Exploring Differentiated Disintegration in a post-Brexit European Union

I. Introduction

Since the Treaty of Maastricht came into force in 1993, member state opt-outs in areas of core state powers such as monetary and foreign policy affairs have become a constant feature of each subsequent treaty reform (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014). The term ‘integration’ has been defined as a process of centralization, policy scope and territorial extension. Consequently, the European Union [EU] can be conceived of as a system of differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; see further below). ‘Differentiation’ refers to variations in the scope on each of these dimensions accorded to any member state at a point of time. Systems of differentiated integration are “characterized by vertical and horizontal differentiation” (ibid., p. 767); whereas vertical differentiation refers to levels of centralization in specific policy areas, horizontal differentiation reflects the scope of membership in specific policy areas. In this vein, it is possible to distinguish between ‘internal differentiation’, in which at last one member state does not participate in integration (e.g. the Economic and Monetary Union), as well as ‘external differentiation’ in those cases where at least one non-EU member state partakes in processes of integration, such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, in the internal market, by means of membership in the European Economic Area [EEA].

While there certainly is no lack of scholarly work on differentiated integration, two recent political developments trigger a need to revisit our established knowledge (see Rittberger and Blauburger, 2018). The first one is the United Kingdom [UK]’s withdrawal of the EU as a consequence of the British Conservative government’s decision to hold referendum on EU membership. On 23 June 2016, with 72.2 per cent of eligible voters coming forward to the ballot, the UK chose to leave the EU by a margin of 51.9 per cent to 48.1 per cent. This outcome sent shockwaves across the UK, Europe and the world catapulting the EU into one of its deepest crises of its more than 60 years of history. Clearly, the EU and its predecessor – the European Community – have witnessed forms of (territorial) disintegration before with Greenland departing in 1983, although it has ever since been recognized as one of the Overseas Countries
and Territories of the EU due to its political union with Denmark. Still, the UK is the first member-state to engage in a process of disintegration with an unclear outcome.

The second event is the presentation of the European Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe, put forward by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on 1 March 2017 mostly as a response to this Brexit vote. The document sketched out five broad scenarios for the EU by 2025, ranging from thorough disintegration to more EU collective action. In short, these scenarios have been captured under the following titles: “1: Carrying on”, i.e. following the existent path of muddling through without any major changes and reforms; “2: Nothing but the Single Market” excluding areas such as migration, security and defence; “3: Those who want more do more” based on coalitions of the willing; “4: Doing less more efficiently” with a strong focus on further market integration leaving non-market-related affairs aside, and, eventually, “5: Doing much more together” across a wide range of areas (European Commission, 2017, p. 15-25). The key to understanding the White Paper does not lie so much in understanding each scenario per se, but in grasping both the choice for scenarios at the detriment of a single grand vision as well as the nature of these scenarios. While the choice for scenarios rather than one comprehensive future vision in light of the EU’s 60th anniversary is rather obvious, the nature of the scenarios is more delicate. Thus, the White Paper maintains that “the starting point for each scenario is that the 27 Member States move forward together as a Union” (European Commission, 2017, p. 15) based on the unity of the single market, however, it meticulously avoids referring to the term of differentiated integration expressis verbis. Yet, differentiated integration is implicitly present in the third scenario, allegedly favoured by Jean-Claude Juncker himself, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel (EurActiv, 2017), calling for further differentiation by which ‘a group of countries, including the euro area and possibly a few others, chooses to work much closer notably on taxation and social matters” (European Commission, 2017, p. 20). Scenarios two and four, in turn, call for a ‘spill-back’ in several policy areas, “such as regional development, public health, or parts of employment and social policy not directly related to the functioning of the single market” (European Commission, 2017, p. 22). These cannot be grasped as ‘opt-outs’ but should rather be conceived of as different forms of disintegration.

