

Britain's Alternating Immigration Discourse

An investigation of whether Britain's Immigration Discourse has gone in a circle since 2001 and if the media and the people have influenced government policy.

BRETT DAMON LANGRIDGE

SUPERVISOR

Erik Mustad

University of Agder, 2023

Faculty of Humanities

Department of Foreign Languages

Abstract

This thesis will investigate whether British immigration discourse has gone in a circle for the last 20 years. Following on from that, it will also attempt to determine whether the government's discourse and policy on immigration is heavily influenced by the other two powerful players, the media and the people. To do this, I will examine three speeches that are based solely on immigration from different times in this 20-year period. The first speech is by then Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005, the second is by Conservative home secretary Theresa May in 2015 shortly before she became prime minister, while the third is by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022. I will apply the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to these speeches. The way I will do this is to determine if the first speech and the third speech promote a similar ideology, whereas the second speech has a completely different one. The aim will be to establish that both the first and third speeches have a discourse that both promotes 'good' immigrants yet denigrates 'bad' immigrants, while the second speech would contrast to this with a very negative outlook on immigration. Along the way, I will also attempt to show that these three speeches and, subsequently the government's immigration discourse have been influenced by the other two players.

Acknowledgements

First, I'd like to thank the two most important people in my life, my wife Gjertud and son Leon. Also, thanks to all my friends and family both in Norway and beyond as well as Samfundet Skole who have supported me the last five years.

I'd like to say a big thanks to Erik Mustad, my supervisor. Since I've come to Norway, I've never met anyone who knows more about British politics than him, and he's the reason why this thesis is here today. Plus, we always have great chats.

I'd also like to thank all my fellow thesis students, both from the Shut Up and Write sessions and the 46 building. What a team we made. We always had each other's backs and made this whole adventure fun. Special mention to Simen and Lenke for their help. Also Heidi, Marcus, Tone, Carla, Adriane, Tom, Ane, Gunder and everyone else.

Thanks must also go to all the great teachers and staff at UiA. I never dreamed I'd be a student again, but you've made this process so enjoyable. Special mention to Allison, Luis, Susan, Michael and Charley who've given me help, tips and inspiration along the way.

Finally, thanks to both Colin Yeo and The Migration Observatory. Your fine work is what inspired me to write about this subject.

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Introduction

One of the hottest topics of debate in society today is that of immigration. It is an issue that divides people, with competing narratives and ideologies both for and against it. The United Kingdom is no exception. In Britain, while views differ, there has consistently been a mainstream immigration discourse that has portrayed immigration negatively. There are plenty of examples of how powerful the issue of immigration has been as well as reaction against it, with perhaps the most famous Enoch Powell’s ‘River of Bloods’ speech in 1968 (Powell, 1968). However, as I will show later, before 2001 Britain’s immigration discourse was relatively muted as for decades there was a policy of restriction and integration which meant that the country had ‘zero-migration’ (Somerville, 2007, p. 4).

However, the last 20 years has seen Britain’s immigration discourse become relevant again, which can be seen in the headlines from the tabloid newspaper *The Daily Express*, below:



Image 1- Daily Express Headlines (Clipshare, 2016)

Since 2001, the immigration discourse appears to have seen a new trend develop where it alternates back and forth between two different ideologies. The first ideology on one hand promotes legal immigrants, often for economic reasons, while, simultaneously, it scapegoats what is seen as undesirable immigrants on the other. It divides immigrants into what we can refer to as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The ‘good’ immigrants are praised and welcome, while the opposite applies to the ‘bad’. However, the second ideology, while still full of

praise for Britain's traditional tolerance and history of immigration, is, in essence, hostile to newcomers. It labels immigration itself as a major problem in society that is out of control and must be dealt with. Moreover, there appears to be three powerful players who have major influence over the direction that the immigration discourse takes. These three players are the media, the government, and the people. So, what this thesis will attempt to establish is that British immigration discourse has gone in a circle for the last twenty years. Following on from this, it will also attempt to establish whether the government's discourse and policy on immigration has been heavily influenced by the other two players: the media and the people.

Aims and Research Questions

Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. My aim is to use the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to determine the two research questions stated below.

1. Has British immigration discourse gone in a circle in the last 20 years?
2. Following on from that, is the government's discourse and policy on immigration heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people?

My expectation is that these two questions will closely tie into each other. The idea is that immigration discourse is not controlled by just one of the three players but rather involves a struggle in the battle over the power of language and subsequently how the language is used to sway the message. However, these questions are too difficult to answer with so much available information. Therefore, I have decided that the best way to approach this question is to examine three government speeches that focus solely on immigration from three different times after 2001. The first speech is by then Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005, the second is by Conservative home secretary Theresa May in 2015 shortly before she became prime minister, while the third is by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022. To prove my first research question, I need to demonstrate with CDA that both the first speech and the third speech promote a similar ideology, whereas the second speech has a completely different one. This would mean that both the first and third speeches will have a discourse that promotes 'good' immigrants yet denigrates 'bad' immigrants, while the second speech will contrast to this with a negative tone on immigration. Along the way, to prove my second research question, I need to demonstrate that the other two players have influenced these speeches and thus the government's immigration discourse and policy.

