

# George W. Bush a Revolutionary President?

The Picture of "the Others": An Analysis of Political Speeches by George W. Bush and Harry S. Truman

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*This Master's Thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this education. However, this does not imply that the University answers for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.*



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Mr. Elsey has had an uncanny knack of being in the right place at the right time in history. He has been directly involved in historical events such as: the D-day, the Truman Doctrine, Whistle stop campaign, Potsdam Conference, the atomic bomb, the Berlin blockade, Korean War and meetings with Churchill, Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek. Under Harry S. Truman he worked mostly with speeches and political advice. Elsey participated also in formulating the famous Clifford-Elsey paper, known as The Long Telegram, some State of Unions and speeches in the Whistle stop campaign.

It obviously had a high value for me communicating with someone who was there as an eye and ear witness to some of the greatest decisions made in the last century. Some of his responses in three interviews will be included in chapter three, four and five.

Finally before starting this paper, I would like to thank my supervisors Olav Arild Abrahamsen and Jan Erik Grindheim for their feedback that I occasionally used, as well as their encouraging words that were always welcome. Special thanks go to Dr. Jan Erik Grindheim who has inspired me to go on with this task after some discussions about continuity-discontinuity in international politics.

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## **ABSTRACT**

There are ongoing debates about the concept of continuity and discontinuity in American foreign policy. This research has focused on whether the controversial George W. Bush's rhetoric can be seen as radical new or as a traditional element in American foreign policy.

According to researchers such as Sven Melby, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, George W. Bush can be seen as a revolutionary president. George W. Bush rhetoric was aggressive and dualistic. With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, he must carry much of the responsibility for his hawkish image, they claim.

Not all agrees to a presentation like this one. Researchers such as Melvyn P. Leffler, John Lewis Gaddis, Robert Kagan and Walter Russell Mead argue more for continuity. Walter Russell Mead operates with four traditions in American policy. According to Mead, these traditions were present under Bush. These traditions are: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian.

In searching for answers, this research investigated speeches and statements from two American president's by focusing on time of crisis and the relation to "the others." The controversial Harry S. Truman's rhetoric has been compared with George W. Bush's in relation to the Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions. Truman and Bush can be seen as representatives not only for the Wilsonian and the Jacksonian tradition, but also the same aspects and variations within these typologies.

Looking at it historically, it can be discussed whether Bush's sharp tone was a new phenomenon in American politics. An aggressive and dualistic style seems to be little revolutionary in American politics. Much indicates that George W. Bush was one of several carriers of continuity in the U.S. politics.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 George W. Bush and the Debate Between Continuity and Discontinuity

Among internationally oriented researchers there are ongoing debates about the concept of continuity and discontinuity in American foreign policy. A recurrent theme of the discussion is to what extent the U.S. foreign policy have changed after the fall of the wall and 9/11. With Soviet Union's collapse a structural change appears to be evident. United States must no longer deal with a bipolar system. The country has become a hegemonic power in an almost unipolar system. Although the U.S. role in the world trade appears to weaken, the nation frequently shows muscles as a fearsome war-hungry nation (Sadar and Davies 2002:78).

The focus on the U.S. as a new and more powerful state was especially present during George W. Bush's presidency. During the Bush era several nations were threatened, and some were attacked. A majority of Europeans saw themselves in opposition to the U.S. behavior (Lanford and Tashev 2005, Kagan 2003). Much of the U.S. confidence in the world community was broken down, due to Bush and his illegal interventions and frequently rhetorical assault against a number of nations.

In this context, some researchers saw Bush as a revolutionary phenomenon in American foreign policy. According to one of the discontinuity researchers, Svein Melby, it was only a matter of time before the U.S. unique position of strength after the Cold War would lead to a change in the country's foreign policy. The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) researcher argues that 9/11 was the excuse the U.S. needed to increase the aggressiveness (Melby 2004:166). In "*The Bush Revolution in U.S. Foreign Policy*", Melby consistently refers to Bush as an American president that has changed the United States. In Melby's eyes, Bush took a final farewell with Harry S. Truman's defensive policy of containment (Melby 2004:17).

Melby, places himself within a larger tradition of researchers. In Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay "*America Unbound, the Bush Revolution In Foreign Policy*", Bush is being fronted as a radical new element. Daalder and Lindsay write that Bush turned the U.S. foreign policy on its head (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:12). The philosopher Peter Singer sees Bush as the hugest moralist ever becoming president (Singer 2004:2). Bush is being portrayed as more aggressive and dualistic than any previous president, especially when it comes to his rhetoric.

This discontinuity aspect is not an understanding all researchers share. The Cold War historian Melvyn P. Leffler found little new with Bush (Singh 2006:175) and the political scientist Robert Kagan argues that the U.S. only became more of itself after 9/11 (Kagan 2008). In "*Special Providence*" the former pupil of Henry Kissinger, Walter Russell Mead, is arguing for the existence of four traditions in American politics regardless of president (Mead 2002). It is in the light of this intense foreign policy debate I will examine whether Bush was a new element, or only one of several carriers of continuity in the U.S. politics.

## **1.2 Defining the Paper Thematically**

One major motivation behind this research is to see how Bush has broken down the U.S. confidence in the global community. The skepticism toward the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush can be compared with late 60`s and early 70`s, and the war in Vietnam. Like the Johnson and Nixon-administration, Bush has made strong anti-American sentiments. Large protest-movements have united across national borders against the United States. Both in the media and among scholars the connotations of George W. Bush were negative: stupid, ignorant, cowboy, imperialist and warlike were typical descriptions of him as a president.

With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, Bush has to carry much of the responsibility for this image. There is no need for discussing whether Bush was aggressive or not. What can be discussed is whether Bush's sharp tone is a new phenomenon in American politics. Could it be that the Bush critics disliked his value-conservative policy so strongly that they were emotionally involved? Perhaps political values and science have been mixed up in terms of researching the phenomenon of George W. Bush.

This research will focus on whether George W. Bush`s rhetoric is comparable to former president`s. Have we heard the aggressive and dualistic tone before? Or has the discontinuity research a point in seeing Bush as one who surpassed his predecessors in aggressiveness and dualism? I will approach this debate by comparing presidential speeches and statements. It is possible to imagine that almost all presidents mention "the others" in a condescending manner. "The others" will be an important concept in this task. The others" refers to the fundamentalist Islamist and Communist groups.

The concept of "the others" is taken from Edward Said`s "*Orientalism*", the Palestinian professor who was arguing for a current tradition where the Western World acted condescending against "the others."

A short historical overview shows that a number of president`s have used a tough phraseology. Thomas Jefferson, the great author of the Constitution with its principles of liberty and equality, is the man behind the characterization on Muslims as: "Traacherous Villains" (Eide and Ottoson 2002:21), Dwight D. Eisenhower characterized the Soviet Union as an empire of "Godless terrorism" (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:89). Lyndon B. Johnson told during the Vietnam War that he wanted to: "Whoop the hell out of èm and kill and some of èm" (Fog of the War: 2003 documentary).

Ronald Regan spoke of: "the Evil Empire". Bill Clinton talked about the: "Evil Cowards" (Eide and Ottosen 2002:34). Even the idealistic Jimmy Carter could be confrontational in his style, as when he told that the Soviet Union could expect a war if they were obstructing the U.S. interests in the Middle-East (Morris 1996:276).

Examples like these can illustrate that some parts of the criticism against Bush has evolved into a grassroots-like and unreflected fashion campaign. On the internet, Bush is being compared with everything from Adolf Hitler to monkeys. The presentation of the president is simplified. By simplifying, I mean overlooking historical perspectives, and embracing political values in a larger degree than empirical history. In doing so, it may turn out to be a failure to describe Bush as a radical president. However, it is not unthinkable that revolution is a striking characteristic of the president. George W. Bush seems to be especially aggressive and dualistic with many of his expressions. "Axis of evil", "Hunt them down", "Evildoers" and "Crusade for freedom" are some examples of his harsh rhetoric.

Whether the revolution arguments live up to a scientific standard, will be tested empirically in relation to a selection of speeches from another president. With his rhetoric about the evil of "the others" Ronald Reagan could have worked well as a basis for comparison with Bush. But such a comparison has little new in it. There is nothing innovative about comparing two typical right-wing republican hard-liners. Therefore, I will take a daring chance in my comparative selection. My sample of speeches will consist of a comparison of the Democrat Harry S. Truman and the Republican George W. Bush.

Why Truman is chosen will further be explained under heading 1,4. As a starting point in the debate between continuity and discontinuity this research has a twofold thesis.

### 1.3 Introducing and Explaining the Thesis

Let me begin the first thesis by asking the question: *Is it so that George W. Bush represented radically new elements in his speeches in relation to "the others", compared with Harry Truman? Or is it possible to talk about historical continuity in the U.S. policy in this area?*

This task cannot give answers to the major international issues, only parts of the debate between break and continuity. The purpose is to provide an indication on how far we can see discontinuity or continuity through the use of speeches and statements of sources. This survey will have a primary focus on the presidents in their relation to "the others". How they refer to "the others" in the speeches and statements is my primary focus.

When it comes to what kind of speeches and statements I refer to, I will focus mainly on presidential rhetoric in situations where they have faced serious foreign crises in American history. Most of the speeches and statements for the basis analyze will have their origins from turbulent times in American history. For Truman, this is mainly in the negotiations with the Russians after the war, and in his second term, after 1948. George W. Bush met on his side a climax in the context after 9/11 and the Iraq War. A series of speeches and statements will be based on the rhetoric surrounding the Iraq-and the Korean War.

The content in the speeches will be considered in relation to Walter Russell Mead`s traditions. Mead claims that four traditions, named after former American politicians, are always present in the U.S. foreign policy (Mead 2002). These traditions will be more comprehensively commented on in chapter two under the theory and research section, and is only a brief introduction. The Hamiltonian favor American business (the economic tradition). Jeffersonian thinks that the U.S. should stay away from the dangerous world (the isolationistic tradition). The Wilsonian promoted the idea that the United States should spread democracy (the idealistic tradition). In the last tradition, the Jacksonian, tough and simple attitudes are ideals (the cowboy-tradition).

This survey is focusing on two of these traditions, the Wilsonian and the Jacksonian. If the president`s have links to Mead`s traditions, it will illuminate continuity or some degree of it. Chapter three and four will comment on whether they belong to the traditions such as Mead understands them. But as we shall see in chapter two, Mead is simplifying the continuity in American politics.

Therefore, I have added some additional theory to Mead's understanding by introducing different types and aspects of Jacksonian and Wilsonian traditions. If Bush and Truman turn out to be representative for the same aspects and directions within this tradition, it can further strengthen the continuity claim. That's the reason why I raise this second thesis by asking: *Are Bush and Truman members of the Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions? And, are they the same kind of Wilsonians and Jacksonians?*

#### **1.4 Why Comparing Harry Truman with George W. Bush?**

Comparing Harry S. Truman with George W. Bush is done mainly out of two reasons. First, it is a desire to make the paper concise and to the point. Truman in relation to Bush is an unusual comparison. Potential links between these president's would be more innovative than links between hard-liners. Second, Truman was a conscious choice because it is precisely this president that Melby believes Bush distanced himself from (Melby 2004:17). Let us take a brief look at these presidents. Who are they?

Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) was a former Missouri senator, who became president after the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Truman is controversial as president. Some sees him as a dove in international politics, others as a hawk. Those who front a positive image of the president regard him as a hero, one that saved the world from a World War III. His focus on institution building, defensive policy of containment and human rights is often highlighted (Kirkendale 2004:6,15). Among those who want to draw a positive picture of the president we have David McCullough, author of the Pulitzer-winning biography "*Truman*", and the historian Wilson D. Miscamble's "*From Roosevelt to Truman*." These two claim that Truman wanted peace and reconciliation with the communists. It might appear strange that someone will draw parallels to George W. Bush.

The former Texan Governor, George W. Bush (1946-) became president after he defeated Al Gore in the dramatic 2000 election. Bush is often described as an arch-typical political hard-liner in his fight against terrorists (Melby 2004, Daalder and Lindsay 2005). To a large extent, these president's verdict of history can be related to their success in the fight against "the others." Both went off as the extremely unpopular president's (Kirkendale 2004:2).

Both had started wars in the periphery, in Iraq and Korea, and they were widely regarded as tough president's in their response to "the others". Moreover, Truman and Bush had little knowledge and experience in foreign policy when they became president's.

They were representatives of Heartland America, using a simple, folk-oriented rhetoric. Even in international settings and public speeches they used a simple rhetoric. With Bush, this careless rhetoric was perhaps a bit surprising. He received after all diplomatic training from political veterans such as Henry Kissinger and George Schultz (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:30). Despite the training, George W. Bush had little knowledge about foreign policy's issues in the election campaign in 2000 (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:32). Harry Truman was vice president, but was little involved in the foreign policy planning. Wilson D. Miscamble has shown that Roosevelt failed to inform Truman about important foreign policy issues. In the Manhattan Project and in negotiations with Stalin and Churchill, Truman was excluded from the process (Miscamble 2007:94). Miscamble's headline, "Knowing Nothing About Foreign Policy", is an adequate formulation for underlining the lack of experience Truman had in this area.

Although the president's were inexperienced, they learned quickly. They made clear traces in international politics. Both can be fronted as representatives of a new era, or a new world order as well. After the Second World War, Truman faced a new international situation. The Americans soon understood that Russia would become a rival superpower and that they had to enter an ideological, geopolitical, economical battle. New measures were then needed in the security policy. In the Truman period, 1945-1953 the United Nations, NATO, CIA, IMF and the basis for the containment policy were created. Also under Bush it can be argued for a new world structure. After the Cold War it was difficult to identify who the enemy was, and when the enemy could strike back in the global world community. After 9/11 Bush responded to the challenges by increasing resources on new agencies such as Homeland Security. The President made use of anti-terror laws and preemptive warfare against his enemies.

In the history profession there is often a battle of what's the real truth. In fact this is a highly complicated matter. Even if Truman has been portrayed as a nearby saving angel or a necessary hard-liner, he has also been criticized. Arguments like, Truman was embracing a defensive containment policy (Melby 2004:17), will not be recognized by all scientists. The Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis shows that Truman in 1948 started an increasingly aggressive policy of containment (Gaddis 2005:81).

Truman is also portrayed as an aggressive head of state by the historian Thomas Patterson, who draws a picture of a tough and simple president blinded by anti-communism. Patterson argues that Truman regarded communists as red devils and Fascists (Patterson 1988:12-13).

He was a president who saw relentlessly on America's enemies (Patterson 1988:38). Melvyn P. Leffler emphasizes that Truman had a very simple world view. He saw the world in black and white (Leffler 2007:41). The presidential scholar Robert Ferrell follows the same line of thinking. He describes Truman as a plain-speaking ordinary fellow (Ferrell 1984:135).

All these descriptions could easily have been given about George W. Bush. In addition to this, several factors indicate that Truman broke with Roosevelt's conciliatory style in relation to the Russians. The fact that the President scolded the Russians, asked them to go to hell and threatened with nuclear weapons, made the climate tense. He was responsible for much of the escalation of the Cold War (Moen 2008:426).

On the other hand, Truman never rolled communism back in Eastern Europe. He wanted no domestic anti-communistic legislation and provided several veto's against such proposals. He took a stand against the extreme anti-communists like Joseph McCarthy and Douglas MacArthur. However, it is not without a reason Truman was admired by George W. Bush and other hawks in American politics (Moen 2008:435). Even though he was distancing himself from the extremely anti-communistic forces, he did not reject them. Truman was probably influenced or pressured by anti-communist movements in the American society. The President became known for his hard-line and skepticism towards double talk (Medhurst and Scott 1997:74). The nickname "Give em hell, Harry" tells that Truman could be clear in his message.

Looking at it this way, it can be productive to compare the former Missouri-Senator with Bush. Which face Truman really showed toward "the others" remains to be seen in analyzing his formulations. A brief glance at the speeches may indicate that Truman disliked communists. The main question is whether Truman was just as skeptical to "the others" as Bush? Or expressed in relation to this tasks theory: Are Truman and Bush Wilsonians and Jacksonians, and are they the same type of these traditions?

### **1.5 Sources and Methology**

Most of the speeches and statements are found on the web. Some hand-written speeches have been sent from the Truman Library and Research Center in Missouri. The number of special individual statements which is included in my source material are to be found in biographies and books related to these president`s.

Speeches as sources can provide a solid overview of president`s policy toward "the others." But as we shall see, speeches have clearly weaknesses. Essentially, there are two weaknesses using this kind of source:

Weakness number one: representativeness:

How representative the speeches and statements really are for a president`s policies can turn out to be a problem. The final content in a speech is often a result of what kind of voices whom gains most power in promoting their view. The battle of the final words is a struggle between competing wings. In the Truman-administration, this seems to be the case between Dean Acheson, a hard-liner, and Henry T. Wallace, a soft-liner. The Bush administration experienced also an ideological battle between the hawk Donald Rumsfeld versus the realist Colin Powell.

This means that a president`s policy and rhetoric consists of variations. A president has a great deal of staff members. One consequence of this can be little room for personal design on speeches. Under Bush, this appears to be the case. He seems to have been strongly influenced by the advice of heavy political ideologues like Karl Rove and Richard Perle (on Rove: Draper 2007:100-102. on Pearle: Melby 2004:78). Truman had a somewhat different situation. In "*Presidential Speechwriting*" Martin Meadhurst tells that Truman had a tendency to put a personal touch to the speeches (Medhurst /Ritter 2004:43). This could mean that Truman`s speeches to a greater extent than Bush, are less representative of the administration as a whole.

Reducing the weakness:

In trying to make the speeches as representative for the administration as possible, I have chosen to investigate speeches that have been thoroughly discussed and debated by the administration. This is particularly public speeches like the president`s doctrines, the State of Union and Annual Addresses. The doctrines are important because they show the main core in a presidential policy, while in the State of the Union and Annual Address many considerations are included in order to win support. In this case the political administration`s remarks are reflected, not only single personalities or wings in the politics.

Weakness number two: disparity between words and action:

I am also aware of the dangers involved in focusing on speeches, particularly the disparity between, what is being said and what`s the real action.

Bush and Truman could threaten "the others" repeatedly. However, there was made no action out of the threat. On the other hand, occasionally politicians talk like diplomats before going to war.

#### Reducing the weakness:

This weakness can be reduced by including the context. Both presidents faced strong challenges in which the harsh rhetoric in many cases was followed up by real action. I will put up several speeches and statements made in situations where the presidents are forced or expected to act in a nearly churchillian way. If Truman and Bush in their contextual situation are applying a similar response pattern, this is highly valued in a continuity perspective.

Although the study of rhetoric has weaknesses, it is also a good source for getting information. It is through speeches that culture manifests itself. In speeches and statements we can find information about how the U.S. regarded the world, and not at least, how they wanted to promote themselves and "the others." The professor in communication theory Robert F. Scott, claims in "*the Cold War and Rhetoric*" that words and reality are more integrated with each other than many realize (Scott 2001:7). In fact, all sources have weaknesses, something which makes it difficult to conclude with one hundred percent accuracy.

It is unlikely that the speeches are less uncertain than other types of sources. If I had been doing a survey on the continuity-discontinuity by using military budget as a source, it would have been weakness here as well. It is not certain that an increase in a military budget under a president is synonymous with increased hatred against "the others."

History is not physics. We cannot predict the future with the same certainty that a physicist can chart the trajectory and velocity of a falling object. My analysis of words cannot tell anything with one hundred percent accuracy, but it will be a source to some vital information about tendencies toward break or continuity in American foreign policy.

#### Methodological work on speeches and statements

This research area, the U.S. foreign policy, has a rich theoretical basis. This can be seen as strength where it is possible to include several fruitful approaches. I will refer to key literature and theory after advice given by researchers and experts such as Ole O. Moen and Olof Kronvalla.

In my material, it is clear that the scientific principle of neutrality is not always respected. The theme is often politically biased. Several of the researchers have a political background from a certain administration in which they served in vital positions.

It may therefore be sensible to create more or less equilibrium between the categories: liberal-conservative, Democrat-Republican and realist-idealist. When this diverse spectrum of the theory is used, it will be of great help in the interpretation of speeches. In examining the speeches only some factors will be the subject of analysis. My focus is on how the presidents understand themselves in relation to "the others."

By searching after a certain type of formulations in the speeches, presidential aggressiveness and dualism, this paper uses a qualitative method. This is the best approach in order to get a broad insight into the presidents understanding of "us" and "them." A number of places the analysis is simple. The presidents talk directly by referring to "the others" as: monsters, terrorists, murders, totalitarians. However, connotation of words is important to include as an analytical method. Truman and Bush's formulations will be seen in relation to the context. Despite the fact that both referred to the formulation "crusade" it does not mean that these president's appeared identical. Things have different connotations in relation to whom they were speaking to, and at what time/space they are saying it.

In including a historical perspective it is possible to see what's lying behind their formulations. Already on an early stage it appears that the fear of "the others" is a profound common denominator. As we shall see in the following chapters the challenges these president's meet influenced their rhetoric. The next chapter will provide some comments about this papers central research and theory, something which includes introducing my additional theory.

## CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH AND THEORY: CONTINUITY VERSUS DISCONTINUITY

### 2.1 Svein Melby and the Bush Revolution

As one of the representatives for the discontinuity research, Melby is pretty clear in arguing that Bush represented a revolution. In his reader-friendly, *“The Bush Revolution in American Foreign Policy”* and in the more scientific research report *“Hegemonens Hamskifte”*, Melby characterizes the Bush presidency as a revolution. Yet Melby recognizes parts in Mead's thinking. He agrees that the four traditions provide a good explanation of the U.S. foreign policy and its conduct. He refers to Mead in order to explain the large-scale and generally structural picture of America. But despite nuances, Melby recurrently promotes Bush as the most aggressive Jacksonian and dualistic Wilsonian president ever. Mead's theory is seen more as a general idea or as an abstract structural explanation, than as a concrete description of the U.S. foreign policy. Melby provides the following three arguments for seeing Bush as a new element in American foreign policy:

1) The President's dualism: Bush perceived the world as a struggle between good and evil. He was more moral and religious oriented than previous presidents. His rhetoric was simple and religious. The image of "the others" was simplified. "We" are good, "the others" are evil. Stereotypes were being created. "The others" were compared with the Nazis and devils. The reference, in particular the speech to the Congress 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 in which Bush describes the world in black and white, was highly dualistic (Melby 2004:135).

2) The President's approach in meeting with "the others": Melby refers frequently to the West Point 20<sup>th</sup> January 2002. In this speech Bush proclaimed a global warfare against "the others." With this speech, Bush is characterized as an aggressive head of state, an anti-realist who left Truman's defensive policy of containment. Particular formulations referring to preemptive warfare were seen as a radical element (Melby 2004:149-51).

3) The President's macho cowboy rhetoric: Melby refers to Bush as a simple and straight talking president. Bush is portrayed as an anti-intellectual, "a doer, not a thinker" in American politics. He acted more out of emotion than rationality. With Wild Western statements such as: "I'm a gut player", "Hunt em down" and "Take em out", Bush provoked the international community in a larger scale than any president before him (Melby 2004: 87,132).

### Why focus on Melby`s discontinuity research?

George W. Bush was a controversial president and Melby places himself among several researchers who look critically at the Bush era. With crisp offensive formulations such as: "They hate us", "Axis of evil" "Crusade" and "Either you are with us or against us", including the context after 9 /11, there are good arguments for Melby`s assertion about a radical transformation. Bush was aggressive and dualistic in his style. He made the fight against terrorism into a struggle between good and evil. But drawing conclusions from this are perhaps too daring in a research project. Is it really productive to talk about the total transformation of an existing order? Is Bush the only dualist, the aggressor and cowboy in American history?

Walter Russell Mead states that the U.S. was not changed after 9/11. The country only became more of itself. After the terror attack, the four traditions came into force, he argues (Mead 2002:335-36).

### **2.2 Walter Russell Mead and the Four Traditions**

Mead names the traditions after three former president`s and one minister of finance. In Mead`s theory, these traditions are always reflected in the U.S. foreign policy. Regardless of party affiliation, personality, ideological foundation and background, a presidential speech will always reflect these traditions (Mead 2002:2). It is only the later two traditions I will try to relate to Bush and Truman. This because it seems to be possible to relate these two tradition to both president`s. The two others will therefore be briefly commented. The Hamiltonian comes from Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) who was the first minister of Treasury in USA. Hamilton is known for his hard effort to achieve a strong financial base in the union. An alliance of national governments and big business was seen as necessary to ensure stability at home and abroad. This tradition implies that foreign policy should reflect actions that benefit the U.S. economic interests.

The national icon Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), is the thinker behind American isolationism, also known as Jeffersonian. Jefferson was concerned with staying out of foreign conflicts. He did not want to become embroiled in the Napoleonic wars. In the Jeffersonian mentality, the United States serves best if they stay away from the dangerous world. In doing that the U.S. is avoiding compromising their policies in the world community.

This tradition has been weak in the U.S. foreign policy after World War II. Apart from a brief aftermath of the Vietnam War, the tradition has been disregarded by the other three directions.

The Wilsonian is the Jeffersonians greatest opponent with its idea of active American involvement in the world. The Wilsonian tradition comes from the idealist Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924). Wilson`s idea was that democracy and freedom should be spread to all people all over the world. Historically, this idealism is based on the view that the U.S. is a unique country. The United States has a special obligation as a great power. The country has a moral responsibility to promote liberal values. This is an approach that builds on the idea that the U.S. is based on completely different assumptions than other great powers. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1909-1994) once pointed out:”While other states have interests, the United States only has obligations” (Melby 2004:21).

The origins of the Wilsonian-tradition are not related to Woodrow Wilson exclusively. The idea of the United States as something unique has roots back to the Puritan refugees arriving in Cape Cod on the ship May Flower in 1620. This event can explain the strong religious rhetoric in American politics. A Wilsonian argues that the world needs the spreading of American values such as: democracy, freedom, human rights and personal rights. The idea is that these values can harmonize the world. In a Wilsonian`s eyes the world should be based on laws, not on power, but as we shall see in chapter three with my additional theory, power is also recognized, even within this tradition.

In the Jacksonian tradition, Mead shows the main attitudes among ordinary Americans. This tradition consists of values such as: toughness, conservatism, liberalism, and simplicity. It is closely related to traditional Wild Western values. Andrew Jackson, who is this tradition`s pioneer, was in many ways a good representative for typical American grassroots values. He was a macho president. The brutal Jackson was a lightweight compared to his intelligent and sophisticated predecessors (Moen 2008:145). His behavior toward Indian`s is a dark chapter in American history. More than any other president his name is synonymous with the Indians suffering. Yet Andrew Jackson was enormously popular.

Historians such as, Hans Olav Lahlum and Jon Meacham tell about a president who was loved by the people. How was it possible to admire such a violent head of state as Jackson? Mainly there are two explanations. Firstly, Jackson`s background meant a lot. Andrew Jackson was a man of the people.

He was born in poverty, prisoner under war, and he fought his way to the top in the oval office. Americans loves an underdog. Jackson represented the American dream in practice. Secondly, in his violent attitude, force was emphasized (Meacham 2008:91-2). Andrew Jackson was not afraid to have a shoot-out with his enemies.

He threatened to shoot political opponents, even his own vice president was in Jackson`s line of fire. Showing muscles was extremely popular in the Wild West. Much of the hard-boiled style of the Jacksonian tradition originated from groups of poor immigrants from Europe, particularly Irish and Scottish settlers, in what could be regarded as the Wild West. It is perhaps among these people the so-called hawk`s in American politics has its origins. They are those who turn to military power in order to promote the U.S. interests.

