Multi-level Administration in Time of Crisis

A Case Study of The Norwegian Directorate for Immigration and the so called "asylum crisis of 2015"

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ABSTRACT

In Autumn 2015, a record high number of 31,145 asylum seekers entered Norway. The overflow of refugees caused an organizational challenge for the national agency, the Norwegian Directorate for immigration (UDI). The challenge was expected for an organization like the UDI which operates within a Multi-level administration system (MLA), both under Norwegian state and within the European. The overflow of the refugees is considered as a crisis, calling for cooperation and coordination of the affected and relevant entities and units both within and across organizations. Beside revealing the UDI's inability and lack of resources and capacity to handle the uncommon situation, the crisis also revealed the weak coordination among affected and relevant entities and units across the levels of government. The goal of this thesis is to understand the organizational response to the refugee crisis through a theoretical perspective: MLA. This is particularly a study of MLA. The UDI as the national agency is a case for this study. This thesis mainly studies the coordination proximity of the UDI with other actors both at the national and international level in time of crisis, in order to examine how and to what extent the UDI was in coordination with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD), European Commission (EC) and sister agencies in other countries. It is also a study of the coordination pattern within the UDI. The study illustrates by the asylum crisis of 2015 and investigates how did the UDI addressed the peak of the so-called asylum crisis of 2015 both internally and externally. The purpose of the thesis is to understand UDI's administrative actual behaviour during crisis from an organizational perspective. The thesis finds support for the organizational perspective pointing out that national agencies form part of an integrated administration. Specialization principles in the national state and at EU level enable the UDI's extensive contact with the EC, the EU agency - European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and sister agencies in other countries related to immigration and asylum matters. National agencies' representatives are also concerned with having professional discussions and information exchange at EU level. The proximity of the coordination with actors at the national level and specially with the JD, to which the UDI is a subordinate body, is stronger than other actors during the crisis.

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Acronyms
CEAS - Common European Asylum System
EASO - European Asylum Support Office
EMN - European Migration Network
EU - European Union
EEA - European Economic Area Agreement
EC - European Commission
JD - Ministry of Justice and Public Security
MLA - Multi-level administration
MLG - Multi-level Governance
PU - National Police Immigration Service
UDI - The Norwegian Directorate for Immigration

UNE - Immigration Appeals Board
NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data
UD - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
BLF - Ministry of Children and Family
POD - Norwegian Police Directorate
IMDi - Integration and Diversity Directorate
DSB – Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem statement
Europe lives in times of existential crisis within and beyond the European Union (EU Global Strategy, 2016). In the last decade alone, the Great Britain's pending exit from the EU in 2016, the asylum crisis of 2015, the terrorist crises (Nice truck attack 2016, Brussels bombing 2016, Paris attack 2015, Norway attack 2011) and the financial crisis of 2007 - 2010 have challenged the existence of the open and free Europe. Incidents and uncertainties in any part of Europe will undoubtedly impact the whole Europe. Besides geographical proximity, a major reason for the connectivity of Europe is the EU - a political and economic platform consisting of 28 member states, who actively cooperate on a wide range of issues including but not limited to refugee's human rights, transport, and trade. The policy around those issues encompasses both internal and external areas. Any unstable situation in a single member state calls for a common solution and the whole of EU for contribution (EU Global Strategy, 2016). In the fields of safety and security, tasks and responsibility tend to be spread among several sectors and levels and involve a large number of actors (Christensen, et. al. 2009).

Since the 2015/2016, an increasing number of people from the Middle East and Africa attempted to cross the Mediterranean to come to Europe (Caparaso, 2018). It was the largest inflow of refugees since World War II (Neiman and Zuan, 2018). In 2015 alone, the number was over one million people, consisting of refugees, displaced persons, and other migrants. Most of the emigrants from Syria took the perilous Eastern Mediterranean Route to Europe (Lavenex, 2018). Pressures for the dramatic movement of refugees were building with the civil war in Syria and the Arab Spring dating from December 2010. State failure and civil unrest in sub-Saharan Africa and central Asia also contributed to the refugee crisis (Caparaso, 2018. p. 1347).

The immigration flow, apart from the transit countries such as Turkey, Greece, and Libya (EC, 2017), had a profound impact on the EU as a whole (EU, 2017). A situation which not only threatened the EU as a whole, but also affected every member states in different ways, in particularly caused operational and organizational challenges for related and most affected organizations (UDI, 2015; EC 2017).

The pressure from such situation gave the national agencies little time to respond to the crisis. It put the affected organizations in difficult circumstances, who were not capable enough to handle the pressure from the crisis, and the means they had in disposal were inadequate to cope with the crisis (Mishra, 1996). This situation not only revealed the inadequacy and inability of national agencies to cope with the crisis, but also the coordination problem among various actors within (Deloitte, 2017) and across countries. Crisis means a situation where there is a serious threat to the basis structure or fundamental values and norms of a system and where critical decision has to be made quickly under highly uncertain circumstances (Christensen, et al. 2016).

Norway (as a non-EU member) was not exempted from the impact of the European migrant and refugee crisis. In Norway, the national agency, the Norwegian Directorate for Immigration (UDI) in particular, has largely been affected by European migrant and refugee crisis of 2015. The UDI is the central body of immigration administration that implements and contributes to developing the government's immigration and refugee policy under the responsibility of Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD). The goal of the UDI is rapid and correct processing of all applications (for asylum, stay- and work permits) and a comprehensive commitment to many of the people who for various reasons have come to Norway (Deloitte, 2017). In Autumn 2015, a record high number of 31,145 asylum seekers, tripled than the

previous year, entered Norway. The UDI did not have adequate capacity to cope with it (UDI, 2015).

The UDI has been largely affected because Norway is tightly associated with the EU through a set of agreements. This is not a cohesive set of agreements that establishes a framework for cooperation that embraces everything. The most important and largest agreement is the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) which signed in 1992 and it can be considered to be the main pillar, which comprises most of the cooperation and influences the entire model of association. The EEA agreement provides for the inclusion of EU legislation covering the so-called four freedoms—the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital throughout the 31 EEA states – 28 EU member states, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (Gänzle & Henökl, 2016).

Norway has also entered into agreements in other fields including climate and environment, education and justice such as Schengen and Dublin agreements (Egeberg & Trondal, 2017; Gänzle & Henökl, 2016). The Schengen agreement was signed in 1999 and entered into force in 2001- a collective of countries comprising 26 European states that have officially abolished passport and all other types of border control at their mutual borders. Membership of the Schengen Agreement contain that Norway had to control the Coastal Border, the border with Russia and accept a common list of third countries that needed to be shown to enter the country. Collaboration on police matters is also part of the Schengen cooperation. The Schengen agreements have made little difference between Norway and EU members in terms of external immigration control (Brochmann & Lavenex, 2002).

In addition, Norway actively participating in large number of other EU policies and programs and Norwegian policy over the past 15 years has been to adapt to emerging European norms and regulations on immigration control, through its participation in Dublin system. The Dublin Regulation was signed and implemented in Norway in 2001 and sets out rules for which country responsible for handling asylum applications. The rules state that an asylum seeker can only get his application processed in the first Dublin country the applicant enters. Norway together with Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland is, through its own association agreement - The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – is bound to Dublin Regulation. The Eurodac Regulation is a regulation closely related to the Dublin Regulation and was created to facilitate Dublin cooperation. The Eurodac Regulation involves a system for recording and storing fingerprints, so that it is easier to clarify which country is responsible for examining the asylum application (JD & UD, 2014).

Through this participation, Norwegian authorities are also indirectly committed to complying with other EU legislation on immigration, at EU and other member countries, to ensure that Norwegian immigration policy is carried out within the standards (Brekke, 2011, p. 9).

One can thus claim, that Norway's connection with EU is in some ways unique, as it is not an EU Member State but is still enmeshed in Europeanised asylum policies (Staver & Brekke, 2018) and almost over 60 percent of EU legislation are adopted in Norway through different national organization (Lavenex, 2018).

The thesis in some way investigates the consequences of these connections to the Norwegian national agency, the UDI´s actual administrative behavior as an implementing agency for Norway's asylum and refugee policy during the refugee crisis of 2015.

The 2012 European Report investigated the consequences of the EEA Agreement, and thus Norway's form of association with the EU. According to the report, Norway - seen from Brussels - is the third country most closely associated with EU cooperation (NOU 2012, author's translation). The European influx of asylum seeker of 2015, has challenged the UDI organizationally, and forced Norway to change some national policy and contribute to change in supranational policies (UDI, 2015). The UDI, together with other European member states,

participate in various networks and working groups at European level to support and monitor developments and implementation practices of immigration policies in other countries. These networks include the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Migration Network (EMN), which is a forum for consultation with other Member States on the implementation of directives in practice. Both the formal agreements and networks make Norway involved in the EU's asylum and refugee policy.

In addition, it is claimed that the situation under crisis undermines the "multi-hattedness" of national agencies and impacted the coordination of the agencies with other actors. The multi-level administration-embedded agencies and their coordination with other actors became more national oriented during the crisis. This thesis also addresses this concern and mainly examines the degree of coordination between the UDI and other actors (Neiman and Zuan, 2018).

At the EU level, responses to the European migrant and refugee crisis includes internal and external policy measures. Main internal measures include the introduction of hotspots in Italy and Greece and responsibility-sharing through relocation and resettlement. The internal measures to the migrant and refugee crisis of 2015/1016 were not fully successful and the EU had to seek for solutions externally. One of the main externalization policies among others is the EU-Turkey statement (Neiman and Zuan, 2018). The EU-Turkey statement present Turkey as a safe third country, where the EU can send refugees for processing their cases (Lavenex, 2018). Other external measures taken by the EU are the redefinitions of who is in need and who has a right to asylum (through the introduction of new safe countries of origin), the prevention of irregular migration (through border control and measures against trafficking and smuggling), and stopping the departure of refugees from their home and transit countries (through the introduction of trust funds) (Lavenex, 2018).

However, the EU has attempted to manage the refugee crisis in the best possible way through Common European Asylum System (CEAS) , but as lavenex (2018) claimed, the EU's response disclosed the inadequacy of common protectionist instruments and most Member States' unwillingness to emphasize the protective elements of the CEAS. Many EU member states either resisted and totally rejected the EU solutions or only implemented the EU policies to a certain degree rather than in wholesome (Brekke and Staver, 2018). Many EU countries including Norway (indirectly member of EU) followed strongly their own national government policies (ibid).

The core of the CEAS, the Dublin Regulations and the Schengen agreement proved unsuited to channel the inflows. Visa obligations and strict border control enforcement precluded safe and regular access to EU territory (Lavenex, 2018). This situation raised questions on the deficits and inability of EU as a political system on the migration and refugee policy and its implementation and a weak cooperation and coordination mechanism between EU member states (Neiman and Zuan, 2018).

It is necessary to mention that this thesis is not focused on examining the EU's responses to the largest inflow of refugee crisis, but the Norwegian national government's response, particularly the national agencies that are responsible in the policy area. It studies cooperation pattern within administration bodies, namely Multi-level administration and the UDI of Norway is used as a case. Refugee crisis of 2015 is used as an example to examine the theories of multilevel administration and organizational theory. The overarching research question is how did the UDI respond to the refugee crisis of 2015 both internally and externally.

1.2 The Aim of the Thesis and Research Question

This thesis is both descriptive and analytical. The descriptive portion aims at outlining the UDI as part of the Multi-level administration system. It studies specifically, the UDI´s

actual administrative behaviour in relation to cooperation and coordination pattern within and across the UDI. The cooperation pattern within the UDI is the relationship between organization's management and departments and between departments. The cooperation pattern across UDI is the relationship between the UDI and Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the European Commission (EC), the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and sister agencies. The description component draws thus on Multi-level Administration (MLA) theory. The analytical component is aimed at understanding the cooperation and coordination pattern within and across the UDI. It explains how and why the UDI is connected within and across organization in such a particular way. This explanation is based on organization theory, which helps find organizational factors including both vertical and horizontal connections.

It is necessary to mention that the relationship of the UDI with JD and EC is vertical, and with the sister agencies and EU agency - EASO is horizontal. Within the UDI, the relationship of the organization's overarching management and department is vertical and the relationship between departments is horizontal.

The research questions of this thesis are as following:

1. *How did UDI respond to the asylum crisis of 2015 internally?*
2. *How and to what extent did UDI collaborate with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD) and European Commission´s administration vertically and sister agencies and EU-agency horizontally to respond to the refugee crisis of 2015, externally? And can it be explained?*

In addition, the study will examine the extent to which there are causal relationship between question 1 and 2. The casual relationship express that if the UDI is overruled by the JD, it has a direct consequences for internal management and the role of the UDI`s director would be strengthened. It means that external hierarchization of processes and increased involvement of political leadership contribute to internal hierarchy. In case the role of the EC and sister agencies were strong, this may correlate with a lower degree of internal hierarchy and greater professionalization of internal processes in the UDI (Egeberg and Trondal, 2015). The study also analyzes how and to what extent the UDI participates in the the upstream (policy formulation) processes and downstream (implementation) processes in a European multi-level administration.

The concepts are clarified in the method section 3.1.4.

1.3 Theory and Method
This thesis is informed by two theories complementing each other: Multi-Level Administration (MLA) approach and Organization Theory.

MLA contributes to the understanding of a public organization, which acts as part of a system, sharing responsibilities and functions with different levels. From a MLA perspective, the UDI as a national agency is part of a broader administrative system. Bauer and Trondal (2014) argues that national agencies act as "multi-hatted" in which they form part of national administrations while increasingly acting as part of a common union administration with the European Commission (Bauer & Trondal, 2014). National agencies are also usually affiliated with the sister agencies in other EU member countries. The affiliation of the UDI with other administrative orders is either direct with the EU institutions (such as the EC) or indirect (through parent ministries and/or EU agencies). And finally, the theory studies the coordination proximity of national agencies and is useful to render to what extent national agencies are coordinated with upper units (Bauer & Trondal, 2014) in order to examine the impact of the decision making at the upper level on national agencies behaviour and the vice versa.

Organizational theory provides knowledge and insight into organizational structure and design. Organizational theory contributes to understanding UDI´s actual administrative behavior and decision making. The theory also helps to find out organizational factors (organizational structure, demography, culture, and location) (Egeberg, Gornitzka & Trondal, 2016). The organizational factors include both formal (also called instrumental factor) and informal (institutional) factors within and across organizations. Finally, organizational theory helps explain how and why an organization coordinate with other organizations.

In this thesis, I use documentary analysis and key informant interviews as data collection tools. First, I gather and analyze relevant publicly available documents and reports . I use purposive (strategics) sampling to identify and recruit participants for the interview. Key informants are those with experience and knowledge of the way the UDI handled refugee crisis and are employees of the UDI. Interviews are conducted at their time and place of convenience.

Before conducting the interview, participants are informed about the research and their consent has been take. The interviews are conducted preferably in English or participant's language of convenience. The interviews are audio-recorded. The data are transcribed and translated into English if needed. The transcribed data are read and re-read for thematic coding, informed by multi-level administration theory and organizational theory. The themes are constantly compared. A final report is written based on the analysis.

Organizations' administrative behaviors - and the interplay organizations have in-between, assumes to be depended first of all on how the organizations are organized (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). Organizations must therefore be analyzed on the basis of formal and informal features. This thesis analyses the organization on the basis of only formal features. One of the other main condition to understand organizational administrative behaviour (decision-makers' behavior) is the legal rules and context an organization operate within. These variables set limits for activities and affects patterns of action and thus also the outcome of decisions (Christensen, Egeberg, Roness, Røvik, & Lægreid, 2015). The main reason is that employees in a public organizations are limited in rationality. Human cognitive capacity is limited and when employees are faced with a choice, they are not able to evaluate all possible alternatives and calculate their utility. However, they make decisions based on a simplified assessment of the alternatives and the consequences the organizational structure provides. The organizational structure says something about how work tasks are distributed and according to what principles, and provides the decision makers with certain goals, tasks and considerations that should be emphasized.

To explore the UDI's administrative behaviors, the following questions can be raised; 1) Do the UDI seek for solutions at the national or supranational level (EU level)? And 2) To what extent do the UDI's administrative behaviour was professional and to what extent it was political during the crisis? Based on previous research, some crises affect the dynamics and hierarchy of power, contributing to the movement of the power upwards, and increasing the degree of politicization. It means that crisis demand for greater national control and strong coordination within the nation. In the light of this one can thus generate an important argument that in time of crisis, one would expect to see that national agencies drawing primarily from their national 'line of command' and relying less on supranational organizations including European Commission administration, EASO and sister agencies, given to examine the national agency from the MLA perspective.

Table 1.3 Expected hypotheses

	National	Supranational

Professional	National/Professional	Supranational/Professional
Political	National/Political	Supranational/Political

Table 1.3 is an illustration of questions raised up before generating the hypothesis. It indicates clearly that either a solution for handling the refugee crisis of 2015 was at the national/professional, national/political, supranational/professional or supranational/political levels.

1.4 Previous Research and the Contribution of the Thesis

Several major quantitative studies have been carried out on the relationships between national administrations and the European institutions and national ministries and agencies, and on the impact of European institutions on national administration (Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Trondal, 2011). The case studies find that there are relatively close and direct connections between the European Commission's administration and national agencies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2013, author's translation). The studies on national agencies within the context of Europe are in many fields such as health (Søetorp, 2012, author's translation), railway (Stene, 2010, author's translation), statical area (Sverdrup, 2006) and so on (Egeberg and Trondal, 2013, author's translation). There are also research that explore the relative strengths of influence of different institutions at national agencies. A recent paper have attempted to understand how the Norwegian government coped with the crisis of 2015 partly through multilevel governance (Brekke and Staver, 2018). According to the literature review and to my knowledge, apart from a master thesis (Mari Nygaard Simonsen, 2018), there is no study of Norway's national agency, particularly the UDI, based on multi-level administrative system at the time of crisis. The focus of the master's thesis was on how the UDI, within multi-level administrative system, balances the steering signal from different actors but not the degree of coordination of the UDI with other actors (Brekke and Staver, 2018).

This thesis thus provides the opportunity to understand the UDI's administrative (bureaucratic) behaviour during a crisis, given from the MLA perspective. It also helps understand how horizontal and vertical bureaucratic interactions occur among various political layers across different levels of government. It also helps understand how supranational administrations function and cultivate and use resources, and how national bureaucratic structures and actors adapt to and exploit respective constellations.

In a state of crisis, a public organization being part of a complex organizational structure and in coordination with so many actors may get trapped in a coordination dilemma (Egeberg and Trondal, 2015). This thesis thus contributes to understanding how a public organization, i.e. the UDI, survive a coordination dilemma during a crisis and what other ways and opportunities exist to cope with it. Finally, I hope this thesis contribute to helping the UDI be better prepared in the future, especially during a crisis.

Since WWII, it was the first large inflow of refugees to Europe in 2015. During this short period of time, there are not so many scholarly articles on this issue. Most of the accessible information are either reports and evaluation from affected actors or news stories and media press releases. There are some recent scholarly papers on how EU and national government have handled the crisis, but not on issue of refugee crisis of 2015 in general and particularly from an organizational perspective.

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Thesis

It is a case study of the UDI's management of refugee crisis of 2015. The study is explicitly limited to the crisis period of 2015. The crisis of 2015 is the condition for choosing the UDI as a national agency. Within the organization, the focus is particularly on the asylum department and its relation with reception department and overarching leadership. UDI's asylum department's relation with reception department is a horizontal connection. UDI's asylum department relation with overarching leadership is a vertical connection. Across organizations, the focus is the UDI`s relation with the JD, EC, EASO and sister agencies.

UDI's interaction and coordination with other agencies is significant on how the situation was handled. The task of the UDI is largely affected by other actors during crisis. One main actor, a department which is subordinate to the UDI, is the National Police Immigration Service (PU). There are many other actors that relate to asylum seeking process in Norway such as National Police Directorate, the Norwegian Directorate of Civil Protection (DSB) and municipalities that remain beyond the scope of analysis of this research.

One of the limitations of the thesis is the exclusion of key informant interviews from the European Commission and sister agencies because of limited time and resources.

The main focus of this study is on the phase of the policy process in which regulations are to be implemented in the national context; the downstream phase of the policy process. Other parts of the policy process, such as the formulation phase (the "upstream phase"), the incorporation phase in which legislation is written into Norwegian law and the policy change phase will also be considered.