Methodology

I will use CDA to attempt to prove my research questions. Wodak and Meyer define CDA as “being fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse)” (2009, p. 10). There are countless examples of inequality faced by immigrants in Britain, and there is no doubt that some immigrants face discrimination, endure hardship and are treated unfairly. However, my focus will not be on what their own personal experiences are, but rather, why there is an immigration discourse that has allowed their experiences to be what they are. I will attempt to show that there are three powerful players that influence the landscape on immigration discourse: the media, the government, and the people. It is the relationship between these three players that I will examine. An important theme of CDA is that there is always a constant struggle for power (Fairclough, 1989, p. 43). It is this power struggle that I expect will play a pivotal role in both the ideologies of these three government speeches and the influence that the other two players, the media and the people, have on them and their subsequent message, as well as their resultant policy.

Structure

Therefore, the first way I will proceed is to find exactly how I will use CDA. After I discuss the theory of CDA, I will then look at criticism that it has received. However, as I will discuss later, CDA has flexibility, as “there is no single view of what CDA actually is” (Paltridge 2022, p 214). With this flexibility, I will establish my own personal blueprint for how I will apply CDA to the three speeches to best answer the research questions.

However, before I apply it to the three speeches, I need to determine why my proposed immigration discourse circle only started 20 years ago and not before. Therefore, I need to provide a historical background section to explain what the situation was previously like. This section will examine both the roots of today’s immigration discourse and what stands behind it, which is the triangular relationship between the three players. I will attempt to show that it is because of how that relationship between the government, the media, and the people has developed that has led to the current situation of the last 20 years.

After I have analysed the three speeches, I will have an analysis where I will compare the results. This will allow me to determine if my expectations were accurate. Finally, my conclusion will build on the analysis and provide an answer to my research questions.

Data

As I mentioned above, my main data will be the three speeches. The first speech is by then Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005, the second is by Conservative home secretary Theresa May in 2015 shortly before she became prime minister, while the third is by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022. However, I will also use other references along the way as I use CDA to analyse these speeches. Since I will try to show that the three speakers promote their ideology, an ideology that has been influenced by the other two players, I will need to prove that they consistently manipulate the facts to support their ideology as they promote their argument. This means I will use a variety of different sources to confirm whether the facts they present are accurate and if there are signs that they have deliberately left certain facts out.

Theory

As I discussed in the introduction, I will use the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to answer or discuss the two research questions about British immigration discourse.

CDA will be applied to the research questions with a focal point on the three government speeches I mentioned in the introduction and their relevant interaction with the other two players, the media and people. Therefore, it is important for us to establish exactly what CDA is, if it can be truly defined, and how I plan to apply it to this work.

Therefore, I will break this section up into three parts. I will first investigate what CDA is, including how it ties in with discourse. The second part will look at criticism of CDA. The third part will explain how I plan to use CDA in this thesis to best answer the research questions.

A Definition of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

In the introduction, I used Wodak and Meyer's definition of CDA for inspiration. The quote I used established that, in their opinions, CDA uses language to demonstrate "structural relations of... power" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10). In other words, CDA is used to analyse texts where they show that the language used demonstrates in one way or another a power relationship where one side is dominant, and the other side is not. This ties into the fact that, according to Norman Fairclough, all parts of language are part of society. As he says, "all linguistic phenomena are social..." but "not all social phenomena are linguistic..." (1989, p. 23). So, every word, whether written or spoken, is part of the social fabric of society, and the power relationships that exist in society are therefore reflected in language. However, how to apply CDA to that language is flexible as "there is no single view of what CDA actually is" (Paltridge, 2022, p. 214). Therefore, in my analysis of immigration discourse, I will use CDA to link the language with its social context, a context that we shall see is steeped in domination.

The overriding theme of CDA is that it links language with social and political issues, and it does this in the form of discourse. The question is, what exactly is discourse and how does it differ from language in general? Perhaps the best way to compare them is to see language as part of discourse. Fairclough describes discourse as "language as social practice determined by social structures" (1989, p. 17). To clarify, the 'language' could be a view on a certain topic, for example, disagreeing with immigration reform while taking a stance, which

could be conservative or liberal, within a certain domain, which in this case would be politics. This language, whether written or spoken, consists of what Fairclough refers to as “text” (1989, p. 24). However, language is just one part of discourse, as the ‘social practice’ involves the participants who exchange these ‘texts’, with one party that produces them and the other that receives them. Fairclough describes this as an “interaction” (1989, p. 25). An example of this could be a simple conversation in the street, an expression, or a newspaper article. Finally, we have ‘determined by social structures’, which is influenced by non-linguistic parts of society. Fairclough refers to this as the “social conditions of interpretation” (1989, p. 25). An example of this could be a country where social media is banned as opposed to where it is prevalent, such as the West. So, discourse is the whole package of language and what it entails, and it is this discourse that CDA analysts use to determine their findings.

