

Corruption and Education: An Interdisciplinary Approach

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Master of Science in Business Administration, International
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12.1.2010

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This Masters thesis was carried out as part of a Masters degree education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as such. However, this does not imply that the University is responsible for the methods that were used or the conclusions that were drawn.

Acknowledgement

Many thanks to Dr. Andreas Falkenberg Professor and Chair of the PhD Program in International Management at the University of Agder for his invaluable guidance in the creation of this report, along with the tutelage and support of others in the business and economics department at the University of Agder in Kristiansand, and Tina Del Castillo a corruption specialist in the Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) bureau of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition thanks go out to Vibeche Moland for her support and comments on earlier drafts of this report.

Abstract

Objective. This article will begin by defining corruption, looking at the causes of and phenomenon correlated with corruption, as well as comparing some of the current solutions being proposed for dealing with it, and attempt to determine if higher education could lead to corruption. The aim of this research is to accept one of the following hypotheses:

H₁ : Higher Education might lead to corruption in developing countries

H₀ : Higher Education does not necessarily lead to corruption in developing countries

Also important to this analysis is the notion that by focusing on providing basic resources, to citizens with-in society, an anti-corruption scheme is laying the foundation for long term corruption reduction, something that, despite the recently heightened attention and billions of dollars of funding world wide has been elusive thus far among anti-corruption initiatives.

Method. In order to achieve this aim an interdisciplinary analytical model of corruption phenomena is created where a (1) Micro analysis (2) Marco analysis (3) Wide analysis and finally a (4) Long analysis are assessed and combined in order to form a deeper understanding of education and its interplay with corruption. With-in this model various research and theories from diverse disciplines will be considered, some of which perhaps for the first time in connection with corruption, including; the social cognitive theory, Kohlberg's framework of moral development, Klitgaard's $C = M + D - A$ corruption calculus, and the resource arena view of quality of life originated by Coleman (1971) and adapted by Falkenberg (1998), in conjunction with a review of select empirical findings and widely supported theoretical concepts to include moral suasion. Personal interviews with subject matter experts from USAID will also

be included in the analysis. Both perception and experience based corruption data will be used in the analysis, which is intended to add credibility to this interdisciplinary look at corruption and education due to the ever-prevalent questions of accuracy and reliability regarding corruption occurrence figures. The aim of using an interdisciplinary approach is to begin to create linkages between disciplines and fill gaps that have prevented a holistic understanding of corruption and the phenomena surrounding it.

Results. This article identifies a large divide in education between individuals in country leadership and the average citizen to be a potential cause of corruption in developing countries while an over all increase in education levels in society is thought to decrease corruption and build the foundations needed in a society for long term corruption reduction. Conclusion. The most important discovery of this article is the current lack of interdisciplinary cooperation among researchers in the many disciplines that are involved in anti-corruption initiatives. The hope is that the interdisciplinary model created here can be further used to create linkages that will allow for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon surrounding corruption. Future research is needed in order to create these linkages between the varied disciplines involved in the complex phenomena surrounding corruption, especially where a distinct lack of attention to some of the social sciences such as psychology and history was revealed while current research, and policy creation, has been heavily weighted toward economic causes and cures perhaps detrimentally to all but the elite in developing countries. This article does its part by using an interdisciplinary model of analysis to find support for the notion that anti-corruption schemes will be more effective in the long run if, among other things, they make narrowing the education gap between the general population in society and the highly educated leadership in developing countries a high priority

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Introduction

"Give a man a fish; feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish; feed him for a lifetime"

Lao Tzu, 4th- 6th century BC

Corruption is an important issue that has been present worldwide throughout the history of mankind. Yet only since the 1990's has corruption garnered an increasing amount of attention from researchers. In these recent years academics of many disciplines, private organizations, governmental organizations, and the media alike on a global level have sought to better understand and battle corruption. This heightened level of attention to corruption is certainly a welcome change since research supports the notion that the reduction of corruption globally could increase the quality of life for millions, perhaps billions of people many of whom suffer from the poverty that is left in the wake of singular corrupt acts of grand corruption and endemic corruption alike. But the problem of corruption is complex one. The consequences, definition and causes of corruption are numerous which makes finding a solution difficult. And, as Everett, Neu and Rahaman put it "the ethical dispositions of those working in the anti-corruption field are complex, sometimes contradictory, and often hidden" (2006, p.1) making a complex problem even tougher to unravel. It is the same underlying idea of the actors in the anti-corruption realm portraying deceptive intentions that support the premise that a grassroots scheme of fighting corruption that engages local civil societies may be the only path toward sustainable corruption reduction, along with the notion that in order for a change to take place on a sustainable societal level it must be internally driven (Gordon, 2000).

Corruption Defined

Though there are many definitions of corruption one of the most well known is - the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit (Robinson, 1998), akin to the potentially most widely used definition, used by Transparency International, which defines corruption as - the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Fagan, 2009).

Defining corruption is crucial, and it should be noted that corruption may have many contextual definitions that differ, Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) find that these definitions, rather than being intent on better solving the problem, differ in a manner that is inclined to aid the specific cause(s) of the actor doing the defining. According to Transparency International (Debere & Sidwell, 2009) corruption occurs anytime a public official or employee acts in an unethical manner where a disregard for the authority given to them as a public servant is misused and their own private gain is put before that of the public whom they are intended to serve. Though, in most societies, there is no requirement of altruism from public servants, there must be at the very least a sense of loyalty or duty to society, otherwise selfishness prevails and civil society will suffer. As long as officials believe that the country's laws and regulations are not efficient or are unenforceable, meaning that cost of misuse of power is low with a high potential to gain, corruption will be given room to spread and erode existing governance structures and alienate, or worse, rob from the very civil society these public servants are intended to provide service to. As noted by Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) there are also differing definitions of corruption, these definitions usually stem from the purpose the author is intending to use the word for, or more appropriately, the goal the author is trying to achieve. They find the largest global actors produce the most literature and deal primarily, or as in the case of the World Bank

solely, in economic corruption. This results in a push for freer markets where unknowing or uncaring local actors can be manipulated to produce ends that benefit the outside actor, in this example, the World Bank. This is a specific phenomenon which is well documented in John Perkins' *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* (2004) and points to the need follow the trail of money that serves to promote grand corruption in developing countries. Of course, as implied by the existence of varying definitions, corruption has the ability to degrade and undermine on a myriad of levels including dismantling the legitimacy of the judicial system and government mandates set in place control corruption among private and public actors, which can progressively hinder economic growth and even thwart any form of development objective (USAID Anti-corruption Hand book, 2009).

History and Culture

Society has been burdened by corruption presumably as long as any type of society has existed. In a dissertation on public administration dating back to the fourth century B.C. in India, Kautiliya writes in his famous Arthasastra,

Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue. Just as fish moving under water cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not drinking water, so government servants

employed in the government work cannot be found out (while) taking money (for themselves). (R. P. Kangle 1972, p. 91)

Additionally, the idea that people have an obligation to act ethically is shared by nearly all, if not all, races, religions and cultures. In fact going back to ancient times, theological scholars will recall the story of Jesus and the woman who was caught in the act of adultery. In this case the people tested Jesus' ethical stance, pointing out that biblical scriptures called for her to be put to death, (generally by stoning as was the practice at that time) Jesus' reply to them was, "He who is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone." (Nelson, T., 2002). This story highlights two important points. Firstly, that a rule of law, the Old Testament scriptures, was present and secondly that a unified ethical decision was agreed upon by the people making them shared values in their culture. This story also highlights the distinction between stages in Kohlberg's stages of moral development, which will be covered in depth in the macro analysis. The idea that individuals are expected to act ethically remains today among all cultures and people just as it did in ancient times despite varying social norms. Falkenberg (1996) developed a procedure for developing a shared sense of "GOOD," originally inspired by John Rawls (1971) that can help us move toward this aim. Still the idea of a common "GOOD", though well supported among academics, has resulted in little tangible results since it's inception, which could go back to the reason for an economic focus toward battling corruption, which is that there are no sincerely altruistic actors in this fight and as the opening line of this research points out teaching people how to "fish" for them selves, or helping educate them especially in their role in society the degradation of corruption, might be the only real step toward any long term gains in any anti-corruption initiatives.

Yet throughout history countless cases of corruption can be found, often involving upstanding citizens and in repudiated societies, many times with the collusion of corrupt officials. Examples range from, smuggling products such as sugar or tea in avoidance of taxes or bribing public servants for priority in a queue, to the enslavement and trafficking of people or embezzlement of millions or even billions of dollars usually against constitutional principles and certainly the most basic principles of write and wrong. But, as in the case of slavery in the United States when behavior is endemic in society it takes the will of the very society to reverse the momentum and cause a change to occur. One technique used, which this article will look into in depth later is moral suasion which is defined as the act of using moral principles to influence individuals, groups and even nations to change their beliefs and actions. Moral suasion was used heavily by abolitionists in the beginning of their abolitionist movement, the most official adoption of moral suasion occurred in 1832, by the Garrisonians, with the launching of the New England Anti-Slavery Society and was somewhat abandoned by more radical tactics as resistance intensified, the speeches and actions of John Brown exemplify this (James Stewart, 2007). Today moral suasion is being used by gay and lesbian rights advocates, the US government, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals all who try to use moral suasion to persuade others, often politicians or financial institutions, to act in an ethical manner where no enforcement power is present. Even American president Obama has used moral suasion to settle bipartisan disputes based on moral principles, such as the moral principle that everyone deserves adequate health care. These examples are based on both local values (swaying banking institutions to act fairly) and the broader “GOOD” that Falkenberg addresses which include among other things, human rights issues (slavery and gay rights for example) that are not specific

to a time or place. It is a commonly held idea that anti-corruption schemes require tailoring to specific local and national conditions to include cultural practices and traditions, among other things. This quickly raises the issue of “cultures of corruption” where corruption is endemic in society and in order to fight corruption there is a need to delve into the complex arena of cultural nuances where researchers need a close, even personal relationship to the phenomena if they are to have any hope of understanding and eventually being successful in any sort of anti-corruption effort. Recently, as experts step outside the bounds of traditional thought in the field of corruption new ideas have begun to emerge, Michael Johnston (2005) gives birth to the notion that all societies suffer corruption and that all corruption is detrimental to accountability, a welcome change from the mainstream view that corruption decreases as societies ‘develop’, which is vague at best. The idea of accountability suffering rather than development, in a sense, gives the control back to the local population and helps anti-corruption policy makers avoid the complex cultural differences that exist in the countries they intend to operate in. Clearly the depth of history and the still emerging ideas regarding corruption present today highlight the notion that there is much to learn and that the entrenched foundations of corruption will take considerable will to understand. The hope is that with better understanding and agreement on the phenomenon surrounding corruption that those engaged in fighting corruption will begin to see results from the billions of dollars and countless man-hours already channeled into the effort.

