Ever closer administrative institutions?

Impacts of the European Union on national decision-making processes

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Summary

Faced with a variety of unprecedented societal challenges such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemics, the traditional epicentre of decision-making - the nation-state - is increasingly reliant on its bureaucratic supplement, the administrative state, to ensure viable, long-term solutions. Concomitantly, as the world grows closer, so do national administrative institutions by frequently engaging in policy-making both within and across levels of government. Consequently, public policy is initiated, shaped, and implemented at the intersection of national and international levels of government. National administrations, particularly national agencies, serve as administrative bridges between international and national politics and contribute to coordinate policy agendas and outcomes. At the abstract level, this has been conveyed as the emergence of common political orders and has given rise to a (re-) new(ed) set of questions: how can we conceptualize and explain political orders? What are the mechanisms and consequences of integration of states and their administrations? To what extent do new patterns of multilevel cooperation supplement or challenge the nation-state?

This Ph.D. thesis confronts these questions by addressing the impact of organizational factors in the public governance process. The theoretical point of departure examines the explanatory power of organizational characteristics to account for how integration impacts public governance and political orders more generally. The study thus aims to contribute to organizational scholarship more broadly by testing and building on established causal relationships. The empirical impetus for this project lies in the institutional interconnectedness that characterizes public administrations. Specifically, the study investigates how the supranational locus for policy-making integrates into domestic structures. The study thus follows in the footsteps of established scholarly approaches focusing on the national-supranational nexus and adopts two classical questions: (i) how do organizational factors affect governance processes generally, and (ii) how do supranational institutions influence decision-making processes within domestic public administration particularly? Methodologically, the study is quantitatively driven (large-N questionnaire data) supplemented with qualitative data (semi-structured interviews).
This thesis consists of two parts: part I comprises the synopsis with six chapters, while part II collects three independent studies that each address different aspects relating to the aforementioned research questions. The study makes both theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. Theoretically, it adds to organizational scholarship by testing and building on established variables. Empirically, it offers a study of the Norwegian central administration encompassing 47 agencies and 16 ministries (2016). Methodologically, it contributes a large-N study of national officials combined with a mixed-methods approach. The main novelties introduced include: firstly, a study on ministerial officials over a time period of two decades (article I); secondly, a study of the relationship between secondary organizational affiliations and actor-level identities among agency officials (article II); and finally, a study of the effects of ‘institutional overlaps’ in domestic inter-organizational relationships on agency autonomy in practicing of EU legislation (article III).

A key observation of this thesis regards the self-reinforcing administrative bias fueled by organizational properties and moreover, how sectoral cleavages are sustained by a series of interconnected processes. Article I showcases how organizational variables at the domestic level bias how supranational policies and steering signals are received and processed. It also shows that these processes intensify over time. Article II finds a causal link between participation in secondary structures, such as advisory boards or expert committees, and identity shifts, and that this shift is particularly evident in supranational secondary structures. Article III reaffirms the role of organizational duplication and illustrates how this may affect how supranational policies are processed and steered from the (national) agency level.
Preface

Connection has been the key word of this Ph.D. project.

Public institutions connect across levels of government and give rise to new sets of theoretical puzzles and empirical playgrounds. Along these lines, this Ph.D. dissertation seeks to enhance understanding of how national administrations are linked to institutions in the European Union (EU). To do so, it applies data from the Norwegian central administration and asks what implications the ‘EU-connection’ has for decision-making behaviour within national agencies and ministries. The Ph.D. dissertation has been part of a larger project systematically collecting and analysing data from the Norwegian central administration. The 2016 questionnaires are the fifth set in a larger array of surveys that have been conducted every ten years, with the first survey dating back to 1976.

Well-functioning public institutions are the crux of society. Every once in a while, we are reminded of just how much we rely on these institutions to live good lives and moreover, how privileged we are to have them. Finalizing this Ph.D. dissertation at my kitchen table-turned-home office during the lockdown induced by the COVID-19 pandemic, has certainly been (another) one of these moments. It also highlighted both shortcomings, challenges, opportunities and, above all, the importance of international cooperation and coordination. The COVID-19 crisis has illustrated how fragile international cooperation may appear during the initial phases, however, lesson for past crises suggest that it may be equally resilient in the long run. Provided the latter, we will hopefully avoid further eras of mandatory kitchen table-home offices.

In life we connect to other people. The completion of this dissertation is thanks in large part to the special people who have supported and challenged me along the way.

It’s been a privilege to work with my principal supervisor Professor Stefan Gänzle. He has been inspiring and constructive throughout my process and I have benefited greatly from his insights and comments. He has always been available to advise me on my questions, drafts and ideas. I am deeply grateful for his patience, kindness and constant encouragement. I would also like to extend my sincere
thanks to my co-supervisor Professor Simona Piattoni for helpful contributions and advice along the way.

I am greatly indebted to Professors Tom Christensen, Morten Egeberg, Per Lægreid and Jarle Trondal for giving me the opportunity to be part of the Central Administration Surveys 2016. It has truly been a great learning experience that has only reinforced my interest in bureaucracy and administrative sciences. I wish to thank all the respondents in the ministries and agencies that took of their scarce time to answer the questionnaire. Special thanks also to the informants in the Norwegian Communications Authority (Ncom) and the Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA) for sharing their experiences and thoughts. Without the generous cooperation of all these individuals, my efforts would have been pointless.

I express my heartfelt gratitude to all my wonderful colleagues at the Department of Political Science and Management at the University of Agder for creating such a stimulating and pleasant work environment. In particular, I would like to thank my good friends and dear colleagues Barbara Zyzak, Kjerstin Lianes Kjøndal, Martin S. Time and Sara Blåka for all the inspirational talks and constant encouragement. I have really appreciated daily ‘emergency sessions’ with Barbara, reflecting on the mysteries of life and love with Kjerstin, good discussions and laughs with Martin and coffee breaks with Sara. Additionally, I would like pay special regards to the rest of the Ph.D. group: Aleksandar Avramovic, Frans af Malmborg, Johan Erik Andersen, Laszlo Bugyi and Rukia M. Pazi for fruitful discussions and valuable comments on my work. Lastly, the following people deserve special thanks for making my time as a Ph.D. student particularly fun and enjoyable: Anne Elizabeth Stie, Charlotte Kiland, Gjermund Haslerud, Jarle Trondal, Kari Nordstoga Hansen and Katja H-W Skjølberg.

Different parts of this dissertation have been presented and discussed at seminars and conferences. I would like to thank participants at the Brown-Bag Lunch seminars (BBL), the Ph.D./Post-Doc seminars, the research group of European integration and transnational governance, Nasjonal Fagkonferanse i Statsvitenskap, European Group of Public Administration (EGPA) and the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) for excellent questions and comments on my work.
I owe thanks to my dear friends Carina, Corinne and Else. They all enrich my life in their own special way, and I am so thankful for their continued support and positivity. Words cannot express how grateful I am for my beloved family: my parents Felix and Evelyn, my brothers Simon and Oliver, and my dear Granny. Their unwavering support and belief in my abilities has meant everything to me during this process. Last but not least, I am eternally grateful to Jarle for being my rock through this emotional and exciting rollercoaster of life.

Kristiansand, May 2020

Nadja S. Kühn
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<td>Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-state</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Central administration surveys</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>EMA</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>LIG</td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<td>LOS</td>
<td>Ledelse, organisasjon og styringssystem (English: leadership, organization and governance systems)</td>
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1. Introduction

Public institutions have the power to make or break a society. When institutions work well, we hardly take notice. It is not until we are faced with the consequences of their failure that we fully come to appreciate them. Consider, for instance, the recent threat posed by COVID-19 to healthcare systems across the globe or the complete failure of government to provide basic welfare to citizens in war-torn societies such as Syria. In essence, well-functioning societies begin with viable and legitimate policies drafted within the frame of well-functioning institutions. Understanding conditions for political order has thus been essential in political science (Elster 2007; Olsen 2007). During the last decades, this focus has shifted from studying conditions within states (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Rokkan 1999) to studying conditions across states (Bartolini 2005; Trondal 2010), notably through studies of interconnected orders such as the European Union (EU) (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2017). One string of literature has been concerned with discussing the nature of this interconnectedness, pursuing what it is and how we can understand it (Haas 1958; Moravscik 1998). A second line of study preoccupies itself with implications and seeks to identify causal mechanisms and effects of integration. Scholarly contributions to this field include studies on identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), democracy (Eriksen and Fossum 2002; Piattoni 2015; Stie 2013), differentiated integration (Leuffen et al. 2012) and institutions (Héririer 2007; Olsen 2007). This study focuses on the latter, asking what implications interconnected administrative orders have for state level institutions (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Heidbreder 2011).

The grand arguments of political order can roughly be grouped into three main macro-level research agendas: firstly, scholarly efforts have been directed at studying the emergence and development of political order with a focus on state building and nation formation (Fukuyama 2014; Huntington 1968; Rokkan 1999). A second research agenda has been concerned with limited or failed political order (Börzel and Risse 2010; Risse 2011). Finally, another prevalent line of research studies the factors that improve and sustain political order (Dahlström et al. 2012, 2019).

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1 ‘Political’ refers to institutions that are “entitled to and able to (contribute to) initiate, decide and implement public policy”. ‘Order’ suggests a “relatively stable arrangement of institutions that are fairly formalized and institutionalized with respect to who does what, when and how” (Trondal 2017: 3).”
Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Putnam 1993). Building off of these arguments, this thesis functions at the meso-level that studies public organizations as part of political order. Aligning with studies that advocate for the ‘public administration turn’ in political science (Trondal 2007), it asserts the view that organization matters in understanding political systems. In order to discern why and how political orders emerge, develop, succeed and fail, it is necessary to unpack encompassing organizational characteristics. Hence, the study contributes with an organizational approach to institutions and decision-making dating back to studies by Luther Gulick (1937) and Herbert Simon (1957). This study draws on contemporary organizational studies with emphasis on structure, demography, and site (Egeberg 2006).

Combining the two arguments outlined above, this thesis applies theoretical insights from organizational studies to understand and explain interconnected administrative orders. It addresses two classical questions: (i) how do organizational factors affect domestic governance processes? and (ii) how do supranational public institutions influence decision-making processes within domestic administrations? The latter refers to processes in which supranational institutions become important points of reference for domestic actors, leading to “[…] adaptations and changes in policies and institutions at the domestic level” (Sverdrup 2000: 8). The thesis therefore has both a theoretical and an empirical dimension. Theoretically, it draws on the explanatory value of organizational factors to assess transformation of domestic institutions in response to order formation across levels of governance. Empirically, it examines the effect of supranational institutions on domestic public administration.² Figure 1 suggests a heuristic overview of the aforementioned scholarly literatures and how organization theory (meso-level) feeds into the study of political order (macro-level).

² I am aware that the theoretical concept of institutions (March and Olsen 1989; Selznick 1957) is broader than the theoretical concept of organization (Scott and David 2016). In this thesis, I refer to ‘institutions’ as an empirical category and use ‘organizations’ as the theoretical concept.
The thesis is article-based and most of the results are presented through three papers—already published or under review—in peer-reviewed journals. The thesis consists of two main parts:

I) Section I comprises the synopsis in six chapters. The introductory chapter presents the empirical and theoretical debates that underpin the main research questions, as well as the main conclusions. Chapter 2 engages with the literature and discusses the contribution of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework including background, variables, and causal model as well as reflections on contemporary debates on applicability. Chapter 4 discusses methodology, including philosophical underpinnings, methods, case and limitations. Chapter 5 summarizes and links the main findings in the three papers. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions drawn from the thesis.

II) The three articles appended in section II pose three main sub-questions. The articles are theoretically framed from an organizational perspective and each examine a different empirical focal point within the administrative system. The articles appear in the order they have been submitted for publication.

- Article I asks *if* and *how* organization of domestic level executive institutions may influence how supranational executive institutions are
‘received’ at the national level over time (the empirical focus is on the
‘intersection’ between levels of governance).

- Article II asks if and how organizational affiliations at the supranational
level influence national government officials’ identity perceptions (the
empirical focus is on supranational structures).
- Article III asks how and to what extent organizational variables affect
ministerial influence of domestic agencies’ handling of EU/EEA/Schengen
related-work (the empirical focus is on national structures).

1.1 An interconnected European political order
The aim of this section is to introduce and contextualize the empirical relevance
of this thesis. The point of departure is the administrative interconnectedness that
characterizes Europe. Administrative integration implies that different
organizational entities cooperate and become connected as relatively coherent
wholes (Curtin and Egeberg 2008). Other studies have taken these observations a
step further by substantiating ensuing processes and implications at various levels
of government, also conceptualized as a European Administrative Space (EAS).
EAS is understood as a “process of institutionalization of common administrative
capacity” (Trondal and Peters 2017: 79) and denotes increased integration of
national and supranational administrative units (Heidbreder 2011; Hoffmann
2008). The EAS consists of five main blocks: firstly, expert committees under the
European Commission (Commission) are consultative bodies comprised of
officials from member state administrations as well as members from other
stakeholder institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). Secondly, comitology
committees monitor implementation of EU regulations and are also partly
populated by member state officials (Brandsma et al. 2008; Wessels 1998).
Thirdly, transnational regulatory and administrative networks mainly consist of
national ministries and agencies and often also the Commission (Mastenbroek and
Martinsen 2017). Fourthly, member state officials participate in EU agencies,
primarily on management boards (Egeberg and Trondal 2017; Groenleer 2009).
Finally, national officials may be seconded to the Commission for a minimum of
6 months and maximum period of 6 years (Murdoch and Geys 2012; Suvarierol
and van den Berg 2008).
The EAS can be conceptually re-described as a ‘multileveled administrative system’ (MLA) consisting of three dimensions: institutional interdependence, integration, and co-optation (Trondal and Bauer 2017). Correspondingly, administrative integration has been operationalized in various manners. This study identifies three main clusters of indicators (see also table 5). One group of studies sees integration as processes of coordination and cooperation between different administrative entities at the national and supranational level. A second group examines administrative integration through the lens of institutional autonomy and finally, a third group of studies perceive administrative integration as an instigator of shifts in personal attitudes, role perceptions, and loyalties. The three articles that form this thesis each fall neatly into one of these categories (see table 1).

Effectively, MLA materializes through cooperation and coordination between national public institutions (agencies and ministries) and their European counterparts (Commission Directorate-General [DGs] and EU agencies). An organizational perspective holds that such cross-level interactions are nudged by certain organizational characterises at both levels (see also section 3.2).

**Figure 2. A conceptual model of MLA**

Source: Based on Egeberg (2006)
A key component of the European administrative space has been the decoupling of national agencies from their parent ministries and subsequent recoupling into new administrative configurations (Egeberg 2008). Figure 2 outlines a conceptual model of MLA and how it is characterized by certain patterns of governance processes – both across levels of governance as well as within each level. The intertwining of administrative units is a prominent feature of both European and national governance. Alignment and sustained interaction of domestic and supranational institutions has been coined ‘a European executive order’ (Trondal 2010). The administrative dimension of integrated political systems is an important, yet often overlooked part of comprehending political order (trans-)formation. As mentioned, shifts in ‘institutional logics’ (that is, shifts in patterns of cooperation/coordination, autonomy or behavioural logics) may serve as indicators of order formation. Such patterns inherently display the transformative power of executive institutions and can be useful in assessing the distribution of power between levels of governance. Understanding administrative change is thus necessary for understanding European political order (Olsen 2007).

European order formation has precipitated another central debate: the balance between national autonomy on one hand and integration above states on the other. This dilemma is not new; however, it has been reinvigorated in recent years. Most notably, it has been projected as widespread support for populist, Eurosceptical movements. This culminated in the 2016 Brexit referendum, spearheaded by the Leave-campaigns mantra “take back control.” An apparent game changer, Brexit has left practitioners and scholars alike to ask renewed questions about the ramifications of an integrated, interconnected Europe (Gänzle et al. 2019). The debate surrounding the terms and conditions for Britain’s departure have often been simplified into the concepts of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit. Though the narrative of regaining control through a ‘hard’ Brexit and a ‘no-deal’ exit has been repeatedly emphasized by certain politicians, the viability of such options has been called into question (Gänzle 2019). Illustrative attempts to reach an agreement and leave the EU has proven more difficult than initially anticipated by the most persistent ‘brexiteers’. After decades of globalization and integration,

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3 Essentially, ‘soft’ Brexit is understood as close affiliation with the EU, notably by remaining in the single market and its customs union, while ‘hard’ Brexit denotes a complete withdrawal.
interconnected political orders have become tightly interwoven into the societal and political fabric of European nation-states. The classical dichotomies of member-states versus non-members, of in versus out, and dependent versus sovereign all fall short of expressing the reality of an integrated European continent.

1.2 The organizational dimension of administrative interconnectedness
One dominant objective of social sciences has been to produce theoretical ideas and empirical insights that can travel across time and space, and thus be generalizable beyond the case at hand. Scrutinizing isolated empirical cases may be a fruitful endeavour in itself, yet there is an added value of research that outlines and tests theoretical models that demonstrate causal connections between variables. This section introduces the theoretical perspective that constitutes the second dimension of the research question (see also chapter 3). Organizational theory maintains that understanding governance (political orders) requires an understanding of the government apparatus (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). It seeks to make causal inferences between certain organizational attributes (independent variables) and governance processes (dependent variables). The independent variables applied in this thesis are grouped into structure, demography, and locus and each encompass different dimensions with subsequent assumptions (Egeberg 2006).

The dependent variable, ‘governance processes,’ may broadly be defined as a process through which the steering of society takes place (Ansell and Torfing 2016). Political science scholars generally subscribe to the idea that governance comprises several phases of decision-making, such as agenda-setting, policy development, formal policy-making, and implementation (Egeberg and Trondal 2018: 4). Thus, operationalizing a ‘governance process’ means researchers are confronted with several possible proxy measurements. For organizational scholars, decision-making behaviour has been a prevalent construct in this regard. Dependent variables in organizational studies thus often attempt to capture attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that suggest a likelihood of certain behavioural patterns to occur. Therefore, dependent variables relate to decision-making processes and behaviour.
There are several theoretical venues that can be pursued to disentangle drivers of public governance. This study, however, chooses a partial theory of public governance by focusing on the causal role of organizational factors. An organizational perspective falls under a comprehensive umbrella of institutional theories that in itself harbours numerous fruitful sub-perspectives (see also figure 4). Scholars have pinpointed two main reasons for applying organizational theory to the study of governance. Firstly, generic variables allow for generalizations across time and space. Insights drawn from organizational theory may be applied to understand both single organizations or institutional configurations consisting of multiple organizational entities within or between levels of governance (Olsen 2007; Simon 1958). Secondly, scholarly efforts have sought to translate theoretical scholarship into instrumental scholarship through highlighting design implications of organizational theory (Egeberg and Trondal 2018; March 1965) (see also section 3.3). The latter has been amplified through increasing calls to ‘rediscover’ political science by focusing on the compatibility of pure (theoretically-driven) and applied (practical-driven) knowledge (Densch 2015; Holmberg and Rothstein 2012; Ricci 1987; Stoker et al. 2015). On a broader note, another reason for applying organizational theory in this study is found in the Scandinavian academic tradition of which it is part. This scholarship (also referred to as the ‘Bergen-school of public administration’) pioneered the study of organization in political science (Olsen 2018).

**Figure 3. The causal model**

![Causal Model Diagram](image)

Source: Based on Egeberg and Trondal (2018)

Up until that point, the combination of political science and organizational theory had a longstanding history of parallel agendas but mutual disregard (Olsen 1991) (see also sections 2.2 and 3.1). Supporting reasons for selecting organizational
theory as the analytical tool in this study is firstly, organizational theory remains a marginalized perspective in public governance studies (Döhler 2020). Secondly, rather than confronting different theories it confronts different independent variables within organizational theory (figure 3). Consequently, this study seeks to investigate the robustness of organizational theory with the aim of advancing the organization theory research agenda.

Organizational theory is the theoretical backbone of MLA. How we organize matters for how people meet. It determines who meets who and with what agenda. The street-level relevance of organizational theory derives from the assumption that the aggregated outcome of this amalgamation of ideas, preferences, and experiences ultimately becomes embodied in public policy. Notwithstanding, this argument emphasizes bureaucracy as a fundamental provider of political premises (Christensen et al. 2018; Peters 2014; Waldo 1948). With a focus on organization of the European executive space, organizational scholarship aims to contribute another piece to the puzzle of European integration.

1.3 Methodology and data
Predominantly situated in the positivist methodological tradition, this study aims to make causal inferences between a set of independent variables (organizational factors) and a dependent variable (administrative integration). The principal source of data is large-N quantitative datasets from the Norwegian central administration (agencies and ministries). This dataset has been supplemented with qualitative data collected from two Norwegian agencies in 2018/2019.

Applying quantitative data in this study comes with two main advantages. Firstly, it allows for statistical inferences on a high number of observations that may uncover patterns of behaviour across large populations and produce generalizable conclusions. Secondly, results may easily be replicated, increasing the overall reliability of the study. Additionally, qualitative data has been collected to corroborate and explore some statistical patterns observed. Key advantages of data

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4 For instance, the Oxford Handbook of Public Governance (Levi-Faur 2012) lacked a discussion of the implication of organizational variables.

5 The surveys are part of a series of identical inquiries conducted once every decade from 1976 until 2016. Article I apply surveys conducted at the ministerial level in 1996, 2006, and 2016. Articles II and III apply surveys conducted in 2016 at the agency level.
triangulation in this case is increased validation of data that can then be cross-referenced by multiple sources, as well as to enhance the complex understanding of cross-level interactions. Table 1 below summarizes the main components of the research design in each article.

Table 1. A broad overview of the research design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Independent variable(s)</th>
<th>Methods and data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| I       | Patterns of coordination | Organizational structure  
• Horizontal specialization  
• Vertical specialization  
• Organizational affiliation | Large-N survey data on ministerial officials, 1996, 2006, 2016 |
| II      | Identity perceptions | Organizational structure  
• Organizational affiliation | Large-N survey data on agency officials, 2016 |
| III     | Inter-organizational autonomy | Organizational structure  
• Size  
Organizational demography  
• Educational background  
Organizational locus  
• Location | Large-N survey data on agency officials, 2016 supplemented with semi-structures interviews of agency officials (N=11) |

Source: own compilation

The Norwegian central administration is the empirical testing-ground for this thesis. Norway is not a formal member of the EU, yet it is closely affiliated with the EU through numerous agreements, such as the European Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen agreements (Archer 2005; Fossum and Graver 2018; Kux and Sverdrup 2000). The former, in particular, is the cornerstone of Norway-EU relations. Norway’s relationship with the EU may be seen as territorially dis-integrated yet sectorally integrated: Politically, participation in the EU Council and EU Parliament remains blocked, however, the agreements grant the Norwegian central administration privileged access to the EU administrative system on the same terms as regular member states. Norwegian officials are thus frequently represented in EU executive institutions (such as Commission DGs and EU agencies) as envoys of their policy sector. More detailed descriptions of the relationship between Norway and the EU is outlined in each article.
1.4 Summarizing the articles

This section presents how the three articles fit together and briefly illustrates the bigger picture that emerges (see also chapter 5). As outlined, the articles share fundamental theoretical and empirical properties. Theoretically, they differ in that they employ various organizational variables. Empirically, they differ in that Article I studies ministerial officials, while Articles II and III study agency officials. Additionally, the articles examine three different avenues in which EU-level institutions may influence domestic government officials, demonstrating how organizational variables may facilitate or impede the impact of EU-level institutions at different points in the multilevel system. Figure 4 provides an overview of the empirical focal points of each study.

Figure 4. Three studies of multi-level administrative governance: An overview

Article I discusses how organizational characteristics at the national level ‘filter’ how EU level institutions are received and processed by national level officials. The empirics are drawn from surveys conducted among ministerial officials at three points in time over two decades (1996, 2006 and 2016). Article I finds that EU level institutions contribute to a self-reinforcing administrative bias enabled by favourable organizational conditions at the national level. Article II asks for the impact of organizational affiliations, more specifically how secondary structures
at the supranational level influence identities among national officials. This is contrasted to similar effects from secondary structures at the national level. It suggests that supranational level structures have a stronger impact on identities among national officials. Article III examines the scope of inter-organizational relationship between national ministries and agencies. The objective of Article III is to establish if – and how – different types of ‘institutional overlaps’ affect ministerial influence over agency’s handling of EU-related legislation. It finds a positive relationship between ministerial influence and organizational duplication. Additionally, it suggests that secondary structures at the ministerial level may be an effective means to exert influence. This aligns well with Article II that discussed the impact of secondary structures. The empirical stepping stone for the latter two articles is survey data from national agency officials in 2016. Additionally, Article III draws on interview data.

What main conclusions can be drawn from this thesis? Theoretically, the study emphasizes the role of organization in multilevel governance systems. It highlights how organization contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias that appears to expand over time. Empirically, it shows how supranational institutions are increasingly institutionalized and integrated in daily operations of national domestic institutions. A summary of the articles and the thesis is found in table 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article I</th>
<th>Article II</th>
<th>Article III</th>
<th>Ph.D. thesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argument/Aim</strong></td>
<td>EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias due to favourable conditions at the domestic level of government</td>
<td>Secondary affiliations at the supranational level impact substantially on national officials’ identities</td>
<td>Institutional overlaps at the national level increase likelihood of ministerial influence over domestic agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theoretical contribution</strong></td>
<td>Examines role of horizontal, vertical specialization and organizational affiliation in mediating the impact of EU level institutions on the domestic level over time</td>
<td>Examines role of organizational affiliation in sustaining and shaping identities of officials. Suggests a focus on ambiguous structures.</td>
<td>Examines the effect of administrative capacity, demography, and geographical location on inter-organizational influence at the domestic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical contribution</strong></td>
<td>Examines how EU level institutions impact national executive institutions (ministries)</td>
<td>Examines how secondary affiliations at different levels of government affect identities towards national central administration and the EU level</td>
<td>Examines conditions under which national ministries have stronger influence over national agencies’ practicing of EU legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>Quantitative analysis</td>
<td>Quantitative analysis</td>
<td>Mixed methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection</strong></td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Survey Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Statistical analysis</td>
<td>Statistical analysis</td>
<td>Qualitative content analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main finding</strong></td>
<td>EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias due to domestic level organizational factors</td>
<td>Impact of secondary structures is more evident with regards to supranational secondary structures</td>
<td>Capacity is the most influential variable. No effect could be established on site or demography.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation
2. Contribution and notes on literature

This thesis explores the implications of organizational factors in public governance. The main ambition is thus to add to the literature concerned with questions of how, why, and under what conditions certain ways of organizing can have an impact on politico-administrative institutions. Empirically, the thesis asks how domestic government institutions are transformed by supranational ones and thus how nation-states are transformed through processes of integration. This section presents both the overall and the specific contributions in more detail before discussing the status of this research field to identify the added value of this study.