Jacksonian is an extensive tradition. It unites pessimism and optimism. On one side, the world is perceived as a dangerous anarchy where the evil controls all development. Everyone must fight hard to survive in a system like that, but the tradition is also based on optimism. United States are perceived as the world's foremost nation. With this populist worldview, Jacksonians are embracing the inherited and ingrained attitudes about the Wild West's right to self-defense, also included the right of individuals to bear arms (Mead 2002:231).

Threats must according to the tradition be eliminated before they turn into full bloom. Much of this can be transferred to the security policy arena. Jacksonians are therefore characterized by a straightforward mentality. Diplomacy has been seen as weak. It prevents quick results. This tradition is related to "Cowboy rhetoric". It lies in the Jacksonian nature that "we" take care of our self. In order to do so "we" need action. Action is a sign of strength. This is why values as self-help and patriotism are central in the tradition. The tradition recognizes violent actions against an enemy. Crushing those who would or could harm the United States is regarded as a necessity (Mead 2002:246).

#### Why focus on Mead`s continuity research?

When Mead's theory and research are selected in my task there are multiple factors behind this choice. Mead is a heavy weight scholar with great scientific work. Despite the fact that he is an active political democrat, he avoids a one-sided negative image of George W. Bush. In addition to this he promotes with his four traditions, a fruitful view of continuity. Politics is never static in practice. It is a struggle between several traditions.

In relation to Walter McDougal's "*Promised Land And Crusader State*", which operated with two traditions, Mead provides a more flexible explanation. Also purely empirical, Mead seems to give a sensible explanation. The traditions linked to the politicians blend in well with their political goals and behavior. Minister of finance, Alexander Hamilton was eager in promoting increased trade.

Thomas Jefferson would keep the U.S. away from a dangerous world characterized by the Napoleonic Wars. Woodrow Wilson wanted to spread democracy and human rights for all the world's peoples. Andrew Jackson wanted to show military muscles against "the others" as the leader of a state with increasing industrial development. These traditions seem to have been continued and taken up by later president`s.

The flexible in Mead`s typology is that no president are marked by one tradition exclusively. Moreover in a research perspective, the Jacksonian tradition is in the highest interest. The strength and scope of this tradition is probably underestimated. Academics have likely a tendency to overlook the populist motivations behind someone`s actions. But Mead operates in no way without missing elements in his theory. At times, the theory is too narrow-minded. There is a need for introducing some additional theory.

### **2.3 Introducing Additional Theory**

As we shall see in Chapter three and four, a Wilsonian and a Jacksonian can act far more flexible than what Mead expresses. By promoting the Wilsonians and Jacksonians as one coherent tradition Mead became victimized by the "tyranny of the models" criticism. The term "tyranny of models" has its origins from the Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip`s criticism against forcing real life into abstract models. This thesis recognizes Seip`s empirical stand, but adds the importance and necessity with social science models. History is after all a hybrid discipline. We need models to explain and analyze features in complex areas such as the U.S. foreign policy.

By creating a division within Wilsonian and Jacksonian traditions, it would be more up to the reality than abstract theory. It is a "tyranny of models" mistake to regard Wilsonian only as a peace loving tradition. Although a Wilsonian loves peace and reconciliation, the tradition recognizes promoting the good society by applying rough power. This makes it possible to create a division of two different groups.

I name them the "communicative Wilsonians" and the "war-hungry Wilsonians." A Jacksonian has also various ways to move forward, or to put it differently, there are different ways to demonstrate toughness.

Taken into consideration that not all Jacksonians are thirsting after participation in global warfare, I will create a division between what I name the "extreme Jacksonians" and the "moderate Jacksonians." This additional theory will be further elaborated in chapter three and four.

## **2.4 International Relation Theory**

Since the continuity and discontinuity debate is highly a battle between different directions in international relation theory, it can make sense to define terms like realism, idealism, expansionism and containment policy. Here is a short explanation of these terms, starting with realism, idealism and expansionism.

### Realism, idealism and expansionism

Political philosophy offers two different views of how harsh a state needs to be. Thomas Hobbes, the father of political realism, wrote in an England wracked by civil war, emphasized insecurity and force. He described humanity as being in constant war. A half century later, John Locke, writing in a more stable England, argued that although a state of nature lacked a common sovereignty, people could develop contracts, and therefore anarchy was less threatening. These two views, one pessimistic (realism), and one optimistic (idealism) still operate today in foreign policy.

Realism has been the dominant tradition in thinking about international politics. A realist will maximize a nation's power, and minimize the ability of other states to jeopardize its security. This term is often synonymous with power politics. According to a realist a state should not base its policy on morality. A president has to relate to the world as the world is, not as he wished it to be. A realist embraces military power because the world is seen as a dangerous place. Comparing it to Mead's typology, realism is closely related to Jeffersonian and Jacksonian.

Idealism is often being traced back in Western political philosophy to Kant in Germany and to British philosophers as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Idealists see a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for states.

Trade crosses borders, people have contacts with each other, and international institutions such as United Nations create a context in which the realist view of pure anarchy is insufficient. Idealists complain that realists portray states as possessed with balancing power. The realism is regarded as immoral by idealistic Wilsonians.

What about the expansionism? This orientation combines the ideal libertarian ambitions to promote the good, and a realistic recognition of the hard power in order to do so. Recognition of the force to achieve success is an important feature in this direction. But the direction is different from realism since it recognizes use of violence in a wider context.

Even military interventions in areas which are not considered as a vital sphere of interest can be a military target for an expansive head of state. Where can the U.S. be placed among these typologies? One answer to that can be found in the policy of containment.

### Policy of Containment

During the Cold War, the United States made use of a policy of realism known as containment policy. Containment was a policy using military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to temper the spread of communism, enhance America's security abroad, and prevent a domino effect. A component of the Cold War, the policy was a response to a series of moves by the Soviet Union to expand Communist influence in Eastern Europe, China, and Korea. Containment combined hard and soft power. Often has this policy of realism fought partly against idealism and expansionism.

Policy of containment was regarding some centers in the world as of vital security importance. Daalder and Lindsay, together with Melby claim that Bush was abandoning this containment policy with his global battle against terrorism. Bush acted as a radical leader promoting American interests in attacking all the corners of the world, not geographical limited areas, they argue (Melby 2004:17. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:194).

Robert Kagan disagrees with a presentation like this one. He sees Bush more as a traditional real politician. In "*Of Paradise and Power: America And Europe In A New World Order*" he admits that change has occurred in the world. Communism is gone and the United States is the winner. But just as before, the United States is committed to protect its citizens with military aims, Kagan argues (Kagan 2003:2). Through an intense focus on security issues, the United States appeared typical American under Bush with policy of containment as a strategy, but this time against the radical Islamic fundamentalism (Kagan 2008:18).

When it comes to discussions about Bush and the containment policy, John Lewis Gaddis is an important scientist. He shows that the containment policy has functioned in numerous ways, and that this policy was present under Bush. In the updated version of his classic “*Strategies of Containment*” he provides a power-filled historical perspective on Bush policy. Gaddis refers to a number of cases in which the former president`s were harsh in their style against “the others.” Although the U.S. based their policy on containment, Gaddis tells that there also existed hawks within this policy. Gaddis does not see containment policy unilaterally as a defensive strategy (Gaddis 2005:81). This point I will look into in chapter four, under heading 4.5.1.

## **2.5 Rhetoric and Theory**

Chapter three, four and five will include a number of researchers who have worked with rhetoric. Closely linked to this paper is a master thesis written at Trondheim University, NTNU, titled: “*The Rhetoric of Good and Evil in American Foreign Policy.*” It shows an American tradition dividing the world into good and evil spheres. Other research related areas can be found in communication professor Denise M. Bostdorff`s “*Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine.*” Bostdorff gives a detailed analysis of Truman`s rhetoric in relation to the doctrines. Among other things, she is concerned with the simple and dualistic language of both presidents in an international setting. In “*The President of Good and Evil*”, Peter Singer has a different point of view. He shows that no president in living memory has spoken so often about good and evil, right and wrong as George W. Bush did (Singer 2004:1).

There will also be some references to biographies. Both of David McCullough`s “*Truman*”, and George W. Bush biography like, “*The Polarized Presidency of George W. Bush*” and Robert Draper`s “*The Presidency of George W. Bush*”, discuss a number of speeches in my selection. The wording, purpose and context surrounding presidential formulations are all being discussed. Common for the biographies is that they portray their president`s as unique leader. In “*War Rhetoric*” by Rune Ottosen and Elisabeth Eide there are several references to the rhetoric before and after 9/11. In the book it is being discussed whether the United States did experience a fracture after the terror attack. Some of the book`s authors are presenting Bush as a radical element, while others point out tradition. As we have seen, this is a major debate in the U.S. foreign policy area. Let us turn our attention toward a scientific discussion in chapter three, four and five, starting with Wilsonian dualism.

## **CHAPTER 3: WILSONIAN DUALISM – A TRADITION IN AMERICAN POLICY?**

### **3.1 Never heard it before?**

Taken from a perspective of continuity, many American president`s such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, have promoted strong dualism in their speeches and statements. Roosevelt compared the Second World War cooperation with Russia as: “Holding hands with the Devil” (Gaddis 2005:3). More famous is Ronald Reagan`s statement in the Evil Empire speech. Statement as: “I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God,” are nearby legendary as a dualistic performance (<http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/reagan/evilempire.htm>).

Is it really possible to categorize George W. Bush as a unique character when including this historical context? If George W. Bush was a revolutionary dualistic president, it would be a sensational tragedy for the Americans and international relations. Especially considering that dualism represents a black-white thinking that can have unfavourable consequences. But sometimes dualism is a useful tool, essential to categorizing the reality. To understand our complex daily life we need some degree of the black and white mentality. On the other hand, dualism can lead to racism, prejudices, ethnocentrism, and creations of stereotypes. A strong dualism can increase hatred among people and states.

When the discontinuity research argues that black and white thinking was a hallmark of the Bush administration after 9/11, I will try to check out whether it is possible to relate this to the Wilsonian tradition in American politics (Melby 2002:38-39. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:186). Dualism is after all a vital part of this tradition. The Wilsonian mentality is based on the division ”we” and ”the others.” “We” are representing values as democracy, freedom and individuality. ”We” have a responsibility to spread these values to the oppressed ”others.” A mentality like this has long traditions. Mead himself shows this by telling that the Wilsonian has missionary roots as their background (Mead 2002:133-135). By observing Bush`s presidential period, 2000-2008, it is not difficult to argue for a pro-dualistic style during his time in office. A statement like:

“We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name,” is only one expression of the “we” – “the others” thinking in the Bush’s rhetoric ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html)).

However, when Melby, among others, writes that dualism is a distinctive character of George W. Bush, it seems to be a strong charge against the President (Melby 2004:135). The Norwegian researcher sees it as characteristic for the administration that they divided the world into friends and enemies, based on black and white thinking. Melby writes: “After September 11, the world was divided into friends and enemies. There was no room for some middle position or neutrality” (Melby 2004:135). He refers also to the well-known Bush saying: “You are either with us or you're against us” as an evidence of the dualism (Melby 2004:135).

The discontinuity research has a point in being concerned about the dualism in Bush's politics. Bush appeared to be dualistic, in a hostile manner. The speeches in my selection refer to a number of places where the world is divided into good and evil spheres. It is more problematic whether this kind of language represented a new element in American politics. Is it conceivable that former presidents have had a Bush like, black and white view on the world? Maybe we have heard it all before?

There are different ways to categorize the U.S. presidents. In this case I will ask whether it is possible to regard these president’s as representatives of the Wilsonian tradition. If this turns out to be possible, it can illuminate continuity or degrees of it.

### **3.2 Two Presidential Wilsonians?**

Today there is almost a common agreement that the U.S. won the Cold War based on hardcore highly nuanced realism. But it should be added that realism was not the only direction in the American foreign policy during the Cold War. It’s counterpart idealism, had a great deal of influence as well. Several American president’s after 1945 were inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic values. It is not uncommonly that we have heard American president’s talking about promoting liberty, human rights, international cooperation and world peace. Well-known for this type of rhetoric is president’s like John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter, but also Harry S. Truman can be seen as a typical Wilsonians (Mead 2002:314).

A Wilsonian president has often a tendency to cherish previously national leaders, seeing them as heroes or icons from a gone past.

In that case, Truman`s favorite president of the century was Woodrow Wilson (McCullough 1992:356). Melvyn P. Leffler tells that Truman was inspired by this president. Leffler claims that Truman decided to support Woodrow Wilson`s crusade to make the world safer for democracy (Leffler 2007:37).

It can be debated how much influence the Wilsonian tradition had under Truman. To regard Truman as a Wilsonian, and nothing else, will be an oversimplification of his foreign policy. The reality is much more complex. Since foreign policy seems to be an enduring battle between different international directions it would be incorrect to label Truman or any other president as one hundred percent Wilsonian. A president`s final political stand seems to be a result of compromising between these different directions. In that case, Henry Kissinger is on to something when he claims that Truman had to balance between idealism and realism (Kissinger 1994:23).

When it comes to George W. Bush`s foreign policy, he disappointed many realists in the American Cold War tradition (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:124). The former Texan governor drove his own style with a worldwide crusade against “those who hated freedom.” It is likely that he was motivated by his idol, Harry S. Truman. It is possible to object to a presentation like this one by arguing: George W. Bush had clearly realism in his policy. The U.S. politics toward North-Korea and Saudi Arabia under Bush appeared to be classical realpolitik.

Saudi-Arabia is one of the least Wilsonian places on the face of the earth, but the United States support the royal family. Even under Bush they did so. Bush`s choice of Condoleezza Rice as his national security adviser after the election, including Colin Powell as minister of foreign affairs, made many people assume that Bush was a realist (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:195).

After 9/11 it has become obvious that Bush was not a typical realist. Bush has since the terror attack consistently painted the international scene in moral terms. His moralism is the polar opposite of the realist approach. Despite some traces of realism in Bush`s foreign policy, his presidency must have been like heaven for those who embraced spreading political freedom around the globe. Bush seems to be a typical representative for the Wilsonian tradition. Although Daalder and Lindsay strongly argue that Bush was something new, they choose to place the President within the Wilsonian tradition (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78).

Perhaps this is not surprising at all? Let`s take a look at some speeches and statements, starting with George W. Bush Inaugural Address:

“Though much of the last century America`s faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations.

Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our county, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along. And even after nearly 225 years, we have a long way yet to travel.” (...)

“If our country does not lead the cause of freedom it will not be led”  
(<http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.20.01.html>).

What about Harry S. Truman? Does he differ from Bush? Here is a part of Truman`s Inaugural Address from 20<sup>th</sup> January 1949:

“The American people stand firm in the faith which has inspired this nation from the beginning. We believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law and equal opportunity to share in the common good. We believe that all men have a right to freedom of thought and expression.(...)

We believe that all men are created equal because they are created in the image of God. From this faith we will not be moved”  
([www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030)).

In this Inaugural Address the Wilsonian values are clearly promoted: “democracy”, “freedom”, “image of God” and “justice.” Actually, it seems to be common for both that they express a typical Wilsonian worldview. Put another way, they represent a worldview saying: The U.S. has a responsibility to promote these values to the rest of the world, and “we” are determined to do so. Applying a further detailed comparative overview can make sense.

In examining the speech Melby regards as revolutionary, the speech in the Congress, September 20<sup>th</sup> 2001, Bush says: “Enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” In the middle of the speech Bush declares:

“Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what they see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed.

They hate our freedom—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other!”

([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)).

This is a controversial part of the speech. On one side Bush received criticism for these formulations. Some meant it was hostile dualistic in its style (Melby 2002:38). On the other hand, Bush received praise and acclaim for the speech. The American media-expert, Norman Solomon pointed out that Bush was perceived as a visible politician after the speech. The American people were in deep grief and under great pressure after 9/11.

The President responded to the situation, took the lead, gave comfort and played on national emotions. The Americans needed a strong leader, one who could unite them after the terror attack (Eide and Ottosen 2002:97). A strong uniter the American people got. Perhaps their leader became too strong and brutal in his style?

It is possible to argue for brutality if we examine what Bush actually is saying here. The formulations in the speech are strongly dualistic: It`s “us” against “them.” In short, Bush was claiming three things in the four above sentences:

- A) They hate everything we stand for.
- B) They are different from us.
- C) They represent other values than we do.

Later on, Bush gave the final answer why “the others” hated America. He argued that the U.S. was attacked because the country was the leader of freedom (Sadar and Davies 2002:120). Is really the term revolution a too strong formulation in describing the president`s style?

The discontinuity research has a point in arguing that the background for the speech had a particularly context. The U.S. was attacked on its own ground. The attack in itself represented a break. The U.S. has not been attacked many times throughout the history. This event came as a total surprise from the sky, telling: U.S. the great nation, vulnerable after all. The speech reflected these new circumstances. Bush does not ask for the reasons why some hates the U.S. There is no invitation to dialogue. The speech is devoid of self-criticism and self-understanding.

On the other hand, perhaps a bit surprisingly, as the discontinuity research did not include, the President gives several nuances in his presentations of "the others", such as the following:

"We respect your faith (Islam). It's practiced freely by many millions Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. It's teaching are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect to hijack Islam itself." ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)).

"We've got to do a better job of explaining to the people in the Middle-East, for example that we don't fight a war against Islam or the Muslims. We don't hold any religion accountable." (<http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911e.html>)

In 2003 he explained that: "It should be clear to all that Islam—the faith of one-fifth of humanity—is consistent with democratic rule, Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim countries" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html)).

It is a particular context for the 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 speech, with the terror attack and the tense surrounding. But the President is providing some nuances by giving "the others" some positive review. If we include some of Truman's speeches, revolution appears to be a too strong charge. In his 1949 Inaugural Address Truman runs nearly parallel with Bush. In commenting this speech Melvyn P. Leffler argues that Truman wanted to strengthen the image of him as the Wilsonian leader of the free world (Leffler 1992:267). Facing the threat from the communists in 1949, Truman stated the following:

"The United States and other like-minded nations find themselves directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life. That regime adheres to a false philosophy which purports to offer freedom, security and greater opportunity to mankind. Misled by that philosophy, many people have sacrificed their liberties only to learn to their sorrow that deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny, are their reward. That false philosophy is communism. (...)

Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters. (...)

Democracy is based on the conviction that man has moral and intellectual capacity, as well as the inalienable right to govern himself with reason and justice. (...)

Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punishment without trial, and forced labour as the chattel of the state. (...)

It decrees what information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leader he shall follow, and what thoughts he shall think. (...)

Democracy maintains that governments is established for the benefit of the individual, and charged with responsibility of protecting the rights of the individual and his freedom in the exercise of those abilities of his. (...)

Communism maintains that social wrong can be corrected only by violence.

Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved through peaceful change.

Communism holds that the world is so divided by classes that war is inevitable.

Democracy holds that free nations can settle differences justly and maintain a lasting peace. (...)

I state these differences, not to drawn issues of belief, but because the actions resulting from the Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of free nations to bring about world recovery and lasting peace”.

At the end in the speech:

“Steadfast in our faith in the almighty, we will advance toward a world where man`s freedom is secure. To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and our firmness of resolve. With God`s help, the future of mankind will be assured in a world of justice, harmony and peace”

([www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030)).

In the same way as Bush, Truman distinguishes between good and evil societies. The president`s are speaking plainly: “the others” represent a totally different concept of life. Diktonomis are especially present in their formulations.

Here are some dualistic utterances from the two speeches, Bush 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 and Truman 20<sup>th</sup> January 1949:

<u>We = Positive features:</u>	<u>”The others”= Negative features</u>
Democracy	Autocracy.
Democratically elected leader	Self-appointed leaders.
Freedom	Slavery.
Social justice	Social wrong
God	Hates God.
Peace.	War
Free media	State-controlled media
Truth	Lies
Wealth	Poverty

The president`s are presenting their enemy societies as repressive systems. Truman states clearly that: “No one deserves living under communism.” In their presentation of communists and fundamentalists, it seems to be a fact that these two enemies not just dislike United States, they really hated the nation. The context is much the same when comparing the speeches from 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001 and 20<sup>th</sup> January 1949. Both president`s were in a hard-pressed situation. Bush had to be the nation`s voice after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. In the aftermath of the terrorist act the fear was distinctly present. People feared that terrorists should set free and explode a bomb in a major American city, or spread a deadly virus across the country.

Fifty years earlier Truman had to deal with expansive communists. At the end of the 40`s, the U.S. officials feared that revolutionary nationalism might turn third world country against the West and drive them into Soviet camp (Interview George Elsey 6 January 2010). In 1948-49 new developments reinforced older fears. The Chinese communist seizure of power, their intervention in the Korean conflict, created fear.

The threat was magnified by the Soviet acquisition of atomic capabilities. When China finally got lost to communism and the Soviet had its first nuclear weapons developed, it created a climax of fear.

All this including the Soviet Union's "never-ending" imperialism in Eastern Europe, told Truman that he had to respond. People expected that their leader would protect them from the danger. The contextual situation demanded that they had to act as Churchillian leaders. This means, strong leaders who had to unite the people in difficult times. The contextual demands are reflected in the speeches. In tense situations like this, it is not unusual with a strong presence of dualism.

However, there are differences in their formulations. Truman seems to promote communism as totally opposite to everything the West stands for. Bush does the same with the fundamentalistic terrorists. But contrary to Truman, Bush appears mild, or perhaps more tactical than Truman at some occasions. After the terrorist act Bush followed the same line as the experts of Islam did. The Islam experts told the media that the problem was not Islam, let alone in religious faith itself.

The case was that a group of extremists had misinterpreted their own religion (Singer 2004:99). Bush took several occasions to remind Americans that the fight was with terrorists, not Muslims. He publicly condemned the few sporadic outbursts of anger against some Muslims and invited their representatives to the White House (Renshon 2004:156). Bush received criticism for promoting views like these. One of these critics was Karina Rollins, editor at the American Enterprise. She replied that Islam in itself was the enemy. The Muslims had an inherent hatred toward Americans she claimed (Sadar and Davies 2002:21). Bush ignored this kind of attitude. He distinguished between different types of Muslims. Not all Muslims are American's enemies in his rhetoric. Islam is promoted as a peaceful religion, as in this statement:

"We see in Islam a religion that traces its origins back to God's call on Abraham. We share your belief in God's justice, and your insistence on man's moral responsibility. We thank the many Muslim nations who stand with us against terror. Nations that are often victims of terror, themselves"

(<http://muslimrepublicans.net/Article.asp?ID=164>).

But despite these commendatory reviews, it is not certain at all that the President was a great admirer of Islam. These statements can be interpreted as fear of a confrontation with the Muslim world. If we take economical and geopolitical motives, as well as security, into consideration, such a confrontation would be little desirable for the Bush administration. A united Muslim front against the United States could have resulted in a political suicide. It is likely Bush was trying to create an alliance with moderate Muslims by using the tactics of divide and conquer. In this remark it seems like he wanted to create a clearly distinction between "good" and "bad" Muslims:

"Islam is a vibrant faith. Millions of our fellow citizens are Muslim. We respect the faith. We honor its traditions. Our enemy does not. Our enemy doesn't follow the great traditions of Islam. They've hijacked a great religion"  
(<http://muslimrepublicans.net/Article.asp?ID=164>).

Regardless of the underlying motives, Bush is promoting more nuances than what Truman did. Truman does not show that there are different types of communists in any of my selections of speeches. They all seem to be equally dangerous and destructive to the free world.

This is simplifying the reality. Just like Bush created "fairy-tale" of a relationship between Saddam and al-Qaida, Truman constructed an image of a united communist movement working against America in his 1949 Inaugural Address speech. Despite the fact that Stalin and Mao had a relationship, nearly comparable to oil and water, there are no medium position in Truman`s rhetoric. Perhaps this is not surprising when we talk about the former Missouri-Senator. As Melvyn P. Leffler notes: Truman liked things in black and white. His closest advisers knew that he did not like nuance or ambiguity (Leffler 2007:47). As Truman once said: "I never sit on a fence. I am either on one side or another" (Keyes 1995:28).

Looking at it this way, Truman appears to be as dualistic as Bush. So then, what`s left to say? They are both Wilsonian and continuity exists. But it represents only a small degree of continuity. To say that Truman and Bush are Wilsonians in term of promoting a division between "we" and "the others" is not a solid argument for continuity. Scientific work building on arguments like these can be seen exactly as a "tyranny of models" explanation. The argumentation is too general. Almost every president since George Washington (1731-1799) has talked about American values such as: liberty, freedom, democracy, and human rights.

Even in Henry Kissinger (1923-) and Richard Nixon's (1913-1994) dark and cynical foreign policy, there was some talk about promoting the "good values" ([http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/nixon/first\\_inaugural.html](http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/nixon/first_inaugural.html)). In that case there is a need for a wider perspective on the Wilsonian-tradition.

### **3.3 Variations Among Wilsonians – Introducing a Wider Perspective and Additional Theory**

Walter Russell Mead's Wilsonian narrow minded method is not satisfactory in searching for continuity or not in American foreign policy. Mead sometimes simplifies American attitudes and the way to act, when he regards Wilsonian as one direction in American foreign policy. To Mead's defence, he mentions that there exists more than one type of Wilsonian, but he is not concrete at all. All in all, Mead seems to end up with defending the tradition. The tradition has according to Mead done so much good for people around the world. Prevention of war is one of the main values among Wilsonians (Mead 2002:165).

As a former student of the arch-realist Henry Kissinger it's a bit surprising that he nearly overlooks the danger that lies in this tradition. As we shall see later on in the text it is doubtful that all Wilsonian are peaceful doves. It would be incorrect to regard the Wilsonian tradition as one direction with one common goal and way to act. There exists a variety of types within the tradition.

With introducing a historical perspective, different theoretical aspects and my additional theory, I will look into whether Truman and Bush are the same kind of Wilsonians. With this focus, I will investigate the variations within the Wilsonian tradition by looking at different aspects of it. Let us start by examining the way these presidents as Wilsonians are exploiting the history. Are there any similarities or differences here?

#### **3.3.1 Wilsonian Use of History - "The Others as Nazis", and the "End of History"**

The Wilsonian tradition has deep historical roots, and just as nearly all of mankind has a tendency to do, Wilsonian utilizes history not only for the sake of the past, but also for gaining a certain purpose in the future. Using history in meeting with "the others" can be a powerful tool for politicians. A starting point here is comparing the Bush speech from 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001, with some of Truman's speeches and statements. Melby regards Bush as something new with his aggressive black-white thinking in this speech (Melby 2004:135-36). Let us turn to the content in the speech. Early on in the speech Bush mentions that:

“On September the 11<sup>th</sup>, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country”. (...) All this was brought upon us in a single day- and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack”  
([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)).

Truman stated in a similar way in his Farwell Addresses:

”I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing struggle -- this conflict between those who loves freedom and those who would lead the world back into slavery and darkness”  
(<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059>).

Bush and Truman appear dualistic in their rhetoric. They are regarding” the others” as enemies of freedom. Bush uses the word “war” to describe the horrible action done by “the others”, while Truman apply a milder term in ”conflict”, but adds stronger formulations such as “slavery” and “darkness” to his argumentation. It is likely that these words are chosen to increase the public support toward a futuristic violent action, or to defend a certain action.

By applying empiricism as method, we know that the Bush administration attacked Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attack, while Truman intervned in North Korea and some places in Latin America. If we return to the Bush speech, the President refers to a historical perceptve in the middle of the speech:

“We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions – by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of Fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history`s unmarked grave of discarded lies”  
([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)).

The discontinuity research saw new elements in the President`s rhetoric when comparing terrorist with Nazi, Fascist and others totalitarian ideologies. In Melby`s eyes it was a new step in the direction of a more aggressive dualism (Melby 2004:135). According to Daalder and Lindsay we should agree with Melby`s discontinuity research at this point. They point out that Bush painted the world in black and white (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:86). On the other side, arguing for revolution in this case seems a bit dramatic.