Causes of corruption

There is no shortage of difficulties in pin pointing the causes of corruption. Not the least of these is the fact that it is extremely difficult to measure. The two most widely used methods of

measurement today are; Transparency International's corruption perception Index (CPI) and a rating of the control of corruption published by the World Bank, this article will focus on the CPI for its research, for continuity, due to the fact that the majority of the empirics and research included in this article stem from the same model, but it will also include experience based data to gain a well rounded look at corruption. Both these sources are based on the surveys of international business people, expatriates, risk analysts, and local residents. The use of a corruption perception index is justified because the actual level of corruption in a country is by its very nature extremely difficult to observe. For example, actual cases of arrest and conviction for corrupt acts with-in a country are not a good measure of corruption since they may not include the cases that weren't convicted. It is also important to note that as the awareness of corruption and its negative effects have grown in popularity; corrupt individuals have also used it as a means to snuff out political competition and gain popular support with no real intention of corruption reduction which can lead to concealment of corrupt acts, or even inflated representations of corruption, but certainly skewed numbers of actual cases of corruption to study. Keeping that in mind, measures are taken to reduce measurement error in corruption perception indexes by averaging different sources and Transparency International, for example, estimate perceived corruption rather than the actual instances of corruption in each country it reports on. Though not perfect, studying corruption perception indexes is the best option available given the nature and complexity of corruption.

As efforts to understand corruption increase, empirical studies have uncovered several useful findings. For example, Treisman concludes that states are perceived by business people and their citizens to be less corrupt if; they are highly developed, long established liberal democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women in government, and a

long record of openness in international trade. He goes on to explain that countries with intrusive business regulations, that suffer from unpredictable inflation, or are dependent on fuel exports are perceived to be more corrupt (Treisman, 2007). Treisman concludes that despite the fact that we cannot say that most of these factors cause corruption perceptions to be high or low, the strongest evidence in favor of that relationship is found between economic development 300 years ago and today's perception of corruption in that country via economic growth. He also points out that this is a good indication that we are getting better at constructing indexes of perceived corruption and matching them to explanatory variables (Treisman, 2007). He asserts that corruption perception indexes may well be capturing the best true prevalence of corruption, citing the biased nature of "noisy" experience based measures.

Klitgaard, a consultant for the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, to name a few formed the equation; Corruption equals Monopoly power plus Discretionary power minus Accountability or, $C = M + D - A$ which was created by Klitgaard in 1998 and has come to be the framework of choice for a large number researchers, of various disciplines but especially those in favor of free markets or an economic focus toward anti-corruption. Klitgaard said, "Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. When the size of the bribe is large, the chance of being caught small, and the penalty if caught meager, many officials will succumb" (1998, p.1). Klitgaard's corruption equation, based on the principle agent paradigm, is categorized by Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2006) as an "exit" strategy meaning that alternatives or substitutes should to be available so that actors can exit a situation if corruption is thought to be present, a free market rather than restrictive "control" strategy that they also document as a strategy type.

Many recent theories have focused on institutions in their search of understanding about the causes of corruption, rather than the individuals with-in these institutions. Rose Ackerman explains that the removal of corrupt officials from office will have little effect on corruption if the organization and incentives that cultivate it are not changed (Ackerman, 2000). Xin and Rudel describe a melding of Klitgaard's equation and the principle agent paradigm by saying,

The most influential of the institutional frameworks, referred to as "principal-agent analysis," examines the relationships between three actors: the citizens, the principal (a governor), and an agent (a public official) who manages the relationship between the citizens and their government (Klitgaard, 1988). Agents commit corrupt acts when they have wide discretion in their actions, little accountability, and considerable monopoly power (Riley, 1998:134). Following this line of analysis, reformers can reduce corruption by limiting official discretion, increasing controls over officials, and reducing state power. To accomplish these ends, principal-agent analysts want to diminish official discretion by strengthening democratic political processes and to reduce monopoly power by shrinking the state. (Xin and Rudel, 2004 p. 296).

Perhaps the strongest indication of the complexities of corruption and its causes is the relationship that culture plays in on the occurrence of corruption. Scholtens and Dam (2007) find that there are significant differences among ethical policies for organizations (firms) that are based out of different countries. They use Hofstede's cultural indicators (power distance,

individualism versus collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long- versus short-term orientation) to associate ethical policies in organizations and find that individualism and uncertainty avoidance are positively correlated with an organizations ethical policies while masculinity and power distance are negatively related to these policies. Thus they contend that its impossible to make the assertion that corruption can be battled the same way across the world, or that it even looks the same across regions or societies, which only adds to the complexities of its causes. Additionally, even though corruption has a nearly universal definition, the values of a society that breed corruption or form ethical norms vary widely.

Compilation of factors found to be correlated with corruption

	Positive correlation	Negative correlation
Economic development		✓
Long established liberal democracies		✓
Free and widely used press		✓
High share of women in Government		✓
Openness to international trade		✓
Highly Educated Males, with high income, age 20-60 in large cities	✓	
High GDP per Capita		✓
Improved country level Education		✓
Intrusive business regulations	✓	
Unpredictable inflation	✓	
Dependence on fuel exports	✓	
“Bad” institutions	✓	
Socio-political Environment that allows agents to have wide discretion	✓	
Socio-political Environment that demands little accountability of agents	✓	
Socio-political Environment that allows for considerable Monopoly power	✓	

Organizations or cultures with high individualism		✓
Organizations or cultures with high uncertainty avoidance		✓
Organizations or cultures with high masculinity	✓	
Organizations or cultures with high power distance	✓	

Source: data taken from research articles included in this article written post 1997

Perhaps the largest barrier in the battle against corruption has been that developed countries and their organizations have wrongly assumed that each country has a comparable measure of justice and ethical behavior. This again points to the idea highlighted by Andreas Falkenberg (1994) that a global agreement upon “GOOD” practices is needed. Falkenberg said that in creating this universal standard:

1. We cannot fully rely on our culture's values or on our built-in moral compass to guide us in justice or in ethics.
2. We cannot conclude that our current institutions; laws, norms, values, customs, and rules are "just."
3. We cannot be sure that we are "ethical" in our conduct if we follow the current institutions.

He goes on to state that the three principles needed to form “GOOD” and just institutions are (a) survival; (b) equal moral standing; and (c) distribution of index goods - income, wealth, social basis for self respect, professional powers, and rights, etc. (Rawls, 1971), according to the

maxi-min rule. (1994) This is crucial to understanding corruption because the norms and values of individuals, in this case generally politicians, are ranked (see Appendix 1) as the most important cause of corruption in lower income countries. (McCuster, 2006) McCuster goes on to assert that, in summary, the three most important causes of corruption among high and low income countries alike are firstly the norms and values of politicians and public servants followed by, lack of control supervision and auditing, followed finally by interrelationships in business and politics. (McCuster, 2006)

So it stands to reason that in order to address corruption in any sort of a long-term sense we need to investigate the values and norms of individuals in the societies in question. The idea of individuals affecting the level of corruption in a society is made clearer when we consider that grand corruption, the unashamed looting of national riches, is so detrimental in developing countries where the losers are likely to be the exceptionally poor, female, and marginalized, while the winners are already wealthy, usually more educated, and part of an inefficient, swollen state. This corrupt misallocation of resources happens where poverty is a product of unequal wealth distribution and where it is also a consequence of the social exclusion of the poor (Riley, 2004). Among the top development organizations world wide, USAID has shifted its attack on corruption from a focus on administrative corruption to one of grand corruption among political and economic elites that will exist along side their continued efforts to curb administrative corruption. (Del Castillo, 2010)

Economic development is very relevant to the perceived existence of corruption; in fact the correlation between economic development and corruption is very strong. Treisman (2006) found it to survive the inclusion of a variety of controls (for ethnolinguistic fractionalization, latitude, region, religion, culture, democracy, trade, inequality, inflation, and various policy

variables), and to be found in each region of the world. But the question of whether or not economic development reduces corruption is a tough one. This strong relationship raises other questions as well, such as; does corruption slow economic development, or could both be caused by some third factor?

Of the relationship between democracy and corruption Treisman finds that there is no solid evidence that the actual frequency of corrupt interactions, as judged by experience-based data is related to democratic institutions. However, fairly robust evidence exists that countries with currently high levels, and long histories of liberal democracy—especially those with a strong free press—are perceived to be less corrupt. Also concerning the use of corruption perceptions based data, he states “endogeneity is as great a concern as in the case of economic development. Corruption could itself weaken democratic institutions or could be caused by factors that also undermine democracy“ (Treisman, 2006, p. 25).

Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) echo Treisman (2000) and assert that having found strong empirical evidence that the process of successful economic development reduces corruption considerably in the long run, but little in the short run, and not finding the mechanism through which this works, saying “One possibility is through a rationalization of public and private roles and spread of education, which makes abuses harder to conceal” (p. 101).