1.6 Selection of the Case

The reasons I have chosen the UDI are multiple. First, the MLA perspective describes the development of a common union administration through the EU institutions' 'adoption' of national agencies. A basic prerequisite for choosing the UDI as a case study is that this term embraces the UDI in such a way that the institution can be investigated based on the theoretical framework in the field. Pollitt and Talbot define national agency as public organizations and units are arranged at a formal distance from the parent unit. For example, national agencies have a certain distance from parent ministries in the decision-making process, performing public tasks at the national level, staffed by public officials, mainly funded through the state budget, which is subject to at least some public or judicial procedures (Trondal, 2011). The UDI is considered to meet these criteria and can thus be regarded as such an organization. Second, it is interesting to study a national agency and its administrative behaviour with highly politicized policy area such as migration and refugee, and which is not member of EU but influenced by the EU through a number of other connections. Finally, I have easy access to people and documents of the UDI.

1.7 The Structure of the Thesis

This master thesis mainly follows the recommended structure for master's thesis in political science and management program (UiA, 2018). The first chapter is the introduction. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical background: the multi-level administration theory and organizational theory. Research design, methods, and data collection are presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 and 5 render the results, analysis, and discussions. Finally a conclusion of the thesis draws at the end of the chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction

Whether we are conscious of this or not, theory frame how we think about and approach the study of politics. Theory gives us concepts, provides basic assumptions, directs us to the important questions, and suggests ways for us to make sense of data. Using social theory makes

us think through research (Mikkelsen, 2005, p156). This thesis is informed by two theoretical approaches: Multi-Level Administration theory (MLA) and Organizational theory.

Multi-Level Administration approach, presented in details in 2.2, gives a more recent theoretical direction that emerges from the Multi-level Governance (MLG). The MLA approach implies that administrative units at national level are linked to entities with corresponding responsibilities at higher levels. Findings from previous research provides the basis for expecting a coherent management of administration body of national agencies. This research is a case study of the UDI. A model for coherent management of administration is presented in chapter 2.2.1. The model predicts that the UDI has several connections simultaneously; the UDI´s connection with the JD, European Commission administration (EC), European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and sister agencies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 783).

The Organization Theory approach is presented in 2.3. This approach assumes that the behavior of organizations - and its interrelated organizations - depends on how they are organized. Organizations must therefore be analyzed on the basis of formal and informal features. Organization theory has been used frequently in recent studies to explain the links within and between organizations.

The two theoretical approaches are not mutually exclusive. They complement each other. Both theories are necessary and used to describe and explain empirical findings. The MLA's main premise is an empirical focus on administrative bodies. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the way the UDI has coped with the refugee crisis of 2015 was either at national or supranational level and/or that the UDI has approached to solve the challenges of the crisis through political or professional mechanisms.

An important empirical argument which arises in this thesis is that in the time of crisis we expect to see that national agencies drawing primarily from their national 'line of command' and relying less on supranational organizations including European Commission administration, EASO and sister agencies, given to examine the national agency from the MLA perspective.

Organization theory helps understand the framework MLA accounts for. And therefore, complements the MLA in which it attempts to explain why compound governance occurs.

2.2 Multi-level administration theory

Based on Trondal and Bauer (2017), a 'level' refers to the following items: Separate and relatively independent sets of institutions, rules, procedures and personnel. The Multi-level administration (MLA) entails that a new platform emerges at the interlink of these items at national level with parallel items at the level above in the performance of tasks (p. 76). The result is an indicative paradoxical mix of institutional independence and institutional interconnectedness across levels of government that is necessary to understand the real impact of the European Commission's administrative systems (Trondal & Bauer, 2017). There are two waves of the study of 'MLA' approach, hereby termed 'MLA I' and 'MLA II'. This study is based on the second and more recent approach of MLA - MLA II - a direction that concentrates on new administrative patterns and process of integration of public administration – not on its outcome that arise in connection with European integration (Trondal & Bauer, 2017). The MLA II approach hereafter is termed as the MLA.

It must be important to mention that the MLA is not the same as the Multi-level Governance theory (MLG). The MLA differs from the MLG in three ways: First, the approaches vary as to which units are analyzed. While the MLG often looks at geographical regions that relate directly to the EU without going through their national governments, the MLA sees the relationship between EC administration and state institutions such as national agencies. Second, the MLG regards the regions as coherent entities, while the MLA assumes that the units are internally specialized. Third, the MLA treats institutions as independent variables, as opposed to the MLG, which is actor-centered (Trondal & Bauer 2017; Trondal & Peters, 2013; Piattoni, 2009).

There are clear trends that the EC "adopts" national agencies in the process of implementing EU policies. As the literature review shows in a number of studies that national agencies act as part of their national administrative systems while being affiliated with the EC through European networks (e.g. Egeberg, 2006; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). The national agencies may be linked to the European Commission's administration directly through Directorates-General, or indirectly through EU agencies. National agencies thus act as "multi-hated" in which they form part of national administrations while increasingly act as part of a common union administration with the EC as administrative centre directly or indirectly through EU agencies (Trondal & Bauer 2017). To some extent, national agencies become part of two administrations. The agencies' relationship with the European Commission is thus not comparable to their relationship with international organizations in general (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011, p.5). In this research, the MLA approach specifically helps examine the European Commission's affiliations with national agencies and whether these agencies act with one or more "hats" (Trondal & Bauer 2017).

The goal is to find two simultaneous developments that have occurred at European and national level, respectively. First, the consolidation of the EC as the EU executive and administrative centre. The EC deviates from the administrations of traditional international organizations by being led by a political group and by organizational isolation from the Council where the member states are represented. The institutional structure of the EU violates the territorial principle that international organizations are primarily organized after (Egeberg & Trondal, 2013, p. 155, author's translation). Egeberg expects the EC as the first supreme executive authority with a political leadership that has the opportunity to exercise influence relatively independently of both ministerial councils and national governments (2010, p.1). Secondly, New Public Management-inspired reforms have helped to free up national agencies by organizing them at the formal distance from their respective ministries. National decoupling of agencies has helped European recruitment of the same agencies (Egeberg, 2010). The Commission does not have its own agencies in the member states, but instead "appoints" national agencies by associating themselves with them administratively, either directly or through EU agencies. When implementing EU legislation, national agencies can experience competing expectations from the Commission and their respective governments - expectations that can sometimes be difficult to reconcile (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p.781). Consequently, there may be conflicts about whether the agencies should emphasize the opinions of their European networks heavier than the views from the ministries.

The connections between the EC and national agencies which is ignoring the governments and ministries can be explained in several ways. Firstly, in the absence of its own agencies in the Member States, the EC may be interested in to connect itself to the administrative capacity of the member states, which is facilitated by the national agencies' free standing from their respective ministries. Secondly, the EC needs stable partners. While governments are affiliated with the Council, and are also vulnerable to political change, the free-standing national agencies are with significant freedom of action and discretion

administratively. And there is predictable that the national agencies with freedom and discretion tend to connect itself to the EC administratively (Egeberg, 2010, author's translation). Third, the Commission has functions related to monitoring the implementation of common policies in the member states. In this context, it is expected to contact the national institutions responsible for this. These are often just national agencies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2013, p. 156, author's translation). However, the European Commission's independent role enables the implementation of common policies to be far beyond an ordinary monitoring role (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011, p. 14).

The first indications that national administrations act in several roles – both as servants for their respective national ministries and as constituents of a single union administration – were identified through studies of expert committees within the EU system (Egeberg, 2006, p. 8). Through participation in such committees, officials will be able to experience a conflict of roles between representing the EU level or representing their respective member countries, disciplines or departments. While participants in expert groups in the Council primarily seem to represent their national governments, but participants under the EC with the corresponding tasks assume to have more significant roles as experts where they primarily believe in their field of study and, consequently, are less affected by the Member State they represent (Egeberg, 2006).

Links between the European Commission and national agencies create deeper institutionalization than is the case for the associations of the expert groups' single members. Networking between the EC and national agencies constitutes a further step towards a real Multi-level administration. This type of network can affect both the workplace, the priorities and the culture of the agencies, and in the longer term change their way of working and traditions (Egeberg, 2006).

A model in which national agencies have a "multi-hated" role and report to the EC or its agencies as well as to their respective national ministries, is illustrated by Egeberg (2006, p. 9).

European
Commission

EU level

EU agency

National
level

Ministry

National
agency

Figure 2.2: The "double-hatted" national agency in a multilevel Union administration (Egeberg, 2006, p. 9).

National agencies are also usually affiliated with sister agencies in other EU member countries (Trondal & Bauer 2017). It is not necessarily only the parent ministry and the EC that influence national agencies in a complex organizational landscape. The agencies can also see themselves as part of transnational networks of agencies with common goals and common challenges (Kaiser & Starie, 2005). The exchange of information and consultation between the sister agencies is affecting the performance of the task in which the agencies are responsible (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).

However, a number of networks are controlled by the EC. These networks can be initiated by the EC itself, as in the field of education and in connection with telecommunications (Gornitzka, 2007 and Nørgård, 2006, in Egeberg and Trondal, 2009, p. 782), or developed by the EC gradually taking over existing networks, as in the case of pollution authorities (Martens, 2006). Regardless of creation, these networks are established and managed by the EC, which also determines questions related to procedures, membership and business. The processes that enable the EU agencies to create, maintain and control transnational networks can be termed "urbanization" of networks (Levi-Four, 2011).

For the first time, Egeberg and Trondal (2009) has explored the strengths of different institutions' relative impact on agencies using EU legislation. The article outlined four models, each of which captured various aspects of implementing policies in a Multi-level system: indirectly through national governments, directly through European Commission, network-based transnational clusters of agencies and compound implementation that is triggered by multiple simultaneous forces. The main conclusion in the article was that the task of implementing EU legislation at national level was compound and influenced by several organization simultaneously (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 780). A number of case studies show that Norwegian agencies act as "multi-hated" with links to the EC and sister agencies, as well as their respective ministries (e.g. Løkken, 2011; Søetorp, 2012; Aabel, 2013, author's translation) and also experience pressures from the EC, EU agencies and sister agencies in other countries when EU legislation is to be implemented (Egeberg and Trondal, 2011).

When it comes to the UDI as a national agency, there is not much research as of yet to prove the basis for the assumption that the UDI is also part of a Multi-level administration that complies with Egeberg and Trondal's model for compound governance. There is only a master thesis written by Mari Nygaard Simonsen, 2017. She studies the Multi-level administration in one of the state's core policy area; immigration and refugee policy. The UDI is also her case. Based on her master thesis's, one can still see signals from both the respective parent ministry and the EU level on how the implementation of Norwegian asylum and refugee policies must take place. This is inclusively the result of the vertical free standing at the national level and horizontal specialization which enables the UDI Norway to receive control signal from actors at the EU level. But the space and the strength of the signal may not be as inclusive as it might be indicated in other national agencies.

2.2.1 A compound governance model
A compound governance model envisages a combined model of executive governance. It implies that implementation and practice of EU legislation is intertwined by steering from several actors. The idea of compound governance has tradition back to ancient thinkers. However, the study of the compound governance is more recent and based on how public

administration operates within complex organizational landscape with several actors (Trondal, 2011, p. 63). Extensive literature assumes that the extent of cross-border issues is increasing and that, together with increasing diversity, dynamics and complexity in society, public decision-making processes have become more complex and involve more actors outside the traditional bureaucratic hierarchy (e.g. Cleveland, 1972; Fredrickson, 2007; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). National agencies are also affected by the fact that they are located in a more complex organizational landscape than before. The compound governance model takes this into consideration by saying that national agencies are influenced by several actors at the same time. Thus, several forms of governance can complement each other, so that both the agencies' parent departments, the European Commission's administration and network-based forms of cooperation (such as sister agencies) exert influence on the agencies' administrative behaviour (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).

In a compound governance model, there are signs that the agencies serve as part of complex decision-making arenas where different forms of governance are combined. Traces of several of these forms of governance will be found for steering. For example, in accordance with the general perception that the member states are responsible for implementing the EU's common policy (Egeberg & Trondal, 2013, p. 153, author's translation), and that the parent ministry influence the task of the agencies in implementing policies. However, in a compound governance model, the practice of common regulations by the ministry alone (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009) is not controlled. Compound governance model is in contrast to the implementation of rules and standards adopted by intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, NATO and the Council of Europe. It is also in contrast with the Moravcsik (1998) liberal intergovernmental approach, where national states are regarded as the international societies primary building blocks.

2.2.2 Summary of expected findings

In a compound governance model, more forces are expected to cooperate in influencing the UDI. The formal attachment to the JD as the parent ministry does not therefore exclude the fact that the UDI may also have relevant relations with the European Commission's administration and sister agencies (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). One can therefore expect that the agency has extensive formal and informal relationships with several actors and that the national agency in the downstream processes may feel pressure among several actors in connection with the practice and implementation of common rules. At the same time, the agency is pleased to contact more actors in the upstream processes, to promote views on the design of regulations. One can thus expect to find signs that the UDI has more administrative links.

Firstly, one expects to find that the parent ministry exercises a certain influence on the the UDI´s actual behaviour. The UDI is being strongly steered by the parent ministry. Yet it has some discretion. To perform the tasks and the way UDI should behave is mainly described by the laws and regulation and instructions. These instruments of contact are exactly the tools which prevent UDI to consult with the parent ministry all the time and create some form for discretion. Previous literature has also shown that migration and asylum policy areas is highly politicised. That is one of the reason the UDI don't have considerable autonomy and that the political leadership to some extent steers tasks the UDI does.

The UDI behaviour is broadly to a high extent influenced by budget provision, allocation letters, annual reports and evaluations and other forms of formal instruction from the parent ministry. One can also expect that the ministry and the agency in the upstream phase have a certain dialogue on new proposals for EU regulations and in the downstream phase of the agency's implementation and practice of relevant EU laws.

Secondly, it is expected that there is signs of steering from the European Commission management, directly or indirectly through the EASO. In the upstream process one can expect an active participation of national agency that tries to influence the decisions taken by the European Commission. It is expected that the agency will carry out thorough preparations prior to key meetings, that the agency prioritizes to send employees to attend the meetings and that participants engage in promoting the agency's views and seeking impact. One can also assume that there is some form of lobbying for the purpose of seeking support in advance of meetings at European level. In the downstream processes, the UDI's decision-making processes in the this area can be expected to be closely linked to the Commission's administration through its cooperation with Dublin and Schengen, so that EEA-relevant regulations have a significant impact on the agency (Trondal, 2011).

Third, one can expect frequent networking between UDI and sister agencies in other countries. The sister agencies can impact each other and influence indirectly (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009, p. 783). The networks may exist independently of the EU system, or be created, directed and controlled by the EC. In either case, networking are reasons to expect that the UDI and sister agencies contacting each other with questions in the implementation of common rules. In the upstream phase, the agencies can have formal and informal contact for information, development cooperation or joint efforts. In a model for coherent management, therefore, relations are expected for both the JD, EC administration and sister agencies. However, this does not rule out the existence of where an administrative pattern between, for example, the UDI , the JD and the Commission's administration can be identified without the sister agencies having an influence on the implementation and the practice of decisions. The UDI is expected to be as a two or more hatted agency, based on theoretical assumption. However, how it would be empirically, we would see later in this thesis.

The main theoretical expectations are summarized in Table 2.2.2.

Table 2.2.2 Expected relationships between the UDI and other actors

UDI's relationships	**A Compound Governance Model: Expected relationships between the UDI and other actors**
UDI's relationships with several actors	1- The UDI has relationships with several actors regarding theirs tasks on asylum and migration policy. 2- The UDI actively contacts several actors to promote views on the formulation of regulations. 3- The UDI can feel pressure related to the implementation and practice of common regulations.
With the JD	1- The JD informs the UDI on new proposals for EU regulations. 2- The JD influences the UDI's task on asylum and migration policy through signals in the allocation letters, budget provisions and instructions. 3- There is a certain dialogue between the JD and the UDI on the practice of EU regulations.
With the EC	1- Extensive participation by the UDI in meetings at European level. 2- Preparations of the UDI ahead of meetings at the European level. 3- The UDI is actively seeking consideration for its views in collaboration with the EC. 4- The UDI is in contacts with the EC with questions regarding implementation of the EU laws. 5- EC affects the UDI's work rhythm through requirements for reporting the EC at the specific times. 6- The EC checks that the regulations are used in accordance with the EU common rules and regulations.

With Sister agencies	1- Relationships between employees in the different sister agencies through formal and informal contact. 2- The sister agencies contact each other with questions related to implementation of EU regulations and exercice mutual influence on each other's discretion. 3- Method, procedures and routines are coordinated and sister agencies contact each other to develop collaboration.
With the EASO	1- There is broad contact between the UDI and the EASO. 2- They mutually influence each other's tasks by providing technical and professional support.

2.3 Organisational theory and the explanatory variables

Organisation theory is the study of organizational designs and structures, relationship of organisations with their external environment, and the involvement of managers and technocrats within organisations (Christensen, et al., 2016). This theoretical approach assumes that organizational behaviour and inter-organizational relationships depends on how they are organized. To understand how public organisations work in practice, one must also analyse individual behaviour of the employees within an organization. Individual behaviour is expected to be influenced by formal organizational structure, organizational demography, organizational localization and institutionalization (Egeberg 2004 & Christensen, T. et al., 2016). In this thesis, emphasis is only placed on organizational structure.

Organizational structure can be defined as a collection of role expectation with regard to who is suppose to do what, how and when. Organisation structure is a normative structure that is analytically clearly separated from decision making and process. It is necessary to mention that this thesis analyzes the organization only based on organization structure – the formal factors. The reason to choose organizational structural is because most promising findings has been revealed on these organizational factors and represents classical dimension in the organizational literature that are generic in character (Egeberg og Trondal 2018).

In addition, organizational theory posits that public organizational units are arranged at a formal distance from the parent unit. For example, national agencies have a certain distance from parent ministries (Trondal, 2011). The distance is essential to understand how and why administration in national agencies act the way they do, through opening connections with other actors as well. In the same vein the EU agencies are organized at distance from their parent General Directorates (DGs). Organization theory also contributes to understand the UDI´s actual administrative behaviour and responses in term of both decision-making and its connections with other organizations, regarding coping with the peak of so-called "asylum crisis" in the late 2015.

Public organizations are part of the society's political organization and usually have a political leadership in the end (Christensen, et al., 2016). Organisation theory in the public sector is best suited here. It not only explains how a public organization behaviour is and how the employees and the managers in a public organization should act but also furthermore have strong reasons why political leadership is too much involved in doing task. Finally, it helps finding out the organizational structure (such as capacity, specialization, affiliation and coupling) and institutional factors (such as culture, history and myth) which are useful for explaining the relationship between dependent variable and explanatory variable.

This study focuses on four following variables that explain both the reason behind the UDI´s particular administrative behaviour in term of decision-making and the interconnectedness within and between organizations based on organizational structure. The variables which has been chosen seems to be the most relevant on this case study are: Capacity, degree of vertical specialization and degree of horizontal specialization. There are

two other independent variables which are necessary to be defined: the degree of politicization and the crisis itself. Degree of politicization is absolutely important and relevant variable to be studied because immigration and refugee policy area is a highly politicized issue invoking a greater involvement of political actors. The crisis acts as an intervening/mediating variable. The question is as to what extent crisis affect the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (actual administrative behaviour of the UDI). As the crisis appears to be a condition for the choice of case, and it is not natural to investigate this as one of the explanatory variable. In this context, these four variables are treated as explanatory (independent) variables. Using these variables as independent, does not prevent other researchers from investigating how these characteristics of organization occur in themselves, thus treating them as dependent variable.

2.3.1 Capacity
Capacity is an organizational factor (size, task, technology), indicating as to what extend a unit, department, and position is devoted to a particular policy area. In an information-rich world, systematic interest articulation, problem attention and problem solving are highly dependent upon the degree to which such activities are underpinned by organization capacity (Egeberg et al., 2016). Organization size can be defined in different ways, but the most common one seems to be the number of employees. Some consider an organization small when there are less than 1500 employees (based on that, organizations in Norway considers to be small).

Organization size has meaning for designing the structure of an organization. Increasing size lead to stronger horizontal and vertical specialization. Big organizations have more separate departments, offices, or units than small ones. And big organizations have more hierarchical levels. The mechanism behind it seems to be very easy. As organization become bigger, there would be more opportunities to recruit more expertise. In a small organization for instance, marketing, purchasing, and accounting or things activities will be carried by one person. Recruiting specialist or expertise to every task will cost the organization a lot. Yet when organization increases in size, there will be more opportunities to recruit specialists for every task such as one for marketing, one for accounting and so on. The expansion will be both horizontally and vertically (Egeberg et al., 2016).

