent history that illustrates why natural disasters must be viewed as a substantive threat to both sustainable development and

poverty-reduction initiatives. Natural disasters are a development issue because development planning can make a difference to lessen the impact that disaster has on poverty, growth and welfare. If sustainable development are to be generated, disaster research and disaster managers should account for the connections in society that cause vulnerability, as well as for the hazards themselves. CMDRR interventions can be one of the sources of DRR information through which communities can learn by doing. These interventions are processes that enhance resilience for both an individual, groups and communities to deal with hazard events.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Interview guide: used in personal interviews and FGDs.

#### ❖ Specific Research Question:

- What are the root causes of people’s vulnerability within the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade in Carrefour district, as perceived by the community members and the CARE staff before and after the 2010 earthquake?
- What types of community knowledge and local structures existed in regard to disaster preparedness in these two communities prior to CARE’s operation?

#### Vulnerability and Risk

- Identifying and highlighting the root causes of peoples vulnerability (social, cultural, political and/or economical?) within these three communities.
- Identifying the community member’s knowledge of natural disasters and the concept of vulnerability and CMDRR.
- Identifying the authority that promotes CMDRR programs within these communities.

#### Questions:

- What happened to you and your family on the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 2010? Impact of earthquake?
- Did you receive any help during the first day, week and month? If yes, from whom? (government, national organisations and/or international organizations)
- What resources were made available to you and who provided these resources?
- What resources was most important for you?
- Do women and men in this community have equal access to resources according to you? In addition, have the access to resources changed after the earthquake?
- How has the 2010 earthquake affected your life when it comes to family relations and household? (Is it the same, or do you have different chores, responsibilities etc.)
- Are you more vulnerable today as compared to before the earthquake. If yes, in what way?
- What do you think can or should be done in order to decrease vulnerability in you community? And who should be in charge?

- Have the local government, or any organisations, prepared you for a new disaster?
- What do you believe are the most important factors/means in order to reduce the effects of future disasters?
- Do you believe people are aware of the risk that exists in this community?

### **CMDRR programs, Dependency and Accountability**

#### **❖ Specific Research questions:**

- How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, addressed the needs of the community members and what processes of empowerment is traceable to the local participation in the CMDRR programme after the 2010 earthquake?
- How does the people living in the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade, in Carrefour district, perceive INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it comes to rebuilding the two communities?

### **Participation in CMDRR. The community members perception about the operation of CARE and INGOs.**

- Identifying people's perception about INGOs effort in DRR and in development.
- Identifying people's perception about CARE's effort in CMDRR and in development
- Identify the level of participation in the CMDRR process

#### **Questions:**

- Are you familiar with the term DRR? (if not explain it/ use different words)
- Do you participate in any DRR activities?
  - **If yes:**
- How did you become a participant of the DDR program?
- Any requirements in becoming a participant?
- If yes: Does the requirements differ between men and women from your perspective?
  
- How many community associations does your community have, and can you say something about these associations?

- What activities have been carried out after the earthquake, and who initiated these activities?
- Do you feel that both women and men are included in such programs? If yes, in what way?
- Does the organisation you are with collaborate with the local government in regards to DRR programs?
- What do you regard as the most important obstacles in the participation of DRR programs?
- How could this challenge be overcome?
  
- Do you think DRR can bring opportunities/ positive outcomes, if so in what way?

➤ **If no:**

- Are you aware of any local organization or institution that promotes DRR activities or people who are engaged in such activities?
- Have the government promoted any DRR activities within this community?
- Do you think DRR can bring opportunities/ positive outcomes, if so in what way?

**Dependency towards NGOs**

- What is the organizations role in promoting DRR programs in your community?
- Do you feel like you culture have change after the NGOs have been here? If yes, in what way?
- Is NGOs seen as important players in the process of decreasing vulnerability in your community? If yes: Do you feel that the they includes community interests when initiating DRR programs? Do you feel that your interests and needs are considered?
- Do you trust NGOs?
- Do you feel dependent on NGOs to sustain your life? If yes, how can you decrease this dependency? In addition, how can the NGO decrease this dependency?

**Appendix 2: The INGOs and local NGOs (CARE Haiti, Project Haiti and PLAN Haiti)**

❖ Specific research question:

- How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, addressed the needs of the community members and what processes of empowerment is traceable to the local participation in the CMDRR programme after the 2010 earthquake

### **Questions:**

- How many people live in the community (La Grenada and Ti-Sous)?
- Do you (the organization) promote DRR programs within this community?

### **The 2010 earthquake**

- Was the organizations intervention after the 2010 earthquake timely (i.e., how soon after earthquake did activities begin) and who was in charge?
- What needs were identified after the 2010 earthquake. Did these needs differ between sexes?
- Were available resources adequate to meet the communities need after the earthquake? If so, how do they know that the needs were meet (communication)?
- Do you feel like the knowledge and experience of the staff was and is adequate to meet community needs?
- Was it a partnerships- between the organization and the community members- employed in the response? Were new partnerships formed or existing ones strengthened after the earthquake?

### **DRR and community inclusion**

- How do you select a focus area for the implementation of DRR programs?
- Has there been any allegations from other communities regarding favouritism?
- What are the main activities carried out by you organization in regards of DRR programs in this community?
- Do you think that these programs holds short-term solutions or sustainable solutions?
- Do you feel like there exist a mutual relationship between the organization and the people you work for (community members)? Describe the relationship.
- Do you think the community members are dependent on you to sustain a decent life? If yes, what should the organization do in order to decrease this dependency?
- How is local capacities identified and included in DRR programs today?
- What role does the community members play in local DRR activities?
- What key lessons can be taken forward to ensure that you (the organization promotes local capacities, including women, in building the community to resist a new disaster?
- What are the main barriers (social, political and economic) of vulnerability facing people within this community, according to you?

- What are the main management challenges facing this organization in regards to DRR programs?

### **Appendix 3: Questionnaire used by CARE Haiti before and after the CMDRR workshop**

- Give an example of risk in this community. How would this risk affect your community to cope with natural disasters?
- How does a catastrophic event affect development?
- If an authority announces a hurricane, how would you assist your household and/or community?
- Do you know the meaning of DRR?
- What do you know about risk and disasters?
- What does a catastrophic event mean for you?
- Do you know the term vulnerability?