Summary of approaches to fighting corruption

While we have compiled a sizable amount of data to about the causes of corruption in the recent history (though few are strongly supported), there is a strange ambivalence toward the

effects of corruption, which has direct implications on our reaction toward it. As we'll see later there is good reason to believe this disparity in information could be due the actors and their own agendas in the world of anti-corruption. Michael Johnston puts it this way in his book *Syndromes of Corruption*;

The effects of corruption are often reduced to economic data, facilitating statistical work but to often equating human wellbeing with trends in GDP, and saying even less about justice. Much of the debate has been driven by groups advocating the bundle of changes commonly called globalization – outlooks and policies that I see as more positive than not, but that have a way of framing corruption issues in terms of obstructions to free markets, and reform as primarily a task of continued economic liberalization... reform recommendations tend to vary rather little. (2005, preface x-xi)

Jeff Everett, Dean Neu, and Abu Shiraz Rahaman compiled and examined two sets of documents in their analysis of the actors involved in the fight against corruption globally (2006). The first set consisted of roughly 200 association, think-tank, and academic reports, books, and papers dealing with the topic of corruption the second set examined the websites or position papers of nearly, if not all, the major global governance actors to gain insight on the different approaches taken by each. They were able to group the approaches of these organizations into three categories. These categories are; the use of expert “control” to align the environment in a manner that reduces or blocks corruption, “exit” which uses Klitgaard’s famous $C = M + D - A$ corruption calculus to allow actors an exit away from corruption generally by the reduction of

government bureaucracy which limits the free market, or “voice” solutions which call on the active involvement of civil society to unify in agreement against the forms of corruption present in that society. This research team uncovers an interesting finding, they discover that the actors involved in fighting corruption implement approaches that are often tied to their own motives and different phenomena they have chosen to “problematize”. They say,

What emerges from our analysis is the need to ask certain questions prior to intervening in the field. Namely, is corruption a problem because the poor are being victimized by it? Is it a problem because it impedes efficiency? Is it a problem because it can be used to enhance the expert’s symbolic capital? Or is it a problem because it is essentially a social phenomenon, which doesn’t accord well with the strictly economic models developed by those in charge of the system of global governance? Before business leaders, or anyone for that matter, decide to commit themselves to helping fight this “cancer” or “virus,” they need to decide what they think corruption is, why they think they need to solve it, and how they wish to solve it. They also need to acknowledge that they may well be an endogenous variable or determinant factor in the corruption equation. (Everett, Neu, Rahaman, 2006, p.9)

Of the three approaches found in their research the team points out that the favored approach, or the one most commonly employed, is the exit approach. This approach which they found to be favored by both the IMF and WB as well as many of the large global governing actors, is based on economic principles which they say are proposed with a great deal of

confidence, despite the fact that the majority of the research in the area is inconclusive, and a discipline (economics) that by nature erases moral concerns.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is primarily concerned with promoting development in developing countries, and as such has a strong interest in the reduction of corruption, which has been strongly connected to poverty and harmful effects on economic development (Treismann, 2007). In 2006 USAID spent a total of US\$ 403,361 thousand on the combination of economic initiatives and the promotion of democracy in Africa, largely control and exit strategies, compared to the US\$ 121,727 thousand the agency put toward broader access to education in the same year which builds human capital in developing countries and would be considered a voice strategy. Meaning USAID spent roughly a third of the money it spent in Africa on educational, voice, programs as it did on economic and governance, control and exit, strategies in 2006. By 2009 USAID spent a total of US\$ 614,686 thousand on the combination of economic initiatives and the promotion of democracy in Africa, largely control and exit strategies, compared to the US\$ 219,291 thousand the agency put toward broader access to education in the same year. These figures translate into higher overall funding toward both areas of aid, and only a slightly larger portion toward education, voice initiatives (USAID financial reports, 2006 & 2009). Though there has been a larger push in USAID toward programming that promotes local ownership with the goal of sustainability, these figures indicate that proportionately funds are being allocated much the same as they had been before. There could be several reasons for this, perhaps the size of an agency as large as USAID hinders quick change, perhaps the bureaucracy and red tape of a governmental agency can be blamed, or perhaps the fact that the American election process of four years is not enough time for the political leadership of the agency to show proof of change through the use of voice initiatives

such as increased educational opportunities that could take decades to take hold, so the funds are spent on short term, quick results schemes. And if that is true, could it be said that the short lived ups and downs of the corruption perceptions index in developing countries are due to the quick results given by the short term economic exit schemes Everett, Neu, Rahaman have found to be favored in battling corruption. The actual use of funds by USAID as well as the in depth research done uncovering the favored usage of exit schemes by the major actors in anti-corruption world wide could point to the reason there has not been one strong example of corruption reduction in developing countries by the Corruption Perceptions Index.

In Rob McCuster's review of anti-corruption strategies (2006) we again find three categories of anti-corruption strategies. He categorizes these approaches as; Interventionalism, which entails a reactionary approach where offenses take place and are found out and punished, Managerialism, where the establishment of appropriate systems or institutions manage away the chances of corruption taking place, and finally Organizational Integrity, the integration of operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards create a norm of ethical behavior. These three basic strategy groups are parallel to those of Everett's team of researchers, and seem to form a pattern of assessment for anti-corruption schemes. However, he also notes that Huberts (1998) distinguishes six focus strategies that break down into more specific methods of action.

Economic – emphasizes the need for the economic stimuli for corruption to be reduced and suggests that such might be achieved by, inter alia, paying higher civil service salaries

Educational – aims at altering the attitudes and values of the populace and civil servants alike via training and education campaigns and engagement of the media

Cultural – ensuring that the behavior and attitudes of those in power are subject to stringent codes of conduct and their behavior filters down to civil servants

Organizational or Bureaucratic – strengthening internal control systems such as auditing to detect corrupt activity, and staff rotation to reduce the propensity for individuals to establish themselves in entrenched corruption


Political – increasing in transparency in terms, for example, of the monitoring of party finances and more broadly, a clearer and more definite separation of powers in terms of the judiciary and the state

Judicial or Repressive measures – advocates harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also the creation of independent anti-corruption agencies.

(McCuster 2006, p. 20)

McCuster summarizes his analysis with the importance of a holistic approach to anti-corruption like that of TI's National Integrity System (see below) which places society's values and public awareness at the foundation of its anti-corruption strategy.

Figure 3: The national integrity system



Source: Pope 2000: 35

Michael Johnston, a man named 36 in 100 Most Influential People in Business Ethics 2008 by Ethisphere.com (2010) gives his view of the reforms needed to battle corruption in this way:

At one level, successful reforms will help a society withstand corruption and may shift the problem itself toward less disruptive forms. But at a more basic level the issue is justice – enhancing citizens’ ability to pursue and defend their own economic and political wellbeing free from abuse and exploitation by political and economic elites. The opportunity to participate

in open, competitive, and fair political and economic processes and link them to each other while restraining their excesses, are both defining characteristics of our four syndromes and ultimate goals of reform (Johnston, 2005, p. 187).

Johnston's reference to the four syndromes is where his research differs from previous subject matter experts. Though Johnston agrees broadly that development in the form of "Strong institutions and balanced participation (to) enable societies to reform, to respond to corrupt activities more effectively." (2005, p. 199) is the key, he also lays out a path dependent approach to bringing about those reforms based on four corruption syndromes (influence markets, elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, and official moguls) present in each respective country. Johnston's main argument is that these particular syndromes of corruption are linked, via participation and institutions, to deeper problems of development, and his work has opened a new avenue of research into political corruption that, in his own word, "offers a better understanding of the contrasting ways the problem develops and functions in real settings" and "(it) can also suggest countermeasures appropriate in differing settings, and ways to avoid doing unintended damage through unwise reforms" (p.35). Though admitting that much more comparative research on corruption is urgently needed, Johnston states that the recent focus on economic liberalization in the battle against corruption has shown us more than ever that strong, accountable, public institutions are the solution (2005).

The overriding idea of developing strong institutions to support a society where citizen participation controls corruption is in contrast to our current state of operation

globally according to the findings of Everett, Neu, and Rahaman (2006) who found the “voice” strategy to largely be just an addition to either a “control or “exit” strategy among the largest global actors of anti-corruption. Also interesting to note is the fact that though TI’s corruption perception index is relied upon by a large number of researchers and anti-corruption stake holders world wide, though the manner from which it measures corruption, the individual populous or civil society its self (a bottom up approach), is often not the means those stakeholders or governing bodies are using to fight corruption. Instead methods of economic and institutional reform are more widely employed, which fit into the control and exit strategies laid out by Everett, Neu, and Rahaman. This is not surprising when we consider the notion that the majority of the largest actors in the global anti-corruption arena are funded directly by governments (predominantly western) that have primary obligations to their own citizens needs first. As Everett, Neu, and Rahaman point out,

Virtue ethics forces us to consider whether those fighting corruption are indeed themselves virtuous or moral actors. ... it is not without some irony that these two organizations (IMF and the WB) have taken a leading role in the fight to safeguard public office. We say ironic because both of these organizations are promoters of global free enterprise and they are themselves contradicting Klitgaard’s general, $C=M+D$ A anti-corruption formula: both organizations have a great deal of discretion (D), they are close to being, if not are, monopolistic (M), and they are far from being accountable (A), in a number of important ways ... these two organizations are not particularly willing to accept responsibility for the turmoil that has often been left in the midst of their liberalization efforts... and

specific to the issue of corruption, they have little interest in talking about the fact that privatization has at times actually increased the amount of corruption in those countries to whom they give loans (p.8).

Are there Examples of Success?

In short, there are few success stories or examples of actually reducing corruption in a sustained way (OECD, 2003). Since 1995 Transparency International has been releasing their annual corruption perceptions index report. This index is arguably the most widely used indicator of corruption in the world, it has grown in scope while added and dropped countries, and slightly changed its methodologies over time but remains an excellent source of cross country comparison for the prevalence of corruption. A quick perusal of the corruption perceptions index shows that the battle against corruption has very few winners over that decade-plus time span of time and includes several countries who seemingly made strides against corruption but have since fallen back to the same levels or worse since then (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). There are however examples of progress including, Hong Kong, Singapore, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Of the four, Hong Kong and Singapore were both city-states that had fairly authoritarian governments when they began their anti-corruption efforts, they are also both included in the group known as the Four Asia Tigers renowned for their exceptional economic growth and therefore not considered developing countries (OECD, 2003). Nigeria and Bangladesh are both developing countries who have seen success in their fight against corruption, but the success of Bangladesh, laudable as it is, should still be considered a short term achievement being that it's leap from last place in the corruption perceptions index (held from 2001-2005) to rank 139

among 180 countries will need to hold through a transitional period to be sure the gains are sustainable. It is also important to remember that these countries are still considered highly corrupt on a global scale. Nigeria is deserving of investigation for its consistent, though not as overwhelming, success at reducing corruption over the last decade. Nigeria held a Corruptions perceptions index score of 0.60, where 10 is totally corruption free and has risen to 2.5 in 2009. Nigeria has been a key player in the international oil industry since the 1970s, and maintains membership in Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which it joined in 1971. Today it is classified as a mixed economy emerging market. One would think the successful, oil driven economy of Nigeria would be a hindrance in the fight against corruption because the lack of strong institutions coupled with the large amounts of money flowing through such an under developed country. To a degree that is the case, in the period of 1991-1997, the losses due to corruption in Nigeria are estimated to be 66.05 and 66.79 percent of GDP per capita while the losses for Norway for example were 11.2 percent of GDP per capita (Dreher, Kotsogiannis & McCorriston, 2004). Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Distinguished Fellow of The Brookings Institution and Former Finance Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2003-2006) concluded that too often the corruption debate is “centered on economic corruption – on cases of rent seeking, on procurement fraud, on leakages in government budgets ... the World Bank’s Governance and Anti-corruption plan ... is interpreted all in economic terms.” (2007) She goes on to state during her speech entitled *Corruption: Myths and realities in Developing Country Context*, that she battled economic corruption tirelessly while in office. She says,

... we will all be deluding ourselves if we believed this myth that economic corruption is the key to tackling corruption in developing countries. I want to

argue that the big elephant in the room, which is often ignored, is political corruption, and unless tackled this will and does undermine all the focus on fighting economic corruption and improving governance in the economic sphere (2007).

