

The emergence of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism in European defence cooperation

the role of PESCO and its Secretariat

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Preface

There are numerous factors contributing to the manifestation of this master's thesis. First, I am grateful for having completed the UiA's European Integration Summer School (EISS) together with brilliant co-students and professors. This opportunity sparked the interest in EU-affairs and challenged my personal beliefs on the so-called 'bureaucratic Brussels machinery'. Security and defence policies unveiled itself as a particularly interesting topic, that I later addressed in a research paper about PESCO. Prof. Stefan Gänzle supervised my work and I had the opportunity to become a research assistant for him- and Prof. Tanja Klenk as part of UiA's student-in-research [projects](#). The last factor contributing to my decision of writing this MA-thesis was the internship at the South Norway European Office in Brussels. All my interviews were conducted there, and I had the opportunity to witness the phenomenon I was studying in the proximity of all the EU-institutions.

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Abstract

For a long time, the European Union's (EU) member states have meticulously ring-fenced defence cooperation *vis-à-vis* the potential intrusion of supranationalism. Thus, defence cooperation has been conceived as perhaps the most central part of core state powers in Europe. Has this changed since member states have agreed to establish the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017? Clearly, PESCO has developed both as a more structured and legally 'binding' cooperation in defence matters amongst participating member states, such as defence procurement, training and capability development. Yet, the jury is out for as to whether there are 'more' supranational principles enshrined in policies, governance rules, decision-making and day-to-day practices, or whether intergovernmentalism with its emphasis on the sovereign (member) state calls the tone in EU defence. As a facilitator for cooperation, the PESCO Secretariat has been established in order to function as a focal point of communication and overall support at the interface of EU 'bodies', such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the participating member states.

This thesis seeks to grasp to what extent PESCO and its Secretariat support principles of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and/or hybridization in the area of European defence cooperation. The thesis will start with a review of the relevant literature as well as a short account of the development of the EU defence cooperation. It will then study PESCO's functioning – also with a view to its Secretariat – how it relates to other EU actors and participating member states. To achieve this aim, the project will have to relate to the gathering of empirical data and information directly with the actors involved in PESCO. Theoretically, the thesis draws from both supranational and intergovernmental accounts. Tentatively, it argues that decision-making practices in PESCO revolve around intergovernmental logics, but there is some conjectural evidence that its architecture has become supranational in its orientation – and thus presents a game-changer in European defence cooperation.

Keywords: European defence cooperation; Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); PESCO Secretariat; European Defence Agency (EDA); European External Action Service (EEAS); supranationalism; (new) intergovernmentalism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....	iii
Abstract	iv
1.0 Introduction	1
2.0 Theoretical and analytical framework	5
3.0 Methodology and data gathering	13
3.1 Research design.....	14
3.2 Literature review	15
4.0 The history of the European defence sector and the making of PESCO	16
4.1 History of the European Defence Sector and military integration	16
4.2 EUGS and CSDP: Enhanced security and defence cooperation	20
4.3 Member states' CSDP engagement	21
4.4 The architecture of PESCO.....	23
4.5 The Secretariat's functioning and adherent defence mechanisms.....	25
5.0 Analysis	29
5.1 Collaboration based on binding commitments.....	29
5.2 Coordination and facilitation	31
5.3 Decision-making	37
5.4 Sanctioning and incentivizing <i>vis-à-vis</i> the National Implementation Plans.....	38
5.5 Participating member states and alliances	42
5.6 Autonomy and EU-agenda	44
5.7 (Complex?) Legislation.....	47
6.0 Discussion	49
6.1 PESCO's impact on European defence cooperation.....	49
7.0 Conclusion.....	58
8.0 Literature	60
9.0 Appendix	66
9.1 Annex.....	66
Figures	66
Tables	66
9.2 Interview guide and questionnaire.....	66
9.3 Interview transcripts.....	71

List of Abbreviations

CAP Directorate:	Capability, Armament and Planning Directorate
CARD:	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP:	Capability Development Plan
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPCC:	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP:	Common Security and Defence Policy
CWS:	Common Workspace
DG DEFIS:	The Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space
EDA:	European Defence Agency
EDAP:	European Defence Action Plan
EDC:	European Defence Community
EDF:	European Defence Fund
EEAS:	European External Action Service
ESDP:	European Security and Defence Policy
EU:	European Union
EUGS:	European Union Global Strategy
EUMC:	European Union Military Committee
EUMS:	European Union Military Staff
HR/VP:	High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
MoD:	Ministry of Defence
MPCC:	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NIP:	National Implementation Plan
PermRep:	(EU member state(s)) Permanent Representation(s) to Brussels
PMG:	Politico-Military Group
PSC:	Political and Security Committee
pMS:	Participating Member State(s) (of PESCO)
TEU/ 'the Treaty':	Treaty on European Union
TFEU:	Treaty on the functioning of the European Union

1.0 Introduction

PESCO was launched in December 2017, only one year after the EU had endorsed its new comprehensive foreign policy strategy, the so-called European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). Emerging in the shadows of both transatlantic NATO-tensions and the Brexit process after the UK's referendum on EU membership of 23th of June 2016, PESCO was created in order to fulfil the EUGS' objectives relating to the Union's Common Security and Defence Policies (CSDP).

PESCO deviates from the traditional path of European defence cooperation by denoting a binding commitment for the member states participating. This development pinpoints to the first legally binding cooperation among member states that has occurred in the traditionally highly fragmented European defence sector; it now aims at enhancing defence capabilities, accomplish operational readiness, invest, and develop standardized military technology in order to increase the EU's capacity to become an international security actor. Furthermore, the new Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who had served as the German Federal Minister of Defence (2013-2019), has raised expectations *vis-à-vis* further integration in European defence cooperation because of her experience in the field.

In this particular context, the PESCO Secretariat assumes an important role in providing secretarial functions for the defence cooperation. The Secretariat is the administrative body of PESCO, and its structure and 'system of governance' comprises several bodies such as the EEAS, including sub-units such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and the EDA's Capability, Armament and Planning Directorate (CAP Directorate) (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017, p. 32; European Defence Agency, 2020a). The Secretariat is under the responsibility of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP).

The EEAS and the EDA are two EU-level actors functioning in order to be a single point of contact for the participating member states (pMS). Whilst the pMS are supposed to carry out this cooperation by enhancing capabilities and leading-, participating and observing on the PESCO projects themselves, the Secretariat's functioning in the framework might give rise to

some questions concerning the interference of both the EDA, the EEAS, and the HR/VP's which are in regular contact with the Commission. Although, the organizational institutional dimension of PESCO is quite complex, it constitutes a practical example of European defence cooperation. Studying this newly developed mechanism can provide insights into how today's European integration functions in the area of CSDP.

The Secretariat consists of actors to which Bickerton et al. (2015) refer as so-called 'de novo' bodies; actors that have a considerable amount of autonomy either by executive or legislative power and control over their own resources to a certain degree (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 705). The *de novo* bodies have relatively simple mandates pointing at specific issues. These bodies, it has been argued, often display intergovernmental structures that ultimately facilitates member states' control and influence.

Historically, security and defence cooperation in Europe has remained primarily associated with NATO and preserved in the realm of intergovernmental relationship in the EU as one of the central elements of EU member states' core state powers (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014, p. 2). After the faltering of the proposed European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954, defence cooperation has primarily rested within the transatlantic alliance. It was only with the Treaty of Maastricht and the subsequent establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that defence gradually moved closer to the process of European integration. While it is fair to say that defence cooperation has never been entirely absent in the European integration process, it was only becoming part of it at a later stage – and often because of external circumstances.

In theoretical terms, this conundrum has been explained differently from the perspectives of the two main grand theories of European integration, *neo-functionalism* and *intergovernmentalism* – including its variants. From the perspective of new intergovernmentalism, a theory that has gained some ground in EU studies (Bickerton, Hodson, Puetter, 2015) over the past years, EU decision-making processes in today's EU are increasingly based on intergovernmental logics, and that domestic governments are more open to deliberative and consensual policy making.

Supranational governance, a variant of neo-functionalism (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 2012), focus in contrast on institutions or organizations gaining some form of (relative) autonomy *vis-à-vis* member states. Supranationalism can be associated with certain actors and norms, but it is often revolving around political decision-making. If this process is carried out by legislative, executive, or adjudicative bodies of the joint effort of several countries, or by a single body over the domestic level, then it is supranational decision making (Büthe, 2016, p. 486). The process of establishing or strengthening this authority, either by shifting authority from the domestic/regional-level to e.g. the EU-level or creating new bodies, is then called supranationalism. Intergovernmentalism on the other hand presents the political decision-making form ‘without loss of authority’; countries maintain their sovereignty. For intergovernmental organizations the participating states abstain the sharing of power with other actors and the decision-making is by consensus – unanimity (Hurrell & Gomez-Mera, 2009).

New intergovernmentalism, in turn, argues that a modern trend in European integration is that policy coordination and cooperation amongst countries occur without delegating powers to supranational institutions. This theoretical framework assumes countries as to act more open to cooperate and practice policy coordination, and the supranational institutions themselves have assisted in creating the consensus-seeking agenda in the EU. Classical European integration on the other hand is often associated with competences transferred from the member states to supranational institutions.

The EU has launched CSDP, created the HR/VP-position and established the EEAS. These initiatives have an impact on the European continent; PESCO is a mechanism to enhance the governing aspects of the EU-level. Neither the EDA nor the EEAS can be defined as supranational institutions *per se*, but both might expose features thereof (further investigated in *table 1*). Even though these bodies hold some executive power, they have a limited degree of control over their own resources and are overseen by the Council.

The pMS are eager to protect their sovereignty and have made sure that the Commission’s power is limited through the intergovernmental treaties Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)/European Fiscal Compact, and the

Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 704; European Union, 2012; European Union, 2011). The pMS equally want to create mechanisms that will oversee the pMS' activities, such as in the CSDP context, where they have the initiatives Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Capability Development Plan (CDP), and the National Implementation Plans (NIP) that are linked to PESCO. These initiatives are assessed and reviewed by the EEAS and EDA.

PESCO can be perceived as yet another practical example for EU member states coordinating CSDP. The Council decided to create PESCO, as it is based on consensus-building, which means that they seek solutions in the best interest for everyone – wanting to reduce vetoes and exits. The legally binding commitments of PESCO is to ensure the EU member states' willingness to participate.

This MA-thesis seeks to disentangle the logics of PESCO, focusing on the Secretariat as an administrative entity with ties to both EU-level actors and member states. The main focus of the thesis will be on the interplay of the EU- and the domestic level of PESCO as well as on the Secretariat's functioning role and its interaction in the framework. Decision-making processes, autonomy, and even core state powers of pMS may be challenged by the interaction of EU-level actors.

The HR/VP, who is in charge of the EEAS and chairs the EDA, is in regular contact with the Commission. The EEAS possess certain autonomous features, but does the Secretariat do this as well? The capacity of coordination is another aspect; If the Secretariat is facilitating and coordinating at the political level of PESCO as well as initiating and approving projects, is it then the pMS who are in formal charge of this legally binding cooperation? Is the Secretariat calling for a strengthening of their autonomy even more? These questions arising leads to this thesis' research question: **Does PESCO and its Secretariat introduce supranational or intergovernmental principles in European defence cooperation? How can we account for this?**

2.0 Theoretical and analytical framework

This MA-thesis engages with some of the grand concepts of European integration such as intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Viewing European security and defence through the lenses of governance has rarely been a subject of study, focusing on the coordinating management and regulation of issues by authorities (Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff, & Krahmman, 2004, p. 4)

Assessing policy-areas such as European security and defence, it is too simple to characterize it as either just ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’, as Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 7). With regards to intergovernmentalism, the thesis will focus on more recent efforts of reformulating intergovernmentalism presented by Bickerton et al. (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015).

The theories supranationalism and intergovernmentalism need to be discussed in more detail. A common conception of intergovernmentalism is that member states’ governments are central in decision-making and that they pursue their domestic preferences. In the EU, intergovernmentalism is often revolving around integration through policy-making and -development as bargains between member states, and that member states integrate in the ‘low politics’ as Stanley Hoffmann wrote in 1966, not foreseeing member states pursuing the area of ‘high politics’¹ creating mechanisms such as PESCO (Meunier & Vachudova, 2018, p. 1635).

With the theory of intergovernmentalism there has been developed more recent revisions, creating *liberal intergovernmentalism* presented by Moravcsik and *new intergovernmentalism* presented by Bickerton et al. Moravcsik’s ‘liberal theory of international politics/relations’ or liberal intergovernmentalism assess integration as reducing transaction costs between member states of the EU through bargaining. Moravcsik argues that member states’ governments act on behalf of domestic preferences in policy making (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 513). Viewing global politics, Moravcsik implies the significance of national states’ presence, and that the state’s behaviour has an impact in world politics. European integration is then the product of the member states’ governments relative bargaining power.

¹ High politics are connected to the states’ existential nature; their ‘survival’, e.g. security and defence policies, whereas low politics are areas not necessary for the states to survive, e.g. welfare politics (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 715).

Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes the importance of domestic interest groups, new intergovernmentalism broadens the perspective, focusing on the domestic policies as including institutional change at the EU level. This theory is based on a relatively new form of intergovernmental integration process in the EU after 1994. In this post-Maastricht era, EU policy-making has been characterized as being mainly coordinated between member states, processing in an informal way and escaping several legislative frameworks that specified supranational law-making. This coordination has occurred at both the Council level, towards committees consisting of national experts (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, s. 704). The coordination of resources is rather decentralised and requires the EU member states' governments to agree with each other in order to decide, develop and implement common policies. Bickerton et al. argue that supranational decision-making is absent, which means that this initiating power is transferred to e.g. the Commission. These authors also focus on a shifting trend where EU member states have adopted the norms of seeking consensus and deliberation and moved away from transferring their powers to supranational institutions (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 713). They argue that supranational actors still exist, but that their role in the European integration process since the Maastricht treaty (TEU) has been reduced in relation to actors representing member states' interests.

New intergovernmentalism will help explaining why *de novo* bodies are interacting in the integration process in terms of decision-making. The authors argue for a shift where member states delegate functions to these new bodies, instead of the supranational institutions. Yet, these functions could in practice be delegated to the latter institutions, but *de novo* bodies contain member state representation (ibid. p 705). The introduction of these *de novo* bodies does not imply a power struggle between member states' governments and existing supranational bodies, as Bickerton et al. argues.

Intergovernmental coordination has increased after the Maastricht treaty, and thus side-lining the 'integration engines' of the CJEU and the Commission. The permissive consensus of transferring power to supranational institutions, is now replaced by more flexible and open-ended procedures, as well as peer pressure and consensus building under the open method of coordination. (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 709). Deliberation and consensus amongst member states regarding decision making has been subject to supranational

institution building, and policy-making powers to these institutions. Bickerton et al. argue that supranational institutions today prefer less supranationalism and view it as a failing process; they are listening to the favored movement of more intergovernmental decision-making amongst member states.

Many member states view (European) integration as a secondary priority. The supranational institutions are positive towards the creation of *de novo* bodies, rather than empowering themselves. Bickerton et al. argue that supranationalism is just not as just and legitimate any more, but the member states are willing to create *de novo* bodies and give them powers (ibid.). Domestic interests vary, and as Bickerton et al. outline, the Europeanization-, alongside Euroscepticism-trends, these interests are often contested and in flux (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 714).

New intergovernmentalism considers the domestic governments political preferences as well as the public opinion about representation and legitimacy as important factors for the integration process. The theory also points out the EU as in a state of disequilibrium, altering the point of view of liberal intergovernmentalism which perceived the EU in a state of (relative) stability and continuity. Bickerton et al. argue that the lines between 'high'- and 'low' politics have increasingly been blurred. These areas have varied over time, but as member states pursue domestic interest, several opt-outs have occurred from European integration. The EUGS' goal of becoming an international security actor and 'speaking with one voice' is therefore a significant example of interacting in a high policy area (EUGS, 2016; Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 715).

According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998), intergovernmentalism downplays the significance of supranational governance; member states are the ones controlling the policy decision-making, its processes and its outcomes (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 2). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue that supranationalism revolves around a process by which horizontal and vertical linkages between social, economic and political actors emerge and evolve. They also argue that the supranational governing is beneficial for actors operating cross-border, which benefits from EU-legislation, but will avoid domestic legislation. The transfer of power from the member states to the EU-level has been only partial in the

European defence sector. The authors argue that intergovernmentalism focus too much on the ‘grand bargains’ in European integration, defining the outcome, but in fact the institutions are providing rules and regulation subject matter for the bargaining. According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, intergovernmentalism does not take into account that also other actors, including governments, private entities and EU bodies adapt new rules and arenas, whereas intergovernmentalism views the member states’ governments as negotiating between non-state actors and the EU policymaking. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue that member states’ governments cannot always impose their preferences on other actors in the EU system.

Creating proxies for supranationalism will involve governing aspects. It is important to assess the presence and substantial involvement of EU institutions, primarily those with no direct member state representation, e.g. the Parliament and the Commission. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz operate with three factors on policymaking processes and outcomes in any given policy sector; supranational organizations, supranational rules and transnational society (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 8). These factors indicate whether processes linger more towards intergovernmentalism or supranationalism.

Table 1 explains the typical features of an intergovernmental or a supranational European defence sector. These seven features are central in this policy area, and can be used as indicators related to figure 1, lingering more to intergovernmentalism or supranationalism. The seven features revolve around the core identity of EU: Is the EU an intergovernmental organization limited by the agenda of the member states’ governments or does it act as a supranational entity (Fligstein & Mcnichol, 1998, p. 59)?

In order for an intergovernmental model to function, collaboration between member states and commitment are essential factors. It is also important to foster agreement between member states in supranational institution-building. The member states of the EU have increased the commitment of national executives to EU policy-making, but yet they have been watchful of involvement in collective policy-making regarding policies involving all the member states (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 710).

Coordination can be seen as an effect that occurs when an individual receives increased benefits from a particular activity if others adopt the same option. In EU decision-making, deliberation and consensus-seeking is in the post-Maastricht period prominent in the European Council. Before this period it was rather associated with supranationalism argued by Bickerton et al. (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 704). There has been a shift in delegation policy from supranational actors towards *de novo* bodies.

Decision-making is the process of bargaining between the member states. It is based on the member states preferences and their bargaining power, which leads to policies (Pierson, 1998, s. 49). The power of other European bodies might also have an impact on the decision-making. Processes of communication are central in the collective decision-making in the EU (Sjursen, 2004, p. 59). The role of communication and coordination of action through discussions and deliberation is seldom considered in European defence. Actors in this policy area coordinate plans through argumentation seeking common grounds and agreeable outcomes.

Pro-integration actors, argued by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, promote the coordinative solutions to supranational bodies, helping these institutions acquire expertise, information and legitimacy, increasing their authority (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 6). It is also argued that governmental actors have their own interest; maximizing their autonomy and maintaining control over their own resources. Governments can either attempt to slow integration or push it in preferable directions argued by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz. In European policy areas, where rules are clarified, sanctioning might be needed to resolve disputes.

In terms of autonomy, 'agenda-setting' is a set of issues receiving serious consideration in political systems. Agenda-setting is not revolving around the actual decision-making, but the issue that decision-makers devote their attention to. To set an agenda, it has to become a topic of discussion. Setting the agenda largely determines the terms and importance around the topic discussed, and therefore struggling over the political agenda becomes a crucial component of the process of policymaking. In European Integration, the EU's agenda is associated with the European integration itself, but the EU's agenda is not equate with the institutions alone

(Princen, 2009, p. 12). The agenda-setting perspectives of Princen, stresses the ‘what’ is being discussed, and ‘who’ that are discussing it.

Regarding member states’ involvement and control, Princen also argues that in decision-making conflicts may involve fractions, where each initial parts enlarges their circle to get support (Princen, 2009, p. 31). Another important point in the terms of agenda-setting is that the larger the size of the audience in which the issue can be enlarged, it is likely to remain- and be in focus in the formal agenda.

Member states’ governments have their own domestic preferences. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz claim that they often act upon short-term interests and do not anticipate the long-term consequences of delegating authority to EU institutions (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 22). Regarding the member states bargaining, positive effects are the reduced transaction costs functions that regimes performs, whereas the negative aspects are related to the risk of losing autonomy. It is possible for groups of organized members to enter an arena, exit it, or remain inactive over a periode of time (Fligstein & McNichol, 1998, p. 62). In the foreign and security policy area of the Union, the member states are, argued by Fligstein and McNichol, the central actors and that this domain remains intergovernmental structured.

Member states’ governments have created the ‘European Community’ in order to serve their purposes (Pierson, 1998, p. 35). This Community includes new EU bodies and institutions to serve common purposes. These new bodies may have their own interest which might diverge from its creators. Gradually these bodies have seeked to enhance authority for their own purposes, increasing their autonomy. Therefore many member states have seeked to control different bodies.

As Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argue, rules and rule-making are essential of institutionalization; rules to define different roles and establish social context where the actors interests and strategies take shape (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 16). Actors within this context counter the limits of the rules, situatuons where their content is unclear or disputed, and the rules may not provide clarity regarding all aspects. New rules may be pushed on by actors in the framework, or seeking revisions of existing rules. According to Stone Sweet and

Sandholtz policy areas mentioned in the Treaty (TEU) should move more quickly towards supranational governance.

Table 1: Indicators of intergovernmental-, and supranational features in European defence policies

Feature	Intergovernmental model	Supranational model
Collaboration and commitment	Voluntary participation with some commitment. Interstate cooperation on European Defence preserving domestic sovereignty, sustained by EU-institutions.	Legally binding: requires enforcements, monitoring of processes, incentives, and sanctioning mechanisms. Overseen by EU-institutions.
Coordination	Member states coordinates amongst eachother, but it is facilitated by EU-institutions. (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 7)	Coordination is facilitated by EU-institutions more actively.
Decision-making	Member states bargain with each other to produce common policies, preferable by unanimity.	Qualified majority voting (QMV) is practiced, but member states interests might be overruled by the common will or EU-institutions.
Sanctioning	Member states sanctioning other member states by unanimity.	EU-institutions have the power of sanctioning, e.g. excluding member states.
Involvement and control²	Relative bargaining power determines member states' policy preferences outcome. The EU-institutions, e.g. the	Centralized mode of governance.

² Alliances, (military capacity [based on technology, R&D, equipment] geographical location, historical connection and relevance))

	Commission will then incorporate these bargainings efficiently.	
Autonomy ³	EU-institutions involvement in decision-making is to a minimum (facilitating) or not heavily interacting. (A hands-off approach).	EU-institutions can pursue their agenda, and involvement is directly in decision-making processes (A hands-on approach). The more diverging preferences of member states, the more beneficial rules created for the Commission's autonomy.
Legislation	Few and diffuse rules. Rules that does not intervene with member states interests.	Rules have higher degree of clarity and formalization. Laws enforceable by courts.