These two recent developments mark the start of a ‘new’ chapter in the burgeoning literature on differentiated European integration. Although the future shape of the UK-EU relationship in the post-Brexit era is set to remain uncertain for some time, it is necessary for practitioners and scholars of various EU-related disciplines to ponder what the implications for the future of
European integration are. How does Brexit as well as policy-based forms of disintegration (as the ones described in the White Paper on the Future of Europe) impact the study of European integration, and how did the debate over the future of the EU evolve after the Brexit vote? Most importantly, at times of such fundamental uncertainty, can this paper suggest that we should first draw conclusions from existing studies in order to identify key scenarios for the future development of European integration and its implications for research?

This paper serves two purposes. First, it aims at opening up the debate on the study of the EU in a post-Brexit era. We suggest that in light of the two above-mentioned developments, scholars and policy-makers alike need to consider differentiated integration as a genuine sub-field of European Studies; as such, the paper offers a state-of-the-art review of the existing literature on differentiation. Second, as we suggest that Brexit should be studied as a ground-breaking case of differentiated disintegration as a new form of flexible integration. By the term of differentiated disintegration, we conceive the general mode of strategies and processes under which member-states withdraws from participation in the process of European integration or under which EU policies are transferred back to member states. Phenomena such as Brexit remind us of the neo-functionalist argument that theories of integration should not only capture disintegration, but also embrace forms of differentiation which does trigger the need for theorising and conceptualising differentiated disintegration. As such, this paper is not a traditional ‘research’ piece. Instead, it is an agenda-setting article which attempts to demonstrate the need to categorise differentiated integration studies as a core component of ‘mainstream’ European studies in a post-Brexit era. Given the impact Brexit had on the study of European integration (and disintegration) since June 2016, it is undeniable that the EU has entered a new chapter. We suggest that existing studies of differentiation will help both scholars and practitioners get a better understanding of what lies ahead for a post-Brexit EU.

This paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction, the second section provides an extensive, albeit selective chronological review of the existing literature on differentiated integration. Scholarly work started to emerge in the mid-1970s following the publication of the Tindemans report and evolved exponentially with an increase in the use of differentiated mechanisms, especially since the 1990s. The third section then focuses on the consequences of the Brexit vote for the study of European integration. It relies on the wide range of studies that have been published on this topic between 2016 and 2017, and concludes that the vote led to the development of two visions for a post-Brexit Europe: one advocating that Brexit effectively triggered a process of European disintegration; and the other stating that the exit of the EU’s
most Eurosceptic and ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998) will ultimately pave the way for a more integrated Europe. In that section, we also conceptualise Brexit as a case of differentiated disintegration and tentatively assess its consequences for the future study of European integration. In outlining contours for future studies, three broad ideas or scenarios are then carved out in the conclusion: breaking down, muddling through, and heading forward.

II. Differentiated integration as a field of study: a chronological literature review

Differentiated integration in the EU is far from being a new phenomenon. As illustrated in Figure 1, the literature on this issue started burgeoning in 1995 and the number of articles published every year on the topic has increased exponentially especially since 2007 (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Kohler-Koch and Larat, 2009).

This section seeks to order conceptualizations of differentiated integration in a temporal and diachronic perspective by showing how increasing volume and forms of differentiation of the EU is followed by differentiation in the study of it – and that continuously progressive integration has implicitly been accepted as the bedrock of EU history for a long time. As shown below, studies on differentiated integration have failed to agree on a common definition of the notion for a long time, and scholars are still divided over its consequences. This could be explained by the fact that “EU governance research tends to follow a pattern of self-centred and self-referring national focuses” where “the national agendas with their specific preoccupations and interests still matter” (Larat and Schneider, 2009, p. 181). Yet, differentiation is now considered as a persistent feature of the EU.

While certain limited elements of (legal) differentiation have been present since the endorsement of the Treaty of Rome (Hanf, 2001), one of the first formulation of differentiated integration as an idea finds its roots in a report on the future of European integration written by Tindemans (1975), in which he laid the foundations of a ‘multi-speed Europe’, yet without explicitly mentioning this notion. The general concept of differentiation appeared for the first
time in the primary Community law in 1986, as stated in Article 8c of the Single European Act (now Article 27 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]):

When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Article 7a [now Article 26 TFEU, authors’ note], the Commission shall take into account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences in development will have to sustain for the establishment of the internal market and it may propose appropriate provisions. If these provisions take the form of derogations, they must be of a temporary nature and must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the internal market.