Is it really revolutionary to characterize your enemy as a totalitarian? Historically, it seems to be more a tradition than a new hateful formulation. It can be argued that the term totalitarianism was, and still is, the antithesis of Americans self-image. It's well known that Americans has for a long time used expressions like: despotism, dictatorship, autocracy, tyranny, and authoritarianism to describe anti-democratic governments. In political speeches it is a well known rhetorical trick to dehumanize your opponent by calling him or her a Fascist or Nazi. The term "Islamofascists/Nazis", used by some conservative American broadcasting commentators are only one expression of this technique (Singh and Buckley 2006:21). Even a number of U.S. critics have categorized the United States president's as Nazis, Fascists or Imperialists. In anti-American demonstrations it is quite common that the U.S. is referred to as the "Great Satan" of the world (Interview George Elsey 6<sup>th</sup> January 2010).

Best known is perhaps a comment made by Noam Chomsky. In an interview, he compared the political relation between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger with the cooperation between Adolf Hitler and Adolf Eichmann (<http://www.chomsky.info/talks/1990----.htm>).

Among American presidents, George W. Bush was not alone in harbouring a great deal of skepticism towards totalitarian states. John Lewis Gaddis tells that Harry S. Truman really hated totalitarianism (Gaddis 2005:16). Perhaps this is why Truman in 1947 proclaimed that: "There are no differences in totalitarian states, call them Nazi, Fascist or Communists, they are all the same" (Patterson 1988:47).

In the context after the World War II Americans disliked communism. The ideology was in opposition to economic liberalism, human rights and the free market. Nicknames as "Red fascism", "Tzaristic imperialism", "Red fever" and slogans as, "Better dead than Red" are all expressions for the skepticism toward communism. George Elsey, Truman's administrative adviser, told that the Truman-administration perceived Stalin as a new type of Hitler, but he was seen as greater threat to the U.S. security than Hitler had ever been. Stalin had so many resources and ruled with terror, he told (Interview George Elsey 15<sup>th</sup> January 2010).

It is likely that Elsey, Truman and the Americans as well, easily transferred their hatred for Hitler's Germany to Stalin's Russia. Actually, the Americans compared directly these regimes. As Truman said in a comment about the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia:

“Russia had kept none of its agreements. So now that we are faced with exactly the same situation with which Britain and France faced in 1938/39 with Hitler”  
(McCullough 1992:603).

In another statement, Truman was showing Soviet`s historical roots of oppressing it people:

“Soviet Union is made up of sturdy people, but they have been oppressed and downtrodden by dictatorship from the time of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great to this very day” (Keyes 1995:48).

In these formulations Truman systematically abused history by focusing on negative events and personalities to create fear, and probably to strengthen the image on the Russians as totalitarians. As Bush did on Saddam, Truman used the word “dictatorship” on the Russian government. Truman compared also the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, with Gestapo (McCullough 1992:553).

In one way it is understandable that Truman and Bush would be drawn to the simple analogy in the face of, the Soviet Unions and the terrorist behaviour. Soviet behaved imperialistically in Eastern Europe and the terrorists committed a horrible act in killing thousands of innocent people. But it is also note worthy that such statements probably were more the stuff of propaganda and international gamesmanship than of patient inquiry of statesmanship. When Bush said: “I can`t tell you whether the bastards will strike again” (Woodward 2003:194), he sounded like Truman did in the 40`s and 50`s.

It appears like they both overplayed the image of “the others” as enemies in dangerous opposition to the American system. Totalitarian states have, of course, undeniable similarities. Yet it did not follow logically that Stalin`s Russia would or should act like Hitler`s Germany, or that the terrorists or Saddam Hussein should act as military aggressive as the Nazis. Bush`s comparison between Hitler and Saddam was misleading. Hitler was the leader of a strong world power, Saddam was not. Hitler was on an expansionist path, Saddam had been contained since 1991. Nor was Saddam a committed jihadist or Islamist in the mold of Khomeini or Bin Laden. He only used Islam when he needed to as political purpose (McNair 2003:217).

In Truman`s case, the Russians behaved aggressively after the war, but it is likely that they did so in order to gain security over certain geopolitical areas. Little suggests that the Russians had Adolf Hitler like imperialistic foreign policy.

The control over certain security zones in Eastern Europe was the cornerstone in the Soviet foreign policy (Nye 2007). Despite nuances like this, the rhetoric and the goal is in many cases more important than the accurate description of reality. The labeling of an enemy as a totalitarian "Nazi" is an efficient metaphor.

A metaphor means a figure of speech that are comparing two things, saying that one is the other. The term "Nazi" is a cognitive metaphor. By applying it, we get some associations of an object to an experience outside the object's environment. In this case it will be negative connotations.

If the aim is to show how evil "the others" are, these descriptions may be an effective way to compare the enemy with the former evil. This may have a self-reinforcing effect of hatred. Nazism and Fascism are debited ideologies that most will recognize the type of evil. These are ideologies that we often associate with oppression. When Bush talked about: "Axis of evil", it is not coincidence ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.29.02](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.29.02)). The choice of word is done with a particular purpose, probably to wake up memories from the past. It's a rhetorical trick to tell the world that "we" are the good guys, fighting the bad guys. Just as the coalition of free nations did in the Second World War against the initial "Axis of evil."

While Bush talks about "Axis of evil", Truman repeatedly warns against a new world war because of Soviet aggression. In the Korean War, Truman was seeking arguments for defending the war, and he found some in arguing: "Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier" (Pierce 2007:246). Again this is an attempt to take advantage of history in order to create a reaction. If the enemies are as evil as Nazis and Fascists, they evoke no sympathy among "normal" people. They are then regarded as monsters. Monsters who destroy people's lives and societies, almost for sheer pleasure, deserves no mercy.

Many Americans recognize that terrorists and Nazis are the same kind of enemy. President Barack Obama (1961-) even mentioned this in his Nobel peace speech (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/12.10.09.print.html>). An even more typical expression for this comparison is given by the Southern Baptist-leader Pat Roberson. Roberson said: "Adolf Hitler was bad, but what the Muslims want to do to the Jews is worse" (Mansfield 2003:141). Another evidence for this view, can be found in Ann Coulter's statement after the terror attack:

“We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity. We weren’t punctilious about locating and punishing only Hitler and his top officers. We carpet-bombed German cities, we killed civilians. That’s war. This is war” (Lawrence/Jewitt 2003:11).

The background for Ann Coulter’s temper was extraordinary. Coulter, the political commentator, lost a friend in the World Trade Centre tragedy. However, the statement is likely representative for much of the American mentality after 9/11. She would, as her president create a connection between the terrorist’s and the Nazi’s evil acts. Only by applying to the Nazi term it is possible to show the world how terrible terrorists really are,

In other statements, Bush with obviousness compares “the others” with Nazis. As in this case: “The Pearl Harbour of the 21<sup>st</sup> century took place today. This is a war in which people were going to have to die” (Woodward 2003:37).

Truman is also clear in his comparison:

”I knew at Potsdam that there is no difference in police states, call them what you will, Nazi, Fascist, Communist or Argentine Republics”. (...)” the attempt of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, et al to fool the world and the American Crackpots Association represented Jos. Davies, Henry Wallace, Claude Pepper and the actors and artists in immoral Greenwich Village, is just like Hitler’s and Mussolini’s so-called socialist states” (Pierce 2007:181).

Truman seems to be even closer to Bush’s Pearl Harbour analogy, in telling that the Americans in meeting with the communists must not forget that: “We laughed about Hitler” (Patterson 1988:8). By telling this, Truman warns against a situation where the history repeats itself because of isolationism and idealistic pacifism.

While some historians and even cultures argue that history repeats itself, it should be added that so does also the use of history. In that case the discontinuity research overlooks historical perspective in arguing that Bush saw only one political ideology as viable, namely the democracy (Melby 2002:31. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:121). It is possible to argue against the discontinuity researchers at this point because Truman and Bush seem to have not only a common use of history as Wilsonians, but also a common agreement on the final results in history. Truman proclaimed in his Farwell Address that:

”The Iron Curtain, the secret police, the constant purges, all these are symptoms of a great basic weakness -- the rulers fear of their own people. In the long run the strength of our free society, and our ideals, will prevail over a system that has respect for neither God nor man”

(<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059>).

Bush on his side, stated that fundamentalism will end up in: ”History`s unmarked grave of discarded lies” ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)). This implicates that the good will prevail over the evil. They agree that their enemy will lose because of their own greatness and ”the others” weaknesses. The democracy will win. The author of “*The End Of History*”, Francis Fukuyama could not have said it better himself. What about their presidential doctrines? Are the president`s behaving comparable dualistic in these?

### **3.3.2 Wilsionian Doctrines?**

In many eyes, the Bush-Doctrine was a new element in American policy. When it comes to the term preemptive action, there are solid arguments that the Bush-Doctrine represented new methods in dealing with “the others.” Perhaps this is the discontinuity`s strongest research evidence on revolution? Chapter four will examine the American reactions toward ”the others.” Now the focus is on whether the doctrines are dualistic or not.

A doctrine is an important element in the investigation of an American president`s politics. The term refers to a belief system, a set of principles. A doctrine is the basis in a president`s policy. Let`s start with examining Truman and his doctrine.

In the situation surrounding this speech, Greece was beset by a civil war, and the British could no longer fund a war against communist-led insurgents. The Americans argued that they had to prevent communist expansion in these important geopolitical areas. In meeting with the threat, Truman enunciated in March 1947 a universal doctrine. Here are some vital parts of it:

“It must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” (...)

”The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points”,

”We are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States”

([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html)).

Can the content in this doctrine be compared with the Bush ones over 50 years later? This seems to be possible, in the Bush Doctrine at West Point in 2002, the President states:

“The American flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom. Our nation`s cause has been larger than our nation`s defence.” (...)

“We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favours human liberty. We defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants.”

Further in the speech:

“We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants”

([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html)).

America is seen as just and fair. ”The others” are characterized as ”aggressors”, ”totalitarians” and as ”terrorists.” The Presidents constructs two very different realities as the best way to deal with those realities. Bush described “the others” with the same words as Truman did. Referring to words like “terror”, “oppression” and “suppression,” is a recurrent theme in their speeches.

It should also be noted that Truman characterized the U.S. enemies as ”terrorists.” The term terrorist is filled with negative connotations. A terrorist can be viewed as an unworthy opponent. For those who achieve status as freedom fighters, instead of terrorists, the connotation can be milder. In a larger degree, people have an understanding for a freedom fighter`s cause. A terrorist however, is often regarded as a foreign hateful guy who deserves no compassion. Terrorists can be seen as a cowardly race, hiding and attacking innocent people. In the American Wild West tradition, the tactic of ambush and surprise element was seen as some of the most cowardly move an enemy could do.

According to Denise M. Bostdorff's research one can hear echoes of Truman's words in the Bush doctrine. Bostdorff tells that the Bush line: "Either you are with us, or you are with the enemy" looks just like Truman's words in his doctrine, especially, when he is mentioned: "Alternative way of life" (Bostdorff:149-5).

This is a solid point made by the American professor in communication. There are clearly resemblances at this point. Truman's two ways of life are as follows:

"At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one."

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms."

Truman's "second way of life" is also comparable with Bush's statement in the middle of his doctrine:

"Now, as then (Cold War) our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of power with no place for human dignity. Now, as then, they seek to impose a joyless conformity, to control every life and all of life"

(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandoctrine.html>).

In other words, "the others" are working against freedom, and "they" are embracing negative elements such as control and oppression. The doctrines are dividing the world into good and evil spheres. The existing links between the doctrines are not that revolutionary breathtaking. Even Bush himself confirmed continuity. In this statement the President compared the fight against terrorism with the Cold War's fight against communism: "Like ideology of communism our enemy is dismissive of free people" (Bostdorff 2008:151).

It is likely that King and Edwards have a point when they claimed that Bush's public messages have served to reenergize the Cold War dualism of freedom versus communism and

transform it into freedom versus terrorism (King and Edwards 2007:8). It can absolutely be argued that Bush tried to make a connection between the war against terrorism (Iraq) by equating both with the struggle against totalitarianism on behalf of democracy. The content in the doctrines is much about creating a battle between those who want freedom and those who “despises” freedom. It is not a surprise that these presidents applied this kind of rhetoric. Truman gave under the preparation of the doctrine the following instructions to his speechwriters: “I want no double talk” (McCullough 1992:546).

He sought a speech closely connected to the Roman Cicero tradition. This means a straight forward formulated speech (Bostdorff 2008:109). In terms of plain speaking dualism, it is possible to state that the Truman Doctrine is the Bush Doctrine's legacy.

On the other hand, the content in the doctrine are not identical. An interesting point with the Truman Doctrine is that the President avoids mentioning the Soviet Union directly as the enemy. In a way, Truman acts carefully with his formulation. He is not as direct as Bush. But although he never mentioned the Soviet Union by name, his juxtaposition of words like democratic and totalitarian and his references to Eastern Europe made the menace to Greece appear to be the Soviets. This is a smaller difference, a bit larger one, is that Bush often refers to words like “Evil” and “God.” In his doctrine the rhetoric appears to be more religious. The next part will investigate whether there are any Wilsonian religious differences between these two.

### **3.3.3 Wilsonians and Religion**

The Wilsonian tradition has deep roots stemming from religion. Through the missionary activity a Wilsonian should promote the good to the uncivilized others. The use of religion and religious concepts seems to make a difference between these two. Much have been written about George W. Bush's religious belief (Mansfield 2003, Lind 2003). In several speeches it is easy to argue that Bush was extremely religious oriented.

This religious image of the President has obviously a hint of truth in it. Religion saved the Texan from his personal problems in the 80's. Bush has ever since been grateful to God for his new life (Lind 2003:54). Bush's confidence to his Lord has reflected his politics. For instance, according to him, freedom is a: “Universal, Godgiven right” (Lind 2003:13).

And the battle against terrorists was being promoted as a conflict between good and evil (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html>). Peter Singer portrays Bush as a ground-breaking Christian president. He tells that as the war with Iraq loomed, Bush read the bible every day, and that the President prayed under cabinet meetings (Singer 2004:91). Also the speechwriter David Frum tells that attendance at Bible study was a vital part of the working process with speeches (Singer 2004:85). A religious and moralistic president in America, is that a revolution?

Religious rhetoric can provoke people, but there is a difference between provoking and being a revolutionist. On one hand we can ask, to what extent is it appropriate for an elected leader in a pluralistic world community to invoke religious faith on official occasions in speeches, and radio, internet broadcasts. But on the other hand, religion and politics in America is a curious mix. Americans are religiously oriented. While less than 20 percent in Europe goes to church once a week, 47 percent in America do so. About 94 percent believe in God, 89 in Heaven, and 72 percent in hell. This mentality is reflected in the political life and speeches (Singer 2004:91).

The religious rhetoric is in itself hardly any original feature of George W. Bush. Al Gore (1948-), John Kerry (1943-) and Harry Truman, would likely agree with some of Bush's religious statements. There are several examples of religious statements in American politics. One of these, said by the conservative John Adams, goes like this: "I pray Heaven to bestow the best of blessing on this house (the White House) and on all that shall hereafter inhabit it" (<http://www.infoplease.com/spot/presquotes1.html>).

George Herbert Walker Bush (1924-) gave the U.S armed forces in Somalia the following message: "You're doing God's work. We will not fail" (Lawrence/Jewett 2003:1). In facing the Watergate crisis, Richard Nixon prayed at his office together with Henry Kissinger. Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) called the Bible: "the best gift God has given to man" (<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagannrbroadcasters.htm>).

What about Harry S. Truman's religious tone? For some people, religious beliefs are seen as a private matter. But Truman as well as Bush are making this perspective impossible. For them, religion is a matter of public interests by referring to it frequently. During Truman's time in office, religion had probably a stronger role in the American daily life than under Bush. In a historical perspective, Bush was not alone in describing "the others" as evil.

Among some of the Christians in America, communism was seen as master-minded by Satan. They thought they had to create a shield against these non-believing "evildoers".

Although many Christians voted for Truman, he occasionally provoked them with his use of words as "hell" and "damn" in media. This gained him a reputation as a profane man (Mitchell 1998:188). Despite that Truman was mentioning God in several speeches and directly referred to Christian/Jewish texts such as King Solomon ([www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/41645.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/41645.htm)), he was not as religious oriented as Bush. In my selections of speeches, Bush includes religion in a larger scale than Truman by referring frequently to words like God and evil in almost every speech.

Although Truman was referring to these terms he has more variety in his language. Sometimes he used "evil" in commenting on "the others", sometimes "aggressors", which is a milder term. This discovery can be connected to another research, showing that no other president since Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 has mentioned God so often in his inaugurations or State of the Unions as George W. Bush (<http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0129-26.htm>). Although Bush made nuances between different types of Muslims, he appears to be more directly than Truman. In this statement he used religion as a tool for going to violent actions. As in this incident:

"Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for you are with me. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war and we know that God is not neutral between them" (Daalder/Lindsay 2005:86).

Occasionally, Bush sounded like a conservative preacher from the deepest Southern States. Formulations like this one: "They hate Christianity. They hate Judaism. They hate everything that is not them" (Woodward 2003:45), can verify this Southern aspect.

Despite strong statements as the above, it is conceivable that Truman's use of the word God provoked "the others" in a larger degree. It is possible to argue this because of the different context the presidents had to relate to. "The others" under Bush's presidency had after all some common religious features with the Americans. The Christian and Islamic faith is not that different. The religions have the same geographical origins. They are monotheistic religions, believing in one and same God. So what's so provocative in referring to a common God?

Bush does not refer to Jesus, or any distinctive Christian leaders. If he does so it is highly unusually. It is correct that Truman applied religious concepts in a smaller degree than Bush, but we have to take into consideration that he spoke toward the non-believing communists. As we know, communists are often atheists, believing in Karl Marx famous saying: "Religion is opium for the people." When Truman characterized the non-believing communists as an infidel people, or as he said in his Farwell Address,: "A Godless system of repression", he created a stronger dualism than Bush. Truman was then using religion to create a diversion between the Americans and "the others."

As in this incident: "A dictatorship is the hardest thing in God`s world to hold together because it is made up entirely of conspiracies from the inside" (Keyes 1995:32).

While Bush`s speechwriters tried to avoid using terms like heaven, hell and Jesus, and replacing them with God, prayer and faith (Weisberg 2008:98), Truman made use of a more biblical language. Is it thinkable he did this with purpose? Perhaps it was. Truman was after all trying to unite the world's religions in a front against communism. He did so by sending his personal representative to Pope Pius XII to coordinate not only with the Vatican but also with the heads of the Anglican, Lutheran, and Greek Orthodox churches. These church communities, especially the Roman Catholic Church, were strong religious allies in the moral battle against international communism.

When George Elsey in the interview stressed that he had: "No recollection of ever having heard Truman speak of communists as devils", he was surely mistaken (Interview George Elsey 15<sup>th</sup> January 2010). Even Robert Ferrell, who gives a positive picture of Truman, recognizes that the President disliked many aspects of the Soviet system (Ferrell 1984:174). Elsey as a source is not reliable all the time. Even in the middle of his nineties he seems to be loyal to his friend Harry S. Truman. As a speechwriter under the Korean War he should have remembered his president`s formulations.

In the Korean War Truman was including religious concepts in a dramatic dualistic way. Under the war he told the media that: "The devil was loose" (Ferrell 2006:96). In negotiations with the Russians he declared: "We shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil" (Patterson 1988:13). Formulations like these create a perfect transition to the next aspect of Wilsonian, the creations of stereotypes.

### 3.3.4 Wilsonian Stereotypes and the Dehumanizing of “The Others”

It can be argued that Wilsonians are dependent on stereotypes. A good society cannot exist without an evil counterpart. In order to describe something as good, we have to present something as less good and evil. A dividing of the world into good and bad people is not a new phenomenon. In this case Edward Said (1935-2004) seem to be a central contributor in explaining the “us versus them” thinking during history. In “*Orientalism*”, the Palestine professor pointed out that the Western World had a tendency to create stereotypes of “the others”. Orientalism can be explained as a fundamentalist political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient is weaker than the West (Said 1978:204).

The classic image of Muslims as militant, barbaric, corrupt, tradition-oriented and uncivilized as people, was early developed among the Western power elite according to Said, and this image has proven to be very resistant (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:46). The creation of “we” and “the others”, represents continuity in our history. It is also a common feature that “we” describe ourselves with good qualities and values: “We” are good, free, modern, successful, democratic and fair as people. They are not (Said 1978:6-8). We have already seen that the presidents used descriptive words such as: “terrorists”, “despotism”, “liars”, “murders”, “false”, “poverty” and “aggression” to describe “the others.”

This is descriptions which are in accordance with Said`s claims. George W. Bush alone gives Said nearby credit for his scientific work by telling: “We haven`t seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time” (Woodward 2003:94). Or Truman, who told in his last speech as President, in 15<sup>th</sup> January 1953:

“I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing struggle-this conflict between those who love freedom and those who will lead the world back into slavery and darkness”

(<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059>).

“The others” are being associated with negative formulations as: “barbarism”, “slavery” and “darkness.” It should be noted that Said`s claims seem to be quite dramatic. Is the Western world really that dualistic minded some may ask?

Some perceive their world view in accordance with the principles in “*Orientalism*.” But it must be stated that many have a good relationship with “the others”.

Why does Said ignore the fact that friendship also exists across cultures? Why does Said construct stereotypes of the Western people as hateful and simple minded?

Said should have differentiated between the types of Muslims that are being discussed. A Muslim, well integrated in a society, will probably face less negative remarks than a fundamentalist fanatic from the Middle-East. On the other hand, Said`s work make some sense. Politicians can strengthen their position by talking condescendingly about "the others." This should not be underestimated. The anthropologist, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, argues that we strengthen our identity by distinguishing ourselves from "the others."

By being condescending to "the others", we can strengthen our position as a group (Hylland-Eriksen 2004:89). Seen from this perspective, there is a potential for continuity of negative characteristics of "the others."

In tense situations, it is not unusual to tell how bad "the others" are. History shows that it is unifying to construct a clear image of an enemy. In the Ancient Greece, the Greek states had a stronger cohesion because they had the Persians as their common enemy. In the middle Ages, the church was united by a common enemy, the Muslims. Under the Crusades which began November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1075, Pope Urban II held a sermon in Clermont in France. The Pope described his enemies as a: "demon worshipping and sleazy race" (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:128). Nine hundred years later, Hitler`s minister of propaganda, Josef Goebbels used the same rhetoric about the Jews. As Bush and Truman, Goebbels characterized his enemies as "terrorists."

In conflicts today, the rhetoric of the past repeats itself. In the Palestine conflict, the ultraorthodox Jews regard themselves as "God`s chosen people", while the Palestinians are simply "terrorists" with no right to God`s land. This traditional rhetoric are familiar with Truman`s description of communists as "devils", and Bush comment about terrorists as "parasites." What kind of connotations can these types of descriptions provide us?

First of all "the others" are not seen as human beings. They are evil vermits. As the commandant in Auschwitz Rudolf Hoss meant, the vermits (Jews) must be exterminated (Rees 2005:56). Creating a distinction where "the others" becomes dehumanized may be appropriate in certain situations. It can legitimize violence. It creates a moral base for brutal actions. A week after the terror attack Bush stated:

“They can’t stand freedom, they hate what America stands for” (<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html>).

In a Press Conference on 11<sup>th</sup> October 2001 George W. Bush said: “We’re smoking al Qaeda out of their caves so we can bring them to justice” (<http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911e.html>).

In the following statement Bush gives a typical Orientalist description of the Afghanistan society: “When I take action I’m not going to fire a 2 dollar million missile at a 10 dollar empty tent and hit a camel in the but. It’s going to be decisive” (Eide and Ottosen 2002:217). What the President is telling is that the Afghan people are underdeveloped. They live in cheap tents, caves, they hate freedom and have camels. In short, they have a primitive culture.

George W. Bush seems to despise “the others.” One day after the terror act, he stated that: “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by faceless cowards” (Swansbrough 2008:89). This statement implies that the enemies are not a worthy opponent for the Americans. They are cowards, hiding before attacking.

When it comes to Truman, he said that it was almost hopeless to deal with the Russians: “Dealing with the communist governments is like an honest man trying to deal with a number of racket kings or head of a dope ring” (McCullough 1992:873). Truman was here comparing the Russians with criminal elements. He stated also that the: “Communists are trained to lie” ([www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965)).

Both talked about “the others” as they were non-human or evil monsters. Under Truman’s presidency it was said that the communists were a: “Parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue” (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:82).

Often this type of rhetoric is applied in order to achieve a certain purpose, to legitimize, or to defend a military attack. What Bush says about Saddam Hussein’s brutality can be one expression of legitimizing an attack: “Tongues are cut off, their eyes are gouged out, and female relatives are raped in their presence” (King and Edwards 2007:167). Saddam was a brutal tyrant. He had used chemical weapons against neighbours and oppressed his own people in decades, but this is probably an exaggerated description.

Another example of defending an act can be found in this utterance by Truman. In this case the President wanted to defend the use of the atomic bomb:

“We have used it (the Atomic Bomb) against those who attacked us without a warning at Pearl Harbour, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners of war. We thank God that it has come to us instead of our enemies, and we pray that he may guide us to use it in his ways” (Jewett and Lawrence 2003:259).

It is not surprising that Bush and Truman are describing their enemies as evil monsters. According to Jennifer Szalai, editor in Harper Magazine, there is nothing revolutionary about characterizing somebody as evil monsters in the USA. Szalai shows that a condescending rhetoric has been used consistently in the course of history. Industrialization, slavery, atheists, communists, and now Muslims have been called evil and wicked (Eide and Ottosen 2002:128).

This seems to be a point, because during World War II, American troops prayed that they would beat the enemy. It has been told that soldiers learned that their enemy was not a man, but a monster. He was evil. The same mentality can be located in the battle against communism and terrorism. These images of “us”- “them”, have been presented in so many movies, stories, books, and newspapers after World War II that they probably etched themselves firmly into the national consciousness. In a historical perspective all enemies to the U.S. are evil. They had/have nicknames, such as: “royalists”, “Nazi”, “jap”, “gok”, “reds” (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:222).

It has to be added that Truman and Bush were presidents in times when these kinds of negative attitudes could grow strong, Bush after 9/11, and Truman in the McCarthy era. So when Bush characterized terrorists as “parasites” it is not a new formulation (Lawrence and Jewett 2003: 222). It`s only a part of a historical technique in dehumanizing an enemy. However, it can also be a genuine true belief. I will do comments about this genuine belief part later on.

It is correct that humans apply words strategically to attain political goals. The problematic part is that we often do this, even without realizing it. Some words may be used in an unconscious way. It`s a part of the culture. It`s nearly a habitus in American policy that the country`s leaders create evil stereotypes (Bourdieu [http://wollan.info/begrepet\\_habitus](http://wollan.info/begrepet_habitus)).

When these stereotypes repeat themselves years after years, decades after decades, they become a natural part of the reality. After a while, you are not supposed to question whether the enemies are evil or not. They are evil!

But it is narrow minded to regard stereotypes only as a direct hateful creation towards "the others." It is also about treating them as inferior in a childish way. Sometimes a Wilsonian can behave as a strict father who is regulating his son's behavior. All this to promote the good society, often with good intentions.

### **3.3.5 Wilsonians and the Pax Americana Paternalism**

A Wilsonian may have a positive side in being a supporting liberator repressing people needs. In many cases, Wilsonians have done a great effort in helping "the others" in creating a safe and wealthy environment. In that case, the American empire is comparable with the Roman Empire's politics about establishing a lasting peace. In the Roman Empire this is known as the Pax Romana. Under and after Augustus there was a peace period approximately 200 year called, the Pax Romana.