Source: Compiled by the author based on Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998 (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998).

Focusing on the PESCO framework from intergovernmental- and supranational theoretical accounts, will help explain the Secretariat's functioning and investigate further why it may not be a supranational actor itself, but potentially influenced by a supranational institution. The table inspired by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz might bring information useful to determine PESCO and its Secretariat impact on the European defence sector, on whether it is more supranational or intergovernmental or a hybrid model with elements of both.

To draw up on the research question and the introduction of the features of table 1, further seven sub hypotheses drawn out of the main hypotheses must be assessed. Each hypothesis is a conjectural answer to the research question.

H1: The legally binding PESCO framework has active monitoring of processes and consists of incentives that are overseen by EU bodies and initiatives. pMS' collaboration and commitment are challenged by the interference of actors from other levels.

³ An organization's capacity to define and pursue, continuously a politically relevant agenda (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998, p. 10)

H2: The Secretariat, as a hub of several entities, satisfies the qualification of a *de novo* body (according to Bickerton et al.) and manages the coordination both at the Council level and the level of projects.

H3: The decision-making in PESCO functions merely as intergovernmental deliberation and consensus-seeking between the pMS.

H4: There are sanctioning possibilities and a ‘naming and shaming’-culture in PESCO.

H5: There are pMS-alliances existing in the framework of PESCO pursuing national agendas. pMS have different bargaining powers.

H6: The Secretariat is pursuing the EUGS and CSDP-agenda of the Commission. These institutions’ presence challenge pMS’ sovereignty, core state powers and autonomy.

H7: PESCO’s legislative framework requires the substantial involvement, competence and aid of the Secretariat.

3.0 Methodology and data gathering

This master’s thesis will be based on a qualitative research design and is build up around a case centred perspective (Bukve, 2017, p. 82). To operationalize the research question on whether PESCO and its Secretariat introduce supranational-, or (new) intergovernmental principles in European defence cooperation, the thesis must map the architecture of the Secretariat and the actors involved before observing its functioning regarding the integration and the policy decision-making. Features such as the Secretariat’s correspondence and reporting with the member states’ Ministries of Defences (MoD) and Permanent Representations to Brussels (PermRep), the Commission, and internal communication between the participating member states of PESCO (pMS) is assessed in the data gathering. This method of research will provide insights into the autonomy of the Secretariat. Autonomy, which in this context is understood as an organization’s capacity to continuously define and pursue, a politically relevant agenda. This mapping through the interviews is

necessary due to the Secretariat's lack of information on their internet site. The mapping process will also reveal the Secretariat's potential 'hands off'-, or 'hands on'-position regarding the aspects of autonomy in the operational and capability-, as well as the political area of PESCO and their relation to the pMS. The Secretariat, being a hub that brings different actors together in this matter, rise questions regarding classical European integration concerning supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.

The EU-institutions' agenda regarding collaboration and commitment, coordination, decision-making, sanctioning, involvement and control, autonomy and legislation must further be investigated. The thesis assesses if this is at play to a degree - or not - through the possible entry gate; the Secretariat in PESCO. The Secretariat must correspond with the Commission, and the HR/VP must be involved regarding suspension or acceptance of potential new PESCO member states. The Commission might have the opportunity to express their interests to the Secretariat through the EDA by the notion in Article 45 (2) in the TEU which specify that the EDA "*shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary*" (European Union, 2012a), as well as through the HR/VP.

3.1 Research design

The thesis will also explore six (6) semi-structured interviews including open-ended questions, added in the Appendix (9.1, 9.2). The units of research are representatives from the pMS' PermReps and MoDs of Sweden, Finland, France, and the Czech Republic, as well as officials working in the PESCO Secretariat. There is also an interview with a German expert. This is to better view the relation between the MoDs operating on the domestic level, the PermReps physically located in Brussels, representing the pMS' national security and defence interests towards EU-interests, and the Secretariat's representatives that are engaged on the EU-level. The Secretariat has both contact with the pMS and their MoDs, mainly regarding PESCO projects in the operational and capability area, but also often in Brussels with their PermReps on the more political level of PESCO. The structure, capacity and functioning of the MoD of each pMS is different, and that is an important factor in the way they assess the Secretariat compared to the Secretariat's officials themselves. The opinions of the MoDs and PermReps on the functioning of the PESCO framework will be of interest because this information is not explicitly shared with the public. The pMS' willingness to accept the

interaction of *de novo* bodies might be more legitimate, than if the Secretariat were to directly be represented by the Commission, because of absence of supranationalism, argued by Bickerton et al. (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015).

The countries of analysis are selected on the background of availability and acceptance of interviews. There are certain constraints attached to the choice of the interviewees. The respondents working at the pMS' PermReps have competence on the political level, but less insights in the capability and operational level of PESCO. The respondents working at the MoDs have on the contrary less insights on the political level of PESCO. The intention of these two selections would originally have been to increase the number of respondents, but due to the representatives' heavy workload both at the MoDs and the PermReps, this was not feasible. The Secretariat responded in one single written answer. The interviews were conducted in Brussels fall 2019.

3.2 Literature review

PESCO was launched November 2017, so due to its newly establishment the existing literature is not extensive. Relevant publications on PESCO are until now written by authors such as Daniel Fiott, Sven Biscop, Steven Blockmans, Simon Luis. The literature in the European security and defence area includes Anand Menon, Jolyon Howorth, John T.S Keeler, and Michael E. Smith, but it is too vast to review in detail. The literature covering PESCO show minimal signs of any supranational intrusion so far in this initiative's framework. Several authors argue PESCO is an overly ambitious security and defence development.

There is still a vast amount of scientific literature on European security and defence policy, as well as theories of European integration and new intergovernmentalism. The timespan of the relevant literature publications are from the early 2000's until 2020. The scientific literature and policy documents are primarily in English. Concerning the aspect of supranationalism, the book "European Integration and Supranational Governance" of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz is frequently used in the theoretical chapter. With regards to the different forms of intergovernmentalism "The New Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-

Maastricht Era” by Bickerton et al. is also being used in the theoretical chapter to outline new intergovernmentalism.

4.0 The history of the European defence sector and the making of PESCO

4.1 History of the European Defence Sector and military integration

It is said that nation states are bound to resist sharing their military, because while doing so they erase their enforcement powers (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 46). That is why the ‘intergovernmental way’ of explaining military integration has, argued by Mérand and Angers, been referred to as the ‘standard way’ of viewing it. Moreover, constructivists have claimed this integration occur as an identity project (ibid. p. 57); the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was an early initiative from the 1996’ NATO-meeting in Berlin; working for the same capabilities, but having a European command within NATO, responsible for the Western European Union (WEU).

After several Eastern-European countries joined NATO, the EU’s deficiency in Bosnia, and France’s desire for more decoupling from transatlantic military dependency, there was a need for more EU coordination within NATO, and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched (Webber, 2003, p. 162). ESDP sparked its potential after the Saint-Malo Summit, December 1998. Before the launching of ESDP, European defence cooperation had been rather tacit the past fifty years (Howorth, 2003, p. 221).

Despite different stands on the ambition of ESDP, most European leaders supported the idea of a collective, European responsibility for increasing military capacities, regional security, and the deploy of military instruments in operations of crisis management, peacekeeping and -enforcement. ESDP would contribute to NATO, cooperating with EU members of NATO, as well as non-allied EU candidates. Because of the EU’s enhancement on the single market-affairs, and also regarding justice and home affairs, it was urgent protecting certain economic, commercial, and industrial interests (Howorth, 2003. p. 222).

The publishing of the European Security Strategy of 2003 made advancements on the Union's CFSP, to act collectively outside the EU borders. The decision-making in the European defence sector has been characterized by being 'unilateral', albeit security and defence being 'normalized' as any other European policy area, it adopts some transforming processes often connected to supranationalism; inclusion of supranational actors, national actors and linkages between issue areas (Menon, 2014, p. 66). One can argue that the reluctance of progressing in a quicker pace with European integration in the field of security and defence is due to member states' self-reliance even though self-reliance comes with a degree of uncertainty (ibid. p. 77). Autonomy and independence are important factors entrenched in member states' core state powers. Diverging member states international preferences, alongside higher level of integration-demands in this field compared to for example the welfare sector, has curbed the urge for a common, complete European security and defence 'alliance' and EU operating as an international security actor.

As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the European defence sector has been lacking a binding, structured, and committed cooperation; both defence industry, defence spending and -procurement possibilities were fragmented. The core state powers such as control over police, military and border control have been rooted in the member states' domain, but gradually Europe has witnessed EU involvement in regulatory matters, publically and by 'stealth'. (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2014, p. 2). The enforcements powers of the member states still remains with the member states ((European Union 2009/81/EC (1)), but as EU institutions enlarge their regulatory area and in several policy fields it is in flux. After Saint-Malo. military experts in uniform were gradually a regular sight in the Council building (Menon, 2003, p. 203).

Brussels gradually creating military buildings, and political-military bodies in charge of new military operations under the EU-flag. Member states, e.g. France, were reluctant funding the European defence ambitions in accordance with the ESDP (ibid., p. 204). This reluctance was also caused by transatlantic tensions as the US was not seeing Europe as an equal partner. But even back in the early 2000's, the member states dominated the decision-making structures of the ESDP themselves. Different security and defence preferences among EU member states made, and still makes intergovernmental decision making difficult. Menon even describes this tension between countries as a backlash. The mainly Anglo-French driven ESDP was soon to be differentiated; France wanted a more autonomous European defence, while the British still wanted to rely on the US. Many member states were also disagreeing on the stand of

defence policy, from neutral member states to more military engaged states.

Defence spending is increasing, the EDA was established, and EU Battle Groups were initiated to make domestic armed forces smaller, and more professional (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 49). The defence industry and -market have gradually been integrated and regulated by the EU-level (Weiss, 2014, p. 27). Development of defence technology, as well as the production of equipment and procurement of military goods and services have been located in the member states area of responsibility for centuries. Compared to NATO, the EU does not have one clear leader member state or institution such as the US; large and small member states decide on policies, but they all have the same veto-power in the Council regardless of size. Even the ‘EU big three’, Germany, France and Britain do not seem to have decision-making privileges (Menon, 2003, p. 209). Concerning the ESDP-matters, Menon also argues that the Commission has been absent. In other policy areas, the Commission has exclusive competence and power, but in the area of ESDP, leadership has been member state driven. NATO has been embracing decision-making by compromises and agreement on preserving the organization.

Another aspect of the EU-enlargement of military institutions, as Howorth points out, is that there were several issues linked to the Political and Security Committee (COPS; *Comité politique et de sécurité* – now abbreviated PSC); how autonomous in the EU-context would they be? Or would they be influenced by NATO, and the US? (Howorth, 2003, p. 224). The transparency focus of the earlier High Representative of CFSP, also created difficulties, when an internal report was shared with the press. This led to the relocation of both the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the EUMS, that moved out of the Council building. Other security measures were also made.

The European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999 (Howorth & Keeler, 2003, p. 10), and the Headline goal of 1999, set for 2003, was about creating new institutions for the ESDP, and focusing on European capabilities, also agreeing on a non-decoupling, duplication or discrimination with regards to NATO. The 1999’ Council meeting resulted in amongst others the creation of the PSC, EUMC and the EUMS (Freire, 2008, p. 12). A new action plan adopted in 2004, resulted in The Headline Goal set for 2010, that was a regulatory process cheering member states to develop their own defence capabilities (not *European* only), around a single template. This was a plan resulting from the aftermath of Saint-Malo, where France and Britain agreed to give EU a role in security and defence policy (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 51). The EU Battle groups of 2005 are a part of this process, and 1500 multinational personnel

per military unit who have been operational since 2007 (European External Action Service, 2017a).

The EDA was created by the Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, 12th of July 2004 in order to support the member states of EU and the Council focusing on improving the overall European defence capabilities, especially in regards of crisis management and to support the ESDP now, and for future matters (European Defence Agency, 2020; Council of the European Union, 2004). The EDA more generally was created to prompt member states to spend more-, and better on defence, especially for investment in equipment procurement, R&D and more European cooperation (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 52). The 2011 Council Decision replaced the Council Joint Action, and the consecutive revision of 2015 ‘Council decision (CFSP) 2015/1835’ which specified that the EDA would be central in the work area of the CSDP developing defence capabilities being able to meet operational requirements (Council of the European Union, 2015).

The EDA and the Commission have pursued more standardisation of defence technology and equipment (*read*: components, not training of military personnel) on the basis of lowering the financial costs of the member states (Fiott, 2014, p. 1). At this point, in 2013, the European defence sector was highly characterised of national standards of defence technology, and defence establishments. Compared to the US’ industry (which indeed has provided certain member states with equipment (Menon, 2014, p. 80)), EU had considerably less defence equipment, and even more different types of it; e.g. components of different aircrafts and communication equipment struggling to communicate with each other resulting in difficulties regarding military operations. The EDA has also introduced several procedures and rules into the *Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement*, a non-binding and voluntary agreement. This makes EDA facilitating cooperation and integration in the procurement process (Howorth, 2013, p. 14; European Defence Agency, 2005).

Article 346 in the Treaty specifies amongst other matters that any member state of the Union may take “*measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security..*” regarding “*the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material..*” ((European Union, 2012b, TFEU Article 346 (b)). The legal act of directive 2009/81/EC (European Union, 2009, 2009/81/EC), which Weiss argues is supranational (Weiss, 2014, p.

31), integrates the trade and the production of military goods and services, establishing new regulations; member states must verify what is of essential interest regarding security, the link between the interest and procurement decision, and whether the application of the new directive undermines the interest. Based on the Council's initiatives of the Headline Goal, the EU Battle Groups and the EDA, a minimum defence budget floor is set, and deployable forces are created to address 'free riding' countries; the military integration has progressed as a consequence (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 59). The aspect of capacity building has yet to progress. This integration is also one of the steps of creating a more common European defence market, less fragmented and more competitive. Despite the EU's regulatory activities in the defence sector, there has been generally more soft regulation versus hard regulation. The soft regulation, often by stealth, has gradually been seen by civil servants and military officers in EU' forums and buildings (ibid p. 53).

4.2 EUGS and CSDP: Enhanced security and defence cooperation

Security and defence is the policy area where EU has progressed the most in the recent years (Merlingen & Orstrauskaitè, 2008, p. 2). Even though setting this policy field on the EU-agenda, alongside the 'Brusselization' of ESDP, it did not become central of the EU member states' defence and security policies. Focusing on creating mainly new EU military-oriented institutions has been criticized in the context of the European defence sector, because of the demand of military capacity (Howorth, 2003, p. 223). But without the institutions, Howorth argues that the military capacity is more difficult to manage and enhance. The CSDP launched in 2000, sought to enhance defence cooperation amongst EU member states and address security and defence challenges (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 47). Being in the limelight of the Union's CFSP, CSDP was a step in the direction for European autonomous defence structures. After the predecessor European Security Strategy of 2003, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016, emphasized the potential of CSDP.

The former HR/VP, Frederica Mogherini, had continuously emphasized the importance of strengthening Europe's defence. Just after the release of the EUGS, she presented the 'Implementation Plan on Security and Defence' building on responding to external conflicts and crises, developing the capacities of partners, and protecting the EU and its citizens *vis-à-vis* external action (European External Action Service, 2020d). Building on the

Implementation Plan, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) initiated in 2017 and under the work charge of the EDA, seeks to enhance transparency for member states defence plans. According to EEAS, the EU together with the member states will identify defence capabilities (also R&D and industrial aspects) needed through the Capability Development Plan (CDP).

Since the establishment of the CDP in 2008, the EDA is officially in charge of the plan (Capability Development Plan (2018 revision), 2018), together with the EUMC, the EUMS and the EU's member states. The CDP addresses challenges on a long-term scale concerning security and defence and further recommends necessary capability measures for the European Defence Sector (European Defence Agency, 2019). In PESCO, member states use the EDA's expertise regarding planning in context of their NIPs. The EDA's and the Commission's goal of more standardization of defence industry will create transparency in procurement, operational readiness, financially favorable costs of equipment and the production of them for firms and member states. Member states have been under attempts of defence standardizations, both under NATO and later via EU (Fiott, 2014, p. 3). It is a voluntary process, and in civilian markets, it is often driven by firms in the industry itself.

The Commission has then taken a market-based approach to this standardization. Questions regarding competitiveness of national industries and markets may occur. Defence standardization challenges the safety of products and the costs of producing the equipment. Bringing the economic aspect in security and defence has possibly increased member states interest- and willingness to integrate in security and defence, in a cooperative manner, Menon argues (Menon, 2014, p. 77). Thus member states wants to proceed on security and defence integration, EU insitutions has earlier lacked opportunities for the mobilization and coordination of more integration; in comparison where NATO has provided such structures (ibid. p. 80).

4.3 Member states' CSDP engagement

PESCO being launched December 2017 on the background of Article 42 (6), 46 and Protocol 10 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (European Union, 2012a; European Union, 2008; Blockmans,

2018), it was in the limelight of the Union's CSDP-focus. Also triggered by the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, ISIS, Brexit, and transatlantic tensions, Trump's arguments on NATO costs; Europe now attempting to rely less on the historical US-commitment and less on the US as an external protector (Menon, 2014, p. 77). Even though outlining in 4.1 that that member states pursue first and foremost their own national security and defence preferences; it is likely to acknowledge as Matlary argues, that *modern issues are common issues* (Matlary, 2009). Clear military threats against nation states in Europe are reduced, and it requires common efforts to tackle modern menaces.

PESCO is basically a realization of CSDP; combining the core state powers of 25 pMS rather than European power resources (Menon, 2014, p. 73). PESCO is unique in the CSDP-context, not to be affiliated or being similar to for instance the EU Battlegroups. With the CFSP and the exclusion of ECJ rulings, alongside with not giving new powers to the Commission, specified in the TEU, pMS themselves will cooperate in a binding framework (Menon, 2014, p. 73). Menon argues that the Treaty clearly excludes supranational institutions, further implying that in Article 3a (European Union, 2012a), the member states core state functions (*essential state functions*) shall be respected by the Union; particularly national security.


PESCO is a flexible instrument, allowing EU member states to participate (Biscop, 2008, p. 15). Together with the EDA, the pMS have agreed on the criteria for participation that apply to each contribution. Having agreed on the 20 commitments and providing the first NIPs in 2017, the Council's implementation roadmap for PESCO for the first wave of 17 projects was implemented in the early 2018 (Council of the European Union, 2018a; (Council of the European Union, 2018b)). PESCO is set out to be organised at the Council level, and the roadmap functions as providing strategic direction and guidance for the implementation of PESCO. Regarding the EU budget for 2019-2020 financing joint industrial projects have been in focus, and launching the (European Defence Fund) EDF for the period 2021-2027 (European Commission, 2019). The Juncker Commission had a strong focus on security for EU citizens as well as on R&D in defence and its industry. The projects of interests in PESCO are therefore the ones related to defence industry, attached to the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) in symbioses with amongst other the CDP. The new EDF on 13 billion euros, will provide 4,1 billion euros with the purpose of financing competitive and collaborative research projects, but 8,9 billion euros are available for the pMS' investments on co-financing the costs for prototype

development. These PESCO projects could then receive the extra 10% bonus.

4.4 The architecture of PESCO

PESCO’s governance rules are described in the Council Decision establishing PESCO and determining the list of participating Member States (Council of the European Union, 2015). PESCO has a Council level, and a project level. Specified by Article 4(2) (b) in the ‘PESCO Governance’ of the Council decision of establishing PESCO and the list of pMS, the Council should adopt decisions and recommendations on sequencing the 20 binding commitments for the two phases of 2018-2020 and 2021-2025 (Council of the European Union, 2017); (Council of the European Union, 2018b). The Council will also ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of PESCO, the same as the HR/VP are obliged to by Article 6 (1) in Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (Council of the European Union, 2017). Furthermore the HR/VP will be involved in proceedings relating to PESCO according to Protocol No. 10, specified as the ‘importance’ of the positions full involvement (European Union, 2008).

Figure 1 PESCO chart based on the PESCO Factsheet (European External Action Service, 2018a).




The HR/VP will present an annual report on PESCO to the Council on the basis of the updated pMS’ NIPs, showing PESCO’s state-of-art, and the pMS current status regarding the commitments according to their NIP, as well as sketching the contributions made by the EDA in the PESCO framework (Council of the European Union, 2018b). Based on this report, the Council shall review annually whether the pMS continue to fulfil the commitments and enhancing and updating the commitments if necessary. That is

also why the pMS' NIPs have to be updated annually to the Secretariat, also specified to be available (through the Common Workspace (CWS)) for other pMS by Article 3 in Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (Council of the European Union, 2017). The Council decides and adopts the recommendation that specify commonly agreed indicators to assist the pMS in completing the commitments and assess the progress (Council of the European Union, 2018b).

There is also a common set of governance rules for the PESCO projects where the pMS participating in these projects could adapt as necessary for the respective project. There are currently 47 projects per 2020, after 13 new projects were approved by the Council on November 12th 2019 (Council of the European Union, 2019). There are numerous projects being proposed from the pMS, but just some of them are accepted. The assessments of new project proposals should be completed annually in November, calling new proposals per May the next year. The projects of PESCO must have a value for the benefit of Europe, regarding the EU's capability and operational needs in accordance with CARD and EU Capability Development Priorities (European Defence Agency, 2018). The HR/VP may make a recommendation regarding identification and evaluation of these projects. pMS who proposes projects individually, not backed by other pMS beforehand, should inform other pMS in due time before the formal presentation of the projects (Council of the European Union, 2018b).


Figure 2 based on data material and (EEAS, EDA, EUMS; PESCO Secretariat, 2020)



4.5 The Secretariat’s functioning and adherent defence mechanisms

The Secretariat is the focal point of communication in PESCO; a supplement for the pMS to operate in the intricate CSDP framework. This sort of ‘triumvirate’, consisting of the EDA, the EEAS and the EUMS, provides the secretarial functions for PESCO in addition to the level of the Council (EEAS, EDA, EUMS; PESCO Secretariat, 2020).

Figure 3 compiled from information by (EEAS, EDA, EUMS; PESCO Secretariat, 2020; (European Defence Agency, 2020a); (European External Action Service, 2020a) (European External Action Service, 2020b) (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017, p. 32))



The Secretariat is formally under the responsibility of the HR/VP, specified under Article 7 in the Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (Council of the European Union, 2017) The EDA-branch of the Secretariat is engaged in the projects and assessments in PESCO, whereas the EEAS operates moreover on the political level. Within the EEAS, it is mainly the CMPD that is dealing with PESCO. The EDA holds a staff of approximately 140 employees (European Union, 2020) and is facilitating in developing the capabilities to enhance the CSDP of the Union. In the projects, they offer support based on the pMS strategic priorities operational requirements or interest in projects. The steering board of the EDA is made up by Defence Ministers of 26 member states and is the only EU Agency where the board meets at a ministerial level (Menon, 2014, p. 73, (European Defence Agency, 2020c)).