In the mid-1980s, numerous studies over the notion of differentiated (or flexible) integration started to emerge (Wallace et al., 1983; Ehlermann, 1984; Grabitz, 1984; Wallace and Ridley, 1985). Academic debates over differentiated integration eventually gained momentum in the early 1990s for three reasons. First, several – originally temporarily constrained – opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty were granted to the UK and Denmark in 1993, leading towards more institutionalised forms of differentiation and raising questions on the future of European integration. Second, the end of the Cold War paved the way for the ‘big bang enlargement’, creating new challenges with the potential diversification of national interests (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995). Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam constitutionalized mechanisms of differentiation through the introduction of enhanced co-operation which, to date, has only been used in three cases (divorce law in 2010; unitary patent in 2013; and property regimes of international couples in 2016; see Philippart and Edwards, 1999; Thym, 2005; Fabbrini, 2012).

One of the first and most influential attempts to define and conceptualise differentiation was offered by Stubb who defined it as “the general mode of integration strategies which try to reconcile heterogeneity within the European Union” (1996, p. 283). Stubb (1997) further categorised differentiation under three dimensions based on the existing literature and debates, which are summarised by Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012). First, a temporal dimension: the notion of ‘Multi-speed’ Europe presented by Grabitz (1984), where differentiation is only temporal and only relates to member-states rather than sub-national entities or non-members. Second, a territorial dimension: the ‘Concentric circles’ model, envisioned by Schäuble and Lamers (1994) the Club of Florence (1996) or Fischer (2000), where ‘Avant-Garde’ member-states would constitute a core group leading to a federal political union, while other states
belong to a second, less influential circle and non-members can be part of a third outer circle (see also Schimmelfennig, 2013). Third, a functional dimension: the models of ‘Flexible integration’, ‘Variable Geometry’ and ‘Europe à la carte’, where participation to European integration varies depending on the sector.

In contrast to political scientists, lawyers and legal scholars on the whole have been quite wary of the idea of ‘differentiation’. In a study of the political dynamics of differentiated integration, Walker (1998, p. 374) was particularly critical and defined it as a ‘non-project’ which could lead to irreconcilable divergences in terms of managing boundaries between legal orders, political efficacy, democratic credentials and self-legitimation: “[c]ontingency, ambiguity and disagreement, rather than design, certainty and consensus, are key motifs in the composition of the new differentiated structure”. Subsequently, Tuystschaever (1999) presented a more succinct classification of differentiation, distinguishing between (i) actual and potential differentiation in primary and secondary law, (ii) inter-state and intra-state/temporary and non-temporary differentiation, (iii) general and specific as well as (iv) positive and negative differentiation. In another influential discussion of the Economic and Monetary Union, Schengen and tax harmonisation, Kölliker (2001, p. 147) found that temporary differentiated mechanisms can lead to centripetal effects on ‘reluctant’ member-states, but that only applies where policy design can “change the fundamental character of a common pool resource or a public good”. Kölliker (2006) was the first to theorize differentiated integration from a rationalist perspective. Warleigh (2002, p. 2) further argued that “flexibility offers the most useful means of balancing different (national) interests and thereby allowing progress to be made for (and in) the EU as a whole.”

Until the early 2000s, studies of differentiated integration were influenced by the first generation of studies of Europeanization (Mény et al., 1996; Olsen, 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp, 1998; Knill, 2001; Zeff and Pirro, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Early case studies of differentiation mostly focused on the relations between the Nordic countries and the EU (e.g. Mouritzen, 1993; Ingebritsen, 1998; Trondal and Egeberg, 1999; Gstöhl, 2000; 2002a; 2002b; Tiilikainen, 2001; Trondal, 2002; Neumann, 2003). Surprisingly, there were only few country-specific studies focusing on the United Kingdom’s opt-outs as case studies of differentiated integration.