2.1 Contribution
This thesis offers theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. Theoretically, its overarching ambition concerns the expansion of a research agenda that advocates for examining organizational variables in public governance processes. The thesis builds on the work of Herbert Simon (1957), March and Olsen (1989) and Egeberg and Trondal (2018), amongst others, and its objective therefore is to test the robustness of organizational variables with a view to adding new insights to this line of scholarship.

Article I examines the sustained effect of organizational variables over a time period of two decades. A key theoretical contribution of this article is thus the systematic inquiry of the effects of organizational properties over time. Article II is motivated by ‘unpacking’ the implications of organizational affiliations. Initially understood as a dichotomous variable (primary/secondary affiliations), the article attempts to nuance this understanding by examining the effect of secondary affiliations on government officials’ identities. To this end, the article suggests a focus on structural ambiguity and argues that secondary structures produce diverse impacts depending on their organizational embedment. Finally, inspired by previous studies on organizational duplication (Egeberg and Trondal 2009a), Article III aims to develop this argument by introducing and testing other types of ‘institutional overlaps.’ Combined, the three articles subsequently explore the effects of structure, demography, and locus.
Empirically, this thesis makes two main contributions. First, it aims to illustrate developments within national executive institutions in response to European administrative integration. This includes questions such as: How - and to what extent - does the supranational level influence national executive institutions? What main patterns of integration can be observed? In what ways are governance processes at one level linked to governance processes at another? Secondly, the thesis contributes to the debate on autonomy versus integration by illustrating to what extent Norway as a third country is interwoven into European affairs. Whereas the vast majority of MLA literature has been focused on agency officials at one point in time (Egeberg and Trondal 2011a), Article I takes a longitudinal approach. In this vein, it casts a spotlight on the role of ministerial officials over time. Articles II and III, by contrast, examine agency officials at one point in time by means of survey data collected in 2016. The former asks what effects supranational engagements (such as expert groups or committees) may have for national officials’ identity. Arguably, identity is a significant indicator of integration, yet has not previously been subjected to much scrutiny within MLA literature (see Egeberg 1999a). Article III takes a close look at how certain variables may affect ministerial control of subordinate agencies’ execution of EU-related policy. The empirical contribution of Article III therefore pertains to questions related to the national politico-administration nexus, in particular, how organizational properties may be employed by the ministries to prevent the emergence of so-called ‘runaway’-bureaucracies.

Methodologically, the thesis uses statistical analysis of large-N questionnaire data and additionally draws on 11 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018/2019. Article I and II apply quantitative analysis only, while Article III is based on mixed methods. One particular novel contribution by Article I is to provide a study over a time period that spans two decades. The thesis therefore offers a comprehensive study of the whole central administration, allowing broad conclusions across sectors and policy areas.

By extension, the thesis epitomizes the question of the implications of organizational interconnectedness. In doing so, it contributes to literature that links specific organizational properties to governance literature. Equally, it informs literature that challenges the conventional state-centric views of public
governance. Established literature on public administration has long been confined to political processes within national borders appraising the different levels of governance as distinct analytical spheres (Egeberg 2008; Trondal 2010). Accordingly, this thesis builds on various tenets of scholarship that illuminate reciprocity between different levels of government, pursuing questions such as what the causal mechanisms at play are, how can they be identified, and what causal inferences can be drawn from cross-level interlinkages (Bach et al. 2016; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Trein and Maggetti 2019). The study thereby also advances the literature on differentiated European integration.

2.2 Notes on literature
This thesis elaborates upon different strands of literature roughly grouped into three main categories: organizational theory (including institutional theory where required), Europeanization research, and finally, literature that combines organizational theory with the study of governance, and Europeanization more specifically. Given that organizational theory will be discussed in chapter 3, this section will be limited to the latter two. This section is sequenced in chronological order and summarizes the literature that underpins this thesis. It begins with a brief introduction and definition of ‘Europeanization’ before sketching out the main arc of its theoretical antecedents to current use in public administration literature. Next, it discusses contemporary research relevant to the thesis before proceeding to consider what the future might hold for the study of multi-level administration.

2.2.1 Past: From European integration studies to Europeanization
The concept of ‘Europeanization’ has traversed across several sub-disciplines of political science, from political economy to European Union studies to public administration. Accordingly, it has been widely applied and adapted to fit different research agendas, methodologies, and empirical phenomena. As such, the term in itself has become a separate field of scholarly debate (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2015; Graziano and Vink 2007; Radaelli 2018; Jensen and Kristensen 2013; Olsen 2002). One of the many scholarly interests that emerged within Europeanization studies was the question of the relationship between European integration and domestic administrative adaption (Héritier et al. 1996; Jacobssen 1999; Mény et al. 1996; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). In the same way, Europeanization in this study focuses how supranational logics embed into domestic policy-making. This aligns with literature that views
Europeanization as a process where the domestic realm adjusts to supranational dynamics - to the extent that they become an endogenous logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech 1994). By the same token, Europeanization has been understood as an explanatory factor in political continuity and change at the national level (Hix and Goetz 2000). This is also echoed in Olsen’s seminal work on Europeanization (2002: 932), in which he cites five possible uses of the term ‘Europeanization,’ one of which denotes the ‘alignment of institutions across levels of governance: “[another conception of] Europeanization focuses on change in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies.”

At the outset, studies of European integration were concerned with explaining European integration itself. Different theoretical schemes were suggested to discern and explain why and how integration occurred. Most notably, the main theoretical cleavage formed between the neo-functionalists (NF) (Haas 1958) on the one hand and liberal intergovernmentalists (LIG) (Moravscik 1998) on the other (see for instance Rosamund 2000). From the 1990s onwards, however, the dependent variable changed from studying processes of integration itself to studying the impact on political processes at the national level. Up until that point, studies of national political systems and studies of European integration had largely evolved in isolation (Hix and Goetz 2000), however, developments at both the European and at the domestic realms increasingly called for research that considered interdependencies between levels. This marked the beginning of the study of ‘Europeanization’ (see also Puchala 1999).

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6 Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009: 206-207) list three possible conceptions of ‘Europeanization’: Firstly, Europeanization can be seen as an outcome. This enables comparisons of the degree of Europeanization of social domains, political parties, social movements or whole countries. Secondly, Europeanization may be understood as a process in which the outcome is change (or lack thereof) of public policy, politics or polity. And finally, Europeanization as a broad political strategy implying the construction of governance architectures such as the Eurozone.

7 Hix and Goetz (2000 1-2) list three main reasons for this. Firstly, the study of the interconnectedness of levels of governance was caught between two stools: it did not fit the research agenda of comparative politics scholarship, nor did it quite match the interests of international relations scholarship. Secondly, scholars of comparative European politics were reluctant to take on the question of European integration because they saw it as a normative project, and doubted that it would contribute to much generalizable knowledge. Finally, there was little evidence that European integration had much impact on the national level and was thus seen as largely irrelevant.
Rather than residing solely in the realm of European integration’s grand theories, Europeanization literature drew inspiration from other fields of political science, such as international relations (IR) and comparative politics. As a consequence, EU studies shifted from being largely sui generis in nature to having broader applicability and interdisciplinary relevance (Trondal 2007). For scholars seeking to unveil mechanisms for change (or lack thereof) within domestic administrative sphere, insights from institutionalist scholarship in particular became a promising avenue. The integration of EU studies and institutionalism followed what has been labelled ‘the institutionalist turn’ in political science (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Dowding 2000; Jupille and Caparaso 1999; Jupille et al. 2003; Olsen 2018). The influx of institutionalist perspectives into political science and integration studies particularly (Bulmer 1993; Pierson 1996; Olsen 2000), has been attributed to Scharpf’s (1988) landmark piece on the joint-decision trap as well as Johan P. Olsen’s entry into the study of European integration (Olsen 1996). March and Olsen’s (1984) equally influential article on new institutionalism - that championed the role of organization in political life - has been seen as pioneering this regard. March and Olsen continued to advocate for the role of institutions in their books “Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of political life” (1989) and “Democratic Governance” (1995). Their core argument was that actors’ institutional embeddedness was imperative for understanding political reality.

Inspired by institutionalist advances, public administration scholarship became increasingly invested in forging a research agenda that not only built more extensively on the institutionalist frame of reference, but also bridged analytical borders between the national and international level (Egeberg 1980; Knill 2001). Up until that point, the dominant context for public administration studies had been power relations within and across nation-states, and less attention was given to organization of relations between states (Olsen 2018: 196). Egeberg (1989) argued that in order to understand public administration in modern democracies, it was necessary to account for both institutions and actors within the national level of government, but also relations to institutions and regimes outside national borders.

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8 On a broader note, social constructivism for example, was largely adopted from IR scholarship into the study of Europeanization (see for instance Checkel 2005; Jupille et al. 2003). In the same vein, multi-level governance (MLG) (Hooghe and Marks 2001) was influenced by comparative politics.
Egeberg proceeded to develop this argument by studying various aspects within and between national and European executive institutions (Egeberg 1996; Egeberg and Trondal 1997; Egeberg 1999a; Egeberg 2001). In 2004, he published an article which heralded an organizational approach to the study of European integration. A prelude to MLA, and building on his early work on the fourth level of government (Egeberg 1980), this perspective expressed how decision-making was contingent upon its surrounding organizational framework (see chapter 3). At the same time, various institutional spins on cross-level analysis were adopted across public administration scholarship in Europe (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Börzel 2002; Knill 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Kohler-Koch 1999; Sbragia 1992). Moreover, questions about the relationships between European integration and domestic administrative institutions catapulted to the forefront of scientific debate (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Trondal and Veggeland 1999).\(^9\) Notwithstanding, the research program ‘Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-state’ (ARENA), established by Johan P. Olsen in 1994, remained a flagship for the import of institutional theories to the study of European integration and Europeanization.

### 2.2.2 Present: From Europeanization to multilevel administration in Europe

The 1990s and early 2000s endowed public administration scholarship with the first generation of Europeanization literature. Incited by the institutional epiphany, key questions related to the extent of institutional adaptation (in administrative institutions) at the domestic level, convergence and how such institutional changes could best be understood (Sverdrup 2000). Thus, the first wave of literature was principally occupied with institutional relations, notably how EU-level institutions affected and ‘hit’ domestic-level institutions (Börzel and Risse 2000).

The next generation of public administration scholarship expanded their focal point to institutional interrelations, that is, the mutual impact between EU-level and domestic-level institutions and how member-state institutions ‘hit’ back (Beyers and Trondal 2003).\(^{10}\) Acknowledging that “[u]nderstanding change

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\(^9\) For a comprehensive review of the Europeanization research agenda see Graziano and Vink (2007) chapter 1.

\(^{10}\) This is also akin to Trondal and Bauer (2017: 77) who identify two ‘waves’ of MLA research. The first wave, emphasizing convergence of administrative systems and policies, was preoccupied with measuring
requires information about how different types of institutions fit together, their interdependencies and interactions [...] and how change in one institution is linked to change in another” (Olsen 2009: 24), this scholarship became increasingly interested in capturing the integrated nature of public institutions across levels of governance (Egeberg and Trondal 2015). A key concern of this scholarship has thus been the reciprocal effects of the institutional arrangements within and across levels (Ansell et al. 2016; Bach et al. 2016). Bauer et al. (2019: 913), for instance, argue that “administrative internationalization11 is not just a trend that ‘hits home’ in a top-down manner [...] but needs to be understood also as a domestic transformative force transcending the borders between the national and the international.”

This second generation of public administration scholarship, interested in the study of executive institutions in a multi-leveled Europe, can largely be arranged within two dimensions: horizontally and vertically (see also Brandsma et al. 2019). Prominent examples of studies on the horizontal axis have been interested in network governance within and between levels of government (Heidbreder 2015; Levi-Faur 2013; Maggetti 2013; Maggetti and Giladi 2011; Mastenbroek and Martinsen 2018; Mathieu 2016; Yesilkagit 2011), while literature centered around the vertical axis is geared mainly towards hierarchical relationships within and between levels of governance12 (Bach and Ruffing 2018; Egeberg 2006; Groenleer 2009; Hofmann and Türk 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Trondal and Bauer 2017). Bearing most relevance for this thesis, the following discussion will mainly focus on the latter.

‘Vertical’ inquiries have been dominated by two main empirical interests.13 First, there exists a considerable body of literature on EU-level institutions, notably EU MLA by its outcome. The second wave saw MLA as featuring an emergent common administrative order in Europe and underscored new patterns and processes of integration rather than its outcome.

11 Defined as “domestic administrative change whose origin can be traced to developments outside the national realm” (Bauer et al. 2019: 906)

12 Bauer and Trondal (2015: 10) note that scholarship centered around the emergence of a multi-level administrative system can be split into two-dimensional sub dates: the first represents a political-science based literature that tries to theoretically conceptualize multi-level governance (MLG) (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001) and a more recent public-administration based scholarship that aims to understand the EU as a multi-level administrative system (MLA) (e.g Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2010). The second scholarship on multi-level administration is largely legal (e.g. Hofmann and Türk 2006).

13 Due to space limitations, literature that primarily focuses on the Commission (for instance, Kassim et al. 2000) is excluded from this discussion.
agencies and expert committees. Literature on EU agencies has been concerned with three central themes (for a comprehensive review see Egeberg and Trondal 2017): (i) agencies’ organization, tasks and proliferation (Bach et al. 2016; Coen and Thatcher 2008; Egeberg and Trondal; Levi-Faur 2013; Ongaro et al. 2015; Vos 2000), (ii) their implications for power relationships (Busuioc 2016; Busuioc and Groenleer 2012; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Ossege 2016) and finally, (iii) policy consequences of ‘agencification’ (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Levi-Faur 2013; Vestlund 2017). Additionally, the study of EU expert committees has been a parallel research interest, including Commission expert groups, Council working groups and comitology committees (Christensen and Kirchner 2010; Egeberg et al. 2003; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008; 2011; Mauer and Larson 2002; Metz 2013; Schaefer 2000; Trondal 2001; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). Secondly, an extensive literature developed on the administrative national-supranational nexus. In fact, this literature was in part inspired by early studies on EU committee governance that hinted at national administrators enacting different roles when attending different EU-level committees. On one hand, they represented their national ministries, while on the other, they were part of a common multi-level administration. Egeberg et al. (2003) successfully established that this effect appeared to be stronger for officials attending Commission expert committees than for officials attending Council working groups or comitology committees. They argued that this divergence was due to a stronger territorial component in the latter two instances. Thus, officials attending Commission expert groups did not only evoke a broader repertoire of roles but were also subjected to less coordination from their ministries than their peers in Council working groups or comitology (see also Schaefer et al. 2000). Similarly, a preceding study undertaken by Trondal (2001: 231) concluded that “administrative integration […] is affected differently by the various [domestic] institutions embedding them.”

Executive Europeanization has been associated with a dual centralization through strengthening of the administrative-level (the EU Commission) – as well as the political level in the form of an increased role of key ministers and heads of governments (James 2010; Kassim 2003; King 1994; Szukala 2003). However, as demonstrated in the aforementioned studies, the EU policy process may not uniformly favor centralization. Building the case for the organizational argument, it was suggested that participation in EU institutions invoke different roles
depending on the organizational principles on which they are constructed (Egeberg 1999; Trondal and Larsson 2005). Hence, participation in EU institutions based on territorial lines (the Council) would invoke intergovernmental loyalties, while participation in sectoral-oriented institutions (the Commission) would invoke stronger sense of loyalties along sectoral and functional lines. These assumptions were supported by studies of Germany (Derlien 2000) and the Netherlands (Harmsen 1999) that also found evidence of increased sectorization rather than centralization (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008: 14).

Impelled by such observations, Egeberg (2006: 2) suggested that processes of administrative integration could be seen as the emergence of a new political order in which national and supranational administrators converged to form a “[…] genuine multilevel union administration.” Evidenced by several empirical studies, Egeberg found that national agencies became increasingly ‘double-hatted’ in the sense that they comprised constitutive building blocks for both their national as well as the supranational administrations. He argued that their ability to detach from national administrations in order to recouple into the European configurations hinged on their organizational properties (see for instance also Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg 2005). Innately, this process is tied to both specialization principles (Gulick 1937) as well as to the proliferation of semi-autonomous agencies both at the national- and supranational level (Lærgeid and Christensen 2006; Yesilkagit 2011). This was corroborated by Trondal (2010: 29) who concluded that “[the] emergent European executive order is driven by the formal organization of its component institutions.” Correspondingly, in her analysis of agencification, Martens (2010) argued that changing patterns of cooperation, coordination, and power were intrinsically linked to organizational conditions at both the national and European level.

Under the conceptual heading ‘multilevel administration’ (MLA), this arising scholarship aimed to unpack the organizational components of government and study how these components may interact across levels of government (Bauer and Trondal 2015: 10).14 Bauer and Trondal (2015) suggest three dimensions of MLA:

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14 While MLA emanates from public-administration scholarship, its conceptual counterpart, MLG, was inspired by comparative politics. Three key variations of the MLA and MLG approach include: firstly, the unit of analysis in the MLG approach is based on regions while MLA suggests a focus on administrative institutions. Secondly, the coherence of units of analysis vary between the two approaches.
institutional independence, integration, and cooptation. As exemplified by empirical studies, these may serve as indicators for the institutionalization of a common administrative order (Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; Olsen 2007). Similarly, Brandsma et al. (2019: 261) note that ‘administrative autonomy’ has been a central area of interest for public administration research on the EU. This is supported by Bauer et al. (2019) who identify ‘transformation of bureaucratic power’ as a key theme in debates on ‘administrative internationalization’15 more broadly. Accordingly, research efforts along these lines have been directed at exploring various dimensions connected to the inner workings of bureaucracy. For instance, Martens (2010: 7) notes that “increased cooperation and development of common rules […] are seen as indications of administrative integration” (see also Olsen 2007).

Consistent with the exploration of this thesis is research that explores the effects of EU multi-leveled administration on executive inter-organizational relationships on the national level (Goetz 2000). These studies share the common assumption that the administrative institutions at the EU-level form a new European executive center that bears direct consequences for the *modus operandi* of national administrations, and thereby also politics (Egeberg 2006; Lægreid et al. 2004). On an abstract level, this is interpreted as transformation of the European political order (Gulbrandsen 2012: 5). Relevant for this thesis are the implications on national regulatory agencies as well as executive ministries. Empirical studies have documented that European institutions have a stronger impact on national agencies than on national ministries (Egeberg 2006; Egeberg and Trondal 2011a; Ruffing 2017). As mentioned, a number of authors have recognized that this has led to the emergence and institutionalization of new layers of bureaucracy, so-called ‘agencification’ (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Levi-Faur 2012). A central question examines how these developments relate to national administrative regimes. This line of inquiry, that departs from the perspective of ‘double-hatted’ agencies (Egeberg 2006), maintains that national ministries remain the dominant principals

The MLG approach largely treats regions as coherent units of analysis, while the MLA approach treats their units as internally differentiated. Thirdly, they differ on core assumptions on the contingency of governance processes (see Trondal 2017, 13-16)

15 Bauer et al. (2019) identify three key themes in studies on ‘administrative internationalization’, namely diffusion, resistance, and transformation of bureaucratic power. Administrative internationalization in this regard is not limited to the EU, but also includes studies of international public administration.
of their agencies (Egeberg and Trondal 2011a). However, it acknowledges that the European drift is likely to (gradually) alter operating principles within agencies and that the degree to which they do so may vary. Juggling the roles of both sector expert and national representative, agency officials often embark on European policy-processes with a relatively ambiguous mandate (Esmark 2008) that arguably leave them more open to supranational ideas and impulses. Moreover, as noted by Lægreid et al. (2004), political leadership is generally more involved in policy-making in EU states than in non-EU states. Overall, these developments point to discretionary loss of political steering and control (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008). Consequently, a vital concern has been the implications on decision-making behavior amongst national incumbents (Egeberg and Trondal 2015).

An analogous line of inquiry has examined the potential impact of administrative integration on bureaucratic autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission and national governments (Maggetti 2007). Two observations stand out in this regard. Firstly, it is contended that agency involvement in international and supranational regulatory networks may cause national ministries to lose sight of their agencies, notably due to restricted possibilities of monitoring and control (Eberle in and Newman 2008). Secondly, empirical studies suggest that ‘agencification’ empowers national agencies vis-à-vis national ministries (Bach and Ruffing 2013; Bach et al. 2015). However, as Bauer et al. (2019: 911) point out, the debate on this is still open. Recent contributions to this discussion suggest that core-executive institutions may have (re-)gained some control over their agencies (Di Mascio and Natalini 2014; Dommett et al. 2016). Equally, the perceptions of growing independence of bureaucracy may also be at odds with comparative public administration scholarship in particular, which has suggested that European bureaucracies have become subject to increasing functional politicization (Page and Wright 1999; 2004; Peters and Pierre 2004) as the capacity of elected politicians to monitor and steer the behavior of non-elected officials has increased (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008: 13).

Over time, an extensive literature on the study of Europeanization of national ministries has developed. A key observation here points out how Europeanization likely affects organization, routines, and culture of ministries (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Jordan 2003; Zubek and Staronova 2012). With specific reference to the UK
and Ireland, James (2010: 832) for instance, notes that “[core executives in member states] encourage greater alignment of domestic coordination structures within the EU decision-making.” Similar inter-departmental coordination structures have also been established in non-member states, albeit the de facto effect of these remains contested (Trondal 2006). Lægreid et al. (2004: 357) find that governments and political leadership in EU member states are more directly involved in ministerial EU policy-making than their counterparts in EEA member states, suggesting that administrative traditions, organizational structure and forms of affiliation to the EU play a role. Other studies have found that Europeanization of national ministries has a more powerful impact on a limited number of civil servants in the ministries (Geuijen et al. 2008; Masterbroek and Princen 2010; Meyer-Sahling and von Stolk 2015; Meyer-Sahling et al. 2016; Müller et al. 2010; Vifell 2006). Similar to the central administration survey reported in this thesis, Geuijen et al. (2008) conducted a comprehensive study of Dutch civil servants in which they mapped the extent to which government officials were involved in EU-related policy-making. They found that overall engagement in EU-matters in the Dutch civil service was limited, and moreover, largely confined to a small core of specialized ‘eurocrats’. Akin to such observations, secondment to the European Commission equip a group of national civil servants with competences and skills in European policy-making (Trondal et al. 2008). Yesilkagit (2012: 7), who emphasizes such tendencies of differentiated integration of national ministries, notes that “though the […] EU impact [of the ministries] is modest for what one can observe, it remains the case that many policy issues have become international. It is even fair to suggest that some of the national ministries […] have essentially become the national branches of the European Commission rather than ministries of the nation-state.”

2.2.3 Future: From multilevel administration in Europe to the world
There are at least two major pathways ahead for the study of Europeanization and MLA more specifically: one concerns the research agenda within the field of EU governance while the second relates to export of ideas to new empirical domains. Firstly, on a broader note there is still a need for studies on how to conceptualize and empirically map administrative integration (Brandsma et al. 2019). Moreover, the winds of change blowing across Europe appeal for renewed questions about institutional resilience and adaptation (Olsen 2007; Trondal 2007). Following in the footsteps of Dwight Waldo (1971), recent literature has thus attended to
questions relating to governance under crisis (Bátora and Fossum 2020; Piattoni 2015; Riddervold et. al 2020; Saurugger 2014) and turbulence (Ansell et al. 2017; Baldersheim and Bátora 2012; Thomann et al. 2019). One question relates to how crisis, such as for instance the COVID-19 crisis and Brexit, affect the processes of (dis-)integration. Does crisis lead the EU towards more, less, or differentiated processes of integration? Another question pertains to the institutional sustainability of the EU: How resilient is the EU system, and its sub-components, when it faces situations that might shake the institutional core of the system? To what extent can the EU absorb, adapt, and muddle through crisis?

Second, there is a shift from sui generis studies of European integration towards a broader comparative study of international bureaucracies. This study has coined the term international public administration (IPA), focusing on variation in policy styles, bureaucratic autonomy and behavioural logics among international civil servants16 (Bauer et al. 2016; Ege and Bauer 2013; Gänzle et al. 2019; Knill and Bauer 2016; Stone and Moloney 2019; Trondal et al. 2010; Trondal 2016).

2.3 Summarizing chapter 2: Identifying the added value

To begin with the big picture, while reform and change of political orders has been subjected to much scholarly attention, institutional emergence and effects have been relatively ignored (Padgett and Powell 2012). In particular, public administration scholarship discipline has paid little attention to wider debates on how administrations affect the rise and fall of political order (Trondal 2017: 8). Likewise, in studies of political order formation, administrative dimension has been largely neglected (Rokkan 1999). Following more recent efforts to rectify the ongoing debate on the emergence and implications of political orders, this thesis aligns with literature that spotlights the administrative dimension of order formation (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Olsen 2007). Key questions include: what is a political order and how can it be explained? How do they function and what are the mechanisms that make organizations and orders function? To what extent do international political orders transform basic logics of pre-existing national, regional, and local political orders? (Trondal 2017: 4) Along

16 For a review on the evolution of research on international bureaucracies see, for instance, Eckhard and Ege (2016).
such lines of inquiry, this thesis examines how a relatively new political order (the EU) challenges an existing one (the nation-state).

As substantiated in the literature review, a golden thread can be traced through the institutionalist perspective on the EU, is the idea that the ‘EU effect’ is filtered and mediated through pre-existing domestic institutions, norms, and cultures (Héritier et al. 2001; Lægreid et al. 2004; Trondal 2007: 967). However, following Bauer and Trondal (2015), public administration scholars have so far imperfect and piecemeal understandings of the functioning of the supranational-national administrative nexus. In particular, the study of how organizational choices affect processes of integration and disintegration is of great importance to understand how administrations form political orders. This calls for studying processes between the EU and domestic level institutions (and also studies that include the international level of government), focusing on, among others, how domestic institutions interpret, process, and practice supranational policies.

Moreover, there is a need for more studies on the systematic impact of organizational variables. Large-N studies, as provided by this thesis, are particularly limited in this regard. Though numerous case studies provide critical insights, there is a lack of comprehensive understanding of the bigger picture and the scope of ‘Europeanization’ across domestic governments.

Additionally, the articles that comprise this thesis each speak to different research gaps. First, the impact of Europe on ministerial officials has been understudied compared to studies of agencies. At the same time, discerning how supranational institutions influence domestic administrations calls for an understanding of both ‘frontline’ institutions. Secondly, there is a lack of studies that consider the relationship between participation in organizational entities at the supranational level and actor-level identities more directly (but see Egeberg 1999a for an exception). Arguably, a shift in identities is a significant indicator of institutionalization of a common European order. Akin to the ‘thin-thick’ Europeanization binary (Vink 2003; Checkel 2001), a shift in identities implies an internalization of European perceptions, norms, and values that is likely to impact decision-making behaviour. Finally, Article III addresses the need for more studies on the interplay between different domestic institutions in how they implement
and exercise European policies. Article III thereby also underscores the question of national political control versus cross-level administrative integration.
3. Theoretical framework

This chapter is dedicated to organizational theory. It begins with a section aimed to (briefly) illuminate its heritage and rise to prominence. The second section discusses its causal component and outlines how the argument is applied in this thesis. The final section briefly reflects what the future might hold for organizational theory with a view to ongoing scholarly debates.