Expected theoretical findings
In organizational structure, more than anything else, the first and foremost is the organizational capacity important element. The number of the employees in an organization and the tasks which is divided among different sections and units both vertically and horizontally hamper an organization to decide and behave out of the organization limitation and capacity. Public organization with small capacity, are dependent on the corresponding ministry in regard to increase the budget so in order to increase the employees in cases where organization is in need of more human resources. It would expect that organizations with small capacity, are not able to do more tasks until they have been attributed more resources by the political administrative unit they are operating under. So organization has a particular capacity and cannot act more than its capacity allow it.

2.3.2 Vertical specialization
Vertical specialization shows how tasks are thought to be allocated vertically within or between organizations. National agencies operate in an organizational landscape that are more complex and the vertical and horizontal lines can be blurry. This creates uncertainty as to where the national agencies located in practice. Previous research shows that the governance of

national agencies are compound in a model where both the ministry, the European Commission's administration, networks with sister agencies and EU agencies exert a certain influence on their administrative behaviour. The MLA presents this organizational landscape, which is complex (Christensen et al., 2009).

In vertically specialization, responsibility for task coordination is shifted to higher levels in the organization. Thus, intra-organized vertically specialized systems appear to be as one organization (ibid). A classic Weberian bureaucracy is usually highly vertically specialized. In administration of a national agency which is vertically specialized, contact with the ministry is usually conducted through the agency's management. It is also the management that is most likely to be influenced by the ministry and bring the signals from there. At the same time, staff at the lower level will be most likely to influence the European Commission's administration as experts. They have narrower responsibilities and more specialists in their areas, and therefore have more contact with the EU on technical issues (Christensen et al., 2009; Trondal, 2010).

Vertical specialization can also entail division into two separate institutions such as a formal division between the ministry and agency. This entails interorganizational vertical specialization (Christensen & Egeberg, 1997). This type of specialization leads those national agencies' employees are less affected by political processes at government level. The agencies is expected to have little contact with political leadership, the country's parliament and other ministries. Interorganizational vertical specialization gives less political control of decision-making. At the same time, staffs have fewer opportunities to influence political leadership, but feel greater freedom to emphasize their own professional opinions and views (Egeberg, 2003).

The UDI is formally organized as a professional dependent institution subject to the Ministry of Jusice and Public Security (JD). Formally, the arrangement is an example of an interorganizational vertical specialization. It is therefore expected that the JD manages the agency through budget, allocation letters and other forms of formal instruction from the parent ministry. However, the agency's formal attachment to the parent ministry does not prevent staff in agency from experiencing a significant degree of freedom and independence from the ministry.

Expected theoretical findings

The national agency's behaviour is expected to reflect the bureaucracy's vertical organizational form. It is therefore expected that the contact between the ministry and the agency is mainly channelled through the agency's management (leadership). Furthermore, an interorganizational vertical specialization with division between the ministry and the agency is expected to lead to relatively clear differences between the respective areas of JD and the UDI. The UDI governance is expected to take place through main instruments (means) such as budget management and allocation letters.

Relations between institutions are therefore expected to be largely formal, and relatively little contact is expected between the UDI employees and the JD regarding refugee policy area. It is unlikely that the ministry and agency will have significant contact with upstream and downstream processes. Thus, the agency's participants in international meetings feel less politically controlled and therefore relatively free to promote their own professional views. In summary, the organizational form indicates that the parent ministry's management to a limited extent includes professional management with the agency's task on asylum area. The possibilities for parent ministry are reduced, which opens for a more compound connection where also the Commission's administration, sister agencies and EASO are part of the organizational landscape surrounding the UDI.

2.3.3 Horizontal specialization

The degree of horizontal specialization is an expression of how different policy areas are interconnected. High degree of horizontal specialization increases the likelihood that the entities have different interests and that decisions will be made through negotiations. Tasks which are horizontally specialized, are more likely to be coordinated when performed by the same entity than when performed by different entities (Christensen et al., 2009, p.34; Gulick, 1937, in Egeberg, 2003, p. 117)

Horizontal specialization explains how work is planned to be divided within and between units and organizations. According to Gulick, there are four fundamental principles for horizontal distribution of tasks between units. Tasks can be organized by geographical areas, common purpose or sector, common processes and groups of clienteles (Egeberg, 2003, 2004b). The European Council may serve as an example which is organized by geographic principle, as each member represents their respective member country. However, both the Commission and national governments are characterized by horizontal specialization according to the purpose principle – the Directorates-General and the ministries are organized according to the areas in which they are responsible (Christensen et al., 2009, p. 41).

One common challenge is precisely that adapting tasks along one axis does not mean that the tasks are adapted along the other axes at the same time. School health services usually serve as "textbook example": Organizing this under the education authorities will coordinate the service with the education system by the way, while at the same time preventing coordination with other health services (Thompson, 2003, p. 57). While public bureaucrats are usually vertically specialized, committee work and expert groups often have a more horizontal impact (Egeberg, 2003, pp. 117-118). Horizontal specialization affects, who comes in contact with whom in an organization. In relationships between different organizations, employees are expected to come into contact with others who have similar tasks in the other institutions (Egeberg, 2003, p. 117).

Expected theoretical findings

Horizontal specialization according to the purpose principle is expected to promote harmonization of refugee policy area across territorial divisions, because the specialization promotes attention to divisions between disciplines more than borders between countries. Employees who works with asylum seeker in the UDI, at the Commission's administration and in other national authorities working with immigration in other countries, can develop cooperation, coordinate tasks and develop relationships across national borders.

Horizontal specialization according to the purpose principle thus increases the likelihood of mutual influence between the national agency, the Commission's administration and sister agencies in the upstream and downstream is in line with a model for compound governance.

2.3.4 Degree of politicization

Public organizations differ from private organizations as they are part of the society's political organization and usually have a political leadership in the end (Christensen et al., 2015). Political leadership means that politics is more or less involved in decision-making process. Politicization is argued to manifest itself in three different forms: politicization of institutions, politicization of decision-making processes and politicization of issues (Wilde, 2011). The first group of manifestations refers to the political institutions of the multi-level EU-polity, including most notably the European Commission, European Parliament (EP), Council of Ministers, member state governments and national parliaments. They may become 'politicized' when party politicians gain a tighter grip on their operations leading to increasing prominence of party political conflict. The second category includes the procedures, rules and practices that make up the day-to-day functioning of these political institutions. Politicization in

this sense refers to increasing influence of elected or appointed politicians in decision-making processes at the expense of professionals, like bureaucrats, experts and lawyers. Finally, politicization of issues refers to an increase in salience and diversity of opinions on specific societal topics. If issues become more contested and there is an increasing public demand on public policy, these issues are then considered to be 'politicized' (Wilde, 2011, p. 560-561).

National agencies are organized in a way which has been split from its respective parent ministry. This is resulted in a relative insulation of agencies decision making from political consideration and being less exposed to political governance **(**Egeberg, 2006a, p. 10)**.** It is nevertheless worth pointing out that the ministry's control over underlying agencies exists and it may depend on the three above mentioned circumstances.

The extent to which national agency personnel assign weight to political signals from their respective ministries also partly depends on the capacity (size) available for monitoring and steering agency activities (Egeberg og Trondal, 2018, p. 7).

However, the respective ministries normally keep the political responsibility for agencies` activities (Egeberg & Trondal, 2018). In light of this, this master thesis expects to find that the UDI acts as a subordinate agency to the JD, and follows the command line of the national governance. In addition, the sensitivity and controversiality of the refugee and immigration policy keep the JD to control and affect the underlying agencies administrative behavior. The asylum and refugee field is politically sensitive policy area. It affect individuals lives and are concerned with the central tasks of the state, namely control of the territory.

Expected theoretical findings
Highly politicized issues and contested policy area such as justice and security and migration and refugee overlap the underlying body's portfolio, and the national agencies which their daily task performance is based on rules and procedures, one can expect the involvement of political leadership. In light of this, it is expected that the UDI (a highly politicized and contested policy area) acts as the JD`s subordinate agency and follows the national 'line of command'.

2.3.5 Summary of the expected relationship between variables
For the purpose of this thesis, the organizational perspective sets frames around the organizations I aim to analyze, namely the UDI. The UDI is separated from the Ministry of Justice and Public security through vertical specialization. The practical treatment of asylum applications, visa applications, residence permits, and citizenship are at arm's length from the Ministry. In addition, tasks in the immigration field are horizontally specialized between organizations, as various tasks are being allocated to various agencies, such as the Police Immigration Unit (PU) and the Integration and Diversity Directorate (IMDi). From the organizational perspective, the sectoral specialization will enable entities within the same sectors to connect to each other, regardless of territorial boundaries. This is also related with the fact that there is vertical specialization, degree of duplication and capacity at a supranational level to connect institutes at the national level. Connection to another level depends on a relative autonomy that can be achieved with vertical specialization.
The supranational organization (EU in this case) have a capacity and resources to influence the national units. In the EU, the Directorate-General of the Commission and the EU Agency, EASO are dealing with monitoring and facilitating work. The Commission has a certain capacity for this, which is bigger in relation to other international organizations. All of these can be indicative of a multi level of administration. The specialization principles divides tasks at national and international levels. The organizational alignment between the

Commission, the EASO and the national level is expected to affect tasks, cooperation and conflict patterns. Cooperation and conflict patterns among multi-level organization is expected to follow sectoral divisions.

The vertical specialization of the UDI indicates that the UDI has the potential to be connected directly to the European level. The organizational structure ensures that the contact with agencies in other countries will not be at the ministry and government level. The distance from the ministry as well as the sectoral specialization that allows employees to have sectoral perceptions can cause the directorate to act with "multiple hats". Thus, from the organizational perspective, one would expect the UDI to be part of both a national administration and a supranational administration, and possibly also have other "hats" in participating in bilateral forums with other member states and sister agencies.

'Politicized' issues will likely be dealt with in 'politicized' decision- making processes as the final decision is made by politicians rather than bureaucrats or lawyers. Institutions often involved in decision-making on politicized issues are likely to be increasingly pressured by interested actors – particularly political parties – and may thus become 'politicized' themselves. In turn, 'politicized' institutions are more likely to be involved in 'politicizing' issues than depoliticized institutions (Wilde, 2011).

The main theoretical expectations are summarized in Table 2.3.5.

Table 2.3.5 Expected relationships between the variables and its effect on the UDI's administrative behaviour

Variables	Explanatory Variable: Expectations
Capacity	It is expected that organization has a particular capacity and cannot act more than its capacity allowing it. Capacity indicate to what extend a unit, department, and position, both vertically and horizontally, devoted to a particular policy area. This may cause; 1- Public organization with small capacity, are dependent on the corresponding ministry in regard to increase the budget. 2- Public organizations with small capacity, are not able to do more tasks until they have been attributed more resources by the political administrative unit they are operating under.
Vertical specialization	Expected to affect the national agency's task on asylum and migration policy by opening up relationships with actors other than JD. This may cause; 1- The contact between the JD and the UDI mainly takes place through the agency's management and leadership. 2- UDI's employees generally have few relations with the Ministry. 3- The JD controlling the UDI is expected to take place through main instruments (means) such as allocation letter, budget provision, and instructions. 4- The agency is experiencing little direct ministry management of the tasks with the UDI. 5- It is unlikely that the ministry and agency will have significant contact with upstream and downstream processes. 6- The agency's participants in international meetings feel less politically controlled and therefore relatively free to promote their own professional views.
Horizontal Specialization	Horizontal specialization according to the purpose principle is expected to promote harmonization of refugee policy area across territorial divisions, because the specialization promotes attention to divisions between disciplines more than borders between countries.This may cause; 1- Employees who works with asylum matters in the UDI, at the Commission's administration and in sister agencies develop cooperation, coordinate tasks and develop relationships across national borders. 2- It is expected sector cooperation on refugee and migration matters between the UDI, the EC and the EASO. 3- Horizontal specialization increases the likelihood of mutual influence between the national agency, the commission's administration and sister agencies.

	4- It may increase integration regarding asylum and migration policy, both in upstreaming and downstreaming process.
Degree of politicization	It would be expected the involvement of political leadership in decision making. This may cause; 1- The role of the UDI's directors increase when the JD overrule the UDI. 2- Decrease in internal hierarchy causes greater professionalization and stronger rule of the EC.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA COLLECTION

This section describes the methods used to conduct this research. The thesis is a case study of the UDI's administrative behaviour and its affiliations with the JD, the Commission's administration and sister agencies particularly during the time of crisis. This thesis aims to answer how did the UDI cope with the refugee crisis both internally and externally, and how and to what extent did connections existed between and across various immigration-related organization. The purpose of this investigation is thus partly descriptive and partly analytical. This research is an opportunity to analyze UDI's own understanding of their connections with other institutions and to investigate how the UDI and the organisation's employees' behaviour were affected by a complex organizational landscape during crisis the immigration crisis of 2015.

This study applies two theoretical frameworks: Multilevel Administration (MLA) and Organizational theory. The MLA's main premise is an empirical focus on administrative bodies. An important empirical argument or the main hypothesis is also drawn from this field stating that in time of crisis, we would expect to see that national agencies drawing primarily from their national 'line of command' and relying less on supranational organizations including European Commission administration, EASO and sister agencies, given to examine the national agency from the MLA perspective. The organization theory also helps expand the organizational behaviour beyond the MLA framework.

3.1 The choice of research design: qualitative method and case study

In order to gain insight into the specific characteristics of an organization, qualitative studies are preferable (Repstad, 2004, author's translation). This thesis is based on qualitative methods, which are used to seek in-depth semi-structured interviews and document analyses and focuses on few units with more information (Thagaard, 2009, author's translation). In addition to thematic analysis, the qualitative methods seek to bring different perspectives and insights from different informants through interviews (Potter, 2006).

This is a case study of the UDI. In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are being posed (Andersen, 2013,) when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. As a research strategy, the case study is used in many situations, including policy, political science, and public administration research, community psychology and sociology, organizational and management studies and etc (Yin, 2013). It is suitable and generally useful, among other things, when choosing in-depth knowledge rather than broad knowledge, when internal analysis is given precedence over external representativeness and when useful variation is available for only one or a few units (Gerring, 2004). It is precisely in-depth knowledge of UDI´s tasks, processes and influences or connections which is needed to be study in this thesis.

A strength with case study is that it has great internal validity (Gerring 2007). Because it devotes a lot of attention to explaining the inner processes. This results in poorer external validity, as narrowing focus reduces the ability of the same explanation to apply to other cases. A case study can be understood as an intensive study of a single case where the intention is at least to illuminate a larger case area in the form of a population (Gerring 2007).

The population in this case will be the other Norwegian regulatory bodies. Through a study of the UDI, the goal, at least to a certain extent, is to be able to form a picture of how the actual functioning of the other regulatory bodies is also influenced by a complex organizational context at both European and national level (Gerring 2007).

3.1.1 Validity and reliability

Validity and reliability can be seen as an indication of the quality of the research program (Repstad, 2004, author's translation). Validity is about the research measures what it is

intended to measure. When dependent variable is an effect of one or more of the independent variables in the study, it shows that the relationship is causal and can be claim that it has a good internal validity (Lund, 2002). If the dependent variable in real life cannot be explained by the independent variables used in the study, but by other underlying or omitted variables, the internal validity of the study is low (Adcock & Collier, 2001). The UDI's administrative behaviour -- the dependent variable -- appears to have causal relationship with the independent variables - the national organizational structure and the European organizational structure through being vertically and horizontally affiliated with each other. Validity is about the operationalization of the concepts, capturing the ideas of the term one measures in a meaningful way (Adcock & Collier, 2001). Validity will be increased if one uses operationalizations of concepts from previous studies when these have succeeded (Lund, 2002). External validity is about being able to generalize the findings in research to and over other cases / individuals, places and times (Lund, 2002).

Threats to validity are important topics to highlight. It can be argued that the choice between single-case study and multi-case studies constitutes a trade-off between internal and external validity. The strength of the case study is precisely that one achieves good internal validity (Gerring 2007, p. 43). Because it is easier to uncover the causal conditions when studying a case in depth. Although the external validity is weaker in a case study, because it is problematic to conclude that a context revealed in a case may be relevant to a larger population of cases. The external validity is improved by considering the UDI as a critical, "least-likely" case, since the directorate handles a sensitive policy area, and this could remedy this challenge. However, the main objective of this study is not to generalize and represent the findings of this study to other national agencies or bodies. Because empirically the UDI can be very different and specific. Theoretically, there would be strong support for the causal relation of dependent and independent variable.

Threats to validity, especially in social science research, are that the concepts are often abstract constructions that are difficult to measure. The concepts used in this thesis chosen cautiously to maintain the validity. In this study, the operationalization of a dependent variable (see, section 3.1.4) is done on the basis of several previous, similar studies and I therefore consider the concept validity as high.

Reliability is about the research data being reliable. It means whether one will get the same results if one repeats the same data collection and analysis. Reliability is largely about the quality of the measuring instruments in the research program, because good measuring instruments will give more precise information (Repstad, 2004, p. 134-135, author's translation). High reliability is linked to and is a prerequisite for good validity (Hellevik, 2002, p. 53, author's translation).

Although the researcher has found a good operationalization of the concept, the data can still give a misleading picture of the empirical reality if the data collection has been characterized by inaccuracy. External reliability is about the extent to which a study can be replicated. One way to strengthen or test the reliability of a study is to repeat the collection of data to see if you get the same results. Replicating and verifying qualitative studies is often challenging as it is impossible to recreate similar circumstances as when the data was first collected (Bryman, 2016). In this thesis, this challenge will not be as obvious as, for example, in field studies, where the social circumstances and the situation cannot be frozen. On the other hand, the study's reliability is strengthened if the researcher is open about the procedure in the research program which is the intention of this chapter (Bryman, 2016).

And last but not least, a way to strengthen the reliability of the study is member checking or validation. Member checking or validation is a procedure to check the preliminary findings and analysis of research with participants who were the source of the raw data (Bryman, 2016). Member checking adds value to the analysis of the raw data, as the participant

takes part not only in providing the data but also in the interpretation of them. During the member check, the researcher and the participants discuss different interpretations to reach a shared interpretation. This process also helps validate misunderstandings, wrong information, and misinterpretations though it will be a challenge for the researcher to select how much and what parts of the initial findings be shared and with which participants (Bryman, 2016).

3.2 Data collections

To conduct the research, I collected two types of data: primary and secondary. The primary data is mainly come from in-depth semi-structured interviews with experts from the UDI who are involved in immigration and refugee policy area, particularly during the crisis of 2015. The secondary data includes theories and written resources.

The theoretical data is based on organisational theory and MLA approach. And the written resources include public documents from both Norway and the EU in the form of investigations, reports and parliamentary documents. There is also a lot of information from the UDI, the JD and the Commission websites. These documents have provided a foundation for the formal conditions and historical development at both national and European level within border management. Previous research within the field has also been used, both for writing about the background and for forming the problem.

The thesis uses a form of triangulation by combining the interviews with document analysis, in order to increase the study's reliability and validity. Triangulation reduces the risk of errors and omissions. For example, in researches based on interviews alone, there is always a risk that the informants' assessments are misinterpreted. Furthermore, triangulation increases the ability to assess whether the data is consistent. In addition, the combination of these forms of methodology will expand the data material, in that the information that appears in the documents will not necessarily appear in the interviews and vice versa (Gibbs, 2007).

3.2.1 In-depth interviews and the selection of informants

Interview consist of questions on experience and behaviour, on opinions and values, on feelings, on needs, knowledge and background data. There are presupposition questions and neutral questions, simulation questions. The questions may address the past, present or future (Mikkelsen). There are several reasons for the necessity of conducting interviews for data collection. Firstly, information relating to informal aspects of the UDI and its affiliation with the JD, the Commission's administration, EASO and sister agencies will be difficult to obtain through written documents alone. Second, interviewers give the opportunity to synthesize the data in the documents with implicit information from key informants. The method based on a combination of interviews and document analysis is a form of triangulation that increases the study's validity and reliability.

When studying a particular phenomenon qualitatively, purposive sampling is the method of choice (Thagaard 2003). I therefore started the interviews with purposive sampling of the informants who had long experience and knowledge about various aspects of the issue.

Seven in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted between October 2018 and April 2019. These interviews are central to the project's source basis to elucidate how the UDI function, forms a cooperation with JD and the EU bodies. An interview guide was prepared ahead of the interviews (Appendix II). This was used to a greater extent as a checklist of topics that needed to be highlighted. Semi-structured was considered the most appropriate interview form, allowing interviews to lead informants to topics and issues, but at the same time there was room for the informant to illuminate the topic (Bryman 2016). Semi-structured interview also gave the opportunity to lead the interview into topics that were relevant to the task, but were not known in advance. Among seven interviews, six were from the UDI and one was a national expert working at the EU commission. One interview was conducted over Skype, and

the rest face to face. All the interview conducted in the language of preference of the informants.