The introduction of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union and the 2004 ‘big bang enlargement’ eventually led to an increase in differentiated integration, and to the emergence of what many will dub a ‘two-speed Europe’ (see e.g. Piris, 2012). By 2010, more
than half of EU policies were implemented in different ways (Leuffen et al., 2013). Majone (2009, p. 205) acknowledged that the EU is evolving into a ‘number of, often overlapping, state groupings established for cooperation in a variety of fields’ (see also Jensen and Slapin, 2011).

From 2005 onwards, academic studies started to improve the theoretical and empirical depth of what will eventually become a sub-field of European studies. From a theoretical perspective, many studies then started to focus on the scope and limits of differentiated integration in the EU. Andersen and Sitter (2006) wondered ‘how much differentiation can the EU accommodate?’ and proposed a typology of European integration with four models: homogeneous integration; aligned integration; deviant integration; and autonomous integration. They argued that differentiation is now “a common and normal phenomenon” and that its study should also include formal and informal arrangements (ibid., p. 327). De Neve (2007, p. 516) asked whether differentiated integration is reshaping “the European polity into what increasingly resembles a multi-layered European Onion”. Following the first Irish vote on the Lisbon Treaty, Jensen and Slapin (2011) focused on the efficiency of the ‘multi-speed approach’ and created a model under which opt-outs could lead to cascades (i.e. a ‘domino effect’ under which member-states opt out because of other member-states’ decisions to opt out; with the authors using Sweden’s informal EMU opt-out as a case study) or no cascades (with the authors using Schengen and the Social Charter as case studies). The latter study, however, reflects some of the semantic confusion in the existing literature, as it contradicts Stubb’s original categorisation of differentiated integration by using ‘multi-speed integration’ as a synonym of differentiation (see also Leruth and Lord, 2015). The varied ideas about differentiation led Olsen (2007) to ask what kind of political order Europe was in search of. The EU was depicted as “a conceptual battleground and an institutional building site” (Olsen, 2010, p. 81). The EU was further viewed as a compound and unsettled system consisting of a varied mix of organizational forms, governance patterns, and ideas about legitimate forms and speeds of integration and differentiation. Institutional differentiation was understood as “new institutional spheres have split off from older ones and developed their own identities” (ibid., p. 142) and where political order consists of relatively autonomous institutional sub-systems with separate actors, structures, sources of legitimacy and resources. The overall institutional ecology was seen as consisting of nested and coevolving institutions that yet enjoy some degrees of mutual independence.

Empirical studies of differentiated integration also became more prominent from 2005 onwards. These include a special issue of the Journal of European Integration on Euro-outsiders
(Miles, 2005) as well as studies on the impact of non-Eurozone membership (e.g. Marcussen, 2009), opt-outs in Justice and Home Affairs (Adler-Nissen, 2009; 2011; 2014; Balzacq and Hadfield, 2012), the Single Market (e.g. Howarth and Sadeh, 2010) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (e.g. Lavenex, 2011). Two influential research networks (CONNEX and EUROGOV) concluded that even the study of European integration was unable to integrate (Kohler-Koch and Larat, 2009) and that the EU was characterized by multiple – and thus differentiated – ‘modes’ of governance (e.g. Héritier and Rhodes, 2011).

In a research agenda section of the Journal of European Public Policy, Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012, p. 293) outlined some of the existing shortcomings in this field of study where “empirical analysis has been limited to a few important cases of treaty law (such as EMU and Schengen), but there are no comprehensive data sets”. Criticising Stubb’s original categorisation, they highlighted that differentiation always has territorial and sectoral impacts and that purely functional conceptions are not included in this categorisation. They subsequently suggest a categorisation into six dimensions: (1) Permanent vs. temporary differentiation; (2) Territorial vs. purely functional differentiation; (3) Differentiation across nation states vs. multi-level differentiation; (4) Differentiation takes place within the EU treaties vs. outside the EU treaties; (5) Decision-making at EU level vs. regime level (i.e. intergovernmental decisions); (6) Only for member-states vs. also for non-member-states/areas outside the EU territory. The authors also underlined that empirical examples can be found for almost all models, suggesting that “differentiated integration comes in an astonishing variety of forms and [...] the concepts of differentiated integration can and should be used systematically to describe these forms and their frequency” (ibid., p. 297).