3.1 Background

Although ideas and debates on organization have arguably circulated since the earliest days of civilization (for instance, in Plato’s Republic\(^{17}\)), most scholars consider the growth of industrial societies in the 19\(^{th}\) century the beginning of classical organizational theory. As the name implies, it was the first theory of its kind and remains a nucleus for organizational schools of thought across numerous scholarly disciplines (Shafritz et al. 2005). Reflecting its sociological (Max Webers Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft\(^{18}\)) and managerial (Frederick W. Taylors The Principles of Scientific Management\(^{19}\) and Henri Fayol’s General and Industrial Management\(^{20}\)) origins, early organizational theory was concerned with analyzing organizational structures and tasks. It was primarily interested in describing hierarchical levels of authority and coordination along with horizontal differentiations between units. Inspired by Taylor and Fayol, Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (Papers on the Science of Administration and Notes on the Theory of Organization by Gulick)\(^{21}\) later developed the classical theory of organization,

\(^{17}\) Republic (approximately 375 BC) discusses justice and the order and character of the ideal city-state (‘Kallipolis’). He claims democracy is a danger due to excessive freedom and advocates rule by philosopher kings as the ideal form of governance.

\(^{18}\) Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft (1921) by political economist and sociologist Max Weber is a broad sociological treatise that discusses relations and power between different societal actors. The book contains chapters on amongst others, social action, law and religion.

\(^{19}\) In The principles of scientific management (1911) Frederick W. Taylor explains how productivity can be improved by applying the scientific method. The monograph consists of three parts: introduction, chapter 1: Fundamentals of scientific management, and chapter 2: The principles of scientific management. The latter introduces four core principles including science, harmony, cooperation and development.

\(^{20}\) Henri Fayol became known with the publication of General and Industrial Management (1949). The article has originally been published in 1916 in French. In this work, Fayol presented his theory of management, known as Fayolism that included 14 principles of management.

\(^{21}\) Papers on the Science of Administration is a collection of essays on administration, including Notes on the Theory of Administration, published in 1937. Amongst other, it introduced the acronym POSDCORB (planning, organization, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting) that refers to different stages in an administrative process.
also known as ‘administrative management theory’ (Prasad et al. 1991; Rabin and Miller 2000; Shafritz et al. 2016). Echoed by Henry Mintzberg (1979), these ideas emphasized formal authority and the role of hierarchical supervision. Nonetheless, principles put forward by Taylor/Fayol and later Gulick and Urwick were demystified by Herbert Simon in 1946 (Proverbs of Administration), who argued that rather than being scientific, these principles were more appropriately proverbs.

Simon was antagonistic to the dominant idea of unbounded rationality conveyed by the images of ‘economic man’ and the ‘rational manager.’ As argued in Administrative Behavior (first published in 1947), individuals operate with limited information in an exceedingly complex world. Because it is impossible to obtain or process all the information needed to make rational decisions, individuals instead opt for ‘satisficing’ behavior that, that is, solutions that are good enough given what they know. Decision-making is thus the outcome of a simplification process rather than profit maximizing behaviour. It follows that different individuals and different organizations are likely to choose different solution depending on their frame of reference. As organizational analysis developed into a distinct field of inquiry in the 1940s, Herbert Simon’s ideas became the centerpiece of the Carnegie School, also represented by James G. March and Richard Cyert (see also Augier and March 2001; March 2007). An analogous theoretical camp that formed around the same time was sociological institutionalism, represented by Philip Selznick (Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation) (Hannan 2015). The latter was characterized by the study of the whole organization, and was particularly interested in social processes found within an organization (often referred to as ‘old’ institutionalism). Selznick (1957: 17) famously described institutionalization as a process whereby the organization becomes “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand”. During 1950s and 60s ‘behavioralism’ gained ground as the core paradigm within political science and impinged on the popularity of organizational/institutional ideas. In response, organizational/institutionalist scholars began developing different analytical approaches to elucidate the role of

22 Behavioralism, associated with scholars such as Stein Rokkan, viewed that the subject matter of political science should be limited to phenomena that are independently observable and quantifiable (Roskin 2016). In contrast to organizational/institutional scholars that saw institutions as crucial to decision-making behaviour, behavioralists sought to examine observable behaviour of individuals.
institutions in the social and political process. Dominated by its organizational and sociological heritage, this new wave of organizational/institutional ideas was coined ‘new institutionalism’ and has been widely associated with James March and Johan P. Olsen.

Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three main neo-institutionalist schools of thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (see also Peters 1999). The latter arose in the late 1970s within the sub-field of organizational theory and harbored two distinctive (and partly conflicting) perspectives: one that emphasizes exogenous factors (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and one that accentuates endogenous factors (March and Olsen 1984; 1989). Anchored in Herbert Simons concept of bounded rationality, an endogenous focus views institution as “organizational arrangements that links role/identities, accounts of situations, resources and prescriptive rules and practices [...]” (March and Olsen 2006a: 691).

Effectively, this implies that institutions tend to impose certain worldviews, expectations and allegiances on its members (March and Olsen 1989) that ultimately skew decision-making behavior according to institutionalized practices of collectivity (‘logic of appropriateness’). Therefore, endogenous variables, such as rules, procedures, and norms, are considered crucial building blocks of appropriate behavior. Inspired by this approach, organizational theorists detail a set of variables and causal mechanisms that outline how organization might intervene in policy processes and eventually shape its outputs (Egeberg 2003: 157): “ [...] since policy makers base their choices of highly simplified models of the world, it becomes crucial to understand the operative selection mechanisms and filters. An organizational perspective highlights the role of decision makers organizational context in this respect [...]”.

Implicitly, the central recommendation of organizational theory is that organizing political life makes a difference. Organizational theory has been applied to private- and public-sector organizations alike (March 2007; Murdoch 2015), to explain processes within nation-states (Christensen and Lægreid 2006) and more recently, processes across levels of governance (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Gänzle et al. 2017).
3.2 An organizational approach to public governance: connecting across levels of governance

Organizational theory relies on four independent variables: structure, demography, locus, and culture, and asks what difference they make in the governance process (dependent variable). While the former three are all relevant (albeit to varying degrees) in the enclosed articles, organizational culture is excluded from this thesis. According to the culture perspective, decision-making behavior tends to reflect informal norms and values rather than the formal structure (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Culture is excluded for two main reasons: Firstly, culture requires time in order to fully develop. It is less amenable to deliberate change and thus differs from the three other independent variables (Selznick 1957; Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Secondly, the data material used to conduct the studies does not allow for inquiries into cultural aspects. As a result, organizational culture will not be discussed in the proceeding section.

It is important to note that an organizational approach to public governance does not aim to explain particular policy choices or societal consequences. Instead, the impact of organizational factors is thought to have an indirect effect on policy choices through the policy process (Egeberg, forthcoming). Organizational factors can shape and bias processes, making certain outcomes more likely than others. Moreover, an organizational approach views the governance process as continuous. Organizational factors may influence different stages of the political
decision-making process: for instance, the ability to implement policy may be contingent upon the capacity of an organization, and policy development may depend on who is organized where according to what principles. Hence, this perspective questions how organizational factors impact decision-making behavior in the governance process. It also asks how organizational factors themselves may facilitate organizational change (meta-governance). For instance, merging departments, relocating whole organizations, or changing demographics likely impacts how these institutions ‘tick’ and thus, by extension, their outputs. In essence, the core message of organizational theory can be summed up in three words: organization is politics. The following sections will discuss the three independent variables, with an emphasis on organizational structure. The two remaining variables have been applied only intermittently and will be delineated according to their relevance in the articles.

3.2.1 Organizational structure
Empirically, structure has been the most studied organizational variable and its effects are well-documented (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Structure is associated with the ‘classical organizational perspective’ represented by Gulick (1937), as well as with the ‘rational system perspective’ (Simon 1957) and the ‘instrumental perspective’ (Egeberg 1994). A frequently cited definition of organizational structure is Scott’s (1981) conceptualization of structure as a normative arrangement composed of rules and roles that specify who is expected to do what and how. It follows that a structure is never neutral (Hammond 1990): it codifies behaviour by broadly defining what interests and goals should be pursued and what alternatives and consequences should be considered relevant (Egeberg 2003: 158). An organizational structure thus represents mobilization of bias as it provides a framework of role expectations. When an individual is assigned to a specific position in an organization, it concomitantly invokes tacit codes of conduct by regulating what sources of information they are exposed to and whom they interact with.

But for what reasons would we expect that individuals comply with role expectations? Firstly, as noted, bounded rationality does not allow for a full-range consideration of alternatives. Structure assists in simplifying the world by presenting a selection of options. Consequently, as anticipated by Simon (1957), individuals comply with expectations because it is convenient. Bounded rationality
becomes a mechanism that connects expectations to behaviour. Secondly, individuals may comply because is deemed appropriate (March and Olsen 1989), that is, they feel morally obligated. An important step in the development of political order is the acceptance of impersonal roles and ‘rationalized’ behaviour in organizational life. This allows individuals to separate their private interests from those emerging in their capacity as employees or representatives (Egeberg 2003: 158). In the same vein, social control from peers are also thought to minimize deviant behaviour (ibid). Thirdly, individuals may be motivated by incentives (compliance as a means to serve own self-interests), such as career prospects or financial enticements.

There are four dimensions of organizational structure of particular relevance for this study: horizontal specialization, vertical specialization, size, and affiliation.

First, horizontal specialization asserts how tasks and responsibilities are divided both within and across organizations. It determines how different groups or sectors are linked together or decoupled from another, and thereby also unifies or separates different concerns and considerations. With his four basic principles of formal organization, Luther Gulick (1937) laid the groundwork for this analytical scheme. He pinpointed four fundamental ways in which tasks may be distributed horizontally among units (or organizations), namely according to territory, purpose, function (process), or clientele. Concerns and priority will accordingly be given based on a distinctive geographical area (such as a municipality, region or nation-state), a specific sector or policy area (such as environment or health), a specified function (such as human resources or legal affairs) or a specific group of people (such as senior citizens or people with disabilities). A central premise here is the link between horizontal specialization and coordination: areas that are encompassed by the same organizational context are more likely to be coordinated.

Subsequently, vertical specialization outlines how tasks and responsibilities are allocated across the hierarchy. It is useful to distinguish between intra- and inter-organizational vertical specialization where the former describes the formal relationship between different individuals within an organization (positions, rank) and the latter refers to formal relationships between different organizations (such as national ministries with subordinate agencies). Vertical specialization bears relevance for understanding patterns of control and coordination. It defines
whether coordination should be collegial (discussion, voting, consensus) or hierarchical (command). It may also determine extent of hierarchical (e.g. political) control by linking some organizations more tightly, for instance, through mergers or boundary spanning units and positions. Conversely, organizations may become more decoupled and autonomous by organizing them at distance from the hierarchical centre. Additionally, what position an individual holds affects their concerns and considerations. Those at the top, for example, tend to hold a more general view and accentuate the bigger picture while lower ranked individuals have a more local outlook (Aberbach et al. 1981; Christensen and Lægreid 2009).

Thirdly, organizational affiliation refers to different organizational engagements. A ‘primary affiliation’ is the organization in which an individual is expected to be full-time engaged, whereas ‘secondary affiliations’ are various part-time commitments such as committees, advisory boards or expert panels. Though it is generally established that the primary affiliation influences decision-making behaviour more vigorously (March 1994), secondary structures still expose individuals to alternative problems, ideas, and solutions that may merge with - or possibly replace - presiding decision-making logics. Finally, size, understood as the number of positions, gives indications of an organizations ability to initiate, develop, and enforce policies. A general argument is that large organizations have a greater capacity to influence public governance processes than smaller organizations. A frequent applied indicator of size is organizational duplication and overlap (Landau 1969).

Organizational structure is applied as an independent variable in all three articles. Pertaining to cross-level administrative integration specifically, the relevance of the four dimensions materialize in distinctive manners: firstly, horizontal specialization encourages and enables sector-specific cooperation across territorial borders. Secondly, (inter-organizational) vertical specialization has allowed national agencies to decouple from their parent ministries and recouple into supranational organizational configurations. Thirdly, secondary affiliations at the supranational level, such as committees and agency networks, may influence national officials’ decision-making behaviour by adding an additional layer of considerations. Finally, the relevance of size is not as clearly emphasized, but may concern, for instance, the number and types of positions specifically allocated to EU-related tasks in a national ministry or agency.
3.2.2 Organizational demography

Rooted in the theory of representative bureaucracy (Selden 1997; Meier and Capers 2012; Meier and Nigro 1976), organizational demography asks if background characteristics, such as ethnicity or education, matter in organizational decision-making (Pfeffer 1982; Lægreid and Olsen 1978; 1984). Diverse traditions (and contexts) accentuate diverse demographic attributes. For instance, some empirical studies conducted in the United States suggest a significant effect of ethnicity (Selden 1997; Meier and Capers 2012), while studies aimed at unpacking decision-making within the European Union have found little to no effects of classical demographic factors such as gender, age or even nationality (Suvarierol 2008; Trondal et al. 2010). The impact of demographic variables has introduced one central controversy in the literature, namely if – and under what conditions – the effect of demographic attributes overpower the effect of organizational structure and vice versa. Organizational scholars generally view structure as the most influential variable and argue that demographical profile is less relevant in comparison. An exception here is educational background (Christensen and Lægreid 2009; Egeberg and Stigen 2018) and previous work experience (Egeberg and Stigen 2018). It is assumed that the impact of education in particular may be explained by appertaining tenets that privilege certain factors, variables, and consequences. Building on organizational sociology, this has been translated into the effects of ‘pre’- and ‘re’-socialization (see also for instance Checkel 2005). Socialization usually means that values, norms, and role expectations have become internalized (Egeberg 2003: 160). The idea of pre-socialization maintains that, when entering an organization, individuals already retain an inherent bias emanating from previous socialization experiences (such as education, age or nationality). According to the ‘representative’ view, officials’ decision-making will not reflect their organizational position, but rather their demographic background. Conversely, organizational re-socialization (occurring with increasing length service) occurs when individuals internalize the values and norms of their organization.

Organizational demography is applied in Article III. For scholarship interested in European multi-level administration, education and nationality has been a principal subject of scholarly interest. Underpinned by the continuous intergovernmental-supranational tension, the latter has been of key interest
(Suvarierol 2008). At the same time, administrative integration has been catalysed by the accumulation of experts (educational backgrounds) from different levels of government, resulting in burgeoning epistemic communities transcending territorial borders and regimes.

### 3.2.3 Organizational locus

While organizational structure and demography mainly rely on cognitive processes, locus is the only variable that examines the physical ramifications of organizational life. It is important to note that this perspective does not include architecture, design, symbolic structures or individual working spaces, but solely revolves around the actual location of an organization and whether geographical placement matters for decision-making. The idea is that decision-makers’ informational basis is not only shaped by the organizational position or demographic background, but also by the location in the physical space (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Physical location may assist in separating private and professional roles and may also help to separate organizational roles where decision-makers hold multiple organizational affiliations (Egeberg 2003). Moreover, there appears to be an inverse relationship between distance and degree of contact and coordination within government organizations (Egeberg 1994; Hult 1987; Jacobsen 1989). Two types of contacts are sensitive to physical location: first, due to increased cost (time and money), distance may affect formal (face-to-face) meetings. Second, distance also affects the frequency of informal meetings (Egeberg 1994). A study by Egeberg and Trondal (2011b) did not find any significant effect of physical location on agency-ministry contact and coordination (between government organizations). One explanation here is that agencies located in the political center are also located at a distance from their parent ministries, which in practice prevents unplanned encounters. Nonetheless, overall organizational locus remains less emphasized in the literature (but see Jacobsen, forthcoming). Organizational locus is applied as an independent variable in Article III.

### 3.2.4 A note on the relative importance of structure, demography, and site

In a larger context, the question effectively becomes the extent to which politics are driven by routines and administrative structures (organizational structure), their environments (organizational demography) and/or their geographical location (organizational locus). Supported by numerous empirical studies,
organizational scholars generally view structure as the most influential independent variable (Christensen and Lægreid 2009; Lægreid and Olsen 1984; Scharpf 1977; Stigen 1991; Trondal et al. 2008, see also Egeberg 2003 for a review of empirical examples). Notwithstanding, the effect of structure may be overshadowed if for instance, the organization is relatively small or if the organization is largely fueled by trust rather than rules. It is also likely that high degrees of politicization may interfere with structural effects on decision-making behaviour. Additionally, the effect of the two remaining variables (demography and site) may be amplified under certain conditions. A recurring concern of organizational scholarship has thus been to examine what independent variables matter most under what conditions (Egeberg and Trondal 2018).

Table 3. Independent variables with dimensions and sub-dimensions

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Source: own compilation
For instance, demographical characteristics may matter more if decision-makers have substantial room for discretion, i.e. in less rule-driven situations (Cohen et al. 1972; Weick 1976). Likewise, demography could play a role if there is a strong representational linkage (the decision-maker shares the same demographical attributes as the group for which they are responsible) (Selden 1997). A third scenario may be an organization with a critical mass, for example, if a gender or ethnicity is underrepresented. Finally, demography is likely to filter through more strongly in situations where there is a societal culture that does not differentiate between personal life and impersonal roles (Egeberg and Trondal 2018: 12). In the same vein, the effect of location may be amplified if there are limited degrees of formalization, making decision-making more likely to be contingent upon frequent (formal and informal) encounters. Secondly, in turbulent or urgent situations (such as crisis) location is likely to matter more than in everyday ‘low-tempo’ governance processes.

3.3 Bridging craft and science: A broader debate on organizational theory

There have been concerns that political science has disengaged from practical affairs by excessively focusing on rigor rather than relevance (Densch 2019). It is argued that political scientists should not only understand the problem, but also fix it. At the heart of this debate lies the question of how we should motivate the study of political science: to what extent should it be motivated solely by literature (‘pure’ science) and to what extent should it be motivated by societal problems (‘instrumental’ science)? Moreover, can these two interests be consolidated, and if so, how? Such questions have been an enduring theme that regularly re-surface on the research agenda. For organizational scholarship, this debate has been translated into the question of organizational (re-) design (Greenwood and Miller 2010; March 1965; Lægreid 2018). Asserting that “[…] the pursuit of knowledge is not necessarily the enemy of the pursuit of relevance” (Egeberg and Trondal 2018: 129), this perspective expands the organizational horizon by highlighting the design implications of the causal mechanisms at play. Following this, organizational theory may be envisioned as proceeding in two consecutive steps where the first one is to establish causality, and the second one is to apply causality in a design process (see Egeberg and Trondal 2018).
4. Methodology

The aim of a methodology chapter is to establish a clear relationship between means (research question) and ends (data and analysis). This includes the broader philosophical underpinnings of the research question and the ensuing methods employed to assess the theoretical conjectures on which the study is built. ‘Methods’ describe the tools and techniques applied to conduct the research, while ‘methodology’ refers to the philosophical infrastructures that underpin and inform those tools and techniques (Haverland and Yanow 2012: 402). This chapter is organized into three main sections. The first section concerns the methodological principles guiding the research. The second section adopts a more pragmatic focus accounting for the specific methods and cases that have been applied. Finally, the third section critically evaluates and discusses the overall methodological approach.

4.1 Methodology and methods of organizational theory

This section starts by briefly reviewing three main methodological positions of social science before describing the ontological and epistemological foundations of organizational theory more specifically (section 4.1.1). It is followed by a reflection on the research methods implicated by the methodological framework (section 4.1.2).

4.1.1 The philosophical underpinnings of organizational theory

Methodology describes the principles associated with a branch of knowledge and constitutes the ontological (the study of being) and the epistemological (the study of the nature of knowledge) positions of the researcher. It encapsulates the researcher’s worldview, and how it influences the perceived relative importance of aspects of reality. A main cleavage has formed between objectivist (positivist) and constructivist (interpretivist) positions. The former views reality as existing independently of the observer and holds that it therefore can be known objectively. The positivist paradigm is thus constructed on a realist ontology and an objective epistemological position. In contrast, the interpretivist paradigm assumes that reality is not singular and objective but shaped by individuals’ subjective experiences. Social realities are thus socially constructed ideas that do not exist as independent, objective realities. Accordingly, interpretivism adopts an inter-subjective epistemology based on the ontological belief that reality is socially...
constructed (Haverland and Yanow 2012; Marsch and Furlong 2002). A middle
ground is found in critical realism (Ongaro 2017; Oomsels 2016; Pollitt and
Bouckhart 2009; Talbot 2010). Bridging the long-standing divisions between
positivist and constructivist ideas, critical realism is grounded on ‘ontological
realism’ (reality exists independently) and ‘epistemological relativism’
(knowledge is socially produced) (Bashkar 2013; Sorrell 2018). Table 4
summarizes these three main philosophies of science.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Competing philosophies of social science</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Critical realism</th>
<th>Interpretivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Realist (independent and objective reality)</td>
<td>Realist/socially constructed (independent and objective, but in part subjectively constructed through social interaction)</td>
<td>Socially constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Objective (knowledge generated by causal relationships)</td>
<td>Objective/inter-subjective (objective knowledge can expand knowledge, but knowledge cannot be separated from subjective worldviews held by respondents and researcher)</td>
<td>Inter-subjective (knowledge created by interpreting subjective meanings of subjects according to their own frame of reference)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode of reasoning</strong></td>
<td>Deductive</td>
<td>Deductive/inductive</td>
<td>Inductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methods</strong></td>
<td>(Statistical) testing of relationships between dependent and independent variables (quantitative and qualitative)</td>
<td>No particular preference, depends on research question and nature of relevant entities. Mixed methods encouraged.</td>
<td>Qualitative methods such as ethnography. Interpretations of language and texts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambitions</strong></td>
<td>Generalisations about stable cause-and-effect relationships (predict)</td>
<td>Small and medium-sized generalizations applicable across a limited number of clearly specified contexts (explain)</td>
<td>Local understandings, sometimes arriving at intersubjective, consensual understandings through participative discussions (reason)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Oomsels (2016); Pollitt and Bouckhart (2009); Sorrell (2018).

Though public administration is characterized by a multitude of theories, methods,
and philosophical underpinnings, organizational theory remains heavily
influenced by the positivist paradigm. Studies anchored in a positivist methodological framework are generally geared towards testing theoretical propositions by employing deductive logics of inquiry. Theories and hypotheses are built on concepts that require precise meanings and definitions. Moreover, because the concepts are merely abstractions from the real world, they need to be operationalized by translating them into indicators (Haverland and Yanow 2012: 404). Organizational scholarship largely adheres to this positivist blueprint: it assumes that organizational factors exist independently of the observer (realist ontology) and that knowledge can be obtained by testing causal relationships (objectivist epistemology) through either quantitative or qualitative methods. By his own account, Herbert Simon was a heavily influenced by logical positivism (Simon 1991; 1947). Positivistic principles have continued to undergird organizational research as seen in the works of Egeberg (2003; 2006). At the same time, organizational (and institutional) scholarship generally accept the critical realist argument that reality in part is also subjectively constructed through social interaction. Evident in, for instance, the idea of logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989), though the external reality of an organization is embedded in objective (observable) structures, the social structures are continuously interpreted, reformulated and reshaped through social interactions. Hence, institutions partly exist also by the virtue of inter-subjective mechanisms (Ackroyd 2009). It follows that we expect actors’ interpretations of these social structures to affect outcomes. In order to understand institutions, we thus need to identify and understand both the ‘external’ reality as well as the social construction of that reality (Marsch and Furlong 2002: 31). Inferred then is an understanding of organizations informed by objective measures and positivistic research, but not completely separated from the subjective worldviews held by the respondents or the researcher (see also Oomsels 2016).

4.1.2 Researching administrative integration in a positivist methodological tradition

Though positioned in the positivist-critical realist intersection, organizational/institutional scholarship has primarily drawn on positivist research methods. Positivist methodology is populated by quantitative and qualitative research methods (Su 2019). Correspondingly, mainstream PA studies on administrative
integration have principally been characterized by large-n studies (e.g. Bach et al. 2015; Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; 2011a; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011) and case studies (e.g. Busuioc 2016; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Martens 2010; Vestlund 2015) that seek to establish causal relationships between dependent and independent variables.

As noted in the introduction, the governance process is the overarching dependent variable of public administration scholarship. Different PA perspectives have in turn emphasized different aspects of this process. For instance, literature on networks may ask to what extent they contribute to democratic governance (Sørensen and Torfing 2016), while scholars interested in reforms and changing administrative doctrines may ask what consequences such changes entail for various public sector processes (Lægreid and Verhoest 2010). By the same token, studies along the lines of MLA ask what difference organizational and institutional factors (independent variables) make in processes of administrative integration (dependent variable). Administrative integration has been operationalized in different ways. Broadly speaking, three main clusters of indicators can be identified (table 4). The majority of studies have perceived administrative integration as processes of coordination and cooperation between different administrative entities at the national and supranational level. March (1991: 143, quoted in Martens 2010: 7) notes “[w]e imagine a world consisting of set of parts. At least integration is gauged by some measure of the density, intensity and character of the elements of that set” (see also Olsen 2007: 96 and Egeberg 2005). A second group of studies examine administrative integration through the lens of institutional autonomy. A predominant interest in this regard is the de facto independence of national regulatory agencies. Finally, a third group of studies perceive administrative integration as an instigator of changes or shifts in personal attitudes, role perceptions and loyalties. This is sometimes also conceived as so-called ‘behavioural logics’ (see for instance Trondal et al. 2010). Table 5 summarizes the three blocks of administrative integration indicators. Moreover, the three articles comprising this thesis each apply a different indicator (see table 1).

23 ‘Administrative integration’ in this context denotes a broad understanding of studies that discuss aspects and interlinkages between national and supranational public institutions.

24 Limited to references mentioned in section 2.2

25 Limited to references mentioned in section 2.2
Table 5. Three indicators of administrative integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Patterns of coordination, cooperation and conflict between various administrative entities (within and between levels of government)</td>
<td>Bach et al. 2016; Busuioc 2016; Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Heidbreder 2015; Lægreid et al. 2004; Martens 2010; Mastenbroek and Princen 2010; Ruffing 2017; Sverdrup 2000; Trein and Magetti 2019; Vestlund 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integration</td>
<td>Autonomy vis-à-vis other administrative entities (within and between levels of government)</td>
<td>Bach and Ruffing 2013; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Magetti 2007; Yesilkagit 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variation in attitudes, role perceptions, loyalties and identities</td>
<td>Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 1999a; Egeberg et al. 2003; Suvaerierol 2008; Trondal et al. 2008; Trondal and Veggeland 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own compilation

4.2 Analyze this! Research design and case

A research design signifies the methods employed to collect and analyze variables deduced from the research question. The main source of data in this thesis is quantitative questionnaire data from the Central Administration Surveys. Additionally, this data has been supplemented by qualitative interview data conducted in the Norwegian Communications Authority (Ncom) and the Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA). The sections below provide further information on methods (section 4.2.1) and case selection (4.2.2).