The interviews were transcribed shortly after completion while the memory was fresh and physical expressions that did not appear through the tape recorder were noted down. This practice made it safer to capture all the nuances and the context of the information.

After transcribing each interview, the author felt the need for clarification and more information, which were collected in subsequent interview. Two final interviews functioned mainly as member checking and validation. The member checking was beneficial and added quality to the initial data. Three of the informants was from the Reception Department, two from the Asylum department and two from the Analysis and Development Department. All the informants had long experience of working with the UDI and were active during the crisis of 2015. The informants included people at leadership and expert levels.

3.2.2 Document analysis

The purpose documentary analysis was to obtain the relevant information from secondary sources in the best possible way. All the documents analysed for this thesis were publicly available. The documents included annual reports, strategy documents and reports, some of which have been prepared by the UDI itself, while others were prepared by or for European countries. I have, among other things, reviewed the allocation letters from JD to the UDI for the years 2016-2017. I also asked for raw material (which was not available online); for instance, regarding the contingency plan of the Asylum Department and Reception Department. The reason was that the contingency plan of Asylum and Reception departments were relatively detailed and contained information on other government agencies. I was denied access to the raw material because those data were given to higher level researchers and PhD candidates, not to master's and undergraduate students. Together with interview data, the documents provide a relatively detailed overview of the UDI as a public organization, EASO, and the Nordic cooperation and a relatively good overview of the scope of the activities of those organizations.

Document analysis has limitations too. Information about the extent of informal contact through email and telephone is difficult to obtain through written documentation. The documents also do not provide a complete picture of UDI's impact on upstream processes, or of the total scope of management with the UDI through downstream processes. Obtain those information are best through conversations with informants with first-hand information about these processes.

3.2.3 Ethical consideration

NSD's guidelines and standards have been used throughout this research. The privacy of the data was protected in accordance with NSD's guidelines. The guidelines includes question for participation, informed consent and anonymization of the informants (Gibbs, 2007). Before the interviews were carried out, the participants received an information letter that was designed according to the template from NSD and which contained information about the project (Appendix I). Among other things, the participant was informed that access to the audio recordings would be limited to the supervisor and the student, and it was stated that the audio recordings would be deleted when the project was completed - no later than July 2019. The participants were also informed the interviews could be carried out without recordings if they didn't wish to be recorded. The interviews were conducted in such a way that no personal information was produced through the sound recordings. Individuals cannot be identified either directly or indirectly through combinations of background information - neither in the publication nor in the processing of personal data along the way in the project.

The standards for anonymity were also considered during analysis. According to the Personal Data Act and NSD's guidelines, the research project is thus not subject to notification (the Personal Data Act, 2000; NSD, 2018).

At the beginning of each interview, all informants were asked for and agreed to informed consent after I presented myself and explained the objective of my research. All the informants gave permission to use sound recordings during the interviews. No informants had questions or objections to the information letter or to the conduct of the interviews. The informants generally seemed positive about the participation, and several gave explicit feedback that they were happy to contribute further. Some informants showed interest in reading the research paper when it was completed. When the research is done and completed a copy of the thesis will be sent to the UDI.

3.2.4 Operationalization of the research question and conceptualization

Operationalization is about making theoretical concepts measurable in the real world. Concept validity, namely that the study's dependent and independent variables measure the relevant concepts needed to answer the problem is important in operationalization (Lund, 2002, p. 105). The research questions are:

How did the UDI respond to the refugee crisis of 2015 internally?

How and to what extent did the UDI collaborate with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and European Commission´s administration vertically and sister agencies and EU-agency horizontally to respond to the refugee crisis of 2015 externally and how can it be explained?

The dependent variable is the decision-making behaviour of the employees of the UDI, which is influenced by the independent variables: capacity, vertical specialization, horizontal specialization, and degree of politicisation. The operationalization of the variables have previously been used in similar surveys on other regulatory bodies. The operationalizations that have functioned previously, give confidence to use in this thesis as well (see, among others, Bjerke 2016 and Rønning Andersen 2016).

UDI´s employees actual behaviour contains a set of activities the UDI did to tackle the asylum crisis under the time of crisis. The activities include procurement of accommodation and provision of reception centres, processing of applications (asylum and expulsion cases), household procurement (such as budget and economy), recruitment of new employees, assisting National Police Immigration Service (PU) in the provision of accommodation for registration and the interaction of UDI with other actors - in this case European Commission, EASO, and sister agencies.

This thesis aims to measure the employees' attitudes and working methods using indicators such as tasks, contact and influence patterns. In order to capture these indicators, the interview guide has been carefully prepared. Tasks captures the relationship between the Directorate and the Ministry. It also presents to what extent the UDI is involved in the policy process and that the UDI task has changed over time.Contact and influence patterns is aimed to map the frequency of contact between the UDI and other entities and whether there is any tension in this contact.

This master's thesis examines several explanatory variables (independent) that can individually or collectively help explain the reasons for particular behaviour and responses from UDI and the connections between the UDI and other actors. This thesis is limited to investigating three following explanatory variables: Capacity (size), specialization/coordination (vertical and horizontal), and degree of politicization. Another explanatory (independent)

variable that may appear necessary to be defined is the crisis itself. As the crisis appears to be a condition for the choice of case, it is not natural to investigate this as a variable. The three first variables are organizational factors and the last one is a non-organizational factor. The degree of politicization is an important variable because migration and refugee policy area is highly politicized issues and it is claimed that in highly politicized policy area, politicians are going to rule the policy ultimately (NOU 2006:14 & Egeberg and Trondal 2011). It is also argued that the European commission administration and other actors would have little influence although they remain important (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). And last but not least, the organizational independent variables used in this thesis cover both national organizational structure and European organizational structure.

The next paragraph specifies what I mean by the terms; respond, crisis and crisis management, internally and externally, the degree of collaboration, the European organizational structure and the upstream and downstream process.

The term "respond" addresses UDI's organizational behaviour including both behaviour related to decision making and behaviour in relation to connections within and across organization during the crisis. The thesis aims to explore what actions and measures the UDI took in order to process asylum seekers applications, from registration to integration.

A crisis is a situation characterized by three conditions. Firstly, one has the feeling that key values are threatened. Second, there is a need for quick action and a feeling that something needs to be done. Finally, there is a sense of uncertainty. Lack of information, especially in the initial phase of crisis, characterizes a crisis. This leads to uncertainty about which mechanism and instruments should be used to handle the crisis (Heier & Kjølberg, 2013, p. 21-22). The term "crisis management" is defined as "a set of factors designed to combat crises and to lessen the actual damage inflicted by a crisis" (Coombs, 2014, 2007). Drawing from the literature in emergency preparedness, crisis management involves four interrelated factors: Prevention, preparation, response and revision (Coombs, 2014, 2007). These factors are incorporated in a commonly used three-stage approach describing crisis management as involving three phases. The pre-crisis phase (prevention and preparation), the crisis phase (response), and the post-crisis phase (learning and revision) (Coombs and Laufer, 2017). This thesis study the crisis phase (reponse), the second stage of crisis management, the stage which has already hit the organisation, the UDI in this case.

The term 'internally' addresses UDI's behaviour within the organization and study the pattern of coordination between two departments - Asylum departments and Reception department and the coordination of these two departments with overarching leadership within UDI during crisis. The term "externally" is meant to addresses mainly UDI's behaviour toward actors outside of organization. It includes both JD, EU commission administration (EU agency) and sister agencies in other European countries.

The degree of collaboration between organizations may vary from being extensive to negligible. Organizations' formal affiliation with one another is often stated by laws, regulations, statue or cooperation agreements. In this context, however, the term collaboration involves investigating how different departments within the UDI is influenced by each other and examining how and why UDI influences and is influenced by JD, the Commission's administration and sister agencies, and whether this entails changes in UDI Norway's priorities, decisions or behaviour in general. The term collaboration thus refers to both formal and informal relations between the institutions, how this contact can lead to mutual influence on each other's work, and how the real administrative structure of the UDI can best be described with regard to this. The term must therefore be understood in a broader sense than what appears from written documents alone.

The European organizational structure is about how the institutions at EU level are organized, specialized and the tasks and labour are divided. The EU consists of the

Commission, the European Parliament (EP), the Council of the European Union (Council), the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and several EU agencies and other institutions such as the European Central Bank. The Commission is the EU's executive power, while the European Parliament and the Council constitute legislative bodies. The principles of specialization, division of labour and responsibilities at EU level are central to which dividing lines are applicable in the various institutions and which contact patterns are possible. The Commission consists of a comprehensive administration, divided into Directorates-General. Within the Commission`s administration, in particular, the Directorate-General EASO - which has the administrative responsibility for the Commission task in the field of asylum - will be of importance. It is, this administrative connection that are being investigated.

The upstream and downstream processes in this context mean UDI's affiliation with JD, the Commission's administration and sister agencies on tasks related to asylum seekers. The upstream processes applies to UDI`s impact on the design of decisions that affect the tasks related to asylum seekers; for example, in terms of how UDI are harmonized and made comparable across European countries. This impact can be seen both through active participation and through the formal and informal contact that otherwise takes place between the institutions. The downstream processes are concerned with the implementation and practice of decisions, particularly how and to what extent JD, the Commission's administration and sister agencies have an impact on how regulations are used by the UDI.

3.3 Strengths and Limitations of the data
This section address the strengths and limitations of the methodology.

3.3.1 Sampling
The main limitation of the research essay is that this research essay cannot interview participants from other actors focused on this thesis. Their perspectives and views thus won't be taken into account. Whatever data is collected is from the informants selected within the UDI and the documents available online. Another limitation is associated with document analysis. The information available in the document analysis may be characterized by information the organization itself wishes to communicate to the public. It can be conceived that one can consciously or unconsciously adapt public information about these collaborations in such a way that the information supports the agency's goal in the area. Through written material alone, it is conceivable that, for example, one gets the impression that the importance of international cooperation is of a different nature than what managers and employees in the UDI actually experience.

This methodological limitations are addressed through a form of triangulation, where the document analysis is combined with interviews. Information that appears in the documents is thus assessed in light of the data that appears through the interviews.

In terms of generalizability, the UDI does not need to be representative of other national agencies empirically. Theoretically, it is possible to generalize the findings and the relation between UDI´s administrative behaviour and the explanatory variable.

3.4 Summary
The research design for the case study is designed with the purpose of being both descriptive and analytical. The conclusions must be interpreted restrictively in the sense that these are not necessarily transferable to other areas. Ethical standards of safety, privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity are all considered in the process. The research method is a combination of document analysis and interviews. The purpose of using multiple sources is to facilitate a rich data material, and to reduce the risk of errors and omissions in that the combination of the methods means that a form of triangulation has been used. In general, the

document analysis is well-suited for generating information on matters relating to the formal organization of UDI and the connections that are to be analysed, while the interviews are best suited to generating information on informal aspects of the cooperation, and assessments related to these. The conduct of the interviews was relatively convenient, and the answers were relatively consistent. At the same time, both approaches have methodological challenges, which are discussed in the section 3.2. In addition to using a combination of multiple sources, other measures have also been described to reduce the risk of errors and to increase the validity and reliability of the study.

CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

This chapter presents the empirical findings of the thesis. It starts by briefly describing the UDI and the JD with its role as instructing authority. Furthermore, the chapter presents UDI's international relation, particularly its relation with European Commission' administration, EASO, and sister agencies. Finally, it explore whether the UDI is more active in the upstream or downstream policy processes through the empirical indicators of the study, namely UDI's task and contact pattern.

This section is largely based on interviews with the UDI's staff, public documents such as budget management reports, allocation letters, annual reports and instructions from the parent ministry and other public investigations and evaluations.

4.1 The Directorate for Immigration (UDI)

The UDI was established in 1988 and is the central body of immigration administration. The organization manages financial statement and bills in accordance with the cash principle, as stated in the policy note to the Annual Financial Statement (UDI, 2016, p. 65, author´s translation). Headquartered in Oslo, the UDI is divided into six regions. It had 854 employees in 2014 (Regjeringen.no; UDI, 2018). The UDI implements and contributes to developing the government's immigration and refugee policy under the responsibility of the JD. According to the laws and regulations, the UDI is governed by budget management, allocation letter and instruction given by JD. (udi.no, n.d.-a & JD, 2016, author's translation

UDI's main tasks are to process applications under the Immigration Act in a specific division of labor with the National Police Immigration Service (PU), and to process applications under the Citizens' Act (JD, 2016, author's translation). The goal requires a rapid and correct processing of all applications (for asylum, stay- and work permits) and a comprehensive commitment to many of the simple people who, for various reasons, come to Norway (udi.no, n.d.-a & JD, 2016, author's translation). The UDI also has control functions, adopts decisions on the dispossession and expulsions, and is responsible to ensure all asylum seekers are offered a place to stay while waiting for the application to be processed (udi.no, n.d.-a). Immigration is normally handling the cases and issues that the PU does not have authority to decide, and the cases where it is uncertain whether it should have been granted a residence permit (ibid). It is important for the UDI that everyone who settles in the country integrate in the best possible way. In cooperation with local authorities and other public bodies, the UDI constantly works to facilitate reception, workplaces, and social integration (udi.no, n.d.-a, author's translation).

The UDI administration is organized with a senior, responsible ministry, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD). At the same time, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (ASD), the Ministry of Children and Family (BFD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) have roles in the immigration administration. Furthermore, the Norwegian Police Directorate (POD), the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE), the Immigration Directorate (UDI), the Integration and Diversity Directorate (IMDi) and the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir) are underlying units in the immigration administration. The National Police Immigration Service (PU), police districts and Foreign Service missions are also part of the immigration administration (udi.no, n.d.-a, author's translation). This division of tasks, governance mechanisms and specialization among various ministries and units may influence each other's decision-making and working methods.

Figure 4.1 Map of the immigration administration in Norway (udi.no, n.d.-b)

In addition, the UDI provides professional input and support related to regulations and budget process to JD and cooperating ministries (JD, 2016, author's translation). Other responsibilities of the UDI are operation, management and further development of immigration's common information and communication technology systems, including data exchange with other public bodies such as the The Norwegian Tax Administration, NAV, the Loan Fund and the Labor Inspection. And finally, the UDI is responsible for the immigration field's coordination with the IT-agency - EU-Lisa and following up and adapting to new and changed requirements for information and communication technology solutions related to EU and/or Schengen system obligations (ibid).

In Autumn 2015, a record high number of asylum seekers entered Norway. The number was around 31145 asylum seekers in total and over 70 percent of these came between September and December. At the time, the UDI had the capacity to process cases of only 11000 asylum seekers. The new number was almost triple than what the UDI had the capacity for. The ordinary system could not handle this crisis situation, and the UDI had to adopt new solutions and ways of working to fulfill their tasks (UDI, 2015a, author's translation).

Normally, the UDI has a contingency plan for extraordinary situations for the whole organization. In addition, the UDI's departments have their own contingency plans. The contingency plans were not completed when the situation occurred in the fall 2015. This applied to the Reception Department's contingency plan, among others. When a crisis occurs, the first department being hit is the Reception Department. This department's contingency plan was activated on 1 September 2015. The other contingency plans were activated after the UDI's director decided on the activation of UDI's contingency plan on 9 September 2015. The organization's contingency plan stopped on 13 January 2016 (ibid).

The UDI's contingency plan consists of a number of groups and meetings. The directors' group, the secretariat for the crisis, "firermøtet" [Meeting of the four relevant and affected departments including Asylum, Reception, Analysis and development, and Communication Departments] and contingency group for Reception Department. The director's group is comprised of UDI's director, deputy director and departmental directors. The group had two meetings per week on Mondays and Wednesdays. They held meetings after the crisis as well. According to the meeting minutes, most of the time of the meetings were used to

discuss how to handle the crisis and create a common understanding of the situation and strengthen coordination between departments (UDI, 2015a, author's translation).

The secretariat for the crisis was established shortly after the organization's contingency plan was triggered. The secretariat consisted of employees from the Analysis and Development Department. The main task of the secretariat was to establish the structure of the contingency plan in the beginning. The task of the secretariat was to facilitate the contingency coordination meetings both the internally and externally (ibid).

"Firermøtet" consist of the directors from the four relevant and affected departments. They meet twice a week. The PU and the POD also participated once a week in this meeting (ibid).

The contingency group and plan for Reception Department was activated before all the other plan in the UDI. Because the Reception Department was the first to come under pressure in autumn, a lack of capacity to accommodate all the new arrivals was the main challenge. The group was not part of the regular line in the Reception Department. Several sub-projects, such as the PU accommodation, "Råde" and 10000 beds were created. The Communication between the regular line and those projects did not work well. The group could not hold to be strategic. The contingency group had a meeting every morning, which eventually became too frequent. The meeting then decreased to one meeting every other morning (ibid).

These groups were for coordination and informational resources for different levels and were contact points for others within the organization. The contingency plan and groups didn't have a clear meeting structure and necessary internal communication. The relation between UDI's overarching contingency groups and the departments was not as effective as expected. The UDI's plan didn't have a strategy to exchange information internally and externally; the roles and functions were not clear (ibid).

After the first meeting between the UDI's director and the departments directors about the crisis, a report was sent to the JD. The purpose of the report was to inform the JD about the situation and ask for instruction. The instruction included, among other things, an increase of UDI's budget, because the UDI needed to increase the number of its employees. The UDI's budget increased 46% in 2015 compare to 2014, and another 52% in 2016. And many new employees, particularly in the Asylum Department 250 employees has recruited (temporarily) in many rounds to relieve the pressure. Later after the crisis, in 2018, the UDI has increased 80-100 case handling officers permanently (UDI, 2015b). Before the budget was approved by the the JD, the UDI used other methods to address the crisis. The organizations increased the working hours of its employees. The UDI reallocated employees from one department to another. The coping strategies had side-effects. Employees who were transferred to the Storskog had to stay there for many days away from their family. Tough working environment affected the employee not only psychologically but also physically (informant 3).

4.2 The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD) and its role as the instructing authority

The JD was established in 1818. It has approximately 400 employees divided between nine departments, the Ministry's Secretariat and the Communications Unit (regjeringen.no, 2018, author's translation). The main purpose of the JD is to provide for the maintenance and development of the basic guarantees of the rule of law. An overarching objective is to ensure the security of the society and of individual citizens. The Ministry is led by two ministers; the Minister of Justice and Immigration and the Minister of Public Security. The highest ranking permanent official is the Secretary-General, who leads the Ministry's administration. The main task of the Ministry is secretariat for the political staff, management agencies and administration. The Ministry's areas of responsibility can be seen as three separate chains: The

criminal system chain, the asylum chain and the civil security and emergency chain. The goals for the asylum chains in 2015 are fewer asylum seekers without protection needs, faster clarification of identity and faster return (ibid).

The JD has the overall administrative and budgetary responsibility for the UDI. It is also responsible for the Immigration Act while regulatory authority and other administrative responsibility according to the law are shared between the JD and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (ASD). The JD is responsible for coordinating the management of the UDI (JD, 2016).

In line with the hierarchical model, Norwegian Central Administration is built up as the ministries are the highest administrative authority with the ability to instruct the underlying agencies (NOU 2006:14, author's translation). The ministry's instructional access to underlying agencies has been discussed and investigated repeatedly. In 2005, a decentralization process expanded the ministry's instructional access to the UDI to ensure policy objectives and priorities are met (Hartman, 2010 and Prop. 16 L (2015-2016)). The Ministry has since 2005 had the opportunity to instruct the UDI on legal interpretation, discretion and prioritization of matters. The Ministry cannot instruct the UDI on individual cases, but it is nevertheless laid down in Section 127 that the Ministry may make decisions in matters relating to fundamental national interests or foreign policy considerations (Hartman, 2010). That is exactly what happened during the asylum crisis of 2015, when the situation in Storskog was provoked. There was a need for an urgent response to the situation which was also mentioned in the Prop. 16 L (Prop. 16 L 2015-2016, author's translation).