Another attempt at categorising differentiated integration was made by Leuffen et al. (2013). In their views, the EU needs to be conceived of as a system of differentiated integration, as defined in the introduction to this article. Basing their study on primary law, they start from the assumption that “the EU potentially covers the entire range of policies, but that each policy varies regarding the level of centralization and the territorial extension” (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 12). Differentiated integration varies primarily along two dimensions: in the level of centralisation across policies (vertical differentiation), and in territorial extension across policies (horizontal differentiation). Furthermore, they classify horizontal differentiation into four sub-categories: (1) No horizontal differentiation, where all EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member-states (e.g. pre-Maastricht Europe); (2) External differentiation, where EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member-states, but non-member-states can also adopt these
rules (e.g. the European Economic Area); (3) Internal differentiation, where EU rules do not apply uniformly to all EU member-states (e.g. Denmark through the Edinburgh Agreement or the enhanced co-operation procedure); (4) Internal and external differentiation, where EU rules from which some EU member-states opted out, while non-member-states opted in (e.g. Schengen).

Between 2012 and 2017, Schimmelfennig and others published a series of in-depth studies examining various aspects of differentiated integration, such as constitutional differentiation (Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2014), the impact of EU enlargement on differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig, 2014; Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2017), and the impact of differentiation on EU governance (Schimmelfennig 2016a; 2016b). Further studies also focused on differentiated integration within EU legislation, which demonstrate the increasing complexity of EU law and law-making (e.g. Kroll and Leuffen, 2015; Duttle et al., 2017).

In another study, de Wilde et al. (2016, p. 4) explored the impact of politicisation on differentiation. Politicisation, which is “is defined as an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” (de Wilde 2011, p. 560), has grown significantly over time as a consequence of the rise of economic and political interdependence between EU member states. Consequently, as “interdependence pressures increase, travel to other policy areas and countries and start to affect core state powers and less-integration-friendly countries” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2015, p. 779), politicisation has effectively become a major obstacle to deepen the process of European integration. A differentiated EU, the argument goes, leads to differentiated politicisation across times, countries and settings (de Wilde et al., 2016). From that perspective, studies of differentiated integration have increasingly focused on Euroscepticism as one of the most important outcomes of politicisation (see Zürn 2018).

With the ‘Great Recession’ of 2007-08, the EU eventually entered a multi-faceted crisis (Leruth, 2017). The future of European integration became an increasingly debated issue (Rittberger and Blauberger, 2018). The possibility of the United Kingdom leaving the EU or Greece leaving either the EU or the Eurozone surfaced, Eurosceptic political parties became increasingly prominent across Europe, and so did the potential for European disintegration (Vollaard, 2014; 2018; Leruth et al., 2018).
III. What future for European integration studies? Brexit as a case of differentiated disintegration

The UK’s unprecedented vote to leave the EU in June 2016 led many scholars of European integration to consider studying the notion of disintegration. Unsurprisingly, the existing literature on European disintegration is relatively scarce, mostly because of the lack of empirical evidence pre-Brexit. In an essay entitled ‘Europe’s last decade’, Wright (2013, p. 17) predicted that economic stagnation in the EU would “increase the risk of a British exit from the EU which could set in train a period of disintegration in other countries”. One of the first major academic contributions to this nascent sub-field of European studies was by Webber (2014), who offered a series of valuable theory-based prognoses over the future of European disintegration. Vollaard (2014, p. 1144) cautions against the view that disintegration may simply entail a reversal process of integration and argues that “national states are not necessarily the only possible outcome of a process of European disintegration”. Furthermore, the author suggests that existing studies of differentiated integration “only explain why some member-states do not join all integrative steps, and not whether the EU could become less integrated” (ibid., p. 1143).