The EDA supports PESCO by contributing to the HR/VP's annual report on PESCO, and also supports the pMS' contributions related to capabilities and contributions made in accordance with the commitments. They also facilitate capability development projects, coordinating these project proposals. The EDA supports pMS and ensures that no initiative duplicates or cross borders with existing initiatives. The EEAS and the EUMS assess proposed projects in the more operational area; pMS compliance with – and contributions to security and defence needs (EEAS, EDA, EUMS; PESCO Secretariat, 2020). The EDA is also contributing to the regular assessment of pMS' contributions related to capabilities and contributions according to the criteria. This assessment can serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decision adopted in accordance with the Article 46 in the TEU (European Union, 2008, Protocol no. 10, Article 3; European Union, 2012a).

CMPD handles CSDP-tasks and oversees the planning of the integrated civilian-military planning within the EEAS. One of the respondents informed that there has been a re-organization of the Secretariat and its underlying bodies, but this has not been confirmed by the Secretariat. It was mentioned that the CMPD work tasks were moved to the EEAS' CSDP and crisis response (MD-CSDP-CR) underlying bodies Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP.DMD) and Security and Defence Policy (SECDEFPOL.DMD) (European External Action Service, 2020e).

The CAP Directorate works closely with the member states on creating the CDP, and facilitates the CARD, As a part of the Secretariat, they assess the proposed projects to PESCO focusing on capabilities as well as the pMS' NIPs. As they all are different entities inside the Secretariat, they are responsible for different areas of the PESCO framework. The Secretariat must deal with both the Council and the pMS' MoDs on different PESCO projects and in doing so they must bring the overall support to PESCO.

The EUMS, an integrated body of the EEAS, provides the military expertise such as strategic planning, communications and information systems, situation assessment and training and education. The EUMS consists of personnel seconded from the member states (Freire, 2008, p. 18). They mainly contribute in the areas of situation assessments, early warning and the strategic planning of the security field. The EUMS provides military expertise and capacity

and works under the political direction of the European Council, through the PSC, and under the military direction of the EUMC (Howorth, 2013, p. 11). The HR/VP's position functions to coordinate and integrate both CSDP and CFSP. The EDA is chaired by the HR/VP and presides the EEAS (ibid. p. 15).

Within the EUMS, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established in order to improve the EU's capacity to react more rapidly, more effectively and more coherently. MPCC is in charge for the operational planning and conduct of certain CSDP missions at the strategic level (Council of the European Union, 2020a). The other aspect of PESCO is the 'Civilian Capabilities', dealing with civilian missions and handling current challenges. As EUMS and MPCC in general cope with military missions, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) oversees non-executive military missions. The Council has also established an expert group; the Joint Support Coordination Cell that deals with civilian and military affairs, sharing expertise and cooperation (European External Action Service, 2020d).

Amongst the many bodies in the complex web of the EU's CSDP, the EUMC is set up within the Council as the highest military entity (European External Action Service, 2020c). The EUMC functions as a forum for military consultation and cooperation between EU member states regarding conflict prevention and crisis management (Freire, 2008, p. 18). EUMC consists of the member states' Chiefs of Defence, in practice represented by the member states' Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with recommendations regarding military matters within the EU, and on the annual PESCO assessment process of Article 6(3) in Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (Council of the European Union, 2017).

The PSC is a part of the Council 'machinery', consisting of the member states' ambassadors based in Brussels and is chaired by the representative from EEAS (Council of the European Union, 2020b). The Politico-Military Group (PMG) prepares the CSDP workload for the PSC which revolves around the political aspects of EU military and civil-military issues. It is chaired by a representative of the EU's HR/VP (Council of the European Union, 2020c). This is what Mérand and Angers refer to as the EU's military 'bureaucracy' (Mérand & Angers, 2014, p. 53).

The EDF, CARD, and PESCO are the three most central defence mechanisms in the Union's CSDP per now. The former ones are decoupled PESCO or not yet explicitly implemented in PESCO, but they are relevant in the CSDP-context. Yet, their relevance is important, and they are planned to be more directly integrated in PESCO. Both CARD and the EDF are closely linked to PESCO. The EDF provides financial incentives for pMS from the research to the development phases of capabilities through co-financing from the overall EU budget. These financial contributions for PESCO projects are usually being 20% funded, but with these mechanisms the funding can be increased to 30% (European External Action Service, 2019). The purpose of CARD is to increase common spending. CARD will coordinate domestic budgets and investments in the defence area, where PESCO's functions to make commitments to capability developments and operative cooperation (Tveitbråten & Knutsen, 2019, p.2). The capability projects identified by the CDP will also take the results from the CARD into account (European External Action Service, 2019).

The NIP is a domestically self-regulated plan on spending, but it is mandatory for all the pMS. Each year on the 10th of January (from 2020), the NIP is handed in from every pMS to the Secretariat (Council of the European Union, 2018b; (European External Action Service, 2019), in accordance with the Recommendation on the Roadmap adopted by the Council. These plans also take into account the results from the previously HR/VP-reports, the CDP and the recommendations from the CARD report. The HR/VP will present a report on PESCO to the Council, based on assessment made by the Secretariat.

Von der Leyen's Commission's planned department, The Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) will be in charge of developing and carrying out the Commission's policies on defence industry, including 'space' (European Commission, 2020). DG DEFIS is central in the work of the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) which continues the work of the Juncker Commission and the EUGS' goals. Further defence capability enhancement in CSDP projects is strongly emphasized in this plan (European Defence Action Plan, 2016). EDAP functions in order to support Europe's competitiveness and innovation in the European defence industry. EDF plays an essential part in the realization of the EDAP goals.

5.0 Analysis

In order to find out whether PESCO and its Secretariat introduces supranational or intergovernmental principles in European defence cooperation and how we can account for this, the following seven sub hypotheses are the base for the assessment:

H1: The legally binding PESCO framework has active monitoring of processes and consists of incentives that are overseen by EU bodies and initiatives. pMS' collaboration and commitment are challenged by the interference of actors from other levels.

H2: The Secretariat, a hub of several entities, satisfies the qualification of a *de novo* body (according to Bickerton et al.) and manages the coordination both at the Council level and the level of projects.

H3: The decision-making in PESCO functions merely as intergovernmental deliberation and consensus-seeking between the pMS.

H4: There are sanctioning possibilities and a 'naming and shaming'-culture in PESCO.

H5: There are pMS-alliances existing in the framework of PESCO pursuing national agendas. pMS have different bargaining powers.

H6: The Secretariat is pursuing the EUGS and CSDP-agenda of the Commission. These institutions' presence challenge pMS' sovereignty, core state powers and autonomy.

H7: PESCO's legislative framework requires the substantial involvement, competence and aid of the Secretariat.

Based on the data material and policy documents, these sub-hypotheses are further explored in 5.1-5.7.

5.1 Collaboration based on binding commitments

PESCO's 20 binding commitments includes increasing defence budgets and -spending, strengthen Research and development (R&D), advancing on strategic defence capabilities projects, commitment towards CARD and involvement of the EDF, political commitments at the national level through the NIPs, and enhancing the European defence industry. These binding commitments must be accepted by all pMS, and each pMS must participate in at least one project (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017, p. 7). PESCO is also for those member states of the EU, which fulfil higher criteria and have made more binding commitments to one another

based on Article 42 (6) in the TEU (European Union, 2012a). Even though the cooperation is based on binding commitments, each pMS can withdraw from PESCO based on Article 46 (5) in the TEU (European Union, 2012a).

PESCO's governance introduces the support of the EU bodies; the EDA, and the EEAS under the responsibility of the HR/VP. The main tasks of these bodies are assessments made both on the operational- and the capability dimension. When asking the respondents about the *state-of-art* of the PESCO cooperation, the representative from the Czech Republic's MoD stated that the pMS in general supports the security and defence initiative, but eagerly points out the importance of other defence initiatives. Many of the pMS are NATO-allies, and their priorities are not always favouring PESCO. Currently, the focus is mostly on assessing PESCO projects to see whether the objectives have been reached, in order to plan further actions, the representative argues. Changing the criteria for the projects and the overall initiative are also topics of discussion. The representative mentions the importance of the operational dimension of PESCO, and that there is currently a minimal priority for this area. The representative further points at the criteria for the projects within PESCO, which must be adjusted more to the needs of the pMS as well as the overarching goals of the EU.

“PESCO is a step forward in European Defence, but it is not necessary to exist in order for the pMS to have commitments and accomplish other CSDP projects” – The French PermRep representative.

PESCO is mainly based on operations, focusing on mobility and commitments, and it is the projects that is the core of the visibility of the outcome of PESCO, the representative from the French PermRep argues. There is a need to focus on the operational dimension of PESCO and adjust the project criteria more to the pMS' and the EU's overall needs, the Czech Republic MoD representative argued. Raising the EU defence budget has been successful, and there is a need for increasing capabilities at the domestic level with regards to the cooperative nature of PESCO.

The representative from the Finnish PermRep replied that PESCO is the most significant initiative that the EU has launched during the last three years, and further elaborating on PESCO and EDF as ‘game-changers’ in European Defence. PESCO has binding commitments and the EDF is a new way of financing CSDP.

The Swedish PermRep representative implies that there are difficulties viewing the full potential of PESCO and the outcomes after only two years of functioning. The German expert supports the statement, viewing the ambitions raised from the TEU and the EUGS as game-changers. As for PESCO and the outcome of the projects, it still remains to be seen. PESCO rests in the hands of the pMS and everything that is related to the policy aspect of the CSDP. The Commission, and the DG DEFIS have their work area, but in PESCO, pMS are more generally in charge of the policy area. The Swedish PermRep representative says that the Secretariat is useful in the PESCO framework, but the success of PESCO is very much depending on the pMS.

The respondents argue that the pMS are generally committed and satisfied with the cooperation so far, but as two of the respondents say, PESCO is not necessary in order to complete CSDP-tasks, nor does it become the first priority for pMS when choosing between NATO, and domestic security and defence preferences. Even though the active assessments of both the operational and capability dimension by the HR/VP with the aid of the Secretariat, the pMS are responsible for the governance of PESCO.

5.2 Coordination and facilitation

The Secretariat describes itself as a focal point of communication within the framework. When asking the Secretariat about the pMS’ coordination in PESCO, they replied that pMS have developed various channels of communication. Within each project, the pMS arranges meetings, workshops, and studies. The Secretariat will coordinate the assessment of project proposals as well as the NIPs (Council of the European Union, 2017, pp. 76-77). Based on correspondence with the German expert, the coordination in the PESCO framework is characterized as highly intergovernmental. The Secretariat merely functions as a facilitator of

meetings and correspondence, also with the CWS, a web-based tool for the pMS to interact with each other and with the Secretariat. It is further pointed out that the Secretariat is needed as a 'working muscle' in the framework. Another argument in favour of the presence of the Secretariat in the framework is to facilitate communication between the pMS, and prevent pMS to maintain the extensive e-mail lists and -correspondence.

The Secretariat could be associated with a 'spider in the web', but it does not unveil an aggregated will; status-quo is thus not at the same level, the German expert replied. The Secretariat functions as an instrument for the pMS; they are supposed to ease cooperation and coordination. The pMS are interacting the most with the Secretariat (at the policy level) regarding the NIPs. By using the CWS, each pMS can also access other pMS' NIPs.

The Secretariat is facilitating and coordinating physical seminars and more extensive meetings, but also bilateral meetings between certain pMS. Trying to cut costs and travel time, there is not an immense number of physical meetings related to everyday work. Meetings are often conducted by phone or email. At the project level, pMS' proceed initiatives bilaterally or with multiple other partners. In the first steps of the coordination phase, the German expert explains that this process is without the engagement of the Secretariat. The French PermRep representative stated that the pMS' Permanent Representations in Brussels meet quite often with the Secretariat physically, discussing the political sphere of PESCO, but the MoDs are dealing with the more operational dimension of PESCO. The MoDs handle the NIPs and the project proposals by email, phone or by CWS. The EUMS is dealing with the specifications of the operations, while the EDA supports all the pMS in different matters, but also with research on long time trends and with the European defence industry.

The representative from the Czech Republic's MoD responded that their primary cooperation with the Secretariat went by email or by CWS. Regarding CWS, where every pMS is present, each pMS can make changes in projects. Two or three people within the Secretariat are responding to inquiries, which equals the number of staff in the MoDs and in their General Staff. The latter body is responsible for the pMS sending the information to the Secretariat. Physical meetings are either in Brussels or at the pMS' MoDs, and usually for the evaluation

of the NIPs or regarding the CARD initiative. The EDA also hosts events and seminars related to PESCO and CARD three/four-times a year. The PESCO seminars are twice a year.

The NIPs can be available for the pMS if they have a classification marking allowing it to be submitted in the CWS. The use of CWS facilitates correspondence and has improved pMS' way of communicating and consulting with each other, the German expert explains. There is not a specific area where the Secretariat is most active, and due to the third wave of PESCO projects, there is a formalized process where the Secretariat is especially active. What the Secretariat is doing, is merely coordinating all that is pre-set in the governance rules of PESCO. As for the NIPs the Secretariat plays an important role, doing assessments and communicating revisions for the pMS. It is also, as the German expert says, mostly up to the pMS how active they want the Secretariat to be.

The German expert also explicitly explains that the Secretariat is proceeding with Article 45 (2) in the TEU in an active and in a proactive way.

“They (EDA) bring together different pMS in joint projects by facilitating meetings and organizing them” – the German expert.

Furthermore, the representative from the Czech Republic indicated that the EDA has limited resources to fulfil this task. Extending this notion, some of the projects of the first wave of PESCO, and especially on the project ‘Military Mobility’ (PESCO, 2020), the EDA has taken on the responsibility for the project concerning communication between the pMS. This project is according to the representative, the only project of the three waves of PESCO projects where the EDA has taken a leading role. Regarding the CWS, the framework does not need the facilitation of the EDA for it to function.

Since PESCO is relatively new, the German expert implies that there are elements that can be revised and improved. For all actors involved in PESCO, they are still in the process of learning. The Secretariat is merely accepting tasks given by the pMS and not the other way around. The Steering board of the Secretariat's body EDA is made up of representatives from all pMS (Menon, 2014, p. 73, (European Defence Agency, 2020c)). The strategic reviews open up

for revising the state of art.

When it comes to facilitating, the representative from the Czech Republic's MoD stated that the Secretariat was rather understaffed. The representative further believes that the Secretariat needs strengthening; increasing its personnel and budget. The Secretariat will also need analysts because the personnel is primarily occupied with 'bureaucratic' work. The French PermRep representative supported the information about the Secretariat comprising a small structure and added that also the French MoD and -PermRep have scarce resources. Updating the NIPs each year is a demanding process, relying on the complete work capacity from the pMS' defence sector.

Normally, most coordination between pMS occurs bilaterally. Showing interest for other pMS projects is communicated either by email, phone or by CWS. The project Electronic warfare (Electronic warfare capability and interoperability programme for future joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) cooperation)), where the Czech Republic leads, Latvia expressed numerous times an interest in joining, and then the Czech Republic sent a letter to the Latvian MoD representative without going through the Secretariat. Further, the respondent replied that the Secretariat is the most active in the administrative-logistical phase.

“The Secretariat provides space on the premises of the EDA, whereas the communication more often is facilitated bilaterally”

– representative from the Czech Republic MoD.

The French PermRep representative also states that the Secretariat is the most active in the administrative-logistical phase, when it comes to evaluations and assessments of the HR/VP-report. The representative added that the Secretariat is active concerning governance tools for the PESCO projects, but in the end they merely provide their expertise. The Finnish PermRep representative views the Secretariat as a supporting body of PESCO; being the point of contact for information. The Secretariat does the assessments of the NIPs, and the HR/VP produces and presents the final report about the commitments and the projects every year. Even though they are mainly supporting the pMS, it is the pMS who drives the defence initiative. These two levels (political level and project level) have been 'conflict-free',

according to the representative. The representative further indicated that the way the NIPs are assessed by the Secretariat, could be revised in the future.

The representative from the Finnish PermRep mentioned that the correspondence with the Secretariat was rather minimal. The projects report is communicated with the Secretariat once a year, done by the Finnish MoD via the CWS. This also apply for the deliverance of the NIP, and the MoD is the official contact point for the Secretariat. Even though the PermReps officially does not deliver the project proposals and the NIPs, the representative implies that they have close ties with the PermReps' officials. Brussels' proximity lowers the threshold for the PermReps and the Secretariat to meet. Regarding the projects, the Finnish PermRep representative responded that when the Secretariat plans new batches of projects, it is highly intensive.

The Secretariat's tasks include helping the pMS finding each other concerning PESCO projects where they meet other pMS with similar security and defence preferences. The Secretariat organizes 'match making' workshops to help pMS discover their common interests and discuss relevant topics. It seems that the Secretariat does not have a significant coordinating role but is more concerned with drafting the documents. The pMS discuss the projects both at the workshops, but also via their MoDs. The role of the EDA (through the Secretariat) in the framework is to better facilitate the relation between the political level and the military establishment (Hougardy, 2008, p. 12).

The Finnish PermRep agrees with the description given by the Swedish PermRep representative of the distinctive tasks performed by the MoDs and the PermReps. In the permanent representations in Brussels, the staff does not have much visibility or responsibility for the operational area of the projects. Therefore, the representative of the Finnish PermRep did not see any coordination challenges in the framework so far, neither between the pMS, nor *vis-à-vis* the Secretariat. As indicated by the Finnish PermRep representative the revision may launch a discussion about the future coordination of PESCO. All pMS seem to consider the Secretariat a trustable and transparent entity within the framework. The representative further claims that trust and transparency also describe the bilateral relationship between pMS. The administrative workflow of PESCO has improved

significantly from the first wave to the third wave of PESCO projects. The first batch of PESCO projects unveiled itself as a rushed process and procedure.

The Swedish PermRep representative's sees the Secretariat mainly as a facilitator, coordinating interaction between the pMS, especially meetings in the PMG, where the Secretariat normally attends if the topic is on PESCO. In these meetings, the same military staff, either represented as the PESCO secretariat or as e.g. an EEAS-official is an equal representative, as viewed from the representatives stand. The staff works closely between units. The representative stated that there is a significant distinction of the responsibilities and authorities between the military staff working in the MoD's and the defence counsellors in the PermRep. The MoDs use the CWS more frequently, whereas the PermRep's staff often met physically in Brussels with the Secretariat on requests. The PermRep's functioning encloses discussing the PESCO framework and developments of policies, whereas the MoDs often deal with the operational sides of the projects with the Secretariat or bilaterally with other pMS.

Every time PESCO is on the agenda in the PMG-configuration, the Secretariat will be present. Staff from both the EDA and the EEAS participate in the meeting alongside representatives from all the member states. During these meetings, requests and questions to the Secretariat would either be addressed in plenary or in the 'side lines' of the meeting. Many of the questions evolve around the operational aspects, and these questions are normally addressed to the Secretariat from the MoDs. In terms of bringing pMS together on different projects, the EDA is active in several projects, but also in PESCO projects. They have a role in CARD and other initiatives linked to PESCO. Sweden is participating in most of the EDA projects. The Swedish PermRep representative has weekly conferences with the Swedish MoD.

The Secretariat is mostly restricted towards facilitating communication but has been given the authority to draft the NIPs and project proposals by the member states. In terms of coordination, they provide merely secretarial functions. The resources given to the Secretariat is its personnel, but it is the pMS who contributes financially to the cooperation by increasing defence budgets, R&D and enhancing the European defence industry.

5.3 Decision-making

Regarding the legislative sphere of participation and admission of new member states, this is governed by the pMS themselves, voting by principles of unanimity (European Union, 2012a, Article 46 (6)); Council of the EU, 2017. 2.2.2)). The pMS' representatives use the Council as a platform for decision-making where qualified majority voting (QMV) is practiced. QMV is applied in matters of suspension or approval of (new) member states concerned (ibid. Article 46 (4)). If there is a member state that wants to participate on a later stage, this has to be notified to the Council, but as well as the HR/VP (ibid. Article 46 (3)).

The European Union's CSDP decision-making is by unanimous intergovernmental agreement, with little input from-, or role for supranational institutions (Menon, 2014, p. 81). pMS have themselves reported that decision-making in the framework is mainly bilateral and is made by email correspondence and phone calls. Regarding new participating member states wanting to join the PESCO cooperation and the obligation to consult with the HR/VP (Article 46(3) TEU)), the respondents of the interviews were mostly agreeing that it was merely a formality.

In the PMG, the meetings are led by the PMG-chair; a representative of the HR/VP. When the PMG-set up initiates, the Secretariat is normally present, the Swedish PermRep representative explains. The Notification on PESCO to the Council and HR/VP, Annex 3, 'Governance' 2.1, states that existing Council preparatory bodies such as the PMG, PSC and EUMC will meet in so-called 'PESCO-formats' (Council of the European Union, 2017). Therefore, bodies with EU member states participating will still be present, but only pMS will have voting rights in the Council. Informal meetings can take place with pMS only. The Swedish PermRep representative says that Denmark and Malta are present in the meetings, but they remain silent during the meetings. The Secretariat often presents PESCO related orientations on e.g. workshops or in documents.

Concerning the decision-making in these meetings, the Secretariat drafts the documents for instance related to the commitments and then these documents are circulated to the member states participating; later, discussed during the meeting, paragraph by paragraph. Then the member states' representatives present, if instructed, their MoD's view on the matter.

Thereafter the member states negotiate the issues, put on the agenda, trying to find common ground. The role of the Secretariat represented by the EEAS and the EDA is normally presenting, giving information and responding to questions, as well as facilitating the discussion. The Secretariat also transcribes the member states' opinions and renders the results of the negotiations, which then results in a new draft, building on the explicit views of the member states.

The Commission will always be present in these meetings, sitting around the same table, but apart from all the member states present. In Article 2 of the TEU, it is specified that the EDA is going to carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary, and therefore they receive the same information as any member state. The representatives receive no information about what the Commission does outside the meeting and when they meet with the Secretariat, the Swedish PermRep states. The representative says there has been no conflicts of interest.

Decision-making in PESCO is practiced by QMV, making the pMS the formal participants of policy outcome. The EU bodies does not have formal voting rights in any regards of policy decision-making in the framework.

5.4 Sanctioning and incentivizing *vis-à-vis* the National Implementation Plans

There is an absence of judicial enforcement of pMS in the PESCO framework (Blockmans , 2018, p. 1819). Article 46 (4) in the TEU makes it possible to suspend the participation of pMS if they do no longer fulfil the criteria or meet the commitments. A suspension is executed by a Council decision (European Union, 2012a). The German expert argues that sanctioning is not necessary for the cooperation to succeed. Implicit sanctioning of course could happen if a pMS has not delivered what was planned. A 'naming and shaming'-culture is yet not appearing in PESCO. The Secretariat does not sanction, and the pMS are more focused on discussing areas that can be improved than spending time in these meeting on naming and shaming. Sanctioning if further in the political domain, and the German expert does not see any legitimacy for the Secretariat to sanction pMS.