4.2.1 Researching administrative integration through quantitative and qualitative methods

Data has been collected through questionnaires and interviews. The study is quantitatively driven with qualitative data supplemented to provide more complex answers to the research question. Thus, the questions posed in the semi-structured interviews were largely analogous to questions posed in the questionnaire. Both methods come with distinct advantages: while quantitative data allows for descriptive broadness and generalizability, qualitative data provides depth and detail. Combining and integrating data through mixed methods approach (Tashakorri and Creswell 2007) provides broadness and depth, and offsets weaknesses inherent to applying each approach separately.
**Quantitative data collection: surveys**

The Central Administration Surveys are a comprehensive set of studies conducted every 10th year among Norwegian agency and ministerial officials. The study was introduced in 1976 as part of the Norwegian Power Study (1976-82), led by project leader Gudmund Hernes and Johan P. Olsen. A decade later, a similar study was conducted under the umbrella of The Norwegian Research Councils priority area ‘management, organization and governance systems’ (abbreviated ‘LOS’ in Norwegian). It was also extended to include national agencies. Equivalent studies in 1996 and 2006 were directed by ARENA – Centre for European Studies in cooperation with the Departments of Political Science at the University of Oslo (UiO) and at the University of Bergen (UiB). Similarly, the 2016 surveys were administered by the UiO in cooperation with the University of Agder (UiA) and the UiB. Project leaders for the most recent set of studies were Professors Morten Egeberg (UiO), Tom Christensen (UiO), Per Lægreid (UiB) and Jarle Trondal (UiO/UiA).

The surveys have stayed identical over the years for comparative purposes, albeit with a few necessary adjustments. Participants are asked about their backgrounds, careers, contact patterns, perceptions of power, and internationalization. From 1996 and onwards, the surveys also included a section on European integration. The objective of this specific inquiry was to scrutinize the extent of involvement of European actors and possible implications therein. Over the years, the surveys have been distributed to every ministerial official and every third agency official. The first agency survey in 1986 set the standard by randomly selecting one third of agency officials. Initially, this decision was made due to the comprehensive number of employees and from that point forward it was maintained to ensure consistency. Additional selection criteria for the respondents are (i) a-level positions27 and (ii) minimum of one year’s experience in the ministry or agency

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26 I contributed to data collection in the 2016-surveys. Access to the data was granted by the project leaders.

27 A-level in this context is applied to describe positions that usually require a university degree. Over the years, these positions have been labelled differently, however, the key characteristic should be some involvement in policy making, implementing or practicing.
(see also Christensen et al. 2018: 23-24). Surveys were only distributed to employees in agency headquarters.

Compared to similar studies, response rates have been high during the past decades. However, as indicated in table 5, response rates have dropped steadily from 72 percent from 1976-1996 to 60 percent in 2016. Prior to 2006, the surveys were distributed by postal mail, whereas in 2006 and 2016 they were conducted electronically. Likely causes of decreasing response rates are linked to change in survey technology as well as general fatigue amongst respondents towards surveys. The latter is also illustrated through systematic increase in ‘missing values’ towards the end of the survey (Egeberg and Stigen 2018). Nonetheless, ‘missing values’ are not associated with particular characteristics of the respondents (Bjurstrøm 2017) and is hence not likely to significantly distort the representativeness of the survey. All data is made available at the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD).  

Table 6. Response rates, the Central Administration Surveys 1972-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
<th>Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N/ Average percent</td>
<td>7662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Christensen et al. (2018: 24)

The articles included in this thesis have been limited to include only those officials who report being affected to the EU/EEA/Schengen to a “small extent” or more.  

Qualitative data collection: interviews

The survey dataset was triangulated with the help of 11 semi-structured interviews conducted in two Norwegian agencies in 2019. All interviews were conducted in-person. Additional data was collected to corroborate patterns observed in the quantitative dataset as well as for a greater in-depth understanding of the inner

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28 See https://nsd.no/polsys/forvaltning/sentraladmsurvey.html
29 Original question: “To what extent is your policy-field affected by EU/EEA/Schengen?” Articles apply variable 1-4 on the following five-point scale (1) To a very large extent (2) To a large extent (3) Somewhat (4) To a small extent (5) Not affected
workings of government agencies. The interviews are thus intended to be a supplement to the main dataset. The selection criteria of interviewees mirror those of the survey data, that is: (i) a-level officials, (ii) minimum one year of experience in the agency and (iii) involvement in preparing, implementing and/or practicing EU legislation. The table below summarizes the respondent sample.

Table 7. Informants, Norwegian Communications Authority, and Norwegian Medicines Agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Position*</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Ncom</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Dec 2018</td>
<td>Lillesand, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Ncom</td>
<td>Special adviser</td>
<td>Jan 2019</td>
<td>Lillesand, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Ncom</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Feb 2019</td>
<td>Kristiansand, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Ncom</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Jan 2019</td>
<td>Lillesand, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>NoMA</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Feb 2019</td>
<td>Oslo, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>NoMA</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Feb 2019</td>
<td>Oslo, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>NoMA</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
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<td>Oslo, NO</td>
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<td>NoMA</td>
<td>Senior adviser</td>
<td>Feb 2019</td>
<td>Oslo, NO</td>
<td>Transcribed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Senior adviser or equivalent

4.2.2 Case selection

Three cases have been employed in total: the Norwegian central administration (comprising all agencies and ministries) constitutes the empirical basis of the quantitative database, while the qualitative database consists of two Norwegian agencies (Ncom and NoMA). This section outlines the main characteristics of the three cases as well as reasons for selecting them.

The Norwegian Central Administration

The Norwegian central administration is comprised of core-executive ministries (currently 16) and subordinate agencies and other administrative bodies (currently approximately 60). The latter is subjected to political control and administrative accountability from the responsible minister and not primarily from a government collegium. Similar to the Commission and EU agencies, the Norwegian central administration is organized according to the principles of purpose and function (see Gulick 1937). Whereas the ministries function as secretariats for the political leadership with planning and coordinating functions (Christensen and Lægreid 2009), the agencies are mainly responsible for advising

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30 Includes 14 sector ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). See https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/id933/ for full list.

31 See appendix B for agencies included in the Central administration survey 2016
the ministries as well as preparing, implementing, and administrating policies.\textsuperscript{32} The ministries are led by the responsible minister (temporary position), while the agencies are led by a director-general (permanent position). The total number of employees within the central administration\textsuperscript{33} was approximately 22,800 in 2018, of which 4,500 were employed in the ministries and 18,300 were employed in the agencies (DiFi 2019: 16). Approximately two thirds of the agencies are located in Oslo, whereas the remaining third are located elsewhere in Norway.

Christensen et al. (2018:13) list three main motivations for studying central administrations: firstly, the central administration (the ministries in particular) are the executive nucleus of government activities and are thereby responsible for maintaining political order through the steering of society. Secondly, the central administration holds significant political influence and power, as seen in, for instance, the preparation of policies. Finally, organization and recruitment procedures of the central administration are directly linked to efficiency and good governance. In a nutshell, a well-functioning public sector is a prerequisite for a well-functioning society. Exploring how the central administration functions—and the attendant circumstances and consequences—better equips us to both improve but also to build resiliency in the face of internal and external pressures. Selecting the central administration as a case provides unique insights into how supranational institutions affect the whole government apparatus. This allows for theoretical and empirical conclusions valid across sectors and policy areas. Norway’s status as an integrated third country provides ancillary empirical motivation to apply data from the central administration as it tests the effects of administrative integration beyond the territorial boundaries of the EU.

\textit{The Norwegian Communications Authority (Ncom)}

The Norwegian Communications authority is a semi-autonomous agency under the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization. Ncom supervises providers of “[…] post and telecommunications services, manages frequencies and numbering resources, investigates ex ante competition problems in the electronic communications markets and makes decisions pursuant to the Electronic

\textsuperscript{32} See also \url{https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/statlig-forvaltning/forvaltningsutvikling/hva-er-statsforvaltningen/id2397949/}

\textsuperscript{33} Includes ministries and agencies
Communications Act and the Norwegian Postal Services Act. Ncom also manages the duty of confidentiality in electronic communications and works on security and readiness” (Ncom 2019a). The agency has approximately 160 employees, of which 140 are located at their headquarters in Lillesand, Norway. The agency is organized into five departments with subordinate units (figure 6).

Figure 6. Organizational chart, Norwegian Communications Authority (2019)

Ncom was selected as a case study due to its frequent and extensive involvement in various EEA/EU-related institutions. Information on frequencies and forms of supranational cooperation is accessible through the online calendar (Ncom 2019c). Additionally, documents pertaining to supranational cooperation may be downloaded from their website (Ncom 2019d). The latter includes a guidance document for EEA-related tasks, an overview of international – and supranational fora in which Ncom participates as well as an overview of EEA-contact persons within the agency. A supporting reason for selecting Ncom is a lack of academic case studies on EU involvement. Additionally, it was selected due to the geographical component, located approximately 300 kilometres outside the political centre (Oslo) in Lillesand, Norway.

34 The remaining 20 are employed at local offices in Lødingen, Trondheim, Bergen, Ski, and Trondheim.
The Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA)
The Norwegian Medicines Agency, located in Oslo, is a semi-autonomous agency under the Ministry of Health and Care Services. The core mission of NoMA is to “[…] evolve and safeguard public and animal health by ensuring efficiency, quality and safety of medicines and to administer and enforce the medical devices regulation” (NoMA 2019b). NoMA has four areas of responsibility (equivalent to departments) with subordinate units (figure 7). The total number of employees is approximately 320, including full-time positions allocated to supranational policy-making.

Figure 7. Organizational chart, Norwegian Medicines Agency (2019)

NoMa was selected due to its extensive degree of integration into EU regulatory networks, as evidenced by Vestlund (2015). NoMA actively participates in all seven scientific committees in the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (NoMA 2019c). It is worth noting that the European medicines regulatory cooperation pools resources conveyed through routinely interaction and exchange of valuable assets such as knowledge, information, practices, and experiences amongst

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35 There are approximately 50 working groups in total under the seven scientific EMA committees. NoMA participates in approximately 25 of these.
participants. Additionally, there is a routinized division of labour within the network where the participants mutually adapt and specialize in different tasks and fields of expertise (Vestlund 2017: 63). The benefits of cooperation are also emphasized on the NoMA website: “[Through European medicines regulatory] cooperation, smaller countries such as Norway may actively contribute with expertise […] and influence decision-making. At the same time, this enables us to increase own competences by benefitting from the knowledge of others”36 (NoMa 2019c).

4.3 Evaluation and limitations
This thesis does not circumvent the general limitations and methodological difficulties in social sciences. The standard disclaimers apply (for both methods): one general limitation is linked to the possibility of self-selection bias. Though this may never be completely eliminated, the large number of respondents in the quantitative dataset will increase the likelihood of a representative sample. The qualitative dataset is not equally robust. There is a relatively low number of interviewees (Article III) in this thesis, however, combining datasets and comparing results partly compensates for this limitation. Furthermore, respondents may also provide answers that present themselves in a favourable manner, or they may provide inaccurate answers due to boredom, a lack of time and/or memory.37 The former may be partly tackled by introducing proxies; a strategy that was necessarily adopted in both datasets. The use of proxies implies masking the original interest by framing questions in a more accessible and/or neutral manner. For instance, in order to unveil how influential another institution may be in a decision-making process, one may inquire on various indicators such as type/frequency of contact or weight assigned to different external steering signals.

On a broader note, a researcher should acknowledge that there is an imminent potential of spurious correlations (Elster 1999). To some extent, this may be counteracted through a theoretically sound argument coupled with carefully

36 Author’s own translation. Original quote: «Legemiddelsamarbeidet gjør at små land som Norge kan bidra med mye kunnskap og stille viktige spørsmål, og dermed påvirke beslutningen. Samtidig øker vår egen kompetanse på legemidler ved at vi drar nytte av andres kunnskap, som også er helt nødvendig for den nasjonale legemiddelforvaltningen.»
37 This is difficult to control for, yet an analysis of missing values did indicate some degree of fatigue as the survey progressed (Bjurstrøm 2017). The missing values did not appear to be related to particular characteristics of the respondent, such as rank.
selected control variables. Moreover, qualitative research methods are particularly sensitive to personal dynamics in that the interviewer may subconsciously influence the interviewee (‘interviewer effects’). A conscious interviewer should thus strive to standardize the interview process through a systematic approach that includes nondirective probing as well as to refrain from interpreting, paraphrasing or interfering in respondent opinion or behaviour (Kreuter 2011). There are also pragmatic limitations tied to amount of time and resources applied to conduct data collection. Access, arrangements, and completion of both questionnaire data and semi-structured interviews for this thesis required a significant amount of time and effort. Survey data was collected in cooperation with other researchers as well as NSD, while the latter was conducted independently.

Secondly, this study needs to be seen in light of case-specific limitations. Firstly, as regards the questionnaire data that forms the qualitative base of the study, two main shortcomings need to be addressed: (i) the survey questions were predetermined and fixed to fit into the larger set of surveys. In effect, this means the research was adapted to the data rather than the data to the research. Consequently, room for expansion and/or inclusion of new, innovative variables was limited. For instance, the agency surveys included more EU-related questions than the ministry surveys which impinged on the possibilities to analyze the EU effect in the ministries as well as comparisons between agencies and ministries (however, Article I does inquiry on variables at the ministerial level). In general, the questions (variables) were designed with a view to classic organizational variables. This fits well into the frame of the thesis, but simultaneously restricts the possibility for pursuing alternative variables and/or theoretical avenues. As pointed to earlier, the rationale for employing such a rigorous scheme is primarily linked to comparability across time. Effectively, the survey also needs to sustain the balance between different research interests and origins. (ii) In addition to national-level data, data from European-level institutions would have been a valuable source of information. This would have allowed for broader insights and more robust conclusion on the reciprocal effects. The thesis, and Article I in particular, could have benefitted from, for instance, linking variables at different levels of government. Secondly, there are also drawbacks associated with the qualitative dataset. As mentioned, the sample size should ideally be larger (in particular in Ncom). It can also be argued that it could be more diverse given that it is intended to reflect the central administration rather than a specific policy area.
For example, more agencies could have been included, such as agencies not as closely linked to the EU.

Despite the methodological limitations, the thesis benefits from a comprehensive large-N dataset and semi-structured interviews that overall provide unique insights on the role of organization within domestic central administration.
5. Main findings and analysis

This section introduces the three articles that constitute this thesis. It proceeds to discuss the implications of these articles and draws some main conclusions with a view to the research question posed in section 1.2.

5.1 Article 1. European integration and the administrative state. A longitudinal study on self-reinforcing administrative bias

The first article is motivated by an interest in how and to what extent ministerial decision-making is affected by supranational institutions. Drawing on one of the core assumptions of MLA, the study examines how the EU-effect is mediated by organizational variables at the national level. The empirical focus is therefore centred on the intersection of levels: what happens when one level of government ‘meets’ the other, and how can organizational variables contribute to explain variation on such processes? The study also benefits from three comparable datasets (1996-2006-2016), which allows for robust conclusions over time.

Methodologically, the study applies data from the ministries (N=3562) that is statistically analyzed primarily through frequency distributions and bivariate correlations. The thesis takes advantage of an array of variable types to operationalize administrative integration, most of which are linked to cooperation/coordination. In addition, the study also examines preferences/loyalties in case of conflict. Organization structure (organizational specialization and organizational affiliation) is employed as an independent variable.

Article I demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. It suggests that strong European integration without membership strengthens a politico-administrative gap that expands over time. This therefore demonstrates that horizontal organizational fragmentation (arising in consequence of organization according to the sector principle), along with vertical organizational specialization, effectively reduces national political control. From this it may be inferred that the EU contributes to fortify the administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. The study also shows that ministerial officials are ‘double-hatted’ in the sense that they
serve two authorities. Two main conclusions are drawn from the study: theoretically, Article I reaffirms the role of organization in explaining and understanding processes of political order formation and conservation. Empirically, it demonstrates that national ministries are also firmly nested within the European administrative order.

5.2 Article 2. Secondary, but not second-tier: The differentiated impact of organizational affiliations

The motivation for this study is to ‘unpack’ organizational affiliation (more precisely secondary structures) and examine its effect on actor-level identities. In organization studies, organizational affiliation has predominantly resided in the shadow of horizontal/vertical specialization and has received limited scholarly attention.

Two main questions underpin this article: First, what is the effect of secondary structures on actor-level identity? Organizational scholarship assumes that decision-making is informed by the experiences an individual accumulates from participating in organizational platforms. However, less is known about the extent to which individuals attach - and integrate - secondary affiliations in their daily operations. Article II argues that identity is a strong indicator of internalization of values. Thus, understanding identities provide a better understanding of which institutions ultimately affect decision-making.

Secondly, what accounts for the differentiated effects of secondary institutions? In light of the overarching agenda of the thesis, Article II contrasts both national- and supranational secondary structures. It assumes that secondary structures matter, and that officials participating in such structures at the supranational level are more likely to be biased towards the supranational level as compared to equivalent structures at the national level. The study introduces a focus on loosely coupled structures that provide organized ambiguities to the actors (national officials), as an explanatory factor for the differentiated impact of secondary structures. It also draws on established assumptions on horizontal compatibility. The study benefits from a large-N study (N=1963) of officials from 45 government agencies. The data material is statistically processed through bivariate and multivariate regression analysis.
Article II finds that administrative integration across levels of governance induces changes of identity among national officials. Moreover, it recognizes the differentiated effects of secondary structures and argues that organizational scholarship would benefit from escaping the current ‘tyranny of dichotomies’ by adopting a more diverse understanding of organizational affiliations. Two main implications are drawn from the study: First, decision-making behaviour may be substantively influenced by supranational-level institutions. It is likely that institutions that create a deeper imprint on identities are also more influential in general, particularly in ambiguous and vague decision-making situations. Second, it demonstrates the profound effects of EU-level institutions and administrative integration more generally.

5.3 Article 3. Institutional overlaps and agency autonomy: Examining ministerial influence on national agencies’ EU affairs

While Article I examined how the EU influence ‘enters’ at the ‘intersection’ between levels, and Article II examined how it ‘enters’ through secondary structures at the supranational level, Article III closely examines how inter-organizational relationships at the national level may influence the ‘EU-effect’. Specifically, it asks what factors affect ministerial control over agency’s practicing of EU-related tasks, i.e., what extent do overlaps in public administration matter for agency autonomy? Inspired by studies documenting the effect of organizational duplication (see section 3.2), the article outlines three variables that have survived controlled tests in previous studies, and explores if they are able to account for variation in agency autonomy when handling EU legislative acts. These variables are based on different theoretical ideas: autonomy deriving from structural factors (organizational structure), autonomy deriving from demographic variables (organizational demography), and finally, autonomy related to physical distance (organizational locus).

Article III argues that ‘institutional overlaps’ increase the likelihood of ministerial control over agencies. Drawing on a large-N study (total N=1031) conducted in 2016, three such overlaps are tested: organizational overlap between ministries and agencies (similar units and divisions), demographic overlap (similar expertise), and geographical overlaps (same location). Control variables include participation in secondary structures at the ministerial level, rank, and politicization of the given
policy field. The study is supplemented with qualitative interview data collected in two Norwegian agencies (N=11).

The study reaffirms the explanatory value of organizational overlap but does not show any significant effects of demographic or geographical overlap. Interestingly, the strongest effect relates to participation in secondary structures at the ministerial level (control variable). It also shows a significant effect of politicization (control variable). These patterns are observed both in the quantitative and qualitative dataset. Additionally, the latter gives nuance to some observations drawn from the former, most notably it brings attention to the reciprocal effects of organizational duplication. Hence, overlap of capacity implies a potential for top-down influence, however, this presupposes that the ministry has a relatively clear agenda or ambition. Instead, Article III suggests that organizational duplication encourages mutual discussions and consultation, where the agencies are often also instrumental in providing recommendations to the ministries.

5.4 Connecting the dots
A question remains at the heart of this inquiry: what are the overall conclusions and lessons drawn here? In this section, the three articles are evaluated conjointly with a view to the overarching research questions. The research questions examined throughout were (i) how do organizational factor affect governance processes, and (ii) how do supranational institutions influence decision-making processes within domestic public administrations? The discussion will be sequenced accordingly. Therefore, section 5.4.1 mainly speaks to the theoretical observations. The key question addressed in this section is what difference do organizational variables make in the governance process generally, and in processes of administrative integration more specifically? Section 5.4.2 addresses the empirical implications. This section reiterates empirical observations with special reference to the case of affiliated third countries (such as Norway) in a European political order.

5.4.1 Organized interconnectedness: how organization affects public governance
This thesis aimed to add to the existing literature on organization theory. Organization theory describes and explains processes of public governance by
outlining a set of causal relationships. Consequently, organization theory can also be applied to design processes of public governance. It follows that the more knowledge gained on causal relationships between organizational variables and governance processes, the better equipped one is to design desired policy outcomes. This responds to calls for a ‘re-discovery’ of political science as a practical discipline by accentuating its applied potential while at the same time safeguarding long-term ‘pure’ scientific ambitions.

All three papers choose different dimensions of organizational structure as independent variables. Three main conclusions can be highlighted in this regard: Firstly, the domestic organization of public governance (horizontal/vertical specialization) biases how the fourth level of government is received and integrated (Egeberg 1980). Moreover, these effects appear to expand over time. Two observations stand out: (i) Horizontal specialization contributes to cement sectoral cleavages over time. This is evidenced in Article I primarily through the notable difference in patterns of administrative integration between sector ministries (organization according to purpose) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (organization according to territory) as well as patterns of inter- and intra-ministerial coordination. Article II also alludes to the importance of horizontal specialization by demonstrating its impact on actor-level identities. (ii) Intra-organizational vertical specialization compiles EU expertise among lower ranked officials. Lower ranked officials in the ministries consistently report higher degrees of involvement in EU-related work (Article I). This indicates increased differentiation of competences as well as the continued emergence of specialized ‘eurocrats’ within the ministries (see also Geuijen et al. 2008). These observations run parallel to observations on inter-organizational vertical specialization where agencies are seen as the EU-experts vis-à-vis their parent ministries. Vertical specialization contributes to increase the gap between the distribution of competences (specialized vs. generalized). The thesis thus aligns with previous literature that emphasizes the importance of domestic organizational variables and adds to these observations by highlighting the self-reinforcing properties of organizational specialization. Aside from locking in modes of operation, Article II supports the assumption that another effect of specialization appears to be shifts or additional layers of allegiances. Consequently, it may be inferred that specialization and loose coupling of structures that encourage and facilitate an ‘EU-connection’ is also followed by some degree of loyalty shifts. This is a critical
observation because it illustrates how ‘Europe’ permeates national domestic administration through a series of interconnected processes. Moreover, it illustrates synergistic effects created by different organizational variables.

Second, a general observation made in both Article II and III concerns the significance of secondary organizational affiliations. Both articles suggest that these structures are important sources of decision-making premises. As shown in Article II, secondary structures at the supranational level strongly impact on identities of national officials. Moreover, these effects appear to be stronger than those observed at equivalent structures at the national level. It is suggested that officials develop a stronger attachment to secondary structures at the supranational level because matching competences, and moreover, because these structures are more loosely coupled to the primary organizational affiliation. More specifically, it is argued that participation in secondary structures at the supranational level are not as strongly ‘filtered’ by primary institutions. Consequently, secondary structures at the supranational level are arguably in a better position to influence national officials. Similar ideas have been outlined in literature on epistemic communities (Haas 1992), studies of loose and ambiguous structures (Cohen et al. 1972; Weick 1976) as well as literature on competing behavioural logics (Trondal et al. 2010). Governance through secondary structures reinforces the administrative bias and hence sustains the ‘administrative state’ by facilitating sectoral hubs transcending national borders. Additionally, it permits a greater diversity of behavioural logics within domestic public institutions. This observation underscores the differentiated effects of secondary structures. It is moreover suggested that to account for the effect of organizational affiliations, organizational scholarship would benefit from adopting a more diversified understanding of organizational affiliations. Against the empirical backdrop of domestic inter-organizational relations (ministry-agency), an observation made in Article III indicates that secondary structures under some circumstances may also be used as tools to keep subordinate units ‘on a leash’. This effectively implies that secondary platforms (such as advisory boards), that include officials from subordinate units, provide parent institutions with an alternative path to gain influence (than for instance an increase in administrative capacities to control and monitor subordinate agencies). In sum, secondary affiliations have two chief implications: (i) Officials adopt a more diverse set of allegiances and loyalties. The extent to which they do so appears to vary in accordance with certain structural
characteristics. (ii) Secondary structures may be utilized as a strategic tool to control and integrate the subunits into larger organizational configurations.

Third, Article III suggests a causal link between organizational capacity and inter-organizational coordination and, potentially, control. Organizational capacity in this context signifies overlapping administrative capacities in ministries and agencies (similar positions, units or departments), but it is likely that these observations hold true also for other organizational constellations. An important caveat relates to the latent assumption that more capacity equals more control. Based on Article III, capacity appears to be linked to cooperation rather than control. This is likely to be contingent on the ministerial agenda: if there are no political incentives to forge an independent agenda in the ministries, the agencies have considerable room to influence their parent ministry. In sum, Article III shows that (i) organizational duplication (sufficient administrative capacity in the ministries) increases coordination and interaction between agencies and ministries. (ii) This implies that it is a potential design instrument for organizations to influence subordinate units. (iii) At the same time, it also allows subordinate units to provide input to their parent institution. Moreover, an additional effect appeared to be parallel occurrences of informal contact patterns between agency and ministry officials.

In sum, the thesis suggests that organizational structure is a significant explanatory variable for decision-making behaviour. The study did not find any effects of organizational demography or organizational locus. This may, however, be due to the research design more than to the explanatory effect of the variables in general. Some interrelated observations should be noted: Implicitly, Article II does suggest an effect of demography by demonstrating horizontal compatibility grounded in educational and professional backgrounds. As illustrated, secondary structures at the supranational level are analogous to the demography perspective precisely because of the implicit demographical component (education). Although Article III could not establish any demographic effect, this thesis does suggest that different forms of demographics overlaps - primarily in terms of educational and professional backgrounds (expertise) - play a significant role in actively sustaining and amplifying the ‘administrative state’. Pooling expertise, both within an across levels of government, is an inherent consequence of horizontal specialization. Moreover, it contributes to reinforce the administrative bias by enabling sector-
specific policy sub-systems with an ensuing set of values, perceptions, and codes of conduct.