Clearly then, analysts look for far more than the text they read or hear. They look to demonstrate the ‘social practice’ of this language within its ‘social structures’. This is, in essence, proven through discourse, that the language contains examples of a power structure, normally hidden. Fairclough and Wodak have presented 4 main principles of how CDA analysts use discourse in their work (Fairclough & Wodak, as cited from Paltridge, 2022, p. 214):

1. How social and political issues are constructed and reflected in discourse.
2. How power relations are negotiated and performed through discourse.
3. How discourse both reflects and reproduces social relations.
4. How ideologies are produced and reflected in discourse.

What these ideas share is that they all examine the ‘interaction’ that occurs between the party that produces the text (for example, the speaker) and the one that receives it (for example, the listener). Fairclough refers to this process as “interpretation” (1989, p. 26). The analysts will then go a step further and find an “explanation” for why the ‘interaction’ is the way it is in its social, and indeed political, context.

The central theme of CDA is that there is a battle for power going on. “Power... is never definitely held by any one person or social grouping because it can be won and exercised by social struggles in which it may also be lost” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 43). What this quote clearly shows is that discourse, including immigration discourse, is not only the scene for a fight for control, but that this fight for power is fluid. So, those who have won can never stop fighting, even if it is a fight that is barely visible to most. Therefore, except for a government

that bluntly uses military force, the goal for most at the top is as much about how to subtly maintain power as well as to attain it. Moreover, this must be done in a way that is so smooth that most people barely notice that anything has happened. This is known as ideological power.

Ideological power is a vital part of discourse. It is “the power to project one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 33). This is striking, because when we think of common sense, we intrinsically think that it is exactly as it sounds, as something that should be obvious to everyone irrespective of what political view they may have. But as Fairclough notes, “‘Common sense’ is substantially... ideological” (1989, p. 84) Moreover, the word ‘ideological’ is based on ideology, and ideology is an “implied assumption” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 2). This implies that if something that is taken for granted such as common sense is actually based more on ideology than peoples’ own sensibilities, it would not be too difficult for those with power who control the discourse to influence how people think about all different types of issues.

Ultimately, CDA analysts investigate who controls the discourse. Whether in politics or socially, ideological uniformity is never achieved (Fairclough, 1989, p. 88), as there is, as I have just demonstrated, a constant “struggle” with different opinions and ideologies floating about. But within this linguistic battle, there is an effort to establish an ideology and to control it. The discourse that wins out is known as the “dominant” one, and for politicians this means “controlling the contours of the political world, ... legitimizing policy, and ... sustaining power relations” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 90) There are times when an ideology becomes so “dominant” that it comes to be seen as natural, while other dominated discourse types are suppressed. This process is known as “naturalisation” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 91).

However, even when a successful discourse has become naturalised and established as common sense, the struggle to maintain it continues, especially if there is more than one powerful protagonist. Therefore, the fight for control never ends. There are many ways a protagonist can try to control and manipulate the discourse. I have made my own blueprint for how I will use CDA to attempt to show how our three speakers do this in their battle over the immigration discourse, which we shall see shortly.

To summarise, CDA examines discourse to determine how powerful actors can manipulate or utilise their control both socially and politically. They use a variety of different means to control this discourse, in this case immigration, which I shall examine in detail in this thesis. What is consistent is their need to both establish and then maintain power. While

there is always a struggle going on between discourse types, the winner is able to naturalise their discourse to such a degree that their ideology becomes the dominant one. This battle never ends, as there is always a balancing act to maintain and control this discourse.

Criticism of CDA

It is important, however, to note that CDA has not been without its critics. As mentioned above, there is no single view or interpretation of what CDA's meaning is. That might be both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it gives CDA flexibility. On the other, it gives critics of CDA more ammunition against it. This has led many critics to question not only the motive of CDA analysts, but also the validity of their actions. A major part of this comes down to interpretation. CDA has traditionally been far too reliant on both the analyst's personal interpretation of the text and their political leanings, which are generally to the left (Breeze, 2011, p. 516). Van Noppen notes that CDA focuses too much on who a text is aimed for, and not enough on the reader themselves (2004, p. 120). Widdowson also finds that CDA is too strictly focused on the analyst's views while it neglects those of the producers and consumers of the text (1995, as cited from Paltridge, 2022, 224). This is not to say that they find any interpretation of a text possible. For example, a text that is read by one analyst to be anti-immigrant cannot, in most cases, be read as pro-immigrant by another. But too much weight is put on the analysts' results of one text, as if it is fact.