Transparency International reported that in 1999 democratic elections in South Africa cost political parties between US \$40-67 million (2007). Dr. Okonjo-Iweala estimates that Nigerian political parties spent hundreds of millions of dollars on state and federal elections, and goes on to assert that this huge push for democratic elections result in political parties and processes in emerging democracies that are very prone to corruption. In her address at the annual Richard H. Sabot lecture series (2007) she says “I am worried that political corruption in pernicious forms may be taking hold on the African continent as ways are sought to emulate Western forms of campaign finance but without the strong institutions and safeguards existing in Western democracies.” This idea has been pointed out in the past as well for developing countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, South Korea and even China (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). The idea that the major world players in anti-corruption such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund deal solely in an economic context in their anti-corruption schemes seems all too restrictive when expert local nationals, as well as historical results, in a continent potentially hardest hit by corruption are providing this sort of valuable feedback. Not all developing countries are like Nigeria, and for that matter not even those on the African continent, are comparable, which is why experts of each respective discipline have called for individualized anti-corruption schemes based on all the socio-economic make-up of each country and region, and why experts of all disciplines need to work jointly in order to make progress. This idea is

echoed by a team of experts in the OECD, who stated,


What is clear is that country conditions vary widely from the poor HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) countries to large resource-rich countries, such as Nigeria and the variable transition economies, so that there can be no one approach. Many still argue that only major and rapid reforms will be effective. There appears to be a growing pragmatism that more selective and long-term solutions suited to the conditions of individual countries are the direction to go. Reducing corruption is only one objective of such reforms (Bailey, 2003).

In the case of Nigeria, the one (if any can be named) success on the anti-corruption front globally expert local nationals echo the idea held by researchers like Michael Johnston that corruption has different syndromes, or appears in different ways in different countries. If we are to listen to Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, it is easy to come to the conclusion that corruption may have simply taken a more hidden political form than the openly economic one it once had and perhaps not even been diminished.

Philosophy of Approach


As a plan of attack, this paper will utilize a newly created model of assessment of individual phenomena that is useful for highly complex real world problems that require the

faculties of the whole of the scientific and academic community in coordination with those stakeholders in the field to produce an understanding that will hopefully lead to universal truths, and eventually progress where there is currently little to none to speak of. This article will look at education in developing countries in relation to corruption and apply an interdisciplinary set of theoretical and empirical research, in order to create a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and construct specific recommendations to fight corruption in developing countries. Because of the complexities of corruption to include its occurrence and role in society, a myriad of approaches to researching it from the various disciplines exist. This model will break them down into a, (1) micro analysis (2) macro analysis (3) wide analysis (4) Long analysis of education as it relates to the prevalence of corruption in developing countries. See model below:



Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008)

The following is the application of the new model as used for this analysis of education and corruption to gain a deeper understanding and make specific recommendations in order to better fight corruption.



Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008)

Micro Analysis

The individual or group level of corruption is one that is easy to associate with, and the idea that one particular person or group is responsible for the corruption that is uncovered is one

that perhaps we all tend toward perhaps because we can easily relate to being cut in line at a governmental office or paying, or avoiding paying, a violation fee of some sort be it for a traffic infraction some other form of ticket. (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Zimbardo, 2004) Largely accepted among researchers is the idea that any anti-corruption scheme needs to incorporate a tailored approach, it also seems clear that the scheme should also account for the complexities of the individual psyche and societal interaction affects present in the differing environments where corruption is being fought. At the micro level of this interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of corruption we will investigate some lesser visited theories and empirical figures in order to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena of education in relation to corruption on a micro level.

Corruption Demographics on a Micro Level

Regarding micro-scale causes of corruption, recent theoretical work widely identifies the causes for corruption in a combination of institutional conditions: monopoly power, little accountability, and wide discretion. While theoretically this is sound, this article would suggest however that there is much more substance to the causes of corruption at the micro-scale, and that this simple combination of institutional conditions leads to a heavily favored “exit” strategy among anti-corruption initiatives where economics are the focus and societies and the individuals inside them seem to be the after thought.

On a micro level corruption has been attributed to, among other things, demographics. Naci Mocan (2008) finds that the determinants for being exposed to corruption, or asked for a bribe, include education, sex, personal income, age and whether you live in a small or large city. More specifically he finds that highly educated males, with a high income, between the ages of 20 and 60, living in large cities will be targets of corruption. This study also reveals that country

attributes affect corruption. For example, the strength of institutions in the country (as measured by low risk of expropriation) reduces corruption, while an improved education on a country level is negatively correlated with individuals being asked for a bribe along with unemployment in the country being positively correlated to individuals' exposure to corruption. To arrive at these results Mocan builds upon the work of Treisman (2000) and Mauro (1995) as well as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), to create the equation:

$$(1) \quad \text{COR}_{ij} = f(X_{ij}; C_j, H_j, K_j)$$


Where COR_{ij} is the propensity of the i th individual who lives in the country j to be a victim of corruption. X_{ij} represents personal characteristics of the individual, C_j represents the cultural attributes of country j , H_j stands for human capital measures that impact economic development, such as the level of education in the country. It should be noted that these findings were arrived at with the use of the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) compiler by the United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) using face to face and telephone interviews where participants were directly asked if they were asked to take bribes, meaning that the corruption data was not based on perception such as that of TI's widely used corruption perception index. The use of both perception and experience-based data is intended to add credibility to our interdisciplinary analysis of corruption and education. This is one of the few studies that uses actual instances of corruption rather than the perception of corruption which addresses the problem of an indirect measure of corruption since the perception of corruption can be misguided in a society, and the perception of corruption could be slower or

quicker to change over time than actual occurrences since the element of being educated about the actual affects of changes is added. Keeping this in mind Mocan (2008) finds highly educated males with high income between the age of 20 and 60 who live in large cities are more likely to be asked for a bribe, these supply side finding were well supported if not under stated due to the inherent difficulties in collecting experience based data rather than dealing with the perception of corruption, which allows for less ownership of individuals in research and therefore potentially more freely shared information. However, the real question of the usefulness of these finding could be more pertinent, since these demographics reflect individuals that are generally in positions of power in corrupt and non-corrupt organizations as well as positions of public service.

The Social Cognitive theory

Knowing the demographics of individuals likely to be targets of corruption allows for a degree of focus while we address the more central issues of the predispositions of these individuals such as individual integrity and levels of moral development and moral identity, along with the environmental elements that encourage the factors that are so central to our micro analysis. The idea that corruption is attributed to individual predispositions such as moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or low levels of cognitive moral development (Kohlberg, 1975; Trevino, 1986) has strong theoretical support. The social cognitive theory of learning (Bandura, 1991) deals specifically with the latter. It states that individuals learn from direct experience, human dialogue and interaction and observation. Built from the social learning theory, the social cognitive theory describes learning in terms of the interrelationship between behavior, environmental factors, and personal experience. (Kritsonis, 2005 and Robbins, 2003) For

example, how people interpret the outcomes of their own behavior informs and alters their environment and the personal factors they possess which then informs and alters subsequent behavior. The foundation of the theory is of reciprocal determinism, the view that (a) personal factors - in the form of cognition, affect, and biological events, (b) behavior, and (c) environmental influences create interactions that result in a triadic reciprocity (Bandura, 1991).



Adapted from; Social Foundations of thought and Action: A social Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1986)


In 1991 Bandura went on to make the connection of his theory to moral thought development. Here he echoes the importance of a point of view that, despite its focus on individual behavior, intertwines with society in the form of consensual moral codes (Bandura, 1991). He states, “Societal codes and sanctions articulate collective moral imperatives as well as influence social conduct” adding, “however, external sanctions are relatively weak deterrents because most transgressive acts can go undetected” (p.02). His research goes on to show that self-sanction plays a crucial role in regulating moral conduct; an area that he points out is distinctly different from the majority of research that focuses on moral thought. In essence

Bandura makes the distinction between what we know to be ‘right’ and our actual moral conduct. He also states;

Conduct is most congruent with moral standards when transgressive behavior is not easily self-excusable and the evaluative reactions of significant others are compatible with personal standards. Under conditions of shared moral standards, socially approvable acts are a source of self-pride and socially punishable ones are self-censured. (Bandura, 1991, p. 21)

Further underscoring the notion that an organization or society entrenched in corruption is something not easily overcome. Still he goes on to explain that individuals generally select associates who share similar standards of conduct which supports their own system of self-evaluation, an idea that can enhance social influences or buffer individuals from them, meaning a diversity of social standards, through selective association, can actually “forge consistency out of diversity” (p.21).

Much like the interaction of the three influences found in the social cognitive theory of learning, moral conduct is a reciprocity of influence between (a) thought and self-sanction, (b) conduct, (c) a network of social influences.



Adapted from; Social Foundations of thought and Action: A social Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1986)

The social cognitive theory explains how people acquire and maintain certain behavioral patterns, while also providing the basis for intervention strategies (Bandura, 1997). Evaluating behavioral change depends on the factors environment, people and behavior, as would any anti-corruption scheme that hoped to affect the moral conduct of individuals in a society. In relation to the use of education as a tool to battle corruption Bandura’s theory would suggest that a successful strategy to change the moral conduct, in our case to change corrupt behavior, requires a change in the networks of social influence which, in the case of endemic corruption, clearly requires a catalyst with-in that society to bring about change, as is show-cased in the long analysis later on. This aligns with the commonly held belief that for legislative and institutional changes to be effective in an anti-corruption strategy there must also be genuine desire of “ownership” with-in that individuals, organizations or groups involved, it also supports a “control” anti-corruption strategy as defined by Everett, Neu, and Rahaman (2006), which will be explained more in the macro analysis. A lack of the element of individual ownership can be attributed to a large share of the failure of anti-corruption around the world since, at high ranking political levels individuals can appear to promote anti-corruption strategies yet act in their own

best interest rather than that of the larger population they serve, exemplifying the principle agent paradigm. In using the social cognitive theory as a tool of micro analysis we gain a compelling case for altering moral conduct on a micro level from an often under utilized psychological point of view of the subject. The social cognitive theory provides a framework for designing, implementing and evaluating programs to address not only changing moral conduct but also instilling the self sanction element into individuals that can create a network of social influence in the long term, keeping in mind that the individual “ownership” of change is needed for the triad to be complete and create a situation ripe for the change of individual’s cognition, self sanction and eventually, moral conduct.