Supporting previous observations (Egeberg and Trondal 2011), the study did not find any effect of organizational locus for ministry-agency relations. However, given that the ministry-agency relationship represents one of the strongest inter-organizational relationships of public governance, this observation is hardly surprising. Conversely, Article III did give some indication that location may affect relationship to other stakeholder institutions. For instance, it may be the case that cultivating relationships to the ministry comes at the cost of cooperation with other agencies or industries that hold a more peripheral role. However, based solely on this study, no solid conclusion may be drawn on the effects of organizational locus.

5.4.2 Multi-level interconnectedness: domestic administrations in a European political order
This study examined the administrative dimension of political orders with special reference to European integration. Table 8 shows a small, but steady overall increase in officials who report being affected by EU/EEA/Schengen-related matters. From 1996 to 2016, the number of ministerial officials who reported being affected to a very large or large extent increased from 23 to 26 percent (3 percent increase), while equivalent numbers for agency officials shows a 12 percent increase in the same time period. This indicates a substantial increase in actual numbers given that there are approximately three times as many agency officials than ministerial officials. Moreover, it implies currently that approximately one third of the central administration is significantly affected by supranational institutions. Correspondingly, the data also shows an overall decrease in officials that report not being affected: in 2016 one fifth of ministerial officials, and one fourth of agency officials reported no affiliation at all.
Table 8. Percentage of officials who report being affected by EU/EEA/Schengen-related matters, 1996-2016. *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ministry officials</th>
<th></th>
<th>Agency officials</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To a very large extent</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a large extent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a fairly small extent</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not affected</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(1463)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(1773)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(1288)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing values not included.

This thesis posed the question of how and with what consequences do supranational institutions affect national civil servants. It is important to note that European integration of the ‘administrative state’ does not run counter to the stronghold or persistence of the nation-state. The three articles illustrate that the nation-state continues to hold a relatively firm grip on the national administration. For instance, table 8 in Article I shows that ministerial officials deem primary structures at the national level significantly more important than secondary structures at the supranational level. Similarly, Article II shows that 47 percent of agency officials report strong/very strong identification with the central administration as a whole, while 21 percent express strong/very strong identification at the supranational level. This is corroborated by the qualitative dataset applied in Article III in which respondents stress the primary role of national authorities. Conceptually expressed as ‘double-hattedness’ (Egeberg 2006), the supranational level does not replace the national level but rather provides additional premises for decision-making likely to blend with, and influence, national governance processes and structures. The study shows that most ministerial (84 percent) and agency officials (68 percent) are double-hatted (illustrated in article I, table 9). Among officials that are ‘single-hatted,’ the data shows that agency officials lean slightly more towards the supranational level while ministerial officials are more inclined to prioritize national authorities. This aligns with the established literature that shows the national orientation of ministerial officials (due to structural proximity to political leadership). For the same reason, however, the number of ‘double-hatted’ officials in the ministries is somewhat higher than initially expected. Additionally, the study consistently
shows politicized policy areas spark stricter controls and steering from national authorities.

At the same time, national officials are strongly influenced by the supranational institutions. Public governance structures largely favour expertise over territory leading to evolution and consolidation of the ‘administrative state’ both within, and in particular, across levels of government. As suggested by table 8, the Norwegian central administration, and in particular agency officials, thereby become ever more integrated into the European administrative system. This thesis has shown that officials may be influenced by European institutions at three main ‘intersections’: First, supranational policies and steering signals are received and processed by ‘frontline’ institutions (ministries and agencies). Inter- and intra-organizational coordination mechanisms (including coordination arrangements such as coordination committees and political supervision) are important checkpoints in processing supranational policies into domestic politics. The thesis suggests that horizontal specialization of national ministries greatly influences coordination at the national level, i.e. processing of EU policy is largely in the hands of the administration while there is relatively little political interference. While this is expected to some extent, it raises questions in regards to political control over national executive branch of government.

Second, supranational institutions may also influence domestic government officials by mobilizing them directly into policy-making process in supranational platforms (secondary structures). As evidenced by article II, this appears to have significant implications for actor-levels identities and may thus arguably be the most significant point of influence. Moreover, this thesis illustrates an overlap between participation in various EU-related platforms both at the national and supranational level. In a similar vein, observations from the qualitative dataset (not reported in the papers) also indicate a significant correlation between participation in various supranational and international secondary structures. Echoing observations by Vifell (2006) and Geujien et al. (2008), this implies tendencies of specialized ‘eurocrats’ or ‘enclaves’ who are tightly integrated in supranational (and international) institutions. The data also reveals that in some instances these primarily lower-level officials have been given formal positions or responsibilities allocated to supranational policy-making. For instance, the qualitative data found that both NoMA and Ncom has allotted administrative capacity to facilitate EU-
related matters. Another observation is that these officials are principally tasked with ensuring convergence and coherency within their own sector and to a less extent between sectors. This pattern is reflected in the overall thesis that finds increased levels of sectorization and less coordination between sectors. For instance, Article I shows that formal coordination of EU/EEA/Schengen-related tasks between ministries appears to have decreased (table 4, Article I). It follows that the central administration displays a growing reliance on sector ministries and sector specialists and less dependence on the generalists, such as officials from the foreign office, in handling EU/EEA-related tasks.

Third, the influence of EU institutions and policies are biased by inter-organizational relationships at the national level. Article III testifies that overlapping administrative units in agencies and ministries increases the likelihood of formal, as well as informal, interactions between these groups. Consequently, EU policy may also be indirectly influenced through national-level structural arrangements.

In short, national officials are tightly integrated and influenced by European institutions. However, it is important to note that this does not replace national steering, but rather adds another layer to the institutional complexity of national central administrations.
6. Conclusion and outlooks

Finally, it is worth contemplating some of the big questions that this thesis has dealt with: what role does organization play in shaping and sustaining political order such as the EU? Is the EU really the nemesis of the nation-state? Does administrative convergence across levels of government undermine the contested role of statehood? Rather than to withdraw to the trenches, it may be convincingly argued that public governance is not hardwired for one type of government only. While the political nucleus for the European political order remains confined to territorial lines (nation-states), new and border-spanning challenges has led its administrative counterpart to increasingly channel attention along sectoral lines both within and across levels of government.

This study makes two key contributions: First, it adds to the study of organization and to the literature on public administration by drawing attention to the role of national administrations in interconnected political orders. A principle feature of the ‘administrative state’ has been the pooling of expertise across levels of governance, which has led to division of loyalties and interests between a national political authority and a supranational sectoral authority. This thesis demonstrates that sectoral cleavages are sustained and reinforced over time and that ‘Europe’ has subsequently become integral to daily operations in the nation-state’s central administration. It appears the more EU-related tasks become routine, the less need there is for coordination. The main responsibility for handling EU affairs is largely in the hands of specialized ‘eurocrats’ that benefit from considerable flexibility in their daily operations. This study also suggests that loose coupling of structures across governmental levels may enhance those discretionary powers. By virtue of organization, political orders (such as the EU) may thus be seen as two-dimensional with a political (territorial) and an administrative (sectoral) branch, in which the latter follows sectoral logics while the former adheres to territorial logics.

Secondly, this thesis offers a public administration approach to the literature on European integration and differentiation. As evidenced here, patterns and the extent of integration may vary considerably between the political and the executive branch of government. They also may function relatively independently from one another. The formal framework (political) may remain stable, while ‘informal’
(administrative) connections take on a life of their own. This may hold particularly true for affiliated non-members states, such as Norway, that do not have strong incentives to coordinate political positions vis-à-vis the EU. This study shows that Norwegian officials remain firmly integrated with EU administrative institutions and policy processes. Moreover, relatively low degrees of national political interference suggest that administrative integration is not subject to political accountability.

This work thus highlights the role of administration in developing and sustaining political orders by examining the interplay between two levels of government, notably the national-supranational nexus. This perspective could be expanded to include additional levels of government, such as the local and international level (see for instance Gulbrandsen 2012). Future research should therefore look to unravel administrative connections and interdependencies across multiple levels of government. A possible point of departure in this regard is combining the study of IPAs and European integration (see for instance Trondal et al. 2010). As mentioned, another promising avenue of future research relates to administrative integration in times of crisis and uncertainty (Riddervold et al. 2020). While political hardships tend to invoke tendencies toward intergovernmentalism, more studies are needed on institutional resilience and adaptation as well as the consequences of administrative integration and the national politico-administrative relationship.
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PART II
*Articles*

Abstract
The study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. Strong European integration without membership reinforces a politico-administrative gap and this gap expands over time. The paper applies an extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership represented by Norway. The findings suggest that the EU contributes to reinforce the administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. The findings are probed by a novel and comprehensive longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N single case (N= 3562) questionnaire study among government officials at three points in the Norwegian central administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. Theoretically, the paper examines the role of organizational factors in administrative integration and how the impact of the EU is mediated by organizational variables at the national level.

Keywords: Administrative integration; administrative state; central administration; Norway; organizational approach

Introduction
The ‘Administrative State’, originally coined by Dwight Waldo, emphasizes the central role of public administration in democratic governance (March and Olsen 1984: 741; Olsen 2018; Waldo 1947). This paper presents a single case study that shows the profound and rising role of public administration in the multilevel governing system of the European Union (EU). A recent branch of literature has documented an emergent European multilevel administrative system (MLA) consisting of strongly interconnected administrative bodies across levels of governance (cf. Bauer and Trondal 2015). Administrative capacity-building by stealth at the EU-level is seen as challenging administrative autonomy among the member-state governments (e.g. Knill and Bauer 2016; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014; Trondal 2010). These studies also suggest how the an organizationally heterogeneous EU sends a plethora of differentiated ‘signals’ to the member-states, for example how the Council fuels strong member-state coordination and perceptions of national preferences whereas the Commission fuels a circumvention of domestic political control and privileges non-majoritarian bodies (e.g. Egeberg
et al. 2003; Knill 2001; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). This paper makes two contributions to this literature:

- Theoretically, it examines the role of organizational factors in administrative integration and thus advances an organizational approach to public governance (Egeberg and Trondal 2018; Olsen 2018). This theoretical approach emphasizes how organizational factors bias governance processes. By biasing and nudging actors’ attention towards certain problems and solutions, certain policy outcomes become more likely than others. Administrative integration, this paper argues, is nudged by ‘favorable’ organizational conditions at the domestic level of government.

- Empirically, the paper demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. Strong European integration without membership reinforces a politico-administrative gap and this gap expands over time. The paper applies an extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership represented by Norway. The data suggests that the EU contributes to reinforce the administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. To demonstrate how essential parameters of domestic public governance are profoundly influenced by the EU even in a non-EU member-state, the paper presents a novel longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N (N = 3562) questionnaire study collected among government officials at three points in time in the Norwegian central administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. The self-reinforcing administrative bias is illuminated by Norwegian government officials. The data shows that the EU is increasingly loosely coupled to the political level and that officials are (surprisingly) and tightly interwoven and influenced by EU institutions.

The paper contributes to a ‘public administration turn’ in EU studies (e.g. Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2007). Essential to this turn has been to understand the role of administrative actors in political-administrative life of the EU (Olsen 2018). The inherent state prerogative of preparing policy-making and getting things done has been challenged by the rise of independent and integrated administrative capacities at the EU level. The supply of organizational capacities inside the European Commission – together with the rise of EU agencies – has
enabled an emergent EU-level executive order to act independently of domestic government institutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Moreover, organizational capacities of EU-level administrative actors supply them with a capacity to influence non-majoritarian institutions (agencies) at domestic level (e.g. Egeberg 2006). This paper shows how the impact of the EU is mediated by organizational variables at the national level. Moreover, this study provides novel data from the core-executive level of government (ministerial departments), and thereby adds to a literature that empirically has been dominated by studies of agencies. Methodologically, the empirical probe is “hard” by examining the government administration of a formally non-EU-member state – the Norwegian central administration. As such, the paper contributes to studies of external differentiation of the EU and the external effects of EU norms and rules beyond EU borders (see Rittberger and Blauberger 2018). Still, compared to contemporary instances of EU external governance, Norway is by far the most strongly integrated EU non-member through a dense web of institutionalized relations (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Fossum and Graver 2018; Lavenex 2011). This affiliated status grants the Norwegian central administration privileged access to most parts of the EU administration, which in turn paves the way for deep administrative integration. Moreover, administrative integration might go even further in affiliated non-member states than in member states due to their exclusion from political representation at EU level. This paper shows how a lack of political representation in the Council (and the European Parliament) mobilizes an administrative bias in the core-executive of government. Consequently, integration may happen more easily by stealth in affiliated states such as Norway – even though the official position is not to become a political member (Majone 2005).

The paper is presented as follows: The following section outlines an organizational approach to administrative integration beyond membership. The next section presents the data-set and methodology succeeded by a presentation and discussion of empirical findings. The paper concludes with key findings and some suggestions for future research.

**An organizational approach to administrative integration**

Public administration is not a technical apparatus or tool in the hands of shifting governments. An organizational approach emphasizes that public administration might be an important agent in its own right. This theoretical framework is
grounded on the assumption that internal organizational characteristics of public administration may explain how it works and changes. Consequently, organizational factors help explaining just how domestic ministries ‘adopt’ the influence of the EU – and thus how integration may happen even without formal EU membership and affect the pursuit of domestic public governance (Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Egeberg et al. 2016; March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 2009: 24; Trondal and Bauer 2017).

The literature harbours competing ideas on the extent to which actual decision behaviour reflects the organization structure within which actors are embedded – such as public choice theories, organizational sociology, and representative bureaucracy (see Meier and Capers 2012; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Niskanen 1971). While some observers ascribe lack of government action to political leaders’ lack of will, this paper advocates that political will is profoundly shaped endogenously by organizational positions which also enable (and constrain) action. This paper follows what Johan Olsen (2018) recently coined the ‘Bergen approach’ in political science, emphasizing the organizational dimension of politics. An organizational approach posits that organizational factors are not merely an expression of symbol politics (Brunsson 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977) but create systematic bias in human behaviour and decision-making processes by directing and nudging choice and attention towards certain problems and solutions, i.e. making certain outcomes more likely than others (Bækgaard 2010; Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990; Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Contemporary organization theory literature focuses on the explanatory power of organizational factors (Egeberg 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Two reasons are given for focusing on organizational structure: First, empirical studies demonstrate the systematic and significant effect of organization structure on decision-making behaviour (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Egeberg et al. 2016; Trondal 2006). Secondly, organization structure, compared to other factors that intervene in the policy process, is likely to be more prone to deliberate change and may thus be an important design instrument in public governance (Egeberg et al. 2016; Thaler and Sunstein 2009).

An organization structure is a normative structure composed of rules and roles specifying, more or less clearly, who is expected to do what, and how (Scott and Davis 2016). The structure regulates actors’ access to decision processes, broadly
defines the interests and goals that are to be pursued, delimits types of considerations and alternatives that should be treated as relevant, and establishes action capacity by assigning certain tasks to certain roles. It influences decision-making behaviour by providing individuals with a systematic and predictable selection of problems, solutions and choice opportunities (March and Olsen 1976). Whilst organizational structure does not necessarily predict nor determine actual decision-making behaviour, it does make some choices become more likely than others (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). This happens by regulating actors’ access to decision situations, mobilizing attention to certain problems and solutions, structuring patterns of conflict and cooperation (and thus influencing power relationships), and enabling coordination and steering along certain dimensions rather than others. This entails that organizational factors do not impact directly on society; rather, societal consequences can normally only occur via governance processes and public policies. Bounded rationality (Simon 1957) is one of three key mechanisms that connect role expectations to actual behaviour; organizational structure helps simplify actors’ cognitive worlds by directing attention towards a selection of possible problems and solutions and ways to connect them. This concept holds that decision-makers operate under three limitations: limited information about possible solutions and alternatives, limited cognitive capacity to evaluate and process information, and limited time to make decisions. Consequently, actors opt for a selection of satisfactory alternatives instead of optimal ones and often turn to their immediate surroundings and readily available data and knowledge to find suitable choices (ibid). The second mechanism, the logic of appropriateness, views human action as driven by internalized perceptions of what is perceived as appropriate (March and Olsen 1989). Lastly, actors may find that rule and role compliance is in accordance with their own self-interest. Organizations are thus seen as incentive systems that administer rewards and punishments (e.g. Ostrom and Ostrom 2015). In sum, these mechanisms may explain why structural characteristics within central administrations bias how the EU ‘hits’ domestic government institutions. Essential to this paper is examining how different structural characteristics of core-executive institutions matter in this respect. Three such structural variables are outlined in the following: horizontal specialization, vertical specialization and organizational affiliations.
**Horizontal specialization**

Horizontal specialization refers to how tasks or portfolios are divided horizontally within and between organizations. Those policy areas that are encompassed by the same organizational unit are supposed to be more coordinated than those that belong to different units. Luther Gulick (1937) contemplated four fundamental principles of horizontal specialization, namely specialization according to (i) territory, (ii) sector/purpose, (iii) function/process and (iv) clientele. He also emphasized the mutual relationship between specialization and coordination; dossiers that are encompassed by the same organizational unit are more likely to be coordinated than those belonging to different units. Accordingly, empirical studies show that while an overwhelming majority of officials finds coordination to work effectively within their own unit, this holds only for a minority between departments (Kassim et al. 2013: 188–89). Therefore, the departmental affiliation of various policy units could make a significant difference. In the same vein, cleavages of conflict were assumed to reflect these principles of specialization. For example, specialization according to purpose is likely to mobilize sectoral lines of cooperation and conflict and thereby foster policy consistency within its respected field. We thus expect that officials that are embedded in organizations that are primarily specialized by purpose would coordinate more strongly within their respective policy domains than across domains. In the case of government ministries, we thus expected that officials in sector ministries report stronger intra-ministerial than inter-ministerial coordination. Yet, domestic public administration in the EU is part of a larger politico-administrative order. Consequently, organizational compatibilities within such an order might matter. Though transnational cooperation on issue-specific tasks and practices has existed for decades, the EU executive center has emerged as a more challenging actor within regulatory networks (e.g. Dehousse 1997; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Joosen and Brandsma 2017; Levi-Faur 2011; Majone 1996). Essentially, the executive center at the EU-level, concentrated at the Commission and EU agencies (e.g. Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006), is mainly specialized according to purpose (sector) and function (process), and hence largely compatible to national central administrations. Arguably, organizational compatibility is likely to facilitate sectoral allegiances and cooperation across levels of governance. Studies have shown that organizations that are specialized according to similar organizational principles tend to align more easily across levels of governance than those institutions that are organized according to different principles (e.g. Martens
Hence, the effects of organizational principles at one level of governance may be conditioned by the degree of organizational compatibility across levels (e.g. Cowles et al. 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; March and Olsen 1995). Commission DGs and their system of expert committees are largely organized similarly as domestic sector ministries (purpose). By contrast domestic ministries of foreign affairs (MFA) are mainly specialized according to territory and thus organizationally compatible to the core structure of the Council of Ministers (Council). This suggests that domestic sector ministries are likely to align with the Commission DGs more than with the Council structure. Moreover, the continuous expansion of scope and content in the EEA agreement (from 1994 onwards) gives reasons to believe this pattern, if anything, has expanded over time. The following propositions are derived:

P1: Due to organizational compatibility, officials in sector ministries are more likely to interact with the Commission than with other EU institutions.

P2: The coordination of EU-related work is relatively lower between than within ministries.

**Vertical specialization**

Vertical specialization denotes division of responsibility and labour within and between levels of authority. This paper focuses empirically on the effect of hierarchy – or vertical specialization – within ministerial departments. Hierarchy between organizations provides certain decision inputs, e.g. a more general view in hierarchical superior units compared to lower ranked units, that cannot easily be achieved through purely horizontal arrangements. Vertical specialization between organizations means to modify hierarchy by installing an organizational boundary between a superior and a subordinate unit. Agencification, the process whereby regulatory tasks are hived off from ministerial departments into semi-independent regulatory bodies, is a topical example. The New Public Management (NPM) wave that swept across OECD states during the 1980s and -90s made pleas for greater autonomy, fragmentation and proliferation of public administration institutions and systems. As a result, vertical specialization in the form of structural devolution became a major reform trend across Europe (in public administration terms: agencification; in organizational terms: inter-organizational vertical specialization). This reform thread led to semi-autonomous agencies enjoying ever
more degrees of autonomy at both the national and the EU levels (e.g. Bezes et al. 2013; Lægreid et al. 2010). Hierarchy within ministries – or intra-organizational vertical specialization – is measured in this article by official’s rank within their respective ministry. Within organizations, it has been demonstrated that leaders identify with a larger part of the organization than those at lower levels. Leaders also interact more frequently across organizational units and are exposed to broader flows of information than their subordinates. Higher ranked staff in both ministries and subordinated agencies are more attentive to political signals than lower ranked personnel (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2009; Egeberg and Sætren 1999). This implies that leaders are better equipped to take into consideration a wider set of goals, alternatives and consequences when making choices (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Studies show that top-ranked staff tend to identify more frequently with organizations as wholes than staff located at lower echelons (Egeberg and Sætren 1999). Additionally, these officials are exposed to a broader range of information than lower level staff and thus may be more attentive to broader organizational perspectives than lower ranked personnel (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). It follows that government officials with lower ranks are more loosely coupled to the political leadership and have a more local perspective on task execution compared to higher ranked staff. This has one important implication: a relative degree of insulation from political leadership makes lower-ranked officials more eligible receivers of impulses from EU-level institutions and processes. The following proposition is derived:

P3: Ministerial officials at higher ranks are less likely to be strongly involved in EU-related work and thereby less likely to interact with EU institutions compared to ministerial officials at lower ranks.

Organizational affiliation
Organizational affiliations consist of primary and secondary structures. A ‘primary structure’ is defined as the structure to which participants are expected to devote most of their loyalty, time and energy. A typical example would be a bureaucratic unit like a ministry. A ‘secondary structure’ is defined as the structure to which participants are expected to be part-timers. It follows that secondary structures are unlikely to shape actors’ decision behaviour to the same extent as primary structures. Secondary structures include collegial bodies, committees and networks (Egeberg 2012). The EU multilevel administrative system is comprised
of a set of interconnected organizations at different levels of authority. Ministerial
officials that operate within this frame are likely to be exposed to several
behavioural premises from their primary and secondary affiliations. Empirical
studies show that inter-departmental committees, regional councils, and public-
private governing arrangements enhance interaction and coordination, and create
trust-relationships among the participants, however, the effects are moderate
Moreover, a logic of primacy suggests that the primary affiliation is likely to affect
behaviour more extensively than the secondary (March 1994). The following
propositions are derived:

P4: When taking part in both primary and secondary structures, ministerial
officials are likely to attend to and emphasize signals from both structures, albeit
most strongly from primary structures.

P5: When in conflict, ministerial officials are more likely to emphasize signals
from primary than from secondary affiliations.

**Data and methods**
The study benefits from a unique data set on the role of central administration in
the public governance process. Over the last forty years, a group of Norwegian
scholars has regularly conducted surveys in the Norwegian central administration
(1976, 1986, 1996, 2006 and 2016). The data sets include questions about the civil
servants’ background, careers, contact patterns, priorities, perceptions about
power, reforms and internationalization. From 1996 the surveys included questions
about the central administration’s relations with the EU. This article contains data
from 1996, 2006 and 2016, giving an overall number of respondents of 3562. The
survey was sent to all officials at the level equivalent to the ‘A-level’ with a
minimum of one year in office. Appointment at this level usually requires a
university degree. Hence, the sample of this survey is the total universe of ‘A-
level’ civil servants in Norwegian ministries (see the appendix 1 for an overview
of ministries included). These surveys represent the most thorough screening of
the Norwegian central administration, and thus the most comprehensive data-base
on the effects of European integration on national government administrations (see
also Geuijen et al. 2008). To allow for comparisons, the questionnaires are kept
nearly identical over time with just few necessary adjustments. Whereas the survey
from 1996 was distributed to the respondents by postal mail, the 2006 and 2016 surveys were conducted as online surveys by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). All data sets have been stored and made publicly available by NSD. The overall response rate is solid and the total response rates have decreased only marginally during this 20 years’ period. The drop in response rates from 1996 to 2016 may only partly stem from a change of survey technology from postal survey to online survey. The main explanation for decreasing response rates is a general fatigue among respondents towards surveys.

Two caveats should be mentioned: Firstly, studies that rely on respondents own behavioural perceptions do not observe directly public governance processes or behaviour. Respondents may exaggerate or downplay own role or the role of others. Yet, the use of three large-N surveys does, however, substantially increase the likelihood of robust conclusions. Moreover, the use of multiple proxies increases the validity of measurement. Secondly, the use of cross-sectional data may be biased by individual variations in perceptions or that it fails to consider concurring factors that may influence outcome. Ideally, in order to draw robust conclusions on causal effects, research on developments over time should benefit from longitudinal panel data. Nonetheless, this does not mean that cross-sectional data cannot provide useful and interesting insights as regards continuity and change.

Table 1. Sample size and response rates, by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rates</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative integration without membership**

This section demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias in extreme cases of high integration without membership. Over time, this administrative bias shows a self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials dealing with the EU are increasingly far from the political level and are strongly ‘Europeanized’ by being tightly interwoven and influenced by EU institutions. This partly reflect the dynamic character of the EEA agreement which requires Norwegian law to continuously adjust to new EU legislation. The agreement is based on the premise of dynamic homogeneity and currently more than 11,000 EU
acts have been incorporated into the agreement (Fossum and Graver 2018: 47). The agreement covers the Single Market acquis and a number of additional policy fields – making it the most extensive form of agreement between the EU and a non-member as regards regulatory scope and the legal obligations resulting from the contractual relations (Fossum and Graver 2018; Lavenex 2011). At the same time, the agreement blocks Norwegian governments *qua* state from political representation in the Council. Nonetheless, whereas Norway’s associated status does not grant Norway formal access to EU’s decision-making institutions, it provides for administrative participation at various stages of EU’s legislative process. Norwegian ministries and agencies are represented in Commission expert committees and comitology committees, sit on most EU agencies boards and committees, and are entitled to second national experts to the Commission. Norwegian civil servants are thus granted privileged access to the EU administrative system and are largely responsible for handling everyday relationships with EU institutions – in up-stream processes (the agenda setting processes) and particularly in down-stream processes (the implementation and practicing of EU law). Thus, whereas Norway is politically side-lined in EU decision-making processes, the Norwegian national central administration is granted favoured access to the EU bureaucratic apparatus, quite similar to that of EU member states.