These critics agree that to make CDA less one-dimensional, a more constructive approach is needed. There needs to be a way to incorporate both the producers and consumers of the text, instead of just a one-sided analysis of the text. Without this approach, a CDA analyst's work runs the risk of accusations of bias, particularly as it is well-known that many proponents of CDA are left-wing (Breeze, 2011, p. 501). Therefore, the best way to deal with this is to take a well-rounded approach to the sources that are being analysed. This means we need to investigate not just the texts, but the context of wherein they are produced, the purpose behind them and indeed the background behind them.

How I Plan to Use CDA

I will compare three speeches that are all the same discourse type, speeches. In all three speeches I will consistently use CDA as I attempt to answer the research questions. Therefore, I will investigate if British immigration discourse is going in a circle. In an

attempt to find out, I will look to establish that both the first and third speeches have a discourse that promotes ‘good’ immigrants while it simultaneously demonises ‘bad’ ones, while, conversely, I will attempt to show that the second speech contrasts greatly with a downright hostile tone to immigration. Along the way, I will also attempt to illustrate that these speakers have been heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people, in the battle over the power of language.

However, before I start with CDA, I will show how the relationship between the government and the two players has come to the point it has with a historical background section. There’s a reason why the government must account for the two players when it comes to immigration discourse, but this wasn’t always so straightforward. This section will give a short build-up not only of the roots of this triangle but why it exists to begin with.

I will then proceed to the three speeches. As a prelude, I will briefly provide some relevant context of both the speech and the speaker. After this, the speeches will be divided into sections where I will apply a different feature of CDA to them. There can be some overlap between the different sections, especially between power in discourse and ideological power, an idea Fairclough describes as “the complementary concept” (1989, p. 89).

The first section will look at how the text is organised. I will have a quick review of both the contents of the text and the order of events. This will help to see how the text is framed and how the author positions themselves to present their argument, the stance of the opposition, and, under the surface, the ideology that they promote.

The next section will examine what Paltridge calls foregrounding, which is what concepts, issues and ideologies are being emphasised (2022, p. 221). We can often see when the speaker foregrounds their themes by a clear presence of agency. What is agency? Agency revolves around the perpetrator, or agent, of the action in a sentence. To put it technically it means that the grammatical subject is also the semantic subject which means the sentence is active (Johnstone, 2018, p. 55). A simple example of when agency is clear would be “John eats the panini”, as “John” is the clear agent as both the grammatical and semantic subject. However, the speaker does not need agency to emphasise their point. They can also use what’s known as non-transactive sentences (Johnstone, 2018, p. 55). This can be passive, like when the grammatical subject is the semantic experiencer, such as “The panini was eaten.” However, it’s possible to leave out both the semantic subject and object and use the subject form of the verb instead, like, for example, to replace the verb immigrate with immigration. This is known as nominalization (Fairclough, 1989, p. 51), such as “immigration creates

problems”. So, whether active or not, I will show what the speaker foregrounds in their speeches.

However, the next section will show when the speaker tries to be less obvious because there is an ideological struggle over control (or maintenance) of the discourse with the other two players. Therefore, to re-establish dominance they will use ideological power so that they can project their practices as universal and common sense. They will do this in as sensible and natural a way as possible. As Fairclough says, “Naturalization is the royal road to common sense” (1989, p. 92).

The next section is power in discourse. This can be seen by the way the speaker promotes their narrative while they hide or omit any information that they don’t want the other actors, who are particularly constrained in this discourse type, to see. So, what this means is that the agent, in this case the speaker, is quite happy to show the consequences of an event without showing causality, which means who is responsible for it (Fairclough, 1989, p. 51). This is because the speaker can disguise their power as well as control the content of the speech to ensure that the discourse that they promote portrays them favourably. The non-powerful participants, on the other hand, have limiting “constraints” placed on them (Fairclough 1989, p. 48).

However, there are times when hidden power has to be less subtle, perhaps because of the stance of the other players. This means the speaker must take a more pro-active approach. One such technique the author will use is backgrounding, the playing down of negative information to suit their discourse (Paltridge, 2022, p. 221). However, the speaker may find it far easier to deliberately neglect to mention that negative information to begin with. In other cases, agency will be placed onto convenient scapegoats to deflect any possible blame. In some cases, the speaker may mention the scapegoats far more than themselves.

The next section will see another popular technique, power behind discourse, such as whether they try and constrain the listeners with formal language or win them over with informal. “Formality” is a way to exclude people that have no power (Fairclough, 1989, p. 66). However, formality can, of course, go both ways. One of the features of the tabloid media we will see later is their ability to be informal, and thus inclusive. Part of that informality is to use words that strike a chord with constrained audiences. So, we will also check for the use of particular words or metaphors or loaded words. The speaker will use these words as they know that they may have strong connotations to the players and help win over their support in their immigration discourse.