The fact that the Secretariat presents a tool to allow pMS to view other pMS' NIPs increases the transparency of the PESCO format. The member states do incentivize themselves through the NIPs. The expert also thinks that incentivizing has to do with defence spending. The pMS are held accountable for increasing defence spending and vice versa and the NIPs merely function in relation to how the pMS will achieve their goals. The Secretariat's CWS plays an important part in incentivizing other pMS. The sharing function is commonly used to learn from each other. The incentive for increasing defence spending lies with the commitments of PESCO, not the NIPs, whereas the latter state where each pMS is in the roadmap for the commitments and their current status.

The representative from the Czech Republic MoD responded that the Secretariat mainly collects the information from the pMS' NIPs, passing it on to a higher level. The main responsibility for the NIPs lies with the pMS themselves, updating them regularly. Sanctioning pMS is not something the Secretariat could do, the representative argues. The decision lies with the EU level if one would want to alter this practice. Compared to NATO, PESCO does not have the same sanctioning mechanisms. On the other hand, the NIPs have an incentivizing effect on national defence planning, but due to NATO and domestic preferences, PESCO will be the third preferred commitment, especially regarding decision-making. At the same time, pMS try to synchronize their national defence priorities also between NATO and the EU. There are differences within the EU, which are easily detected in the existing projects where different pMS participate.

The representative from the French PermRep implied that the starting point, when dealing with capabilities and defence spending, is different for each pMS. The assessments of the NIPs are not being done by the EU institutions, but the Secretariat will review what the pMS describe in their own NIP (European External Action Service, 2019). The NIPs are explaining what each pMS' capabilities and defence spending are. There are different benchmarks of defence spending on the national levels. The major difficulty when analysing the NIPs are not being too 'politically correct', meaning being critical to ambitious goals. The political 'correctness' of the NIPs is noticeable in the focus on what is working well and in the way the pMS are positively attuned. In the first assessments of the NIPs, the representative replied that it was problematic for the HR/VP to be critical to the outcome, but it was necessary. The

conclusion of this first feedback was that the pMS' capabilities are generally sufficient, but that the industry aspect was more critical. The content of the pMS' NIPs in general lacks proportional information. Each NIP is different, and comparing them, especially in the Secretariat's assessment process is not an easy task, because they must take the overall outcome into account. The Secretariat must also assess how the pMS made the commitments and how they will relate to that.

When each pMS' NIP is being assessed, the Secretariat and the respective pMS agree on the information put in the NIP, but the French PermRep representative says that this empowers the Secretariat, because they are improving the NIPs. The representative states that PESCO is not about 'naming and shaming', but there is a need of a non-politically correct HR/VP that can be freer to criticise and inform the pMS what can be improved in the annual report. The HR/VP-report of 2020 will be more political and detailed than previous ones.

The Finnish PermRep representative replied that Finland is meeting their NIP's criteria to a certain degree, especially regarding defence investments due to large procurements the coming years. There are other areas in which the pMS face difficulties. pMS must plan several years in advance and present information about achieving future goals and that can be challenging. With regards to the EDF and what activities to consider is something that the Secretariat gave feedback on. Another problem area is dealing with the timeframe when meeting the commitments, for all the pMS. The representative emphasizes the importance of being realistic, not only enthusiastic when implementing the commitments of PESCO.

The PMG has discussed how to sanction and incentivize pMS and how to proceed with this in the PESCO framework, the Finnish PermRep claims. It is possible to discharge a pMS out of the framework based in the TEU (Article 46 (4,5)), if they do not apply to the commitments. On the political level, the representative does not see that other sanctioning possibilities are necessary or feasible under current circumstances, because of the inclusive approach that PESCO has. The NIPs are there to incentivize pMS and to keep pMS posted on what each pMS does on the security and defence area, creating a positive peer-pressure way of proceeding. This is not a naming and shaming mechanism, but rather praising each pMS' efforts in this area. Finland's feedback on their NIP was communicated with other pMS. The

representative further suggests that PESCO could be more ambitious in the future and find ways to get pMS to apply with the commitments. The Czech Republic MoD representative mentions that there is a large-scale document hierarchy and decisions and governing rules to relate to. Therefore, it takes time to integrate this into the national planning.

The Swedish PermRep representative also indicated that the Secretariat does not have any form of formal powers or mechanisms to push coordination, at least not for the projects that Sweden is participating in or observing on. The lead pMS often drives each individual project. The representative said that the work with the NIP is highly time consuming, and it is therefore crucial to have clear deadlines for submitting them. There are pMS who want more time before handing in the NIPs, says the representative, but there must be time limitations in order for the Secretariat to assess them all and thereafter for other pMS in the framework to see the overall result and the state of art of PESCO.

The Swedish PermRep representative replied that every pMS is a member on a voluntary basis, meaning that the incentive is building on pMS own will. Sweden is a pMS pushing forward for a light and flexible format of PESCO and does not want any new interference of new bodies, nor cumbersome processes to push the initiative further. The pMS must see the outcome and result benefitting, because of all the efforts put in the framework. The representative has never thought of the Secretariat as being there to sanction the pMS. The Secretariat stated with regards to the Council Decision establishing PESCO, that there are no possibilities of sanctioning pMS. The pMS are in practice very willing to comply with the binding commitments they have signed up to, because of the common principles for the defence and security in the EU.

There are no clear sanctioning possibilities in the PESCO framework. The EU bodies does not have formal powers to sanction pMS, but if any of the pMS does not fulfil the commitments or the criteria set, they can be excluded from the framework by a Council decision. The respondents made it clear that the pMS incentivise themselves by the NIPs. It was also stated that if the pMS wants any other formal sanctioning mechanisms in the future, they must decide by unanimity.

5.5 Participating member states and alliances

In security and defence policies, member states have different preferences (Howorth, 2019, p. 263). Howorth argues these differentiations revolves around large and small states, (NATO)-allies and neutrals, nuclear and non-nuclear states, expeditionary and territorial armed forces, professional and conscript militaries, military and civilian security cultures, large and small defence spenders and naval states and land army states. PESCO was set out to be an ambitious cooperation platform and it has developed to become an inclusive mechanism consisting of 25 member states. The challenge then is to raise the level of ambition while ensuring the inclusivity (Blockmans , 2018, p. 1812)

The Lisbon Treaty makes it clear that group-building within the EU framework is possible (Algieri, 2008, p. 20). Based on the data material it seems that there are not any clear groupings of pMS in the PESCO framework. Meetings with the pMS indicate that there generally are a committed collective of 25 member states in the mere political area of PESCO. There are more groupings in the projects, but here as well; based on pMS' mutual preferences. The German expert responded that there are not explicit groups or fixed coalitions of the pMS, but there might be multiple sub-groups of pMS in the projects, because of domestic preferences. For pMS in projects, it is an advantage having like-minded countries participating and pursuing the same objectives. The French PermRep representative also replied that every pMS does not have the same capabilities, therefore each project contains different groupings of pMS.

“Certain projects of the third wave of PESCO have been fixed, aiming at obtaining the EDF-support” – Representative from the Czech Republic MoD.

In contrast, the Czech Republic's representative argued that pMS-alliances within PESCO is obvious. The projects focusing on defence industry needs to be backed by the pMS to receive a 4/5 financial funding, but some projects have been pre-arranged by certain pMS, without asking other pMS to join as observers or as full members. When the third wave of projects was launched, these projects were already prepared, and submitted to the EDF without further consultation with other pMS. The French PermRep Representative said there were no political alliances within PESCO. The representative also mentioned that the PESCO cooperation is an

ad-hoc phenomenon, and that the decision-making mostly happens bilaterally. The Finnish PermRep representative argued that each individual project receives more attention than the rest of the PESCO cooperation because it is easier to communicate them to the public sphere. What happens more generally on the political, or administrative level is less communicable. The representative clarified that the entirety of the legally binding commitments of PESCO might have the most potential, and not each individual project. Increasing the defence budgets is central in PESCO, and that is why the commitments are central.

The Finnish PermRep representative also implies that pMS find other pMS with similar interests, and the workshops hosted by the Secretariat is a useful arena to do so. The representative also responded that pMS would likely form varieties of alliances in projects, if the pMS are like-minded. Further on, the strategic phase on PESCO from 2018 to 2020 and its achievements and commitments will go under a common revision by the pMS, also discussing if more coordination is needed from the Secretariat, or more automatic processes. The Secretariat does not have any concrete instruments to push coordination, the representative responded.

The Finnish PermRep representative says that alliances exist in PESCO, but for Finland this shifts often based on which preferences they seek out with others. This is how projects function. With regards to the multi- and bilateral discussions, it depends which questions are raised, and with whom one shares preferences. 'Shifting alliances' would describe the situation in PESCO's framework. Starting out, Germany, France, Italy and Spain teamed up in PESCO discussions, and later on Finland, Estonia and the Dutch. Finland has not always agreed with these countries on a later stage.

When pMS get the status of a leading member states in projects, they are in charge of the respective project, the Swedish PermRep representative responded. Also, the Secretariat could have a role to play in the PESCO projects, but currently it is the lead nation that invites to meetings and leading the discussions, whereas the Secretariat's involvement is often minimal. The Swedish PermRep representative has not seen any alliances forming, except within projects; if that can be called an 'alliance'. PESCO is also an alliance, and each project is a part of the entirety, the representative argued. The only occasion where alliances might have

been visible, has been around the discussion-issue of third country participation in the framework.

There is ambiguity on whether there are alliances or fixed coalitions in the PESCO framework. Most respondents point to the PESCO projects as hubs for pMS coalitions with similar preferences, but other respondents added that these coalitions are pre-fixed, meaning these pMS have arranged certain projects, and often to get the EDF bonus.

5.6 Autonomy and EU-agenda

The Secretariat outlines its own hub as a single point of contact between the Council and the pMS, supporting the latter by providing secretarial functions, amongst others contributing to the HR/VP's annual report and assessing the project proposals. It also supports and coordinates pMS by arranging workshops and bilateral meetings. The collaborative effort of the bodies within the Secretariat consolidates views and needs, assessing both the capability, operational and political aspects of PESCO to fulfil the EU military level of ambition. It was also communicated that the Secretariat view PESCO as a pMS driven initiative. There is no exist a 'Secretariat agenda' because its tasks are limited to secretarial functions. Since it is a pMS driven initiative, it cannot have institutions and other EU bodies involved in the decision-making.

The German expert implies that in the CSDP context "*...everything is owned by the member states*". Every meeting with the Secretariat is not scheduled to Brussels. The Secretariat is quite flexible visiting the pMS' MoD facilities. This is to cut costs and operate environmentally friendly. As mentioned by the German expert, the Secretariat does not own nor direct processes unless it has a 'freeway', or a granted permission to do so by the involved pMS. It is further explained that the Secretariat does not 'overrule' the member states, nor is the Secretariat drivers- or agenda-setters of processes. The Secretariat cannot govern in the same way as the member states can. It has for instance no voting power, but is proactive facilitators.

The role of the Commission, based on the data material, seems to be minor in the PESCO framework. The French PermRep representative says with regards to the assessments of the projects, the Secretariat looks at the funding of the projects, and if it is a multi-pMS driven project and what question they seek to solve. The Secretariat will also do a technical assessment of the projects. It is then up to the HR/VP to recommend it to the Council, where the 'un-biased' Secretariat has referred it first to the HR/VP. Even though the Secretariat provides the facilitation for the PESCO meetings, it does not set the agenda, as the German expert indicates. The German expert also says, that the individual bodies of the Secretariat might appear independent, but they are dependent and a working muscle for the pMS.

When asked the question on whether there are conflicts of interest, the German expert implied that PESCO is an inclusive platform, but there have not been any significant conflicts. Being an open cooperation with the possibilities for other member states joining and allowing selected groups to take part in projects, PESCO's political domain remains currently without conflicts between the pMS and the Secretariat. Having exclusive groups participating in joint projects is to pursue the same security and defence preferences. On the political domain conflicts of interest might evolve.

Regarding Article 45 (2) in the TEU, the representative from the Czech Republic sees this only as a role of information passing. The Secretariat passes information to the Secretariat, and the representative also claims that the Secretariat is not in favour of a significantly active role for the Commission in the PESCO framework. Supporting this statement, the French PermRep representative mentioned that the Secretariat only brings information to the Commission. When introducing the Commission into Article 45, it is often related to operational and capability related PESCO projects, and two or three pMS have done it voluntarily, the Secretariat's representative has responded.

The Finnish PermRep representative responded that the Commission did not have any specific formal role in the PESCO framework. Regarding the decision of establishing PESCO, the role of the Commission in the framework has merely vanished. The Commission can assist pMS if it is requested, and the EDF-initiative the Commission's idea, offering member states economic bonus for projects. Consulting the Commission regarding these projects can

therefore implicit be useful for the pMS. On the topic of new member states' joining the PESCO framework (TEU, Article 46 (3)), the Czech Republic representative was precise to point out that the framework should be open to all who want to apply. Regarding third country participation, it was also further specified that allied countries should be able to join the PESCO projects under previously agreed rules. However, there are member states wanting PESCO as a less broad project.

When asking the respondents about new participating countries (except for third country participation in projects), it is obvious that a probable scenario would be an application from Malta. As the representative from the French PermRep points out, Malta does not meet the criteria of being able to participate sufficiently, but according to the participation process, it is up to the pMS whether new member states could join, and not the HR/VP alone. The representative also implies that it is beneficial to keep in touch with the Commission if the pMS want the funding. The Finnish representative specified when discussing new member states joining PESCO, that the obligation to consult with the HR/VP, is rather a formality. Practically, it would have been discussed first with the Secretariat, handled like a request, then a consultation process occurs, where the pMS most likely would not have any objections agreeing on a new participation because of the broad approach of PESCO. If the group of pMS were smaller, like it was initially intended in Article 46 (3) in the TEU (European Union, 2012a), participation would probably be interpreted more strictly.

When discussing new membership, excluding third country participation, with the Swedish PermRep representative, it was implied that there are no objections attached to this, because the decision lies with the pMS. The Czech Republic representative describes the framework as a member state driven development, and the Secretariat as an intermediary point between pMS and the Commission. The French PermRep representative claims that there has not been any conflicts of interest between the Secretariat and the HR/VP, but there has been between the pMS and the Secretariat. This conflict included the pMS wanting a pre-draft of their NIPs. There would be a possible risk if the Secretariat were to differentiate their practice and become bias in its practice, the representative argued.

When the Secretariat meets with the Finnish MoD, the main topic when the agenda is set is the preparation of the NIP. Both parts will be involved in setting the agenda for the meeting, but it is not always so. When for instance in the EEAS-led working group, the PMG, where the topic is the roadmap for PESCO, the EEAS sets the agenda. However, the representative says this does not imply overruling the intergovernmental framework in PESCO. The representative sees the Secretariat as an active facilitator, pushing the pMS forward, but according to the pMS' preferences; they have the 'final call'. The Finnish relation to the EU-bodies in PESCO is prosperous, and the Secretariat's existence and aid is an important value. The Commission is not actually present in the PESCO framework, but they have helped pushed forward security and defence on the EU-agenda with amongst others the EDF.

The respondents reply that EU level actors are almost absent in the PESCO framework. On the other hand, there is a need for both having tight relations to the Commission, in order to get funding, as well as the Secretariat in order to get support, as the Finnish respondent argued.

5.7 (Complex?) Legislation

The legal sphere of PESCO revolves around the Council Decision (CFSP 2017/2315) establishing PESCO and the participation list (Council of the European Union, 2017). This legal framework is set out to be "ambitious, binding and inclusive" (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017, p. 6).

The German expert indicated that a comprehensive legal framework is positive, and especially as pMS have well-functioning and competent MoDs handling PESCO's legal framework, not having the need to rely on the competence of the Secretariat only. The legislative framework of PESCO is also dynamic and is open for revisions where pMS can change different parts of it. The flexibility of adaptation of the legal framework also comes into play, whereas pMS fulfil their commitments, and then annually and gradually update it, leaving the foundation of the common legal framework consistent. The representative from the Czech Republic MoD argues that the legislative framework of PESCO is quite extensive, and this issue has been discussed by several pMS. The strategic revision of PESCO in 2020

will possibly assess the legislative sphere of PESCO, and for the Czech Republic, one aim is to decrease the amount of reports and documents that have to be sent to the EDA and the EU. There is also a need for a standardised database, where all the documents can be uploaded and be accessible for all the pMS and the Secretariat's staff.

The Finnish PermRep representative described the legislative framework of PESCO as quite complex to some extent, but the complexity is needed for e.g. the twenty commitments and their adherent description. For Finland there were some difficulties applying with some of the commitments when negotiating because of the demand of a description of future plans with regards to for instance the EDF. It demands extensive resources updating the NIP every year and it also demands an effort to gain an insight into all the areas in that plan. To increase the efficiency and effectiveness on the commitments would ease the pMS' MoDs workload.

For the Swedish PermRep representative there is a distinction between how the PermReps and the MoDs are focusing on different aspects of PESCO. In meetings, attended by PermReps in Brussels, the focus lies more on the political level of PESCO and its commitments. Certainly, some of the discussions have been about raising the level of financial backing of the framework, where some pMS want to raise the economic costs to two percent; the same as a NATO-membership demands. The NATO allies also enrolled in PESCO often advocates the same commitments in PESCO as in NATO. There are countries – such as Germany, that are members of both initiatives, but do not want similar commitments. The representative also points to differences and challenges regarding national legislation and the commitment to PESCO. This also leads to discussions for the strategic review on PESCO. Although Sweden is not a NATO member, Sweden still has to partake in discussions about NATO relations, because these issues often occur in PESCO discussions.

“PESCO is very much an intergovernmental framework, but it remains to be seen whether it will continue to be, with the new setup of the Commission, DG DEFIS and the EDF” - The Swedish PermRep representative.

EDF is very much linked to PESCO, depending on the project. The institutions might be more involved in PESCO in the future given the dynamic nature of PESCO, and because these

institutions also have security and defence on their agendas.

The representatives are generally satisfied with the aid of the Secretariat related to areas revolving around PESCO's legal sphere. They argue it is complex, but that is needed to describe governance rules and the commitments.

6.0 Discussion

6.1 PESCO's impact on European defence cooperation

Viewing table 1 in the theoretical section, the thesis research question; does PESCO and its Secretariat introduce supranational or intergovernmental principles in the European defence sector, must be assessed in accordance with the features and vertical theoretical frameworks, based on policy documents and the data material.

H1: The legally binding PESCO framework has active monitoring of processes and consists of incentives that are overseen by EU bodies and initiatives. pMS' collaboration and commitment are challenged by the interference of actors from other levels.

The EU has not witnessed a similar development and initiative as PESCO; outlining which common interest that are going to be achieved. PESCO has a legally binding framework, but the membership itself- entering the cooperation was-, and still is voluntary. The 25 pMS have chosen to participate in this security and defence development willingly and agreed upon a Secretariat to facilitate and assist them both at the Council level and the level of projects. Most of the respondents have expressed that they view the Secretariat as a facilitator, mainly providing them with communicative assets and not interfering in their decision-making or general collaboration. With regards to the aspect of the NIPs, they are merely a supportive mechanism that enables the pMS to hold track of their own progress as well as pursuing the progress of others. There are though certain problems in foreseeing one's progress and predict what their capabilities and defence spending state-of-art over a period of one year. The nature of the commitment to PESCO depends on the respective pMS. Therefore, PESCO should be

understood as a team effort, enhancing the common capabilities and spending.

Having a legally binding framework would contrast with the intergovernmental model of a European security and defence sector. On the other hand, the framework of PESCO is not including heavy monitoring from EU bodies. It would seemingly become questionable that the EDA shall carry out their tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary, and that the HR/VP are to be notified on the possibilities of new member states participating in the TEU. For the pMS, this involvement from the Commission and the HR/VP is merely seen as formalities and not as an attempt to over-rule or to acquire supranational powers.

As for EU incentives the EDF is still waiting to be integrated to the framework, making it an economic support for projects aimed at certain goals. The EDF is a Commission driven project, but it is co-financed between the EU budget and the pMS' budgets. The EDF grants will support certain projects aimed at R&D and the defence industry, enhancing cooperation between pMS. This will also reduce duplication of military capabilities and national procurements. But on the other hand, as the Czech Republic representative said some projects are pre-fixed to get the EDF bonus, making some countries getting more funding and allowing certain projects to proceed more efficient.

CARD was coordinated between the Council, and the HR/VP, in order to deliver identified capabilities based on more transparency more efficiently. Whereas the CDP initiative focus on the common efforts of the pMS, CARD provides overview on the state of art and the future steps of the capability landscape. These initiatives are overseen by the EDA, but the initiatives themselves are put in place to support the pMS to get an overview of their common capabilities. PESCO sketch out how to reach these capabilities (European Defence Agency, 2020e). These initiatives do have active monitoring but based on the interviews it does not seem that these initiatives nor the actors are challenging the cooperation between the pMS, but enhancing it.

H2: The Secretariat, as a hub of several entities, satisfies the qualification of a de novo body (according to Bickerton et al.) and manages the coordination both at the Council level and the level of projects.

In this post-Maastricht period, member states have empowered these bodies, but in PESCO the Secretariat may not qualify directly as a *de novo* body. The EDA is highly active and involved in the operational level of PESCO, whereas the EEAS is more active on the political level. As for the Secretariat, it does not possess much autonomy, neither by executive, nor by legislative power (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, p. 705). It has, as some respondents pointed out, scarce resources. However, *de novo* bodies have relatively simple mandates pointing at specific issues, which applies the Secretariat. But the Secretariat does not have the possibility to overrule the pMS in decision making, nor proposing new legal framework.

Regarding the monitoring by EU bodies, it is-, based on the data material, clear to see that the pMS do not sense the EU institutions as prominent in the coordination processes; especially not in the projects. One instance was reported, where the EDA informally took charge on 'Military Mobility', facilitating the communication, but except from this incidence, the Commission is not very visible within the coordination processes itself. The EEAS is made outside the framework of EU treaties. The Commission is represented only in an observer capacity (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015, s. 713).

The Secretariat provided a single answer to the interview, empowering the statement of it functioning as one hub. As some of the respondents from selection 2 indicated, the Secretariat is in lack of sufficient resources. Providing support for the whole PESCO framework is resource- and time consuming. The pMS most surely assess the Secretariat as a coordinating hub regarding communication, but as for some of the respondents, the Secretariat was not highly active within the projects. They were mostly managed by the leading pMS in the projects. Certainly, the pMS can manage bilateral correspondence, and for the representative from Czech Republic MoD, project 'match-making' did not need the support from the Secretariat. The German expert informed that the Secretariat did match-make pMS in a very active and proactive way. This could imply that pMS use the Secretariat in different ways and to fulfill different needs, but the interviews shows the Secretariat as engaging in a more 'hands-off' way.