The launch of the EEA agreement in 1994 marked the beginning of a new area of dense administrative integration between EU institutions and the Norwegian central administration. At the time the EEA agreement was viewed as a prelude and an interim-period towards full EU membership as the prospects of such were both open as well as vigorously pursued by the then-government. However, the following rejection of EU membership in a heated national referendum reintroduced the EEA agreement as Norway’s foundational connection to the EU in the years to come. Additionally, close historical and cultural ties as well as common interests in a host of policy areas led to subsequent agreements in areas outside the framework of the EEA agreement (Meld. St. 5 (2012–13)). There are numerous agreements between the Norway and the EU, with the EEA and Schengen being the most encompassing. In effect, while the form of affiliation has remained stable during the past 20 years, the scope of the affiliation has undergone significant expansion – partly in response to policy progressions in the EU, partly in response to the dynamic character of the EEA agreement, and partly because of
Norway signing ever-more sectoral agreements with the EU. In sum, this has increased the subsequent likelihood of Norwegian government institutions and governance processes being affected by EU-level institutions and processes.

Quite similar to the Commission and EU agencies, the Norwegian central administration is organized according to the principles of purpose and function. From an organizational perspective, this has two critical implications: it is likely to firstly, encourage sectoral allegiances and integration across levels of governance, and secondly, to underpin national inter-ministerial fragmentation. Moreover, as far as policy harmonization is concerned, the form of affiliation does in fact warrant EEA countries the same level of integration as full member states. Since Norway is not subjected to political representation in the Council, it has been argued that Norwegian sector ministries are likely to be even more strongly ‘hit’ by the Commission than member states’ ministries (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Trondal 2002). This assumption, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Like most core executives, the Norwegian central administration is organized into core-executive ministries and subordinated agencies. The system is characterized by a ministerial primacy where subordinated agencies are subject to political control and administrative accountability from the responsible minister and not primarily from a government collegium. The total number of employees within the central administration\(^1\) has increased from around 13000 in 1994 to 21000 in 2015 of which 4600 are employed in the ministries and the remaining 16400 are employed in subordinate agencies (DiFi 2015). Whilst Norwegian ministries are secretariats for the political leadership with planning and coordinating functions (Christensen and Lægreid 2009), agencies are mainly responsible for advising ministries and being technical helpers, but are also essential ingredients in the political processes of preparing policies and implementing and administering policies.

Our survey asked ministerial officials how, in general, affected they are by the EU/EEA/Schengen in their daily work. Table 2 displays an overall stability in this

\(^1\) Includes employees in ministries and subordinate units, for more details see https://difi.no/rapporter-og-statistikk/nokkelall-og-statistikk/ansatte-i-staten#4817
regard over time, yet with a small increase during the last decade. In the remaining, only those officials who report being affected (to a fairly small degree, or more) by the EU/EEA/Schengen are included in the analysis.

Table 2. Percentage of officials who report being affected by the EU/EEA/Schengen, by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To a very large extent</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a large extent</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To a small extent</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not affected</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100 (1463)</td>
<td>100 (1704)</td>
<td>100 (1773)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ministry officials were asked about their contacts and participation in EU-level institutions. Table 3 reveals two main patterns: First, stability over time in multi-level participation and secondly how organizational affiliation matter in this regard (P1). First, whilst we observe increased contact between sector ministries, the Commission, expert committees and comitology committees from 1996 to 2006, these patterns remain stable during the last decade. This suggests that Norwegian ministries have experienced a threshold in its access to the EU administration. Correspondingly, the gap between the sector ministries and the MFA shows a notable increase between 1996 and 2006, and then remains stable from 2006 to 2016. This gap reflects organizational compatibility between sector ministries and the EU administration (P2). One additional explanation is that the EEA agreement makes the Commission the main interaction partner for sector ministries, thus biasing the access structure for Norwegian ministries vis-à-vis EU institutions. Also, worth noting is that whereas contacts towards the Commission have remained stable during the past decade, sector ministries’ contacts towards EU agencies have decreased. This reflects the fact that national agencies have acquired a larger position as access-points for EU agencies (see Egeberg and Trondal 2015). Secondly, the data shows that ministry affiliation matters (P1) since Table 3 reveals a substantial difference between staff affiliated to sector ministries and staff affiliated to the MFA. Except for the European Parliament (2016 data only),
sector ministries are consistently more involved with EU-institutions, even the Council.

Table 3. Percentage of officials who report contact with* and/or participation in** EU-level institutions, by year and ministerial affiliation (sector ministries (SM)/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the Commission</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100 (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the European Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with EU agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in expert committee(s)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100 (94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in comitology committee(s)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in committees, boards etc. in EU agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The “contact” variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, (2) app. every month, (3) a few times, (4) never.

** The “participation” variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) once, (3) never.
Moreover, reflecting compatible principles of organization, officials from sector ministries tend to concentrate attention towards the Commission, EU agencies and Commission expert committees, whereas officials from the MFA give more attention to the Council. As mentioned above, this patterns also reflect the access structure embedded in the EEA agreement.

Next, respondents were asked about their coordination behaviour. Table 4 reveals an overall low level of coordination of EU-related work and an increasing reliance on intra-ministerial coordination over time. In support of P2, coordination is slightly higher within ministries than between ministries at all three points in time. Moreover, the gap between intra-ministerial and low-level inter-ministerial coordination appears to increase over time. Since the Foreign Office chairs the high-level inter-ministerial coordination committee, these data also testify the declining role of the FO over time. This in sum shows rising reliance on sector ministries and sector specialists and less on the generalists from the FO. Also worth noting is the general decrease in this type of coordination behaviour, particularly from 2006 to 2016. One important caveat should be noted though: Although a common assumption is that the primary objective of coordination committees is to coordinate, studies have shown low level of substantial coordination in inter-ministerial coordination committees (Trondal 2001).

Table 4. Percentage of officials who have met in ministerial coordination committees, by year*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-ministerial coordination committees**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-level inter-ministerial coordination committees***</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-level inter-ministerial coordination committees****</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1038)</td>
<td>(1056)</td>
<td>(1402)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table applies value 1 on a three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never.
** These committees are established to pursue intra-ministerial coordination of EU-related work.
*** These committees are headed by the responsible sector ministry to coordinate across affected sector ministries.
**** This committee is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate those dossiers that the low-level inter-ministerial coordination committees do not solve.
Table 5. Percentage of officials who report *contact with* or *participation in* the following EU-level institutions, by year and rank (lower level officials (L)***/medium and higher-level officials (MH)**** (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>MH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with the</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expert</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committee(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comitology committee(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committees, boards etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in EU agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The *contact* variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, (2) app. every month, (3) a few times, (4) never.
** The *participation* variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) once, (3) never.
*** Lower level officials include the following ranks: 1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, principal officer, assistant director. 2006: executive officer/adviser, principal officer/adviser, assistant director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special adviser or equivalent.
**** Medium and higher-level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, positions higher than director general. 2006: director/adviser, director general/adviser, positions higher than director general. 2016: director or equivalent, director general or equivalent.
These committees are characterized by mutual inter-ministerial information-sharing but low level of coordination of tasks, policies and positions. Moreover, bearing in mind that EU-affectedness has remained stable over time (Table 2), one may contemplate that the decrease in coordination behaviour reflect EU-related work becoming more routinized, which in turn diminishes needs for formal dialogue through committees.

As proposed (P3), Table 5 confirms that officials’ rank is negatively associated with interaction with EU-level institutions. The finding is robust since the pattern unfolds consistently over time both with regards to contacts with various EU-institutions and participation in EU committees – including those under EU agencies. In other words, coordination is consistently exercised by low-level bureaucrats, thus reinforcing a politico-administrative gap. Interestingly, Table 5 shows a 10 to 15 percent increase of interaction with EU-level institutions for low-level officials from 2006 to 2016 and a corresponding decrease in interaction for medium and high-level officials on all variables. This provides further support to the assumption of a self-reinforcing politico-administrative gap. Moreover, the sheer increase in interaction is also fostered by an increasing number of agreements between Norway and the EU, affecting ever more policy areas and government officials.

A similar analysis (Table 6, see appendix 2) on the effect of rank on coordination behaviour reveals a similar pattern: A negative correlation between rank and participation in coordination committees and a parallel negative correlation between rank and those reporting that their ministry’s work has been subject to coordination from the Prime Minister’s Office, the MFA, other ministries, the parliament, and/or interest groups. Officials at low ranks score consistently higher on these variables than do officials at medium and high ranks. This finding is also consistent over time, supporting the observation of a self-reinforcing politico-administrative gap. This behaviour, we argue, measures degrees of involvement in EU-work, not merely coordination as such. It follows that lower level officials will enjoy a more comprehensive view of their ministry’s EU-related work compared to higher level officials. Supporting these findings in greater detail, Table 6 displays increased participation in high-level coordination committees from around 55 percent in 1996/2006 to almost 70 percent in 2016. Moreover, from
2006 to 2016 our data shows an average of 11 percent increase in participation of lower level officials in the three types of coordination committees. A similar pattern can be found when examining modification/change due to coordination with other actors: from 2006 to 2016 we see an average of 16 percent increase in lower level officials reporting that their ministry’s work had been modified or changed due to the actors listed above.

Table 7 (see appendix 3) examines whether various types of coordination behaviour are mutually supplementary or contradictory and thus deemed important by the same officials. To merely probe patterns, Table 7 applies two sets of variables from the 2016 survey: The degree to which officials participate in intra- and inter-ministerial coordination committees (variables 1 to 3) and the extent to which they report that own ministry’s position in EU related work are modified due to coordination with various other institutions (variables 4 to 8). The findings suggest that different coordination behaviour tend to be mutually supplementary, but also that that substantive coordination is weakly associated with participation in coordination committees. From the latter we infer that coordination committees, albeit meeting actively, are not instrumental coordinating devices in EU related work.

Next, Table 8 illustrates the perceived importance of both primary and secondary structures (P4). Two main findings are displayed: As proposed, primary structures are deemed significantly more important than secondary structures. Moreover, this pattern is robust over time. The most noteworthy change is the increased importance ascribed to national agencies from 1996 to 2016. This finding reflects the ‘agencification’ wave in Norway, as in most OECD countries, during the same time period (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2010) and the parallel ‘agencification’ of the EU administration (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Whilst Table 3 revealed decreasing contacts between sector ministries and EU agencies, Table 8 shows a corresponding decrease in perceived importance of EU agencies. This finding reflects the increased importance of national agencies, and not ministerial departments, as national access-points for EU agencies. Studies have demonstrated a tendency for EU agencies to bypass the ministerial level and interact directly with the national agencies contributing to a ‘direct’ multilevel administrative structure (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 2009a). This may have off-loaded some EU-workload from the ministerial level.
Table 8. Percentage of officials who report that the following institutions are important* when making decisions on their own policy area, by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own ministry</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinated agencies</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ministries</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parliament</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary structures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU agencies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table combines values 1 and 2 on a five-point scale: (1) very important, (2) fairly important, (3) somewhat, (4) fairly unimportant, (5) very unimportant (6) Do not know/not relevant

Finally, to probe P5, respondents were asked to reflect on conflict behaviour: They were questioned how they prioritize when conflicts appear between the wishes of their political leadership and the requirements of EU law in their EU-related work. Table 9 demonstrates that, when in conflict, most ministerial officials seek to compromise between the wishes of their political leadership and the requirements of EU law. This suggests that ministry officials, not only agency officials as studied by Egeberg and Trondal (2009b), are ‘double hatted’ in their EU-related work. Moreover, Table 9 illuminates the intrusiveness of the ‘double-hatted’ national central administrations since ministry officials seem to serve ‘two masters’. This observation is an even stronger probe of the idea a national ‘double hatted’ central administration, given that ministry officials are less likely to ‘go Brussels’ than agency officials simply by being more strongly bound by national political steering. Among the few respondents reporting being ‘single hatted’, their primary structures (the wishes of own political leadership) is deemed slightly more important than secondary structures (the requirement of EU law).
Table 9. Percentage of officials who report the following priorities if conflicts occur between the wishes of their national political leadership and the requirements of EU law*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primarily follow the wishes of own political leadership</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to combine the wishes of own political leadership and EU law</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily follow the requirements of EU law</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>608 (100)</td>
<td>476 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The table includes those officials who incorporate and/or practice EU legislation within own policy field. The category “not relevant/not occupied with such tasks” are excluded.

Conclusion
The paper has made two main contributions: Theoretically, it examines the role of organizational factors in public governance in general and in administrative integration in particular. The data suggests that administrative integration is promoted and nudged by ‘favourable’ organizational conditions at the domestic level of government. Moreover, the paper highlights how strong integration without political membership in the EU fuels the ‘administrative state’. Following the public administration turn in EU studies, one might also envisage that while a member-state withdraws from political membership in the EU, domestic agencies might find themselves somehow integrated with EU administrative networks. Moreover, the observed mechanism may play out more generally in other (member) states: i.e. the observed general EU coordination techniques could also be expected to have similar effects in member states, especially the higher involvement of lower ranks than involvement of higher (more political) levels. The general theoretical idea is captured by the public administration approach to European integration that sees the EU as consisting of interconnected sets of agencies, ministries and regulatory networks.

Empirically, this study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias in domestic core executives. To do so, the article applies an extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership. Over time, this administrative bias develops a self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials dealing with the EU are increasingly far from the national political level (low-ranked staff) and are (surprisingly) strongly ‘Europeanized’ by being tightly interwoven and
influenced by EU institutions. In greater detail, the data consistently displays a relatively high degree of interaction between sector ministries and EU-level executive institutions (P1). It also affirms a higher level of coordination within than between ministries (P2) and that officials of lower ranks are more extensively involved at the EU-level than officials of higher ranks (P4). Finally, the importance of primary organizational structures is affirmed (P4) and the data demonstrates a strong tendency of ‘double-hattedness’ amongst ministerial officials (P5). Future longitudinal studies are needed that document continuity and change in patterns of administrative integration.
References


Appendix 1

List of ministries included in the survey (2016)

1. Office of the Prime Minister
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Food
3. Ministry of Children and Equality
4. Ministry of Climate and Environment
5. Ministry of Culture
6. Ministry of Defense
7. Ministry of Education and Research
8. Ministry of Finance
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10. Ministry of Health and Care Services
11. Ministry of Justice and Public Security
12. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
13. Ministry of Local Government and Modernization
14. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
15. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries
16. Ministry of Transport and Communications
## Appendix 2

Table 6. Percentage of officials who report the following coordination behaviour*, by year and rank (lower level officials (L)**/medium and higher-level officials (MH)***).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>MH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in intra-ministerial coordination committees</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100 (181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in low-level inter-ministerial coordination</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100 (116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in high-level inter-ministerial coordination</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100 (61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>due to coordination with the Prime Minister’s Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100 (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>due to coordination with the MFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100 (82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>due to coordination with other ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>due to coordination with the National Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>due to coordination with interest groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table applies value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never

** Lower level officials include the following ranks: 1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, principal officer, assistant director. 2006: executive officer/adviser, principal officer/adviser, assistant director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special adviser or equivalent.

*** Medium and higher-level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, positions higher than director general. 2006: director/adviser, director general/adviser, positions higher than director general. 2016: director or equivalent, director general or equivalent.
Appendix 3

Table 7. Inter-correlation matrix on coordination behaviour (Pearson’s r, 2016 data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
<th>7.</th>
<th>8.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Participation in intra-ministerial coordination committee</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation in low-level inter-ministerial coordination committees</td>
<td></td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Participation in high-level inter-ministerial coordination committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td></td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work due to coordination with the Prime Minister’s Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.71**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
<td></td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work due to coordination with the MFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td></td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work due to coordination with other ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td></td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work due to coordination with the National Parliament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td></td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work due to coordination with interest groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices
Appendix A
List of ministries (2016)

Office of the Prime Minister
Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Ministry of Children and Equality
Ministry of Climate and Environment
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Education and Research
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Health and Care Services
Ministry of Justice and Public Security
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
Ministry of Local Government and Modernization
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Appendix B
List of agencies (2016)

Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Direktoratet for forvaltning og IKT)
Arts Council Norway (Kulturrådet)
Civil Aviation Authority Norway (Luftfartstilsynet)
Directorate for Building Quality (Direktoratet for Byggkvalitet)
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap)
Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren)
Directorate for Emergency Communication (Direktoratet for Nødkommunikasjon)
Directorate for Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet)
Directorate for Integration and Diversity (Integrerings – og Mangfoldsdirektoratet)
Directorate of Norwegian Customs (Tolldirektoratet)
Directorate of Public Roads (Vegdirektoratet)
Directorate of Taxes (Skattedirektoratet)
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet)
NAV – Directorate of Labour (Arbeids- og velferdssdirektoratet)
The Directorate of Mining with the Commissioner of Mines at Svalbard (Direktoratet for Mineralforvaltning med Bergmesteren for Svalbard)
National Police Directorate (Politidirektoratet)
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Direktoratet for Utviklingssamarbeid NORAD)
Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (NOKUT)
Norwegian Agricultural Authority (Landsbruksdirektoratet)
Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (Statens helsetilsyn)
Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket)
Norwegian Communications Authority (Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet)
Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet)
Norwegian Country of Origin Centre (Landinfo)
Norwegian Data Protection Authority (Datatilsynet)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Barne-, ungdoms- og familiedirektoratet)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Directorate for Correctional Services (Kriminalomsorgsdirektoratet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Directorate for Health (Helsedirektoratet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training (Utdanningsdirektoratet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet UDI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Food Safety Authority (Mattilsynet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Gaming and Foundation Authority (Lotteri – og stiftelsestilsynet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management (Direktoratet for Øknomistyring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Industrial Property Office (Patentstyret)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (Direktoratet for Arbeidstilsynet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian Media Authority (Mediatilsynet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian Metrology Service (Justervesenet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian National Rail Administration (Jernbaneverket)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian National Security Authority (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Maritime Authority (Sjøfartsdirektoratet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian Medicines Agency (Statens legemiddelverk)</td>
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<td>Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Oljedirektoratet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Railway Authority (Jernbanetilsynet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (Norges vasdrags – og energidirektorat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Petroleumstilsynet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
**Hvilket departement er du ansatt i?**

- Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet
- Barne-, likestillings-, og inkluderingsdepartementet
- Finansdepartementet
- Forsvarsdepartementet
- Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet
- Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet
- Klima- og miljødepartementet
- Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet
- Kulturdepartementet
- Kunnskapsdepartementet
- Landbruks- og matdepartementet
- Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet
- Olje- og energidepartementet
- Samferdselsdepartementet
- Utenriksdepartementet
- Statsministerens kontor

**Hvilken avdeling arbeider du i?**

Fyll inn: [ ]

**Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?**

- Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver
- Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver
- Avdelingsdirektør
- Ekspedisjonssjef og over

**Innenfor hvilken av de følgende oppgavene faller hovedtyngden av ditt arbeid?**

- Lønns- og personalforvaltning
- Organisasjonsutvikling, (om)organisering
- Utarbeidelse / endring av lover, forskrifter, avtaler og konvensjoner
- Budsjetttering
- Annen utredning og planlegging
- Enkeltvedtak (saker som angår bestemte personer, bedrifter, institusjoner o.l.)
- Kontroll, tilsyn, oppfølgning av offentlige tiltak, regnskap
- Resultatrapportering
- Samordning, koordinering
- Opplysning, informasjon og kommunikasjon
### Hvordan vil du vurdere den administrative kapasiteten til forvaltningen innenfor ditt saksområde langs følgende dimensjoner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aktivitet</th>
<th>Meget god</th>
<th>Nokså god</th>
<th>Både og Nokså dårlig</th>
<th>Meget dårlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Få iverksatt vedtak og tiltak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontrollere at ulike aktører etterlever reguleringer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Få aktører til å samhandle og samarbeide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gi råd og informasjon om fremtidig utvikling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I hvilken grad arbeider du med saksområder som krever samarbeid på tvers av forvaltningsnivå og departementsområder?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- Både og
- I nokså liten grad
- I meget liten grad

### Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis mht. utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

- Meget klare regler / praksis
- Nokså klare regler / praksis
- Både og
- Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
- Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn

### Hvilken vekt tillegger du hvert av følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hensyn</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uviktig</th>
<th>Meget lite viktig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra politisk ledelse (regjering, statsråd, statssekretær, politisk rådgiver)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lojalitet overfor nærmeste overordnede</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faglige/profesjonelle hensyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra brukergropper, klienter, særlig berørte parter i samfunnet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra tjenestemannsorganisasjoner i staten</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kostnadseffektivitet, produktivitet</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Forsvarlig saksbehandling</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fornyelse og omstilling</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontinuitet og langsiktighet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hensynet til sentral kontroll og samordning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensyn til samfunnsmessige konsekvenser, resultat og effekter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensynet til åpenhet og innsyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hvor viktig mener du, generelt sett, at følgende faktorer er for å forstå dine kollegers handlemåte, prioriteringer o.l.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faktor</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stilling/organisasjonsmessig plassering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utdanningsbakgrunn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tidligere yrkeserfaring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geografisk bakgrunn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kjønn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiske holdninger og oppfatninger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig mener du det følgende er i arbeidet ditt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faktor</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mulighet for egen karriere, forfremmelser, inntekt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulighet for å gjøre noe nyttig for samfunnet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når det utnevnes toppleder (ekspedisjonssjef eller høyere) i ditt departement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kriterier</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utdanningsbakgrunn</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i tidligere stillinger</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ansienitet</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom kjønn</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom etniske grupper</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partipolitisk tilhørighet/sympati</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når mellomledere og saksbehandlere skal utnevnes/ansettes i ditt departement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kriterier</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utdanningsbakgrunn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i tidligere stillinger</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ansienitet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom kjønn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom etniske grupper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partipolitisk tilhørighet/sympati</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Hvor ofte hender det at en på ditt saksområde henter forbilder fra andre land og/eller internasjonale organisasjoner når nye tiltak / oppgaver skal forberedes?

- Meget ofte
- Nokså ofte
- Av og til
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden/aldri

### Kontaktflater i arbeidet
Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontaktflater i arbeidet

Dersom du tenker på gjennomsnittskontakten på årsbasis, omtrent hvor ofte har du hatt kontakt med henholdsvis statsråd, statssekretær(er) og politisk(e) rådgiver(e) siste året?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statsråden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statssekretær(e)/politisk(r) rådgiver(e)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med de instanser / grupperinger som er listet nedenfor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrativ ledeste i eget departement (departementsråd, egen ekspedisjonssjef)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre avdelinger i eget departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre departementer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stortinget og dets organer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egne direktorater, tilsyn, forvaltningsbedrifter og lignende</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statsaksjeselskaper, statsforetak, stiftelser under eget departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionale og lokale etater under eget departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fylkesmannsambetet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etater, direktorater og tilsyn under andre departement</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fylkeskommunale og kommunale forvaltning</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private bedrifter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

196
Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med instanser/grupperinger i utlandet som er listet nedenfor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instans/Gruppering</th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norges faste delegasjon til EU</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rådet i EU</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Parlamentet</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-byråer (Agencies)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordiske statlige samarbeidsorganer</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myndigheter i andre land</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i følgende sammenhenger?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sammenheng</th>
<th>Ja flere ganger</th>
<th>Ja en gang</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. innenfor eget departement</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. på tvers av departement</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. med underliggende etater</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offentlig oppnevnt utvalg</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordisk komite, arbeidsgruppe og lignende</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komite, arbeidsgruppe under internasjonale (globale) statlige organisasjoner og lignende</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IKT

I hvilken grad benyttes følgende IKT-verktøy i ditt daglige arbeid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IKT-verktøy</th>
<th>I meget stor grad</th>
<th>I nokså stor grad</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>I nokså liten grad</th>
<th>I meget liten grad</th>
<th>Benyttes ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKT-baserte rapporteringsystemer for dokumentasjon av resultater / aktiviteter</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKT baserte verktøy for informasjonsutveksling og samordning på tvers av departementsområder eller forvaltningsnivå</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKT baserte verktøy for informasjonsutveksling og samordning innenfor eget departementsområde</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elektronisk debattforum, sosial media (for eksempel Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elektroniske høringer</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Internasjonale saker**

Vi går nå over til å stille noen spørsmål om ditt arbeid med internasjonale saker

Hvor stor del av din arbeidstid har gått med til internasjonale saker siste året?
- ☐ Helt dominerende andel
- ☐ Nokså stor andel
- ☐ En del
- ☐ Nokså liten andel
- ☐ Arbeider ikke med slike saker/helt ubetydelig

Har du det siste året arbeidet med internasjonalt (nordisk, europeisk, globalt) lovsamarbeid (dvs. harmonisering av nasjonale lovverk og regelverk, standardisering og lignende)?
- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nei

---

Vi vil så gå over til å stille noen spørsmål knyttet til EU / EØS / Schengen spesielt

I hvilken grad berører EU, EØS-avtalen og / eller Schengen ditt saksområde?
- ☐ I meget stor grad
- ☐ I nokså stor grad
- ☐ I noen grad / en del
- ☐ I nokså liten grad
- ☐ Ikke berørt

Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i noen av de følgende sammenhenger i forbindelse med EU- / EØS- / Schengen-arbeidet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samsvar med EU / EØS / Schengen</th>
<th>Flere ganger</th>
<th>En gang</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i internt koordineringsutvalg (eget departement)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i ett eller flere spesialutvalg (interdepartementalt)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i koordineringsutvalget (interdepartementalt)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i forberedende komite/ekspertkomite (og lignende) under EU-kommisjonen</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komitologikomite (iverksettingskomite)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komite i Rådet</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komite, styre o.l. under EU byrå (agency)</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Har det på ditt saksområde, i løpet av det siste året, forekommet at ditt departements standpunkter i EU-/EØS-/Schengen-saker har blitt endret/modifisert som følge av samordning eller konsultasjon med:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flere ganger</th>
<th>En gang</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statsministerens kontor</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Utenriksdepartementet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andre departementer</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stortinget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interesseorganisasjoner</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Har du det siste året vært involvert i følgende aktiviteter?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utarbeiding av nytt EU-regelverk/endring av EU-regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkorporering av EU-regelverk i norsk regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praktisering/anvendelse av EU-regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dersom det ved <u>inkorporering</u> eller <u>praktisering</u> av EU-regler på ditt saksområde oppstår konflikt mellom politisk ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav; hvordan vil du da forholde deg?