Finally, I will look for any examples of repetition. Repetition fits in well with naturalisation in the struggle for the dominant ideology. As Johnstone says, “Patterns of words that occur together over and over ... may convey implicit messages that readers and hearers are not consciously aware of...” (2018, p. 62). So, the speaker will recycle many of the same words for effect. Another technique they may use is to use certain words in tandem with other words which may cause these keywords to change meaning. Therefore, I will look out for examples of this, known as collocation (Johnstone, 2018, p. 63). One type of repeated keyword that the speakers will often use to support their stance is modal verbs. These words can also have different expressive values, like how the word ‘may’ can have an expressive value of either possibility or permission (Fairclough, 1989, p. 128). What these words share is that they are a tool for the speaker.

To conclude, I will have a summary of all the different sections.

Historical Background

We have now established the CDA theory that I will use in this thesis. I have discussed how my research questions will use three speeches to examine if British immigration discourse has been going in a circle in the last 20 years and whether these speeches have been heavily influenced by the other two players in the battle over the power of language and, subsequently how that language is used to sway the message. First of all, however, it is important to understand what lead to the creation of this modern discourse circle that has moved back and forth between these different messages. Therefore, I will introduce some brief historical background that will shed some light on how Britain's current revolving immigration discourse came to be established as well as the roots of the interactions between the government, the media, and the people.

The Roots of Britain's Revolving Immigration Discourse

The first point I will address is one I made in the introduction where I noted that the dominant ideology about immigrants in the past, before 2001, has generally been negative. I will now go into more detail to show that this is the case. The history of immigration to Britain over the centuries of both white and non-white peoples is vast, and far too large a scope for this piece. Therefore, I will have a quick summary. Before 2001, Britain was not a country that traditionally encouraged immigration. There were some temporary schemes like the European Voluntary Worker Scheme after World War II, but this was an exception and it failed to fulfil its purpose (Somerville, 2007, p. 14). Nevertheless, immigrants still came, sometimes in large numbers. The government's reactive approach to managing immigration contained two aspects: restriction and integration. There are plenty of examples of both. The history of restrictions goes back centuries with the first recorded parliamentary debates about 'foreigners' in the 1660s (Somerville, 2007, p. 12). From that time there are countless examples, such as the 1793 Aliens Act (Somerville, 2007, p. 12) or the 1914 and 1919 Acts (Somerville, 2007, p. 13) or the acts that came after the start of the 1948 mass Commonwealth immigration like those in 1971 and 1982. Simultaneously, while these reactive acts limited, often severely, the number of immigrants allowed entry, the attempts at integration can be seen in the race relations acts that were passed in 1965, 1968 and 1976, the last of which led to the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality (Somerville, 2007, p. 14). The reasons that these two approaches were taken has remained constant: the negative or perceived negative reaction of the other two major players, the people and the

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media, to large numbers of immigrants. And there have been many examples of such negative reactions, such as the race riots in Liverpool in 1919 (BBC News, 2022), or the Teddy Boy-inspired race riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham in the late 50s (Bhandhukravi, 2008) or those in Southall after a few racist murders in the 1970s and 80s (digitalworks51, 2014, 15:16), to name a few. Therefore, the motivation for the traditional ‘restriction/integration’ approach is clear to see. Van Dijk notes that Britain, particularly its media, is unusually focused on the issue of race, as well as immigration, compared to other countries (1991, p. 115). However, this also reflects the strength of voice that non-white people have, and they appear to be proportionately much more involved in British society.

However, my second point shows that, despite its obsession with immigration, the numbers before 2001, the starting point for the period I will cover, do not reflect the perceived reality. The chart included below demonstrates this.

Population of the United Kingdom (2020 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Country's Share of World Pop	World Population	U.K. Global Rank
2020	67,886,011	0.53 %	355,839	260,650	40.5	1.75	281	83.2 %	56,495,180	0.87 %	7,794,798,739	21
2019	67,530,172	0.58 %	388,488	260,650	40.1	1.84	279	82.9 %	56,012,276	0.88 %	7,713,468,100	21
2018	67,141,684	0.62 %	414,223	260,650	40.1	1.84	278	82.7 %	55,521,226	0.88 %	7,631,091,040	21
2017	66,727,461	0.65 %	429,517	260,650	40.1	1.84	276	82.5 %	55,025,421	0.88 %	7,547,858,925	21
2016	66,297,944	0.66 %	437,798	260,650	40.1	1.84	274	82.2 %	54,529,375	0.89 %	7,464,022,049	21
2015	65,860,146	0.75 %	480,068	260,046	40.0	1.87	272	82.0 %	54,035,311	0.89 %	7,379,797,139	21
2010	63,459,808	1.03 %	634,371	437,881	39.5	1.86	262	81.1 %	51,469,697	0.91 %	6,956,823,603	21
2005	60,287,954	0.46 %	272,929	198,445	38.7	1.66	249	79.9 %	48,178,255	0.92 %	6,541,907,027	21
2000	58,923,309	0.34 %	198,171	102,672	37.6	1.74	244	78.7 %	46,365,434	0.96 %	6,143,493,823	21
1995	57,932,453	0.28 %	159,612	41,089	36.5	1.78	239	78.4 %	45,427,516	1.01 %	5,744,212,979	19
1990	57,134,391	0.25 %	144,168	19,752	35.8	1.84	236	78.2 %	44,683,287	1.07 %	5,327,231,061	15
1985	56,413,553	0.07 %	40,876	-19,499	35.4	1.78	233	78.5 %	44,263,815	1.16 %	4,870,921,740	15
1980	56,209,171	0.02 %	11,368	7,824	34.4	1.73	232	78.6 %	44,157,482	1.26 %	4,458,003,514	14
1975	56,152,333	0.21 %	115,776	21,283	34.0	2.01	232	77.8 %	43,667,185	1.38 %	4,079,480,606	13
1970	55,573,453	0.49 %	266,521	-16,971	34.2	2.57	230	77.2 %	42,903,762	1.50 %	3,700,437,046	12
1965	54,240,850	0.70 %	374,050	28,614	35.1	2.81	224	77.9 %	42,259,485	1.62 %	3,339,583,597	9
1960	52,370,602	0.51 %	261,340	13,993	35.6	2.49	216	78.5 %	41,130,617	1.73 %	3,034,949,748	9
1955	51,063,902	0.18 %	89,578	-83,006	35.1	2.18	211	78.8 %	40,241,373	1.84 %	2,773,019,936	9