Transparency International’s (TI) Global Corruption Barometer (2005) gives a clear picture of the wide-ranging influence of corruption within a number of sectors and institutions. Based on the perception of 55,000 people in 69 low, middle and high income countries on a range of issues relating to existence and impact of corruption within a number of sectors and institutions (see Appendix 1). Political parties were perceived as the most corrupt, while parliament/legislature, police and legal system/judiciary all followed in descending order. This knowledge highlights the importance of focus on political institutions in an effective anti-corruption strategy.

Corruption Calculus

Why have we been ineffective thus far?

Through the use of Klitgaard's widely known $C = M + D - A$ model of anti-corruption where corruption (C) is measured as a sum of Monopoly power (M) and discretion (D) minus accountability (A) we get a clearer picture of the composition of institutional corruption on a micro level. Klitgaard's model suggests clear theoretical premises to be used in the creation or restructuring of political institutions. The need to reduce monopolistic control and narrow the discretionary power of institutions while increasing their accountability to the public they are created serve is crucial to corruption reduction in political sectors.

These premises have been used since 1988 when Klitgaard created this model citing a few examples of success. Andvig and Fjeldstad stated, "Klitgaard (1988) provides some interesting cases of successful anti-corruption reforms, including the reform of the tax administration in the Philippines under the late President Marcos. However, without exception the "successful" cases presented by Klitgaard have proved to be unsustainable." (2001) The reason could be lack of a strong civil society including an educated population to hold politicians accountable, since it is the society that sets the standard of acceptable practice for the long term, keeping in mind that internal will for change is needed as well. Yet a heavy focus has been placed on Klitgaard's corruption calculus, speculatively to the benefit of the large global actors who support the theory (Perkins, 2004). Andvig and Fjeldstad point out that,

Until recently the World Bank was criticized of playing down more indirect means of reducing corruption such as the strengthening of public institutions and increasing public education and awareness (Riley, 1998, p.138). This critique has

been advocated by, for instance, Transparency International that emphasizes the importance of civil society and public awareness in fighting corruption (2001, p. 105).

Micro Analysis Summary

Using CORij f(Xij;Cj;Hj;Kj) (Macon, 2006) to show the demographics of where and to whom in society corruption is likely to appear we can begin to make decisions in anti-corruption strategy such as where to aim our attempts at transparency and accountability to achieve the best results and how to create more accurate measurements of actual corruption as we battle it in societies. Bandura's social cognitive theory of learning, and its adaptation toward moral conduct, describe the interplay between (1) Personal factors, (2) environmental factors and (3) actual behavior, or as adapted to moral conduct (1) network of social influences, (2) thought and self sanction, and (3) moral conduct and give us valuable knowledge about individual behavior change. The social cognitive theory provides a framework for designing, implementing and evaluating programs to address not only changing moral conduct but also instilling the self sanction into individuals that creates a network of social influence in the long term, keeping in mind that the societal "ownership" of change is needed for the triad to be complete with the hopeful result of long term change of moral conduct and eventual change in shared values. We also found that the corruption calculus, $C = M + D - A$ (Klitgaard, 1988) while valuable for insight into micro analysis, has been over used and that even found to cause corruption (Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2001) where decentralization of political systems in developing countries actually further corrupts.

Macro Analysis

Earlier in the micro analysis section we discussed the social cognitive theory of moral development (Bandura, 1991), which took into account Kohlberg's stages of moral development theory. Though Bandura chose not to incorporate stages but rather to use an interplay of reciprocal determinism, a stage theory, as we'll see here, works well in examining organizations, rather than individuals, on national and international levels as a moral entity, which will allow us to shed light on education and moral development on a macro level. Here we will take a different sort of look into corruption than most have thus far, we'll call into question not only the supply and demand side of corruption but also the interventionist relationship played by aid and development organizations using Kohlberg's stage of moral development theory.

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

On a basic level Kohlberg's theory allows for three levels of moral development, stage one - pre-conventional, deals in the realm of the individual where a "sticks and carrots" or reward and punishment mentality override moral decisions. In the pre-conventional stage individuals, or organizations as we'll adapt the theory to, acts with their own interests in mind first and use sanction or punishment to limit the bounds of their actions. In stage two – conventional, individuals consider law and order and the group or communal importance of moral decisions. The conventional stage is typical for adolescents and adults and morality is

characterized by an acceptance of society's conventions concerning right and wrong, here an individual obeys rules and follows society's norms. Stage three – post-conventional, individuals use the principle of morality they live by their own principles about right and wrong that may or may not parallel those of the society around them, but principles that typically include such basic human rights as life, liberty, and justice.



Source: information taken from: Kohlberg, L. (1975). The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education.

On nearly all levels of operation the ethics of an organization effect society, and thus firms (notably from the western world where capitalistic/free market economic models abound) face a considerable amount of peer pressure to operate within certain moral principles. Corporate social responsibility regards the moral obligations the firms (organizations) have to the societies they operate in, which are, at times, administered through self-regulation. Given that capitalism is driven by the profit motive, there is an obvious call for moral principles in firms' operations,

especially on an international level where accountability is at its lowest, and cultural and economical divergences can be made excuses for actions that most would deem “immoral”. Within countries, institutions form the guidelines of behavior that organizations must follow. Falkenberg stated, “Institutions include the legal and regulatory framework in a jurisdiction as well as the norms, values, customs and patterns of behavior present in a particular place at a given time” (2004, p.4). He raises the notion of a need for shared yardstick with which to measure the behavior of organizations across cultures and time by use of a neutral panel under a veil of ignorance. He calls for the establishment of a universal “GOOD” and says the use of “accumulated time honored wisdom of multiple cultures can help us form a universal notion of ethics” (Falkenberg, 1996, p.12) Further in his work he uses Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development framework to assess the ethical maturity of corporate moral reasoning. He points out that in microeconomics and finance we have seen an emergence of transaction cost economics and the principal agent theory, both of which include the assumption that man is opportunistic, selfish and not necessarily honest. (2004, p.18) Much to the same effect Everett, Neu and Rahaman bring the idea of ethical decision making into the macro arena by calling into question the moral dispositions of international governing bodies that are integral actors in the field today. It is these organizations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transparency International, USAID, the United Nations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe, that produce the majority of literature on corruption and, arguably, it is because of these organizations and their own political or economic agendas that the majority of anti-corruption schemes are founded on institutional framing and economic principles, or “control” and “exit” approaches rather than the involvement of civil societies or

“voice” centered approaches, though several if not all of these organizations do incorporate civil society to a much lesser degree into their scheme in some form. (Everett, Neu, Rahaman, 2006)

Since John Dewey brought about the cognitive-development approach (Kohlberg, 1975) Kohlberg and Piaget began to redefine and validate Dewey’s work into the stages of the moral development theory today. This theory is not only taught in classrooms today but is also used in heavily in the research arena to describe various phenomena, as in the analysis of this article.

In this macro analysis of the global infrastructure in relation to corruption it seems befitting to take a look at those organizations that operate in all or many of the socio-economic arenas involved. In this case we’ll assess the United State Agency for international Development (USAID), and use Kohlberg’s stages of moral development to do so. As a government run, taxpayer funded organization; USAID understandably requires a high level of justification for the programs it undertakes and the use of its funds. Today USAID spearheads the development operations of the American people though; in the past this task was split between several federal agencies some of which still operate on certain levels today in collaboration with USAID under what is deemed a whole of government approach. As realizations about development and corruption have become mainstream around the world USAID has slowly, as is normal for governmental versus non governmental organizations, begun to implement anti-corruption elements into nearly all of it’s operations from food and health aid to the support of democracy and governance and even in conflict mitigation. But the truth about state run development organizations, especially USAID while the USA stands alone atop the world stage as it does today, is that all facets of the federal government represent the entire state and all it’s varied interests. In 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz said, “our foreign assistance programs are vital to the achievement of our foreign policy goals” (1986). Still, this shouldn’t surprise us;

every country's foreign aid is a tool of foreign policy. Whether that aid benefits the citizens of the developing country is determined by the motives and goals of that policy and is outlined by how a government defines national interest. (Sullivan-Catlin, Lappé, Collins, 2000) In the case of USAID all funding is passed through, and approved or disapproved by the Department of State the federal Executive Department responsible for international relations. USAID has actually gone through historical phases of full control by the Department of State, even today talk of the same scenario lingers while, in some cases, program and policy formation is still heavily influenced by State Department. In fact huge amounts of time and energy are being spent internally on the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which is an internal review the State department and USAID have undertaken to analyze this long term relationship of the two with the goal of integrating diplomacy and development missions under one planning process. What this means in a pragmatic sense is that not only do the funds for development get approved in accordance with the varied needs of the US Government as it relates abroad as a whole, but that programs and their implementation are actually developed and weighed against the needs of US security and Military initiatives for example, or even domestic economic situations under the US Department of State, the governing body that controls operations such as home land security, the department of defense and even the department of commerce which is responsible for, among other things, promoting American job creation. It is clear that the motives of such an organization cannot be purely altruistic. Perhaps private organizations are more suited for development work, or perhaps there is a need to focus or even solely operate in form of facilitating local institutions taking away the opportunity to for dual-hatted reform initiatives. Given the lack of success globally at combating corruption it is only reasonable to assume that successfully combating such a complex problem requires sincere motives and undivided

attention. Yet, the majority of the most influential actors, are those who are also involved in global governance, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transparency International, USAID, the United Nations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe. All of these organizations are involved in the arena of global governance, an arena which contains divergent interests and diverse geopolitical realities (Everett, Neu, Rahaman, 2006) These men find that the definition of corruption given by a the largest global actors in anti-corruption gives quick insight into their “solution”. They go into more detail pointing out that the actors who agree upon the definition of corruption as “the misuse of public office for private gain,” such as the World Bank and the Intentional Monetary Fund follow that idea by making scapegoats of members of public office and they are intentionally pushing for a free market, an “exit” strategy that benefits their needs regardless of the results (often harmful) in the host country. Their comprehensive research into the field of anti-corruption and ethics framing ends by saying, “It is worth reiterating that the fight against corruption is a function of specific acts and specific actors, making it a field where both ethical rules – hypernorms – and ethical actors are together needed.” (2006, p.9) Keeping in mind the that the pre-conventional stage of Kohlberg’s moral development includes actors who use rewards and punishment as the bounds for their moral reasoning it is all to easy, and disheartening, to find that we must place some of the largest actors in fight against corruption into this stage.