- Primært ivareta politisk ledelses ønsker
- Søke å ivareta både politiske ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav
- Primært ivareta EU-reglenes krav
- Ikke relevant/arbeider ikke med slike saker
### Innflytelsesforhold mellom instanser
Vi går så over til å stille noen spørsmål om innflytelsesforholdet mellom ulike instanser:

**Kan du si hvor viktige følgende instanser eller grupperinger er når sentrale beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instanser/Grupperinger</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eget departement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egne direktorater, tilsyn, forvaltningsbedrifter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egne regionale og lokale etater</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andre departementer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stortinget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regjeringen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tjenestemanns-organisasjonene i staten</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv ellers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Konsulentbyråer/ tenke-tanker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private bedrifter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forskningsinstitusjoner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massemedia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rådet i EU</td>
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<td>EU-Parlamentet</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-byrå (Agencies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Hvordan vil du karakterisere samordningen på ditt saksområde langs følgende dimensjoner:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samordning mellom ulike statlige myndigheter innenfor eget departementsområde</th>
<th>Meget god</th>
<th>Nokså god</th>
<th>Både og Nokså dårlig</th>
<th>Meget dårlig</th>
<th>Ikke aktuell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samordning med statlige myndigheter i andre sektorer</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samordning med kommunale / fylkeskommunale myndigheter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samordning med overnasjonale / internasjonale organisasjoner</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samordning med privat sektor/sivile samfunn</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Hvor godt forberedt er man på ditt saksområde til å forebygge og håndtere krisesituasjoner, ulykker og katastrofer?
(For eksempel ras, flom, orkan; fly-, jernban-, eller skipsulykker, epidemi; terroristangrep)

○ Meget godt forberedt
○ Nokså godt forberedt
○ Både og
○ Nokså dårlig forberedt
○ Meget dårlig forberedt
○ Vet ikke / Ikke aktuelt

Hvor gode eller dårlige mener du myndighetene er til det følgende?

Redusere risiko (forebygge) for store ulykker og katastrofer

Håndtere store ulykker og katastrofer

Hvor villig er du til å akseptere at ivaretakelse av samfunnets sikkerhet går på bekostning av enkeltindividers frihet (for eksempel personvern og rett til privatliv)?
Siden dette er et nytt spørsmål, og dere har ikke brukt en "villig-skala" ennå, kommer jeg med en anbefaling. Jeg ville heller spurt "I hvilken grad er du villig til..." og så ha "I meget stor grad" osv som kategorier.

○ Meget villig
○ Nokså villig
○ Litt villig
○ Ikke villig i det hele tatt

I hvilken grad synes du din avdeling har lykkes i å få sine synspunkt og ønskemål akseptert innen følgende instanser og grupperinger?

Regjeringen

Stortinget

Eget departement

Andre departementer

Egne underliggende etater

Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning

EU-kommisjonen
I hvilken grad vil du si at eget saksområde er preget av enighet eller uenighet?

- Meget stor grad av enighet
- Nokså stor grad av enighet
- Både og
- Nokså stor grad av uenighet
- Meget stor grad av uenighet

I hvilken grad er de saker som du arbeider med gjenstand for offentlig debatt?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- Både og
- I nokså liten grad
- I meget liten grad

Har en det siste året lagt til side programforslag, utkast til lover, forskrifter m.v. innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi det oppsto strid om disse?

- Meget ofte
- Nokså ofte
- En del ganger
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri
- Vet ikke

Er det innenfor ditt saksområde lett eller vanskelig å vite hvilke saker som bør forelegges den politiske ledelsen?

- Meget lett
- Nokså lett
- Både og
- Nokså vanskelig
- Meget vanskelig
- Vet ikke

Har en det siste året unnlatt å ta opp et problem/sak innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi man har antatt/forutsett at det ville oppstå strid om det i den politiske ledelsen?

- Meget ofte
- Nokså ofte
- En del ganger
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri
- Vet ikke
Hvor vanlig/uvanlig er det at din(e) overordnete foretar endringer av mer prinsipiell karakter i de forslag/utkast som du utarbeider?

- Meget vanlig
- Nokså vanlig
- Hender av og til
- Nokså uvanlig
- Meget uvanlig
- Vet ikke

Vil du sende oppover et forslag du personlig mener er riktig dersom du samtidig vet (eller antar) at forslaget vil støte på betenkeligheter/innvendinger hos din(e) overordnete?

- Ja, som regel
- Bare i spesielle tilfeller
- Nei, aldri
- Vet ikke

Hender det at du må forberede eller iverksette tiltak du personlig er uenig i?

- Meget hyppig
- Nokså hyppig
- Av og til
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri

Hvordan vil du karakterisere det gjensidige tillitsnivået mellom eget departement og underliggende etater og virksomheter på ditt saksområde?

- Meget godt
- Nokså godt
- Både og
- Nokså dårlig
- Meget dårlig
- Vet ikke

Nedenfor vil vi be deg om å angi hvor sterk eller svak din tilhørighet og identifikasjon er med følgende organisasjonsenheter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisasjonsenhet</th>
<th>Meget sterk</th>
<th>Nokså sterk</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså svak</th>
<th>Meget svak</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egen avdeling</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eget departement som helhet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sentral-forvaltningen generelt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egen profesjon/utdanning</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
I forbindelse med moderniserings- og fornyingsarbeidet i staten er det lansert en rekke reformer og tiltak. Hvor stor betydning har følgende reformer/tiltak på ditt saksområde?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform/tiltak</th>
<th>Meget stor</th>
<th>Noksa st</th>
<th>Både og noksa liten</th>
<th>Meget liten / brukes ikke</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endring i tilknytningsform for underliggende virksomheter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offentlig/privat samarbeid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regelforenkling / deregulering/redusere tidstyver / Lean organisering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Økt fleksibilitet / fristilling i lønns-, personal- og budsjettsaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluering/ resultatmåling, nye kontroll- og rapporteringsrutiner, resultatoppfølging</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Verdiibasert ledelse, etiske retningslinjer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunnskapsbasert politikkutforming</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klarere skille mellom roller som for eksempel eier, bestiller og utfører</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risikostyring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Digital og elektronisk forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparens og åpen forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samordning mellom offentlige aktører</td>
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<tr>
<td>Konkurranseutsetting</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Etatstyringssystem, tildelingsbrev</td>
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<tr>
<td>Målformulering/målkonkretisering</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvor enig eller uenig er du i følgende påstander om mål- og resultatstyringssystemet i staten på ditt saksområde slik det kommer til uttrykk i etatsstyringen, tildelingsbrevet og styringsdialogen mellom departementet og underliggende etater?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Påstand</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
<th>Delvis enig</th>
<th>Verken enig eller uenig</th>
<th>Delvis uenig</th>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utforming av mål og resultatindikatorer skjer i samarbeid mellom overordnede og underordnede myndigheter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det er først og fremst et kontroll- og styringsverktøy for overordnet myndighet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det gir stor fleksibilitet og autonomi til underliggende organer</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det fremmer læring og forbedring i forvaltningen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det er lite egnet til å håndtere problemer og oppgaver som går på tvers av departementsområder eller på tvers av statlig og kommunalt nivå</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Forvaltningsloven

Hvor godt tilpasset er forvaltningsloven innenfor ditt arbeidsområde til følgende hensyn og utviklingstrekk:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nytt spørsmål: Vil her anbefale å bruke skalaen god/dårlig som dere har brukt tidligere</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effektiv saksbehandling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Døn enkeltes rettsikkerhet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt antall «uavhengige» forvaltningsorganer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt samarbeid med mellom det offentlige og private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt bruk av IKT-verktøy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hvilken grad skaper følgende regler i forvaltningsloven problemer i praksis på ditt saksområde:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vil her anbefale å enten bruke en grad skala eller en ofte/sjelden skala, ikke en hybridløsning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I hvilken grad skaper følgende regler i forvaltningsloven problemer i praksis på ditt saksområde:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovens virkeområde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definisjonen av «enkeltvedtak»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definisjonen av «part»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habilitet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taushetsplikt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hvor stor grad er taushetsplikt til hinder for ønskelig informasjonsutveksling mellom forvaltningsorganer innenfor ditt saksområde?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- Både og
- I nokså liten grad
- I meget liten grad

Bør klager i større grad gå til uavhengige klagenemnder enn til overordnet forvaltningsorgan?

- Ja
- Nei
Yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn
Så går vi til slutt over til noen spørsmål angående din yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn

Kom du til dette departementet (inkl. også departementet slik det var før eventuell deling eller sammenslåing) fra:

- Utdanning
- Annet departement
- Egne underliggende etater
- Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning
- Annen offentlig virksomhet
- Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv
- Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner
- Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter
- Annet

Hvis du har tidligere yrkeserfaring, i hvilken av de overnevnte typene har du arbeidet lengst?

- Annet departement
- Egne underliggende etater
- Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning
- Annen offentlig virksomhet
- Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv
- Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter
- Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner
- Annet
- Ikke relevant (nyutdannet)

På hvilket nivå var din første departementsstilling?

- Førstekonsulent eller lavere stilling
- Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver
- Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver
- Avdelingsdirektør
- Ekspedisjonssjef
- Stilling over ekspedisjonssjef

Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:

Nåværende stilling: [ ]
Nåværende departement: [ ]
Departementene samlet: [ ]

Har du i dag planer, eventuelt ønsker, om å forlate departementet for å gå over til annen virksomhet?

- Ja
- Nei
- Vet ikke
Hvis ja, til hvor

Flere svar mulig
☐ Til underliggende etater
☐ Til annen off. virksomhet
☐ Til privat virksomhet

Har du i løpet av det siste året fått noen direkte tilbud/henvendelser angående nye stillinger?
☐ Ja
☐ Nei

Hvis ja, fra hvor:

Flere svar mulig
☐ Fra underliggende etater
☐ Fra annen off. virksomhet
☐ Fra privat virksomhet

Alder, hva er din alder

☐ Under 25 år
☐ 25-34 år
☐ 35-44 år
☐ 45-54 år
☐ 55-64 år
☐ 65 år og mer

Kjønn

☐ Mann
☐ Kvinne

Hvilken utdanning har du?

☐ Juridisk, høyere grad/master
☐ Økonomisk, høyere grad/master
☐ Samfunnsvitenskap, høyere grad/master
☐ Statsvitenskap, høyere grad/master
☐ Historisk/filosofisk, høyere grad /master
☐ Matematisk/naturvitenskaplig, teknologisk, o.l. høyere grad/master
☐ Cand. mag./bachelor
☐ Annen utdanning

Har du utdannelse i utlandet av minst ett års varighet?

☐ Ja
☐ Nei
Hvilken målform benytter du til daglig?
- Riksmål
- Bokmål
- Nynorsk
- Andre

Hvor har du bodd det meste av oppvekstårne?
Spesifiser kommune eller land

Hvor har du bodd det meste av ditt yrkesaktive liv?
Spesifiser kommune eller land

Hva var din hovedforsørgers yrke i den tiden du vokste opp?
- Gårdbruker
- Fisker
- Arbeider, håndverker
- Funksjonær i privat virksomhet
- Ansatt i sentraladministrasjonen
- Ansatt i annen offentlig virksomhet
- Selvstendig næringsdrivende
- Annet yrke

Hvilken utdanning hadde din hovedforsørger?
- Grunnskole
- Yrkes-, handels-, fagskole og lignende. Realskole, middelskole, artium eller økonomisk gymnas
- Universitets- eller høyskoleeksamen
- Annen utdanning

Er du i dag, eller har du vært, medlem av noe politisk parti?
- Ja, er medlem
- Ja, har vært medlem
- Nei

Har du i dag, eller har du hatt, tillitsverv i noe politisk parti?
- Ja, har tillitsverv
- Ja, har hatt tillitsverv
- Nei
Har du noen gang vært nominert som kandidat for noe parti ved et kommune- / fylkestings- / Stortingsvalg?

☐ Ja, kommune- / fylkestingsvalg
☐ Ja, stortingsvalg
☐ Ja, begge deler
☐ Nei

Er du medlem av en arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjon som er tilknyttet følgende hovedorganisasjoner: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO), Akademikerne, Yrkesorganisasjonenes sentralforbund (YS), eller UNIO?

☐ Ja
☐ Nei

Skriv inn eventuelle kommentarer i feltet under:

Vennligst noter:
Appendix D
Arbeidsområde og arbeidssituasjon
Vi begynner med noen spørsmål som har med ditt arbeidsområde og din arbeidssituasjon å gjøre.

Hvilken instans (direktorat, tilsyn, verk o.l.) er du ansatt i?
Skriv inn navn på virksomheten:

Hvilken avdeling arbeider du i?
Skriv inn navn på avdelingen:

Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?
- Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver
- Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver
- Seksjonssjef
- Avdelingsdirektør og over

Arbeidsområde / arbeidssituasjon
På de neste sidene i skjemaet vil vi nå stille en del spørsmål knyttet til dine arbeidsoppgaver, kontaktflater, samarbeidsrelasjoner og lignende. Ikke alle spørsmål vil være like relevante, men vi ber deg likevel om å fylle ut skjemaet etter beste evne.

Innenfor hvilken av de følgende oppgavene faller hovedtyngden av ditt arbeid?
- Lønns- og personalforvaltning
- Organisasjonsutvikling, (om)organisering
- Utarbeidelse / endring av lover, forskrifter, avtaler og konvensjoner
- Budsjetttering
- Annen utredning og planlegging
- Enkeltvedtak (saker som angår bestemte personer, bedrifter, institusjoner o.l.)
- Kontroll, tilsyn, oppfølgelse av offentlige tiltak, regnskap
- Resultatrapportering
- Samordning, koordinering
  - Opplysnings-, kommunikasjonsarbeid
I hvilken grad arbeider du med saksområder som krever samarbeid på tvers av forvaltningsnivå og departementsområder?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- Både og
- I nokså liten grad
- I meget liten grad
- Vet ikke

Hvordan vil du vurdere den administrative kapasiteten til forvaltningen innenfor ditt saksområde langs følgende dimensjoner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Få iverksatt vedtak og tiltak</th>
<th>Meget god</th>
<th>Nokså god</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså dårlig</th>
<th>Meget dårlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kontrollere at ulike aktører etterlever reguleringer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Få aktører til å samhandle og samarbeide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gi råd og informasjon om fremtidig utvikling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis mht. utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

- Meget klare regler / praksis
- Nokså klare regler / praksis
- Både og
- Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
- Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn
### Hvilken vekt tillegger du hvert av følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hensyn</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså lite viktig</th>
<th>Meget lite viktig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lojalitet overfor nærmeste overordnede</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra politisk ledelse (regjering, statsråd, statssekretær, politiske rådgivere)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra toppledelsen i etaten</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra departement (embets- og tjenestemenn)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faglige/profesjonelle hensyn</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra brukergrupper, klienter, særlig berørte parter</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaler fra tjenestemannsorganisasjoner i staten</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostnadseffektivitet, produktivitet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsvarlig saksbehandling, gjeldende rett</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fornyelse og omstilling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kontinuitet og langsiktighet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensynet til den offentlige opinion</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensyn til uavhengige kontroll- og tilsynsorgan, ombud</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensynet til sentral kontroll og samordning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensyn til samfunnsmessige konsekvenser, resultat og effekter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hensynet til åpenthet og innsyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig mener du, generelt sett, at følgende faktorer er for å forstå dine kollegers handlemåte, prioriteringer o.l.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faktor</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stilling/organisasjonsmessig plassering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utdanningsbakgrunn</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidligere yrkeserfaring</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geografisk bakgrunn</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Kjønn</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politiske holdninger og oppfatninger</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig mener du det følgende er i arbeidet ditt?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faktor</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mulighet for egen karriere, forfremmelse, inntekt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulighet for å gjøre noe nyttig for samfunnet</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

215
### Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når det utnevnes/ansettes toppleder i din organisasjon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kriterium</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utbyggingsbakgrunn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobberfaring; oppnådde resultatter i tidligere stillinger</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ansienhet</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom kjønn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom etniske grupper</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partipolitiske tilhørighet/sympati</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når andre ledere og saksbehandlere ansettes/forfremmes i din organisasjon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kriterium</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uvesentlig</th>
<th>Meget uvesentlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utbyggingsbakgrunn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobberfaring; oppnådde resultatter i tidligere stillinger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ansienhet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom kjønn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Likestilling mellom etniske grupper</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partipolitiske tilhørighet/sympati</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Finnes det i <u>departementet</u>, som etaten sorterer under, bestemte enheter / stillinger knyttet til <u>ditt eget saksområde</u>?

- Ja, avdeling(er)
- Ja, seksjon(er) og lignende
- Ja, enkelt(e) stilling(er)
- Nei, ingen bestemte enheter / stillinger knyttet til eget saksområde

### Hvor ofte hender det at en på ditt saksområde henter forbilder fra andre land eller internasjonale organisasjoner når nye tiltak / oppgaver skal forberedes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kategori</th>
<th>Meget ofte</th>
<th>Nokså ofte</th>
<th>Av og til Nokså</th>
<th>Meget sjelden sjelden / aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fra andre land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fra internasjonale organisasjoner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med de instanser / grupperinger som er listet nedenfor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instanser / Grupperinger</th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toppleledelsen i egen etat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre avdelinger i egen sentraladministrative etat</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politisk ledelse i departement som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embets- og tjenestemenn i departement som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre departementer (politisck ledelse og / eller embets- / tjenestemenn)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre direktorater og lignende</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egen ytre etat (hvis slik etat finnes)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre ytre etater</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statsaksjeselskap, statsforetak, stiftelser</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fylkeskommunal og / eller kommunal forvaltning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stortinget og dets organer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjenestemanns-organisasjon(er) i staten</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv ellers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private bedrifter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Er det innenfor ditt saksområde lett eller vanskelig å vite hvilke saker som bør forelegges eget departement?

- Meget lett
- Nokså lett
- Både og
- Nokså vanskelig
- Meget vanskelig
- Vet ikke / ikke relevant

Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i følgende sammenhenger?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sammenheng</th>
<th>Ja, flere ganger</th>
<th>Ja, en gang</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. innenfor eget departementet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. på tvers av departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. med underliggende etater</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offentlig oppnevnt utvalg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordisk komite, arbeidsgruppe og lignende</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komite, arbeidsgruppe under internasjonale (globale) statlige organisasjoner og lignende</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med instanser/grupperinger i utlandet som er listet nedenfor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instanser/grupperinger</th>
<th>Stort sett hver uke eller oftere</th>
<th>Stort sett hver måned</th>
<th>Noen få ganger</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norges faste delegasjon til EU</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rådet i EU</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-Parlamentet</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-byråer (Agencies)</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordiske statlige samarbeidsorganer</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myndigheter i andre land</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Internasjonale saker
Vi går nå over til å stille noen spørsmål om ditt arbeid med internasjonale saker

Hvor stor del av din arbeidstid har gått med til internasjonale saker siste året?

- Helt dominerende andel
- Nokså stor andel
- En del
- Nokså liten andel
- Arbeider ikke med slike saker/helt ubetydelig

Har du det siste året arbeidet med internasjonalt (nordisk, europeisk, globalt) lovsamarbeid (dvs. harmonisering av nasjonale lovverk og regelverk, standardisering og lignende)?

- Ja
- Nei

IKT

I hvilken grad benyttes følgende IKT-verktøy i ditt daglige arbeid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verktøy</th>
<th>I meget stor grad</th>
<th>I nokså stor grad</th>
<th>I noen grad / en del</th>
<th>I nokså liten grad</th>
<th>I meget liten grad</th>
<th>Benyttes ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKT-baserte rapporteringssystemer for dokumentasjon av resultater / aktiviteter</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKT baserte verktøy for informasjonsutveksling og samordning på tvers av departementsområder eller forvaltningsnivå</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKT baserte verktøy for informasjonsutveksling og samordning innenfor departementsområder eller forvaltningsnivå</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elektronisk debattforum, sosial media (for eksempel Facebook, twitter, linkedin)</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elektroniske høringar</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I hvilken grad berører EU, EØS-avtalen og / eller Schengen ditt saksområde?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- I noen grad / en del
- I nokså liten grad
- Ikke berørt

Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i noen av de følgende sammenhenger i forbindelse med EU- / EØS- / Schengen-arbeidet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Møtt i forberedende komite/ekspertkomite (og lignende) under EU-kommisjonen</th>
<th>Flere ganger</th>
<th>En gang</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komitologikomite (iverksetningskomite)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komiteer i Rådet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Møtt i komiteer, styrer ø.l. under EU-byråer (agencies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Har det på ditt saksområde, i løpet av det siste året, forekommet at din etats standpunkter i EU- / EØS- / Schengen-saker har blitt endret /modifisert som følge av samordning eller konsultasjon med:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ganger</th>
<th>Flere</th>
<th>En gang</th>
<th>Aldri</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overordnet departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre departementer</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Andre departementer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Har du det siste året vært involvert i følgende aktiviteter?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aktivitet</th>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utarbeiding av nytt EU-regelverk/endring av EU-regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkorporering av EU-regelverk i norsk regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Praktisering/anvendelse av EU-regelverk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dersom det ved <u>inkorporering</u> eller <u>praktisering</u> av EU-regler på ditt saksområde oppstår konflikt mellom politisk ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav; hvordan vil du da forholde deg?

- Primært ivareta politisk ledelses ønsker
- Seke å ivareta både politiske ledelses ønsker <u>og</u> EU-reglenes krav
- Primært ivareta EU-reglenes krav
- Ikke relevant/arbeider ikke med slike saker
Hvor viktige er følgende instanser eller grupperinger når det gjelder å påvirke ditt direktorats/tilsyns (og lignende) <u>praktisering av EU-lovgivning på ditt saksområde</u>? (Hvert stykke skal behandles som uavhengig fra andre stykker.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instanser eller grupperinger</th>
<th>Meget viktig</th>
<th>Nokså viktig</th>
<th>Både og Nokså uviktig</th>
<th>Meget uviktig</th>
<th>Vet ikke / Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overordnet departement</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eget direktorat / tilsyn eller lignende</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESA</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-byrå (Agency)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>«Søster-direktorater / -tilsyn» i andre land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bruker- / interessegrupper</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nasjonale direktorater, tilsyn o.l. er ofte knyttet sammen på tvers av landegrensene gjennom EU-nettverk. I hvilken grad mener du at EU-nettverk på ditt saksområde kan føre til:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Felles innføring</th>
<th>I meget stor grad</th>
<th>I nokså stor grad</th>
<th>Både og I nokså liten grad</th>
<th>I meget liten grad</th>
<th>Vet ikke/ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mer harmonisert praktisering av EUs lovgivning og politikk på tvers av land</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mer arbeidsdeling og samkjering («pooling») av administrative ressurser på tvers av land</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mer faktisk uavhengighet for direktoratet, tilsynet o.l. i forhold til eget departement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Spredning av god styring og forvaltningspraksis på tvers av land</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindre rom for nasjonal forvaltningspolitikk (f.eks. innlemming av direktoratet i departementet)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uklare ansvarsforhold</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Innflytelsesforhold mellom instanser</td>
<td>Meget viktig</td>
<td>Nokså viktig</td>
<td>Både og</td>
<td>Nokså uvesentlig</td>
<td>Meget uvesentlig</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egen sentraladministrativ etat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Departementet som etaten/saksområdet sorterer under</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egen regional og lokal etat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andre departementer og etater</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stortinget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regjeringen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tjenestemanns-organisasjonene i staten</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv ellers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private bedrifter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsknings- / undervisningsinstitusjoner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massemedia</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-byråer (Agencies)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rådet i EU</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Europaparlamentet</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hvordan vil du karakterisere samordningen på ditt saksområde langs følgende dimensjoner: |
|------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|
| Samordning mellom ulike statlige myndigheter innenfor eget saksområde / egen sektor | Meget god | Nokså god | Både og | Nokså dårlig | Meget dårlig | Ikke aktuelt |
| Samordning med statlige myndigheter i andre sektorer |              |              |         |                |                |                      |
| Samordning med kommunale / fylkeskommunale myndigheter |              |              |         |                |                |                      |
| Samordning med overnasjonale / internasjonale organisasjoner |              |              |         |                |                |                      |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hvor godt forberedt er man på ditt saksområde til å forebygge og håndtere krisesituasjoner, ulykker og katastrofer?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(For eksempel ras, flom, orkan; fly-, jernbane-, eller skipsulykker, epidemier; terrorangrep)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Meget godt forberedt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Nokså godt forberedt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Både og</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Nokså dårlig forberedt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Meget dårlig forberedt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☐ Vet ikke / Ikke aktuelt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hvor gode eller dårlige mener du myndighetene er til det følgende?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>活动</th>
<th>Svært gode</th>
<th>Nokså gode</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså dårlige</th>
<th>Svært dårlige</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redusere risiko (forebygge) for store ulykker og katastrofer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Håndtere store ulykker og katastrofer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvor villig er du til å akseptere at ivaretakelse av samfunnets sikkerhet går på bekostning av enkeltindividens frihet (for eksempel personvern og rett til privatliv)?

- Svært villig
- Nokså villig
- Litt villig
- Ikke villig i det hele tatt
- Vet ikke

Hvordan vil du karakterisere det gjensidige tillitsnivået mellom egen etat og overordnet departement?

- Meget godt
- Nokså godt
- Både og
- Nokså dårlig
- Meget dårlig
- Vet ikke

I hvilken grad synes du din etat har lykkes i å få sine synspunkt og ønskemål akseptert innen følgende instanser og grupperinger?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>_instanser og grupperinger</th>
<th>Meget godt</th>
<th>Nokså godt</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså dårlig</th>
<th>Meget dårlig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regjeringen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stortinget</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departement som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre departementer og etater</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egne underliggende virksomheter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-kommisjonen</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-byrå( agency)-nettverk</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hvilken grad vil du si at eget saksområde er preget av enighet eller uenighet?

- Meget stor grad av enighet
- Nokså stor grad av enighet
- Både og
- Nokså stor grad av uenighet
- Meget stor grad av uenighet
I hvilken grad er de saker som du arbeider med gjenstand for offentlig debatt?

- I meget stor grad
- I nokså stor grad
- Både og
- I nokså liten grad
- I meget liten grad

Har en det siste året lagt til side programforslag, utkast til lover, forskrifter m.v. innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi det oppsto strid om disse i politisk ledelse?

- Meget ofte
- Nokså ofte
- En del ganger
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri
- Vet ikke

Har en det siste året unnlatt å ta opp et problem/sak innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi man har antatt/forutsett at det ville oppstå strid om det i politisk ledelse?

- Meget ofte
- Nokså ofte
- En del ganger
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri
- Vet ikke

Hvor vanlig/uvanlig er det at din(e) overordnete foretar endringer av mer prinsipiell karakter i de forslag/utkast som du utarbeider?

- Meget vanlig
- Nokså vanlig
- Hender av og til
- Nokså uvanlig
- Meget uvanlig
- Vet ikke

Vil du sende oppover et forslag du personlig mener er riktig dersom du samtidig vet (eller antar) at forslaget vil støte på betenkeligheter/innvendinger hos din(e) overordnete?