Through the CWS, the pMS are communicating with each other and the Secretariat. The Secretariat is aiding the pMS on request, but most of the communication is bilateral, and in

the projects, the lead nation is often taking responsibility of coordinating the project. The Secretariat also responded that the Commission could be of aid as well if requested.

H3: The decision-making in PESCO functions merely as intergovernmental deliberation and consensus-seeking between the pMS.

The HR/VP's direct involvement in the assessment of new participants might arise questions regarding EU-level actors' interaction in the framework. In the end, it is the pMS that discuss these matters in the Council, voting by QMV. As Moravcsik claims in his depiction of intergovernmental bargains; this is merely how PESCO decision-making functions. The pMS are deciding on policies themselves, and for the most part they come to an agreement. The only instances, where there has been a conflict of interests are related to third state participation. Certain pMS want PESCO to be achieve an inclusive, broad platform, whereas other pMS emphasize the importance of the ambitious nature of PESCO, arguing for participating member states who fulfill a higher criteria of defence spending and -capabilities.

The Commission and the Secretariat are present in the negotiations, but only as observers. The Secretariat functions as a preparatory body that facilitates the meetings and provide secretarial functions in the meeting. Princen stresses the inclusion and exclusion of actors in institutional decision-making arenas, and as the Secretariat and often the EDA are facilitating meetings in their premises they have an actual possibility to influence (Princen, 2009). As the respondents communicate, the Secretariat is providing secretarial functions and are not integrated as much in the discussions.

H4: There are sanctioning possibilities and a 'naming and shaming'-culture in PESCO.

The only sanctioning possibility in the PESCO framework is for the pMS to decide to exclude or remove other pMS from the cooperation, if they do not meet their own criteria put in their NIP. The Secretariat will only assess the NIPs drafted by the pMS but cannot sanction them if they fail to meet their goals. The NIPs may function as a peer-pressure mechanism, as the NIPs are available through the CWS. However, the respondents say that there is not actually a 'naming and shaming' culture yet in the framework.

Some of the respondents said the NIPs were there to incentivize the pMS, but due to time constraints and heavy workloads these plans demand much personnel. The Finnish PermRep representative was clear about some issues of pMS wanting more time on planning their NIP, but this might damage the work progress of the Secretariat, as well as not being able to publish it in the CWS for the other pMS to assess it. The process of learning of each other's NIPs was pointed out as incentivizing as well.

H5: There are pMS-alliances existing in the framework of PESCO pursuing national agendas. pMS have different bargaining powers.

It is clear that PESCO has moved from an initially small gathering of pMS in which the members were those whose military capabilities fulfilled a higher criteria and had made the more binding commitments to one another with a view to the most demanding missions, towards a more inclusive template, as Howorth also argues (Howorth, 2019, p. 269). Some respondents indicated, that for NATO-allies, PESCO is a second or third priority. The pMS often consider their national preferences the most important to pursue.

Certainly, the projects have clusters of pMS pursuing their preferred CSDP-interests, and they seek out other pMS with the same goals. In the operational and capability area of PESCO, there are less conflicts of interests, because of these clusters pursuing the same goals. On the more political level of PESCO, during the bargains, some of the respondents have witnessed coalitions of pMS regarding the issue of third country participation. One respondent argued that some of the projects of the third wave were pre-fixed to get the EDF-bonus, and with this claim, there might be evidence in favor for differences in pMS bargaining powers.

H6: The Secretariat is pursuing the EUGS and CSDP-agenda of the Commission. These institutions' presence challenge pMS' sovereignty, core state powers and autonomy.

The EEAS has autonomy, and the EDA has executive powers, but on the other hand the Parliament has an important formal role in the CSDP of the Union, as in terms of political control, and regarding legislative and budgetary matters (Council of the European Union,

2010, p. 30). The EEAS and the EDA possess autonomy, but the Secretariat in the framework has scarce resources and reduced influence and power in terms of decision-making and coordination. The CSDP has been member state driven, and the so-called EU-agenda is based on the collective preferences of the member states. The data material does not present clear evidence of a supranational agenda at play, nor showing any sign of a specific Secretariat-agenda in the PESCO framework.

The common goal of the EU is planted in the EUGS, seeking amongst others to become a security provider, internal and external. From being mainly concerned with military threats, the CSDP faces new obstacles in various areas, related to social and economic inequalities, terrorism, international crime and migration (Sjursen, 2004, p. 65). The representatives responded that the Commission is not really present in PESCO, and it is difficult to assume that there would be a top-down approach, or an agenda at play that would be contrary to the pMS' collaborative goals.

H7: PESCO's legislative framework requires the substantial involvement, competence and aid of the Secretariat.

The legal framework of PESCO is visible through the Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (Council of the European Union, 2017). Assessing the governance rules and the 20 more binding commitments, this legal aspect is clearly in favour of a member state driven cooperation. There is a clear focus on the role of the HR/VP, which participate in all the procedures in PESCO. The need for the Secretariat to interpret and assist in the legal framework, is sometimes required. The pMS' MoDs comprise competence but lack resources. It is stated in the notification on PESCO that the cooperation will leave the pMS' sovereignty 'untouched' (Blockmans, 2018, p. 1819).

The thesis' findings of this research are shown in table 2. PESCO is a new development, and to better assess it in European security and defence, a hybrid model is added in table 2 to highlight features that are both intergovernmental and supranational.

Table 2: PESCO's placement related to Table 1 based on the data material and policy documents.

Feature	Intergovernmental model	Supranational model	'Hybrid' model
Collaboration and commitment	PESCO-membership is voluntary, but it has legally binding commitments. EU level actors are not challenging the cooperation between the pMS.	PESCO is legally binding, and does have monitoring of initiatives such as the NIPs, CDP and CARD being linked to the framework. It is also overseen by the Secretariat, but mainly assessed by the HR/VP, and not EU-institutions directly.	PESCO has the possibility of new member states joining the cooperation, and the pMS do not give formal autonomy directly to other pMS or EU institutions. Other pMS does gain coordinating powers when in the position of leading, compared to participating and observing a project of PESCO.
Coordination	PESCO's pMS coordinates within each project, using the Secretariat mainly as a facilitator and an information hub often when having operational and capability inquiries.	The coordination is not facilitated directly by EU institutions in the framework of PESCO.	The Secretariat cannot directly be viewed as a <i>de novo</i> body. They are facilitating and coordinating communication and information, but the pMS are

			<p>mainly overseeing this on the project level.</p> <p>The Secretariat may coordinate pMS in order to find relevant projects, and assess these projects. Other than facilitating communication and meetings, there is not much coordination from the Secretariat.</p>
Decision-making	<p>PESCO's pMS discuss and bargain with each other. The governance of PESCO also implies that the decision-making is anchored in the pMS, without other member states of the EU or other bodies of the EU having these decision-making powers.</p>	<p>The decision-making cannot be overruled by the EU institutions.</p>	
Sanctioning	<p>PESCO has only the ability to dismiss pMS by unanimity, and there</p>	<p>EU-institutions or other bodies have no formal</p>	

	is no informal ‘naming and shaming’ sanctioning culture either.	sanctioning power in the PESCO framework.	
Involvement and control	<p>PESCO’s policies are bargained and discussed openly before agreeing on the framework.</p> <p>Some of the respondents imply that there are alliances of pMS, but more over a cooperation based on the common goals for the Union as a whole. The Secretariat are providing secretarial functions in order for the discussions to happen, but not intervening.</p>	<p>The governance mode of PESCO is two layered at the Council level and at the project level, where pMS have the formal decision-making powers.</p>	<p>‘Like-minded’ alliances exists based on pMS preferences in projects, but in decision-making, the respondents communicated that there is not so much discussion on the political level, other than when the issue of third country participation.</p>
Autonomy	<p>The Secretariat has a ‘hands off’ approach in PESCO.</p>	<p>There is minimal evidence of an EU level -agenda directly at play in the PESCO framework. There is no way the EU institutions directly can take part in the decision-making of PESCO, since they do not possess voting power.</p>	

Legislation	The legislative sphere of PESCO outlines commitments and governance rules that are explicit and do not intervene with the pMS' interests as they have decided on them.	There are few rules overruling pMS' domestic legislation.	
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Source: Compiled by the author based on Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998 (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1998).

7.0 Conclusion

In European integration studies, scholars discuss the direction integration has taken. Bickerton et al. have argued that the post-Maastricht period has been characterized by a new intergovernmentalism approach. The integration process has proceeded without the substantial presence of supranational governance, but deliberation and consensus-seeking of EU member states. Member states have increasingly been cooperating in the realm of high politics, but the relation between both low- and high politics have been reduced (Howorth, 2019, p. 263). From a differentiated integration perspective, Howorth argues that in security and defence, member states are driven by their national interests, rather than by common values.

Is PESCO an ambitious game-changer, or is it trapped in the wrong body when it comes to achieving the goals of the EU, becoming a legitimate security actor on the world stage? Does PESCO call for more EU-level intervention, -or not, to be able to push CSDP forward? It remains to be seen how PESCO will develop in the next period. Will PESCO make a complete 'u-turn' in the future, creating new bodies and governance rules to progress further? It is fair to assume that PESCO remains highly intergovernmental per now and continues the tradition of a member states driven European security and defence sector, despite the involvement of the Secretariat and *de novo* body?

PESCO is still a developing initiative but it has most certainly become a ‘game-changer’ in European defence. European defence sector has been transformed after the Global strategy, and the CSDP, with its new initiatives of CDP, CARD, EDF and PESCO. This Master’s thesis will be handed during the Covid-19 pandemic. CSDP will have to face challenges towards civilian actors and providing cross-border support (European External Action Service, 2020f). EEAS states that the EU military and civilian missions and operations will proceed by closer coordination with NATO and the UN. The PESCO projects can also generate collaborative projects by enhancing the EU’s readiness and resilience.

By introducing the seven sub-hypotheses in the table of supranational and intergovernmental features, this research has discussed collaboration and commitment, coordination, decision-making, sanctioning, involvement and control, autonomy, and legislation. The discussion ultimately leads to a conclusive answer to the research question:

Does PESCO and its Secretariat introduce supranational or intergovernmental principles in European defence cooperation? How can we account for this?

PESCO and its Secretariat do not introduce significant supranational principles in European defence cooperation. One can argue that the Secretariat’s architecture is not intergovernmental, and the legislative nature of PESCO might open for interpretations towards EU level actors interfering. The binding commitments of PESCO does imply principles that strides with intergovernmental logics, and the CSDP-initiatives demands monitoring and active overseeing by the Secretariat. Even though these indicators might be problematic for classical intergovernmentalism, new intergovernmentalism opens up for *de novo* bodies that are easier for EU member states to accept. Based on this research the Secretariat merely provides secretarial functions in the framework of PESCO, but the decision-making, voting-powers and executive powers lies with the pMS.

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9.0 Appendix

9.1 Annex

Figures

Figure 1: PESCO chart

Figure 2: Synergies of actors in PESCO

Figure 3: The Secretariat chart

Tables

Table 1: Indicators of intergovernmental-, and supranational features in European defence policies

Table 2: PESCO's placement related to table 1

9.2 Interview guide and questionnaire

Selection 1:

Representative from the PESCO Secretariat.

[Written answer provided by the EEAS and the EUMS].

Topic 1: General

Do you assess PESCO as a 'u-turn' in the development in European Defence? (There are plenty of initiatives, also regarding CSDP).

How do you describe the functioning of the PESCO framework this far?

How do you view the PESCO Secretariat functioning in the framework of PESCO?

How does the implementation process of the PESCO projects occur and proceed?

How do you evaluate the results of the projects? The second wave of PESCO projects have been set into motion, then which instruments where used to measure the outcome of the projects?

Topic 2: Capacity and communication

How do you and the member states interact via the web-solution (CWS), and how often do you interact?

How often do you physically meet with representatives of the MoD's?

Are there certain forms that need to be filled in frequently by you or the MoD's?

How much staff do you need to perform your tasks?

Who are in charge of the Secretariat? Who does the Secretariat answer to? Who oversees the budget, the EDF, and the overall capacity of the Secretariat?

Topic 3: Coordination

How do you view the coordination (between the member states) in PESCO?

What types of instruments do you have to push coordination? How do you stimulate coordination or facilitation; 'hands on'-, or 'hands off'-steering? (Hands off steering is less interaction from higher EU-levels in this context; intergovernmental oriented, whereas hands on would describe a more active way of pushing coordination).

How is it to cooperate with different bodies in the hub of the Secretariat, and what coordination issues can occur?

Are there coordination challenges across levels? Has there been tension or conflicting interests in any projects so far?

Topic 4: Decision-making

How are meetings arranged and how are the decisions-making in practice?

Topic 5: Sanctioning

What possibilities do you have to sanction member states, or by other means; how do you incentivize (non-)compliant member states? Does the National Implementation Plans have an incentivizing effect for increasing member state defence spending?

Topic 6: Member states involvement and control

Do you already see any alliances of strong member states pursuing the same projects?

Topic 7: Autonomy

How do you view the Secretariat's possibility to be directly involved in decision-making processes?

Topic 8: Legislation

The legal framework of PESCO is quite extensive, how is this beneficial for the Secretariat? Does this make it more difficult for member states to orient, and follow own domestic interests?

Selection 2:

Representative from the Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union in Brussels [Oral Interview in Brussels].

Representative from the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union in Brussels [Oral Interview in Brussels].

Representative from the Permanent Representation of France to the European Union in Brussels [Oral Interview in Brussels].

Representative from the Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic [Oral Interview by phone].
German expert [Oral Interview by phone].

Topic 1 General

Do you assess PESCO as a new development in European Defence? (There are plenty of defence initiatives, also regarding CSDP). How do you assess this framework concerning cooperation?

How do you view the PESCO Secretariat functioning in the framework of PESCO?

Does the Secretariat represent an *aggregated will* (the will of each respective member state) or a *common will* (the will of the EU(-level actors) or alliances of member states)?

What do you think about new member states wanting to participate, having the obligation to consult with the HR/VP first (TEU: Article 46 (3))? Are the EU-level opinions interacting in this process?

Topic 2: Capacity and communication

How do you interact with the Secretariat via the CWS? and how often is this correspondence occurring?

How often do you physically meet with representatives of the Secretariat?

Are there certain forms that needs to be filled in frequently by the Secretariat or you?

How much staff do you need to perform your tasks?

How does the EDA engage and bring together different member states in joint projects, specified in Article 45(2) in the TEU?

Topic 3: Coordination

How do you view the coordination between the member states in PESCO, and how does the Secretariat help you in the coordination?

What types of instruments does the Secretariat possess to push coordination? How does the Secretariat stimulate coordination or facilitation; ‘hands on’-, or ‘hands off’-steering? (Hands off is more intergovernmental oriented, whereas hands on would describe a more active way of pushing coordination).

Which phase of the framework is the Secretariat most active?

How is the decision-making in practice between the member states?

In Article 45 (2), TEU, there is specified “*The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary*”. How is this interpreted by you?

Are there coordination challenges across levels? How do you cope with them?

Does the Secretariat facilitate the coordination and integration in PESCO in a passive or more active way?

Topic 4: Liability and trust

How important is the liability and trust to the Secretariat for the cooperation to work?

Who is setting the agenda for the meetings? Are they driven by the member states?

Assessment of National Implementation Plans; how does the Secretariat assess them? What happens if there is a delay, are there consequences?

To what degree would you describe the Secretariat having the power to act autonomously?

Has there been conflict of interests between you and e.g. the HR/VP?

Topic 5: Decision-making

How are meetings arranged and how are the decisions-making in practice?

Topic 6: Sanctioning

What possibilities do the Secretariat have to sanction member states, or by other means; how do they incentivize (non-)compliant member states? Does the National Implementation Plans have an incentivizing effect for increasing member state defence spending?

Topic 7: Member states involvement and control (pMS Alliances)

Do you already see any alliances of strong member states pursuing the same projects?

Topic 8: Autonomy

How do you view the Secretariat's possibility to be directly involved in decision-making processes?

Topic 9: Legislation

The legal framework of PESCO is quite extensive, how does this affect your membership? Does this make it more difficult for you to orient, and follow your own domestic interests?

Topic 10: *De novo* body; Influence, executive power, control over own resources

The aspect of executive power; who is setting the agenda, who is coming up with new ideas? PESCO is called a mechanism of intergovernmentalism; how do you perceive its connection to the Commission?

9.3 Interview transcripts

Rules of transcription

The audio recorded interviews are based on parts of the transcription system of Du Bois (Svennevig, 2009). The interview transcription is divided in intonation units, in which each unit is placed on its own line. An intonation unit is a segment of speech. The units are often separated with short breaks. After each intonation unit there is a symbol marking of the intonation contour (questionable (?), terminating (.) or continuing (,))

Symbol	Meaning
(Hard shift of line)	New intonation unit
&	Intonation unit continues on the next line
.	Terminative intonation (final)
?	«questionable» (final/continuation) appeal intonation
,	Continuative intonation
..	Short pause (under 0,3 seconds)
...	Middle pause (0,3 - 0,6 seconds)
...(1,2)	Longer pause
word, [word]	Overlapping speech
[word], word	Overlapping speech. Double brackets ([[word]]) when multiple instances of proximity.
-	Terminated word
--	Terminated intonation unit
((COMMENT))	Comment on the transcription e.g. ((IMITATION))
X	Uncertain hearing (words)
<X word X>	Unintelligible (syllables)

Table compiled on the transcription system of Svennevig/Du Bois (Svennevig, 2009).

Verbal transcription

Interview with the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU

Whom: Interview respondent (J1) and interviewer (J2)

0:00 – 30:31

1. J2: Let us start with the interview on PESCO. The questionnaire is as you see- it has eight topics on PESCO's impact on European defence cooperation, whether it lingers more to intergovernmentalism or supranationalism or even a hybrid model. So, we can just go with the general questions at first. Do you assess the Permanent Structured Cooperation as a new development in European defence cooperation, is it a game-changer?

2. J1: Well, it is a new development since, well everything started with- well, not everything, but of course it comes from the list on the Treaty ((TEU)), but then from the European ((Union)) Global Strategy from 2016, and then also with Brexit as more or less; that is certainly the game-changer of the development also when it comes to European Security and Defence. So since then PESCO started and, of course it is new for the past three years. If it is or will be a game-changer I think that remains to be seen. Because so far, we have of course had some development, but we don't really know how much outcome we really will have both from the projects and the other parts of PESCO.

3. J2: As for this master's thesis, I have an emphasis on the PESCO Secretariat which consists of the EDA ((European Defence Agency)) and the EEAS ((European Union External Action Service)) and how does Sweden view their ((The Secretariat)) functioning in the framework as to now?

4. J1: I think we mainly see them as coordinating between the member states, and also when we have our meetings, not least in the Politico Military Group (PMG), where they normally always participate if we are discussing PESCO, and they are providing facilitation and coordination. Sometimes I don't think we really see any difference between any other person coming from the EEAS, whether they come from the PESCO Secretariat or the come as expert from one of the departments of the EEAS. There, we don't really distinguish between that.

5. J2: There are 25 member states in PESCO per now. The only- if there is a member state wanting to participate in the framework, there is only Malta that is a possible option and the member states have an obligation to discuss this with the HR/VP first. How do view that this is mandatory?

6. J1: For the time being, particularly when it comes to other EU member states, I don't think we really..., well we don't see it as any obstacle, because it is up to the member states whether they want to participate or not. We know why the British are not there, we know why the Danes are not there and Malta has their own reasons. I see very little difficulties, if they would want to join or if new member states would want to join, then I don't see that.. or Sweden doesn't see that as any particular obstacle, then on the other hand when it comes to third states, but we can wait with that.

7. J2: I'll jump over to the next topic if that is okay, regarding capacity and communication. You said that you had some contact with the Secretariat, but I wonder how it is functioning in real life. You have this web tool, are [you]--

8. J1: That's also what I would say, because I think there is also a distinction between people working in the capitals ((Ministry of Defence of Sweden)) and in my case in Stockholm; if they ((MoD)) want to get information et cetera, they would use that ((Web based tool: PESCO Common Workspace)). If I would need information, I would probably talk to the people working here in Brussels. Our role sitting here ((Brussels)) is of course very much when it comes to negotiations around the frameworks and developments of policies, and now we have been discussing for over a year the third state participation question, while in our case in Stockholm, when we are considering whether we would want to join a new- one of the existing projects or if we would consider looking at contacting the countries regarding their interests in the projects where we participate et cetera. Then we might, but I really think that is one of the questions that should be asked to Stockholm. I never use that web- there is no reason in the job that I'm covering here, and then sitting in negotiations, so I don't really see any need to use it from my responsibilities here.

9. J2: Here in Brussels how often do you meet with the Secretariat?

10. J1: I would say every time we are discussing a PESCO issue, they will be part of the-, so when we sit in the PMG configuration with all the member states and then the PESCO Secretariat, both from the EDA and the EEAS would always be present if we discuss a PESCO issue, so then we meet-, but of course we sit with all the member states present, but if I would have some particular question from Swedish point of view, I could either take it in plenary or I could talk on the sidelines of the meeting, or I could get in touch with them. Many of the question that Sweden would have, would often be of more technical aspects regarding different projects, and then those contexts would be taken from the capital ((Swedish MoD)). So, I mean every time PESCO is being discussed then they are present, so we could- I mean if I would want to talk to them bilaterally, I could do that.

11. J2: So, the EDA is a part of the Secretariat, and I was looking into the Treaty on the European, article 45 (2), and they are supposed to engage and bring together different member states in joint projects. How do you feel- have they done anything for Sweden regarding this?

12. J1: Yeah, but then it is not so much about PESCO, of course, I mean the projects that they also have initiated, and we also have a couple of Swedes working at the EDA and, so their main role of course would be within those projects and could of course be also when it comes to the PESCO projects. But then also their role when it comes to CARD ((Coordinated Annual Review on Defence)) and other initiatives that are clearly very much linked to PESCO. But when it comes to other- I think Sweden is participating in most of the EDA projects. So, we see them having a very important role there. When as for the PESCO projects I don't really see that we have had- I mean we haven't really had any reason to- from- and there is only one project that Sweden is heading together with France; Potentially if the EDA would have a role there, that remains to be seen I think.

13. J2: And also, coordination ((Topic 3 in the Questionnaire)); how do you view the coordination between the member states in PESCO to now? And how does the Secretariat help you in this coordination?