Macro Analysis Summary

Our macro analysis has revealed that the most influential actors in the global anti-corruption arena, are those who are also involved in global governance, the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transparency International, USAID, the United Nations, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe, and often have allegiances and obligations to their own regions or nations first. In the end, whether their aid, or anti-corruption schemes benefit the citizens of the developing country is determined by the motives and goals of their policies, and is outlined by how a government defines their own national interest. What is worse is that in the past the presence and authority that these agencies hold has allowed them to have the leverage to act on their own national interests rather than on the behalf of the host countries their programs are intended to aid, as in the case of the World Bank and IMF (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001 Perkins, 2004 et al.) in light of this behavior these actors would have to be placed in the pre-conventional stage (stage one) of Kohlberg's moral stages of development along with the kleptocrats that commit some of the most unscrupulous acts of corruption themselves.

Wide Analysis

In our wide analysis of education and it's interplay with corruption we will take a system-wide perspective that includes the supply and demand sides of corruption, that includes the entire infrastructure of the global economy as well as national diplomacy, non-governmental and even religious organizations and the interaction between them in societies as they interact with each other on a system wide level. (Ashford, Gioia, Robinson & Trevin, 2008) This wide global infrastructure certainly includes education and takes into consideration the supply and demand


side of corruption much like our micro analysis did where demographics pointed out individuals who were likely to be asked for a bribe.

Empirics and Widespread Corruption

No organized system can function efficiently as long as corruption is endemic, governments, businesses, non-profit organizations; Wall Street and even global capital markets rely on the faith of stakeholders to function. Even globally the world has trended toward a capitalistic model (Ashford, Gioia, Robinson & Trevin, 2008), that are founded on business functioning properly, a notion that makes corruption the primary enemy of efficiency.

Additionally, if the trust that stake holders place in any organization or regulatory mechanism falters, regardless of the initial source, the effects are often system wide. And yet, academics, global and local media and even individual citizens all acknowledge that the presence of corruption and scandal are widespread, pointing to the scale and scope of the problem.

Transparency International's global corruption barometer points out what elements of society are perceived to be the most corrupt on a global scale, and leaves little doubt of the wide range of corruption globally. This particular research sought the opinion of 55,000 people in 69 low, middle and high-income countries on a number of corruption based issues. The graph below indicates the results of this research in regards to which sectors and institutions are perceived to be the most corrupt.



Source: Adapted from Transparency International 2005

Reviewing this data points to the sweeping presence of corruption in societies around the world, placing political parties, parliaments, police and legal systems at the top of the list for the most corrupt, and putting non governmental organizations and religious bodies at the bottom of the list. Zuckerman’s (2006) review of the prevalence of cheating in the United States in everything from, business and taxes to sports and cable television, fuels the fire that is echoed in argument of David Kuzilva, a citizen of Tanzania, who pointed out the presence of pride in many developing countries that accompanies their rejection of the wealthier west’s solutions to local problems of corruption, often times despite their subsequent acceptance of aid, which is a great segue into our next point, who accepts that aid?

We just reviewed the figures from Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer that pointed to political parties and parliaments as the most corrupt sectors or institutions. It is in these very sectors where the leaders of society are found. In developing countries, we’ll look at the African continent, these leaders either have access to arenas that

allow them to acquire more education or they are selected because they are more educated. In any case, if we look at the make up of top political leaders on the African continent and compare that to literacy rates in them we see that African political leaders are considerably more educated than the poorer populations they serve (see Appendix 2 & 3).

If we consider the principle agent paradigm we would say that these political leaders are the agents and it would appear that the problems of moral hazard and conflict of interest where the agent pursues their own interests rather than the principal's interests is all too often played out. This scenario is more conspicuous when we look closer at the table of education among African leaders and see that these men and woman are often educated not only outside their home countries but quite often in developed western countries with predominantly capitalist, free market economies. The prevalence of corruption on the African continent (see Appendix 5) could be attributed to these men and woman being educated in systems that instill capitalistic, free market concepts of organizational operation that function well in developed countries where developed institutions, governance mechanisms, and transparency have strong roots, but merely give an understanding of business models that are used for private gain upon returning to their home. Ashford, Gioia, Robinson and Trevino (2008) recall an Aspen Institute study that showed that MBA graduates favored shareholder interests (or primarily placing emphasis on shareholder interest) much more strongly at the end of their MBA studies in America, and called into the question the sort of ethical leadership they were releasing into a society where corruption is so widespread. A simple perusal of recent world news shows that multi national corporations show little reluctance to push the boundaries of moral action in the international arena where the governing laws of their home countries don't apply. There are countless examples of corporations headquartered in developed free market economies lead by those educated in western countries

(perhaps along side their future African leader' counterparts) who have shown disregard for human rights and societal well being when there is a lack of institutional regulation or governance. For example Foxconn, a manufacturer of electrical components (notably electrical connectors for computer components) provides components to such upstanding western companies as Apple, has factories that have been described even by Chinese media as labor camps, detailing widespread worker abuse and illegal overtime not to mention numerous worker suicides that have even recently made news (Dean, 2010; et al.).

Studies of the direct relationship of education on corruption are few but recent work has shed light on the relationship. Cheung and Chan (2008) use Hofstede's four cultural dimensions as the exogenous independent variables to predict corruption through several endogenous independent variables (namely, educational, political and economical factors) to examine corruption perceptions in 56 countries and find that both enrollment in tertiary education (and gross GDP per capita) can strongly predict Corruption Perception scores. They state "As more people participated in tertiary education the lower its incidence of corruption across nations... the results of this current study indicate that the effort educators have put in teaching students to be morally and socially responsible persons has a noticeable effect" (p. 235). Also, work under way by Christian Bjørnskov (2003) at the Department of Economics Aarhus School of Business find a strong causal link between higher levels of social capital (including education as an indicator) and less corruption. He suggests that it is possible to build social capital through investing in education, other forms of social capital, some level of income redistribution and therefore reduce corruption; his work in European countries has produced interesting results thus far.

Wide Analysis Summary

Our wide analysis of corruption has revealed the system wide prevalence of corruption across the entire infrastructure of the global economy; diplomacy, non-governmental and governmental, western developed countries included. We have also found that leadership in developing countries (represented by Africa) almost invariably have considerably more education than the populations they serve, (see Appendix 2&3) and yet interestingly that as tertiary education rises corruption decreases. So, though higher education might cause corruption in cases, as in Africa where highly educated leaders steadily lead countries with the some of the highest rates of corruption globally, (see Appendix 5) it also reduces corruption as evidenced by the finding that tertiary education is negatively correlated with corruption perceptions. Perhaps it can be said that in cases where the disparity in education between the leaders of a country and the individuals in society is great, corruption is inclined to prosper.

Long Analysis

In our “long” analysis we will investigate the interplay between corruption and education over time. Since corruption has only been directly addressed in more recent history, starting with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in the United States, there is a dearth of history to investigate. However, if we consider corruption to be a culturally deep seeded social injustice, as endemic corruption is often described in under developed countries, there are other historical cases that can be considered and used for comparison.

Moral Suasion and Historical Change

One of these historical cases of deep seeded injustice in society is that of slavery in the United States prior to 1865 when it was outlawed by the 13th amendment to the US constitution. Though more direct measures were eventually taken to end slavery in the USA a large part of the success of its abolition was the wave of public opinion that changed as a result of the use of moral suasion by the few individuals who stood against the societal norms they believed to be morally wrong. Moral suasion is the act of trying to use moral principles to influence individuals, groups and even nations to change their policies. The beginning of the change that took place in societal norms in the USA was rooted in the use of moral suasion by individuals like; Lewis Tappan, James G. Birney, and William Lloyd Garrison. These individuals, through no small amount of effort and intestinal fortitude, awoke the American people to their heresy.

In what other system did exploitation of the defenseless occur more brazenly?

Where was sexual wantonness more rampant than in the debauchery by masters of their female slaves? Where was impiety more deliberately fostered than in masters' refusals to permit their slaves to read the Scriptures? Where was brutality more evident than in the master's heavy use of whips, or his willingness to dismember the slaves' ties of family? (Stewart, 2007 p. 5)

Although the eventual end of slavery required more than moral suasion alone, requiring civil war and large loss of life, moral suasion played a large role in bolstering support among citizens and awakening individuals to the disparity in their moral beliefs and the practices they

had allowed to become norms in society. Endemic corruption as a phenomenon can be likened to slavery in that; in both cases the societies and cultures' involved (in the USA and today in all nations where corruption is rampant) could find a disparity in the actions that were found to be social norms and their individual moral values.

Moral suasion is a tactic that has, through no small amount of action and at times individual sacrifice, achieved astounding results through out history. Yet, as an instrument for change it generally garners little attention from researchers aside from a few specific historical events, which is surprising considering the large role it plays in daily life, and it certainly has gained little to no attention in the world of anti-corruption schemas, though public and private pleas for change on moral bases have no doubt been used, moral suasion as a societal tool in the battle against corruption remains underutilized. Still, some examples exist; one of the biggest examples of its use is in the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), an initiative to encourage businesses worldwide to adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, and to report on their implementation. UNGC has been highly criticized for its lack of monitoring or enforcement, but clearly fully employs moral suasion as it appeals to the corporate world on a moral level.

Today the use of the term moral suasion has come to be largely associated with the fiscal policy used by the US Federal Reserve to encourage bank behavior through threats of certain action (also known as jawboning). But the definition of moral suasion is far boarder than that, for our purposes we'll define moral suasion as the act of persuading by appealing to one's sense of morality. There are no shortage of examples of moral suasion in history, its successes range from the abolition of slavery in the US to Canadian women's suffrage and more recently it has been seen on multiple occasions being used by American President Barak Obama in an attempt to

bring change in America on a number of cases with moral suasion rather than legislation (see Reuters, Mar 16, 2009). Ernesto and Pedro Dal Bo put it this way.