Even though the use of the word "peace" is a bit misleading, this period refers mainly to the great Romanization of the Western World, or as in this case, the Americanization of the world. The Roman Empire had under Augustus a kind of Wilsonian mentality. The Romans were not enjoyable with only winning a war; they needed also to win the peace. They did so by raising "the others" as good Roman citizens after a war victory. This sounds familiar with the situation after World War II.

In examining presidential rhetoric it seems like American president's are trying to promote a period of relative peace, a Pax Americana. There are several good reasons to claim that Americans have tried to establish a Pax Americana after World War II. The success with the formation of the UN, the rebuilding of Japan and Europe was to a large scale a Wilsonian Pax Americana project trying to avoid further warfare.

It is a positive feature with the Wilsonian mentality that even powerful empires like the Roman and the American wishes to promote peace and stability to the world. But on the other hand, Wilsonian wishes to promote peace can lead to ethnocentrism and paternalism.

The Wilsonian has links to the Roman thinking about raising "the others." The barbarians had to become civilized Roman. The same attitude can be found in the beginning of America's modern history with Christopher Columbus thinking about raising "the others." The choice was simple, unless "the others" confessed to Christianity; they were slaves by nature (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:130).

It is likely that this mentality of the past has been transferred to today`s modern Western mentality by saying: Unless you confess to values as democracy, freedom and individuality, you will remain a totalitarian villain by nature.

Just like under the Pax Romana, today Wilsonians tell "the others" what`s good for them, and what kind of ideal they should seek. It can provoke a lot of people when a Wilsonian inspired president is telling "the others" how they should live and organize their society.

Two presidents who made an effort to create and establish the Pax Americana were Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) himself and Jimmy Carter. (1924-). Their presidencies can be used as examples of how harmful, good intensions can be.

In Versailles, Wilson created a tense atmosphere. With his fourteen points he provoked a number of countries. The skepticism toward Wilson's "kindness idealism" was perhaps best demonstrated by Georges Clemenceau. Clemenceau saw Wilson`s idealism as a lack of respect for the suffering the French people had experienced under the war. To Wilson`s 14 point he replied: "Why 14 points? For God it was enough with 10 points" (<http://www.ctevans.net/Versailles/Diplomats/Clemenceau.html>).

Jimmy Carter created a bad mood in the U.S-Soviet relations when in 1978 he insisted that Soviet`s foreign minister, Gromyko had to respect the human rights. It is doubtful that Carter wanted a confrontation with the Russians before 1980, but in the meeting with Gromyko and Brezhnev he was certain that human rights were absolutely in everybody interest (Morris 1996:231).

Those with a different understanding of reality may react negative on the Wilsonian paternalistic style. Sometimes, Wilsonians occur almost like a Roman Emperor from a long gone past. They want to control cultures and teach them what they should believe in."The others" are regarded as small children who need education and refinement.

In the following three statements Truman are talking to the Russians almost like a father talks to a rebellious son:

"They don`t know how to behave. They are like bulls in a China shop. They are only twenty-five years old. We are over a hundred and the British are centuries older. We have got to teach them how to behave" (Kissinger 1994:426).

The same President said that he had no geopolitical conflicting interests with the Russians but: “An anger over misbehaviour and political immaturity.” And that he was: “Tired of babying the Soviets” (Leffler 1992:48). Statements as these result in a condescending form of communication. A “we know better” form of dualism is a dangerous path, it can irritate people. Robert Kaplan, one of Bush top-advisers, stated this form of dualism further by arguing that the terrorists hated America because America was a successful nation (Davies and Ziauddin 2002:19). During the election campaign in 1948 Truman expressed the same kind of mentality in proclaiming:

”The communists hates this Democratic administration, because of this country's strong foreign policy, and because the economic and social gains which we have put through make it impossible for them to make any progress whatever in this country” (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965>).

The arrogance in formulations like this is what Noam Chomsky warns against when he writes that American presidents are treating others like small children (Chomsky 2004:23).

This is perhaps worse than yelling at them. Firstly, it is humiliating and secondly it can lead to a form of covered imperialism, hiding behind nice words.

### **3.3.6 Wilsonian Methods in Promoting Pax Americana: Introducing Additional Theory: “Communicative Wilsonians” Versus the “War-hungry Wilsonians”**

In relation to promoting a Pax Americana it can be said that Americans after the Second World War have considered themselves as the world`s most important nation and its destined leader. Viewing the USA as the locomotive of all mankind is often used as metaphor on the country`s greatness. Or as Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) said: “USA, still a land of heroes with all the courage and love of freedom that ever was before” (Bacevich 2005:98). In addition to this, Robert Kagan points out that the self-image seems to be the same under Bush as before the Cold War (Kagan 2008:103-105).

We have already seen that Bush and Truman regarded themselves and “the others” in a similar Wilsonian way. There are traces of continuity. But it is only degree`s of continuity. The president`s may have the same values, but how do they actually look at those who cannot, or will not accept these values? How far are they willing to go as Wilsonians in promoting the Pax Americana?

The father of the Pax Romanum period, Emperor Augustus did not consolidate peacefully conditions by applying to soft measures. Pax Romana was protected by the emperor's great army. Legions patrolled the internal borders with great success, and even though there were still many foreign wars, the internal empire was free from major invasion (Meyer 2002:285). What about Bush and Truman's methods?

When it comes to different ways to promote peace I will argue for the existence of two different types of Wilsonians. One of them can be labelled "communicative Wilsonians", and the other as the "war-hungry Wilsonians". These two can behave quite differently. The "communicative Wilsonians" prefers to promote the good values through soft method and cooperation with "the others."

A "communicative Wilsonian" embraces listening, diplomacy and dialogue as methods. The other type of Wilsonian, the "war-hungry" prefer these values, but adds an extra element in their willingness to use raw military power to promote the Pax Americana. First, some comments on George W. Bush in relation to this division.

By using my additional theory in relation to Svein Melby's revolution claim, it can be argued that the Norwegian researcher describes Bush as a "war-hungry" Wilsonian. Melby writes:

"The idealistic pursuit of democratization and value spread that had dominated the U.S. foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson's day, would now be promoted through aggressive and unilateral use of American power resources" (Melby 2004:20,165).

In Melby's more scientific report to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs with the title, "*Hegemones Hamskifte*", he claims that Bush was willing to expand the democracy by using violence (Melby 2002:18-19). Several researchers are following Melby's line at this point. The historian Andrew J. Bachevich describes Bush in "*The New American Militarism*", as a: "Wilson under arms" (Bachevich 2005).

Peter Singer writes in "*The President of Good and Evil*" that Bush was willing to take dramatic measures in order to promote what he saw as the moral right. According to the same Singer, no other president in living memory has spoken so often about good and evil, right and wrong (Singer 2004:1). Singer's research shows that the President spoke about evil in 319 separate speeches in his first term (Singer 2004:2). Singer even uses the same example as Melby, by referring to Bush's sentence at West Point June 1. 2002 stating:

*"We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name"*

(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html>).

Historically, these discontinuity researchers definitively have a point. Bush, the candidate who had promised in his 2000 acceptance speech to be a uniter not a divider, had by the end of his first term in office become a super-divider (King and Edwards 2007:245-246). It started differently, many defensive oriented real politicians (Jeffersonians) was probably satisfied with Bush`s answers in the presidential debate, 12<sup>th</sup> October 2000. In a classical real political manner, the Texan governor gave the debate leader, Jim Lehrer the following answer on a question about his foreign policy stand: "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us; if we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us" (Melby 2004:13).

In retrospect this formulation can be regarded as an empty phrase. It`s difficult to disagree with the discontinuity claim that Bush was willing to promote peace through a loaded gun. This is reflected in this statement:"Freedom is worth fighting for, dying for, and standing for—and the advance of freedom leads to peace"

([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html)).

Is this promoting the good by using raw power, a solid argument for revolution in American foreign policy? When people are saying, "Peace in the world is the same as war in Pennsylvania Avenue", it is not without a reason. As former secretary of defence Robert McNamara (1916-2009) stated in an interview regarding the methods in the U.S. foreign policy: "In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil."

As the statement tells, we must not be blinded by a narrow-minded view on Wilsonians as peace seeking pacifists. The American empire has for a long time, like the Roman before it, seeked to impose a peace upon the world by using force (Kagan 2007). After the World War II, the isolationistic alternative in the foreign policy was seen as a dangerous path to follow.

It`s not surprising that the U.S. regards involvement in the world as a natural obvious case. Historically, isolationism has lead to a series of adverse consequences where dictators have strengthened their position in an anarchy-like world community. Former security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is on to this issue in stating that: "American preponderance is currently the only practical alternative to global anarchy"

(Harvard:[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_hb137/is\\_1\\_24/ai\\_n28905706/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_1_24/ai_n28905706/)).

As Truman put it: "Isolationism is the road to war. Worse than that, isolationism is the road to defeat in war" (Keyes 1995:42).

During the American history there are many examples on incidents that recognize that the only accepted plan for peace is the loaded gun. Woodrow Wilson himself was in many people's eyes an idealist who disliked wars. He spent the time between 1914-1917 trying to keep America out of the war in Europe. By one occasion he said that: "We desire no conquest, no domination"

(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/wilson/warmessage.html>).

During World War One, he offered to be a mediator, but neither the Allies nor the Central Powers took his requests seriously. Instead the Republicans, led by Theodore Roosevelt, strongly criticized his refusal to build up the Army in anticipation of the threat of war. Renominated in 1916, Wilson used as a major campaign slogan: "He kept us out of the war", referring to his administration avoiding open conflict with Germany or Mexico (Moen 2008:364). In the presentation so far he appears to be a typical "communicative Wilsonian." On the other hand, it is not that easy to categorize Woodrow Wilson. He never promised to keep the USA out of war regardless of provocation.

After a while, he decided that the war had become a real threat to humanity. Unless the U.S. threw its weight into the war, as he stated in his declaration of war speech on April 2, 1917, Western civilization itself could be destroyed. His statement announcing a "war to end all wars" (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/wilson/warmessage.html>).

This meant that Woodrow Wilson took the U.S. out of isolation to prevent totalitarian forces to succeed. Even the idealistic Wilson himself went to war to prevent future warfare. In this emergency situation, it is understandable that something had to be done. More problematic for Wilson's image as a dove is his military interventions in Latin America between 1914 and 1918, particularly in Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and Panama. In his Latin America policy Wilson differs little from his predecessor, the hawk Theodore Roosevelt. With the U.S. imperial history in our minds, we can ask whether it is possible to characterize any president in the U.S. as a "communicative Wilsonian" at all. All president's have made use of hard power to promote the good values.

Maybe, Jimmy Carter is the closest we get to a communicative Wilsonian? His presidency was weak and unstable, although also he strengthened the grip towards Soviet Union at the end of his presidency. Despite his good intentions, these historical examples illustrate the existence of a context leading most of the U.S. presidents in an aggressive “war-hungry” Wilsonian direction. Presidents with good intentions, who wish to build peace and prosperity, end up as warriors, more than diplomats. In the U.S history, it is much easier to find “war-hungry Wilsonians” than the “communicative” ones.

Researchers such as Daalder and Lindsay and Edwards and King expressed it probably well when they categorize Bush as a “cultural warrior,” one who was willing to use military power to transform to the world (King and Edwards 2007:1, Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78).

Descriptions like these seem to be suitable. Despite the fact that several times the President described himself as a clear-eyed realist, his expansive rhetoric echoed much of the idealism of Woodrow Wilson. The content in speeches are extremely concerned about “ending the tyranny in the world” (Swansbrough 2008:19).

The “cultural warrior” President expresses his view clearly: “Our responsibility to history is already clear. To answer these attack and get rid of the world of evil” (Woodward 2003:67). The former Texan governor also told Bob Woodward that there was: “Nothing bigger than achieving world peace” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:85).

According to this line of thinking, Bush’s beliefs in promoting democracy through strength was something unique with this President. By employing a historical perspective in this part of the thesis, the revolutionary claim is given little credit. Many presidents have been willing to go far in order to promote the Pax Americana. How much force a president should use in order to promote the good society has been a perpetual debate between real politicians and the idealistic direction of Wilsonian in American politics nearly since the birth of the nation (Gaddis 2004).

Early in the discussion, USA’s sixth president John Quincy Adams (1767-1848) had another perspective than the Wilsonians: “America applauds those who fight for liberty and independence. But she goes not abroad in searching monsters to destroy. She cannot be the dictatress of the world” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:4).

A typical Wilsonian would turn Quincy Adams statement on its head by arguing: “America would lose its soul if it did not go abroad.” Long before Woodrow Wilsons liberal internationalism there were set forth moral arguments for a broad American engagement in the world (Kagan 2007). It had been seen as a necessity to promote peace with strength. It is likely that some of the “war-hungry” Wilsonians have the same understanding as Fredrik the Great. This Prussian king proclaimed that “Diplomacy without armaments is like music without instruments” (Ferrell 2006:44).

If you want to promote Pax Americana you need to combine the good intentions with strength. As Bush express it: “All people want is freedom. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom all over the world”

([http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush.georgew/second\\_inaugural](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush.georgew/second_inaugural)).

When Bush talked about “Expansion of freedom” it is unlikely that he wanted to promote that by being a “communicative Wilsonian.” Among American presidents, the American society as well, there is a great ideal of skepticism toward negotiations with terrorists.

Some Americans regard dialogue with terrorist as practically impossible. How can you negotiate with a fanatic who is willing to sacrifice everything he owns for gaining a moment of the world`s attention? A “war-hungry” Wilsonian combines realism and idealism in seeing these negotiations as impossible. Realism is seeing dialogue with terrorists as utopia. The part of idealism can be found in the belief that the terrorists will accept democracy under hard pressure.

Also, Truman had a hard time trying to deal with “the others.” Stalin and the Communist officials did not hold their agreements according to Truman. This is why he frustrately expressed: “I don`t believe in summit conferences. They don`t amount to a damn. I have been to two of them, and nothing was accomplished” (Keyes 1995:42).

In an early stage in the aftermath of the war discussion, the Americans became frustrated. The Truman administration responded to the Russian stubbornness by tightening the grip (Miscamble 2007:97). This development gave the “communicative Wilsonians” little leeway. According to the historian Ellen Schrecker, Truman was more concerned with protecting individual rights than any president before him, with the possible exception of Jimmy Carter (Kirkendall 2004:228). Could one say that Truman was willing to use violent means in order to promote the Pax Americana?

It appears so if we include Wilson D. Miscamble commenting on Truman as a Wilsonian. In *“From Roosevelt to Truman”*, Miscamble understands Truman as a non-aggressive president. But in comparing him with Woodrow Wilson he writes: “While Wilson defined the war, Truman prepared to fight it” (Miscamble 2007:6).

The following Truman statement may indicate that the President was willing to go far in order to protect the free world:

“From Darius I’s Persia, Alexander’s Greece, Hadrian’s Rome, Victoria’s Britain, no nation or group of nations has had our responsibilities. It was now America’s task to save the world from totalitarianism” (Lundestad 2003:35).

A similar trend continues in examining the following four statements: The first one has its origins from April, 1945. In this speech Truman seems to have a Bush like tone in calling the nation to live up to a glorious heritage by bringing the war to total victory. He declared: “America will continue to fight for freedom until no vestige of resistance remains. Freedom is the only reliable path to peace” (Pierce 2007:8).

Secondly, in an address at Fordham University on May 11<sup>th</sup>, 1946, Truman exhorted:

“Intelligent Americans no longer think that merely because a man is born outside the boundaries of United States, he is no concern of ours. They know that in such thinking lie the seed of the dictatorship and tyranny. And they know from sad experience that dictatorship and tyranny are too ruthless to stop at the borders of the United States and conveniently leave us alone” (Pierce 2007:126).

The President is referring to formulations like: “fight until no resistance remains.” In the last sentence he regarded “promoting freedom” as the only tool for gaining peace. In the second statement he argues for an active the U.S. involvement in the world. In order to stop dictatorship the U.S. has to display a great deal of energy in the international community. In statement three and four, Truman further strengthens his image as a “Wilsonian war-hungry” president.

In statements like: “I want peace and I’m willing to fight for it” (McCullough 1992:384), and: “The will to peace must be backed by strength for peace. We must be prepared to pay the price for peace.” (McCullough 1992:384), he sounded like Bush. The content in these formulations can explain why Bush admires Truman.

Because, no matter how polarized Washington becomes between Democrats and Republicans, there is still one Democrat the Republicans love, namely: Harry S. Truman. Especially hard-liners loves Truman`s efforts in promoting democracy, and his fight for defending the free world. Bush regarded Truman as one of the greatest president`s. (Weisman 2008:234-35).

In the basement at the Truman Museum and Research Centre in Missouri there are several quotations on the wall were Bush is praising Truman. An example is shown below:

"Harry Truman cared, because he had a vision that was a long-term vision about world peace. . . . [He] had the foresight to see the capacity of freedom, the universal right of people to change the world" (Bush in Clive, Iowa, October 2004).

But the reality is more complicated than what this view tells. Whether Harry Truman's presidential policy towards communism, led America to victory in the Cold War is a highly debatable question.

What is not debatable is the belief that Truman`s tough style toward “the others” was the right way to face an enemy. This is probably one of the reasons why Bush invoked “the Truman story” at his 2006 West Point graduation speech. In these two statements it is obvious that Bush is comparing himself with Truman:

“Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian aims.”

And further in the speech: “President Truman made clear that the Cold War was an ideological struggle between tyranny and freedom. At a time when some still wanted to wish away the Soviet threat” (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html>).

But is it fair to associate Truman`s name with the “war-hungry Wilsonian” extremely hard-line policy? In a way this is abuse of history. It is likely that Bush did use Truman`s history with great awareness, and with the purpose of defending his own hard-line. As Bush told in 2005: “President Harry Truman stuck to his guns. He believed as I do, in freedom to transform an adversary into an ally” (Weisman 2008:235).

In this way Truman became a comforting role model for Bush. Like Bush, Truman was a wildly unpopular wartime leader who aimed big and did some mistakes.

Both did face a stormy opposition and plummeting public approval during their presidency (U.S News, 21 January 2007 –History`s Verdict). Later on, after the fall of the communism, Truman is regarded as one of the greatest presidents in the U.S. history (Lahlum 2008 Moen 2008). Robert Dallek is on to something when he claims that everyone who gets in trouble in their presidency period invokes "the Truman story." But Dallek says: "there is only one Truman" (The Kansas City Star, 15 December 2006 – Bush-Truman Comparison).

Robert Dallek is in one way correct. Truman was sometimes careful in his foreign policy. There are discussions on how strong Truman wanted to defend the free world. Wilsonian moralism turned out to be short-lived as nuclear weapons spread and the Cold War emerged.

During the Cold War, it was necessary for the United States to ignore some human rights violations by allies because the global struggle against the "red danger" overshadowed all other concerns. Therefore, several military dictatorships were given a pass as long as they remained friendly to the USA. But American presidents continued to expose the virtues of freedom and the spread of American values. However, they balanced these idealistic ambitions with a careful eye towards guarding American security in a nuclear age. Truman had to balance between politics of idealism and realism. Real political there are traces of these contradicting directions in Truman`s foreign policy.

The President had clear realistic positions when he portrayed China`s leaders Chiang Kai Shek and South Korea`s Syngman Rhee as loyal members of the free world. In reality these regimes were brutally dictatorial. They both had systematically destroyed their political opposition and stamped out the free speech. A true "war-hungry Wilsonian" should not have supported these regimes.

Truman`s policy of containment was conservative in many ways. It rejected the risks of a larger, potentially devastating war associated with "rolling back" Soviet gains in Eastern Europe. Truman showed patience and wisdom in responding to the Soviet threat.

On the other hand Truman sometimes sounded just like Bush. The former Missouri Senator appears to be a mixture of the five directions: "war-hungry Wilsonian", "communicative Wilsonian", "Jeffersonian real politics" and as we shall see later on, "Jacksonian extreme and moderate line." In addition to talking as a "communicative Wilsonian" and Jeffersonian, he acted like a "war-hungry Wilsonian" and "Jacksonian" in dropping two nuclear bombs, and starting a global warfare against communism in Korea, a warfare comparable with the ones in

Vietnam and Iraq in its cruelty. This global warfare politics toward "the others", will be examined closer in chapter four under the heading: "Meeting "the others" as a global enemy."

Despite that Truman`s foreign policy seems to be flexible, it was in many ways fairly simple: Truman did not believe in isolation. He was against dictators (Leffler 2007:39). It can be argued that Truman had great passion for history. He admired the founding fathers, and disliked those who worked against America`s historical values, as stated in the Constitution. It`s likely that his foreign minister Dean Acheson (1893-1971) with this quote summarizes the main point of Truman`s politics: "Americans are children of freedom and cannot be safe except in an environment of freedom" (Leffler and Legro 2008:51).

In following this line of continuity thinking, George Lakoff has a point in arguing for a tradition where presidents think in dichotomies, based on a "we" versus "the other" mentality. The world is always divided into an evil and a good part. Rough behavior, to promote the good will is nothing new according to Lakoff (Eide and Ottosen 2002:170). American policy has always been based on an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth mentality he argues (Eide and Ottosen 2002:176). Based on the above examples, it seems like Bush`s wishes to "get rid of the world evil" were only an echo of several of his predecessors.

This means that a tough style is accepted if it can promote a good cause in American politics. However, there seems to be an insufficient ground for concluding that both president`s belong to the direction "war-hungry Wilsonians". As argued above, Truman is a highly flexible president. In the following statement, an Annual Message to the Congress January 4<sup>th</sup> 1950, Truman behaved as a "communicative Wilsonian" by arguing: "Our aim for a peaceful, democratic world of free people will be achieved in the long run, not by forces of arms, but by an appeal to the minds and hearts of men" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm>).

Also, Bush appeals to "communicative Wilsonian" solutions. Like in his 2005 Second Inaugural Address:

"So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. This is not a primarily task of arms"

([http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush\\_georgew/second\\_inaugural.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugural.html)).

This is a peaceful request, but it is not synonymous with dismissing the image of Bush as a "war-hungry Wilsonian", or Truman for that matter. With these presidents' formulations, there are still good reasons to claim that they saw themselves as the leaders of the free world, fighting evil just like USA had done in the struggle against Nazism, Fascism and the Japanese militarism during the World War II (Leffler 1992:267). Although the presidents had some links to the "communicative Wilsonian" direction, they were not afraid of expressing themselves clearly.

Bush and Truman partially overlooked advice from America's founding fathers against avoiding the: "out searching monster for destroy politics." Sometimes, it seems like they were going on a crusade in the name of the free world. As Bush proclaimed in his 2005 Inaugural Address above: the ultimate goal was to: "End the World's tyranny" ([http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush\\_georgew/second\\_inaugural.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugural.html))

Truman expressed firmly the same content by telling: "I have been fighting communism not merely where it is a contemptible minority in a land of freedom, but wherever it is a marching and menacing power in the world" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965>).

Those who saw Bush's foreign policy as radically moralistic, should not overlook the fact that both Truman and even today's President, Barack Obama embraces vital parts of Bush's freedom agenda. When the discontinuity research claims that democracy, liberal values and morality was more important for Bush than any previous president, it is nearly an unhistorical reflection on foreign affairs. According to the arch-realist Henry Kissinger, we can hear the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism marching already early in American foreign policy after World II (Bacevich 2005:12).

However, when America's forty-third president may go down as one of the most criticized in American history, it is not without a reason. The problematic, perhaps revolutionary part, with Bush as a "war-hungry Wilsonian" can be found in formulation like: "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while" (<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html>).

It was at a Press Conference only a week after the terror attack that the President gave this answer to the audience. The term crusade refers to a series of religiously sanctioned military campaigns waged by much of the Christian Europe.

The specific aim to the crusaders were to restore Christian control of the Holy Land. When Bush applied this term it seems to be little new about it. Truman expressed the same term in his acceptance speech, July, 1948 by saying:

”This is more than a political campaign: it is a call to arms. Give me your help, not to win alone, but to win in this new crusade to keep America secure and safe for its own people” (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1060>).

Although they are applying the same term, the context is different in this case. The surroundings are not the same at all. Truman used the term in a Campaign speech in Philadelphia in 1948, while Bush talked in a broadcasted Press Conference with millions of listeners all over the world. It is worrying that the President did use such a heavily charged term in a public performance. Crusade has different connotations around the globe. In America, Bush's reference to a "crusade" against terrorism, passed almost unnoticed. In the Middle-East the alarm bells rang.

The formulation raised fears that the terrorist act could spark a “clash of civilizations” between Christians and Muslims, sowing fresh winds of hatred. Although Bush was obviously quite pleased with himself for having thought of such a catchy phrase, he was quickly silenced by his advisers, who pointed out to him that the word "crusade" has very unfortunate associations for the Muslim world (Woodward 2003:94-95). In relation to communists, the term did not have burdensome historical connotations. In this case, Bush seems to differ from Truman as a clearer dualistic president. Why was Bush behaving that aggressive? One explanation can be found in the fact that the President leaded an incredible powerful nation. The rhetoric reflected this great power. Having much power gives a "war-hungry Wilsonian" a solid opportunity to develop and grow strong under a presidency.

What about Truman in relations to Bush at this point, is it possible to argue for a common power context in comparing these presidents?

### **3.4 Common Context of Great Power Gives Strength to “War-Hungry” Wilsonians**

One of the discontinuity arguments for the Bush revolution can be found in the president`s great power. The U.S. operates no longer in a power sharing bipolar system, but in a more unilateral one. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the USA was characterized as superpower. In the 90`s a new term started to emerge. The new label was the hegemonic superpower.

This since Bush led a powerful nation he could tighten the grip on "the others," without meeting any consequences (Melby 2004:34). With great power, Bush could make a solid effort in creating Pax Americana. The discontinuity argument seems to make sense. Despite an economic downfall in the end of his last term, Bush led a powerful nation during the period 2000-2008.

Gone was the competing ideology in east. The U.S. alone accounted for nearly 40 percent of the world's defense budgets under Bush. The country also stood for 25 percent of the world's total production of goods and services (Melby 2002:6). In addition to this, the country had a leading star when it came to higher education and research. This is evidence on a current hegemonic power. But is it possible to object to a presentation like this and ask for nuances? Is it really true that the U.S. was more powerful under Bush than under Truman? Harry S. Truman did not lead a weak state during his time in office. He was well aware of the USA's great power, as in this formulation:

"Today, by the grace of God, we stand a free and prosperous nation with greater possibilities for the future than any people ever had before in the history of the world."

Later on in the same speech, Truman was arguing for a more active U.S. involvement in the world: "Our tremendous strength has brought with tremendous responsibilities", and further on the President declared that he wants to use this strength to support "world peace" and the "free world" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm>).

Truman was in many ways correct in his statements about the U.S. greatness. In World War II almost 40 000 Americans soldiers died and another million was wounded (Lundestad 2003:27). But the American people did not experience the suffering during the early 40's as many others did. The United States emerged from the conflict stronger than it had ever been before. American production attained new peaks. At the end of the war the USA had 2/3 of the world's gold reserves and 3/4 of its invested capital. The gross national product of the United States was three times the Soviet, and more than five times the Britan (Leffler 1992:23). The country was a strong military power. It's navy dominated the sea while the strategic air force had the airspace under control. It also held a monopoly over the most intimidating weapon, the atomic bomb. The historian Geir Lundestad has compared the U.S. power with the one Britan had at the end of the Napoleonic wars.

Both completed a triumphant war, their technological revolution had taken off and their rivals were exhausted. Lundestad concludes that the U.S. was the strongest power the world had ever seen and the undisputed leader of the free world (Lundestad 2003:27). But this presentation needs certain refinements. For instance, the American military advantage was eaten up by competing elements around the globe in the late 40`s. The Soviets developed the nuclear bomb and China got lost to the communists.