14. J1: To be very frank, I mean some of the projects we see- or it is easier also of course to talk about the projects where Sweden participates or is at least present as an observer. Then it is, I think to the main extent we see that it is the lead nation, or the member state leading the project which is in charge. So the EDA, or the PESCO Secretariat could of course have a role, but our experience so far is mainly that it's the lead nation inviting to meetings, also you know, leading the discussions et cetera in the project, but that is also more of a question to be put to the capital rather than- because all the projects- of course we follow to some extent then we, you know, coming from each member state we know bits about how we are participating, but normally everything is contacted from the capital. But I see a rather small role for- when it comes to the actual project for the EDA so far-, or EDA, I say EDA all the time, I mean the PESCO Secretariat. So it's a-

15. J2: [So] they don't have any kind of formal power or mechanisms to push coordination?

16. J1: Not for the projects where we ((Sweden)) are present. But-, so, I mean from our experience its more for the projects where we do participate, its more the lead nation.. they could potentially of course have a role, but <X this X> that's also why I say some of the questions, it's really the capital, it's not the PermRep (Permanent Representations to Brussels) really in charge of you know, following these specific projects et cetera. So that is why I think some of the questions should be really asked to the capital.

17. J2: Yes, so we talked about the Secretariat and coordination ((Topic 3 in the questionnaire)). Decision-making ((topic 4 in the questionnaire)), in practice you said that you meet with the Secretariat often, but how is it in the meetings, do you- how is the decision-making?

18. J1: [So] normally their role ((The PESCO Secretariat)) in our meetings- but then, its- in the meetings where you have all the member states present, even the non-PESCO, I mean,- well currently UK is not participating in our meetings but Malta is present, Denmark is present, they are not saying anything and- but they are still there. So then the Secretariat will normally present.. if there is a document or like next week there will be this PESCO workshop and then normally they would present certain things. The meeting, normally in the PMG ((Politico-Military Group) case would be the- chaired by the PMG-chairman and then the PESCO Secretariat representatives both from the EEAS and the EDA would be present in the meeting. And then the decision-making would be, if we take the example we are discussing the documents regarding the commitments for example then they would draft the documents which is then circulated to the member states which we then would discuss in the meeting, normally you know, para by para, and then all the member states present who are also participating member states in PESCO, they would- if we then have instructions from our capitals we would say, state out views and positions and if we want to change something in the draft document et cetera, so then it is up to all the participating member states to state their views, and then of course there will be a negotiation where the member states are, I would say

in the lead. It is facilitated by the chairperson ((of the PMG)), and then you know trying to find some common ground et cetera, but the role of the EEAS and the EDA would normally be rather, you know, presenting, giving information, responding to questions, but the decision-making in that sense would be the negotiations and such where the member states would state their mind and then in the end we would try to come to some solution one way or the other, so I would say, in all those meetings the role of the Secretariat would rather be, you know, giving information, facilitating the discussion and then.. well, noting all the member states' views and then coming back with the new draft building on the views from the member states et cetera. So, I would say, no decision-making role but rather you know, providing information and facilitating the discussion and such.

19. J2: So, also in the Article 45 (2) ((TEU)) there is also specified that the Agency ((EDA)) shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary. How do you interpret that?

20. J1: Yeah. If I look at our meetings also, of course the Commission is always present in the meetings, so sitting around the table apart from all the member states you always have the Commission there, so I mean, they get the same information, they get the same documents, what they do outside the meetings, yeah- I can't say that I- I don't really have any particular view on that. And I am not sure that there- you could probably ask the question also to the capital but.. Given that I mean, when we sit at the same table, we always have the three- if we talk about PESCO, we always have the three institutions present, so.. and in between the meetings of course they do meet et cetera. I can't say that I have any particular view or is aware of any particular view from you know, a Swedish standpoint, but you could also put that question to Stockholm ((MoD)), but..

21. J2: Yeah. Liability and trust ((Topic 4 in the Questionnaire)), topic 3, do you view liability and trust and especially then to the Secretariat ((of PESCO)) as an important factor to PESCO, for the success of PESCO?

22. J1: I would say that the success of PESCO is to a very, very, very large extent depending on the member states, and so far I think the Secretariat is providing- they are being very helpful, but I think whether PESCO succeeds or not, is not depending on the Secretariat or the institutions, it's very much depending on the member states.

23. J2: And we also talked about the meetings, but the- I am very interested in the National Implementation Plans because every member state has it, and how do the Secretariat assess each National Implementation Plan; what happens if there is a delay, or does it have any consequences?

24. J1: Now, we were discussing this also this morning, we have a weekly video conference with Stockholm ((MoD)) and we were talking about the Implementation Plan as we have to, I mean, the time is getting scarce now to hand it in, and Stockholm is putting the final touches, and I know from last year and of course some member states were quite late, and one thing is the time constraints, but then of course what's is put in the National Implementation Plans is quite important- or is very important. But then, and I think we all understand why there is some time- I mean, if you did not have the limitations and then some member states would

come I mean, I don't think- I think it is quite reasonable to have the timing, so you will always have someone saying that we need more time and we also come back to both from our point of view and also many other member states saying that they need to, I mean, they do similar work on the NATO side, If they are NATO allies and so.. I think we, from our point of view it is a job that has to- that needs to be done and I think it makes sense also that you should try to hand it in on time, because we then expect them ((the Secretariat)) to go through and assess what is in them, so of course then we need to give them the, you know, the background to work with, so I think we are quite- I mean we see that they do- they go- they normally do a good job and we have to provide them with the input for them to do that job so.

25. J2: Yeah, and to, the Secretariat is supposed to be one entity, like, one focal point of contact. It is based of two large entities with different directorates underneath, and for them to work as one entity, do you fell- do you have the power to act autonomously as this entity?

26. J1: If they have or?

27. J2: [Yes], the Secretariat as a whole.

28. J1: I can't really- I don't really have any view on that. It is a, no- I mean both that I haven't really asked them and I don't, I mean we- I don't think that we have any particular Swedish position on that either, so I think that's probably a question you need to ask the institutions.

29. J2: Yeah, and has there been any conflicts of interests? Between for instance the member states, Sweden, or the HR/VP?

30. J1: No, no.

31. J2: [No] okay.

32. J1: I mean not on this, I mean- no.

33. J2: Yeah, and we were talking about consequences, that there are no formal powers that the Secretariat has regarding sanctioning. So how do they incentivize non-compliant member states? Is there any form, without like the NIPs?

34. J1: I mean of course, all the member states- all the participating member states in PESCO, they have decided to participate freely and no one has forced anyone to participate, and then I mean, all but three member states have decided to be part of this, so I think it is quite clear that the incentive as such is building on, you know- your own free will and if we want to get something out of this I think- even if we- and Sweden is really pushing for light and flexible formats and we don't want to build new big organisations or you know, to have processes that are very cumbersome et cetera, but I think for most member states the incentive is just to try to make PESCO work and to get something out of it because we all do put quite some efforts into this, so I think that is the incentive as such. It is not so much- and that was also when I was reading some of the questions ((in the Questionnaire)), I don't think that we have really thought of- we are not looking at the Secretariat as you know, putting sanctions on us or anything. They are there for us, not the other way around. So. Us as member states of course.

35. J2: Yes, and you said that like Stockholm ((MoD) had much to do with the projects themselves, so you haven't seen any, like, alliances forming yet, so far?

36. J1: No, and there are of course you know, that- in every project for the members of a project or the observers, so if you want to call that an alliance, but that is- but other than that- I mean, PESCO- the whole initiative as such is one thing, and then each and every project is of course you know, separate parts within the main initiative, so, the only alliances or say, like-minded discussions that clearly have been very very present for the past one, two- one and a half year, is really the issue related to third-state participation.

37. J2: Yes, we were also talking about decision-making, the Secretariat's possibility to be directly involved, and topic 8 legislation ((Topic 9 the Questionnaire)) because the entire framework is kind of complex. How does this affect member states' membership of PESCO? Is it difficult to orient? Are you dependent of the Secretariat to contribute?

38. J1: No, I wouldn't say that, I think also- and this is something I can't say for other member states, but I think in the Swedish case there has been a lot of focus on the projects and looking at what can we get out from the specific project, while here in Brussels between- in our meetings, and when I talk to my colleagues we are talking a lot more about the commitments and there of course you come back to the issue certain member states wanting to have a two percent ((of GDP)) you know, if there are NATO allies and some of them, particularly the ones who are, you know, providing two percent or more to NATO, they would like to have the same- more or less have the same commitments here, while others even those who are both allies and EU members, definitely don't want to have that. Germany for example doesn't want to have any figures, and many others doesn't really want that either, but here so much more focus is put on the commitments and of course if you look at the commitments and when it comes to legislation, your own national legislation, your own planning processes et cetera. There, I know in our case, looking at the commitments which we have signed up to, and then comparing to, you know, our own national process, there are some challenges and I think that this goes for possibly most member states also. We have signed up to this, but can we really follow this. And I think this would probably be the most interesting part of the strategic review also. Both for us nationally, but also for the whole group of participating member states in PESCO. Of course, that could also- the lead framework could affect that also, but either than that- And also with your question there with the domestic interests, that's a part of that, and then also what- even if we ((Sweden)) are not members or allies in NATO as very active NATO-partners, of course we are looking at what's happening within NATO and our possibilities to, in our partnership also provide input to what's going on within NATO to the extent possible et cetera, because that is also something in our meetings here, some of the member states who are both allies ((of NATO)) and members ((of PESCO)) they say; "yeah but for us who belong to both the organizations, we need to look at these different organizations we are a part of", but we ((Sweden)) have, I would say, very much the similar position. So even if we are not NATO-allies, we need to look at where we want to provide and participate on that side also. That could clearly also affect our domestic processes.

39. J2: I think that was my last question actually. Do you have anything to add or?

40. J1: Not really, well rather more a question then. I mean, some of the questions ((in the Questionnaire)) make me think of that the institutions here, their role, and I mean I was reading your outline that you (the Interviewer)) are looking at the intergovernmental the supranational et cetera. And so far at least when it comes to PESCO, I think it still works very much intergovernmental, but then of course that also remains to be seen with new setup, and with the role of the Commission, and to the extent, the European Defence Fund is also, I mean, to some extent is linked definitely to PESCO, depending on the type of projects et cetera. So in the long run, the institutions could have more of a say than our current experience, so I think that remains to be seen given not least, given that this is all developing, and if you ask the same questions in a years' time when the PESCO- the overview has been finalized the responses might be slightly different so.

41. J2: What do you mean with the new set up?

42. J1: I mean, the role of what- how much more, say, active the Commission would be with the Directorate General ((DG DEFIS)), when it comes to also defence industry, some of the projects are industry related, some are not and-. Depending on also the type of projects in PESCO and the role of EDF ((European Defence Fund)) and behind the EDF the role of the Commission.

43. J2: Well, thank you very much for the interview!

Interview with the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU

Whom: Interview respondent (J1) and interviewer (J2)

0:00 – 28:38

1. J2: Let's start.

2. J1: Yes.

3. J2: We could probably take the general topic first --

4. J1: [Yeah]

5. J2: And start from the bottom, down.

6. J1: Yeah.

7. J2: So, how do you assess PESCO as a new development in European Defence? There are plenty of defence initiatives existing-

8. J1: [mhm X]

9. J2: Also in the Common Security and Defence Policies

10. J1: Yeah

11. J2: So, how do you assess this framework concerning cooperation?

12. J1: Well I would say that PESCO is definitely one of the most significant initiatives that we have launched during the last three years- last two years, so PESCO and European Defence Fund, for me are the, well, the initiatives that are, can be, game changers, though of course there is still much work to do. And why I think that PESCO is a special and important initiative is that it is legally binding unlike other defence initiatives that we have been launching. So, the twenty commitments that the member states have made to each other are legally binding. It is a different framework and it's also in this perspective or I think that it's the commitments that have the most potential. I know that we are many times concentrating X more on the projects which is understandable since it's easier for the public also to understand that you are doing these concrete projects, unlike the commitments which are quite I don't know if you ((The interviewer)) have read them X which are quite detailed and not so easy. But still I would say those are the heart of PESCO and as you know they include the increasing of defence budgets et cetera which is of course is kind of the starting point for everything.

13. J2: [Yes]

14. J1: So, this would be my answer.

15. J2: The National Implementation Plans; I have actually read the Finnish one-

16. J1: Is it public? Oh good.

17. J2: Yeah, it was.

18. J2: Could you elaborate more on that? The Finnish National Implementation plan. How do you feel you meet your criteria?

19. J1: Well, average.. I would say that in some parts as regards to the defence investments for example, we meet the criteria well.. but this also has to do because we have big procurements upcoming in the following years, but- so there are areas where we are quite good but where we have difficulties, is giving information about the future activities for example as regards to European Defence Fund and which activities we would be taken part in and that was also something that was commented to us in the assessment of our National Implementation Plan, so plenty of work for us to do but we are trying, and I think one- well for us, and for all the member states the key issue and why it's also taking a bit longer to really achieve what we are saying in the commitments is that we need to integrate these into the national defence planning. It takes time, it doesn't help if the EU people are very enthusiastic and keen on implementing the commitments but then you have to get it to the different studies, different reports and then to defence forces' planning. And this is what we are working on.

20. J2: Yeah. And to the Secretariat-

21. J1: [mhm]

22. J2: How do you view the Secretariat functioning in the framework of PESCO? They're supposed to be like a focal point of communication-

23. J1: [Yes]

24. J2: to ex-

25. J1: They give the kind of the, well.. they support us in what we do and they are exactly the point of contact if someone wants to ask about PESCO from the institutions so they can provide kind of centrally the information. But what could I say, I think their job has, or they have performed their job in a professional way. We see it especially once a year when they produce the assessment, well the HR produces the assessment report about the commitments and the projects and they ((The Secretariat)) are the ones' drafting it, I see that they have the supporting role in PESCO, but it is still, really strongly member states driven. But they are helping us, in a very professional way I would say and I haven't really heard about problems or troubles in the way they are working, so you know it is the EDA, the EEAS, together with the EUMS and at least towards member states it has been okay. Of course maybe you know that the National Implementation Plan is assessed towards certain criteria and of course we can still in the future discuss the best way that the Secretariat can assist the National Implementation Plans et cetera, so there is maybe further work to be done, and the methods, but overall we are happy.

26. J2: I actually heard that there was some reorganization within the Secretariat-

27. J1: [Yeah]

28. J2: Like, the Capability Directorate ((CAP Directorate))-

29. J1: Yeah

30. J2: Was reorganizing as well as the CMPD

31. J1: [Yes, because-]

32. J2: X, yeah, how do you find information about that?

33. J1: Yeah, I don't know too detailed about that neither, so I don't.. their internal, how they are organizing, I haven't really followed it.

34. J2: I see, you said that you have regularly contact with the Secretariat.

35. J1: No, not that much. It's because you have to report to the Secretariat once a year with the projects report, and that is done from the Finnish capital ((Finnish Ministry of Defence)). The National Implementation Plans are also assessed from Finland ((MoD)). They are the ones officially contacting the Secretariat. And also when you report about ((PESCO-)) projects, that is made via the Common Workspace, the electronic workspace. It is our projects people et cetera, so it is not me, but I know the people from the Secretariat, I can easily call them if there is need to and they sometimes come to presents some progress or some report to my working group. So I have easy access if there is need. They are always available and if there are questions, no problem, you just ask them, but otherwise there is no necessity for regular contact with them all the time. If the member states have questions they can address the Secretariat.

36. J2: Maybe we can talk about coordination, for topic 3 ((in the Questionnaire)). How do you view the coordination between the member states in PESCO and how to they ((The Secretariat)) help you in with the coordination?

37. J1: The Secretariat has a big role when we are planning the new batches of projects. There they really help the member states to find each other; that member states will have similar interests to start a new project, so they ((The Secretariat)) have been organizing these match making workshops et cetera, where they bring different interests together, a place for member states do discuss. So there I think they have a big role and they have been really helpful and maybe in other parts of PESCO the commitments and when we are negotiating them they don't have too much of a coordinating role, they draft the documents. As regards to member states coordination, in projects that is done mainly in the workshops arranged by the Secretariat and then between capitals ((MoD's)); depending on the interests, and who are interested in going in the same direction and in the projects. Now we are going to start, quite early next year to discuss the first strategic phase of PESCO from 2018, 2020 and its achievements and what should be maybe changed or being done better and if we would have to modify the commitments. There member states would probably from some alliances, or if they are like-minded on something or agreeing on other aspects, so I think we will step up the coordination between different groups, different member states, soon again, but maybe there is not one general answer. It depends always on the topic, on the phase of PESCO if there is more coordination needed or if it is more automatic and it goes through the Secretariat, but it depends.

38. J2: So they don't have any concrete instruments to push coordination?

39. J1: No.

40. J2: So, which phase of the framework is the Secretariat most active?

41. J1: The assessment, let's say they have a big role there to assess the National Implementation Plans and also what the national project coordinators have reported to them on the advancement and progress.. of the projects. It's a big assessment for them to make. Also, when we choose the new projects, the Secretariat has to assess them, so throughout the year they have always these permanent tasks. That is how it is defined in PESCO decisions.

42. J2: [Do you feel they have] enough staff to help every member state?

43. J1: I don't know about their ((The Secretariat)) staffing situation. Also, member states have a possibility to consult them bilaterally, as regards to national implementation plans et cetera, so they really provide their services. Maybe you ((the interviewer)) could also have a word with them ((The Secretariat)), so they could tell you more generally about the staffing and these kind of things.

44. J2: I have also made a question about article 45, point two, where it is specified that the Agency ((the EDA)) shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary. How do you interpret this?

45. J1: I think I was the one who was supporting this one when we negotiated the—so the Agency is the EDA, no?

46. J2: Yes.

47. J1: Because the Commission does not have any formal specific role, but in the decision ((Establishing PESCO)) things like this have been written out. The Commission can help if the member states so wish, because PESCO has links to the European Defence Fund, so projects that are in PESCO can get a bonus from the European Defence Fund, so for example in that case it is useful that you can also consult with the Commission as regards to projects et cetera. So, if needed it is important that the Commission can also help and they know what is happening if the PESCO project is trying to get funding from the EDF, they can also help and give their advice. It means practically that.

48. J2: Yes, it is the ten percent bonus, isn't it?

49. J1: Yes, so it is useful, beneficial also to keep in touch with the Commission at least if you want to have the EDF funding. That is the purpose.

50. J2: Has there been any challenges so far regarding to coordination? Have there been any challenges as you can see?

51. J1: Do you mean within the PESCO Secretariat, or in general?

52. J2: In general, either with the Secretariat or between member states.

53. J1: [member states] I don't know, because if we are talking about the projects I don't have great visibility since it is very much the national people and from the defence forces et cetera who really do that. Probably there is always something that you can do better, but I don't have any examples to give you. Now that we will discuss the future of PESCO, I think the coordination and how it can be done better or if it is sufficient that will be one topic that we will also discuss. But to my eyes it has been okay.

54. J2: All right, let's move over to liability and trust. Is that an important factor? How important is liability to for example the Secretariat for the cooperation to really work?

55. J1: It is. I think that they ((The Secretariat)) are trustable and transparent. I think-- at least I haven't heard otherwise or any member state complaining neither. The last time, this year when the new projects were elected and the Secretariat handles the process, I think everyone was praising how much better and more mature the processes are this time than the first time. Of course its natural also, because we started in quite a rush and of course the mechanisms and procedures developed. So, its important and I haven't really seen problems there. And of course liability and trust between member states are also important.

56. J2: We were also talking about that the Ministry of Defence of Finland met with the Secretariat. This meetings; who are setting the Agenda. Are they member states driven?

57. J1: Well, The Secretariat, if they meet with the capital (MoD) it is to prepare or to help with the Finnish National Implementation Plan, so I supposed that is the broad issue for the agenda, and then you would go through the National Implementation Plan together and see

where the challenges are. So I would say that both are involved in setting the agenda. And I understand what you ((the interviewer)) are trying to ask here as regards to setting the agenda. But It really depends because, if we are negotiating in my working group PMG ((Politico-Military Group)) something about PESCO recommendations for the future, or this is one example 'roadmap', then it is an EEAS led working group and then it is EEAS who is setting the agenda. But still I wouldn't say that the EEAS or the Secretariat is somehow stealing PESCO from the intergovernmental framework, so we need the Secretariat and the EEAS to kick us forward and to push us forward. They are there to do that, but still it remains-- nothing happens if the member states don't want to.

58. J2: About the relation to the HR/VP, has there been any conflict of interest between Finland and--

59. J1: No, we always love the institutions, more the Commission and the EEAS, we are quite-- I mean that, we are not-- defence is intergovernmental but we see that there is an important added value that the institutions can bring, also the Commission and the EEAS and really to push us forward and this wouldn't have been possible without the EEAS help and support neither. This is not PESCO, but when we talk about the role of the Commission, without the EDF ((European Defence Fund)) and the Commission's really strong push to put defence to the agenda, it would have been different. Now it is much more visible for Finland we appreciate that. Of course there are some limits, but in general no conflicts.

60. J2: Maybe we can talk about topic five; sanctioning, because there aren't any formal very strong ways to sanction member states. There aren't any institutions that have any real power. How is it that member states get incentivized? What is the role of the NIPs ((National Implementation Plans))? Is that the incentive that is the more clearest?

61. J1: Yeah it is true, we have been discussing many times also in working groups the stick and the carrot and how we should proceed. It is true that currently- well in the treaty ((Treaty on the EU, TEU, article 46, (4,5))) there is the possibility that you can kick someone out if someone would not apply to the commitment. Politically I don't see it feasible, at least not currently because it is such a big group; twenty-five member states. Maybe it would have been different if it would have been a small core group where you really would have needed to apply. As we are talking about a broad and different group of member states, at least in the near future, I don't see that no one would be kicked out. But the National Implementation Plans, the intention is exactly to keep the other member states posted on what ones are doing and to create peer pressure but so far in a more positive way. So, kind of not shaming one but through praising. Through the National Implementation Plan, Finland got feedback that here you could do something better and this was good and this is distributed to all member states. This is seen as a way to encourage the member states, but yeah there are no sanctions and I don't know if- it would be difficult to decide on sanctions but decisions must be unanimous, but it is possible that little by little PESCO could be more ambitious and lets see how move forward, if it looks like that member states really are not applying with the commitments, what could be done then? Now it's a bit too early because we just launched PESCO, also we need time because there is a bit of fatigue with all the documents which we have been working on for two years with revisions and new documents and decisions and

governments rules et cetera, so you also need time to really integrate all this to the national planning as I said before, so lets see in the future if we need sanctions but now we just really need to get this getting better.

62. J2: Yeah, could we go back to the general questions because if there is a member state that wants to participate, lets see, probably not the UK or Denmark.