The consequences of the Brexit vote on the future of European integration itself have been analysed in two different ways. The first envisions Brexit as a process of disintegration. In commentaries published shortly after the referendum, Jones (2016) and Rosamond (2016), among others, emphasise the need to fill this new gap in the literature by developing ideas of European disintegration as well as differentiation, which the “EU will not escape […] in the future” (Chopin and Lequesne, 2016, p. 545). In a study of the referendum’s consequences on international political economy, Sampson (2017) further categorised Brexit as a case of ‘international disintegration’. Similarly, Oliver (2017) drew on the aforementioned studies published prior to the referendum to categorise Brexit as ‘a symptom of a wider crisis in democratic capitalism’, though ‘this does not mean the EU, transatlantic cooperation, Western internationalism and capitalism as we know it are doomed’.

The second vision takes into consideration the UK’s historically ‘awkward’ relationship with the EU (George, 1998) and perceives Brexit as an opportunity to deepen the process of European integration. Instead of focusing on disintegration, these studies establish that now that the EU has ‘gotten rid of’ one of its most reluctant members, the Union can experience accelerated integration. Before the Brexit vote, Zielonka (2014) and Oliver (2016) argued that there is little support for the view that the UK has more to lose by leaving the EU than the
Union itself. This was the view of several mainstream European newspapers immediately after the Brexit vote, including those which shared concerns with the UK over the current pace of European integration (see e.g. Bijsmans et al., 2018). Emmanuel Macron’s election as French President and his subsequent Europe speech at La Sorbonne, where he laid out his plans for the future of European integration, further led commentators to assess Brexit as a positive outcome for the EU under a strong renewed Franco-German leadership (see e.g. Matthijs 2017). Majone (2017, p. 27) argued in favour of the transformation of the EU into a genuine confederal model: “[w]ithout more integration, but of the right kind, Europe may just cease to play any significant political and, eventually, even economic role in a rapidly changing world”. This second category of contributions do not deny that the EU has entered a process of disintegration; however, they offer a positive vision and do not perceive Brexit as the EU’s demise.

In a sense, the depth of discussion over the impact of Brexit and its consequences for the future of European integration mirrors what happened following 2005 Dutch and French rejections of the Constitutional Treaty, which led to a (relatively short) period of uncertainty. Scholars and practitioners immediately considered that the outcome of both referendums called for the end of the federalist ‘utopia’. However, the immediate reactions to Brexit suggested that unlike in 2005, the status quo is no longer an option for the EU. The two above-mentioned conceptions are not mutually exclusive and suggest that Brexit is a driver for change not only for the EU as a political system per se, but also for European studies. Categorising Brexit as a process of European disintegration is thus a step in the right direction; however, the sole notion of ‘disintegration’ can be misleading, as it can also imply that the EU might eventually cease to exist (Hodson and Puettter, 2018). Yet, the Union’s immediate response to Brexit and the release of the White Paper do not suggest such radical outcome. As a result, and drawing on the existing literature on differentiated integration, we suggest that Brexit should be categorised as an instance of differentiated disintegration.

Using a post-functionalist explanation according to which “demand for opt-outs arise from concerns about the preservation of national sovereignty in areas of core state powers and in countries with comparatively strong exclusive national identities”, Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 1) argued that “differentiated integration results from a process in which individual member-states remain at the status quo when the EU increases integration, whereas in the case of differentiated disintegration, individual member-states reduce the level or scope of their European integration while the rest of the EU remains at the status quo” (ibid.). Drawing on previous work by Leuffen et al. (2013), differentiated disintegration is thus seen as negotiated
processes by which a member-state withdraws from participation in European integration or under which EU policies and competences are transferred back to a member-states.