By this, it seems like the discontinuity research has a point in its claim about a more powerful nation under Bush. However, the U.S. under Bush was not an almighty state. A nation`s power cannot be measured only in its internal greatness. It`s power depends to a large degree on the state`s behavior at the international stage. If a state interacts well with others, it can gain power through confidence and trust. On the other hand, if a nation acts like a bully, others will create alliances against the state. This is what we have seen in the Iraq War where Russia, France and Germany together protested against the U.S. Put another way, the fact that Soviet lost the Cold War is not synonymous with the U.S. doing whatever they like.

Under Bush`s presidency, the U.S. met resistance, and the country will still in the future face nations and actors that disagrees with them. Viewed this way, Truman had probably an advantage by leading the U.S. in a time where the relationship to the other states was better.

By contributing with the Marshall-aid and rebuilding the free world, the U.S. was in a larger scale than under Bush regarded not as a "imposing power", but as an "inviting power" (Lundestand 2003). During Truman`s presidency, the world`s community needed an active involvement from the Americans. The American`s were active in their involvement in the creation of several international organizations in the aftermath of the war. In this context, Truman had a power-advantage in cooperation and confidence that Bush did not have.

However, common for both, it can be stated that with great and overwhelming power, they were expected to refashion the world in America`s image. In American`s justification for war it is a traditional Casus Belli, that they enter wars in order to remove the evil and promote the good. Edwards and King point out that Bush in a Wilsonian manner went into Iraq because of his vision to restore freedom to the oppressed people (Edwards and King 2007:167). This is a bit simplifying the causes of war. There are many motivations behind the invasion. Economical and geopolitical factors are at least two driving forces.

Perhaps, this Wilsonian, defending freedom and democracy talk, only are justifications violent for actions. In some occasions this lead to accuracy.

On the other hand, both presidents refer frequently to the importance of defending the free world. They are mentioning these values so frequently that they in some degree must have had the Wilsonian aims and ideals as a genuine value. Their National Security Strategies seem to substantiate this claim.

A National Security document explains how the president`s are working to protect the American people, advancing American interests and enhancing a global security. Reading these strategies, it seems like both wanted to enter a post-historical paradise of democratic peace. Nearby, an idealistic version of Immanuel Kant`s perpetual peace. As stated in Truman`s NSC-68: “A defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere” (Kissinger 1994:462). In Bush`s second term National Security Strategy from March 16, 2006 he sounds similar to Truman`s expression:

”The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all over the world” (<http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nss-2006/index.htm>).

In this contextual discussion it can be wise to include Robert Kagan`s claim about a resurrection of old dualism. According to Kagan, the competition between democracy and autocracy has re-emerged. Kagan claims that we today are witnessing an old struggle between radical Islamists and the modern cultures (Kagan 2008). By including Truman and Bush`s rhetoric into the discussion, it is possible to support Kagan`s argument that dualism from the Cold War`s days has returned. In today`s situation it is impossible to deny that there are ideological contestants left to liberal democracy. A symbolic expression of the ideological conflict can be found in the attack on the World Trade Centre . Little suggests that the attack at World Trade Centre was a random choice. Seeing the World Trade Centre as a symbol on American glory made the buildings a tempting target for terrorists.

It can be objected against Kagan that states like Russia, China and some states in the Middle-East in the 90`s started to move toward political and economical liberalism, but on the other hand the positive expectations were in many ways misplaced. In the Middle-East the development are going in an opposite direction, toward a return of theocracy.

In regard to this development, John Ikenberry were probably too optimistic in describing the end of the Cold War as the beginning of a “liberal paradise” (Leffler and Legro 2008:56).

At the world stage, there are several actors who believe in a strong state, leadership and who see democracy as a system of weakness. The dualistic battle the Wilsonian Bush met were in some degree identical with the one under Truman`s Cold War days. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the symbol on repression was gone, but the battle between freedom and autocracy seems to be continuing. As Bush stated so well in 2001:

“What is at stake is not just America`s freedom. This is the world`s fight. This is civilization`s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom ” ([presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html](http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html)).

As Truman expressed, it half a decade before Bush in 1949:

“In the pursuit of these aims (free people, peace on earth, equality), the United States and other like-minded nations find themselves directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life”  
([www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?i=1030](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?i=1030)).

Little suggests that the “End of History” was closer under Truman, Bush or Obama. By examining the rhetoric, it seems to be more a return to history. A new repressing enemy appears as a fundamentalist from the Middle-East who repeatedly are confronting Western values. It is possible that terrorism could become as important in holding the two sides of Atlantic together as the Soviet threat was during the Cold War. As some have argued, maybe we are in the early stages of a Second Cold War where the history of dualism between good and evil is repeating itself (Singh and Lynch 2008:6).

The next chapter will examine Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush in relation to the Jacksonian tradition. It will check out the following claim made by the discontinuity research: “George W. Bush represented new elements with his extreme hard-line policy” (Melby 2004, Daalder/Lindsay 2005).

### 3.5 SUMMARY CHAPTER 3

The discontinuity research argues that black and white thinking was a hallmark of the Bush administration after 9/11. Taken from a perspective of continuity, many American presidents have promoted strong dualism in their speeches and statements. This chapter has shown that Truman and Bush can be seen as traditional Wilsonians. In the same way as Bush, Truman distinguishes between good and evil societies in his rhetoric.

But Walter Russell Mead's theory sometimes simplifies American attitudes, when he regards Wilsonians as one direction in American foreign policy. It is doubtful that all Wilsonians are peaceful doves. There exists a variety of types within the tradition.

With introducing a historical perspective, different theoretical aspects and my additional theory, Truman and Bush turned out to be highly comparable as Wilsonians. Both were exploiting the history of World War II. George W. Bush was not alone in harbouring a great deal of skepticism towards totalitarian states. Also Harry Truman compared communism and Nazism. In their presidential doctrines one can hear echoes of Truman's words in the Bush doctrine. The content is much about "us" against "them".

In terms of religious Wilsonians Bush seems to be more religious. He refers more frequently to religious terms. But we have to take into consideration that Muslims and Christians have the same God. Communists on the other hand have no faith in religion. In this context Truman provoked "the others" more than what Bush did by referring to God.

The presidents also gave a typical Orientalistic description of "the others". "We" are good, free, modern, successful, democratic and fair as people. They are not. The presidents used descriptive words such as: "terrorists", "despotism", "liars", "murders", "false", "poverty" and "aggression" to describe "the others."

Looking at it this way it is not revolutionary to characterize somebody as evil monsters in the USA. Condescending rhetoric has been used consistently in the course of history. Much indicates that these presidents in a true Wilsonian spirit wanted to promote the good, known as Pax Americana.

In this context the presidents are talking to “the others” as they were small children. If “the others” would not listen, how far are they then willing to go? I have argued for the existence of two different types of Wilsonians. One of them the “communicative Wilsonians” prefers soft method and cooperation with “the others”.

The war-hungry Wilsonians add an extra element in their willingness to use military power to promote the Pax Americana. Bush and Truman can be connected to the war-hungry direction. They were willing to take dramatic measures in order to promote the moral right. Promoting the good by using raw power seems to be little new in American foreign policy. After the World War II, the isolationistic alternative in the foreign policy was perceived as a dangerous path to follow. During the American history there are many examples on incidents that recognize that the only accepted plan for peace is the loaded gun. Much indicates also that these president`s after a short time in office lost their faith in dialogue as method. They turned to a hard-line style.

Many hard-liners love Truman`s efforts in promoting democracy, and his fight for defending the free world. Bush himself regarded Truman as one of the greatest presidents. Those who saw Bush`s foreign policy as radically moralistic, should not overlook the fact that both Truman and even today`s President, Barack Obama, embrace vital parts of Bush`s freedom agenda.

However, one solid argument given by the discontinuity research is George W. Bush use of the crusade term. Seen in relation to people from the Middle-East this had an unfavourable effect.

Although George W. Bush lead a more powerful nation than Truman, both were well aware of the USA`s great power after World War II. In speeches they were arguing for a more active U.S. involvement in the world. It can be said that Bush, as Truman had to deal with an enemy that disliked the western system and way of life.

## CHAPTER 4: JACKSONIAN TOUGHNESS - A TRADITION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY?

### 4.1 Two Presidential Jacksonians?

Some would say that Harry S. Truman was the originator of the Cold War. Revisionist historians argue that Franklin D. Roosevelt's respectful treatment of Soviet had been reversed by his successor Harry S. Truman (Patterson 1988, Alperovitz 1995). One thought by the revisionist historian Gar Alperovitz is that the Americans under Truman dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese in order to alert the Russians that they had great power. Alperovitz claimed that the U.S. dropped the bombs to intimidate the Russians (Alperovitz 1995:11-14). Not all agree with a presentation like this. Some argue that Truman was a mild president (Miscamble 2007).

Although people disagree about Truman's presidency, several researchers label him as a hard-liner in foreign affairs (Patterson 1988, Bacevich 2005, Moen 2008, Medhurst and Scott 1997). John Lewis Gaddis presented in, "*We Know Now*", Truman as a noisy shopkeeper with hard-line advisers (Gaddis 1997:23). In this research Truman appears to be quite noisy. Truman's rough style is reflected in his rhetoric. Once, he characterized the Russians as a: "pigheaded people" (Patterson 1988:44).

Often he was regarded as one of the people, an ordinary man, a typical representative of Heartland America. Among some, it was being said that if Truman could be president, so could the next door neighbor (McCullough 1992:59). A good quotation about Truman's popular orientation is provided by admiral Ernest J. King. At the Potsdam Conference, King told Lord Moran to look after Truman by telling: "Watch the President. This is all new to him, but he can take it. He is more typical American than Roosevelt" (McCullough 1992:434).

Several factors indicate that Truman enjoyed the image of himself as an ordinary man. He promoted this image throughout his career (Kirkendall 2004-Hamby:350), as in this statement: "I'm a meat and potatoes man" (Keyes 1995:38). If we take a brief look at some of his formulations, they are closely related to the Jacksonian tradition. The plain spoken Truman operated from the gut with his simple and populist tone in talking to reporters (Weisman 2008:234). Once, he assured them that: "the country was not going to hell" (McCullough 1992:742).

Other expressions of the Presidents tough attitude can be located in sayings such as: "If you can't stand the heat, you better get out of the kitchen," "the buck stops here" (McCullough 1992:584), or as when the President in dealing with Stalin advised using a "baseball bat" (McCullough 1992:384). All these statements express tough and simple Jacksonian rhetoric.

The direct style in these statements shows the main-reason why Truman still is a controversial president. In a biography of Truman written by David McCullough, it emerges that the President had no problems with using negative description in relation to others. When he talked about Stalin, he used terms like: "Uncle Joe, or "Son of a bitch" (McCullough 1992:452). African-Americans were "niggers" and the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann was a "boldheaded son-of-a-bitch" (Keyes 1995:101).

When it comes to George W. Bush it seems like no serious researcher will debate whether he was aggressive or not. According to the United Nations, Afghanistan, Iraq and several other states, he appeared aggressive. After the terror attack, Bush proclaimed that he was: "pissed off" and he wished to: "kick their ass" (Draper 2007:141). On an early stage Bush told that he would kick: "Saddam's sorry motherfucking ass all over the Middle-East" (Weisman 2008:98).

Academic debates at this field consist in a larger degree about discussing the necessity of the President's methods. What kind of tools and behavior shall the U.S. make use of in order to safeguard its own citizens and the world community? Some supported the hard-line, and saw it as a necessity. Among these supporters we find Bill Kristol, Max Boot, Norman Podhoretz and Robert Kagan. While others like Noam Chomsky and John Galtung saw it as a policy of madness (Eide and Ottosen 2002).

Whatever future historians may say about this President one thing is clear: their verdict will hinge upon evaluations of the President's tough style and war on terror. The big question is whether his foreign policy will succeed in the end. The answer to that is not given, it remains to be seen. Just as Truman, Bush will be judged for his success, or not in the battle against "the others." Independent of political views it should prevail little doubt that George W. Bush was an archetypical representative for the Jacksonian tradition. In resemblance with Truman, he was proud of his roots in "Heartland America". Some argued that he had anti-elitist grievance and hated Yale (Weisberg 2008:42).

In "*Bush at War*", Bob Woodward provides a consistently characteristic of Bush as tough, simple and populist. By referring to some of Bush statements, we can easily underline this image:

"A president has got to be the calcium in the backbone. If I weakens, the whole team weakens. If I'm doubtful, I can assure you there will be a lot of doubt. It is a necessity to be confident and determined" (Woodward 2003:259).

Bush preferred a strong presidency. He admired former leaders who had a tough attitude toward "the others." Truman and Reagan's direct style in meeting with communism, and Churchill's leadership during World War II were seen as ideals. In the best Jacksonian tradition, Bush wanted to: "scare the hell out of the enemy." As he said: "I want to have them quaking in their boots" (Woodward 2003:98).

It is easy to be critical toward George W. Bush, but on the other hand he has successfully been able to promote himself as a man of the people. Unlike many of the U.S. elite politicians, Bush has managed to emerge as a common man. For better or worse, he was a Heartland America president. After the attack, many believed in his leadership. He was a major part in the grief process. He visited the ruins at Ground Zero and cried at his office later on. In the response to the attack, he took a cruel revenge on "the others."

#### **4.2 Jacksonian Variation: Introducing Additional Theory With - The "Moderate And Extreme Jacksonians"**

The common view of Svein Melby and Walter Russell Mead is that they view these president's as Jacksonians (Melby 2004. Mead 2002). Does this mean that there is a connection between Truman and Bush? According to Melby, there are clear differences between Truman and Bush (Melby 2004:18). Melby explains that the Jacksonian tradition rarely gets any influence in American public politics. When the tradition got so much power under Bush, it was because of 9/11 and the unipolar situation (Melby 2004:39).

The strong Jacksonian influences in American politics under Bush represented a totally new and aggressive style according to Melby. Bush is presented as the most extreme version of Jacksonian, while Truman's foreign policy is being described as defensive-oriented toward cooperations (Melby 2004:17-18,149). As in the writings about the Wilsonian tradition, Mead seems to be simplifying and overlooking the existence of different wings within these traditions. Mead describes the Jacksonian mentality as a hard-line toward "the others."

The enemy has to be met with hard military measures. A Jacksonian prefers to hit as hard and as fast as possible (Mead 2002:254). Mead gives examples on this mentality telling that this was Oliver Cromwell's (1599-1658) strategy in Ireland, Andrew Jackson's strategy in the Creek Wars against the Indians, Douglas MacArthur's strategy in Korea, and it was what the tradition wanted to do in Vietnam. Also during the Vietnam and Korean Wars there were serious proposals to use nuclear weapons (Mead 2002:256).

My objection or addition to the typology can be summarized in the following questions: Does Mead really believe that all Jacksonians acclaimed military use in these places, and that they wanted to use nuclear weapons in Asia? Is it possible to argue that some Jacksonians have a more violent attitude than others? I will claim that some Jacksonians want to crush their enemies harder than others in the tradition. Not all the Jacksonians agree with military leaders as William T. Sherman (1823-1890) that the civilian population had to suffer in warfare, George C Patton's (1885-1945) eagerness in entering a military crusade against communism (Lawrence and Jewett 2003:81), or Curtis la Mey's (1906-1990) desire to use nuclear bombs during the Cuban missile crisis (Fog of the War: 2003 documentary).

If the Jacksonian tradition is based on realism like Mead claims, it becomes a bit misleading that all Jacksonians support warfare in Iraq, Vietnam and Korea, and are willing to use nuclear weapons in these places (Mead 2002:245). Although Jacksonians are anti-intellectual, it is doubtful that all of them would agree that it is appropriate to engage in warfare in the periphery. We have to consider that Jacksonians are nationalists, and some nationalists regard a costly war in the periphery as something that may weaken the military capabilities to respond to other threats.

It is possible to divide the tradition into two types, one moderate and one extreme. What is the basis for these theoretical divisions? By using Mead's contrasting elements it is possible to argue for a division. The division becomes visible when we check out the tradition's different values, such as liberalism versus conservatism, and optimism versus pessimism (Mead 2002:248). By referring to these values, I will label one group as "moderate Jacksonians." These moderate ones embrace conservatism and pessimism in foreign affairs. They seek a hard-line policy, but in the name of the conservative realism they see the world as a center-center geopolitical battle, not as a center-center-periphery battle. These Jacksonians would resist interventions that don't favour the U.S. interests.

These "moderate Jacksonians" would probably have been skeptical about attacking places like Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq, unless it benefitted their nation. They embrace pessimism because they have little faith in human beings and the international society. The utopia is not around the corner; therefore a nation needs to have a strong military unit in the center (Mead 2002:248). Often the isolationistic tradition, the Jeffersonians, and "moderate Jacksonians" stand together in opposition to humanitarian interventions, or intervention in support of Wilsonian world-order initiatives. But opposite to Jeffersonian, all Jacksonians have a great faith in military power, and moderate forces. What about the other direction?

The "extreme Jacksonians" favors values as liberalism and optimism. These are the real dangerous warmongers in American politics. They differ from the moderate ones because they act a bit stronger offensive toward "the others." They see the world as a dangerous place, but are not as negative as the moderates. They sees few limitations in American power. Liberalism and optimism goes hand in hand in promoting national interests by intervening all over the world. In their eyes it is possible to promote a better world in every corner of the world by using military power.

In order to elaborate the differences between these Jacksonians it can be productive to apply to a short historical overview, starting with commenting two representatives for each direction: Ronald Reagan and John Foster Dulles.

#### **4.3 A Historical Overview on Extreme and Moderate Jacksonians**

Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) and John Foster Dulles (1888-1954) have strong belonging to the Jacksonian tradition, but they are not the same type of Jacksonians. John Foster Dulles can be labeled as one of the few "extreme Jacksonians" in American politics. Dulles who served as the U.S. Secretary of State under Dwight D. Eisenhower from 1953 to 1959, was a significant figure in the early Cold War era, advocating an aggressive stance against communism. Dulles compared the communism with the content in Hitler`s *Mein Kampf* (Gaddis 2005:135). In 1950, he published "*War or Peace*", a critical analysis of the American policy of containment. Dulles criticized the foreign policy of Harry S. Truman.

He argued that containment should be replaced by a policy of liberation (Gaddis 2001:59). Although in the end he relied much on the containment policy, as a single person he appeared to be one representative of the "extreme Jacksonians." Dulles wanted to roll the Communism back in all over the world.

He threatened the Russians with massive nuclear retaliations, and stated that the differences with the Russians could not be removed by compromise (Whitfield 1996:7-8). In the Eisenhower-administration the "extreme Jacksonians" did not gain total or hegemonic power. Some historians argue that the moderate real politicians (Jeffersonians), Dwight D. Eisenhower won the ideological battle in the administration (Gaddis 2005:126).

Despite that Ronald Reagan implemented Dulles rollback policy during the 1980`s, he seems to be a solid representative for the moderate ones with his real political approach. Reagan embraced a conservative policy that strengthens the American nation against the Soviet Union. He built a strong army and intervened several places in order to secure American interests, but his policy of roughness never got too tough (Schweizer 2002). He never got stuck in a quagmire as Lyndon B. Johnson (1908-1973) did in Vietnam, or as Bush in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Eastern Europe, Reagan was tough towards communism, but he acted carefully. Reagan never took the chance on warfare against Russian communism (Godbolt 1994:290).

Ronald Reagan as a "moderate Jacksonians" can be compared with the politics of Richard Nixon (1913-1994) and Henry Kissinger (1923-). Although these three belong to the moderate direction, they are not totally the same type of politicians. In one way they have in common that they are classical conservative international thinkers. They think in terms of realism geopolitics (Nye 2007:5,148). But they are also influenced by the other traditions in Mead`s typology. Next to being moderate Jacksonian real politicians, Ronald Reagan was strongly influenced by Wilsonian mentality. He appears more populist as Jacksonian than Nixon and Kissinger. The last two were in a larger degree affected by the intellectual Jeffersonian tradition. But they also embraced a tough foreign policy line. The same flexibility can be found within the "extreme Jacksonians." Also they operate within many of Mead`s traditions.

In American politics there are few "extreme Jacksonians." But John Foster Dulles is not the only one. In order to explain the difference between these directions and arguing further for my additional theory, I will argue historically, and introduce some leaders with an "extreme Jacksonian position. An arche-typical "extreme Jacksonians" have often a military background with representatives such as William T. Sherman, Douglas MacArthur and George C. Patton.

More politically, Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt belong to this tradition. Let's turn our attention toward some of these leaders, starting with William T. Sherman (1820-1891).

Sherman was a general in the Union Army during the American Civil War (1861–65), for which he received recognition for his outstanding command of military strategy as well as criticism for the harshness of the “scorched earth” policies that he implemented in conducting total war against the Confederate States. Total war means a conflict of unlimited scope where the aim is to destroy the rival's capacity to continue resistance. In Sherman's warfare there were no differences between combatants and non-combatants. Sherman's advance march through Georgia was characterized by destruction of civilian infrastructure. Sherman told under a march that he would: "Make Georgia howl," and "Make its inhabitants feel that war and ruin are synonymous terms" (<http://www.civilwarhome.com/shermanbio.htm>).

Further, he was responsible for the conduct of the Indian Wars. Like General Philip Sheridan (1831-1888), he believed that military control of the reservations was essential, and that Indians should be punished for misdeeds. He regarded Sitting Bull and the Sioux as outlaws and hostile savages. They had to feel the superior power of the Government, he once said (<http://www.legendsofamerica.com/WE-IndianFighters.html#General%20George%20Crook>).

A representative in more modern time was Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), a highly decorated U.S. soldier of war. The problematic part with MacArthur's leadership was the fact that he saw little weakness in the American military machine (Manchester 1978:693). He wanted not only to attack Korea, but totally destroy the country, and expand the war by using atomic weapons towards China (<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html>).

Although Lyndon B. Johnson's warfare in Vietnam, after the escalation in 1968 are comparable to some of Sherman's tactic, it would be absurd to categorize any president as a total one hundred percent "extreme Jacksonian." After the First World War, there is not a great deal of "extreme Jacksonians" president's in American politics, but there were some politicians such as John Foster Dulles, or perhaps controversial presidential advisers/ministers as, Dean Acheson (1893-1971) and Zigniew Brzezinski (1928). In searching the period before World War I, a few "extreme Jacksonian" president's appear. One of them, Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) was the seventh president of the United States. As already stated in the introduction, he is one of the originators of the hard-line in American politics.

He was the commander of the American forces at the Battle of New Orleans (1815), before he became president. The most controversial aspect of Jackson's presidency was his policy regarding America's Indians. He led the war against the Creek Indians and the Cherokees in the Black Hawk War. Jackson was responsible for the removal of Indian tribes from their ancestral lands. The Norwegian historian Hans Olav Lahlum is applying the term "mass murder" in describing the presidential Indian policy (Lahlum 2008:90). Even in the balanced biography "*The Lion*", written by Jon Meacham, the President is promoted as an unstable killer. In commenting Jackson's Indian policy Meacham talks about a massacre (Meacham 2009:12).

It can be objected to the categorization of Jackson as an extreme hard-liner that he was not especially rough against the Indians. Jackson lived, after all, in a time where hatred against the Indians flourished. The mentality of the white male supremacy was firmly understood in the U.S. long before and after Jackson. Yet, the fact that the Bureau of Indian Affairs were placed under the department of War, tells much about his methods toward Indians. The American government was brutal under Jackson, and an estimated 4,000 of the 16,000 Cherokees were killed under his presidency (Meacham 2009:23). It was not just the Indians who experienced the cruelty of this President. Jackson was also ruthless against the Britons and Spanish. He feared an anti-American alliance between these groups. Actually, he was often ruthless in the pursuit of anyone he believed to be a threat to the world as he saw it. (Lahlum 2008:91).

The Indian question was seen as one of security. To him, the tribes represented the threat of violence. This statement by Andrew Jackson represented probably much of his attitude:

"With such arms and supplies as I can obtain I shall penetrate the Creek towns until the captive with her captors are delivered up, and think myself in laying waste their village, burning their houses, killing their warriors and leading into captivity their wives and children until I obtain a surrender of the captive and captors" (Meacham 2009:95).

Much can be said about a legendary president as Jackson. In that case Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) summarized it well in describing Jackson as a dangerous man with strong temper and unstable emotions (Moen 2008:145). The other "extreme Jacksonian" is Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), a man with a striking resemblance with Andrew Jackson.

Roosevelt was a war hero and like Jackson he is regarded as one of the builders of the Imperial U.S. While Jackson industrialized the country, Roosevelt expanded the U.S. sphere of interests further. Roosevelt was fascinated by international affairs and realized that the war with Spain had transformed USA from a provincial nation on the fringes of the global affairs into a world power. A major part of Roosevelt`s policies were characterized by his famous comment, "Speak softly and carry a big stick" (Miller 1994:87).

The "big stick" was often used under his presidency with nationalistic tendencies. The U.S. had to be a place for Americans in Roosevelt`s eyes. He argued strongly that Americans should have a proud place in their own country and the world (Miller 1994:97). To demonstrate American power he sent out the "Great White Fleet" to display American power. "The Great White Fleet" is a nickname on the worldwide American navy battle fleet under this president. With this "big stick politics", he made it clear that the U.S. could use military power against Great Britain and Canada in a border dispute (Moen 2008:336).

In 1905 the President made an amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, making it possible for the U.S. to intervene in order to secure economic interests in other places than Europe. A result of this was that the U.S. saw it as a legitim right to intervene in Cuba`s internal governance. Despite that the President received the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War, he was no dove in international politics. Despite the fact that his biographer Arthur Miller nuances the image of this president by telling about his gentle sides, he ends up concluding that he behaved imperialistic. In "*Theodore Roosevelt, A Life*", he repeatedly refers to terms like imperialism and nationalism in relation to the President (Miller 1994).

Presentations like this seem to be appropriate. Already before being president, Roosevelt built up a reputation in Dakota as a hard-liner of a cowboy (Moen 2008: 331). This cowboy image became no weaker when he got shot under a speech and demanded to continue talking to the crowd.

Roosevelt`s "extreme Jacksonian" style exists also in his formulations such as he wished a war welcome because the country needed one (Moen 2008:332) and quotes like: " No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war" (Miller 1994:255). Theodore Roosevelt can be seen as a chauvinist on behalf of the white people. He advised Americans to wield power for a reason: "In pursuit of right and honor" (Pierce 2007:225).

It should be stated that he was responsible for genocide in the Philippines. Over 250,000 of the civil population lost their lives in the conflict (Moen 2008:338).

What about Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush in relation to my additional theory? Before starting the comparison, it has to be said that the distinction between "moderate" and "extreme Jacksonians" cannot explain all features in American foreign policy. I state clearly that using this division is all about explaining how far some are willing to go in order to secure the nation against "the others." Most of the time these two Jacksonians agree on following a tough line, but occasionally they are debating questions like: What can be regarded as a threat to American national security? What kind of geographical areas shall we protect? How far are we willing to go in order to protect American lives?

The next part will direct its attention toward an investigation of Bush and Truman's extreme or moderate Jacksonian rhetoric in their doctrines. Are there any Jacksonian differences or similarities between the presidents in the way they met "the others"?

#### **4.4 The Doctrines: Meeting "The Others" in an "Extreme Jacksonian Manner"**

The Bush Doctrine is a central part in this survey. The main core in Bush's policy is to be found in his doctrine. When researchers talk about this doctrine, they generally refer to these three sets of principles:

- 1) the idea of preemptive action.
- 2) the promoting of democracy.
- 3) regime change.