The committee for the Norwegian Official Report (NOU) that discussed Ministry's instructional access to underlying agencies criticizes the UDI for being unclear about the form and content of the instructions and for not being aware of signals from political leadership. The reason for the criticism of the management of the immigration field is the balance between independence and responsiveness. The UDI is governed by laws, regulations and formal instructions to manage the government's policy on immigration; the rules exist precisely so that UDI does not consult JD in each decision and thus have some degree of independence (NOU 2006: 14, p. 55, author's translation). On the other hand, the committee emphasizes that the UDI has a duty to be responsive to political leadership. The immigration field is highly politicized and it is ultimately the politicians who control the policy. To be responsive means, in the opinion of the committee: 1. following the laws, regulations and instructions given, 2. adding signals from political leadership, emphasis interpretation of the regulations and the discretionary exercise, and 3. actively investigating and clarifying the political assumptions for the directorate's practice (ibid, p. 61, author's translation). The committee states that "in areas that are politically sensitive, it is particularly important that the national agencies's administration does not go beyond its role" (NOU 2006: 14, p. 55, author's translation).

4.3 UDI's international relation

The immigration field in Norway is governed by the act of 15 May 2008 on the entry of foreign nationals into the Kingdom of Norway and their stay in the realm (Immigration Act). The act shall be applied in accordance with the international provision by which Norway is bound (regjeringen.no, 2018, author's translation). The immigration field in Norway is committed to a number of international agreements (Vevstad, 2012, author's translation) and participate in many different networks, working groups and committees on immigration, at international, European, intergovernmental and bilateral levels namely the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC), the General Directors' Immigration Service Conference (GDISC), the European Migration Network (EMN), the EU asylum agency; European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in addition to a number of

cooperation forums in the asylum field, reception area, return field, visa and border control, etc. (udi.no, 2011, author's translation).

The asylum and refugee fields are particularly affected with the Schengen and Dublin agreements which Norway is committed to and which are integral parts of the EU's Common Asylum and Refugee Policy (CEAS) (Vevstad, 2012, author's translation). Norway therefore participates in issues related to Schengen Agreement in committees and working groups under the Commission and European Council. If the European Commission presents proposals for new regulations or changes to existing regulations, Norwegian experts should be consulted on an equal footing with experts from EU countries (Informant 2 & Vevstad, 2012, author's translation). Norwegian authorities consider it appropriate to comply with other parts of EU justice policy as many of the EU and Norway objectives are the same, and because the case is of a cross-border nature (udi.no, 2018, author's translation). Norway therefore participates in parts of the EU's asylum and refugee policy. At the same time, the Immigration Act of 2008 is written by model from the EU CEAS regulations, such as the Status Directive and the provisions of the Procedural Directive, although we are not bound by these directives (Vevstad, 2012, author's translation).

The development of a common policy on justice in the EU has been a slow affair characterized by member countries who have been reluctant to pass sovereignty to the EU in a sensitive policy areas. Nevertheless, cooperation in this field has started in the 1980s. As a result of an increase in asylum arrivals to Europe and the deepening of European integration, the victory of the Single European Act created a single market and the EU countries began to recognize the benefits of cooperation on immigration and refugee fields (Ucarer, 2016 , p. 282). In 1985, the Benelux countries and Germany, France and Italy agreed to start cooperation with common external borders and the Schengen Agreement became a reality (ibid). The justice field was added to the intergovernmental decision-making structure in the EU, the third pillar, which marginalized the EU Commission's right of initiative and excluded the EU Court from jurisdiction over the justice field. The Council was the most important decision maker, and decisions were unanimous (Ucarer, 2016, p. 284).

Immigration, asylum and police cooperation were moved to the first pillar of the EU decision-making structure with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and today follow the same decision-making procedure as other policy in the EU (Statskonsult, 2005, p. 6, author's translation). The European Court of Justice is the judicial power in the EU, but Norway is not bound by the European Court of Justice's decisions on asylum and refugee policy. The exception is in Schengen-relevant cases where the European Court of Justice has been given an ordinary judicial authority (NOU 2012-2013, p. 53, author's translation). On the other hand, Norway is bound by the European Court of Human Rights and since these two courts are reciprocal, Norway may be indirectly affected by the decisions of the European Court of Justice. Norwegian administration is interested in decisions taken by the European Court of Justice and Vevstad concludes that the Norwegian legal base is to a certain extent changing (Vevstad, 2012, author's translation).

4.3.1 The EEA agreement
The EEA Agreement allows Norway and the EFTA/EEA countries to participate in committees in the areas covered by the agreement. Participation in committees under the European Commission is the only formal input Norway has to the actual policy design in the EU. EFTA / EEA countries are represented in several committees under the European Commission. The two most important types of committees are the expert groups and working groups. The EFTA / EEA countries are furthermore represented through the various program committees and a heterogeneous assembly of technical, scientific, and legal expert committees (UD, 2012-2013). A large number of EU agencies and supervisory authority have been created.

These agencies will primarily assist with information retrieval, networking and regulatory tasks, but they also help to strengthen interaction and cooperation with national agencies including the Norwegian (ibid).

Norway entered into an agreement in 2001 on the Dublin regulation, which was subsequently updated in 2003 (Dublin II). The purpose of the regulation is to prevent asylum seekers from being referred back and forth between the countries without having their asylum applications processed. Furthermore, it aimed to prevent asylum applications being promoted in the several Member States to be handled by more than one state authorities (asylum shopping). The Dublin regulation implies that asylum seekers who come to Norway via other Dublin countries may be sent back there without the Norwegian authorities had to conduct a full asylum treatment. This is a practically important agreement for Norwegian immigration policy. Through Dublin, Norway also has a separate agreement on participation in the Common European Database for fingerprints of asylum seekers – Eurodac (ibid)

Dublin regulation does not give Norway full access to the Council structure as the Schengen Agreement does. However, the Association Agreement to the Dublin Regulations establishes a Joint Committee, with the participation of the Associated States and the EU at the Commission. Here, questions of principle are discussed between the parties. Norway is thus kept up to date on developments and has the opportunity to promote input. Furthermore, Norwegian authorities participate in on-going meetings of the Dublin Contact Committee and Eurodac Expert meeting (ibid).

In view of the participation in Dublin cooperation, Norwegian authorities have also been invited to more informal cooperation on immigration law issues. Norway thus participates in the meetings of the Directors of the Immigration Services Conference (GDISC) of the EU Member States: the Directorate of Immigration Services. Furthermore, Norway participates in the Asylum Expert Group Eurasil under the EU Commission. Norway is from 2010 through a separate agreement linked to the European Migration Network (EMN), an information network, which consists of national contacts and the Commission (ibid).

4.3.2 European Commission's administration and the EU agency - EASO

Norway is not a member of the EU directly but is bound to the EU through a set of other agreements such as Dublin and Eurodac regulation and Schengen agreement. The research informants understanding of this indirect relationship varied and thus they reacted differently to the questions 'to what extent the UDI coordinates with European Commission's administration and if their relationships increased during the asylum crisis of 2015?'. Many informants stated that Norway was not a member of the EU. Yet voluntary and selective participation of Norway in the EU asylum system surfaced.

Two informants remarked:

"We are not governed by (Common European asylum system). Only Dublin, and the Eurodac regulation binds us to the directives which comes from the EU, and that is in relation to the return directives. Asylum cases do not bind us to EU, but we are part of the system of course" (Informant 4).

"Norway is not a member of the EU but Schengen" (Informant 1).

Among the informants, two of them (Informant 4 and 7) said that "the UDI relationships with the European Commission in any form is based on voluntary participation and that is at the operational level"

"Since Norway is not a member of the EU, so the participation and relationship in any form with the EU-related regulations do not fall into the EU. It is optional. In the asylum field, Norway is only bound by the Dublin regulation and the Eurodac regulation because of the membership in Schengen" (Informant 2).

One area of the asylum field that Norway has coordinated with EU member countries has been the 'relocation process'. Relocation process is a measure where one transfer refugees from Greece and Italy to other countries. However, Norway has participated in the EU relocation program, the country had little say in the details of the process because of not being a direct member of the EU.

"What was established was voluntary from Norway to participate in to support other member countries. We are a part of Schengen, so it was sent to Norwegian experts. There was a desire from Norwegian political authorities. And so one established such a relocation where people transferred refugees from Greece and Italy to other countries, not because we were committed but chose politically entirely voluntarily, 1500 of them came to Norway" (Informant 2 & 4).

"Since Norway is not a member of the EU, the European Commission has limited control over what is happening in the member states, and whatever happens there, the European Commission can hardly override" (Informant 2).

When it comes to policy process at the strategic and political level, it is largely the JD who is responsible and who participates at the EU level. In cases where the UDI participate at the strategic level, the UDI is always together with the JD and has the task of giving professional input such as filling in missing information to the JD.

"When the JD has the political dialogue, we are not sitting there. We are more on the operational side. We have meetings with our working groups under the Commission or European Council. ... The UDI is instructed by JD, not a European body" (Informant 4).

"The JD is responsible for policy making and we are responsible for implementing. That is how it is the task division" (Informant 6).

Despite not being an EU member, Norway was invited by the European Commission to have a voice on the proposals related to changes of the Dublin Regulations in the time of crisis. In May 2016, the Commission presented new legislative proposals, a reform of the European common asylum system (ECAS). Norway's agreement with the EU on participation in the Dublin cooperation is a type of agreement, which, as a matter of fact, states that when the commission makes a law proposal or works on a new bill, the Commission shall consult Norway in the same way as the other EU member states to get input and consultation into these types of regulations.

"Although Norway is not a member of the EU and Norway has no place on discussion on the table… From Norway, the JD and the UDI were invited to go through the European Commission's bill and give professional input under the consultation of the JD. Norway has not been invited to such a thing in this field earlier" (Informant 2).

European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is an EU agency or institution outside the European Commission and has more or less autonomous status. It is comparable with national

agencies, and is used, inter alia, in areas where the EU has wished to have joint coordinating bodies with professional independence (NOU, 2012, author's translation). The UDI relation with EASO is a formal relationship. EASO is only a support office and doesn't have power to control the UDI or any other EU member in order to investigate whether the EU laws and regulation are being implemented correctly.

> *"Ensuring the implementation of the EU regulations is not yet the role of EASO, but it is working on to get that mandate" (Informant 4).*

EASO was established in 2010 to support the practical cooperation of EU member states in the field of asylum, support member states that are under particular pressure and contribute to the implementation of a common European asylum system. Relationship with EASO is important for Norway because it will give the country opportunities to follow the asylum situation in Europe and contribute to the development in the field (udi.no, 2018

The UDI in Norway participates in EASO. Norway assists member states with expertise in asylum processing, reception operation, experience with special groups of asylum seekers and country information, participation in meetings and working groups in EASO on topics such as trafficking in human beings, joint cases, family members and reception. The UDI create training modules and help train others and UDI staff receive training in EASO, participation in the asylum support team from EASO, which has assisted member states, which has a particular pressure on its asylum and migration system. Norway, represented by UDI's Director Frode Forfang, attends board meetings as an observer (ibid).

One of the contributions the UDI made during the crisis was sending case handling officers to help other countries in need, such as Italy and Greece. And in addition, the UDI under the instruction from the JD participated in relocation program.

> *"The relocation process, as an acute problem, was an opportunity for a closer collaboration between many European countries. There was, therefore, a lot of cooperation between the UDI and the EU on this matter." (Informant 2).*

Sending case officers to the EU countries in need still continues and the UDI has appointed a coordinator for this task. The UDI-EASO is not a one way relationship. EASO offered UDI instruments and tools to use for faster handling of asylum cases. Still it depends on the UDI whether to take help or just ignore it and find out their own way.

> *"We have helped them and also use them in other contexts. They made us instruments, tools for use in case processing and we are free to use it "(Informant 4).*

The UDI also collaborates closely with the EU on cases of reception condition of asylums. There is a forum called European Platform of Reception Agencies where member states can exchange experiences and discuss key reception-related issues. In order to contribute to a more even division of responsibilities among asylum applications between European countries, it is a priority objective of the EU to develop adequate reception facilities in countries participating in the Dublin Cooperation, in line with standards and guidelines laid down in the Reception Directive.

> *"EU reception directives that we are not affiliated with but we had cooperated with during crisis" (Informant 3).*

4.3.3 Bilateral and multilateral cooperation

The government aims to have a proactive policy to safeguard Norwegian interests by participating in processes and policy making in the EU earlier. Priorities for the UDI's international work in 2018 are Schengen and Dublin cooperation, practical cooperation on asylum and return. The UDI followed in 2018 the development of new legal acts and the implementation of legal acts as set out in the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Agreement, including the follow-up to the Schengen evaluation (UDI, 2017, p. 58). These are the objectives and guidelines in the letter of allocation which form the basis for the UDI's priorities in the working plan, together with our strategy for the period 2015-2018 (UDI, 2016, page 5).

4.3.4 Network with sister agencies - Nordic cooperation

Contact with sister agencies is bilateral. It is important for the UDI especially when it comes to getting information about other countries' practices. It is also a will by the political leadership that the UDI should follow the practices in other countries so that the UDI does not make itself more attractive for refugees than others. One example is the size of financial benefits for people in asylum centres. Here, the Ministry asks the UDI to compare the services in other countries so that Norway will not be at a higher level and thus appear to be more attractive to asylum seekers than other countries (JD, 2016b & Informant 7).

One of the most significant network with sister agencies is the Nordic cooperation. The Nordic cooperation contributes to developing common Nordic attitudes, especially in cases that are also dealt with in other international forums, such as the EU.

The UDI has both formal and informal contact at strategic/political and operational level with the Nordic countries (UDI, 2011).

The political level is a forum called Nordic High-Level Consultation group for refugee issues (NSHF). NSHF is an information forum where the Nordic countries informally discuss issues in the field of asylum, refugee and migration, including return and resettlement. NSHF does not have a permanent secretariat. The meetings are organized by the Presidency country for the respective year. The chairmanship goes on between the countries. NSHF is a result of increased political attention to asylum-related issues from the mid-1980s, and a result of increased asylum arrivals to the Nordic countries. The forum offers the opportunity to discuss issues of common interest, but especially for Norway and Iceland, the meetings also provide knowledge about processes in the EU that we otherwise do not have insight into (ibid).

The operative level is the Nordic Immigration Committee (NIC) where leaders from migration management and some experts from the lower level participate if they are interested. The Nordic Immigration Committee is a collaborative forum for the directors of the immigration authorities in the Nordic countries for all types of questions on the immigration field. Some experts from the lower level participate if they are interested. Some contacts are not formalized bilaterally, but the UDI's employees formally meet colleagues in their sister boards in the EU committee and other network systems. The Dublin Unit of the UDI has scheduled activities with other countries' Dublin units by visiting and exchanging experiences (ibid).

Two meetings are held each year at the executive level. One is the specialist which participates to varying degrees in the delegation as NIC's contact person in the UDI. The other is the contact person in the International Unit (IN) which contributes to the preparation of the meeting. Normally there will be a report from the organizing country which will be passed on to the directors and departmental directors.

"We have regular meetings with them and you can generally say that there was an increased need for information in different level. One was very concerned about how the others solves a problem, how do UDI find a solution itself. It is a way one to put

together the challenges, it was probably spent a lot of time for sharing experiences, but this was as informal contact" (Informant 4).

Professionally, Nordic cooperation is routinely conducted, with annual executive meetings and around 10 networks, two of which are in the field of asylum and reception. The activity in the networks, however, varies, and seems to be of most importance in areas not covered by the EEA agreement. Nordic cooperation is thus most important for UDI's employees who have little opportunity to attend meetings at the European level.

There are other formal and informal forums that Norway has entered into committed agreements with. At the Nordic cooperation, there are also seven working groups on issues such as asylum, resident permit, reception centre and etc. (UDI, 2011). General Directors of Immigration Services Conference (GDISC) is an informal network to facilitate practical cooperation between Immigration Services in Europe. This meeting is not political, not compulsory and merely for operational purpose. Norway was secretariat for this earlier. It is for those who implement regulations and policy to discuss challenges and their understanding and interpretations of the laws and regulations. Sometimes informal forums can be established for shorter period of times as deemed necessary among sister agencies. But during crisis, it appears to not established any such forum among sister agencies (ibid).

The sister agencies are also in contact with each other to share information and experience through European Migration Network (EMN). The purpose of the network is to meet and exchange information about the EU institutions and the needs of the EU member states on migration and asylum. The EMN consists of National Contact Points (NCPs) and is led by the European Commission. In addition, national networks are formed to bring together various authorities, research institutions and civil society. The EMN collects and disseminates information on all aspects of the regulation of migration to the member countries in the EEA (ibid).

Right after crisis, it appears that the EMN conducted a survey and research on migration and asylum situation to compare the EU member states. Norway was also one of the 25 EMN national contact point (NCP). Many Norwegian experts participated in research. There, the UDI employees meet their colleagues from other sister agencies and informally discusses and share experience (informant 4).

4.4 Upstream and downstream process

The upstream and downstream processes comprise the interaction and cooperation pattern within the UDI; examining the interaction of UDI's director with the Departments of Asylum and Reception, and the interaction between these two departments. It also comprises the interaction and cooperation pattern outside the UDI; examining the interaction of the UDI with the JD, EC EASO and sister agencies. The interaction pattern between the UDI's director and department is vertical and the two departments are horizontal. The interaction of the UDI with JD, EC and EASO is vertical and the UDI and sister agencies horizontal.

In other words, the upstream processes apply to the UDI's employees influence on the creation of procedures and work routines within organization and the UDI's influence on the design and formulation of the policy across the UDI while the downstream processes are about activities in connection with implementation. It applies how much the management and leadership within the UDI influence UDI`s employees behaviour in their task and also reveal the degree of involvement and influence of local actors on the implementation of the procedures and policies with and across organization.

The findings suggest that Norway, and thus the UDI, as a local actor, has come up largely with solutions at the national level to challenges that arose during the crisis. The

findings also suggest that the leadership and directors of the UDI played the central role when it was about the relationship with units across the UDI.

Every year the UDI participates approximately in between 90 and 100 international meetings. Among them, 30-32 meetings are the UDI`s cooperation with the EU on asylum related issues (see table on UDI's international coordination), 40-45 meetings on visa and border control, 3 meetings on reception centre, and 2 meetings on return issues. When it comes to cooperation with sister agencies and/or Nordic countries, 11 out of 100 is attributed to Nordic cooperation. The rest of meetings are the UDI's cooperation such as Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC), General Directors' Immigration Services Conference (GDISC), and UNHCR. Based on this, the European cooperation is thus considerably more extensive than the Nordic sister network, measured in meeting activity (UDI, 2011).

During crisis of 2015, the number of international meetings were the same as earlier. Although the need for more contacts and information was felt, the only change during crisis was that other topics which used to be discussed in such meeting has been put aside and the asylum related and ad hoc issues were on the top of agendas both at the national and international level - EU level. It must be noted that participation in these relationships is not necessarily synonymous with participation in upstream processes alone. It includes participation in downstream processes as well. For more details and information about downstream processes see 4.4.2 section.

4.4.1 Upstream processes

This section uses the following indicators; UDI's task and UDI's contact and influence pattern to describe the findings in the upstream processes. Just to clarify, both indicators used here, are applicable at upstream and downstream processes. As we are in the upstream processes section, the best is to present the empirical observation around these two indicators relevant to this process. First, the coordination pattern within the UDI is presented and later the coordination pattern across the UDI is presented in the upstream process.

The coordination pattern within the UDI according to most of the informants seems to be very good. There have been created many groups for crisis preparedness as mentioned earlier.

One informant remarked:

"There was very good cooperation between the UDI's departments in handling the situation in crisis" (Informant 1, 3, 6, & 7).

"Coordination among departments was sufficient. One does have care what one does, so that every department is in good harmony, specially, the asylum department and the reception department"

There was so much coordination at the strategic level.

"It was a period that was in great need of professional clarifications. Because there were many new issues, a lot of establishment and practice in communication towards the JD, there was also greater and more comprehensive management dialogue in all areas . Otherwise it works as it used to"

"There was a need for more management during that period. Because it was very important for the management to remember what to do, and how to do. That they are connected with the other departments very well because the work one department does affects the other department"

However it is an indication of a good coordination within the UDI, among informants one has stated that they have felt the absence of the asylum department in the beginning.

"At the strategic level, we have felt the absence of the asylum department" (Informant 7)

It is stated clearly from the findings that the routines and procedures for the crisis have been produced within the organisation and at the management level. It consists of UDI's directors and directors from departments. Apart from the routines and guidelines in the case of Storskog. The UDI has had a plan for the Stroskog as well but after the JD comes with the new structure, it overrides the UDI's plan for Storskog.

Based on findings from the two informants, the relationship within the UDI was not only very hierarchical, it was networked based and people consult to each other.

"The relationship is not strictly hierarchical but more of a horizontal and networked and one is talking together" (Informant 3 & 7).

At the upstream processes across organization, the UDI's main task is to contribute to designing regulations and policy process. As an administrative body, the UDI's task is to give professional advice and suggestion on developing policy (NOU 2006: 14, author's translation). When it comes to political issues related to policy, it is the JD that is responsible.