63. J1: [There is Malta still, incredible!]

64. J2: Yes, if they wanted to participate, you have to discuss it with the HR/VP first.

65. J1: That means practically that you discuss it with the PESCO Secretariat, or something like that, and I don't remember how the process goes, I think it comes from the Treaty ((TEU)) or the Council decision establishing PESCO, I don't remember the history, the idea is a consultation process after which probably all the others except Malta are on board. It wouldn't be too difficult for them to join. But I think that the history, do you remember if this is from the Treaty or is it from the Council-

66. J2: It is from the Treaty I think.

67. J1: Yeah, so that would make more sense also because in the Treaty the idea of PESCO initially was a small group of ambitious member states. But now that we are twenty-five that isn't so relevant I would say, anymore, because it is only Malta who is out because of the Denmark opt-out and the UK is a different story so.

68. J2: Okay, so we have been through sanctioning and you were- I think in the beginning you were talking a bit about alliances between member states, and you talked about that they are pursuing- if member states have the same preferences, do they pursue the same projects? Or is it--

69. J1: Yeah, it always depends on the topic I would say, the alliance in Finland's case, the alliances always change regarding the topic, so we don't have- of course there are some like-minded countries that we normally agree, but not always. It depends on the question. I think that the next opportunity to again see how the alliances are going to look like is the beginning of the year ((2020)) when we start to review the next PESCO phase et cetera. It was when we launched PESCO, there was a strong alliance between Germany, France, Italy and Spain and also Finland, Estonia and the Dutch joined afterwards. But then when we had proceeded it has been depending on the topic we have agreed, not always with these countries. So lets se.

70. J2: I think I have to take the last question on legislation because the legal framework on PESCO is quite extensive--

71. J1: [You] mean the twenty commitments? Or?

72. J2: I mean, yeah maybe. Is PESCO that complex that member states have to, being forced to go to the Secretariat to get help kind of, or?

73. J1: I would at least say some, it is quite complex, because as regards to exactly the twenty commitments and their explanation, so they are very detailed and when we were negotiating them I remember that for Finland it was difficult because there are some commitments

clearly, or the explanations for the commitments that are very difficult to apply with, because we don't know that much about the future plans as regards as for example the European Defence Fund et cetera. It is a big-, it is a lot of work to update the National Implementation Plan and really to see what we are doing in all those fields, I would say that it is a challenge. If the commitments could be somehow streamlined, this is a question for the future, for the next one year also. I think that would help us, so probably we wouldn't like to make the commitments even more complicated, but somehow easier to understand and execute at the national level. I think this is our general stand.

74. J2: All right, I think I have actually asked the questions that I wanted to ask.

75. J1: Very good.

76. J2: [Yes]. Do you want to add something, or?

77. J1: No, probably not. I can write you if I remember something else.

78. J2: Thank you very much!

79. J1: No, thank you, it was very nice.

Interview with representative from the Czech Ministry of Defence

Whom: Interview respondent (J1) and interviewer (J2)

0:00 – 28:07

1. J2: We can probably start with topic one, the general one ((in the questionnaire)). Because as we know, PESCO is a new development in European defence, and how do you assess PESCO? There are also plenty of initiatives being established from the CSDP ((Common Security and Defence Policies)); so how do you assess this so far, concerning cooperation?

2. J1: Well, at the moment our position is; we support PESCO and the other initiatives that you have mentioned, the EDF ((European Defence Fund)), CARD ((Coordinated Annual Review on Defence)), and others, but we think that, and this is the main focus for 2020, that we should assess other, especially for other X, now we are talking mainly about PESCO; whether we have reached the objectives for the initiative or whether we should assess how to move forward, and how to let's say, change criteria for the projects, and how to change the criteria for the overall initiative. Many member states of PESCO are saying that there is little focus on the operational dimension, and the Czech Republic supports this. So basically, we are happy that these initiatives are taking place, but at the same time we feel that the criteria for projects within PESCO, the EDF, should be, let's say, more adjusted to the needs of the member states and also what the EU needs to do in the defence area.

3. J2: Yeah, I see, but as for my master's thesis I am focusing especially on the PESCO Secretariat, and how do you view in general, the PESCO Secretariat functioning in the framework of PESCO?

4. J1: Well, one thing that I should say, we feel that the PESCO Secretariat is rather understaffed. Because you have let's say two three people that are doing PESCO projects, CARD and basically all the other EU defence initiatives. So, we believe that it ((PESCO Secretariat)) should be expanded in terms of personnel, in terms of budget, that should be assigned to it. And, if we talk the first, second wave and the third wave of PESCO, we don't have any problems with the PESCO Secretariat. Our cooperation is working quite well, but as I said before we feel it should be expanded. And there should be one thing that I would mention, we ((The PESCO Secretariat)) also need analysts, because at the moment the PESCO Secretariat, most people are doing, let's say, office work, in putting the information at the member states sent to some kind of database, or checking if one database is basically the same as the other. But we also need analyst, who would say "This is how PESCO should work" for 2022 to 2025, and at the moment the PESCO Secretariat doesn't have, at least from our view, this capacity.

5. J2: Okay, so in terms- when the Czech Republic is interacting with the Secretariat, you do it via the web-platform, the web-solution? What is it called? I am wondering how you are corresponding with the Secretariat when you are cooperating?

6. J1: Well, our correspondence or cooperation with the Secretariat is either by email, as you know for PESCO there is a special database, common working space where we can put in all our changes, for projects, whether we lead on one project, or projects where we are observers or full members, and there is always the X DOC X each member state of PESCO who is able to do the changes within the database, and the national DOC for PESCO- then by email or by phone. I would say that the communication goes quite well. It is always two-three people within the PESCO Secretariat who are responding to all the questions that you send them, and on our side it is also two or three people, either in the Ministry of Defence ((CZ)) or at the general staff, where these people are responsible for sending the information to the PESCO Secretariat. But as you have asked before, on the practical level the communication works quite well.

7. J2: Yeah, I see. Do you often physically meet with the representatives from the Secretariat?

8. J1: We meet either when they come to the MoD, which is mostly when the EU is doing the evaluation of the National Implementation Plans, or CARD initiative, or on the other hand when the EU, the EDA once in a while, which would be three times a year, four times a year maybe, would organize seminars related to PESCO, to the CARD initiative, and there would be different people coming from the Ministry ((of Defence)). The PESCO seminars are about twice a year.

9. J2: And there is question on topic two ((in the Questionnaire)) about capacity and communication, because in the Treaty ((TEU)), it is specified that the EDA is to engage and bring together different member states in PESCO projects. How do they do it practically?

10. J1: The EDA, has from our point of view, limited capacities to do that. For some of the PESCO projects, at least on four of the projects of the first wave ((of PESCO projects)), especially Military Mobility, PESCO has arranged, the PESCO Secretariat, the EDA, has arranged that they would be in charge of the project. They would facilitate all the

communication between the member states, between, let's say the EDA, so they would be basically in charge of the project. As far as I know, this is the only project within the three waves of PESCO, where the EDA has taken, let's say' the lead role. Otherwise, PESCO can, the PESCO Secretariat, the EDA, can help you with facilitating communication between the member states in each individual project, but since you have this CWS, Common Working Space, you can do everything within this framework. You don't really need the EDA to facilitate the communication.

11. J2: This brings me up with a following question on topic six ((in the Questionnaire)) actually, because do you already see any alliances of for example strong member states, and that you are pursuing the same projects after you preferences?

12. J1: Well, we see this, and we also see that certain projects which are submitted within the PESCO initiative, initially within the third wave, will also be submitted within the X EDDIB X, slash EDF ((European Defence Fund)), so the problem is that some countries have taken the PESCO, let's say as an entry gate to the EDF, and in case of some projects, we have seen, this is mainly for the third wave that there was already an arranged number of participating PESCO member states, other states were basically not welcome to participate either as observers or as full members within the projects. At this point, I would not like to talk about specific projects, but this was basically the problem that we have already seen that certain projects were pre-arranged by certain member states of PESCO, that they were already prepared for- submission within the European Defence Fund, and that no other PESCO member state were welcome to join the project.

13. J2: I understand, could we talk about coordination on topic three ((in the Questionnaire)). We have talked a bit about alliances, but the general coordination between the member states of PESCO; do you feel that the Secretariat help you with this coordination in general?

14. J1: Well, we normally do the things on bilateral level, so if we know that certain states are interested in for example joining our projects or if we cooperate with other states and projects that are lead and coordinated by the states, we usually do it on bilateral level. So I can give you an example, for our project in the area of Electronic warfare ((PESCO project: Electronic warfare capability and interoperability programme for future joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) cooperation))), where Latvia has expressed previously numerous times, an interest of join the project. When we sent a letter to the Latvian representative of the MoD, if they would reconsider, we did it on bilateral basis. We didn't go through the EU or the EDA.

15. J2: In which phase do you feel the, of the framework, is the Secretariat most active in its work?

16. J1: Well, if I could say this, it would be on supporting, let's say, the projects in the administrative-logistical phase. So, providing space and on the premises of the EDA, I would not say so much in facilitating communication, because this is mostly the responsibility of PESCO member states. So mainly towards the administrative area.

17. J2: They ((The Secretariat)) are also in charge of the National Implementation Plans?

18. J1: No. This is the responsibility- well they are in charge in terms of collecting the information from PESCO member states, but they are only basically collecting the information and then passing it to a higher level.

19. J2: In the Treaty, in article 45, point two, there is specified that the agency, the EDA, shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary. How is this interpreted by you? Is the Commission active in the framework ((of PESCO))?

20. J1: We hope not, we believe that its only about passing information. So, the EDA of the PESCO Secretariat passes the information to the Commission. They are not in support of a stronger role of the European Commission within the PESCO framework.

21. J2: If we also are talking about an EU level institution, and ties with the HR/VP, there is also specified that if new member states where to join the cooperation, the only possibility would be perhaps be Malta. If they want to participate you ((all the pMS)) have the obligation to consult with the HR/VP first, so do you fell that EU level institutions, or if their opinions are interacting in the process?

22. J1: Well, in general, if you are asking for our opinion, we believe that all, either, EU states that have not joined PESCO, which would be the UK, well the UK is leaving so, Malta, and also the third ((third state participation)) states should have the opportunity to join PESCO projects.

23. J2: Yes.

24. J1: This has, as you know, so far, have not been resolved, so we are still waiting for the final decision from the European level. Our position is that all EU states and third states which are partners, allies of the EU, should be able to join our PESCO projects under previously specified and agreed rules. But, if you look at the situation now within the EU and probably as you already know, there are some differences between the member states. The Czech Republic belongs to the 'party' that supports a more broad approach to the third state participation. We would definitely support third state participation without- we would like to make it less restrictive than some other states find ((e.g.)) Greece.

25. J2: [Yeah, I know that-]

26. J1: [This is] basically our position, and this applies to states within the EU that have not joined the PESCO initiative and outside the EU. Third states.

27. J2: So it is basically up to the member states themselves-

28. J1: [Yes], but unfortunately, we have not been able to reach any compromises so far. The Finnish presidency of the EU ((Council of the European Union)) was trying to do this, but they failed. The Croatian presidency is coming up with a new plan, but we don't put our fingers crossed.

29. J2: Maybe we can go to the topic about liability and trust ((in the Questionnaire)) and I am wondering when you for example are meeting with the Secretariat, who is setting the agenda for the meetings? Are they member states driven?

30. J1: Member states driven.

31. J2: Yeah, okay, yes. And, do you feel- to what degree would you describe the Secretariat having the power to act autonomously?

32. J1: Power. They also need to inform their superiors, and as you mentioned in the last question; it's member states driven. So, at this point the PESCO Secretariat from my point of view is mostly intermediary between- contact point between the member states and the European Commission.

33. J2: We were talking about the National Implementation Plans before, and I haven't really seen if there are any possibilities for example for the Secretariat to sanction member states, or by other means maybe incentivize non-compliant member states, but [maybe the National-]

34. J1: [This is] really, like I said before, and I will totally agree with you, this is not something that the Secretariat could do.

35. J2: Okay.

36. J1: The Secretariat, at this point, if nothing changes in the future, is only gathering information for the National Implementation Plans, and then it is up to the EU, but I would again emphasize one thing, in comparison to NATO, the EU doesn't really have, at this point, a mechanism to sanction the member states for not implementing the NIPs. NATO structures, which are relevant, has this power, so you always have to take into account the difference between NATO and the EU.

37. J2: Yes, but during this two-year period, have you seen that the National Implementation Plans maybe could have an incentivizing effect for increasing defence spending?

38. J1: Well, it certainly does have an effect, but if you look at the structure of, lets say, defence planning, most of European states, both members of NATO and the EU, you will see the first level of priorities; national defence planning, second level is NATO, third level is the EU. So it has a certain effect on the national defence planning, we try to synchronize our national defence priorities; the international level between NATO and the EU, but at least from our point of view the EU is always, lets say, how to put it, NATO is a military alliance, so NATO is a priority, within the EU, common differences will be seen as part of the activities that we do, so when there would be any decision-making between lets say, priority between, national planning, NATO, the EU, the EU would be third priority.

39. J2: I think I have one last question for you about the legal framework of PESCO, because it is quite complex, and do you feel that this have effected member states, or yours membership because all the commitments requires much [capacity?]

40. J1: [I] would say that this is a question that has not only been raised by you, but in fact it has been raised by many of the member states of PESCO. As you probably know we are now undergoing a strategic revision of PESCO, 2020. Hopefully we should be completed by June this year ((2020)) and this should also include a look on how legislatively the framework of PESCO works, whether there are any major problems. From our point, and we have been saying this for quite a long time, one thing is to, lets say, decrease the number of reports,

documents that we have to send to the EDA and to the EU, and one other thing which is related to this, to somehow allow for the comprehensive evaluation of the information that is sent to the EU. We send some information within the National Implementation Plan, we send some information within CARD, we send some information within PESCO projects, either as leading on one project and other projects where we are members or observers; this should be all put into one database where all, let say the responsible people, and all the PESCO countries could access this, rather than sending the same information three or four times over. Which, as I would say the last time, is something that we have been saying to the EU for at least the least three or four years. This is again tied to the question you have been asking before about the effectivity of the PESCO Secretariat; if they would have one database to get everything together it would be much easier.

41. J2: Well, thank you very much for your answers, do you [have anything-]

42. J1: [Can] I ask you when you have final report or product, can I get it?

43. J2: Of course, I will send it to all my interviews. It is in May or June I have to turn it in.

44. J1: Yeah. Don't hurry, but just- thank you very much for calling.

45. J2: Thank you.

46. J1: If you have any other questions, just send me an email or call me.

47. J2: Yeah, thank you very much. Bye.

Interview with the German expert

Whom: Interview respondent (J1) and interviewer (J2)

0:14 – 02:09

1. J2: Yes, this is Andreas Gravidahl.

2. J1: Hello, pleased to meet you.

3. J2: Nice to meet you too. Thank you for taking time. How are you?

4. J1: Well, good, good. Okay, yeah I just spent the last ten minutes, actually scanning through the abstract of your paper and the questions you have sent around. And before we really start, let me just make two or three preliminary remarks, first of; well, what I am saying to you is by personal, well professional of course, view based on my experience so far, so this is not an official statement from Germany, from the Government et cetera.

5. J2: [Okay]

6. J1: And this would also state the coordination within et cetera, but you know all that I believe. And, secondly, just to give you an idea of what I am in charge for here, and what I am able to provide you with information as a consequence. So amongst other topics for what

is interesting for you- I am in charge of ((Classified)), so this might be for sure of interest, as I have looked at your questionnaire, and I am for the ((Classified)).

3:11 – 15:48

7. J2: Let's start with topic one, the general questions. Do you have the Questionnaire in front of you?

8. J1: Yes.

9. J2: PESCO, is as you know a very new development in European defence, and also regarding CSDP there is a lot of other defence initiatives, so regarding cooperation how do you assess the framework so far in 2020?

10. J1: Well actually, I think that the role of the Secretariat; you have a between 25 independent member states, and now you need to have some kind of 'working muscle' to make it work – to help communication interacting, because if we ((all pMS)) all do that like with big email XX lists, bilaterally, multilaterally. You need to have a central point where all comes together, and that's the term I like to use for that, the 'working muscle', helping us to communicate with each other, to coordinate with each other et cetera. So, that's the issue the 'spider in the web', without some kind of, as you present, aggregated will, because they are not at the same level, that's what I would say, as we the member states. They are just the ones helping us to communicate with each other, and to coordinate with each other, so they do not represent some kind of aggregated common will et cetera. They are a working muscle for us, and an instrument for coordination and for easing cooperation and coordination. That's how I would sum up the role of the Secretariat.

11. J2: Yes.

12. J1: And that's why I do not somehow see some kind of intergovernmental approach coming in from that because that is perfectly...- everything is owned by the member states.

13. J2: There are the bodies existing in the Secretariat, they are from the EU-level as you said, and for the fourth question here ((in the Questionnaire)); what do you think about new member states who wants to participate, but they ((pMS)) have the obligation to consult with the HR/VP, and the HR/VP is not directly from the member states.

14. J1: Actually, I have no clue about...- because there is only, well for the time being three but, surely two possible new member states ((of PESCO)).

15. J2: Yeah, there is always Malta.

16. J1: Yes, and Denmark.

17. J2: Yes, but Denmark has an opt-out ((on EU Security and Defence)), but Malta [is a possibility]

18. J1: [Yes], that is not really an option, but Malta might be, but I have no idea what the procedures are set down, I mean you might actually be more familiar in the all framework

documents governance rules than I am. If it says something on the process of how to adapt or doesn't it, and that's the reason why you are asking.

19. J2: I was just wondering.

20. J1: Because actually my gut feeling is that <X participation X> has nothing to do with the High Representative.

21. J2: Can you say that again?

22. J1: Because that would just make a scenery, because if it's not written down as such. I think they could just issue a statement, whatever bring it in, they would not have to consult the HR first or but it is something in the documents about it actually?

23. J2: Yeah it is. It is [in..-]

24. J1: [They] have to 'consult'?

25. J2: Yes, but it is written in the Article 46 ((TEU: Article 46 (3))), I think. I don't have it in front of my right now but. Could we probably go to capacity and communication ((Topic 2 in the Questionnaire))?

26. J1: We interact a lot regarding the NIPs ((National Implementation Plans)).

27. J2: Okay, through the web-based communication platform?

28. J1: No, actually, but they do provide information there and that is really helpful, so for example looking for products being made by other member states, like for example their previous NIPs et cetera, if they appear with a classification marking allowing the submission there by a common workspace. Mostly it is interacting directly by email and phone calls. Also if there are bigger issues, then we have 'bilaterals' or we meet, but that is rather rare, but that happens as well. Normally for communications there are specific contact, with specific project officers, if it is distributed with country or regions, then it is contact by email or phone; a lot of email back and forth and that is a good flow of information. That is mostly not via this workspace.

29. J2: Okay, so you do not often physically meet with the representatives from the Secretariat?

30. J1: Well, not that often, because going to Brussels, or they coming here, that is always a lot of travel time and costs money as well. We do that for bigger things. If they ((the Secretariat)) invite for bilateral meetings to prepare the NIP, then we meet, but for day to day work, it is mainly by phone calls, but it is not excluded. So we have met..- and then if you meet on other occasions, then you take of course the time to discuss with them on the side and then you discuss issues as well. But really the day to day work is email and telephone with them.

31. J2: And you know the EDA is a part of the Secretariat, and it is specified in the Treaty ((TEU)) in Article 45, they are supposed to engage and bring different member states in joint projects; do you see that they are active in this process?

32. J1: I did not understand the line perfectly, is that in your Questionnaire somewhere?

33. J2: Yes, it is on topic 2, the last question?

34. J1: Yes, actually think they do all that if you look at the big rocks in PESCO and where the Secretariat has a bigger role to play, coordination et cetera; they do that in a very active and proactive way which is a good thing. So, they invite to meetings, they organize the meetings, they provide the framework, so I see that actually in a proactive way what they are doing.

35. J2: So, they are kind of setting the agenda for the meetings?

36. J1: Setting the agenda? I wouldn't say so. That is really a coordinating role where they provide the framework, but not giving us a hard <X sect X> where we can't change, where we can't do, so it is still clear who owns the process and who does that, but as long as they ((the Secretariat)) have 'freeway' on the other hand for example by governance rules they execute that of course. But this isn't our proper interest, but I wouldn't say that they overrule us, or that they are the drivers of that process. So that they are the agenda-setters, that I wouldn't say. And actually, if they executed parts of the governance et cetera, then we have written it down, we the member states in first place. And have given them before hand the, not really the authority, but we have handed them in their coordinating function to that in advance, but agenda-setters, I wouldn't call it that way. But they are really proactive facilitators.

37. J2: Yeah, so let's move over to topic three, coordination ((in the Questionnaire)), and we probably continue on the EDA, also specified as the 'Agency'. Also, in Article 45 ((45 (2) in TEU)) there is specified that the Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary and how do you view that? [that the commission has to-]

38. J1: [Yes] I have read that two or three times, but to me I do not have a link where the Commission is very predominant so I have no idea how they interact. To me it is not visible that they do when it comes to my topics, so for this I can't really tell you anything.

39. J2: But more in general, how do you view the coordination between the member states in PESCO so far, and we were talking a bit about the Secretariat helping you in that way. How do you see it so far?

40. J1: Well you have different phases on communication between PESCO- and PESCO actually is what's really has improved amongst its member states. That is one of the very big workings of PESCO as such, and really a success story. So I would say there is two ways where PESCO as such has improved; consultation and communication amongst the member states. So there is the one you are looking at which is where the PESCO Secretariat comes into play and has a role, but this is then all in a formalized process for specific areas such as for example the next wave of PESCO projects the National Implementation Plans, strategic review of PESCO what so ever. So that is formalities which are known, and that is really now helpful to have a working muscle, as said in the beginning, which helps coordinate all which is pre-set in the governance rules of PESCO as such and that is done very good by the Secretariat; they have an important role in that. But then there is another aspect, and that is the

interaction of the member states without the involvement of the Secretariat which happens as well. So if you look at for example the project level, it does not include the totality of the member states, but if there are initiatives then you go bilateral or with multiple other partners and then you coordinate. That is without, basically in the first steps, without engagement of the Secretariat, so that happens as well. And for the policy directorates in general, I mean we speak a lot more I think, than we have before PESCO with our, in the national partners, so let's say with French, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian whatever, PESCO member states. So the level of communication has increased a lot so with the help of the Secretariat and without. And then sometimes, even if the one is going before the other, so if you go to a formal meeting by the PESCO Secretariat to execute something we have all written and agreed on with the governance rules, then you can coordinate before et cetera, so that really helps a lot. So that goes with and without the Secretariat.