When it comes to two of these, promoting democracy and regime change, we have already seen that Bush is not the only president who regarded these as high values in his foreign policy. In chapter three we saw that the Truman Doctrine was based on universal principles as political freedom and freedom from oppression. When the discontinuity research claims that Bush was extremely ambitious in his foreign policy it should have included Harry S. Truman as well. Both doctrines were Wilsonian dualistic in many ways. The doctrines consisted of "the empire of liberty thought", a willingness to use force to promote the good society or Pax Americana. In this case, the discontinuity research underestimated the continuity aspects.

The major question now is the debate surrounding point number one, the preemptive strike. How brutal will these Jacksonian presidents behave against "the others"?

#### 4.4.1 Preemptive Strike a New Element?

The discontinuity research means that George W. Bush became revolutionary in embracing preemptive warfare in the controversial speech at West Point 2002 (Melby 2004:149-153 Daalder and Lindsay 2005:120-121). Does this speech represent new elements in American politics? Here`s one of Bush`s remarks:

”New threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against those nations—means nothing against their shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies” (...)

If we wait for threats for fully materialize, we will have waited too long”  
([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html)).

What is Bush actually saying here? First of all he sounds like one of his heroes, Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965). Churchill has stated a similar formulation by arguing:

”If you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without a bloodshed, if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly: you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against yours” (Kaufman 2007:91).

A definition of a preemptive strike can be: An attempt to repel or defeat a perceived inevitable offensive or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war before that threat materializes. ”The others” must be confronted at an early stage, any time before they become too dangerous. This emphasis on a unilateral preemptive strike shaped the administration reactions to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Bush decided to destroy the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which had provided shelter to the al-Qaida movement, and to overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq for supposedly developing weapons of mass destruction. The discontinuity research obviously sees new elements in the ”extreme Jacksonian” attitude, promoted by the Bush and Churchill formulation above, telling that sometimes using force sooner can save much blood, toil, tears and sweat later. Melby argues repeatedly that Bush was more aggressive than any former president. Bush`s policy was based on a cowboy ”do it alone” style.

He was a Jacksonian, but a radical one (Melby 2002:33-35). Again, we see that Melby uses the four traditions a bit differently than Mead. While Mead claims that the U.S. became more itself after the attack, Melby saw new elements in it.

A key point for Melby is that Bush extreme form as a Jacksonian almost never comes to power in American politics (Melby 2004:113). When it came to expression under Bush, it was a revolution. Melby goes further and claim that the speech at West-Point was revolutionary because Bush took a Jacksonian farewell with Truman`s foreign policy (Melby 2004:149-50). This is illustrated in the following formulation by Melby:

“United States started a new course in relation to the outside world. While the Truman Doctrine of 1947 had dominated by a defensive alignment, and a reduced level of ambition, Bush proclaimed now a more aggressive style” (Melby 2004:149).

The Norwegian researcher gets support from Daalder and Lindsay at this point. They claim that the Bush Doctrine was an innovative strategy. According to them, Bush left decades of long consensus that put containment at the heart of the American foreign policy (Daalder/Lindsay 2005:124).

If Bush was abandoning the U.S. security strategy since the days of the Cold War, then he represented a revolution. There may be some new elements here to support his discontinuity research. In addition to the fact that the terrorist act was new in itself. The United States has almost never been hit by war. It is nearly 150 years ago since the civilian population was affected by war. Pearl Harbor was after all an attack on a military installation on Hawaii, not at the mainland America. From a continuity perspective none would deny the dangerous rhetoric in the U.S. after 9/11, but what`s new in it some may ask?

Melvyn P. Leffler has argued persuasively that Bush`s radicalism has been powerfully overstated. In a comparative and historical perspective it is possible that Bush represented something familiar (Singh 2006:29). It is likely that Leffler is on to something. The concept of preemptive action is not new in history. It has been used since the beginning of time. Just like in Thucydides ancient time, there was in 2001 a need to strike the enemy before they could attack.

When Bush warned at West Point that: ”Americans must be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and lives” ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html)), he seems to echo an old tradition

among "extreme Jacksonians." The best example of a country going to war against another nation for supporting and harboring terrorism is still Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia in 1914. Austria-Hungary's case for going to war rested on Serbian involvement in the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian crown prince in Sarajevo. Under the Iraq War there were arguments that the country needed to be struck before it acquired nuclear weapons.

As Bush said: "Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destructions" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html)).

Truman is closely related to Bush's rhetoric of action when a year after his doctrine on March 17<sup>th</sup> 1948 he stated in a Special Message to the Congress on the threat to the freedom of Europe that:

" I believe that we have reached the point at which the position of the United States should be make unmistakably clear. There are times in world history when it is far wiser to act than to hesitate" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/winCast.rss>).

Although the continuity perspective is building on a solid historical empirical basis it should not be overstated. When Leffler claims that there was nothing new in the doctrine, he undermines some of the new elements with Bush. Compared with the Truman Doctrine, the Bush formulation, preemptive strikes seems to be seeking a new way of dealing with the enemy. The West-Point speech tells clearly that containment means nothing. Containment is in the speech promoted as an old-fashioned way in dealing with menacing elements.

Even if there is a rhetorical link between these president's it is not that plainly formulated as is the case with Bush. After looking at Truman's speeches, none of them have ever made the case for preemption in principle, let alone in the public. Why declare it out loud to the public? One answer to that is that by doing so Bush appears to be an "extreme Jacksonian" acting on emotions, not in rational real politics, or Jacksonian moderate manner. By making preemptive action public the U.S. appears arrogant, unilateral and violent. There was little to gain, making it public. Recognize attack on someone before they act is an attack on international law.

But, as one of the discontinuity researchers, Melby also contradicts his own research. New element exists, but Melby draw his conclusions too far in creating a dualism between Truman and Bush. If he accepts that Truman also is a Jacksonian, then he has to admit that a Jacksonian never acts defensive (Melby 2002:33). It exist different degrees of aggression among Jacksonian, but a Jacksonian prefers violent actions.

Walter Russell Mead gives examples of this by telling that spending money on the military is one of the best things a government can do in the Jacksonian tradition (Mead 2002:240). Jacksonians are skeptical about international diplomacy which they regard as weakness. In this context, Bush is not the only Jacksonian who has ignored international law. Throughout America's history, president's have debated the position and role of the United States in the world politics. The UN has always provoked mixed feeling in the U.S. There are many cases where U.S. has overlooked UN. The Cuban Missile crisis, the Vietnam War, Grenada, and Panama are other places.

The U.S. has attacked international law several times before. It is nothing new that the Americans don't feel they can rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety. Therefore they have acted alone several times. On the other side, they have never stated it as clearly as Bush did. How come? It is likely that he felt "the others" were menacing in a larger scale than before. In response the U.S. had to turn to an "extreme Jacksonian" position in order to confront the new enemy. As Bush said at West Point 2006: "The terrorists have no borders to protect, or capital to defend. They cannot be deterred—but they will be defeated" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html)).

#### **4.4.2 Meeting a New Enemy?**

The discontinuity research claims that the term preemptive strike refers to more dangerous enemies than before (Melby 2002: 23-26 Daalder and Lindsay 2005:126). In the speech Bush was calling for: "New thinking to match new threats." The commander in chief told the newest generation of soldiers that the old Cold War Doctrine of Containment was no longer a sufficient basis for defending America:

"We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act." (...)

"Be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html)).

The discontinuity research is on to something by referring to this speech. By proclaiming the term in public Bush seems to be a new representative for the "extreme Jacksonians." But the research has a tendency to draw bold conclusions.

Did George W. Bush really take a radical departure from the policies that had defined America approach towards world affairs throughout the Cold War and beyond? According to Melby, he did so. He argues that Bush was abandoning containment and the reliance on collective action in order to meet the new threat (Melby 2002:23). Even though Bush said so himself it is doubtful that the doctrine totally rejected containment. There is a difference between what's being said and the real action. The term preemptive action seems to be more a supplement in addition to these familiar strategies. It is likely not about replacing containment, it's more about giving the strategy more strength (Gaddis 2004:86).

Containment has for decades been the heart of the U.S. international policy. This strategy has led to good results and success. Why change everything when the formula is successful? The U.S. faces wider challenges than just terrorism. Several states will challenge the country in the future. Viewed in this way it is possible that containment still will regulate the relationship between the United States, China, Russia and Islamic nations.

In these discussions, we must take into consideration the fact that the U.S. remains as one of few nations that possesses power to destroy any country if they wish to do so. But the fact that the U.S. has greater power than everyone else does not mean it can impose its will on everyone else. From this perspective, containment still operates at all levels of politics. But the term preemptive action tells a great deal about "the others". Are "the others" in a larger degree more dangerous than previously?

Preemption is a radical term. It has to be there for a reason. It has never been stated so clearly publicly during the Cold War or in the 90's. No "normal" president, in a nuclear age, would have risked another Pearl Harbor. In this Cold War context the "extreme Jacksonians" never got total control.

In examining the West Point speech, the most radical aspect is the concept of the new security environment. It implies a dark future telling that "the others" are more dangerous than ever. The combination of a stateless enemy with dangerous weapons can create a stronger enemy than previously. It creates fear for Armageddon if they get their hand on an atomic bomb. Viewed like this, there are many good arguments that "the others" represent a greater threat. In Truman's time in office, states were the main participants in the international system.

The states represented the security challenges during the Cold War (Melby 2002:23). The enemies Bush met are often referred to as the new borderless enemies.

When a challenge finally came, on 9/11, it was not from a state, but from a group. The terrorists acted on behalf of no state, although al Qaida was operating from a base in Afghanistan, it is not likely that containment could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. Terrorists attack as states never do, from the sanctuary provided by anonymity: how does one negotiate with a shadow? How does one deal with someone who's prepared to commit suicide? They have no country to lose, no economy to worry about, and no love of life. Easily expressed: States will survive, terrorists don't care. While states want to follow international game ship and seek good reputation in the international society, terrorists don't take these things into consideration (Gaddis 2005).

Several factors indicate that Bush had to deal with a more dangerous enemy than what Truman confronted. Terrorists cannot be controlled in the same way as communists. In this environment it is understandable that some "extreme Jacksonians" are questioning the strategy of containment. Can it function in an environment in which states are no longer the principal threats to be contained? Regarded as this the discontinuity research has a point arguing for differences between meeting "the others" for Bush and Truman. But is it possible to claim that president's also had a common threat they had to deal with?

#### **4.4.3 Meeting "The Others" as an Ideological Enemy**

When Melby describes Bush as an aggressive Jacksonian transformer in American policy, he is also doing so by referring to three main directions in American foreign policy.

These are:

- 1) The Institutionalists.
- 2) The Realists.
- 3) Expansionists

According to Melby, the Institutionalists is keen in supporting the international community, and would legitimize the U.S. foreign policy in international norms and rules.

Real politicians have a vision that the U.S. should relate to the world as it is, not as the U.S. wish it to be. Morality is seen as a dangerous path to follow in real politics. The U.S. must avoid going out in the world in trying to promote Western values. The U.S. should think about geopolitical and strategical interests.

The last direction is the one Melby connects with Bush, expansionism. In expansionism there is a strong belief in the U.S. power. The U.S. should act alone. Institutions as UN weakens the nation's great power. Melby claims that the U.S. under Bush became expansionistic and imperialistic (Melby 2004:230).

A division like this one can provide a solid explanation in understanding the battle between the international direction's ways to deal with "the others." With these three typologies he is explaining Bush policy by referring to the same directions as Daalder and Lindsay. In "*The Bush revolution*" Daalder and Lindsay understand Bush as an anti-realist. Bush did not return to his father's hard-nosed real politics. He wanted to meet "the others" on a global scale with preemptive action (Renshon 2004). So far, Bush appears to be a typical representative of the "extreme Jacksonians" or as Melby claims, an "aggressive expansionists" (Melby 2004:231).

Taken into consideration that history to a large degree is a battle of interpretations, these labels can turn out to be a matter of debate. When politicians during the Cold War went on a global warfare against the communist threat, they have often been marked as internationalists or interventionists, not as expansionists. A historical understanding like this needs some refinements. Why apply the label expansionist in referring to Bush? Is Truman and other Cold War president's innocent Jacksonian interventionists? Was Bush the only aggressive anti-realist in the U.S. history?

In this discussion, we must not forget that communism was seen as a great threat toward the U.S. on a global scale. Why should the U.S. spend money, sacrifice young lives and fight in the four corners of the world, some may ask. The doctrinal sentence: "Out and help suppressed people in the world." was in some American's eyes a dangerous path to follow (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/truman/trumandocctrine.html>).

In this connection, it is time to clear our one mistake in the presentation of history. There are not enormous, almost dualistic differences between meeting "the others" now and then. Meeting "the others" during the Cold War was by no means only based on state versus state containment.

This view represents a simplification of the reality. Just like under the Bush period, former U.S. presidents tried to stop not only states, but also ideological movements. It is unfortunate that the discontinuity research ignores the fact that former president's regarded "the others" as an ideological enemy.

By including a historical perspective in this paper, it seems like the Bush and Truman Doctrine's take its place in an extended family of grand statements of aggressively global purpose, or democratic imperialism.

While many of the founding fathers were skeptical about going abroad on an ideological battle for "searching monsters to destroy", one of them, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) laid the foundation for American global expansionism in his speech at Gettysburg in 1863. In his Gettysburg address he proclaimed: "God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth" (<http://presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/lincoln/gettysburg.html>).

According to Lincoln a global tradition exists in the U.S. The doctrines then become controversial. The historian Robert H. Ferrell puts it pertinent when he uses the word "global crusade" in describing the Truman Doctrine (Ferrell 1994:252). In comparison to the discontinuity research it is interesting that they are using the same label, "crusade" on the Bush Doctrine (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:78).

This is further evidence of these president's focus on a worldwide perspective. In their doctrine, they seem to create a partnership between Jacksonians and Wilsonians. While the Jacksonians see a clear danger in the terrorist's spread of nuclear weapons or communist takeover, the Wilsonian recognized opportunities to remove a repulsive regime and spread democracy throughout the Middle-East or Asia.

The president's global policy is to be found in their warfare in Iraq and Korea. Can we then compare the president's when it comes to meeting "the others" in a tough Jacksonian manner in the Korean and Iraq War?

#### **4.5 After 1948 and 2001: Meeting a Global Enemy: The "Extreme Jacksonians" Strengthen Their Position**

Meeting the enemy at a global scale is in international politics a dangerous and controversial, but not a new pattern. As Thomas Aquinas once stated: "We do not seek peace to be at war, but go to war in hope that we may have peace" (Kaufman 2007:92). On one side the U.S. often enters limited warfare in order to secure wealth, resources, and security. On the other side, the state is also applying global warfare in order to promote peace and security beyond its own borders. After 1948 and 9/11, this combination is present.

After 1948 with Truman and after 9/11 with Bush, a context of pressure lay a solid foundation for growth in the "extreme Jacksonian" attitudes.

In 1948-49, several closely related events made people shake like a leaf. During this time, the Soviet Union had tightened its grip on Eastern Europe, blasted its first atomic bomb, while China were lost to the Communists, and the "red danger" won ground in Korea. All these events, including the Alger Hiss case and the growing communist activity in Europe, probably increased the fear and hatred towards communism.

The level of fear is comparable to 9/11 where many Americans were skeptical toward people with a background from the Middle-East. After 9/11 several people were afraid of driving in tunnels in American cities, or taking domestic flight (Moen 2005:12). During the Cold War, we find much of the same hysterical fear. Communists were hunted down by intelligence agencies in alliance with leading politicians. The Newspapers had daily headlines about the "red danger", students had training in hiding under school desks to protect themselves from nuclear fallout from Russian warheads, and since 1939 the employees of the Government had to swear under oath that they were not communists.

The fear was already in 1949 so high that 63 percent of the Americans believed in war against Soviet Union within the next 25 years (Godbolt 1994:73). A Gallup in 1949 showed that 70 percent of Americans supported the use of nuclear weapons against the Communists (Whitfield 1996:5). The fear became no less when the Soviet launched a "Hate America Campaigns" (Giles 2002:49). For those who saw communists as radical people seeking world domination, inspired by the Marxian ultimate aim: the destruction of the capitalist state, it must have been a scary time living under the Cold War.

When North Korea finally attacked South-Korea after Stalin had given Kim IL Sung the go ahead to reunify the country by military means, the climax of fear was reached. In the U.S, there was an attitude saying that something had to be done to prevent communism from going further (Godbolt 1994:91-3).

#### **4.5.1 The Korean War 1950-1953**

##### **"Seeing Red" and "Containment with a Global Twist"**

Harry S. Truman went to a military battle against the "red danger" in Asia. Acting under two resolutions passed by the UN Security Council, he ordered armed forces against North Korea

in June 1950 led under General Douglas MacArthur. This resulted in a bloodshed that lasted for three years until a truce was signed in 1953. The way Truman replied to those challenges is often referred to as: "the great transformation in American foreign policy" (Lundestad 2000 Gaddis 2005). As I will argue, the strengthening of the "extreme Jacksonians" in American policy. This context affected Truman`s rhetoric in a large degree.

When the English historian Thomas Carlyle once wrote that all of history is the biography of the great men, he was mistaken (<http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/historyov.html>). All leaders, even great powerful ones as Truman and Bush, govern in a set of circumstances that precedes them. What`s more, they must deal with circumstances as they develop, rather than as they wish them to be. The attack by North Korea came actually as a total surprise (McCullough 1992:777). The last American troops had been withdrawn from South Korea. Truman had not expected an attack on South Korea at all. In a Bush manner, Truman knew he had to act quickly before it was too late.

Three of Truman`s speeches in my selections, one of them the Inaugural Address from 20<sup>th</sup> January 1949 and two Annual Messages to the Congress, 4<sup>th</sup> January 1950 and January 8<sup>th</sup> 1951, reflected this context of fear. These speeches are based on an anti-communistic rhetoric. In the Annual Message to the Congress in 1950, Truman told that communism was threatening the following values: freedom, better life, honesty, democracy, cooperation, peace, prosperity and free choice (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm>).

The rhetoric was followed up by military actions. There is historical evidence on this transformation in scientific work done by Geir Lundestad and John Lewis Gaddis. These historians pointed out that Truman in this context, tripled the defense budget when he approved the National Security Council, also known as NSC-68 (Lundestad 2000:133). After some discussions Truman accepted the logic and policy recommendations of NSC 68, outlined by the National Security Council in April 1950. This document dictated the main lines of American defense policy for much of the Cold War. The document wanted a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, and stopped Soviet dominance in the Eurasian landmass (Kissinger 1994:462).

It can be stated that this document laid the foundation for an expansion of military and economic aid to Asia. The man behind this document was Paul Nitze. Nitze, the director of policy planning, can be described as an "extreme Jacksonian".

The best way to win against the Russians according to Nitze was to prepare a nuclear clash. Or as he once said: "If you want peace prepare for war" (Thompson 2009:3).

This point about a new aggressive line is further elaborated upon by John Lewis Gaddis in, "*The United States and the Orgins of the Cold War.*" Gaddis argues that, while previous containment policies sought to block Soviet expansion by a variety of political, economic, psychological and military measures, NSC 68 concentrated on military measures, stressing the need for the United States to be able to respond military whenever and wherever aggression took place (Gaddis 2005:104-105).

In Truman`s 1951 Annual Message to the Congress he is supporting this military buildup by proclaiming: "We are going to produce all the weapons and equipment that such an armed forced will need" ([www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm)).

The Americans felt they had to take a tougher stand against communism. And so they did. In a Radio speech to the American people on the 11<sup>th</sup> April 1951, Truman declared with an "extreme Jacksonian" rhetoric the following message:

"The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out our freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot- and will not sit idly by and await foreign conquest. (...)

"If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression elsewhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world.

When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a dear and present danger to the security and independence of every nation." (...)

"The aggression against Korea is the boldest and most dangerous move the communist have yet made. The attack on Korea was part of a greater plan for conquering all of Asia" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=290>).

As the speech expressed, what made the communists a gigantic threat was not only the danger of territorial aggression but the fact that the "reds" could challenge, take over, or replace the

western political system. In the November 6<sup>th</sup> 1950 Address, the President gave the same kind of warning:

”We are confronted by Communist imperialism- a reactionary movement that despises liberty, and is the mortal foe of personal freedom. The threat of Communist aggression is a continuing menace to world peace. So long as they persist in that course, the free nations have but one choice if they are to remain free. They must oppose strength with strength” (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13658>).

Given this belief that the Soviet state and ideology would advance anywhere there was an opening, Truman decided that it was time to frustrate Soviet ambitions. It was time to show the Soviet that the cost of imperialism was greater than the reward. So when Lundestad and Gaddis argued that the expansionistic direction in the Truman administration was strengthened because of the communist fear, they are on to something. The Korean War was believed to be a result of a communist struggle for world domination, as illustrated by these quotes above by Truman. The idea of the enemy being a part of some vast conspiracy was not unique to Truman or the Korean War.

The most famous example would occur some years later during the Vietnam War with the domino theory. As we see in these speeches, Soviet was first of all not seen as a nation with limited aims and objectives, but as an evil, repressive, expansionistic empire driven by an evil ideology as perverse as Nazism. John Lewis Gaddis put major stress on this escalation of the war against communism in “*Strategies of Containment.*” Here, he claims that Truman put George F. Kennan, one of the fathers of the geographically limited containment policy on trial (Gaddis 2005:81).

The diplomat George F. Kennan (1904-2005) was skeptical to the Soviet Union. Kennan had worked in Russia during Stalin's regime of terror and had seen the cruelty in the system. He disliked Roosevelt's diplomatic trading with the Russians (Pierce 2007:169). In his famous long telegram of 1946 he expressed little confidence in the U.S.-Soviet friendship. The telegram described communism as a: ”Malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue” (Lawrence/Jewett 2003:85).

Kennan wanted a tough policy toward the communists by claiming that until the Iron Curtain is lifted there could be no safe security (Giles 2002:80). According to Kennan there could be no permanent peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union (Pierce 2007:168).

He described the view from Kremlin as neurotic backwardness (Jespersen 2002:4). Despite a strong anti-Soviet position, Kennan seems to be a mix of a "moderate Jacksonian" and defensive Jeffersonian realist. In a Jacksonian tradition he regarded power as the only language the Russians understood.

On the other hand, he was skeptical toward Truman's worldwide battle against communism. He disliked the Truman-Doctrine for being too ambitious (Pierce 2007:169). What was required in Kennan's thinking was not to remake the world in the image of the U.S, but rather to preserve its diversity against attempts to remake it in the image of others (Gaddis 2005:55). Kennan had a prescription on a particularistic rather than universal concept of American security interests.

Truman expressed in his speeches, willingness to battle against communism on a global scale. It was seen as a necessity, because as Truman said: "The aggression in Korea is part of the attempt of the Russian Communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step." Or as he declared later on in the same speech:

"The threat of world conquest by Soviet Russia endangers our liberty and endangers the kind of world in which the free spirit of man can survive"  
([www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm)).

In communicating with George Elsey about the Korean War, he gave the same argument as Truman by telling: "He (Truman) was strongly in opposition to all efforts by USSR to expand its influence of behalf on the United States and the rest of the non-communist world (Interview George Elsey 6<sup>th</sup> January 2010). Again we find the global perspective present. As a result of this, the tone got tougher in the Korean War.

Truman was "seeing red", he overlooked Kennan's advise by arguing in a "extreme Jacksonian" manner: "If we are tough enough now, there won't be any next time" (McCullough 1992:785).

With this development, Kennan had to resign. In the aftermath it became obvious that the Americans had been rough enough. In the Korean War, over four million people got killed. The President created no less tense atmosphere when he told the press that the U.S. had considered using nuclear weapons against Korea (Gaddis 2005:48). In that way Shawn Parry Giles has probably a point when he argues in "*the Rhetorical Presidency*", that the U.S. after 1949 had a militaristic rhetoric (Giles 2002).

So far, Truman appears to be a "extreme Jacksonian." On the other hand, the President seems not to be an arche-typical representative for this direction. He saw the danger in nuclear weapons. In his Farwell Address he stated: "Starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men" (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=2059>). In another statement, before the war, Truman proclaimed a anti-ideal for a Jacksonian: "I don`t want to go to war" (McCullough 1992:780).

Warfare in Korea was a costly affair for an old New Dealer like Harry S. Truman. The high price tag on the warfare made the domestic social reforms impossible. The image of Truman as an "extreme Jacksonian" becomes even weaker when he, in the Korean War, was able to mobilize the UN Security Council to endorse collective security.

In contrast to George W. Bush Iraq War, the UN gave its support for this action by sending troops to Korea, but on the other hand it weakened the operations legitimacy that this was only possible because the Soviet was then boycotting the Security Council. Neither was China a part of the Security Council at this time. It should also be noted that most contributing nations acted primarily under American pressure. This pressure was at one hand formal, because Europeans were fearful of Soviet offenses in Europe. They needed the Americans support. More informal, it is unlikely that it was possible to deny supporting the nation that was rebuilding them, provide Marshall-Aid and protect the free world.

Truman was never leaving the "moderate Jacksonian" real politics totally. He was careful about using too much Jacksonian rhetoric. He did not apply the term "war" in speeches about Korea. Truman legitimized the intervention as a "police action." A description that failed to give Americans enough feeling that the country was in danger (Ferrell 1984:210).

Despite that Kennan had to leave office in 1949 because it was clear that his recommendations no longer carried the weight they once had, this did not mean that Kennan`s influence was over. As Gaddis notes, many of Kennan`s recommendations were implemented during the Cold War (Gaddis 2005:87).

In addition to not giving up on the real politics, Truman stopped General MacArthur`s desire to expand the Korean War. When the general disobeyed orders and declared wishes to attack China with nukes, the President fired "Mr. Prima Donna" (Ferrell 1984:211). The picture of Truman as a non-extreme Jacksonian is also strengthened with his response to McCarthyism.

The President spoke against the hysteric sort of anticommunism that was hurting the U.S. more than it gained the nation. Truman expressed that he disliked McCarthyism when he declared that Joseph McCarthy was a "Pathological liar" (Keyes 1995:12).

However, it would be too simplifying to regard Truman only as a "moderate Jacksonian." He never took a stand against anti-communistic hawks. In one way he rejected McCarthyism, but he was replacing the earlier stereotypes of Russia as well-intentioned and cooperative as propagated by the Roosevelt administration. He pointed out repeatedly that Russia's foreign policy advanced through military conquests (Godbolt 1994:64). In practice, he seems to have balanced between a moderate and extreme form of Jacksonian.

In the following two speeches Truman expresses a belonging to both camps. In the first, Annual Message to the Congress 1951, the President proclaimed:

"If Western Europe were to fall to Soviet Russia it would double the Soviet supply of coal and triple the Soviet supply of steel. If the free nations of Asia and Africa should fall to Soviet Russia, we would lose the sources of many of our vital raw material, including uranium, which is the basis for our atomic power"(www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1851.htm).

Truman argues in a moderate Jacksonian real political manner in telling that he goes to war because of geopolitics and resources. Behind this formulation is probably a conservative real political fear of losing Japan (Else 2005). Americans were afraid of losing control in Asia, and especially Japan (Leffler 1992:391). Truman says nothing about going to war in order to "save" the world. It is all about strengthening the U.S. position. In the following speech, given the same year in front of a national radio and television audience, the President appears to be an "extreme Jacksonian":

"If aggression were allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere. (...)

"We cannot hope to maintain our freedom if freedom elsewhere is wipped out"  
(<http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=861&st=&st1=>).

These sentences have some "moderat Jacksonian" features. Maybe there was a need to protect a weak nation? If the aggression had succeeded, it would have destroyed the American strategic position in East-Asia.

On the other hand, this content is about going to global war to "save" the world. Free nations are in danger if the U.S. does not act. This is similar to what Bush told in his Second Inaugural Addresses: "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands"

([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush\\_georgew/second\\_inaugural.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/bush_georgew/second_inaugural.html)).