"We in UDI have two roles: One is that if things do not work well we have to talk about it and say it to the responsible competent. We do not say it for political reasons but for professional reasons. The other role is to regulate our work through regulations and laws" (Informant 6).

Although the expertise comes from the UDI, the channel to share the information with the EU is through the JD.

"It is primarily the JD [ ] who lead the delegations involved in the design phase at EU level, but UDI can be consulted to prepare Norwegian views before meetings in council context" (Informant 4). *We usually get an instruction from the JD, especially when we are participating in the political level and are involved in creating regulations. But our task is as experts. We contribute with filling and complementing the information or reply to questions which is more operational. If anyone comes up with questions related to politic, we have a way more retracted, because we are experts. The JD is the one who covers the policy question, not we"* (Informant 4).

UDI's participation in EU matters through the JD extends beyond strategic matters and includes operational issues as well.

"Participation can be at different levels, so in Brussels, one is not discussing the development of regulations, but how to implement it, such as Dublin regulations, it is about how to implements the Dublin regulations, but there can be disagreements in interpretations, and there may be challenges because there is ambiguity about

understanding regulations. In such situation, one first discusses the issue, in an open and informal. The UDI role is strong and we have a more active role in the meetings" (Informant 4).

The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is naturally the most important overarching organ for the UDI. Contact with the JD goes both formal, through preparation of Norwegian position before and during meetings in working groups at European level and it seems that there is also informal contact between the JD and the UDI. It is very clear from all the respondent's answers that the JD is the main actor.

"Dialogue between the UDI and the JD goes completely continuous. The JD is the responsible ministry and must have control and shall get answers for what happens and how things going on" (Informant 3).

The JD main communication is through laws and regulations, letter of allocation, budget management and instructions.

"The JD steered us through the award letter, which we receive annually related to our budget" (Informant 4).

"The UDI reported the JD weekly, short day reports, a lot of telephone contacts, dialogue at managerial level, and a lot and quite open and confident contact" (Informant 3).

In policy formulation and processes, the UDI reply to the proposal which comes from the JD. UDI can comments and provide professional and technical advice.

"We are managed on an on-going basis through the management dialogue. We are the one who implements, we need a budget and a mandate for what we should do. The JD is the one who manages us through budget. During crisis, we needed more resources and we asked for that and we got it" (Informant 4).

The main method the UDI play its role as a contributor for developing policy process is through the proposal send to the UDI from the JD. The UDI in this way, share their views and opinions. The proposal not being sent only to the UDI but to many other immigration related administrative organs. Analysis and development department in UDI is responsible to reply to the proposal come from JD.

"Proposals are not sent to UDI alone, it will be sent to the police immigration unit, immigration appeal board, municipality and anyone who may be affected can be questioned" (Informant 1).

"In all regulatory processes we are governed by the JD, but we answer the proposal come from the JD" (Informant 1 & 4).

Yet sometimes, the JD draft regulations, Prop. 16L and Prop. 90L without UDI's input. This has revealed during crisis. When a proposal was created by the JD to bring changes to regulation related to the situation in Storskog during crisis, the UDI was not involved and the proposal has not been sent to the UDI (which is normally happening).

In the Prop. 16L (2015-16) the focus was on the border control between Russia and Norway, that do not allow the cases of people coming from Russia to be processed in Norway. According to the Return Agreement 2007, people coming from Russian should also be taken

back by the Russian government. In this amendment the parliament granted the JD the power to instruct to Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) to refuse ordinary processing of asylum application coming from Russia and return refugees at least until 1 January 2018 (Prop. 16 L, 2015-2016, author's translation).

Two policy instructions to the UDI were made up on situation in Storskog. One is known as GI-12/2015, which is about asylum application from Russian, case handling and prioritization. It is instructing the UDI, and gives it possibility to deny ordinary asylum process. This instruction was proposed on 20 October 2015 by JD and on approved by parliament on 13 November 2015 (bid)

The Second is the GI-13/2015: It is issued by the JD. It entails to accelerated case handling for asylum seekers who have had stay in Russia regardless they have access to asylum procedure in Russia (ibid).

In the second round of amendments, namely, Prop. 90L (2015-16). The key elements of these amendments/measure are among other such as deny asylum seekers entry at the borders with other Nordic countries during crisis, tightening conditions for family reunion, forced return of those who are rejected through ordinary asylum procedure, authorization to collection and storage of biometrics, and refuse application of those who cannot clarify their identity (Prop. 90 L, 2015-2016, author's translation).

None of the respondents claim that there was a conflict between the UDI and the JD. There may have been disagreements, but basically the expectation is that the UDI should implement the policy the government stands for. It happens sometimes, that the UDI presents a solution which the Ministry does not agree. But it always eventually leads that the UDI is being instructed to something else by the JD.

> *"If you disagree with your boss, you do not say that you are disagree. But you come up with a better proposal" (Informant 1).*

Regarding the UDI's role and contribution at the EU level, all of the informants claim that whatever contact and task they have at the EU level related to strategic issues are going through the JD. The JD has largely the leadership and management role and the UDI is being instructed by the JD.

Norway is member of EU through EEA agreement. And more particularly, the UDI is connected to the EU through Dublin regulations and Schengen agreement regarding laws related to immigration and asylum. In light of this, it seems that the UDI is less active in upstream process and doesn`t play a central role. Although the UDI has those agreements, it doesn't mean that the UDI has access to all the meetings at the EU Commission.

> *"All types of agreements we have with the EU do not give us access to the Council Structure. We are not in council meetings when there are issues related to asylum, for example. Basically, when they discuss asylum issues, we are not bound by any of the laws, related to CEAS, status directive, reception condition directive or return directive. All we are connected to is through Dublin and Eurodac, but even that does not give us access to the council meetings that discuss matters concerning asylum or other meetings" (Informant 4).*

When the UDI participates in the meetings at the EU level along with the JD, the UDI's staff prepares thoroughly for the meetings and will engage in promoting specific policy formulations. In some cases, the UDI lobbies in advance to get the support of other countries.

"The JD has the political dialogue with the EU, where we are not, we are more on the operational side, we have meetings with our working groups and committee under the commission. We are reciprocally oriented, but we are governed by JD, not Europe agency. EU Commission did not play a central role during the crisis" (Informant 4).

Regarding the question if the coordination has increased at the international level during the crisis, one of the informants stated:

"It is the same forums but themes and discussions closest to the immigration field and refugees. The whole Europe was naturally discussing the same themes and topics" (Informant 4).

One of the important actors the UDI has, as an ad hoc and on-going contact, is EASO. The UDI seems to have relationship with the EASO on operational matters.

"European Asylum Support Office (EASO) is a support office, we have on-going contact there at various levels. We have permanent networks for country information, for asylum, for vulnerable. We have networks with which we sit and are at the management levels (3-4 management board) throughout the year. We are continually informed about the situation in different countries" (Informant 4).

"With EASO, we have formal connection but not a management relationship. We contribute to them, and use them in other contexts. They do not have control over us. They make instruments and tools to use in case processing and we are free to use them or not" (Informant 4).

Although EASO doesn't have supervisory roles on ensuring the implementation of the EU regulations, they are working to get that mandate.

The UDI also has contacts with sister agencies in other countries. The relations among employees of UDI and sister agencies are both formal and informal. Formal relations normally happen through a permanent contact point. The formal relations remained the same during the 2015 crisis. Informal contacts are through employees in the asylum department Norway and their colleagues in other sister agencies, which often happens via emails or phone calls.

"UDI has special contact with sister agencies in other countries, and it is natural for Norway to be compared with other countries, for instance, with Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium" (Informant 7).

The purpose of this type of collaboration is to exchange experiences and information and to learn from each other. The goal of contacts are to not appear more attractive than other countries. The contact is often on an ad-hoc basis in connection with proposals to change policies.

Respondents say that they experience little degree of conflict with sister agencies, and those small conflicts have political roots rather than technical. When the goal is to learn from other countries experiences, you often ignore the political message and learn from best practices. The discussions are often professional and bureaucrats and they often cooperate well. In fact, employees in sister agencies see the value of cooperation and harmonization, but they are kept back by instructions by their national authorities.

"The different countries have different interests as to how the interpretations should be. One can see that it is constantly moving towards a less generous one, that is, everyone is trying to make sure to accept as little as possible. And often, quite often, there are some countries that have an interpretation and other countries that have a different interpretation of the laws and regulations." (Informant 4).

During crisis, the degree and frequency of formal contacts were the same. It appeared that the crisis did not increase the contacts, except that employees in Asylum Department had increased informal contacts via email and phone.

"Don't think there was so much contact during the crisis, except with Sweden perhaps. I doubt there was much contact. We meet actually in different forums and visit each other there regularly, where one learns how others do, to understand better how their systems set up and then they will see how the UDI does" (Informant 6).

"Asylum Department is in contact with their colleagues in asylum areas, through email and phone" (Informant 4).

It was asked if there was any contact with sister agencies related to cases in Storskog.

"What happened up there in Storskog was very special, therefore we did not get in touch with other sister agencies in that regard" (Informant 5).

In summary, the review of the upstream process indicates that the UDI's employees apart from the directors and those at the leadership has little impact on designing and establishing of procedures, routines, laws, regulations and instructions. Whatever views and opinions the UDI employee have, they come up with suggestion to their leaders or through the hearings they get. During crisis, because of the situation, the findings has shown that the views of the employees was not taken into consideration as it suppose to be. The UDI's relationship with the JD was through the directors and the leadership of the organization. And the UDI's relation with the EC and EASO has happened under the instruction from the JD and the JD preparer the UDI for participation for meetings at European level. It is suggested that the lobbying activity is somewhat curbed because Norway does not have voting rights in the EU and thus acts with some caution. Given, the UDI as subordinate agency and complexity of the cooperation, it was not easy for the UDI to influence decisions in the EC as such. There is no findings whether the UDI was involved in promoting their view with sister agencies during crisis.

Mainly the way the UDI has behaved is based and according to the laws and instruction they take from the JD. The crisis has little to do with UDI's behaviour. The crisis has only increased the frequency of contact between the UDI and JD but it still used the same mechanisms for contact. In addition, the crisis in fact warn and awaken the UDI within and across organization about the importance of the contact pattern which already exists. The crisis revealed which part and which coordination needed to be improved. So the UDI's behaviour is not the result of the crisis in general, but of course one cannot deny some slightly change. The slightly change which has been brought is also written somewhere in the instruction of the JD to the UDI. So that in certain cases the JD can take the control of situations which is not their responsibility, specially in issues, when it is about the security of a country.

4.4.2 Downstream processes

The main role of the UDI in downstream processes is to implement and practice refugee and immigration policy (NOU 2006: 14, author's translation). A good departure point in this section is how much other actors influence UDI's behaviour in implementation of immigration and policy? The main document that forms the basis of the management dialogue between the JD and the UDI, in addition to laws and regulations, are letters of allocation, instructions from JD, and reports from meetings (JD, 2016, author's translation). Through these official documents, the JD formally instructs and orients the UDI on their work related to immigration and refugee issues. Apart from these types of contact and communication, there are also informal contacts, which is on going and ad hoc based. The UDI, to a great extent, implements Norwegian laws and regulations, which are being designed by the JD and Norwegian parliament.

Not only is the UDI being influenced by other actors in doing their tasks, but also they have some form of discretion that they can make decision on work routines and procedures. The rules exist precisely so that UDI does not consult the JD in each decision and thus have some degree of independence. The Majority of the respondents state that there is some room for discretion in the implementation phase. After embellishing their responses it appears that there are quite large limitations on the use of discretion, both in the form that the Ministry can instruct them and the fact that one is also limited by law and regulations.

> "You have a certain degree of room and space for manoeuvre, but it depends on what type of problem you are facing with. Based on problem and the room for action in disposal, one can develop or change a procedure or a task routine (Informant 5).

> "Partly, it is the immigration act and partly it is the instructions we receive from JD to UDI which constrain our space and mandates" (Informant 4).

> "When we get budget, we get a goal to achieve and we have only room within that framework. Beyond that we are not allowed to do anything else. Our work is operational and we are the one who implements the rules and policy" (Informant 4).

Regarding whether if the leadership and other people at lower level of hierarchy in UDI had influence on tasks related to refugee crisis. It seems that that only one level under the directors, namely the professional unit has had in some degree to raise their voice. Otherwise it was both organization directors and the departments' directors which has the central role in producing the routines and procedure. In some cases, the JD were also involved.

Though, the UDI is governed and ruled by JD and Norwegian law, the UDI feels pressure from several international actors in implementing and practice of shared laws and regulations in some extent. But during crisis, it seems that the UDI was seeking for solutions largely at the national level and thus there were not so much pressure from international actors.

> "I think we work quite extensively outward and nationally" (Informant 4).

An interesting finding that emerges from the two of interviews is that respondents do not consider EU regulations isolated from Norwegian laws, precisely because they are incorporated into Norwegian law. The Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulations are incorporated into Norwegian law in accordance with the principle of indirect implementation.

> "It is correct that the UDI does not implement EU legislation, but since Norway is bound by parts of EU legislation, one might think that the bureaucrats still feel to some extent implementation of EU legislation" (Informant 3).

In cases where UDI needs clarification, and correct interpretation of the EU laws are required, several expert groups and committees such as Dublin II Contact Committee exists for the UDI to participate and discuss the issues. UDI's task is to understand the common law and to practice them at home.

> *"......in Brussels, one is not discussing the development of regulations, but how to implement it, such as Dublin regulations, it is about how to implements the Dublin regulations, but there can be disagreements in interpretations, and there may be challenges because there is ambiguity about understanding regulations..... (Informant 4).*

The meetings have multiple purposes. The UDI aims to check if the EU laws are being used and implemented and if they interpret the laws correctly. The European Commission supervises the UDI to check if they are following the EU rule and regulations accordingly.

> *"It is the commission that evaluates Norway. They send experts from other EU countries. They have come to our foreign service mission or Norway to see how we manage the EU regulatory framework, visa, return, border control and etc." (Informant 4).*

The European Commission did not have contact with the UDI during the 2015 crisis related to implementation of EU laws. It was later in 2017 that the Commission evaluated the UDI regarding the Dublin Regulations.

> *"UDI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are going to be evaluated together. Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the foreign missions (they are the first line for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). When it comes to returning cases, UDI and PU are evaluated together. When it comes to information exchange and data protection and privacy, the Data Inspectorate has overall responsibility. So several agencies are involved. Police Directorate (POD) is a secretariat for that evaluation" (Informant 4).*

European Commission did not play a central role during crisis. The same forums were followed as in regular times. The frequency of contact did not increase. Yet, more communications happened at the national level.

> *"In principle, they are the same thing, but one thing I can say that in such a situation one had a much closer follow-up, national coordination, there was a lot of close control, there was a new situation for example: on the border, in north Norway, came over 5000 asylum seekers, it was new situation, did not have a routine, reception places etc. We received on-going instructions from JD" (Informant 4).*

> *"We are part of the system, could have asked for help from the EU, but there were others who had the greatest need in the EU than us. We managed ourselves well through the crisis"(Informant 4).*

> *The only situation European Commission could have influenced us and have a strong role is through our connection to EU - within the Schengen agreement. We were part of Schengen before we became part of the EU, where we are at the council structure and Norway has a strong connection. European regulations here apply to those who stay for short period. Here they could evaluate Norway, in relation to our implementation of the*

EU regulations and border controls. Here the EU has a little stronger role (Informant 4).

No sister agency played any central role during the crisis. There were both some form of formal and informal contacts regarding the implementation of common rules and how other countries solved the refugee problem by themselves. The contacts were not as influential to affect the tasks in UDI.

"We have regular meetings with them and, on the other hand, you can say that there was an increased need for information, we were very concerned with how the others solve, how did you solve yourself, you put together the challenges, it was probably used a lot time for experience sharing, as informal contact then." (Informant 1).

In summary, the review of the downstream processes within the organization has shown that the organization's directors and the leadership of the organization had significant impact on UDI's employees' behaviour. They decide and produce the procedures and routines within organization based on the budget framework and instructions, that is what happened during the crisis as well. The JD continuously was involved sending instructions to the UDI during the crisis. Other actors studied in this thesis did not played significant role during the crisis. Any signals in any from coming from the EU institutions, for instance, went through the JD before being transferred to the UDI. It appears that there were not any particular pressure from the EU on the UDI. Reporting to the EU is a task that the UDI normally does related to Dublin Regulations and Schengen Agreement. The relationships of the UDI with sister agencies were not bounded by any laws and thus the UDI did not have obligations to report to sister agencies. The findings indicate that that the EC and the EASO may be more important actors with some influence on the UDI than the sister agencies.

4.5 Summary of the Empirical Findings
This chapter outlines the UDI's actual behaviour. It presents first the UDI as a national organization and its position in the immigration administration. Next, it presents the steering and management dimensions of the UDI. Furthermore, the UDI's international work is presented to show the extent of Norway's obligations in relation to the EU asylum and refugee policy. Finally, the chapter describes the UDI's employees' attitudes both at the upstream and the downstream processes. These findings are the basis for the analysis in the forthcoming chapter, where theoretical interpretations of the findings are going to be made.
 Based on the current research, there are reasons to assume that the UDI is more active in the downstream processes than in the upstream phases of the decision processes. At the same time, it is largely the national overarching organ, the parent ministry, the JD who had the significant role in influencing the UDI. In upstream process too, it is the JD that does most of the work.
The review of the empirical findings of the research has shown how the UDI as an organization has a low degree of independence from its parent department. The importance of parent ministry, the JD and the power it exercises, is particularly visible in connection with budget provision that affect the resource situation on the asylum field. The other contact between the JD and the UDI is not limited in scope both in the upstream and downstream processes. In addition to the indirect influence through the overall management tools, the JD has the opportunity to exercise control and power through regular meetings. In the case of Storskog, the ministry had significant direct management of task both at the political and operational level.

Furthermore, the European Commission's connection with the UDI is presented through the EASO, Dublin Regulations and Schengen Agreement in the immigration and asylum policy area. The findings has shown how and to what extent the UDI is integrated into European cooperation and how the EEA cooperation is regulated and coordinated. With regard to the sister networks, this chapter has shown how the Nordic cooperation in important in mutual interaction through exchanging information and experiences for policy development.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the theoretical approaches presented in Chapter 2 are discussed in relation to the empirical findings that were presented in Chapter 4. This chapter describes and explains the connections between theory and the empirical data, and examines the extent the theoretical expectations correspond with the actual findings. The points of departure in this chapter are based on the hypotheses raised in chapter 2, stating that the UDI coped with the refugee crisis of 2015 at the national level and/or supranational level in a European context. The thesis examines further the degree of political and professional involvement at the national and supranational levels. An important argument raised in this thesis is that in the time of crisis we expect to see that national agencies draw primarily from their national 'line of command' and relying less on supranational organizations. It is necessary to mention that a reliance on national level increases political involvement. The explanatory variables to test the hypotheses and explain the argument are the organizational capacity, the degree of vertical and horizontal specialization, and the degree of politicization. The explanatory variables explored in this thesis may not be the only ones that can explain the whole behaviour of organizations. There might be other factors in play. One should, therefore, be careful about drawing any general conclusions.

5.1 Multi-level administration

5.1.1 A compound governance model

The compound governance model explores the relationships within an organization and the relationship outside the organization with other relevant actors. In the next few paragraphs, I explore first how the UDI has remained a coherent organization within itself during the crisis. Despite some temporary changes in the structure and slight changes in the procedures, the organization as a whole remained as one. Second, I explore if the UDI is part of a compound governance model and affiliated with several actors across the UDI's level during the crisis.

During the crisis, the frequency of contacts has increased among organization's departments horizontally and between the organization's departments and directors vertically; however, the organization's director and the directors of the departments within the UDI played significant role in establishing the contingency plan. The patterns of contacts among the departments slightly changed and varied from level to level. Some had more contacts while others had few. Some had more contacts at the management level, while others had more contacts at the operational level. The contacts at the management level were rather formal and hierarchical, while at the operational level the contracts were rather informal through random conversations and communications between employees.

The findings indicate that before and in the beginning of the crisis, the contacts and coordination were not sufficient for the level of the crisis, but they later improved. Most of the informants of this research perceived that 'good contacts and relations' existed between the organization directors and departments and also among departments during the crisis. One of the informants from the Reception Department, however, felt that the Asylum Department was often 'absent' at the strategic decision-making mainly due to work overload for the employees and increase in ad-hoc strategic meetings that overly discussed operational issues. This research also found that some of the employees at the lower level of hierarchy had little voice in the change of procedures. Normally, when procedures regarding asylum or other issues with the UDI changes, the proposed document is sent to the some employees for feedback and comments. During the crisis, the decisions need to be made quicker and thus the involvement of lower level employees was ignored.