Source: **Worldometer** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. [World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision](#). (Medium-fertility variant).

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Chart 1 Britain's Modern Net Migration History

Let's look at the fifth column, ‘Net Migration’. Just to clarify, net migration is the difference between the number of permanent (at least a year) arrivals and departures from a country (Yeo, 2022, p. 16). So, if a country has a million immigrants and half a million

emigrants, the net migration figure would be 500,000. Therefore, it goes to reason that a country that has had large scale immigration, like Britain had from the Commonwealth after 1948, would have large numbers of net migration. Yet, strikingly, the numbers say quite the opposite. This demonstrates that, during a lot of these time periods, far more people left Britain than arrived. It is only from the year 2000, and to a lesser extent, in 1995, that there is a clear change. The net migration numbers go up markedly to the degree that by 2010, net migration was nearly 440,000.

This shows that until the mid-nineties, towards the end of John Major's reign, Britain had zero 'net migration'. However, what this graph doesn't show is how post-war immigration has shifted the demographics of the UK. On one hand, pre-war Britain was far more diverse than the dominant ideology suggests, with evidence that large numbers of non-white people have integrated into the British population since Elizabethan times (Hirsch, 2018, p. 259). Furthermore, class was far more important than skin colour in British society until the late 1800s (Anderson, 2013, p. 26). The issue of race itself is a manufactured one that was created at the peak of the Empire, and even during these times, the contemporary discourse reacted more negatively to regional differences rather than racial ones (Ward, 2004, p. 70). Nonetheless, the 1948 Commonwealth immigration changed the view of how Britain saw itself as a predominantly 'white' country, and the latest statistics show that 18 % of the population is non-white (Race Disparity Unit, 2023). It is difficult to predict future numbers accurately, but if current trends continue, Britain will be 1/3 non-white by 2050 (Hirsch, 2018, p. 311). As I will demonstrate shortly, this fact has and continues to cause anxiety among both the media and the people.

This leads to the question of why immigration increased so dramatically from the late 1990s. The main reason is policy. The most important reason is that Tony Blair's New Labour government recognised the value of immigration in a way that previous governments had been afraid of. This previous reluctance to encourage immigration stems from the fear of a negative reaction, and this meant that for many decades Britain was the world's only major industrialised country that had 'zero-migration' (Somerville, 2007, p. 4) despite having a large minority population. However, Labour's ascension to power represented a clean slate to this approach. This was especially the case after their second landslide win in 2001. Labour not only made it far easier for immigrants to come to Britain but leading officials like Immigration Minister Barbara Roche also adjusted the dominant ideology. Politicians like her

stated publicly and openly that a ‘competitive’ Britain needed to attract the world’s “brightest and best talents” (Somerville, 2007, p. 30), a break from traditional immigration rhetoric.

Background of the Interactions between the Government, the Media and the People

Now that I have established how Britain’s immigration situation changed dramatically twenty years ago, it is time to look at the background to the relationship between the three players controlling the dominant ideology on immigration: the government, the media, and the people. Firstly, let us start with the media. I noted above how obsessed the British media are with immigration/race. But this supposed obsession is actually part of a much bigger game to establish a dominant ideology that supports having a Conservative government (The tabloid exception is *The Daily Mirror*) (Thomas, 2007, p. 62). The question is what measures the media take to control the discourse. One measure that has been used is to turn from a broadsheet to an informal tabloid. There are two reasons for this. The first is influence. The power of the populist tabloids is so strong that they can influence government policy. For example, former Labour government spokesman Alastair Campbell acknowledged that for a government to succeed they had to please the right-wing tabloids (Somerville, 2007, p. 137). The other reason is economic survival. Two of today’s main tabloids, *The Daily Express* and *The Daily Mail* were losing so much money in the 1970s that they had secretly concluded that the only way they could survive as broadsheets was if they merged (Thomas, 2007, p. 68). As a result, they both became tabloids and their technique of winning over their audience was to have a sense of ‘permanent outrage (Thomas, 2007, p. 68).