These statements made by Truman and Bush are typical expressions of the "extreme Jacksonians marriage with the "war-hungry Wilsonians" in conflicts. Applying the American hegemonic power for military purposes are not an intervention made by Bush. The formulations above created the foundation for American dominance in the world.

By regarding the battle as a global one, Truman lays the foundation for several "extreme Jacksonian" interventions based on "containment with a global twist." The worse of them was the Vietnam War. Later on in the 50`s, Truman`s words were characterized as the domino theory (Mead 2002:61).

What about Bush and the Iraq War? Let us turn then to a closer comparison between these president`s. The 9/11 attacks on America resulted in president Bush altering the course of his administration`s foreign policy from the traditional approach of republican realists, like his father, toward a global battle just as Truman partly did in his days as president.

#### **4.5.2 Comparing The Iraq and Korean War: Learning From "The Correct History"**

Prior to the Iraq-war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction posed a threat to their security. According to George W. Bush, liberty for the Iraqi people was a great moral cause and a great strategic goal, and the people of Iraq deserved freedom. Saddam was promoted as a brutal dictator, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. He had to be overthrown! He had connections to al-Qaida (Singer 2004:154).

Bush played on emotions in telling that Saddam`s regime once ordered the killing of every person between the age of fifteen and seventy in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq (Singer 2004:168). Claims that the Bush-Administration exaggerated the threat and evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities would eventually become a major point of criticism for the President.

Like Truman warned against a worldwide communism conspiracy, Bush was speaking about a global network of terrorists:

”We know that Iraq is continuing to finance terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle-East peace. We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy – the United States of America”

(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html>).

George W. Bush and Harry S. Truman had one thing in common, and that was dealing with a homely pressure. In this situation, they seem to have learned from the ”correct history” when it comes to meeting threats from ”the others.” The 9/11 incident and the outbreak of the Korean War, gave rise to the demand for a new kind of leadership. Campaigning against ”the others” required a strong presidential leadership.

The main question for both became, How far shall a dictator and tyrant be allowed to go before a Jacksonian president will employ military force against them? For George W. Bush, it was remembering history in the 1930`s, the Truman years 1945-1953 and the 90`s. Before the 9/11 attack, Bin Laden was already responsible for many earlier attacks against the U.S. targets, including the bombing of USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, and U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Bin Laden had often proclaimed his deep hatred for the United States. During the 90`s, he had established a large infrastructure in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban. With the 9/11 attack the ”cup had overflowed.” When 3000 American people died in this act of terror, Bush pulled together a War Council. It was the ”extreme Jacksonians” time to tell Bin Laden that his acts of terror and hatred toward the U.S. had to stop.

Also, Saddam Hussein had a bad record with the Americans. He attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990, and he fired missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It is likely that the Bush administration thought they heard some echoes of the World War II inability to act against Hitler. The Americans argued they had to act before it was too late.

Bush stated this view by telling: ”Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof-the smoking gun-that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud”

(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html>).

The mistake from World War II of being too soft on dictators could not repeat itself. In the respond, it was clear that history had taught him that Americans could not let dictators and

tyrants play their game without meeting consequences. The oratorical framework in Bush`s case for war included the following elements, arousing the fears created by the horrific 9/11 terrorist attacks, warning about the growing danger of terrorism, highlighting Saddam Hussein`s cruelty and aggression against neighbourstates, and warning about Iraq desire for weapons of mass destruction. Bush and Truman relied then on much of the same kind of rhetoric, a propaganda based on fear.

As Truman said: "If this (communist aggression) was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war" (McCullough 1992:777). Truman operated probably under a similar context as Bush did. In 1945 after World War II, it was clear that the policy of appeasement had failed. The result of the 1930`s failure was a horrific savagery, culminating in the Holocaust. Some fear that the cataclysm that befell Europe in the 1930`s could easily happen again. In this situation, the U.S. had to behave strong, not weak and demoralized to Soviet aggression from abroad. In addition to this, a series of frustrating reverses overcame American illusions that the war had eliminated threats to freedom. Disagreements over the occupation of Germany, Austria and Japan arose very quickly, Russian pressure on Iran, Greece and Turkey mounted. All these incidents urged for a response.

Communism could not take over places in the world without meeting consequences. As in the 40`s, and 50`s, after 9/11 it is likely that many Americans feared that history could repeat itself. America had been under attack. The great nation was vulnerable after all. There was probably a strong mentality among people saying, this tragedy must never happen again.

Although Bush was talking about the differences between the enemies now and earlier, he did accept some similarities. As he said at West Point in 2006:

"Like the Cold War, we are fighting the followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has territorial ambitions, and pursues totalitarian aims" (<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/05.27.06.html>).

In this context, Bush went on a harsh global warfare against an invisible ideological enemy. Bush came to Congress for statutory authority to act military first against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and later against Iraq. Truman did not follow the same course of action. Unlike Bush, Truman never came to Congress after the fact of war to seek legislative approval for his actions. He was "seeing red" and went to war without the Congress approval.

It is impossible to disagree with the discontinuity research seeing Bush as an expansionist, or as labeled in this task, an "extreme Jacksonian." But as we have seen, little suggests that Bush was alone. When he was arguing for interventions in Iraq, he sounded like Truman in the Korean War. The following three Bush statements can illustrate a connection between these presidents:

1: "As in the defense of Greece in 1947, and later in the Berlin Airlift, the strength and will of free people are now being tested before a watching world. And we will meet this test" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html)).

2: "Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (<http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html>).

3: "As long as the Middle-East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our country and friends" ([www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html)).

The two first remarks tell us that this is a battle for democracy. The battle is promoted as a global one. If we in the third statement had switched out the words "Middle-East", "al Qaida" and replaced these with, "Russia" or "Communism" it could easily have sounded like a Truman speech. In these three statements, like Truman, Bush states that he must stop the enemy before they not only hurt the U.S. but the whole world as well, and it has to be done before it's too late. In comparing the Iraq and the Korean War, we must take into consideration the fact that both wars were controversial.

Many years have passed since the end of the Korean War. Now (2010) it is more than 60 years since it began. Most Americans today are born after this war. There was little media coverage during this warfare compared to Iraq in 2003. It is unfavorable that the memory of the Korean War has nearly vanished. We must not forget the opposition the U.S. had against this war, just as with Bush and his decision to attack Iraq.

By examining Truman's rhetoric during this conflict, it seems a bit uniform to characterize his foreign policy as defensive (Melby 2004:149). Even Truman himself once told that the American purpose was much broader than the containment policy (Pierce 2007:226).

Some of the letters the President received from ordinary Americans show opposition against going to war in Korea. An example is: "In heaven`s name what are you doing? The blood hasn`t dried from World War II... We have nothing to do with Korea." Another example is: "We demand that you stop murdering American boys and Korean people" (McCullough 1992:791).

But there are also clearly differences between the president`s under these wars, both in content and formulation. Bush sometimes sound harsher than Truman. While Truman avoided referring to the term "war," Bush refers to this term 25 times in my source selection regarding the Iraq War. Bush has a stronger belonging to the "extreme Jacksonians. On the other hand, it can be stated that the differences are not so great after all. Bush appeared to be a "moderate Jacksonians" with embracing conservative real politics as well. His bold rhetoric did not always lead to equally blunt actions.

He did not rush towards confrontation against Kim Jung IL. More of the opposite happened. Bush took part in a slow dance with North Korea in an attempt to get them to reduce their nuclear weapons (Renshon 2004:151). After 9/11, Bush had to resist some "extreme Jacksonians" in the American society. Some of them wanted to utilize nuclear weapons against the "terrorist-states" after the attack. Some even wanted to drop nuclear bombs over Mecca (Davies/Ziauddin 2002). Others wanted to go further than Iraq by using the arche-Jacksonian formulation: "Everyone want to go to Baghdad. Real men wants to go to Tehran" (David Hastings Dunn 2003). Another point is that the President did not rush to war as critics has claimed, but made a genuine effort to forge a consensus at the UN.

The next chapter will investigate whether George W. Bush was a revolutionary cowboy.

#### 4.6 SUMMARY CHAPTER 4

Is it really true that George W. Bush was a revolutionary Jacksonian president? There is little doubt about George W. Bush being a typical Jacksonian. When it comes to Truman, people disagree about his presidency. But several researchers label him as a hard-liner. In this research Truman appears to be quite noisy. Truman's rough style is reflected in his rhetoric. He appears to be a typical representative of Heartland America. With this perspective he is a Jacksonian as well.

As with the Wilsonian tradition, there are variations within the Jacksonian tradition. I have characterized these as the "moderate" and "extreme" Jacksonians. Both traditions prefer violence and toughness, but the extreme acts a bit more offensive toward "the others." In the "extreme Jacksonians" worldview it is possible to promote a better world in every corner of the world by using military power. In U.S politics there is a tradition for "extreme Jacksonians."

The best argument given by the discontinuity research is that Bush embraced preemptive warfare in his speech at West Point in 2002. Was Bush an "extreme Jacksonian", a political revolutionary who were willing to do whatever it took to secure the goal he saw as necessary and desirable? There may be some new elements here to support the discontinuity research. The terrorist act was new in itself. U.S has never been under attack like this before.

After looking at Truman's speeches, none of them have ever made the case for preemption in principle, let alone in the public. By doing so Bush appears to be an "extreme Jacksonian" acting on emotions, not in rational real politics.

However, the concept of preemptive action is not new in history. It has been used since the beginning of time. Jacksonians have always been skeptical to international diplomacy. In this context, Bush is not the only Jacksonian who has ignored international law. Throughout America's history, president's have debated the position and role of the United States in the world politics. It is nothing new that the Americans don't feel they can rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety. Therefore they have acted alone several times.

Several factors indicate that Bush had to deal with a more dangerous enemy than what Truman confronted. Terrorists cannot be controlled in the same way as communists.

In this environment it is understandable that some "extreme Jacksonians" are questioning the strategy of containment. However, in this discussion we must not forget that also communism was seen as a great threat toward the U.S. on a global scale. Just like under the Bush period, former U.S. president`s tried to stop not only states, but also ideological movements.

After 1948 with Truman and after 9/11 with Bush, a context of pressure lay a solid foundation for growth in the "extreme Jacksonian" attitudes. In 1948-49, several closely related events made people insecure. For those who saw communists as radical people seeking world domination, it must have been a scary time living under the Cold War.

Under the Korean War, Truman talked about a domino effect. He warned against a communist takeover. In this context he used a Bush like rhetoric. By regarding the battle as a global one, Truman layed the foundation for several "extreme Jacksonian" interventions based on "containment with a global twist". But Truman was never leaving the "moderate Jacksonian" real politics totally. He did not apply the term "war" in speeches about Korea, he took a stand against MacArthur and he legitimized the intervention as a "police action."

But he never took a final stand against anti-communistic hawks. Truman expresses a belonging to both camps. In some speeches he argues real political, others are more about saving the world.

Under Truman and Bush, the "extreme Jacksonians" used historical experience to tell the enemy that the mistake from World War II of being too soft on dictators could not repeat itself. When George W. Bush argued for interventions in Iraq, he sounded like Truman in the Korean War. The aggression of "the others" had to be stopped in order to save the global democracy.

Placing Bush alone as a one hundred percent "extreme Jacksonian" would be a mistake. In doing so we are judging him by overlooking his successors, like Truman. It is an oversimplification to regard the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment in Korea just as reflecting "moderate Jacksonian" geopolitical calculations alone. Truman`s rhetoric reflected some vital values and beliefs from "extreme Jacksonians", such as belief in America military power and defeating enemies in every corner of the world.

## **CHAPTER 5: HARRY TRUMAN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AS JACKSONIAN MACHO COWBOYS**

The presentation of George W. Bush as a cowboy is another aspect in the discontinuity research. Melby promote Bush as a macho president, one who embraced the pure western style. The Norwegian researcher compares the president with Gary Cooper`s sheriff-role in the movie “High Noon.” As Melby writes: “Bush is the tough sheriff who faces the bad guys alone” (Melby 2004:44). By using the metaphor ”cowboy” Melby provides several connotations to the readers. Many of these are typical Jacksonian values such as, simple, honest, natural, violent, guns, individualism, toughness and revenge.

During the presidency Bush sounded like a cowboy from a traditional western movie with some of his formulations. Statements like, ”I`m a gut player” and “This is an enemy that runs and hides, but won`t be able to hide forever” (Woodward 2003:41), are all representative for the populist Jacksonian tradition. “The others” are regarded as cowards who can be hunted down by instincts. Daalder and Lindsay are mentioning the same features as Melby. They put it like this: “Bush was “a doer”, not “a thinker”, his natural element was action, not analysis” (Daalder and Lindsay 2004:35). They refer to the slogan “Take `em out” as an example on the cowboy rhetoric (Daalder and Lindsay 2004:40).

These researchers are building up the same image of the President as the media did, by arguing that Bush was simple and had a more violent behavior than any president before him. Is it possible to object to whether these are fair descriptions? Can we place the responsibility for the American tough and simple attitude at the feet of a particular President? Charging Bush with responsibility for militaristic and populist tendencies of present day U.S. foreign policy makes perhaps as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) responsible for the great depression. Is it possible to relate the same macho type, simple, and plain-speaking attitude to Harry S. Truman?

According to the anthropologist Thomas Hylland Erikssen, this is an opportunity that must not be ruled out. Hylland Erikssen claims that tough attitude has deep roots in the American history. This is because president`s wants to show the people that they are presidential macho men, men who protect people against aggression (Eide and Ottosen 2002:220-23).

There may of course be discussions on how tough Truman was in his style, but to characterize his policies as soft is as we have seen a claim taken far from reality.

Let us take a look at the historical context, some speeches and statements and see whether Truman is comparable to Bush when it comes to being a plain-speaking Jacksonian cowboy. This part will focus on the following thematically subject:

5.1 The Transition: Roosevelt to Truman.

5.2 The Potsdam Conference and Meeting Molotov

5.3 Wild West Macho-Men: Protecting The People.

5.4 Confronting Idealism Without Strength

### **5.1 The Transition: Roosevelt to Truman**

As Roosevelt's successor, Truman has been criticized for being one of the originator of the conflict between the United States and Russia (Williams Applemann Williams 1988). This subject is a matter of debate. On one hand, Truman warned that once the war was over the United States could be facing a situation more dangerous than ever before. Truman was worried that Stalin would become another Hitler (Nye 2007:125). It is possible to object against a presentation like this. Some saw Truman as the man who saved the world from the oppressive communism. According to Robert Ferrell, Truman was a hero with principled leadership (Ferrell 1984:8). Some would even argue that he laid the foundations for a policy that saved the world from a Third World War (Kirkendall 2004:6).

I cannot go into this extensive historical debate that is largely a struggle between traditionalist and revisionist historians. But through looking at speeches, statements and the historical context, it is possible to see whether Truman is somewhat different from Bush in promoting Jacksonian masculinity. Truman wanted on one hand friendship with the Russians. He told early on in his presidency that his intention was to: "continue both the foreign and the domestic policy of the Roosevelt Administration" (Miscamble 2007:1). How effectively Truman held this promise has been a subject of intense discussion ever since. However, there are indications that the President wanted to get along with Stalin.

He stated early on in his presidency: “I like Stalin. He`s straightforward. He knows what he wants and will compromise when he can” (Leffler 2007:43). As the results of the negotiations stalled, Truman became frustrated (Godbolt 1994:64-5). He then expressed about the Soviets: “I hope I never have to hold another conference with them” (Keyes 1995:48).

It didn`t take a long time before a series of frustrating reverses overcame American illusions that the war had eliminated threats to freedom. Disagreements over Germany, Austria, and Japan arose quickly, and Russian pressure on Iran, Greece and Turkey mounted strongly. Several of Truman`s advisers, such as the secretary of the Navy, James F. Forrestal, Admiral William Leahy, the chief of staff Dean Acheson, and foreign minister James F. Byrnes wanted the President to take a tougher stand against the Russians (Leffler 2007:41).

Harry Truman had no experience in dealing with Russia. He had no background in foreign policy. He then became known for what he called his tough methods (Patterson 1988:38). This lack of diplomatic experiences is a common feature Truman has with Bush. It is likely that uncertainty in itself can explain their eagerness in demonstrating toughness. Roughness can cover up intellectual weaknesses, or lack of experience. It can be discussed to what extent Truman disliked communists, but it would be a failure to ignore his skepticism. Just like Andrew Jackson disliked Indians, Bush hated terrorists, Truman was very skeptical to communists.

Even though George Elsey in my interview underlined that Truman did not hate communism (Interview George Elsey 6<sup>th</sup> January 2010), it is unlikely that the President had any sense for communists. During World War II he stated this cynical view: “If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany and in that way let them kill as many as possible” (Gaddis 2005:4). To Truman`s defence, he was not president only a senator at this time.

However, the statement provides a great deal of information about his attitude. The statement expressed an “extreme violent Jacksonian” mentality against all totalitarian systems. While Roosevelt had underestimated Stalin`s experience as a geopolitical strategist, Truman did not make the same mistake (Gaddis: 2007). As John Lewis Gaddis writes, the new President had a healthy skepticism toward all totalitarian states (Gaddis 2005:16). Before Potsdam, Truman said:

“We must stand up to the Russians at this point and we must not be too easy with them” (Miscamble 2007:97). At the Potsdam Conference Truman held his word. He also did the same when he met Molotov.

## **5.2 The Potsdam Conference and Meeting Molotov**

After the war, the winning nations came to discuss Europe’s future in Potsdam. Truman’s far harder stance against the Soviet Union can be found already at this conference. He confronted Stalin with a theme Roosevelt had avoided, the Polish mass-graves known as the Katyn Massacre (Miscamble 2007:53). The President told also Stalin that the USA had developed a powerful new weapon. After a meeting, he took Stalin aside and informed him about the existence of the atomic bomb by saying: “We have a weapon of unusual destructive force” (McCullough 1992:442). Stalin considered this information as an attempt to intimidate (Kissinger 1994:435). After the conference Truman boasted in pure western style that he: “Gave the boys an earful and took `em for a ride” (Patterson 1988:38).

Also, George W. Bush boasted of his foreign policy. When the Americans captured Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Bush declared that the USA had: “Locked a tyrant in prison” (King/Edwards 2007:154). After the Potsdam Conference, the Secretary of War Henry Stimson (1867-1950) told that Truman bossed during the meeting with the Russians (Patterson 1988:38). Later on, Truman ordered that the atomic bomb should be dropped over Hiroshima, and then Nagasaki. These actions demonstrated great American power. It confirmed that enemies to America would pay a high price for their aggression.

If it can be argued that Truman was a macho-cowboy, the best evidence is likely to be found in his meeting with the Soviet foreign minister Vjatsjeslav Molotov (1890-1986). When the Soviet foreign minister passed through Washington in April 1945, on his way to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, Truman expressed that: ”Molotov should stop by and pay his respect for the president of the United States” (McCullough 1992:362). In the meeting with Molotov, the President used a direct style. Such as when Molotov said that the Poles had been working against the red army, Truman cut him short and told the Russian foreign secretary that he was not interested in propaganda (McCullough 1992:375).

Truman stated that the Kremlin had to comply with its wartime agreements, get rid of communist government and repression in Poland, and establish a government that was representative to the Polish people. Molotov declared:

"I have never been talked to like that in my life." Truman replied: "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that" (Alperovitz 1995:108-09).

After the meeting Truman boasted about giving the Russian foreign minister, a "straight one-to-three to the jaw" (Patterson 1988:38). In retrospect, Truman's behaviour at this meeting was a failure. Even the hard-liner, Avirell Harriman would regret that Truman went at it quite hard (McCullough 1992:376).

The result of the meeting was that Molotov told Stalin that the U.S. had altered their foreign policy. That the Americans are becoming more aggressive. Although it is likely that an insulted Molotov exaggerated the change in American policy, he was not completely wrong when he delivered the message to Stalin. Not long after the meeting Truman gave the Russians the following macho ultimatum in proclaiming: "If the Russian did not want to cooperate, they could go to hell" (McCullough 1992:374).

This is a typical Jacksonian rhetoric. The message is clear, aggressive and simple in its form. Under Truman many were worried about the negative effects of his macho rhetoric. The President received a diverse set of critics. Among those, the diplomat George F. Kennan, the journalist Walter Lippman, the political scientist Hans Morgenthau, politicians of the left and right, like Henry A. Wallace and Robert A. Taft (Patterson 1988:35). Commonly, these critics were that they all questioned the Presidents simple and careless rhetoric. Ambassador Harriman disliked the president's slam-bang manner. His rhetoric was inappropriate and ill-fit in a diplomatic setting. It was little to gain politically in comparing Molotov with a "mutton head" (Keyser 1995:12).

Also George W. Bush received criticism from both international liberalists such as Senator Tom A Daschle as well as conservative realists such as Brent Scowcroft. Many disliked the President's aggressive behaviour toward Putin and Chirac (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:90 on Daschle. on Scowcroft 124).

Another perspective in the cowboy rhetoric is being "a doer." Melby, Daalder and Lindsay mentioned several times that Bush was "a doer" in international politics. He simplified the threat from "the others" and acted like a "man of action" (Melby 2004:18,87. Daalder and Lindsay 2005:35,185). Was Bush the only "doer" in American policy? First of all, it can be said that both president's exaggerated the image of "the others" as a threat, and in doing so, they can be compared as "doers", not "thinkers" in foreign policy (Patterson 1988:36).

If we focus on their election campaigns, it appears that Truman also wanted to build an image of himself as a “macho man.”

### **5.3 Wild West Macho-Men: Protecting the People**

The philosopher Thomas Hobbes pointed out the following in the seventeenth century: There is no community, no authority, and no law. Hobbes claimed further that people always live in a state of continual fear of danger (Nye 2007:12). In a *hobistic* spirit it is often said that a head of state who is not able to protect his people has failed as a leader. Keeping people safe in their homes is one of the basic principles for a political leader. In some of the first communities humanity was bounded together by a desire to achieve protection against threatening elements. A lot of people have given up their sovereignty and independence during history, all in order to achieve security. In ancient and medieval times people gave great men and kings political support, food and money in exchange for protection. Feudalism can serve as an example of this system.

Even in modern history people have transferred legislative power to military leaders in order to achieve security. With this perspective it is possible to argue that this kind of thinking is not extricated yet. Despite the fact that we today have some agencies that can regulate states behavior, states are still the most important part in the international scene. In order to create and establish peace, states still need to behave in a power seeking way. As with states, president`s also want to create images of themselves as macho. Being strong men who can protect the people in difficult times will give the leaders power and trust. As Bush said it:

”I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield, I will not rest, I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people” (<http://presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html>).

Bush will do his job in protecting the American people just like a sheriff protected his hometown in the Wild West. In doing the sheriff`s job, he described himself as” a doer”, not ”a thinker.” This image Bush strengthens by proclaiming: ”Some worried that the United States has lost its edge. My job is to make sure that that blade is sharp.” And: ”I`m the commander – see, I don`t need to explain- I do not need to explain why I say things. That`s the interesting thing about being the President” (Woodward 2003:146-47).

What about Harry S. Truman? In one of his most famous sayings: "Buck stops here", he is expressing much of the same mentality as Bush. The expression has its origins from a game of poker. If the player did not wish to deal he could pass the responsibility by passing the "buck", as the counter is called to the next player.

In foreign policy, Truman saw this transferring of responsibility as a cowardly move. The President took his responsibility seriously: "I am here to make decisions and whether they prove to be right or wrong I am going to make them" (McCullough 1992:384).

This image building has a purpose. A strong leader is someone that can arouse confidence in turbulent times. Under Bush, this image of an action macho-man is heavily expressed in the election campaign speeches. In presidential campaign speech in Ohio October 27<sup>th</sup> 2004 Bush declared that: "Remind them, If they want a safer America, and a stronger America and a better America, put me and Dick Cheney back in office." In the same speech Bush gave the audience the following promise:

"The most solemn duty of the American president is to protect the American people. If America shows uncertainty or weakness in this decade, the world will drift toward tragedy. This will not happen on my watch"

([http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush\\_oct27.html](http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct27.html)).

In several speeches during the election campaign, Bush was promoting an image of himself as a strong man, while his opponent was characterized as a weak leader, one that will not do whatever it takes to secure the American people. Bush gave rhetorical jabs to his opponent John Kerry, he argued: "My opponent`s views would make America less secure and the world more dangerous" ([http://presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush\\_oct18.html](http://presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct18.html)).

In Truman`s famous Whistle-stop Campaign in 1948 where he defeated the republican Thomas Dewey, there are several rhetorical links to Bush. The Norwegian historian Hans Olav Lahlum has described Truman`s 1948 campaign as strongly anti-communistic (Lahlum 2008:376). In one way this seems to be a strong "charge." But, it is not a completely inappropriate term either.

Mainly there are two reasons for arguing for links between Bush and Truman`s anti-"the others" attitudes in the election campaigns. First, Truman used a tough Bush like rhetoric against his opponent in Oklahoma City 28<sup>th</sup> September, 1948:

”Their (Republicans) reactionary policies will lead to the confusion and strife on which communism thrives” ([www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1965)).

Or as he said shortly afterward in Michigan 6<sup>th</sup> September 1948: ”You can choose the Republican party and live in fear”

(<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1797>).

In these speeches, he told the American people that they are safe because of his solid policy against communism. Second, Truman has in common with Bush an eagerness in promoting himself as the man with the solutions on how to stop ”the others.” In a speech in Iowa 18<sup>th</sup> September 1948, he told the audience the following:

”The abundant harvest of this country is helping to save the world from communism. Communism thrives on human misery. And the crops you are producing are driving back the tide of misery in many lands.”

In Indiana October 15<sup>th</sup> 1948, Truman promoted an image of himself as a good leader, fighting against a new depression. Among the anti-communistic voices in American politics it was important to avoid a depression because the communist ideology could not succeed. The communists were predicting that the capitalistic system would break down. In this context Truman explained that:

”The thing that would help the communists is having a depression. That is what I have trying to prevent.” (...)

”The Communists don`t think I`m helping them. They don`t want me to be the President of the United States. They are doing all they can in this election to bring a Republican victory”

(<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1990>).

There are common features, but the president`s are not identical in their styles. In Truman`s election speeches he is not very concerned with foreign policy issues. As opposed to Bush, Truman has a much greater focus on the domestic policy in his speeches. Although the existence of some anti-communistic rhetoric, condemning communism, was not the main focus in Truman many rural campaign speeches. As George Elsey told in the interview, Truman focused on domestic matters because those were the issues in the campaign that would be won or lost (Interview George Elsey, February 14<sup>th</sup> January 2010).

In this campaign, Elsey wrote some of the speeches, and as he said the content is about avoiding a new depression, getting health insurance, jobs, the right farmers, housing prices and dealing with the Unions, not attacking communism.

George W. Bush on the other hand, had a stronger focus on "the others." In the comparison between the campaign speech, Bush communicated a more aggressive message. He applied terms like: terrorists, enemies, tyrants and dictators in describing "the others".

However, mentioning "the others" more frequently than before is not synonymous with the USA becoming more violent or aggressive under Bush. In a globalized world, it is not a surprise that Bush in a larger degree was oriented toward the global enemy. Under the Cold War and in the 90`s, the U.S. voters were never very interested in foreign policy issues (Holsti 2004:281). Why then talk about international relations to the voters? In today`s globalized world, after the terror attack on the U.S. soil, this low interest in foreign policy is likely under change.

Despite differences in their level on focusing on "the others", there are clearly similarities outside these election campaigns. Promoting an image as "a doer" and not "a thinker" is a popular image among some leaders. Being "a doer" is a typical Jacksonian feature. A man of action often embraces being "a doer." This is probably the reason why Truman stated so clearly that his speeches had to be clear and: "free of hesitation and double talk" (McCullough 1992: 546). A clear style and action are signs of strength for both of them. The plain talk avoids pretense, which these president`s disliked. It also helps equalize the distance between them and their audience. The purpose is to convey information in a direct understandable way to the American people.