The public administration turn in EU studies expands this definition by questioning the conception of member-states as coherent wholes, suggesting that differentiated disintegration can also be seen as an administrative phenomenon. One could imagine, for example, that while a member-state withdraws from formal membership in the EU, some domestic agencies keep their membership in EU administrative networks. This idea is captured by the public administration approach to European integration that sees the Union as consisting of interconnected sets of agencies, ministries and regulatory networks (e.g. Egeberg, 2006; Bauer and Trondal, 2015; Heidbreder, 2015; Knill and Bauer, 2016).

In addition to this public administration approach to differentiated integration, the question remains how to theorize ‘disintegration’ in the future. Possible avenues include, but are by no way limited, to the following paths requiring strong interdisciplinary engagement and cross-fertilization: (1) Sociological and anthropological approaches might inquire on the impact of disintegration on identity and practices possibly engaging with the growing literature on Euroscepticism; (2) economic and legal literatures devoted to the study of interlocking systems, e.g. in the context of market integration or institutional inter-locking as witnessed in the area of collaboration between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice; (3) in political science it is conceivable to see (a) revisionist neo-functionalist arguments centring on the concept of spill-back, (b) engagement of (de-) Europeanization research using Brexit as a reverse case or (c) the consociational and confederal literature viewing the EU altogether as a form of “organized synarchy of entwined sovereignties that will also help us rethink democracy” (Chryssochou, 2010, p. 388). Whether all these avenues will be criss-crossed well-trodden one by one in the near future, will remain open for discussion. In the concluding section we offer three overall scenarios for the future research field on differentiated (dis)integration.¹

V. Conclusion: differentiated (dis)integration as a field of study

EU studies has mirrored its unit of analysis through history. With prospects for differentiated disintegration, new questions and scenarios arises and are envisaged both for the Union and for the field of enquiry, and old ones reappear. Three such ideas will be suggested here: Breaking

¹ We are grateful to Alex Brianson who provided invaluable input on this sketch of research avenues.
down, muddling through, and heading forward. Each are sketched briefly in the following and
might arguably guide future studies on differentiated (dis)integration. This paper demonstrates
that much like the use of differentiated integration, academic studies of the phenomenon have
evolved considerably over the past twenty years. From the Maastricht Treaty to the European
Commission’s White Paper, scholars have attempted to theorise and conceptualise this ‘moving
target’. Given the wide range of publications related to differentiation and following the Brexit
vote, it is now fair to consider differentiated disintegration as the next step in the study of the
EU. While at least three sets of ideas developed below might be envisaged, future EU studies
should treat the dependent variable as a full continuum – from the possibility of breaking down
to heading forward (Börzel 2018). Moreover, we should expect the study of European
disintegration to largely follow existing theoretical threads within EU studies. The interesting
avenue for future theorising thus lies in determining the conditions under which each of the
below scenarios play out. Even more, theorising differentiated disintegration is likely to go
beyond EU studies – from generic theories of change. First, studies of differentiated
disintegration might learn from ideas about how organizations emerge, rise and die, thus
building on organizational theories on ‘meta-governance’ (Egeberg and Trondal 2018) – that
is ‘governance by organizing’. Differentiated disintegration is thus seen as contingent on
existing organizational formats (Scenario 2). Scenario 1 might be explained by rational choice-
based perspectives suggesting that the EU as we know it will break up due to member-states’
unwillingness to deal collectively with crises (Hodson and Puetter 2018). Moreover, both
Scenario 1 and 3 might be informed by historical institutionalism where crises may be seen as
unlocking path-dependencies and institutional equilibria that trigger the potential for profound
change. For example, crises may be viewed as situations of punctuation where more (1) or less
(3) integration are perceived as effective solutions to address new challenges, leading to the
delegation of more or, alternatively, less powers to EU institutions (Jones and Baumgartner
2005). Acknowledging that the theoretical menu is larger than this section can cover, the
research challenge is to contribute to mid-range theorising in which scope conditions for each
idea are specified and probed.