Instances of moral suasion are ubiquitous —they take place in religious ceremonies (avoid sin), political arguments (this policy is right), they are part of educational indoctrination (it is wrong to cheat), marketing strategy (buy fair trade), and the workplace (be a team player). This suggests that there might be room for motivation through moral appeals beyond what money (or other forms of compensation) can buy. (Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009)

The work of Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2009) finds that moral suasion does indeed effect behavior; with the caveat that its effectiveness also seems to depend on individuals expectations about mutual behavior among their peers. They also conclude their research by saying,

However, our results also indicate that the potential for persistent positive effects depends on the richness of the strategic environment in which moral suasion is used. In our experiment, the interaction of a moral frame and the presence of punishments appears important to sustain cooperation when moral messages or punishments alone could not do so (Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009, p. 20)

It is these final concluding remarks that point to the need for more than simple appeals to moral reasoning for change in moral conduct. They state that the results depend on the strategic environment in which they are used, which shows the need for more than simple moral appeal but also the proper environments, or arenas as Coleman (1971) and Falkenberg (1998) call them, a notion we'll explore further later-on in our long analysis.

If we consider the perspective of businesses in relation to moral suasion we can begin to see the way it requires internal will to comply, and the power that it can have on society.

Regarding moral suasion as an economic policy, J.T. Romans put it this way,

The sphere for moral suasion, or any other economic policy, is where individual profit-seeking activity does not maximize the national welfare, i.e., where the particular and the social interests diverge. Thus, moral suasion must encourage private economic units to undertake actions which are unprofitable and which they would not undertake otherwise (1966).

As we consider this point it seems relevant to revisit Kohlberg's stages of moral development and see the manner in which external pressure (through moral suasion) with only reason, and no power of enforcement, can be a driving force that brings about change, even though it may contradict the very foundations of a society, as in the case of capitalist countries. Could it be true that through the use of moral suasion a society can be pulled up stages in moral development merely by pressure from a determined contingent?

The Resource Arena Theory

The resource arena theory was created originally by Richard Coleman in 1971 during his work on race relations in America. Coleman stressed that individuals achieving desirable ends was dependent upon their access to different arenas where the resources or capabilities they possessed could be used (Falkenberg, 1998). Those arenas include schools in which to use their personal resources (academic achievement, job skills, degree of self efficacy, et al.), which allow citizens to achieve certain quality of life components. The idea of access to arenas (such as an education system) to utilize resources (such as talents and socio-economic situations) allowing individuals to better their quality of life brings us back to the point at the heart of reducing corruption, the betterment of individuals quality of life. Conveniently it opens the door for development organizations, such as USAID to make a larger impact than those who are intended to battle corruption alone because many times these agencies already possess significant resources man power and potentially current programming to provide the necessary arenas that the resource arena theory calls for in order to raise standards of living. For our purposes that arena is schools systems and the goal of higher education helps solve both the development organizations aim and that of the individuals they are “aiding”, while also building a foundation in society to fight corruption. So why is education funded on a lesser level than so many other programs for these large actors?

Sirkku Hellsten and George Larbi (2006) argue that while there are cultural differences in ethical and social norms, corruption is more likely due to social and economic realities and the disconnection between societal values and the values of formal public institutions. They question the argument that corruption is a cultural phenomenon, an idea they say allows western countries

to claim a change in culture is required to eradicate corruption, and challenge the view that the vagueness between public and private moral requirements in a particular country is really part of the differences in cultural understanding and tradition itself, and finally argue that it is more likely due to either social and economic realities or merely the self-interest of individuals. They conclude with the suggestion to use civic education to spread the values of public service, and the rights and obligations of citizenship more widely in society. (2006) This idea that corruption is not a cultural phenomenon but rather a result of social and economic realities ties together nicely with the resource area theory (Coleman, 1971, Falkenberg, 1998) and the social cognitive theory of learning. Bandura (1991) points out that internal moral self-sanction and moral conduct can indeed differ. He says,

Most of the recent psychological interest in the domain of morality has centered on analyses of moral thought. ... It is considerably easier to examine how people reason about hypothetical moral dilemmas than to study their actual moral conduct. The mechanisms governing the self-regulation of moral conduct involve much more than moral thought. (1991, p. 2)

If we consider the environment in which citizens are placed in under developed countries, it is not hard to understand the divergence that scholars have found between moral conduct and moral thought. One can know that stealing is wrong and even live by that standard on an individual level and act totally the opposite of that moral standard in the public realm (Hellsten & Lambari, 2006). A historical look at this in the US shows the lengths to which a society or

nation must go to reverse this kind of deep seeded social norm, and while historical research, the resource arena theory, and the social cognitive learning theory shed light on how this “heresy” can become a social norm the more important matter of how to begin reversing it can be found, at least to some degree, in the use of moral suasion where the collective moral self sanction that presides in all cultures of “GOOD” (see Falkenberg, 1996) is upheld over the contradictory societal norm of corruption that has been deeply reinforced and even rewarded over time in many societies.

Long Analysis Summary

So, the notion that we can actually affect people actions through the use of moral suasion, a technique that is largely unstudied but ubiquitous in societies and found all throughout history, along with the resource arena theory of Coleman and Falkenberg that says that individuals will achieve desirable ends given access to different arenas where the resources or capabilities they possessed could be used, such as schools, gives hope that societal change can come about. Clearly, moral suasion alone will not be enough, just as it was not enough for the abolitionist movement in the USA, to uproot such an entrenched social norm as corruption is in many under developed countries. Still, as research (see Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2009) and historical evidence reveals, as in the case of the abolitionist movement, moral suasion can effect moral conduct and perhaps just as importantly forge internal ownership toward a cause (such as fighting corruption) based on morals that as we have found previously in our micro analysis is needed for along term results in anti-corruption efforts.

Critical analysis

The weakness of this analysis is first and foremost that without the spanning the entire gamut of fields and theories within each discipline in relation to corruption there can not be a holistic picture of the arenas that are in agreement and those which are in contrast. This sort of a study would take considerably more man hours and better funded research to pin point more concrete results for comprehensive results regarding the interplay between corruption and education. Additionally, due to the nature of the fields involved in educational related outcomes conclusive research is extremely hard, if not impossible, to come by, in fact, the study of social sciences and educational theory are constantly in flux and in the case of approaches to educational theory different approaches have been attempted and reversed in the United States as recently as the beginning of the Obama administration. Still, time has shown that theory grounded in principle can indeed shape favorable societal outcomes. This study merely lays the groundwork for a new approach toward assessing individual phenomena and their effects on corruption as seen through the lens of various disciplines and draws together a modest set of information to assess education and corruption, some of which have been ignored by researchers, to gain new perspectives on fighting corruption. In the end this analysis became an attempt to address the lack of cooperation between those fields involved in the hopes of shedding light on the causes of, and solutions to, corruption so that we might be able to battle it more effectively in the future.

Conclusions

This research has found empirical, and theoretical evidence from an array of disciplines that supports narrowing the education gap between the general population and the highly educated leadership in developing countries will build the societal foundation that is needed for long-term success in anti-corruption schemes in developing countries. Furthermore the original hypothesis, H_1 : *Higher Education might lead to corruption in developing countries* was supported, based on the excessively higher education levels of leaders on the African continent (see Appendix 2) where the basic population has low levels of literacy, (see Appendix 3) and where corruption levels are among the highest. (see Appendix 5) But to say that H_1 was supported only tells half the story. There is also strong support that education, specifically tertiary education, is negatively correlated with corruption perceptions. From these specific findings which include a broad understanding of the phenomenon correlated with corruption, and a consideration of past and present anti-corruption schemes this article concludes that the gap in education between the average citizen and the highest country leadership will provide a meaningful measure for future corruption reduction in developing countries.

Perhaps just as crucial as the evidence for decreasing the education gap is the finding that an interdisciplinary collaboration on the multiple causes of, and cures for corruption is sorely lacking, and that in making a new model to include various disciplines from; psychology and criminology to economics and management studies (to name a few) in order to create a more cohesive, deeper understanding of the factors of an extremely complex phenomenon, we have made progress because, to put it plainly, our over emphasis of economic solutions has been unsuccessful. Moreover, this article reiterates the shared knowledge among researchers in

relation to corruption and change that the starting point in the battle against corruption is supporting the education of the people that make up societies in order to facilitate internal ownership of change. The very foundation of any long term change of societal norms must come from with-in that society, it can not be simply added on, and if a change is to take place for the good of a society it takes a sincere commitment to change by the high ranking officials and ordinary citizens. Outside influence has been ineffective in the long term, possibly because of the reluctance of outside actors to make long-term investments where results do not come quickly, or perhaps because they often have divided loyalties that thwart success. Also, an effective system of education is useless if the resources are not made available for those being educated to take advantage of its benefits, meaning governments, as well as relevant international organizations and NGO's, all need to be sure that the basic needs of citizens are met to a degree that allows them to participate in the arena of education provided. The most basic of needs is a prerequisite to a commitment to individual advancements such as education. Research done by Cheung and Chan in 2008 reveals that both enrollment in tertiary education and gross GDP per capita can strongly predict corruption perception scores. Additionally, support has been found that cultural dimensions are related to corruption perception, lending more weight to the argument that those individuals who have a the deepest understanding of the culture (the citizens themselves) are best equipped to address the unique complexities of specific cultural relations to corruption and therefore can be effective at the task of reducing it in their own country or region.

It is the findings of Cheung and Chan that highlight the great importance of education in the battle against corruption. They found that GDP per capita and Gross Enrolment in tertiary education could predict 80% of the variance in Corruption Perception in 56 countries. These finding also support the resource arena theory created originally by Richard Coleman in 1971

during his work on race relations in America. Coleman stressed that an individual achievement of desirable ends was dependent upon their access to different arenas where resources can be used (Falkenberg, 1998). One of those areas could be an educational system, which allows citizens to use their individual resources to achieve certain quality of life components. The idea of access to arenas (such as an education system) to utilize resources (such as talents and socio-economic situations) allowing individuals to better their quality of life is which is, after all, the point of reducing corruption altogether, for the betterment of individual's quality of life.

The hope is that in the future, researchers can use this framework to create a deeper understanding of the myriad of factors in connection with corruption globally and that the various disciplines involved with each respective corruption related phenomenon will share knowledge and grow toward the eventual success of anti-corruption efforts to snuff out the corruption that hold millions in poverty around the world.

Curbing corruption may prove the most formidable challenge of mankind to date, since in essence it is a battle against his own selfish desires that requires a shift to higher moral reasoning to conquer. Though laudable at times, the efforts of the main actors in the battle against corruption have proven insufficient, and at their worst have been reduced to the most basic stage of moral reason, which gives strong support to the idea that a grassroots effort driven by the internal will of the local societies is needed to bring long term corruption reduction. The ancient words of Lao Tzu, "Give a man a fish; feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish; feed him for a lifetime" could not be more relevant, and it seems that it is in the teaching (education) where the power lies.