Despite the slight change in the structure and procedures, the organization still functioned as a whole. Structurally, the organization did not chang much. One of the informants stated that the UDI had the same director, the same propose and goal, and the same parent ministry. The decisions about the change in procedures took into consideration the whole of organization, making sure that slight changes in one unit or department did not have negative consequences for other units.

The compound governance model indicates that a national agency like the UDI can be affiliated with higher level of government, the JD in this case, supranational organizations such as EC's administration and the EASO in this case, and inter-governmental organization such as sister agencies. The findings of this research indicate that the UDI is part of compound governance model and was both active in the upstream and downstream processes during the crisis: contributing to the development and formulation of policy at the upstream level; and being influenced by other national and European actors. The findings also showed that the UDI was more active in the downstream processes and relied on national 'line of command' primarily. In the following, I analyse the relations of the UDI with each of the organizations at different levels.

The UDI is a subordinate agency to the JD. The differentiation of tasks between the UDI and the JD is mainly clear cut. The JD sets the regulations and procedures, while the UDI has the role of the implementer. The JD steer the UDI through the formal instrument such as allocation letters, budget management, instructions and evaluations. During the crisis, there were extensive contacts between the UDI and the JD. The contacts included tasks both in implementation and development of Norwegian and EU policies. The division of tasks between the UDI and the JD mainly remained the same, but the frequency of contacts, both the formal and informal (ad hoc), has increased during the crisis. The JD consistently instructed the UDI on how to manage specific challenges that arose due to the crisis, and the UDI kept reporting to the JD on a daily basis on how the tasks were being implemented. The instruction of the JD to the UDI went beyond instruments and tools, as the JD does under normal circumstances.

All the tasks related to the implementation and development of EU laws were channelled through the JD. It is a normal process and it has occurred during the crisis as well. During the crisis, the UDI and the JD were invited to the EC on new proposal on Dublin Regulations. It was the JD who informed the UDI related to proposal on Dublin Regulations. Also, the UDI is normally oriented and instructed by the JD with regards to Norwegian Laws. For instance, when the Norwegian Immigration Act was reformed, the JD sent two instructions to the UDI after they were approved by the Norwegian parliament and the UDI was informed by the JD about the new law.

Normally, before the UDI and the JD participate in the meetings at the EU level, such as Dublin Joint Committee, there is a dialog process between the two. They discusses the topic beforehand. The UDI's role at the meetings is to give professional suggestions. Otherwise, all the other inputs, particularly questions of politically embedded matters, are addressed by the JD. In Dublin Joint Committee, the JD had the responsibility of preparing, participating and following-up. In other meetings related to Dublin, such as Dublin II Contact Committee, DublinNet Committee, and Eurodac Committee, the UDI was delegated responsibility for preparation, participation and follow-up. During the crisis, the contacts on these related issues were the same between the UDI and the JD.

The path of influence is bidirectional; the UDI also actively participates in hearings to promote her perspectives. Whatever changes the JD plans in the laws or regulations will affect the tasks of the UDI. According to the administration law, when changes are made in the law or when a new law is proposed, the affected organizations should be sent the hearings before they are approved by the parliament. This process appears not to have happened during the crisis in the case of Storskog. During the crisis the influence of the JD on the UDI`s behaviour was

more prominent in certain cases. Apart from the formal communication channels between the JD and the UDI, there were ad hoc and informal communications. In the case of the Storskog, the JD not only instructed and steered the UDI politically, but also did the JD got engaged at the operational level. It was not business as usual, but an effect of the crisis. The JD wished to decrease the pressures on the UDI through handling the issues as soon as possible by their extensive involvement. The minister of the JD and his secretary visited Storskog in person and oversaw the situation. The visit was not only for political matters, but to see if the agreement were being implemented correctly and that if the Russian government followed the agreement, and also to contribute on the implementation of the instruction on Storskog.

Conflict is not uncommon in organizations. When conflicts arise in an organization, communication with relevant stakeholders and the hierarchy of command can resolve them. To not have hearings and being too much controlled by the JD has created a tough situation for the the UDI employees. Some of the case handling officer and other employees in Department of Asylum in Storskog felt the absence of the UDI. The Asylum Department employees expected, first of all, to receive the hearings before they were approved. Second, they expected that the instruction would come through the UDI's director. None of them happened. It created some insecurity to the employees whom they should have listened to implement the instruction.

Participation of the the Norwegian authorities and particularly the UDI as working groups and committees under the European Commission for the development and implementation of EU regulations is indicative of the UDI's involvement at the EU level. There are observations and findings that the UDI had also meetings in time of crisis. The UDI participation at meetings related to change in Dublin Regulations and voluntary engagement with the EU's relocation process are examples of the relationship of the UDI with the EC. Yet, the participation of the UDI at the EU level was not too extensive but only based on those agreements the UDI was bounded by.

Regarding change in Dublin Regulations, the UDI together with the JD were invited to the EC to play a role in developing policy area. This had never happened under normal circumstances. At the policy formulation in case of Dublin, the JD is normally the responsible organization and send signals to the UDI not the EC. Yet, during the crisis the UDI had contacts with the JD ahead of meetings and were prepared and instruction by the JD. But in the case of relocation program which was initiated by the EC through the EASO, the Norwegian government showed the political will to voluntarily contribute to the process and relocation program. It was not an invitation from the EC itself, directly.

When the UDI participates in EU meetings and working groups, the EC requires the UDI to report back on the issues. Regarding the meeting on Dublin regulations and the relocation process, the UDI updated the EC by sending regular reports about the implementation of the EU laws in that regard. The EC also contacted the UDI to check that the regulations are implemented accordingly with the EU common rules. In the case of Dublin, the EC contacted the UDI after the crisis and monitored if the laws were implemented correctly. Initially, an official document was sent, the EC send first an official document and inform the UDI on the evaluation. Later the EC set an appointment and come to the Norwegian foreign stations or at the UDI in Norway to ask the UDI on the implementation of the EU laws. The EC affects the UDI's work rhythm and put pressure on UDI through requirements for reporting and monitoring the UDI by checking that the regulations are used in accordance with the EU common rules.

From the examples of above, inviting the UDI to Dublin regulation and participating of UDI at the relocation process indicated not only that UDI is part of a European Union Multi-level administration system and an increase in UDI's contact at the EU level, it is also clearly indicate that the UDI has been active both at the downstream and upstream levels during crisis.

Norwegian relationship with EC appears to be guarded. On the one hand, Norway is not a signatory member of many EU agreements. On the other hand, Norway voluntary participates in EU activities (relocation process of immigrants in this specific case) due to the organic tie between Norway and the EU. I believe the Norwegian government understands that major issues in the EU would not leave Norway unaffected. That is why Norway willingly participates in processes to ease critical situations in the EU.

Direct relations with the sister agencies appear to be relatively important for the UDI. There is no formal division of tasks between the UDI and sister agencies. The UDI don't follow same procedure and methods when implementing Norwegian laws and/or the EU laws. The agency's most traditional international collaboration is with the Nordic sister agencies. Outside the EEA-relevant cooperation, Nordic cooperation is also the most comprehensive of cooperation between sister agencies. During crisis, it appears that the sister agencies hold the same contact point and pattern. And there was not any increase in the relationships apart from some informal contact between the employees of the Asylum Department and Reception Department.

Right after crisis, it appears that the EMN conducted a survey and research on migration and asylum situation to compare the EU member states. Norway was also one of the 25 EMN national contact point (NCP). Many Norwegian experts participated in research. There, the UDI employees meet their colleagues from other sister agencies and informally discusses and share experience. The purpose of the network is to meet and exchange information about the EU institutions and the needs of the EU member states on migration and asylum.

Sometimes forum are being created and establish among sister agencies to collaborate on some specific matter. And then they are close down. Interestingly, specific forum on the crisis did not take shape during or post 2015. I suspect governments had too much on their plates to handle and that's why they didn't have time for another forum. It can also be argued that the EU response to the crisis was suboptimal, hinting to individual government's initiative to address the problem within their own borders.

5.1.2 Summary

The analysis shows how the UDI had relationships with several actors on issues related to asylum and immigration, and that these relationships affected UDI's behaviour in such a way that the administration could be characterized as a compound. Based on the findings of this research, relationships are both formal and informal between the UDI and the JD, EC's administration, EASO and sister agencies, with varying degrees. The condition for contact varied with different organizations. The JD is responsible parent ministry, steer the UDI by allocation letters, budget provision, instructions, and evaluations. This contact is considered to have become expansive during the crisis.

The EC and EASO are interested in the implementation and practice of the EU laws within the UDI. On the other hand, the UDI contributes to the development and formulation of the EU laws. During the crisis, the UDI was invited to participate in meetings to reform the Dublin regulations as a response to the crisis. The contact with the EU level always happens under the guidance and instruction of the responsible parent ministry. Except for the Dublin and Schengen agreements, other contacts are voluntary. Moreover, the UDI voluntarily participated in the EU's relocation program, bringing in refugees from countries Eastern Europe to ease the pressure on the EU as a whole. The relationships with these supranational agencies are indirect, through the parent ministry. The contact of the UDI with these EU institutions were not as extensive as with JD during crisis. But one can still observe a slight increase in contact pattern.

The contacts with the sister agencies are for the purpose of exchanging knowledge and information. The frequency of contacts has not increased. Informant contacts among employees

of the UDI's Asylum Department with sister agencies, and UDI's Reception Department with sister agencies in Belgium and Netherlands were mainly for informational purposes. The UDI is not bounded in any form to have relationships with sister agencies. There are some permanent forums in which the UDI Norway participates. Due to the voluntary format of the relation, the JD is not involved in the relationship. It is worth mentioning that some forums are lead by EC such as EMN.

The degree of contact also varies between organizations and shows slight change during crisis. During the crisis of 2015, the UDI had the most extensive contact with actors at the national level and particular with the parent ministry. The second most contact was with the EC and EASO, especially on matters that the UDI has an established agreement with those supranational agencies. It appears that frequency of contact with sister agencies does not change much during the crisis.

The impact of the relationships depends on the type of the relationship and the organizations. The UDI must follow instructions from her parent ministry, the JD. During normal times, the JD steers the UDI through established link and is not much involved in the routine operations of the UDI. Yet, during the crisis, the JD showed particular interest in the operations of the UDI to make sure the agency responds to the crisis effectively. During the crisis, the JD established a supporting unit and a secretariat to continuously and effectively coordinate issues with the UDI. The impact of the relationships with supranational organizations appears to be subtler through learning from one another.

However, the findings support that UDI is primarily ministry-driven, and much less steered by the Commission, still the UDI is sometimes both Commission-driven and ministry-driven, thus being 'double-hatted' (Egeberg 2006). The main conclusion is thus that the primary task of domestic agencies when handling domestic 'EU affairs' is as subordinate units to their 'parent ministry' and much less as satellite units for the Commission (Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).

The findings are summarized in Table 5.1.1.

Table 5.1.1. Compound steering: Relationships between theoretical expectations and findings during crisis. The table distinguishes between strong correlation between expectations and findings (++), some correlation between expectations and findings (+) and no findings (-)

Multi-level administration		
A Compound Governance Model	Expected relationships between the UDI and other actors	Empirical findings: Relationship (+), Strong relationship (++), & no findings (-).
UDI's relationships with several actors	1- The UDI has relationships with several actors regarding theirs tasks on asylum and migration policy. 2- The UDI actively contacts several actors to promote views on the formulation of regulations. 3- The UDI can feel pressure related to the implementation and practice of common regulations.	(++) (+) (++)
With the JD	1- The JD informs the UDI on new proposals for EU regulations. 2- The JD influences the UDI's task on asylum and migration policy through signals in the allocation	(++) (++)

	letters, budget provision and instructions. 3- There is a certain dialogue between the JD and the UDI on the practice of EU regulations.	(++)
With the EC	1- Extensive participation by the UDI in meetings at European level. 2- Preparations of the UDI ahead of meetings at the European level. 3- The UDI is actively seeking consideration for its views in collaboration with the EC. 4- The UDI is in contacts with the EC with questions regarding implementation of the EU laws. 5- EC affects the UDI's work rhythm through requirements for reporting the EC at the specific times. 6- The EC checks that the regulations are used in accordance with the EU common rules and regulations.	(+) (++) (-) (+) (+) (+)
With the sister agencies	1- Relationships between employees in the different sister agencies through formal and informal contact. 2- The sister agencies contact each other with questions related to implementation of EU regulations and exercise mutual influence on each other's discretion. 3- Method, procedures and routines are coordinated and sister agencies contact each other to develop collaboration.	(+) (-) (-)
With the EASO	1- There is broad contact between the UDI and the EASO. 2- They mutually influence each others tasks by providing technical and professional support.	(++) (++)

5.2 Organizational Theory and The Explanatory Variables
5.2.1 Capacity

Capacity is an organizational factor including size (employees), task and technology that a department devote to a particular policy area. Regarding the main point highlighted about the capacity, public organizations with small capacity are dependent on the corresponding ministry and that such organization are not able to do more more tasks until they have been allocated more resources by the political administration. Findings in this thesis support this argument. This thesis also finds that capacity is not rigid. It can be stretched through various mechanisms. When the crisis hit, the UDI relied on some coping mechanism to address the crisis: increasing working hours of some employees, relocating staff from other departments to the asylum department, and finding temporary places as residences for new arrivals. Although short-term solutions, the mechanisms indicate that the capacity of an organization can be stretched for short period of times to handle tasks that are normally above their capacity. It shows capacity is a dynamic concept and the UDI's dynamic capacity played an important role during the crisis of 2015.

Overstretching the capacity for longer periods can have negative consequences for the organization. As the UDI learned that the capacity it had in its disposal was not enough to cope with the crisis, it realized that further and longer stretching can affect other part of organization's task and the regular lines of activities. The UDI consulted with the JD for providing them with more budget and the the UDI's budget increased 46% in 2015 compare to 2014, and another 52% in 2016. The findings thus indicate the importance of capacity in coping with crisis situations and support what the theory posits that an organization cannot function well beyond its particular capacity, the UDI had to increase its capacity in terms of the size and tasks and technological resources to handle the crisis.

5.2.2 Vertical specialization

Vertical specialization is a hierarchical model of division of tasks. Vertical specialization shows how tasks are allocated vertically within and between organizations. Vertical specialization allows the UDI to connect with departments and units within, and to connect with the European Commission across organization and act with multiple hats, and makes the UDI vulnerable to agency capture.

The idea behind vertical specialization over a policy field is to clarify responsibilities and roles and to ensure independence. In the vertical specialization, tasks related to the implementation of the government's immigration and asylum policy have been given to the UDI, subjected to the JD. This method of division of tasks has significant effect on the UDI's actual administrative behaviour, because the UDI had to consult and contact with the JD on issues whenever there was a need for clarification or instructions.

On the other hand, when the distance between the parent ministry and the national agency is at arm's length, the UDI had space to connect at European level without direct involvement from the ministry. The EASO can be an example of the direct contact of the UDI at the EU level. EASO is a separate agency from the European Commission. The purpose of such "agencification" at EU level was to work towards the goal of more uniform implementation of regulations across member states by the agencies being able to monitor and assist the member countries' implementation. The UDI is in fact a national contact point in EASO and manages most of the contact with the agency in Norway. Although there are reporting requirements up to JD, the UDI has the greatest insight into EASO's tasks, and information asymmetry can therefore occur between the JD and the UDI. One outcome of asymmetry of information could be that the UDI develop a slightly different view on the implementation of the European laws and regulations than the JD. Findings in this study show that the UDI and JD may have slightly different views on implementation of the law, such as the case of Storskog during crisis. The UDI employees was not totally satisfied with the implementation of laws and thought it was not proper. Although it is perceived as being very problematic since JD has the last word, it is nevertheless a result of vertical specialization that the UDI can come in a situation where they face other views than the Ministry.

The UDI participates in EU affairs indirectly through the JD. European laws are first integrated into Norwegian law, and then passed through the JD to the UDI for implementation. On the other hand, the UDI assists the ministry with professional input in policy formulation processes related to EU affairs. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the UDI is also directly engaged with EU affairs, specifically through the EASO. The direct engagement applies primarily to the implementation process of policy. Also European networks are used by the UDI to discuss the application and interpretation of the provisions.

Vertical specialization posits that there are few communications between the parent ministry and the agencies on policy processes and implementation of the policies. Yet, this study finds that upstream involvement of the UDI in policy processes has been prominent, as well as downstream involvement of the JD in implementation of policies. For instance, the UDI

sent case handling experts to Italy and Greece to participate voluntarily in relocation process. Involvement of the UDI in the relocation process was a political will of the Norwegian government. Furthermore, when the UDI was invited to the EC about the new proposal on Dublin regulation, the JD had regular contact with the UDI on the issue. Downstream engagement of the JD was also witnessed after the crisis as the ministry formed support units and a secretariat to oversee the management of the crisis by the UDI.

Based on vertical specialization, national agencies which participates in international meetings such as EU, have less political control from their parent ministry. Less political control allow national agencies to promote their professional views in international meetings. This study finds opposite, and the UDI in fact felt much political pressure and had specific instructions from their parent ministry before the meetings. During crisis, it was not easy for the UDI to promote their professional views freely. In fact, the UDI position in international meetings are mostly as the representative of the state. The contact was mainly at the leadership level and the employees at the lower levels of hierarchy in the UDI had less contacts with employee in the JD the same as the theory also stated.

The degree of vertical specialization affects the UDI's behaviour on asylum and immigration policy. The vertical specialization process has allowed the UDI to have relationship beyond the ministry, yet the relationships were controlled through regulations or meetings. This research finds that the JD has a strong direct management of the task, indicative of a centralized vertical specialization.

5.2.3 Horizontal specialization

Horizontal specialization, according to the purpose principle, is expected to promote harmonization of policy area both across territorial divisions and within the same level of an organization. UDI's departments have a form of horizontal specialization. The relation between the UDI, the EC, the EASO and sister agencies is also a form of horizontal specialization.

Norwegian central administration is largely specialized according to the purpose principle with the JD as responsible for the immigration field and the UDI as responsible for processing applications for residence in Norway. The division of labor or specialization nationally and European is believed to have an influence on decision-making processes and working conditions.

Within the UDI, empirical findings of this study indicate that there is a strong coordination between the Reception Departments and the Asylum Departments. Sometimes, the Asylum Department needs to know who and where the refugees are residing. They need to contact the Reception Department to get the information. These departments impact each other's tasks. If the asylum application process is delay or takes longer, the cost increase for the reception department to provide residency for longer.

The findings of this research show that the UDI is also very involved in networks and groups with sister agencies and EU institutions. From an organizational perspective, the UDI's contact with sister agencies and EASO is possible because of the horizontal specialization of tasks and with the European Commission and EASO. The European Commission's tasks are to initiate legislative proposals and to follow up that decisions are complied with in the member states. Since the Commission does not have its own regulatory bodies at national level in the Member States, they are dependent on national implementing bodies. The EU agencies are also considered as an extension of the Commission in this case, as tasks related to following-up and assistance to the member states have been relocated to EU agencies on several fields, partially due to lack of capacity in the Commission and partially due to the reluctance of the Member States to surrender more sovereignty to the Commission.

As the UDI is sector-specialized, there are sectoral divisions that exist in the interaction with the Commission and the EU agency. The division of labor promotes sectoral conflict lines that cross territorial conflict lines and this organizational factor can explain why a multi-level administration has emerged.

The respondents in this study experience low degree of conflict in the interaction at EU level, but disagreements can occur. When there is disagreement in the forums at the EU level, the disagreement usually revolves around the bureaucrats knowing what their ministry / political leadership think on specific cases, and therefore, disagreements between countries are on how to interpret the regulations. The disagreements apparently follow territorial boundaries which conflict with the assumptions promoted by the organizational perspective. It may nevertheless seem that the bureaucrats initially have professionally strong discussions as it is emphasized that there is a high degree of professionalism in these forums. The bureaucrats want to have professional discussions and collaborate at European level, while being aware that one can be instructed for something else at home. Another finding that limits the importance of territorial divisions is that respondents emphasize that contact with EASO and sister agencies is very important and frequent. Last but not least, it emerges from the empirical findings that more of the respondents participate in committees at EU level (e.g. in EASO) on the basis of the position they have as representative of the implementing body, and consider that the appeal body may be of another opinion. This shows that sectoral issues are important to the bureaucrats and displace territorial divisions. One of the reasons why disagreements partly follow territorial divisions may be that the Ministry participates with the UDI in the meetings, for example in the group that is working on interpreting Dublin regulations under the Commission.