Scenario 1: Breaking down

A first scenario builds on the idea that the EU as we know it will break up due to member-
states’ sustained unwillingness or inability to deal collectively with crises. Particularly in
intergovernmentally organized areas, policy-making outcomes assumedly follow processes of
member state bargaining, where strategically rational actors meet to maximize their predetermined and fixed preferences (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Although not limited to rational choice-based odontology, this scenario might accelerate intergovernmentalist scholarship, assuming the EU to be fragile in the face of crisis: Only to the extent that the member states perceive integration or cooperation to be in their interests will they seek common solutions to externally induced challenges. Neo-realist perspectives might therefore expect crisis to further undermine and fragment the EU project. To the extent that member-states willingness to agree on common action in the face of common threats fades, EU policies would be increasingly oriented towards bolstering the member-states’ common interests. Also liberal integovernmentalist approaches might expect crisis such as Brexit to challenge a common EU project, unless member-states expect that economic gains of common policies outweigh expected costs of working together. In general, scenario 1 would see member-states as ss likely to share sovereignty or contribute to redistribution in times of austerity or when faced with an EU sceptic population, and would strive to remain in power to veto future attempt to pool sovereignty.

Scenario 2: Muddling through

A second scenario builds broadly on organizational-institutional approaches to political science (March and Olsen 1989; Egeberg and Trondal 2018) and suggests how the EU will muddle through crisis through path-dependent and incremental responses that draws on pre-existing institutional architectures: Rather than breaking up, crisis may reinforce well-known organizational solutions and governing arrangements and thus have little profound effects on EU integration and governance. Institutional approaches suggest that governance systems and governance practices under stress may revert to or reinforce pre-existing organizational traditions, practices and formats, reinforcing institutional path-dependencies (Olsen 2010; Ansell and Trondal 2018). This may occur because organizations are thrown into a reactive mode of response where decision makers replicate structures that are perceived as successes in the past. Pre-existing institutions may serve as an important source of stability in the face of crisis, enabling organizations to ride out stressful times. European differentiated (dis)integration would by this line of scholarship be seen profoundly path-dependent, locked-in, and structurally conditioned by pre-existing organizations and institutions. As such, differentiated and disintegration would be assumed to be profoundly influenced by the present organizational-institutional architecture.
Scenario 3: Heading forward

A last scenario suggests that crises such as Brexit may unlock and trigger the potential for profound change. For example, crises may be viewed as situations where more integration are perceived as effective solutions to address new challenges, leading to the delegation of new powers to EU institutions in a variety of policy fields. Crisis may entail a fundamental questioning of pre-existing governance arrangements and cause a fundamental institutional soul-seeking (Lodge and Wegrich 2012); crisis may produce critical junctures that generate ‘windows of opportunity’ for more integration (Kingdon 1984) in which crisis trigger organizational meltdown and create opportunity structures for the origin of new organizations (Padgett and Powell 2012). Crisis may thus spur the emergence of entirely new institutional arrangements. Contemporary European examples include the rise of new European Union financial surveillance agencies, the structuring of the new European Union banking union, and the emergent European energy union (Bauer and Trondal 2015). Although this final idea suggests that crisis may lead to more integration, it does not specify what this might imply in terms of concrete institutional designs. That is an empirical question to be analysed in greater detail, but also a theoretical puzzle that might be informed by scenario 2.

Political ‘crises’ at the EU level often lead scholars to rethink the way European integration should be studied. Yet, due to its unprecedented nature, the Brexit vote combined to the potential for subsequent policy-based forms of disintegration as outlined in the White Paper on the Future of Europe have opened up a brand-new chapter in the vast literature of European studies, with new attempts to theorise and conceptualise European disintegration. Conceptualising Brexit as a ground-breaking process of differentiated disintegration paves the way for future studies of European integration, especially focusing on the consequences of the UK’s upcoming withdrawal from the EU on other member-states, policy areas and the European institutions per se. The EU and its integration process has always been a moving target, and so is the study of differentiated (dis)integration. Only time will tell whether Brexit and the subsequent White Paper over the future of Europe will act as a catalyst to reform the Union.
References