Future Work

On the whole, this interdisciplinary analysis of education and corruption through various disciplines has brought up several questions. For example, what is the correct mixture of attention to education and regulatory and institutional reform in a successfully implemented long term corruption scheme, or since we have found internal will crucial, to what degree does a society need to feel ownership of the corruption initiative in order for social change to stick in the long term? In addition, future work should look into the success, or lack there of, of external interventionist organizations such as aid and development organizations versus putting efforts into halting the supply side of corruption perhaps with multilateral agreements that halt the flow of money into the hands of corrupt officials. These are studies that would greatly enhance our understanding of the effect of education on corruption, and are certainly inviting possibilities for future research.

Ideally future work would identify and asses each phenomena known to affect corruption using the an interdisciplinary model and create a collaborative notion of how best to battle corruption. The idea that an interdisciplinary model could be used to asses a phenomena's effect on corruption in a micro, macro, wide and long analysis could quickly point out disparities in currently held "truths" about corruption and more importantly foster a unified attack against corruption, an elusive adversary that is largely misunderstood and has existed far longer than our unsuccessful attempts to control it have. We must work collectively, across disciplines if we hope to progress in our battle against corruption in the future.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Importance of causes of public corruption

Importance of causes of public corruption and fraud				
Factors	Important cause			
	Higher income country		Lower income country	
	%	rank	%	rank
Norms and values of politicians and public servants	88.4	1	98.4	1
Lack of control, supervision, auditing	87.2	2	93.3	2
Interrelationships – business, politics, state	86.6	3	92.9	3
Values and norms concerning government/state	84.6	4	79.7	11
Public sector culture (values/norms)	83.3	5	76.8	12
Lack of commitment of leadership	82.2	6	90.2	5
Misorganisation and mismanagement	80.7	7	91.9	4
Increasing strength of organised crime	79.3	8	90.0	7
Norms and values [in] private and public [life]	78.0	9	73.7	14
Increasing significance of lobbying	76.5	10	72.9	15
Interrelationships – politics and administration	67.0	11	86.4	9
Social inequality	66.7	12	90.2	6
Low salaries in the public sector	56.9	16	87.1	8
Economic problems (inflation/recession)	62.2	14	85.2	10
(n)	(190)		(67)	

Source: Huberts 1998: 7

Appendix 2. African country leaders' educational details for the year 2008

* Where there was no known source to obtain the information the data was left blank

1. President Pierre Nkurunziza - Burundi Attended primary school in Ngozi province and secondary school in Kitega University of Burundi -he majored in education and sports.
2. President Sir Anerood Jugnauth, KCMG, QC - Mauritius Trained and worked in law and took an active role in the 1960s negotiations for independence. Called to the Bar in London in 1954
3. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf – Liberia College of West Africa, in Monrovia, BA in Accounting at Madison Business College in Madison, Wisconsin Diploma at the Economics Institute at the University of Colorado Master's Degree in Public Administration, Harvard University
4. President Colonel (ret.) James Alix Michel - Seychelles Trained as teacher later got involved in the booming tourism industry
5. President Pedro Pires - Cape Verde Elementary and secondary education at S. Filipe, Praia and S.Vicente. In 1956 he left to Portugal to attend Lisbon University of Sciences. However, before concluding his degree, he was called to serve in the Portuguese Air Force as an officer
6. King Mswati III a.k.a. Makhosetive - Kingdom of Swaziland Masundwini Primary School and Lozitha Palace School. He sat for the Swaziland Primary Certificate examination in December 1982 at Phondo Royal Residence, First Class with merit in Mathematics and English. Mswati is the first young cadet to join the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force (USDF).Sherborne School, England
7. President Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi - Libya Gaddafi received Traditional religious primary education and attended the Sebha preparatory school in Fezzan and was later expelled for his political activism. Law at the University of Libya, where he graduated with high grades. Military Academy in Benghazi in 1963 British Army Staff College, now the Joint Services Command and Staff College
8. President José Eduardo dos Santos – Angola, Awarded a scholarship in 1963 to study in the Soviet Union where he received a degree in petroleum engineering. Upon graduation in 1969, he stayed in the Soviet Union to continue his studies in Communications.
9. President Isaias Afewerki – Eritrea
10. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo - Equatorial Guinea Attended the Military Academy in Zaragoza, Spain.
11. President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira - Guinea Bissau Trained as an Electrician
12. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed – Somalia
13. President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé – Togo, Secondary education in Lomé Degree in financial business management Sorbonne, Paris Master of Business Administration degree The George Washington University United States.
14. President Dr. Thomas Yayi Boni – Benin, Educated in Parakou, and later studied economics at the National University of Benin. He studied banking at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, and later economics and politics at the University of Orléans in France and at Paris University, where he completed a doctorate in economics in 1976.

15. Educated in Parakou, and later studied economics at the National University of Benin. He studied banking at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal, and later economics and politics at the University of Orléans in France and at Paris University, where he completed a doctorate in economics in 1976.
16. President General (ret.) Amadou Toumani Touré - Mali Primary school in Mopti, Badalabougou Standard Secondary School in Bamako in order to become a teacher Joined the army and attended the Kita Inter-Military College.
17. President Colonel (ret.) Tandja Mamadou – Niger
18. President Paul Kagame - Rwanda Attended Ntare Secondary School in Uganda
19. President Blaise Compaoré - Burkina Faso Ecole primaire à Guiloungou (Ziniaré) Bachelier de l'enseignement secondaire, série D
20. President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh - Djibouti Highest level of formal education attained -secondary school
21. President Girma Wolde-Giorgis – Ethiopia, Attended an Ethiopian Orthodox Church school
22. Primary school in the village of Hoshe Bannaga, Sudan, primary & secondary education Khartoum, Joined the Sudanese Army and studied at the Egyptian Military Academy in Cairo
23. President Yahya Abdul-Aziz Jemus Junkung Jammeh - The Gambia
24. President Lansana Conté - République de Guinée, Educated at a local Koranic school and attended Dubréka primary school. He then went on to study at military preparatory schools in Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire and Saint Louis, Senegal
25. President Ernest Bai Koroma - Sierra Leone. Attended the Sierra Leone Church Primary School in Makeni, The Government Secondary School for Boys in Magburaka, Tonkolili District Fourah Bay College in Freetown, graduated in 1976
26. President Laurent Koudou Gbagbo - Côte d'Ivoire
27. President Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba - Namibia Attended an Anglican mission school I presume for both primary and secondary education
28. President Denis Sassou Nguesso - Republic of the Congo
29. President Abdoulaye Wade - Senegal Studied and taught law at the lycée Condorcet in France. He holds two doctorates in law and economics.
30. King Letsie III (original name David Mohato Bereng Seeiso) - Lesotho National University of Lesotho Bachelor of Arts Degree in law. Diploma in English Legal Studies at the University of Bristol in Britain. University of Cambridge where he studied Development Studies Wye College of the University of London where he studied Agricultural Economics.
31. President Armando Emilio Guebuza - Mozambique
32. President François Bozizé Yangouvonda - Central African Republic, Attended a military officers' training college in the Central African province of Bouar.
33. President Marc Ravalomanana - Madagascar


34. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali – Tunisia
35. Muhammad Hosni Mubarak – Egypt Bachelor's Degree in Military Sciences, Egyptian Military Academy
36. Abdelaziz Bouteflika – Algeria
37. President Paul Biya- Cameroon Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), Paris diploma in International Relations
38. President Robert Gabriel Mugabe – Zimbabwe Qualified as a teacher Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Fort Hare He then studied at the University of Oxford in 1952, Salisbury (1953), Gwelo (1954), and Tanzania (1955–1957). Mugabe subsequently earned six further degrees through distance learning including a Bachelor of Administration and Bachelor of Education from the University of South Africa and a Bachelor of Science, Bachelor of Laws, Master of Science, and Master of Laws, all from the University of London External Programme. The two Law degrees were taken whilst he was in prison, whilst the Master of Science degree was taken during his premiership of Zimbabwe
39. President Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama - Botswana Sandhurst Military Academy
40. President El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba – Gabon Secondary school
41. President Lieutenant General Idriss Déby Itno – Chad
42. President Bingu wa Mutharika – Malawi University of Delhi, India, master's degree in economics. PhD in development economics from unaccredited Pacific Western University, in Los Angeles, California.
43. President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua – Nigeria Government College, Keffi, received a Higher School Certificate from Barewa College Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria BSc in Education and Chemistry and M.Sc Degree in Analytical Chemistry
44. President John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor - Ghana Prempeh College (1954-58) LL.B Bachelors of Law , Lincoln's Inn, London (1959-1961) and Exeter College, University of Oxford (1961-1964) BA Economics , Philosophy and Politics.
45. President Joseph Kabila Kabange - Democratic Republic of Congo Secondary School in Mbeya Tanzania
46. Western Sahara
47. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni - Uganda Economics and Political Science University of DaresSalaam (I don't know if he graduated)
48. President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete - Tanzania University of DaresSalaam Bachelors Degree in Economics
49. President Mwai Emilio Kibaki – Kenya Economics, History and Political Science at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda Bachelors of Science with Distinction in Public Finance at the London School of Economics
50. General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz - Mauritania

51. King Mohammed VI - Morocco He attended the Qur'anic school at the Royal Palace where he learned the Qur'an by heart, and received a religious and traditional education. Primary and secondary studies at the Royal College B.A in law at the College of law of the Mohammed V University, Rabat. Certificat d'Études Supérieures (CES) in political sciences & Diplôme d'Études Approfondies DEA in public law. Trained in Brussels with Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission Doctorate in law (PhD) with "Very Honourable" distinction and the Congratulations of the Jury on 29 October 1993 from the French University of Nice Sophia Antipolis for his thesis on "EEC-Maghreb Relations."


52. The Late President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa - Zambia Law degree University of Zambia.

Source: various online sources including Wikipedia.org (<http://www.wikipedia.org>, 2010)

Appendix 3. Sub-Saharan Africa (selected countries) Illiteracy Rates, 2000




Appendix 4. Resource Arena Model




Source: Andrew W. Falkenberg's *Quality of life: Efficiency, Equity and Freedom in the United States and Scandinavia*, 1998

Appendix 5 CPI World map



Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008#dnld

Appendix 6. Interdisciplinary Model of Analysis



Model influenced by a special topic forum of the Academy of Management Review (2008)