However, tabloids use different techniques depending on how strong their position is. They can either be ‘spectators’ or ‘players’ (Thomas, 2007, p. 6). A tabloid becomes a ‘player’ when they promote their discourse and use all the tools at their disposal to do so. An example of this would be when *The Sun* used disparaging headlines in the 1992 and 2015 elections with embarrassing pictures of the Labour candidates Neil Kinnock and Ed Miliband respectively. On the other hand, a tabloid becomes a ‘spectator’ by sitting on the side-lines even though it doesn’t want to. An example would be when *The Daily Mail* endorsed the Conservatives in the 2001 election, but knowing full well that Labour would win, it hid its endorsement in the middle pages surrounded by strong criticism of the Tories (Thomas, 2007, p. 139). They can also alternate between being sympathetic to a cause or against it. A good example is with asylum seekers/refugees. Khosravanik notes that when they want to portray

them in a positive light, they use a technique known as extensivization (2009, p. 485). This is when tabloids provide personal details to reflect their sympathy to them, such as in Kosovo in 1999. Conversely, when the tabloids want to show refugees as a threat, such as their arrival in the United Kingdom in large numbers, their tactic is to provide far less details. They ‘dehumanise’ them by presenting them simply as numbers and statistics (Khosravanik, 2009, p. 489). They go back to being a ‘player’, where they use populism, scare tactics and other tools to promote their ideology against them. The question then is, why would the media change their approach? The answer lies in a far less active partner: the people.

The people may be less active in their approach to immigration, but they are no less important. They are the reason why, as mentioned above, broadsheets have turned into tabloids and tabloids have promoted a sense of ‘permanent outrage’. They are also the reason the media sometimes has to revert to being a ‘spectator’ rather than their preferred role as a ‘player’. The media may try to manipulate and coax the people, but they go against the people’s desired ideology at their peril. For as powerful as the tabloids may be, they are completely dependent on the people to buy their papers. There are many examples of the consequences of tabloids ignoring the people’s wishes. For example, in the 1997 election, *The Express* paid the price for remaining steadfastly loyal to the Conservatives by losing a fifth of their readership (Thomas, 2007, p. 132). They decided not to make the same mistake again in the 2001 election by supporting Labour, albeit it only as a reluctant ‘spectator’ (Thomas, 2007, p. 138), before jumping back towards the Conservatives led by Michael Howard’s anti-immigrant rhetoric.

But who exactly are the people? I should clarify that when I refer to the people, I do not mean every person in the UK who is not a first-generation immigrant. As I pointed out in the Theory Section, individual people have many different views, and this leads to an internal power struggle to establish a dominant ideology. The people I refer to here are the group who both the right-wing tabloids and the government appeal to and depend on for their support. They are the people who are most likely to buy the tabloids and most likely to vote. They are the ones who are most alarmed by what they see as the transformation of ‘their’ country from a predominantly white one to one where they may one day be a minority. Not surprisingly this group has a large amount of anxiety, even if it is misplaced. For example, surveys conducted in 2011 showed that schoolkids thought 47% of the population was foreign-born when the numbers were only 13% (Taylor, 2015). To clarify, this refers to first generation immigrants, not non-white British people. It is therefore hardly surprising that surveys have

consistently shown hostility towards immigration. Moreover, public misconceptions, supported by the dominant ideology, have shown that this hostility is constant, regardless of whether immigration is high or low. For example, in 2003, when the current period of high net migration was well under way, surveys showed that 75% of people had an issue with immigration. Yet in 1995, long before our period started, the dissatisfaction was still 66% (Somerville, 2007, p. 132), a negligible difference. Furthermore, while they are a small minority, studies showed consistently for decades after 1948 that about 10% of the white population were opposed to the very presence of the non-white population (Ward, 2004, p. 115). While this has changed over time, and non-white Britons have become established, it shows that there is still a strong racial element that the people have with immigration. Sentiment changes over time, and this is reflected in the most recent survey that showed that only 42 % want immigration to be reduced (Ballinger, 2022), even though immigration levels have remained steadfastly high.

As a result of the two players' pressure, the government's response has often been to use the same 'tabloid' terminology that they feel will address the media and the people's concerns. Whether it is former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher or former defence secretary Michael Fallon's use of the dramatic metaphors "swamped" and "siege" (Jeffries, 2014) or current Home Secretary Suella Braverman's reference to asylum seekers as an "invasion" (2022), the decision by officials to deliberately use this terminology shows that they are locked in a three-way battle to control the discourse on immigration.