- Ja, som regel
- Bare i spesielle tilfeller
- Nei, aldri
- Vet ikke
Hender det at du må forberede eller iverksette tiltak du personlig er uenig i?
- Meget hyppig
- Nokså hyppig
- Av og til
- Nokså sjelden
- Meget sjelden / aldri

Nedenfor vil vi be deg om å angi hvor sterk eller svak din tilhørighet og identifikasjon er med følgende organisasjonsenheter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisasjonsenheter</th>
<th>Meget sterk</th>
<th>Nokså sterk</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså svak</th>
<th>Meget svak</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egen avdeling</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egen etat som helhet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sentralforvaltningen generelt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egen profesjon/utdanning</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

I forbindelse med moderniserings- og fornyingsarbeidet i staten er det lansert en rekke nye reformer og tiltak. Hvor stor betydning har følgende reformer / tiltak på ditt saksområde?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform / tiltak</th>
<th>Meget stor</th>
<th>Nokså stor</th>
<th>Både og</th>
<th>Nokså liten</th>
<th>Meget liten / brukes ikke</th>
<th>Ikke relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endring i tilknytningsform for egen etat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offentlig/privat samarbeid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regelforenkling / deregulering / redusere tidstyper / Lean organisering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Økt fleksibilitet / fristilling i lønn,-personal- og budjettssaker</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluering/resultatmåling, nye kontroll- og rapporteringsrutiner, resultatoppfølgelse</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Verdi- og etiske retningslinjer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunnskapsbasert politikkutforming</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Klarere skille mellom roller som for eksempel eier, bestiller og utfører</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risikostyring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Digital og elektronisk forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transparens og åpen forvaltning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samordning mellom offentlige akterer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Konkurranseutsetting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etatstyrselsystem, tildelingsbrev</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Målformulering/målkonkretisering</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Hvor enig eller uenig er du i følgende påstander om mål- og resultatstyringssystemet i staten på ditt saksområde slik det kommer til uttrykk i tildelingsbrevet og styringsdialogen mellom departementet og underliggende etater?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utforming av mål og resultatindikatorer skjer i samarbeid mellom overordnede og underordnede myndigheter</th>
<th>Helt enig</th>
<th>Delvis enig</th>
<th>Verken enig eller uenig</th>
<th>Delvis uenig</th>
<th>Helt uenig</th>
<th>Vet ikke</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Det er først og fremst et kontroll og styringsverktøy for overordnet myndighet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det gir stor fleksibilitet og autonomi til underliggende organer</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det fremmer læring og forbedring i forvaltningen</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Det er lite egnet til å håndtere problemer og oppgaver som går på tvers av departementsområder eller på tvers av statlig og kommunalt nivå</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hvor godt tilpasset er forvaltningsloven innenfor ditt arbeidsområde til følgende hensyn og utviklingstrekks?

**Kommentar til Per: Nytt spørsmål. Tror jeg vil anbefale å ha en god/dårlig skala i denne sammenheng. Ikke godt betyr ikke nødvendigvis det samme som dårlig, og det blir da vanskelig å fange opp de som mener dette.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effektiv saksbehandling</th>
<th>Meget godt</th>
<th>Godt</th>
<th>Mindre godt</th>
<th>Ikke godt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Den enkeltes rettsikkerhet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt antall «uavhengige» forvaltningsorganer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt samarbeid med mellom det offentlige og private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Økt bruk av IKT-verktøy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hvilken grad skaper følgende regler i forvaltningsloven problemer i praksis på ditt saksområde:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lovens virkeområde</th>
<th>I meget stor grad</th>
<th>I nokså stor grad</th>
<th>I noen grad / en del</th>
<th>I nokså liten grad</th>
<th>Sjelden/al dret</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definisjonen av «enkeltvedtak»</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definisjonen av «part»</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habilitet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taushetsplikt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hvor stor grad er taushetsplikt til hinder for ønskelig informasjonsutveksling mellom forvaltningsorganer innenfor ditt saksområde?

| I meget stor grad | I nokså stor grad | I noen grad / en del | I nokså liten grad | I meget liten grad |
Bør klager i større grad gå til uavhengige klagenemnder enn til overordnet forvaltningsorgan?

Ja [ ] Nei [ ]

Yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn
Så går vi til slutt over til noen spørsmål angående din yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn

Kom du til nåværende (sentraladministrative) instans fra:

- Utøvning
- Departementet som etaten/etate saksområde sorterer under
- Andre departementer og etater
- Egne underliggende virksomheter
- Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning
- Annen offentlig virksomhet
- Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner
- Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv
- Private / halvoffentlige driftnere
- Annet

Hvis du har tidligere yrkeserfaring, i hvilken av de overnevnte typene har du arbeidet lengst?

- Andre departementer og etater
- Egne underliggende virksomheter
- Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning
- Annen offentlig virksomhet
- Internasjonale statelige organisasjoner
- Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv
- Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter
- Annet
- Ikke relevant (nyutdannet)

På hvilket nivå var din første jobb i denne etaten sentralt?

- Førstekonsulent eller lavere stilling
- Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver
- Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver
- Seksjonssjef
- Avdelingsdirektør eller over

Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:

(skriv inn antall år)

Nåværende stilling: [ ]
Nåværende etat sentralt: [ ]
Sentraladministrasjonen samlet: [ ]
Har du i dag planer, eventuelt ønsker, om å forlate nåværende stilling for å gå over til annen virksomhet?
- Ja
- Nei
- Vet ikke

**Hvis ja, til hvor?**
- Til egen underliggende etat
- Til annen off. virksomhet
- Til privat virksomhet

**Har du i løpet av det siste året fått noen direkte tilbud/henvendelser angående nye stillinger?**
- Ja
- Nei

**Hvis «ja», fra hvor:**
- Fra egen underliggende etat
- Fra departement som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under
- Fra annen off. virksomhet
- Fra privat virksomhet

**Alder. Hva er din alder?**
- Under 25 år
- 25-34 år
- 35-44 år
- 45-54 år
- 55-64 år
- 65 år og mer

**Kjønn:**
- Mann
- Kvinne

**Hvilken utdanning har du?**
- Juridisk, høyere grad/master
- Økonomisk, høyere grad/master
- Samfunnsvitenskap, høyere grad/master
- Statsvitenskap, høyere grad/master
- Historisk/filosofisk, høyere grad/master
- Matematisk/naturvitenskaplig, teknologisk, o.l. høyere grad/master
- Cand. mag./bachelor
  - Annen utdanning
Har du utdannelse i utlandet av minst ett års varighet?
- Ja
- Nei

Hvilken målform benytter du til daglig?
- Riksmål
- Bokmål
- Nynorsk
- Andre

Hvor har du bodd det meste av oppvekstårene?
Spesifiser kommune eller land

Hvor har du bodd det meste av ditt yrkesaktive liv?
Spesifiser kommune eller land

Hva var din hovedforsørgers yrke i den tiden du vokste opp?
- Gårdbruker
- Fisker
- Arbeider, håndverker
- Funksjonær i privat virksomhet
- Ansatt i sentraladministrasjonen
- Ansatt i annen offentlig virksomhet
- Selvstendig næringsdrivende
- Annet yrke

Hvilken utdanning hadde din hovedforsørger?
- Grunnskole
- Yrkes-, handels-, fagskole og lignende. Realskole, middelskole, artium eller økonomisk gymnas
- Universitets- eller høyskoleeksamen
  Annen utdanning

Er du i dag, eller har du vært, medlem av noe politisk parti?
- Ja, er medlem
- Ja, har vært medlem
- Nei
Ja, har tillitsverv
Ja, har hatt tillitsverv
Nei

Har du noen gang vært nominert som kandidat for noe parti ved et kommune- / fylkestings- / Stortingsvalg?
Ja, kommune- / fylkestingsvalg
Ja, stortingsvalg
Ja, begge deler
Nei

Er du medlem av en arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjon som er tilknyttet følgende hovedorganisasjoner: Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO), Akademikerne, Yrkesorganisasjonenes sentralforbund (YS), eller UNIO?
Ja
Nei

Skriv inn eventuelle kommentarer i feltet under:

Vennligst noter:
Interview guide, agency officials

[Kort beskrivelse av mitt doktorgradsprosjekt]

1. Innledning
   - Samtykke til opptak
   - Informasjonsskriv (NSD)
   - Personopplysninger: avdeling, stilling og utdannelse/faglig bakgrunn, antall år i organisasjonen
   - Spørsmål?

2. Generelt: oversikt over organisasjon, arbeidsområde og arbeidssituasjon
   - Hva er du/din avdeling opptatt av nå?
   - Hva er din avdeling sitt ansvar og arbeidsoppgaver?
   - Egne oppgaver: Hva er dine arbeidsoppgaver, hva bruker du mest tid på generelt og hvordan er ditt arbeid organisert? Opplever du stor grad av frihet i stillingen, jobber du mye alene eller i team, hvordan er tilgangen på ressurser/bemanning? Hvilke begrensninger erfarer du i ditt daglige arbeid?
   - Eventuelt endringer over tid, reformer el. (i nær fortid), eventuelt har dette påvirket din arbeidshverdag/hvordan?

3. Europeisk samarbeid
   - Hvordan vil du generelt beskrive [direktoratets] involvering i europeisk samarbeid?
     - Type aktivitet: Hvilke europeiske samarbeidsfora har du deltatt i?. Hva består denne aktiviteten i?
     - Omfang: Hvor mye av dette har du deltatt på det siste året? Hvor mye av arbeidstiden vil du anslå går med til denne type arbeid? (Forberedelser, deltakelse, etterarbeid, evt. avspasering)
     - Hvem andre deltar på disse aktivitetene? (Både fra egen organisasjon, departementer?) Er det i hovedsak de samme personer som deltar på møtene? Vil du si at det utvikles kollegialitet?
   - I hvor stor grad opplever du å bli koordinert i forhold til det internasjonale arbeidet, dvs. styrt av egen ledelse eller departement? Utarbeides det mandater, eller gjøres dette under tillit, eller på rent faglig grunnlag?
• Hvordan vil du karakterisere nytteverdi/utbytte av slik deltakelse?
• Hvordan vil du karakterisere arbeidsdelingen innad i nettverkene? Hva fungerer bra/mindre bra?
• Hvordan opplever du at forholdet til EU nettverk har utviklet seg de siste årene?

4. Kontaktmønstre
• Har du kontakt med, og hvordan vil du beskrive kontakten med ulike avdelinger og profesjoner i [direktoratet]?
  o Konfliktlinjer og samarbeidsmønstre?
• Har du kontakt med, og hvordan vil du beskrive kontakten med departementet som [direktoratet] sorteres under, eventuelt andre departement (hvilke)?
  o Konfliktlinjer og samarbeidsmønstre? Kontaktpersoner?
• Hvem vil du karakterisere som de viktigste kontaktene for deg?
  o Overordnet departement, andre departementer/nasjonale myndigheter,
  o EU-byrå eller søsterbyråer i andre land som jobber med det samme som deg?
    (Helt konkret hvilke enheter det er snakk om) Andre sentrale aktører? Hvem tror du er de viktigste kontaktene for din enhet og for organisasjonen som helhet?

5. Innflytelsesforhold
• Hvem oppfatter du som de viktigste premissleverandørene for ditt arbeid? Hvem tar du hensyn til i ditt daglige arbeid? Hvilke aktører opplever du har innflytelse innenfor ditt saksområde? Hvem er ansvarlige for både suksess og feil?
• Hvem setter agendaene for ditt arbeid?
• Hvilke signaler/premisser fra departementene/politisk ledelse viktig for deg i ditt daglige arbeid? I hvilken grad må departementer godkjenne det du/dere gjør? Har departementet faste personer du/dere forholder dere til, eller noen som regelmessig kommer til dere? Finnes det avdelinger i overordnet departement som overlapper med din avdeling (duplicasjon)?
• Hvem spør du om råd, hvem lytter du til og hvem opplever du som viktige for at du skal gjøre en god jobb? Hvorfor akkurat disse?
• Hvordan går dere fram når dere skal implementere nye lover, regler, prosedyrer eller annet? Hvem bestemmer hva, hvordan og når noe skal implementeres?
• Opplever du å få gjennomslag i europeiske fora?
6. Konsekvenser av overnasjonalt samarbeid: lojaliteter, tillitt, autonomi

- Hvordan vil du karakterisere tillittsnivået mellom eget tilsyn og
  - overordnet departement, andre departement
  - andre direktorat – nasjonalt og på EU-nivå
  - EU institusjoner, herunder nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter
- Hva er det som avgjør tillittsnivået til disse institusjonene? Hva bygger/bryter ned tillit?
- Hvor viktig mener du tillitt mellom offentlige organisasjoner er? Er tillitt avgjørende
  for eksempelvis velfungerende institusjoner og for at statlig styring og internasjonalt
  samarbeid fungerer effektivt? På hvilken måte?
- Opplever du at [direktoratets] europeiske samarbeid påvirker forholdet til overordnet
  departement, og på hvilken måte? (mht. til for eksempel tillitt, autonomi, samarbeid?)
- Hvordan ville du forholde deg dersom det oppstår konflikt mellom EU og nasjonale
  myndigheter?
- Hvilke konsekvenser har slik deltakelser for ditt arbeid - endres horisont for eget
  arbeid - fra nasjonalt mot internasjonalt-perspektiv, endres lojaliteter og
  rolleforståelse?

7. Avslutning

- Hvilken betydning tror du Brexit vil ha for arbeidet og europeisk samarbeid?
- Er det noe du føler du ikke har fått sagt som kan være nyttige opplysninger?
- Har du noen spørsмål til mitt forskningsprosjekt?
Appendix F
**SENTRALADMINISTRATIONSUNDERSØKELSEN 2016**


Siden sist undersøkelse har et nytt tiår passert, og vi ønsker igjen å følge opp mange av de samme temaene. Undersøkelsen i år gjennomføres og finansieres av Universitetet i Oslo i samarbeid med Universitetet i Agder og Universitetet i Bergen. Den tekniske utførelsen skjer i regi av Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (NSD) som også ivaretar personvernhusyn i datainnsamlingen. Vi vil med dette få et - i internasjonal sammenheng - enestående innblikk i utviklingstrekkt mht. forvaltningens arbeidsformer, personalsammensetning og verdiorientering over en 40-års periode. Vi tror at undersøkelsen vil bidra vesentlig til forvaltningens selvforståelse, samfunnets forståelse av den, og dermed til arbeidet med å vedlikeholde og skape en god forvaltning.

Spørreskjemaet inneholder også noen spørsmål som er spesielt utarbeidet for det regjeringsoppnemte lovutvalget som skal revidere Forvaltningsloven, under ledelse av professor Inge Lorange Backer, oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon 23.11 2015.

Prosjektledere er professor Per Lægreid, Universitet i Bergen og Rokkansenteret, professorene Tom Christensen og Morten Egeberg, Universitetet i Oslo, og professor Jarle Trondal, Universitetet i Agder og Universitetet i Oslo. Alle forskerne har stått sentralt som prosjektmedarbeidere og prosjektledere i de tidligere undersøkselene.

Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning ved NSD. Resultatene fra undersøkelsen vil selvsagt bli presentert slik at enkeltpersoner ikke kan gjennkjennes. Etter prosjektavslutning vil dataarkivet bli oppbevart i uendret form for framtidige forskningsformål.

Spørreskjemaet består av noen spørsmål med faste svaralternativer og noen åpne spørsmål. I tillegg til er det åpne rubrikker hvor det kan gis kommentarer. Uttyllingen skjer ved at det markeres for det svaralternativ som best uttrykker din egen

NB: Viktige trekk ved deg som skal svare på undersøkelsen er at du:

* er ansatt i et direktorat eller annet organ i sentraladministrasjonen utenom departementene
* har minst ett års tjenestetid
* er på saksbehandler- eller sjefsnivå

Skjemaet sendes til hver tredje ansatt som inngår i denne populasjonen. Ut fra tilsendte lister og tilgjengelige kilder har vi prøvd å finne fram til så korrekt undersøkelsespopulasjon som mulig. Dersom du likevel ikke tilfredsstiller kravene ovenfor, vil vi be deg returnere denne e-posten (reply) med en kort henvisning til hvorfor du ikke skal delta, slik at vi kan stryke deg fra populasjonen og du slipper å motta eventuelle purringer fra oss.

Deltakelse i undersøkelsen er frivillig og du kan når som helst trekke deg. Du kan reservere deg mot deltakelse og purring ved å gi oss melding om det. Du vil da ikke motta flere henvendelser fra oss. Dersom du skulle ønske ytterligere informasjon, ta gjerne kontakt med en av de fire nevnte prosjektlederne. Tekniske spørsmål kan rettes til rådgiver Vidar Rolland: vidar.rolland@nsd.uib.no/ tlf. 55583866 {{Lenke til undersøkelsen}}

Vennlig hilsen

Tom Christensen
Professor
tom.christensen@stv.uio.no
Tlf: 22 85 51 63

Morten Egeberg
Professor
morten.egeberg@stv.uio.no
Tlf: 22 85 88 87

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Jarle Trondal
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Tlf: 38 14 15 61
Appendix G
Forespørsel om deltagelse i forskningsprosjekt med arbeidstitel «The influence of European institutions on domestic administrations»

Formål
Prosjektet er en del av doktorgradsarbeidet med arbeidstitel The influence of European institutions on domestic administrations. Formålet med prosjektet som helhet er å belyse ulike konsekvenser administrativt samarbeid har for norsk sentralsentralforvaltning. Aktuelle problemstillinger og forskningsspørsmål er eksempelvis
- Hvordan kan organisasjonsteori bidra til å forklare samarbeid på tvers av styringsnivå?
- I hvilken grad bidrjer europeiske fagnettverk til utvikling av felles agenda; hvordan påvirker disse nettverkene rolleforståelse og faglige identiteter?
- I hvilken grad, og hvordan, påvirker europeiske institusjoner forholdet mellom sentrale forvaltningsorgan på nasjonalt nivå?

Doktorgradsprosjektet bygger på datamateriale fra spørreundersøkelser gjennomført i samtlige norske direktorat og departement i 2016 (Sentralforvantingsundersøkelsen). For å få mer inngående kunnskap om hvordan norske forvaltningsorgan opplever EU-samarbeidet, er det også ønskelig å gjennomføre intervjuer med ansatte i [direktorat]. Sentrale tema for disse intervjuene vil være hvordan det arbeides mot europeiske nettverk, innflytelsesforhold mellom institusjoner samt endringer over tid.

Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet?
Universitetet i Agder ved doktorgradsstipendiat Nadja Kühn.

Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta?

Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?
Studien innebærer at du deltager i et intervju med rundt én times varighet. Det vil bli tatt lydopptak av intervjuet. Lydopptak vil bli transkribert og deretter slettet. Transkripsjon av intervjuene vil bli brukt som datamateriale i vitenskapelige publikasjoner.

Anvendt data blir anonymisert og vil i utgangspunktet ikke kunne tilbakeføres til deg i publikasjoner. Dersom jeg ønsker å sitere noe som ikke kan anonymisere, vil jeg aldri gjøre dette uten ditt forståelse. Jeg vil da ta kontakt med deg hvis det behøvte oppstå.

Personopplysninger som samlas inn vil være avdelingstilhørighet, stillingstitel, utdannelse/faglig bakgrunn samt antall år du har vært ansatt i organisasjonen. Hovedfokus i intervjuet vil være dine erfaringer og tanker rundt det administrative samarbeidet mellom eget forvaltningsorgan og EU.

Det er frivillig å delta
Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykke
tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle opplysninger om deg vil da bli slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger

Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet?

Dine rettigheter
Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:
- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg,
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få slettet personopplysninger om deg,
- få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og
- å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger.

Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?
Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke.

På oppdrag fra Universitet i Agder har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer?
Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:
- Doktorgradsstipendiat Nadja Sophia Kühn, på epost nadja.s.kühn@uia.no eller telefon 93 23 99 60.
- Vårt personvernombud: Ina Danielsen, på epost ina.danielsen@uia.no eller telefon 45 25 44 01
- NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller telefon: 55 58 21 17.

Med vennlig hilsen

Nadja Sophia Kühn

Prosjektansvarlig
(Forsker/veileder)
Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet *The influence of European institutions on domestic administrations*, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- □ å delta i intervju
- □ at informasjon fra meg brukes i vitenskaplige publikasjoner
- □ at mine personopplysninger behandles og lagres (også etter prosjektslutt til senere forskning)

(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)
Appendix H
Per Lægreid
Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap Universitetet i Bergen
Christiesgt. 17
5007 BERGEN

Vår ref: 48979 / 3 / HIT
Deres dato: Deres ref:

TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER

Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 17.06.2016. Meldingen gjelder prosjektet:

48979 Administrasjonssurveyen 2016
Behandlingsansvarlig Universitetet i Bergen, ved institusjonens øverste leder
Daglig ansvarlig Per Lægreid

Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilråd at prosjektet gjennomføres.

Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger kan settes i gang.


Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database, http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt

Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 01.09.2019, rette en henvendelse angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.

Dokumentet er elektronisk produsert og godkjent ved NSDs rutiner for elektronisk godkjenning.
Personvernombudet for forskning

Prosjektvurdering - Kommentar

Prosjekt: 48979

NASJONAL SAMARBEIDSSTUDIE
Det fremgår av informasjonsskrivet at prosjektet er en nasjonal samarbeidsstudie, der Universitetet i Oslo og Universitetet i Agder ingår, i tillegg til Universitetet i Bergen, som er behandlingsansvarlig institusjon. Personvernombudet forutsetter at ansvaret for behandlingen av personopplysninger er avklart mellom institusjonene. Vi anbefaler at etingås en avtale som omfatter ansvarsfordeling, ansvarsstruktur, hvem som initierer prosjektet, bruk av data og eventuelt eierskap.

FORMÅL

INFORMASJON OG SAMTYKKE
Utvalget informeres skriftlig om prosjektet og samtykker til deltakelse. Informasjonsskrivet er i utgangspunktet godt utformet, men det må presiseres at deltakelse er frivillig, og at man kan velge å trekke seg underveis.

DATAMATERIALETS INNHOLD
Det behandles sensitive personopplysninger om medlemskap i fagforeninger.

INFORMASJONSSIKKERHET
Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Universitetet i Bergen sine interne rutiner for datasikkerhet.

NSD websurvey er databehandler for prosjektet. Universitetet i Bergen skal inngå skriftlig avtale med NSD websurvey om hvordan personopplysninger skal behandles, jf. personopplysningsloven § 15. For råd om hva databehandleravtalen bør inneholde, se Datatilsynets veileder: http://www.datatilsynet.no/Sikkerhet-internkontroll/Databehandleravtale/.

PROSJEKTSLUTT OG ANONYMISERING
Forventet prosjektslutt er 01.09.2019. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres ved å:
- slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsnøkkel)
- slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som
f.eks. bosted/arbeidssted, alder og kjønn)

Vi gjør oppmerksom på at også databehandler (NSD websurvey) må slette personopplysninger tilknyttet prosjektet i sine systemer. Dette inkluderer eventuelle logger og koblinger mellom IP-/epostadresser og besvarelser.
Appendix I
NSD SENTER FOR FORSKNINGSDATA

NSD sin vurdering

Prosjekttittel
Arbeidstitel: The influence of European institutions on domestic administrations

Referansenummer
291197

Registrert
05.11.2018 av Nadja Sophia Bekkelund Kühn - nadja.s.kuhn@ui.no

Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Universitetet i Agder / Fakultet for samfunnsvitenskap / Institutt for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag

Prosjektmann (vitenskapelig ansatt/veileder eller stipendiat)
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Type prosjekt
Forskerprosjekt

Prosjektperiode
01.11.2018 - 01.12.2020

Status
19.02.2019 - Vurdert

Vurdering (1)

19.02.2019 - Vurdert

Det er vår vurdering at behandlingen av personopplysninger i prosjektet vil være i samsvar med personvernlovgivningen så fremst den gjennomføres i tråd med det som er dokumentert i meldeskjemaet med vedlegg den 19.02.2019, samt i meldingsdialogen mellom innmelder og NSD. Behandlingen kan starte.

MELD ENDRINGER
Dersom behandlingen av personopplysninger endrer seg, kan det være nødvendig å melde dette til NSD ved å oppdatere meldeskjemaet. På våre nettsider informerer vi om hvilke endringer som må meldes. Vent på svar før endringer gjennomføres.

TYPE OPPLYSNINGER OG VARIGHET

LOVLIG GRUNNLAG
https://meldeskjema.nsdu.no/vurdering/3be89260-ccc4-4b13-8559-8301a0ae87ce
Prosjektet vil innhente samtykke fra de registrerte til behandlingen av personopplysninger. Vår vurdering er at prosjektet legger opp til et samtykke i samsvar med kravene i art. 4 og 7, ved at det er frivillig, spesifikk, informert og utøvingsgjennomført. Informasjonen kan dokumenteres, og som den registrerte kan trekke tilbake. Lovlig grunnlag for behandlingen vil dermed være den registrertes samtykke, jf. personvernforordningen art. 6 nr. 1 bokstav a.

PERSONVERNPRINSIPPER
NSD vurderer at den planlagte behandlingen av personopplysninger vil følge prinsippene i personvernforordningen om:

- lovlig, rettferdig og åpenhet (art. 5.1 a), ved at de registrerte får tilfredsstillende informasjon om og samtykket til behandlingen
- formålbegrensning (art. 5.1 b), ved at personopplysninger samlas inn for spesifikk, uttrykkelig angitte og berettigede formål, og ikke behandles til nye, uforenlig formål
- dataminimering (art. 5.1 c), ved at det kun behandles opplysninger som er adekvate, relevante og nødvendige for formålet med prosjektet
- lagringsbegrensning (art. 5.1 e), ved at personopplysningene ikke lagres lengre enn nødvendig for å oppfylle formålet

DE REGISTRERTES RETTIGHETER
Så lenge de registrerte kan identifiseres i datamaterialet vil de ha følgende rettigheter: åpenhet (art. 12), informasjon (art. 13), innsyn (art. 15), retting (art. 16), sletting (art. 17), begrensning (art. 18), underretning (art. 19), dataportabilitet (art. 20).

NSD vurderer at informasjonen om behandlingen som de registrerte vil motta oppfyller lovens krav til form og innhold, jf. art. 12.1 og art. 13.

Vi minner om at hvis en registrert tar kontakt om sine rettigheter, har behandlingsansvarlig institusjon plikt til å svare innen en måned.

FØLG DIN INSTITUSJONS RETningsLINJER
NSD legger til grunn at behandlingen oppfyller kravene i personvernforordningen om riktighet (art. 5.1 d), integritet og konfidensialitet (art. 5.1 f) og sikkerhet (art. 32).

For å forsikre dere om at kravene oppfylles, må dere følge interne retningslinjer og/eller rådføre dere med behandlingsansvarlig institusjon.

OPPFØLGING AV PROSJEKTET
NSD vil følge opp ved planlagt avslutning for å avklare om behandlingen av personopplysningene er avsluttet.

Lykke til med prosjektet!

Kontaktperson hos NSD: Jørgen Wincentsen
Tlf: Personvernstjeneste: 55 58 21 17 (tast 1)