As Truman stated: "the simplest words make for the best communication" (Keyes 1995:26). The president`s straight-ahead way to speech is a part of the anti-intellectual mentality in the Jacksonian tradition. With an informal style, without taking considerations to the diplomatic setting, these president`s provoked the international community.

But, as seen above, Truman and Bush are not identical as macho cowboys. Truman acted in a way less macho. He received criticism for being too soft on communism. After the communism expanded geographically, some wanted a stronger stand against "the red danger".

These hard-liners, or “extreme Jacksonians”, meant that Truman’s foreign policy towards Russia, China and North Korea was a policy of weakness. Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908-1957) attacked the administration and accused it for being communistic.

The discontinuity research has a solid reason to promote George W. Bush as a unique Wild West Cowboy. It can be argued that Bush expressed a clearer Wild West Macho concept than Truman. The President directly expressed Wild West formulations by telling that:

”There’s an old poster out West, as I recall, that said, Wanted Dead or Alive” (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:93). Another example is an interview with CNN in 2001. In this interview Bush said:

“If you cough him up and his people today we’ll reconsider what we’re doing to your country. You still have a second chance. Just bring him in, and bring his leaders and lieutenants and other thugs and criminal with him” (Woodward 2003:235).

By these examples, Bush builds up a dominant notion of the United States taken from popular culture as a country of cowboys. The enemies get an ultimatum before they are being attacked. This tough style is not surprising. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen explains: the macho symbolic words by Bush is a response toward toughness of ”the others”. Eriksen also claimed that two macho cultures were clashing after 9/11 (Eide and Ottosen 2002:227-28).

On the other hand, we should not overestimate the revolutionary aspects of Bush in macho-rhetoric. It is not the first time macho cultures have clashed. Truman was under pressure from “extreme Jacksonians” he probably knew that he had to be tougher than his predecessors in negotiating with the “iron man” Stalin. Perhaps this is why he is often characterized as a cowboy? His biographer David McCullough is concerned about promoting Truman as an ”iron man”, a typical Jacksonian oriented president with a simple plain style (McCullough 1992:724). Many Americans in the 50’s saw Truman as the man on the horseback, a strong cowboy whom folks turned to in times of national danger (McCullough 1992:608).

Merlyn Leffler writes that Truman was a simple, straightforward man. A man with great faith in America’s moral superiority (Leffler 1992:26). These descriptions sound familiar in relation to Bush. Despite that Bush seems to be more aggressive toward ”the others” in his election campaign, it can be discussed whether it represented a revolution. By comparing these president’s macho-style, Bush does not represent a total upheaval.

Actually, both embraced the tough hard-line. Their anti-ideal appears to be "weak idealism". By this, I mean idealism without the supporting of hard power.

#### **5.4 Confronting Idealism Without Strength**

In a historical perspective, it is common for Truman and Bush that they took over after president`s who were accused of naive politics toward "the others". Roosevelt has been accused of a naive approach to post-war planning.

It`s been said that he placed too much faith in, or underestimated Stalin, while Bill Clinton were said to be too soft on China, Russia and al Qaida (Nye 2007:120). In this context, the president`s made use of a Jacksonian Wild West macho rhetoric against their common anti-ideal, "idealism without strength". Truman confronted idealism in dealing with Henry Wallace; Bush did nearly the same in criticizing Clinton`s presidency. Let us start with Truman`s disagreement with the old New Dealer, Henry Wallace (1888-1965).

Henry Wallace was an intellectual, spoke Russian and in 1940 Roosevelt choose this liberal as his vice president. He ran for president in 1948 claiming no containment of the Soviet Union was necessary (Kaufman 2007:16). Under Truman he served as minister of agriculture. Many admired Wallace, but some also feared him for his mild attitude in foreign affairs. Wallace urged a return to what he viewed as Roosevelt`s policy (Kissinger 1994:464). He directly criticized Truman`s politics for being without moral, a foreign policy based on Machiavellian principles of force and distrust (Kissinger 1994:468). Truman saw this man as an idealistic pacifist (McCullough 1992:517).

When Henry Wallace started to talk about the tougher Americans get to the Russians, the tougher they get to the Americans, he should soon experience that his president had a totally different view. Truman said:

"Since the language of military power was the only language the Russians understood, it was necessary that the United States maintain sufficient military strength to confine Soviet influence" (McCullough 1992:544).

The disagreement between Wallace and Truman became so problematic that Wallace, the minister of agriculture, had to resign from the Truman-administration in 1946. Over 50 years later Bush attacked the Clinton administration for the same reason, accusing it for idealistic cowardice (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:37).

Bill Clinton (1946-) who had invested a great deal of political capital on the success of his Middle-East peace efforts ended up being disappointed (Clinton 2004:747-48). Bush drew a lesson from this. He criticized Clinton for appeasing terrorist leaders. According to Bush, the U.S. had to deal with these guys in a tough manner without illusions (Daalder and Lindsay 2005:38). If we include Truman`s behavior at Potsdam, the meeting with Molotov and the firing of Wallace, and the Bush behavior in "hunting down the terrorist", it is reasonable to claim that these two in best western style regarded idealism as weakness.

Both president`s proclaimed this clearly, Truman by arguing: "The will to peace must be backed by strength for peace. We must be prepared to pay the price for peace" (McCullough 1992:608).

Bush also declared: "We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the words of tyrants"  
(<http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html>).

It appears that the Jacksonian macho rhetoric was not intervened by Bush. Just like in the Wild West, the presidents thought they had to operate in a hostile environment. They probably did believe that the world was a dangerous place, a nearly hobbesian world where there is anarchy and violence around every corner. In this world you have to be strong in order to survive. The mentality is likely comparable with the one Winston Churchill had under World War II. Churchill told the parliament that there had to be no negotiation with the Nazis. Only a hard confrontation line was appropriate in dealing with Hitler.

The Western myth is brutal in itself. It is based on a mentality saying, the only way to fight evil is to meet it with direct confrontations . If the U.S. interests had been attacked without any direct response, Truman and Bush would likely have been seen as weak idealists comparable to Neville Chamberlain (Weisman 2008:237). Therefore Henry Kissinger argues that in 1946 Truman launched a get- tough policy by successfully demanding Soviet`s evacuation of Azerbaijan (Kissinger 1994:446). The president`s went so far in their rhetoric that it is fair to characterize them as cowboys. In a pure western style they wanted the enemy destroyed. When Kissinger once asked Truman which foreign policy decision he wanted to be remembered for, he did not hesitate to tell in a Wild West manner: "We completely defeated our enemies and made them surrender" (Kissinger 1994:425).

## 5.5 SUMMARY CHAPTER 5

The presentation of George W. Bush as a cowboy is another aspect in the discontinuity research. During the presidency Bush sounded like a cowboy from a traditional western movie with some of his formulations. This chapter has debated whether George W. Bush can be seen as the only cowboy in American history. Little suggests that we can label Bush as a revolutionary macho cowboy.

It is possible to relate the same macho type, simple, and plain-speaking attitude to Harry S. Truman. As we have seen, Truman went further with his tough macho style. Before the Korean War, he said that the communists had to learn that they would pay a price for aggression. Bush gave the same message to terrorists or states he thought had connection with terrorists. In meeting with challenges they made use of a hard-line macho rhetoric. Bush escalated the hard-line macho rhetoric after 9/11. Truman did so in 1948, in response to an aggressive communism.

Truman's behavior as leader after FDR's death, the Potsdam Conference, in the meeting with Molotov, the firing of Henry Wallace and as a leader trying to protect the people, can be described as aggressive. Much of the rhetoric is typical Jacksonian. The message is clear, aggressive and simple in its form. As with Bush, many under Truman were worried about the negative effects of his macho rhetoric.

Both presidents exaggerated the image of "the others" as a threat, and in doing so, they can be compared as "doers", not "thinkers" in foreign policy. In their election campaigns, it appears that they tried to build images as "macho men". In this context they made use of Jacksonian Wild West macho rhetoric against their common anti-deal, "idealism without strength".

Looking at it through historical glasses, we have to admit that America has a tendency to romanticize using military power to defeat enemies, this most likely regardless of who's president.

## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Among internationally oriented researchers, there are ongoing debates about the concept of continuity and discontinuity in American foreign policy. This research has focused on whether Bush's rhetoric can be seen as radical new or as a traditional element in American foreign policy. As one representative for the discontinuity research Sven Melby is pretty clear in arguing that Bush represented a revolution. He places himself among researchers such as Daalder/ Lindsay, Peter Singer, Edwards and King. In Melby's reader-friendly, "*The Bush Revolution In American Foreign Policy*" and in the more scientific research report "*Hegemonens Hamskifte*", he provides the following three arguments for seeing Bush as a new element:

- 1) The President's dualism: Bush perceived the world as a struggle between good and evil spheres. He was more moral and religious oriented than previous presidents. His rhetoric was simple and religious. The image of "the others" was simplified. "We are good, "the others" are evil. Stereotypes were being created. "The others" were compared with Nazis and devils. The speech to the Congress 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001, in which Bush describes the world in terms of black and white, was highly dualistic.
- 2) The President's approach in meeting with "the others": Melby refers frequently to the West Point 20<sup>th</sup> January 2002 speech. In this speech Bush proclaimed a global warfare against "the others." With this speech, as the leader of the world's most powerful empire, Bush is characterized as an aggressive head of state. An anti-realist who left Truman's defensive policy of containment. Particular formulations referring to preemptive warfare were seen as a radical element.
- 3) The President's macho cowboy rhetoric: Melby recurrently refers to Bush as a simple straight talking president. Bush is portrayed as an anti-intellectual, "a doer", not "a thinker" in American politics. He acted more out of emotion than rationality. With Wild Western statements such as: "I'm a gut player, Hunt 'em down, and "take 'em out", he provoked the international community in a larger scale than any President before him.

Not all agrees to a presentation like this one. Researchers such as Melvyn P. Leffler, John Lewis Gaddis, Robert Kagan and Walter Russel Mead argue more for continuity.

Walter Russell Mead operates with four traditions in American policy. According to Mead, these traditions were present under Bush. These traditions are: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian. The traditions are according to Mead always present in American politics. Two of these have been highlighted in my research: the Wilsonian and Jacksonian. The Wilsonian tradition demands an active American involvement in the world. Democracy and freedom should be spread to all people over the world. The U.S. has a moral obligation. The Jacksonian prefer American values such as toughness, conservatism, liberalism and simplicity.

Bush`s rhetoric was aggressive. With his polarization of the world into good and evil spheres, he must carry much of the responsibility for his hawkish image. Statements like: “Axis of evil”, “Hunt them down”, “Crusade for freedom”, speak for themselves. But looking at it historically, it can be discussed whether Bush`s sharp tone was a new phenomenon in American politics.

In searching for answers, this research has investigated presidential speeches and statements from two American president`s by focusing on time of crisis. The controversial Harry S. Truman has been compared with George W. Bush, and the discontinuity research has been controlled against the Wilsonian and Jacksonian typologies. With this as a basis, I had the following thesis to relate to:

*1) Is it so that George W. Bush represented radically new elements in his speeches in relation to “the others”, compared with Harry S. Truman? Or is it possible to talk about historical continuity in the U.S policy in this area?*

*2) Are Bush and Truman members of the Wilsonian and Jacksonian tradition? And are they the same kind of Wilsonians and Jacksonians?*

Among some researchers Truman and Bush wouldn't normally be a subject of comparison. Some reacted negative when I chose to compare these two. Among some Truman is seen as the man that saved the world from a third world war, while others see him as an anti-communistic hawk. In addition to a little unusual comparison, I added different aspects to Meads theory. Among other things I created my own additional theory into Mead`s theory. The Wilsonian and Jacksonian typologies turned out to be a bit narrow-minded “tyranny of the models” in explaining politics in practice. It needed some flexible aspects.

A Wilsonian is more than a peaceful dove. The tradition embraces peace, sometimes so much that some of them recognize promoting the “good society” by applying rough power.

I have argued for a division between two types of Wilsonians, the “communicative” and the “war-hungry” one. Nor neither is the Jacksonian one coherent tradition. A Jacksonian admires toughness, but has different ways to demonstrate it. Not all Jacksonians want to go to war all over the world. I created a division between “the extreme Jacksonians” and “the moderate ones.” If Truman and Bush turned out to be representative for the same aspects and directions within this tradition, it could further strengthen the continuity claim.

Perhaps it is too early for a historical verdict on George W. Bush. As the President himself said: “You can’t possibly figure out the history of the Bush presidency until I’m dead” (Draper 2007:1).

However, it is not too soon for some nuances. Chapter three shows that the discontinuity research is promoting a nearly unhistorical reflection on Bush as a revolutionary dualistic president. It became clear early that dualism was not a unique feature with Bush. By introducing a short historical overview, many American presidents have promoted strong dualism in their speeches and statements. Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush turned out to be typical representatives for the Wilsonian tradition by dividing the world into good and evil societies. In speeches and statements, Bush painted the international scene in moral terms. Truman had the same kind of Wilsonian rhetoric, despite of the real political context of Cold War. Both shared a context of pressure. Bush with 9/11, Truman with expansive communism. In response to this they applied a dualistic rhetoric with the presence of dichotomy`s. Here are some of the utterances:

“We”	“The others”:
Democracy	Autocracy.
Freedom	Slavery
Peace	War
Truth	Lies
Wealth	Poverty

By examining a wider aspects and variations among Wilsonians, Bush became more a traditional than a revolutionary politician. When Bush characterized “the others” as Nazis in his speech on 20<sup>th</sup> September 2001, there was nothing new in it.

In a historical perspective, the term totalitarian was and still is the antithesis of American self-image. It is an efficient metaphor against an enemy. If the enemies are perceived as evil as Nazis, they deserves no mercy.

In rhetoric, it is a well-known trick to dehumanize your opponent in calling him/her a Fascist/Nazi. Truman did the same as Bush in several occasions. Stalin was promoted as a new type of Hitler. George Elsey underlined the same comparison in the interview. Under the Korean War, Truman said that communism acted just like Hitler had done. Both made use of words with negative historical connotations such as: dictatorship, evil, Nazi, Fascism, and they were warning the audience against a third world war. It can be argued that they abused the history in order to gain or defend certain political aims.

As dualistic Wilsonians they agreed on the final result in history. The president`s said that their enemies will collapse because of their own greatness and “the others” weakness.

In their main policy the doctrines, they are referring to the same terms. “The others” are “terrorists”, “totalitarians” and “aggressors.” In American politics, terrorists are often regarded as an unworthy opponent. The content in the doctrine is much about creating a battle between those who want freedom and those who “despise” freedom. In terms of dualism, the Truman doctrine is the Bush doctrine legacy.

When it comes to Wilsonian dualism and religion, Bush was in a larger scale religious. But a religious and moralistic president in the U.S. is not a revolution. In meeting “the others” the historical context is different in this case. Bush spoke toward Muslims who believe in the same God as he did. Communism on the other hand has a tense relationship to all kind of religions. In his speeches, Bush took religion seriously. He tried to avoid using specific Christian terms. Bush did not want to provoke the Muslim world. He surprisingly gave several nuances in his presentation of “the others”.

It is doubtful that the President was a keen admirer of Islamic faith, but he stated cynically that the problem was not Islam, let alone in religious faith itself, the case was that some extremists had misinterpreted their own religion. In Bush`s rhetoric not all Muslims are promoted as Americas enemies.

This is opposite to Harry Truman's use of religion. The former Missouri Senator was employing religion to create a diversion between the U.S. and the communists. Truman stated that communists were infidels and could not be trusted. In the Korean War he stated that the devil was loose. Early on in his presidency he also made it clear that he did not want any compromises with the evil.

In the next aspect, the Wilsonians and creators of stereotypes, the dividing of the world into good and evil spheres is not a new phenomenon with George W. Bush. Both followed a cultural tradition closely linked to Edward Said's theory of "us" and "them".

There is nothing revolutionary about characterizing somebody as evil monsters in the U.S. It is part of a historical technique in dehumanizing an enemy. History shows that it is unifying to construct a clear image of an enemy. Truman and Bush were aware of this by telling that "the others" were barbarians, children and underdeveloped as people. By doing this, the president's overlooked the complexity in cultures. Gaining a certain purpose was likely more important than the accurate description of the reality.

In examining the Wilsonian rhetoric, I argued that American president's often tried to promote a Pax Americana. Democracy protected by hard power is often seen as the road to peace in American politics. Isolationism is seen as the road to war. Bush and Truman act both as strict fathers who wanted to raise "the others", and teach them how to behave. This "we know best mentality" is a dangerous path to follow. It irritates people and leads to a camouflaged imperialism. In the rhetoric the president's appears with nationalistic formulations. They stated that "the others" hates the U.S. because the nation was successful.

In asking whether these are the same Wilsonians or not, Bush turned out to be a "war-hungry Wilsonian". But Bush was not alone in promoting morality with guns. The American empire has for a long time; sought to impose peace upon the world by using hard force. In the U.S. history it is much easier to find war-hungry Wilsonians than the communicative ones. After 9/11 Bush said it was hopeless to deal with fanatic terrorists. How does one negotiate with a shadow willing to sacrifice his own life?

After World War II, Truman had a hard time trying to deal with Stalin. Much indicates that he lost a lot of confidence in communicating with the Russians. He responded to the Russian stubbornness by tightening the grip. As he once expressed:

“If the Russians did not want to cooperate, they could go to hell” (McCullough 1992:374). In my sources, Truman told in a “war-hungry Wilsonian” way that he was willing to fight for peace.

Truman`s image as “the defender of the free world” is one of the reasons why Bush admired him. By including a historical context, the picture becomes more complicated. Even though they talked like “war-hungry Wilsonians” they had to balance between these two types of Wilsonians. In a Cold War context with nuclear weapons, Truman was on one side careful. On several occasions he spoke as a “communicative Wilsonian” by declaring that he wanted no war. Communicating with “the others” was fronted as an ideal.

On the other side, Truman became a highly unpopular wartime leader. As the Russian communism became more expansive, Truman continued to promote “war-hungry Wilsonian” rhetoric by arguing that: “The will to peace must be backed by strength for peace. We must be prepared to pay the price for peace” (McCullough 1992:608).

But George W. Bush cannot be categorized as a one hundred percent “war-hungry Wilsonian”. He relied on communicative and defensive political rhetoric toward states such as China, North-Korea and Saudi Arabia. The most radical element in Bush as a dualistic president came when he referred to the term crusade in a public speech. This is a word loaded with negative historical connotations toward people in the Middle-East. In this case, Bush differs from Truman as a more dualistic war-hungry Wilsonian president. However, those who saw Bush`s moralistic rhetoric as a new element, should not overlook the fact that both Truman and even today`s President Barack Obama embraces vital parts of Bush freedom rhetoric.

Under the Bush presidency, there was a resurrection of classical Cold War rhetoric. The competition between liberalism and autocracy was making a comeback under Bush. Communism has passed from the scene, but powerful challenges to democracy have not. Little suggests that “end of history” was closer under Bush. By examining the rhetoric, it is more a “return to history”.

Both Bush and Truman lead an incredible powerful nation in their time as president`s. This gave the “war-hungry Wilsonians” solid opportunities to manoeuvre at the international stage.

But there is a huge difference; the Europeans needed the American presence more in Truman period, than under Bush. This means that it is was easier to take a stand against the U.S. under Bush`s period.

Chapter four shows that both can be promoted as Jacksonian president`s. Although the level of Jacksonian style under Truman`s presidency can be debated, he had a tough rhetoric.

The Russians were promoted as corrupt, liars, criminals, reds, devils, and as a pigheaded, imperialistic and repressed people. George W. Bush followed the same track by telling that he was “pissed off” and that he wanted to “kick some ass”. The terrorists were evil parasites.

Truman and Bush are plain spoken. They appeared as typical representatives for Jacksonian simplistic form, two ordinary men with connection to the “Heartland America”. Whether they are the same Jacksonians can be debated. This thesis has given a short historical overview on the two types of Jacksonians in American politics.

Explaining American politics based on the extreme and moderate Jacksonian typology, cannot explain all features in the U.S foreign policy. But the division can explain that some Jacksonians are more violent and aggressive than others. Both are representing violent attitudes, but the extreme ones have smaller limitations.

In focusing on the doctrinal methods in dealing with “the others”, Bush turned out to be a new element with his preemptive strike talk in the West Point speech. Promoting the containment policy as an old fashioned way to deal with menacing elements is aggressive in an “extreme Jacksonian” tradition. At this point, Truman was not as clear as Bush. But it is not a revolution in terms of a total upheaval. Empirical history shows that there is little new about using a preemptive warfare rhetoric. Bush is not the only Jacksonian president who has ignored international laws. There are many cases where the U.S. has overlooked the UN.

The new elements in Bush`s rhetoric was that he made the term public. By making preemptive action public the U.S. appeared unilateral and arrogant. In this case, the discontinuity research was on to something, but it turns out wrong with the tendency to draw bold conclusions. Arguing that Bush took a Jacksonian farewell with Truman`s policy is an oversimplification. Promoting Truman`s foreign policy as defensive, and Bush as aggressive is incorrect based on my investigation and from my sources. Using the word expansionist in relation to Bush and interventionist on Truman is perhaps more a rhetorical trick than genuine research.

Although Bush had to deal with a stateless enemy there was not that nearly, dualistic difference between meeting “the others” now and then. As Bush, Truman had to deal with not only states, but also an anti-democratic ideological movement. The Truman-Doctrine had a global perspective in it: “Out and help suppressed people in the world”.

Even Bush compared his enemies with the one from the days of the Cold War. The president`s global warfare politics can be found in Korea and Iraq.

After the Soviet`s expansion in the late 40`s, a context of fear influenced Truman`s rhetoric. The same happened to Bush after 9/11. Paranoia and insecurity were the basis of normal life in these periods. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and 9/11, the climax of fear was reached. With the U.S. involvement in these situations these, “extreme Jacksonians” gained more power.

Under the Korean War, Truman talked about applying nuclear weapons. He characterized the communists as red devils and communism as a Hitler-like ideology. Truman was “seeing red”. He was partly abandoning George F. Kennan`s moderate Jacksonian line, tripled the defence budget by improving the NSC-68 and started up a global warfare against communism. In an “extreme Jacksonian” manner Truman warned against a worldwide communist takeover. This rhetoric should later on lead to the domino theory telling that if aggression was allowed to succeed in Korea, it would be an open invitation to new acts of aggression elsewhere. This was a policy that lay the foundation for American dominance in the world at a global scale and the “extreme Jacksonians” warfare in places like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

Truman`s rhetoric under the Korean War shows that the policy of containment had a more complex nature than just being a moderate defensive real political strategy. Truman himself admitted that the American purpose was much broader than the containment policy. It also had an expansive element in its willingness to battle against communism on a global scale. While Truman warned against a worldwide communism conspiracy, Bush was speaking about a global network of terrorists. The President were telling in an “extreme Jacksonian” manner that the American`s freedom and freedom in the world, are dependent on each other.

My sources illustrates that the president`s had to balance between a moderate and an extreme Jacksonian rhetoric. Under the Korean War, Truman became more “extreme Jacksonian” with his global perspective in confronting “the red danger”, but he never abandoned his “moderate

Jacksonian” position totally. The warfare in Korea was in addition to stopping the communist movement also promoted as a war for defending vital geopolitical areas. Truman did not want to expand the war by including China. He avoided using the term “war” on the situation. He also criticized “extreme” Jacksonians such as Joseph McCarthy by calling him a “liar”.

It would also be a mistake to regard George W. Bush as a one hundred percent “extreme Jacksonian.” He was not willing to do whatever it takes to secure the nation. He did not rush towards confrontation everywhere. He had to take a stand against some “extreme Jacksonians” arguing for the use of atomic bombs against Mecca. The fact that the U.S. has greater power does not mean it can impose its will on everyone.

Truman belongs to the “extreme Jacksonians” in replacing earlier stereotypes of Russians as cooperative with pointing out that the U.S. needed a stronger stand against communistic conquests. Truman stated that if communist aggression was allowed to go unchallenged, it would mean a third world war. Rhetorically, Bush appears to be a more “extreme Jacksonian” than Truman. He is talking about preemptive warfare against “the others”. But it is not a revolution.

In face of ideological conflicts, various similarities in foreign policy begin to appear. Both had to operate in a context of fear. They had to relate to what they saw as the “correct history”. Earlier history had taught them not to be too soft with dictators. The history of World War II and the soft dealing with Saddam and Bin Laden could not repeat itself. Actions of dictators had to meet consequences. The president`s had to respond in some way. The campaigning against “the others” required a strong Jacksonian leadership. This influenced their speeches and statements.

A similar feature appears in chapter five. In this chapter I examined whether Bush was a revolutionary cowboy in American politics, or not. This in terms of being a radical simplistic and aggressive plain-speaking head of state. One who was not “a thinker” but “a doer” in dealing with “the others”.

Bush had several statements that fit well into the Wild Western tradition. Statements such as: “take em out”, “I`m a gut player”, “wanted dead or alive” are expressions for this kind of tough western rhetoric. But we cannot lay the responsibility for American tough and simple attitude at the feet of a particular president. It makes as much sense as holding Herbert Hoover responsible for the great depression.

Harry S. Truman's tone at Potsdam, in the meeting with Molotov, in the election campaign and in the dealing with Henry Wallace, is all evidence that the rough rhetoric has deep roots in American history. It is not without a reason both president`s have been criticized for using a careless simplistic rhetoric. The president`s demanded speeches free of hesitations and double talk.

To a homely audience, this was likely a smart move. In a diplomatic setting it was provocative. They promoted an image of themselves as presidential macho-men and leaders who were able to protect the people against danger. They criticized their predecessors weakness in dealing with "the others". These features are not breathtaking if you take under consideration that the U.S. operates in a hobsitic world where danger is around every corner.

If the U.S. interests had been attacked or threatened without any direct response, these presidents would have been regarded as weak leaders, comparable to Neville Chamberlain. An image little desirable in the Jacksonian Wild West tradition. "Men of action " or "doers" can arouse confidence in turbulent times. Being "a doer" or a cowboy is not an exclusive feature with Bush.

Truman was in the 50`s seen as a man on the horseback. A leader people turned to in times of danger. Truman was expressing himself as a cowboy by telling that he gave: "the boys an earful" and a "straight one-two on the jaw". With its imperial history, it is likely that America has a tendency to glorify using military power to defeat enemies nearly regardless of president.

### **Final Comment**

By employing a historical perspective, Mead`s theory with new aspects and additional new theory in this paper, the discontinuity research is given little credit. However it should be stated that by applying different sources it is perhaps possible to gain a different result than what this research did. This research, based on speeches, shows that the discontinuity arguments overstated the radicalism in Bush`s presidency, especially in terms of being a revolutionary dualistic president.

George W. Bush was not a revolutionary dualistic president. Actually, Truman is in a larger scale dualistic. He was promoting communism as totally opposite to everything the West stands for. Regardless of motivations, Bush is different in some cases.

But, Bush is a bit more aggressive as Jacksonians. He has a stronger belonging to the “extreme Jacksonians” than Truman, but he does not represent a total upheaval. Truman has also a foot inside the “extreme Jacksonians” direction.

Much of Bush`s rhetoric resonates with traditional themes in American policy. Whatever future historians may say about Bush, one thing is clear: their verdict will hinge upon evolutions of the president`s tough style and war against terror.

The major question is whether his foreign policy will succeed at the end. The answer to that is not given. We have to remember that history can take surprising turns. Truman was, when he resigned, rated as one of the weakest president`s in the U.S. history. After communism collapsed he was suddenly rated as one of the best president. What will be the final image on George W. Bush, still remains to see.

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