In justice sector, the member states do not pool sovereignty to EU institutions. The EASO or other EU institutions do not have formal ways to instruct the UDI in the implementation of regulations. EASO nevertheless functions as support office in which there is close and frequent contact between national implementing bodies and where information is exchanged. It must be emphasized that the best practice and information development can also be an influence. Nor is it considered illegitimate to experience the influence of these institutions as Norway's obligations to the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation imply that it also has obligations to participate at EU level, which can legitimize any "two-hated". The respondents of this research emphasize that there is no instructional authority from the Commission or EASO. The information exchange on practice and interpretation that takes place can also affect the UDI's behaviour. The information exchanged between the member states in the EU agencies also forms the basis for new policy proposals by the EU agency.

Participation of the UDI in working groups and networks at European level takes place in part both alone and with the Ministry. Particularly in the Council, it is primarily the JD who is responsible for the Norwegian delegation in the various group. This cannot be considered problematic from an organizational perspective since the Council is territorially specialized. It would therefore be natural for the Ministry to lead these delegations. On the other hand, the UDI participates only in EASO working groups, including in connection with the Dublin regulations (Steering Committee) where Dublin units from the national implementing bodies participate. EASO can, to some extent, be considered a directorate subject to the Commission, which receives control signals from the Commission.

5.2.4 Degree of politicization

Politicization as process is defined as an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation (Wilde 2011,). Public organizations are part of the society's political organization and usually have a

political leadership in the end (Christensen, et al., 2015). Politicization is argued to manifest itself in three different forms: politicization of institutions, politicization of decision-making processes and politicization of issues (Wilde, 2011, p. 560).

The UDI is not a political institution, nor the process of decision-making is politicized. It is an administrative organ. But the policy area the UDI works with, is highly politicized. Politicization of issues is one the main reason that the politics is involve in decision-making within the UDI. During crisis, the findings indicate also the two other manifestation of politicisation. Procedures, rules, practices which the UDI followed in the case of Storskog, particularly, made up the day to day functioning of Norwegian parliament. For example, two rounds of amendments to the Norwegian Immigration Act proposed by the JD. Both tried to slow down and gain control of the flow of asylum seekers. One is the Prop. 16L (2015-16) and the other is the Prop. 90L (2015-16).

In these amendments, the parliament granted the JD the power to instruct the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) to refuse ordinary processing of asylum application coming from Russia and return refugees at least until 1 January 2018. It also instructs and allows the UDI to deny ordinary asylum cases. Through these amendments and the instructions, the JD attempted to overrule the UDI. Based on what the theory posits, if the JD overrule the UDI, the role of the directors will increase. It precisely indicate the internal hierarchization and increased political involvement. In light of this, if the role of the politicians and the role of the parent ministry is strong, there is little to believe the involvement of greater professionalism and stronger role of the EC.

5.2.5 Summary

The analysis shows how and to what extent the explanatory variables can help explain the interconnected management of the UDI on issues related to immigration and refugee policy area within and across organizations. The vertical specialization creates a distance with the parent ministry, and thus opens up potential relations with other actors. The fact that the task on refugee matters is horizontally specialized according to the purpose principle helps to promote relations within the UDI and between the UDI, the European Commission's administration and sister agencies. In particular, the cooperation with the European Commission's administration through Dublin and Schengen regulation and EASO cooperation contribute to promoting sectoral cooperation for harmonization of refugee policies. At the same time, Nordic co-operation is also important with regard to, among other things, professional development and practical aspects. The capacity was one of the most important variables which allowed the JD to control and influence the UDI. And finally, the findings support that the degree of politicization had a significant role and effect on UDI's actual behaviour.

The findings are summarized in Table 2.3.5.

Table 2.3.5. Organizational Theory: Summary of relationships between the variables and the effect on UDI's administrative behaviour. The evaluation differentiates between between strong correlation between expectations and findings (++), some correlation between expectations and findings (+) and no findings (-). No findings (-) mark that in the absence of observations, there is no basis to evaluate relationships.

Explanatory variables	Expectations based on theory	Empirical findings: Relationship (+), strong relationship (++), & no findings (-).

Capacity	It is expected that organization has a particular capacity and cannot act more than its capacity allowing it. Capacity indicate to what extend a unit, department, and position, both vertically and horizontally, devoted to a particular policy area. This may cause; 1- Public organization with small capacity, are dependent on the corresponding ministry in regard to increase the budget. 2- Public organizations with small capacity, are not able to do more tasks until they have been attributed more resources by the political administrative unit they are operating under.	(++) (++)
Vertical specialization	Expected to affect the national agency's task on asylum and migration policy by opening up relationships with actors other than JD. This may cause; 1- The contact between the JD and the UDI mainly takes place through the agency's management and leadership. 2- UDI's employees generally have few relations with the Ministry. 3- The JD controlling the UDI is expected to take place through main instruments (means) such as allocation letter, budget provision, and instructions. 4- The agency is experiencing little direct ministry management of the tasks with the UDI. 5- It is unlikely that the ministry and agency will have significant contact with upstream and downstream processes. 6- The agency's participants in international meetings feel less politically controlled and therefore relatively free to promote their own professional views.	
Horizontal Specialization	Horizontal specialization according to the purpose principle is expected to promote harmonization of refugee policy area across territorial divisions, because the specialization promotes attention to divisions between disciplines more than borders between countries.This may cause; 1- Employees who works with asylum matters in the UDI, at the Commission's administration and in sister agencies develop cooperation, coordinate tasks and develop relationships across national borders. 2- It is expected sector cooperation on refugee and migration matters between the UDI, the EC and the EASO. 3- Horizontal specialization increases the likelihood of mutual influence between the national agency, the commission's administration and sister agencies. 4- It may increase integration regarding asylum and migration policy, both in upstreaming and downstreaming process.	(+) (+) (+) (+)

5.3 Conclusion

The UDI is an agency in relationship with multiple organizations. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (JD), according to the Norwegian administration law, has the overall administrative and budgetary responsibility for the UDI. The UDI's relationships with the European Commission's administration are not mentioned in the law. It is the EEA Agreement, Dublin Regulations, and Schengen Agreement that provide an overview of the UDI's relationship with EC. The MLA perspective helps outline how and to what extent the UDI is connected with the JD, EC, EASO, and sister agencies.

The findings of this study show there are clear tendencies that the UDI is part of a common union administration forming a transnational cooperation with sister agencies, especially the Nordic Cooperation. The collaborations between the UDI and the EC, EASO,

and sister agencies on asylum and immigration issues are through European regulations, while Nordic Collaborations contribute to professional development of the UDI in performing its activities effectively.

This thesis aimed to understand the UDI's administrative (bureaucratic) behaviour during a crisis through the MLA perspective. The theory helped understand the way horizontal and vertical bureaucratic interactions occur among various political layers across different levels of government. It also helped understand how supranational administrations function and use resources, and how national bureaucratic structures and actors adapt to and exploit their respective constellations.

Organizational theory helped explain how an interconnected form of governance in the UDI is made possible. The fact that the agency is vertically organized contributes to the main part of the relationship with the parent ministry, as the contacts happen through the agency's management. Furthermore, the UDI is organized as an arm's length agency from the parent ministry, giving the UDI more discretion professionally. Yet, due to highly politicized area of asylum and immigration, the reality during the crisis can be different. The parent ministry can get involved in operational management of its arm's length agency. The increase in contacts between the UDI and the JD on issues of asylum policy development and implementation helps explain the matter. Moreover, the parenty ministry didn't allow the UDI to have broad administrative relations with the European Commission's administration and sister agencies during the crisis.

The horizontal specialization of the system promoted harmonization across territorial borders. Such specialization contributed in understanding both the UDI and sister agencies being responsible for fairly similar policy areas and also the UDI and the EC which have corresponding responsibility. That's perhaps the reason for increased relationships between the UDI employees and their counterparts in other sister agencies through EMN, EASO or directly during the crisis.

In a state of crisis, a public organization which is often part of a complex organizational structure and in coordination with many actors may get trapped in a coordination dilemma. This thesis helps understand how a public organization, i.e. the UDI, survive a coordination dilemma during a crisis. The findings of this thesis indicate that the UDI's professional behaviour was partially controlled by the parent ministry during the crisis. The strong national relationship could affect the UDI's coordination relationship with other actors.

This thesis finally presents that the task of implementing the EU legislation at national level is compounded and influenced by several organizations simultaneously. The UDI can act as a "multi-hatted" agency with links to the EC and sister agencies, as well as their respective ministries. But the relationship of the UDI and the EC is broadly indirect, through and under the instruction of the JD. The primary role of a domestic agency, even when handling 'EU affairs', is being a subordinate unit to their 'parent ministry' and less of a 'satellite unit' for the European Commission's administration and sister agencies.

The conclusion must be interpreted restrictively in the area of asylum and immigration during a crisis, and are not necessarily transferable to other policy areas. The explanatory variables explored in this thesis may not be the only ones that can explain the whole behaviour of organizations. There might be other factors in play. One should, therefore, be careful about drawing any general conclusions.

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Appendice 1: Request of participation in research project

Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjektet

" UDI i et europeisk kontekst under flernivå litteratur"

Informasjonsskrivet og samtykkeskjemaet er laget med utgangspunkt i veiledende mal for informasjonsskriv fra Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD).

Bakgrunn og formål

I forbindelse med min masteroppgave ved Universitetet i Agder (UiA), Institutt for statsvitenskap og ledelsesfag, ønsker jeg å intervjue ledere og ansatte i UDI med ansvar for flyktninger. Det vil bli en form for strategisk utvalg og førstegangskontakt vil bli opprettes ved hjelp av min veilederen.

Formålet med prosjektet er å undersøke hvordan og i hvilken grad UDI samarbeider med Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, EU-kommisjonens administrasjon og «søster byråer» i andre land i sitt arbeid med flyktninger og særlig flyktningkrise. Prosjektets andre formål er å analysere hvordan dette samarbeidet kan forklares.

Problemstillingen som foreløpig er formulert ser sånn ut. Hvordan UDI håndterte flyktningkrise internt og eksternt.

Hva innebærer deltakelse i studien?

For å få pålitelige data om formelle og uformelle administrative system er det svært nødvendig å samtale med menneskene som berøres av dette. Oppgavens metodiske tilnærming innebærer derfor intervjuer med ledere og ansatte i UDI. Oppgaven vil også benytte dokumentanalyse for å øke undersøkelsens reliabilitet og validitet.

Spørsmålene vil i hovedsak omhandle organiseringen av UDIs arbeid med flyktningkrise og samarbeidet UDI har med Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, EU-institusjoner og «søster byråer» i andre land. Om dere tillater det, vil jeg gjerne ta opp intervjuene på bånd. Intervjuguiden er utformet slik at det ikke vil fremkomme personopplysninger i opptaket. Om ønskelig kan intervjuene gjennomføres uten båndopptak.

Hva skjer med informasjonen om deg?

Intervjuene vil benytte eksisterende normer for datainnsamling. Opplysningene som fremkommer anonymiseres for å unngå at enkeltpersoner gjenkjennes i masteroppgaven.

Alle personopplysninger vil bli behandlet konfidensielt, slik at uvedkommende ikke får kjennskap til opplysninger vi mottar eller innhenter. Båndopptakene vil være tilgjengelige bare for veileder og meg selv. Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes 1. juni 2018. Opptakene slettes når oppgaven er ferdigstilt, og senest i juni 2018.

Frivillig deltakelse

Det er frivillig å delta i studien, og du kan når som helst trekke ditt samtykke uten å oppgi noen grunn. Dersom du trekker deg, vil alle opplysninger om deg bli anonymisert.

Dersom du ønsker å delta eller har spørsmål til studien, ta kontakt med:

Muzhda Rezaee (student): telefon 99877925, e-post nmuzhda@gmail.com

Jarle Trondal (veileder): telefon 38141561, e-post jarle.trondal@uia.no

Studien er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, NSD - Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS.

Appendice 2: Consent of participation

Samtykke til deltakelse i studien 78

Jeg har mottatt informasjon om studien, og er villig til å delta

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(Signert av prosjektdeltaker, dato)

Jeg samtykker også til at båndopptaker kan benyttes under intervjuet

Appendice 3: Interview Guide

Håndtering av den store økningen i antall søkere internt i UDI

1) I hvilken grad har UDI håndtert krisen gjennom eksisterende prosedyrer og arbeidsplaner?

    i) Var de eksisterende prosedyrer og arbeidsplaner god nok? Eller måtte UDI improvisere og utvikle nye arbeidsplaner?

    ii) Hvor og hvem produserte nye prosedyrer og arbeidsplaner?

2) Hvordan og i hvilken grad var kontakt mellom avdelinger i krisehåndtering?

    i) I hvilken grad var kontakten styrt av avdelingsledelse og de har sendt prosedyrer og arbeidsplaner og i hvilken grad var det styrt av andre i avdelinger (avdelingens handlingsrom)?

    ii) I hvilke situasjoner hadde de kontakt?

    iii) Hvem tok initiativ og kontakt først? Var det ledelsen i avdelingen eller andre personer i avdelingen?

3) Hvordan og i hvilken grad var det kontakt mellom organisasjonsledelse og avdelinger i krisen tiden?

    i) I hvilken grad var kontakten styrt av organisasjonsledelse og den har sendt prosedyrer og arbeidsplaner og i hvilken grad var det styrt av avdelinger (handlingsrom i avdelinger)?

    ii) I hvilke situasjoner hadde de kontakt?

    iii) Hvem som tok initiativ og kontakt først? Var det organisasjonsledelsen eller noen i avdelingen som tok kontakt?

Håndtering av den store økningen i antall søkere eksternt

UDI-Justis og beredskapsdepartementet

4) Hvordan og i hvilken grad var kontakt mellom UDI og JD i krise tiden?

    i) I hvilken grad styrtes UDI av departementet gjennom instrukser i praksis? Og i hvilken grad var UDI autonom (UDIs handlingsrom)?

    ii) Hvor viktig var disse instrukser for UDI under krisen?

    iii) Var UDI involvert i endring av eksisterende instrukser (rammeverk) eller i utforming av nye instrukser (for eksempel i Storskogs instruks)?

UDI-Europakommisjonen, søsterbyråer og EASO

5) Hvordan og i hvilken grad var kontakt mellom UDI og Europakommisjons administrasjon, søsterbyråer og EASO under krisen?

   i) Hvilke aktører hadde et sentral rolle i krise tiden? Var det kommisjonen, EASO eller søsterbyråer?

ii) I hvilke situasjoner var det kontakt mellom UDI og de overnevnte aktører?

iii) Hvor mye av informasjonen kom fra EASO? Hvem som er koordinator?

iv) Hvordan fungerte og oppfattes kontakten?

v) Hvilke aktører evt. ansett som mest betydningsfulle i krise tiden?

6) Vet du om det var noe uenigheter mellom måten UDI selv ønsket å gjennomføre oppgavene og måten andre aktører forventet UDI å gjøre under krisen?

i) Hvis ja, hvordan har UDI håndtert uenighetene mellom UDI og andre aktører? Har du noen eksempler som viser dette?

Andre spørsmål

7) Har du noen rapporter, planer eller annet skriftlig materiale med informasjon om UDI's kontakt med JD, Europakommisjonen, søsterbyråer og EASO?

8) Ønsker du til å tilføye noe?

9) Takker for intervjuet og spør om godkjenning til å ta kontakt ved senere anledning dersom noe skulle være uklart.

Appendice 4: UDI's Organisational Map

Appendice 5: Strategy for the UDI's international work. Produced from "UDIs deltakelse i internasjonale fora" (UDI, 2011)

UDI's International Cooperation			
Name of forum	**UDI's participation by**	**The Parent Ministry and other organs**	**Background information**
GDISC			It is a forum for cooperation among general directors of the european administration on asylum and migration. The purpose is to establish a network and cooperation for practical and operational matters. Financing by the member states and EC. Has close cooperation with the EC.
1- Annual Conference	Director & FSK		Annual meeting av directors and the purpose is to maintain the contact and discuss overarching problem.
2- Asylum Conference	Asylum Department (ASA) at Director level		Meetings among asylum directors of different countries. The purpose is to maintain the contact and discuss challenges on asylum issues at the overarching level.
3- Managed Migration Conference	Resident Permit Department (OPA)		The purpose is to maintain the contact and discuss challenges on permit resident at the overarching level.
4- Team-based meetings	Leaders and experts		The purpose is to let the the leaders and experts to discuss the challenges of important topics such as return and etc.
5- High level working group meetings	Department's directors and leaders of specific areas		The purpose is to gather the experts from different country to discuss the less important topics.
6- Expert meetings	Experts		The purpose is to gather the experts from different country to discuss the country and team-based topics.
7- Statistic cooperation/ sending information	FSK & ESA		Sending statistic of weekly arrival of asylum seekers in a month
European Migration Network (EMN)			The network has purpose to cover information the EU institutions and the member states need. Leads by the EC.
1- Meetings for EMN NCP & working groups	FSK/INE in experts level	JD/ISF	

2- Annual EMN conference	FSK/INE in experts level	JD/ISF	
3- National EMN meeting	FSK/INE in experts level	JD/ISF	
European Cooperation and forums on asylum area			To develop a common European asylum system
1- EASO	FSK/INE & ASA, at leader and experts level	JD & Country information	Support office and practical cooperation among member states
2- Working groups	ASA & RMA at experts level	JD, UNE, & Country information	Exchanging experience and discussing question related to asylum practice. Four working groups.
3- Dublin-forum	ASA at leader and experts level		Norway participates in meeting discussing about the implementation of Dublin regulation among EU countries
4- Dublin Joint Committee			Formal meetings among associated countries and EU. The JD has the main responsibility for preparation, participation and following up. The UDI give input before and under the meetings.
5- Dublin II Contact Committee			The committee under the Commission. The committee cooperate about practice of the Dublin II regulations. The UDI has been delegated the responsibility for preparation, participation and following up.
6- Dubli-nett Committee			The committee under the Commission. The committee discusses questions regarding exchange of information between countries. The UDI has been delegated the responsibility for preparation, participation and following up.
7- Eurodac Committee			The committee under Commission. The committee discusses questions regarding Eurodac database between countries. The UDI has been delegated the responsibility for preparation, participation and following up.
European Cooperation and forums on reception area			
1- European Platform of Reception Agencies (EPRA)	RMA at director, leader and expert level		Informal forum. The purpose is to compare and develop practice and implementation of reception area among the central European countries.

2- Full Round of Consultations	RMA at director, leader		In the Full Round Consultation the different countries go through relevant development in policy, practice and statistic.
3- Working group meetings	RMA at leader and expert level		Different topics discussed in depth after the decision taken in the Full Round Consultations.
European Cooperation and forums on return area			
1- Contact Committee "return directive"	FSK/INE & ASA, at experts level	JD	The committee under the Commission. The committee discusses questions on interpretation of return directives. The UDI participates in some meetings by request from the parent ministry
2- European Return Platform for unaccompanied minors	RMA & ASA at leader and experts level		
Nordic Cooperation			It contribute to develop common nordic prospective, specially in issues being discussed in other international forum such as EU.
1- "Nordisk utlendingsutvalg" (NU)			
a) Director meetings	Directors & contact person at FSK		A cooperation forum for directors of the immigration authority in Nordic. Discusses all type of questions related to migration asylum.
b) Working groups			Small working groups for following up practical questions and contact analysis.
Working group for asylum directors	ASA at director level		The purpose is to discuss questions regarding steering and organising of asylum issues related.
Working group for permit resident directors	OPA at director level		The purpose is to discuss questions regarding steering and organisering of permit resident issues related.
Working group for Reception Department	RMA at director level		The purpose is to be a forum for professional contact at the reception area.
Working group for Communication and Service	KOM at leader level		The purpose is exchange of information and experience
Working group for statistic and analyse	FSK/EAS at leader level		The purpose is to discuss and coordinate the presentation of the statistic which is common interest of the Nordic countries.
Working group for visa	OPA at leader and expert level & FSK at expert level		The purpose is exchange of experience and practice of visa regulations.

Working group for EEA regulations - free movement	OPA at leader level & FSK at expert level		The purpose is to discuss relevant questions on interpreting and practicing of regulations about free movement.
2- "Nordisk samrådsgruppe på høyt nivå for flyktning-spørsmål" (NSHF)	Director	JD	An informational forum. The Nordic countries informally discuss questions on asylum, refugee, migration, return and resettling.

Finner ingen stikkord.