41. J2: You described what was working now. But are there any coordination challenges that you see across levels? And how do you..-

Coms. breach

16:12 – 32:10

42. J1: Conflict challenges you can't have of course, because everybody has the same approach opinions et cetera, but when it comes to formalities, how we do then I do not. You have to see PESCO as a relatively young cooperation format and of course there are things that needs to be, or that can improve, that is quite natural, but this is also in the governance rules with the strategic review that this is being done. Of course there is elements that can be revised, improved et cetera, but this is quite natural if you look at the relatively you format such as PESCO.

43. J2: In which phase of the framework or the process, do you feel the Secretariat is the most active regarding coordination?

44. J1: Yeah, that is a very generic question, because this isn't about the projects, assessments, process for project works or et cetera. Is it about, or in general, or about the National Implementation Plans, so I think the interaction with them is really based on specific areas, let's say for example a National Implementation Plan, then of course they don't have a big role to play, because that's like a drafting phase for the member states, drafting there, and updating their National Implementation Plans, and once you have submitted to them, of course they have to the assessments et cetera, and then the ball is again in our field et cetera. So that is hard to say in general, but you look at it individually for the different processes. The same is for the different projects waves, so they have a big role when it comes to organizing all the coordination workshops et cetera, doing their advice assessment, but then it goes into a phase where the member states are proactive, so this is topic specific when they have a bigger role to play and when it is up to the memberships when they are acting, so that's how I would see that.

45. J2: And, I think the National Implementation Plans is really interesting, so I have a following up question on topic five ((in the Questionnaire)), because there aren't any concrete

ways for the Secretariat to sanction member states, but they have maybe ways to incentivize and often non-compliant member states, and does the National Implementation Plans have a part to play? Do they have an incentivizing effect for increasing defence spending?

46. J1: So let me answer you first question first, because I think that is two different questions. So, about the possibilities to sanction, or to incentivize. So they are means.. also here I see them in a coordinating role, so that they are means of transparency between the different EU member states, so all the EU member states have made binding commitments, and now you should have a mechanism allowing one state to see what the other does et cetera. So that is transparency between the member states where, and again you need to have central space where all this come together, who then aggregates that, and also does an assessments, but also make specifically available all the different NIPs of the member states to the others. And actually sanctioning, that is not really necessary, because they will simply state what we have not received from country X from country Y et cetera, without of course be able to sanction et cetera. But, implicit, if you want to call it sanctioning, that comes from the others, because the country would have to state of course why it does not et cetera et cetera. But it is not the Secretariat who sanctions or whatever, and then what they will do of course, and they estimate part to do so, they help to assess the different NIPs and also in there is not a blaming or whatever, it is just to help the member states to see where things can and must be improved et cetera. So I do not really see that as a sanctioning mechanism. So the NIPs are a matter of providing transparency and it shouldn't come then also to sanctioning possibilities either for the Secretariat nor for the others, and then sanctioning that is in a political domain, because you don't want to be the country, having in your NIP, that you are not really compliant or following the commitments you have made yourselves. So that is more an indirect way.

47. J2: Okay, yes.

48. J1: And then, what you say in the second question that was about the incentivizing effect for increasing defence spending. Well of course, and there it is the same issue, look at NATO, with the agreement to spend two percent ((of GDP)), then the big one is that you have committed to it and then whenever in public and in meetings, you are held accountable for it. So of course this is a big incentive to do things, but it is not because in the NIP, there is commitment, and in the NIP we have to provide information on how we want to get there. And of course other member states can then read it and can say; "how do you do this"? So this is the basis then for our communication then with others as well. So it is the incentivizing effect for increasing is basically not the NIP, but the commitments itself, and the NIP is nothing else then an update or where we are with the commitments we have made. So the commitment itself is the one.

49. J2: We can go back to topic three, liability and trust; do you fell that liability and trust to the Secretariat is essential for the cooperation to fully function?

50. J1: So, whether I have liability and trust to them?

51. J2: Yes, or in [general-]

52. J1: [Yes]

52. J2: [- or do you feel in general..?]

53. J1: So actually as I said, I have my points of contact in the Secretariat, and I am really happy with the interaction with them. I think they are professional, they are doing really good work and for their trust. But as I said, we have had this form of cooperation between two years now, and all is a big learning process, it's a learning process for the member states, and for the Secretariat, but everybody looks at it in a professional way. So really my feelings with the Secretariat so far.. I have confidence in them and I trust them. I think that is a good tool in a working muscle, of course sometimes there might be arguments about their role et cetera. But also, who gives them actually their tasks. That's also the member states, right?

54. J2: Yes.

55. J1: Now if you look at one part of the PESCO Secretariat, the EDA, they have steering bodies ((Steering board)) et cetera. That's all the member states doing that.

56. J2: Yeah.

57. J1: So basically they are not that independent as it might seem if you look at them individually, but also they are dependent, and that as a working muscle from us and for us ((pMS)).

58. J2: Yeah okay, so you are describing that there is liability and trust, but if there is a potential conflict of interest, the last question there, between you and for example the HR/VP; do you think that is likable to happen or if it might be?

59. J1: I don't see in that where the HR/VP comes that much into play, so I don't understand what is behind that question. Maybe you will explain that a little bit more, what kind of conflict of interest you are referring to here.

60. J2: [No], I was.. because if you are a new member state, as we were talking about, potentially Malta and if they wanted to participate and the HR/VP was potentially not agreeing with that; would that be a conflict of interest?

61. J1: Well as you describe it, it is, because if you say we want A and they want B, then by definition this is a conflict of interest, yes. But PESCO was made as an inclusive form, so I can hardly imagine that- there are really two pillars in PESCO; that is the inclusive aspect where we say it is open for others, we want to extend it as far as possible and it is impressive to already have 25 EU member states on board, and then there is the specific aspect with the project level, where we say "okay, now within that framework, we open with those of opportunity for, again, selected groups to do really ambitious projects et cetera". So it has an inclusive and an ambitious aspect, maybe in the ambitious aspect and there is different, okay what countries et cetera, but in the inclusive one as it is by definition, inclusive, I have problems imagining that there would be big conflict of interests.

62. J2: Yes, and as you have described you are a broad group of members; 25 member states is quite big group of- have seen any alliances being formed of for example strong member states pursuing the same projects?

63. J1: I think the projects was made for a purpose to not have the necessity to have all aboard, but I can't say that there are really groups. There might be multiple sub-groups, because some focus at this, but at my level I have some different perspectives, but to really see sub-groups, I wouldn't subscribe to that statement. So that is really equal to XX- there is no big blocks where you say and the ones are doing this and the ones are the others, that is really- and for example when I extended a workshop for the assessment of the third wave of PESCO projects, I found that really everybody was sitting on the table and I did not have the feeling that there were fixed coalitions. Everybody was listening to the project proposal from the others and questions oriented to that, and I didn't have the impression at all that there had been coalitions. On the other hand of course, nothing would be wrong with that as well if there would be. So if like Germany would launch a project or would want to launch a project, then we would of course look at potential member states and these are then kind of coalitions because we are looking for partners. We need to have at least one other partner, we want to broaden it and we look at like-minded ((pMS)), because we have seen them pursuing same objectives in the past et cetera et cetera, but it is quite natural that not all member states are interested in everything. So this smaller groups, when it then comes to the projects, that is also intended within PESCO, but when it comes to the big things I don't really see fixed coalitions in there.

64. J2: Okay, yeah. And about topic eight ((in the Questionnaire)), this might be my last question I think, about legislation, and the framework of PESCO is quite complex and as I have heard before, for example regarding the commitments, there are a lot of information of how member states are to comply with them and apply them, and there is maybe difficult to look into the future and see what is, what you are going to plan et cetera, but has it been difficult for you to grasp this framework and do you have to rely on the Secretariat for help, for orienting in this?

65. J1: No, actually we do it within, I mean.. we have a big ministry of defence, and you have to read all that material. I have it on my desk right next to me, so if there is a specific question I pull out the document, I have my legal department for help, so it is basically not the PESCO Secretariat who helps me out with that. That is myself, and I have of course here all the reachback within the house, but I think these rules are necessary, because otherwise cooperation amongst so many member states would not work if you don't have like real procedures, so I think that the extensive framework is of help in the daily work, because it gives clear right and left boundaries and that is really the foundation for solid cooperation.

66. J2: Yeah, I see.

67. J1: So, and well of course you have to read it, but that's with all of them, and 'difficult to orient' I wouldn't say. So, I think that is still an initiative which is not all to complex I would say. And as you said, now, there is a review already in the documents, so this is also a learning. If we would see that something is not feasible, if doesn't work the way it was intended for, nobody says it to be set in stone, so it is the member states who can always change it. And that process is within PESCO, and I think that is a key advantage that it is there. So from the beginning on, it was meant as a learning form of cooperation that in intervals we do that in two initial phases, to fulfill our commitments, and between the phases

we have consult to do a review and then we will sub-phase and then the second-phase and go there step by step. So I think that provides the necessary flexibility for adaptation. So yeah, there is a big legal framework, but it is not giving us like how you would say it.. We are taking away flexibility, so I think that that's the right mixing; you have the foundation to work, but if you see that it does not really have the possibility to come up with proposals on how to improve et cetera. So I think it is quite good how it is made.

68. J2: Yes, okay. Well I think I have gotten answers to what I was wondering about, but do you have anything else you want to add?

Coms. breach

32:35 – 43:12

69. J2: Yeah, I was just saying that I think I have gotten answers to most of my questions, but I was wondering if you have anything else you want to add, or..?

70. J1: Yes, actually there is maybe one or two elements that I can just bring in. I do not know if that is really of interest for the specifics you are working on, but for me, if you look at history in European defence cooperation, now let's say after world war two, there has been a lot of initiatives, ideas and plans, and nothing really materialized, because there has been reluctances between some states, so that was really always a complicated and complex issue and it did not really work, and with PESCO I have the feeling that for the first time within two years we have really achieved something and made it go forward, which was not..- if you would have asked somebody ten, fifteen, twenty years he would hardly think that this would be possible, from my point of view. And I think that that is really a key achievement of PESCO; to help formalize this form of cooperation. And that is a lot of what we discussed initially about coordination amongst the member states et cetera, so the coordination amongst the member states has increased significantly since PESCO I'd say. And that is on the two ways I explained; first, right between the member states without the involvement of the Secretariat, but also with the help of a Secretariat facilitating with a common workspace where we can easily exchange information et cetera, so that is a key advantage and a step forward in PESCO. And I think you have that actually in your questionnaire somewhere, let me scan through it. Yes, in the very first sentence you state that there are "plenty of defence-initiatives also regarding CSDP". Yes, but that's all parts to points, specific projects, specific missions et cetera, and this is the one made for everything. So this is not to be narrowed down to projects. This is not for a specific groups. So this is really something which is made for the duration and it is like a small flower growing and will eventually become a big tree. And of course as I said now, we are learning in that et cetera, but it is a huge step forward and that is the difference between all the other initiatives, because it is not that part to part, but this is the overarching and they have committed and it is impressive that right at the beginning there has been 25 member states signing up to that. So this is really a huge step forward, nobody would have said that it was possible some years ago, and that is the big difference, and it is binding, and we want to have transparency, so we provide each other with a lot of information, also via the Secretariat. We have Secretariat helping us to assess that, for example the NIPs, so we have a lot of more transparency et cetera, and there is a lot of ideas, initiatives deriving from that, so that is really that all encompassing. And that is why I would be also sceptic if you

hear or read all that criticism “It did not achieve this, it did not achieve that”. In two years, for the ambition PESCO actually is, it is a lot, and you have to have strategic patience to see all that at the end materialized, so it is the format as such, if you wish, which is the big work forward. So that is maybe something that I would like to add. And also looking at your topic, to me that is all the policy aspects of that cooperation. It is in the hands, and we do have the feeling that it is like that, and it remains like that in the hands of the member states, and that’s what we clearly want to have, and also looking at the new Commission, General-Directorate Defence Industry and Space, there are certain aspects of course in the Commission, but everything which is policy, in the CSDP, is-, and remains in our opinion within the purview of the member states, and I do not really see tendencies that this is drifting away. That alone, that the PESCO Secretariat is playing a big role and shifting it to something else, so that I would really not subscribe to.

71. J2: Yeah, okay, I understand. It is very interesting. You said that you don’t want to be quotes, like being anonymous.

72. J1: No, I mean not quoted, but this is my personal opinions, so if you would like for example that your questionnaire and I send it around here, and we have written answers from the German MoD then, this would include the planners et cetera, so that is staff officers working on selected PESCO aspects et cetera, so that’s what I wanted to say, so no problems with me, but this is not official German position, so this is the assessment of a PESCO officer working on that. So that is not government position et cetera, so that was the thing I wanted to state at the beginning.

73. J2: I can’t use it in my thesis?

74. J1: Well, of course all the information provided you can use of course. But that is not like “Germany says”.

75. J2: Yeah, of course I understand that.

76. J1: Yeah, because if you would do that then of course we would do the written procedures, then you have to provide the transcripts, I would have to staff it around in the house, so this is really..- but of course you can use what said, but you can not just say well “this is the German opinion on it”.

77. J2: Yeah, of course, but I can send you a transcription later on and you can say what you think.

78. J1: Yeah, but again that wouldn’t then make it then official, because as I said I cannot speak for the entire house on that, that is just my personal, professional experience I have made in the coordination within, with the PESCO Secretariat et cetera.

79. J2: Because, I have planned to have two selection, and selection number two is the member states, and I have planned to have Czech Republic, Germany, France, Sweden and Finland. But the persons I have there are anonymous. But could I get answers that could be approved having in my thesis from the German MoD?

80. J1: That is a long and complicated process I would have to say in the beginning, so I do not know if I would have gone through that. We are a big machine.

81. J2: Yeah, I see.

82. J1: Why don't you rather go with, like more the interaction and you can use meeting with representatives from the member states "indicate that.." et cetera, I do not know what you have from inputs from the others and if that is something that is helpful for you, so that you do not have to really put government opinions or what so ever, because that is all.. at the end what you will get on that is usually bureaucratic phrases, which at the end gives nothing, that's what I would fear. So for you it might be actually more important to get that and I think you will have a huge variety of different ones and from that you can maybe use something without having to quote an official government opinion. Because if you look for that, at the end as I said, you will get bureaucratic answers, and nobody want to have that. You might be disappointed at the end of what you get.

83. J2: I understand, so if I were to use some of the information you gave me, how do I kind of quote that? Or how do I..?

84. J1: That is a good point, I think you should go back with you father ((supervisor)) of your work, because I mean this is not the first time this is being done, so what he would suggest to that, so to that is a question on how to treat that academically, and there I am not in a position I think to provide an answer.

85. J2: Yeah, all right. Thank you anyways, it was very interesting speaking with you.

86. J1: Yeah, I hope it helped for your thesis, gave you a little a bit of inside, maybe gave you also some bits of thoughts, reflections et cetera, and to provide you some answers you had been looking for so.

87. J2: Yeah, very good. Danke Schön.

88. J1: All the best, good luck for your further work. Maybe at the end we can see the result, the study as such? Also a lot of German student are working on that, with different.. so PESCO is really a big pool where topics are hidden and master's thesis that can be written.

Interview with representative from the Permanent Representation of France to the European Union in Brussels (Oral Interview in Brussels)

Topic 1: General

- Is PESCO a new development in European Defence, is it something that has not been done before?

PESCO is a step forward in European Defence and it is based on the commitments from the participating Member States (pMS). Member states have commitment to other [CSDP - common security and defence] projects, and we don't need PESCO to do [CSDP] projects. PESCO is based on operations – focusing on mobility, and commitments.

It is the first time ever we have a compulsory increase of EU defence budget. There is a need of capability at the national level; now in a cooperative manner. Before PESCO the European Defence Sector was based on pMS working unilaterally and focusing purely on national development and their national preferences. The [European Defence] industry is far reaching, and there is positive feedback on [defence] spending from the Ministries of Defences [MoD] – now we [pMS'] have to take care of other preferences.

EDF [European Defence Fund], and CARD [Coordinated Annual Review on Defence] (implies all the member states); [Regarding these initiatives] it is up to the pMS to deliver. The National Implementation Plans (NIP) are also an important element. The pMS all have commitments of different nature, and there are political differences.

The starting point of each member states is different. It is not the [EU] institutions doing the assessment for every pMS. The goal of the NIPs is for the pMS to try to explain to each other what their capabilities and defence spendings are. The NIPs require huge amounts of work. Regarding defence spending there are different benchmarks at the national levels. When analyzing the NIPs, there is difficulties to not being too politically correct.

After the first assessment of the NIPs it is hard for the HR/VP to be critical, but in fact they are. That is a good sign. Generally, the capabilities are good, but the industrial aspect is not so good. There is although a lack of information for the content of the NIPs. The bias of being politically incorrect must also be achieved.

For every commitment made it has to be explained by the pMS to the Secretariat. There are difficulties for the Secretariat [of PESCO] to compare pMS' plans [NIPs].

The Secretariat and the pMS are agreeing on the information put in the NIPs, and there are dry negotiations on this. pMS are trying to empower the Secretariat because they are improving the NIPs.

On obligation to consult with the HR/VP regarding membership in PESCO;

Malta does not meet the criteria. In the end it is up to the pMS to decide, if they don't want something in the cooperation – they decide. Its [PESCO] really a member state driven project. It is intergovernmental oriented. This is much because of the NIPs.

The idea of PESCO comes from the pMS, it was driven by four pMS; France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The legitimacy of the intergovernmental PESCO framework is that it is driven by the pMS.

Topic 2: Capacity and communication:

[The PESCO] Secretariat consists of a small structure, with not that many people [employed]. We also have scarce resources in the French Ministry of Defence. The NIP must be updated every year alongside with the projects. We [French Permanent Representation to the EU] also have scarce resources.

EDA [The European Defence Agency], and the EUMS [The European Union Military Staff] try to improve the NIPs to the pMS after the process of seeing the project proposals from the

pMS. It is difficult to assess the plans; they must assess how the pMS made the commitments, and how they can relate to that.

PESCO as an entity is more visible through the projects, they are not just ideas on paper.

EUMS is the body of the Secretariat that is in charge of the operations. EDA supports pMS as a whole, with research on long time trends as well regarding the industry [European defence industry].

We [French PermRep] meet physically quite often with the Secretariat. The NIPs, the project proposals are all dealt with at the capital level [French Ministry of Defence]. At the political level, it isn't dealt with that often.

The CAP Directorate is reorganized, bringing more clarity. It is more of a focal point in the EDA. EUMS has a PESCO unit that mirrors the CAP Directorate. This needs information from different branches.

Horizontal, industry related. CMPD [Crisis Management and Planning Directorate] was reorganized to (ISP)planning), (SecDefPol) (defence policies).

Topic 3: Coordination

The mission of the EDA, regarding Article 45 (2) in the Treaty on the European Union; projects labeled to the industry - they bring information basically. That question has nothing to do with PESCO. When further speaking on Article 45 (2) ["The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary"], operational and capability related project; two or three pMS invite the Commission to attend - it is up to them, it is not forbidden.

Regarding new projects, one pMS doesn't have projects with 25 other member states. Every pMS doesn't have the same capabilities. Smaller pMS; Don't expect Romania, or Latvia to drive Space missions.

France thinks decision-making is important, the Council (28 member states) - cheered by the EDS [European Defence Sector]. Commitments are important for France.

Do your NIP 100%, that's our national specificity, do things next year of reasons - deprive it from these characteristics, if this was taken away - not intergovernmental.

The Secretariat is most active when it comes to evaluations and assessment of the HR/VP report. They are also active concerning governance tools for the PESCO projects. In the end they merely provide their expertise.

Topic 4: Liability and trust

Trust and liability are very important, and it is essential for the survival of the Secretariat. The line of contact is an honest fine line.

PESCO is not about naming and shaming but we need the HR/VP to put a degree of naming and shaming into a report. The report comes in March 2020, but last march – we [PESCO] are not there until 2030. The idea of PESCO is being more ambitious. The report in 2020; let's see if it goes better. It is a politically correct report.

The Commission has created the 10% bonus from the EDF (projects about industries, industry project) but it needs to be backed by the pMS. 4/5 of the money could be provided to a project - if this project is labeled 'PESCO' it gets a 10% bonus funding. This was an incentive from the Parliament, the Council and France. EDF and PESCO - 10% link.

HR/VP does a politically incorrect assessment. The report in March will be more political and detailed.

When the Secretariat assesses proposals, they look at the funds, if it is a multi-project and what the questions are. It is also expected that they do a technical assessment of the projects.

It is up to HR/VP to recommend to the Council – un-bias Secretariat - refer to the HR/VP-obvious.

There have not been any conflicted interests with the Secretariat or the HR/VP, but between pMS - the ones that asked for pre-drafting their NIP. If the Secretariat were to go that way that could be a risk for them [The Secretariat] to be bias.

Topic 7: Member states involvement and control

There are 47 projects now: different [from 2018]. Principle of realism must be taken into account. The PESCO cooperation is an ad hoc thing - not consisting of political alliances. Meetings and decision-making happen bilaterally.

Interview with the PESCO Secretariat

1. How do you view the coordination (between the member states) in PESCO?

Participating Member States (pMS) have developed various channels of communication in order to coordinate their actions within the PESCO framework. This can be seen especially the way pMS are coordinating PESCO projects by establishing meetings, workshops, studies etc. In general, the coordination level between pMS has a positive trajectory.

2. What types of instruments do you have to push coordination? How do you stimulate coordination or facilitation; 'hands on'-, or 'hands off'-steering?

PESCO secretariat as the single Point of Contact between the Council and the pMS is supporting the latter by providing the necessary secretariat functions such as contributing to the HR's annual report on PESCO implementation and assessing the PESCO project proposals. Beyond of these functions PESCO secretariat supports and coordinates pMS by organizing workshops or bilateral meetings aiming to improve the PESCO framework requirements amongst pMS.

3. How is it like to cooperate with different bodies in the hub of the Secretariat, and what coordination issues can occur?

It is very interesting to work with different entities in the PESCO secretariat. It is a collaborative effort to promote PESCO framework and to consolidate different views and needs. Meaning it is an effort to "marry" the political aspects of PESCO with the operational and capability needs in order to address the EU military Level of ambition (LoA).

4. What possibilities do you have to sanction member states, or by other means; how to you incentivize (non-)compliant member states? Does the National Implementation Plans have an incentivizing effect for increasing member state defence spending?

In the Council Decision establishing the PESCO framework there are no provisions of sanctioning pMS. Actually, pMS are very much willing to comply with the more binding commitments they have signed up because they share the same principles for the defence and security in Europe. That also means, pMS are committed to invest on the defence sector in order to be able to fulfil the EU LoA.

5. How do you view the Secretariat's possibility to be directly involved in decision-making processes?

PESCO as a defence initiative is a pMS driven one. PESCO secretariat's role is limited to deliver secretariat functions. If it was directly involved in the decision making process we should have to speak for a different initiative and not pMS driven one.