Conclusion

To conclude, this section has demonstrated that while mass immigration to the United Kingdom is not new, what sets the last 20 years apart from the rest is that Britain is now a land of high net migration. This has led it into an internal linguistic conflict between the three players about immigration, one that has helped bring about a new, and possibly alternating, immigration discourse. I will use the next sections to analyse the three government speeches to attempt to determine whether this discourse has become circular as well as to establish whether it has been influenced by the other two players: the media and the people.

Tony Blair's 2005 Speech

The third speech that I will examine is the one given by Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005. I will often cite his speech as I analyse it (Blair, 2005). In keeping with the research questions, my focus is twofold. I will use CDA to primarily look at how Blair portrays immigrants, while I will also look for signs of whether Blair leads the immigration discourse or if he has been forced to accept his position due to the influence of the other two players, the media and the people.

Background Information

The first speech that I will examine is the one given by Tony Blair in April 2005 right before the General Election. This was 8 years into the life of the New Labour government and in the wake of two landslide elections. Tony Blair won comfortably over John Major in 1997 and William Hague in 2001. Neither were much of a threat despite Hague's efforts to make political capital out of asylum seekers (Ahmed, 2004, p. 122), and Blair's advisor Alastair Campbell secretly referred to Hague as "useless" (2007, p. 365). Meanwhile the next Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith, who had been brought in with much fanfare, was forced out by his own MPs before the 2005 election (Tempest 2003). His successor, Michael Howard, however, was far more successful, and it was clear that, in this election, Blair had more of a fight on his hands. Unlike his Conservative predecessors Howard resonated better with voters partly due to his ability to capitalise on the issue of immigration. We have already seen previously how much immigration had increased after Labour came to power. Over time this caused a strong reaction from the other two players. By 2003, 75 % of the people had a major issue with immigration, while far-right groups like the BNP became prominent as a grassroots anti-immigration and at times openly racist party that had started to have some electoral success at local levels (Tetteh, 2009). The media was able to manipulate the people's frustration and go back to being an assertive 'player' again, rather than a 'spectator'. Indeed, when it comes to immigration generally, the media feels particularly more emboldened than it does on other policies to the degree it feels it can control the agenda (Somerville, 2007, p. 135). Howard was able to exploit this issue to his advantage in the election campaign. This prompted the following speech from Blair that we will now explore step by step. Along the way, my expectation is that Blair's immigration discourse will praise 'good' immigrants and be critical of 'bad' immigrants.

The structure of Blair's immigration discourse

Firstly, let's see how Blair has structured his speech to frame his argument. By far the longest of the speeches, what's unusual is that Blair positions this speech, which followed the election "launch", to be exclusively about one issue, "asylum and immigration". Normally a manifesto lays out all the different planned policies of the government (UK Parliament, 2023). Clearly, a perhaps reluctant Blair feels he must address this separately.

Then Blair posits what will be one of the recurring concepts of his speech, "Concern over asylum and immigration is not about racism. It is about fairness." This is a tacit acknowledgement to the other two players that he now accepts that immigration is an issue.

Blair then nearly apologises to the players when he says "We are listening." However, rather than accept responsibility, he implies that, contrary to appearances, he has "been working hard" on immigration all along before he concedes "we have to tighten the asylum system further" with "strict controls".

Blair then appeals for unity and says he doesn't want it to be "an issue that divides our country" despite the irony that his efforts to "unify" the country will divide immigrants into 'good' and 'bad' ones.

Blair then attacks the Tories' obsession with immigration. They "have gone from being a one nation party to being a one-issue party", a reference to historical "One Nation Toryism", where the 'patrician' Conservative Party focused on Britain's collective well-being (Mustad et al., 2018, p. 79). Blair frames the Conservatives as "Afraid to talk about the economy, embarrassed by the sheer ineptitude of their economic plan, unable to defend their unfair and elitist NHS and schools policies", and "unable to explain how they would finance the extra police they are promising". Blair posits their immigration stance as a "joke".

Blair notes that the issue of 'bad' immigrants is not easy to resolve. Nevertheless, he lists a variety of places he's visited, actions he has taken, and brand-new technology like "biometric visas". He also complains about those who have helped 'bad' immigrants to succeed.

However, Blair goes further in his quest to win over the players. He concedes that Labour lost control of 'bad' immigrants but has now regained it. He's also adamant he will not budge on welcoming 'good' immigrants. He acknowledges immigration is much higher but says it's vital for Britain's "strong and growing economy". Blair also uses opponents as shields from undesirable facts, like when he says "Michael Howard himself admitted...

“There are no official estimates of the number of illegal immigrants...” This implies the Tories are no better on immigration.

Blair then renews his focus on the Conservatives and “the position we inherited from Michael Howard as home secretary in 1997”, an attack that conveniently neglects that that was eight years and two terms ago. He continues to selectively blame Howard before he concludes “Step by step, we've been working to deal with this legacy.”

Blair then provides a long list of his successful actions that he has taken to control ‘bad’ immigrants before he radiates about more technology like “x-ray equipment to scan every lorry” and newly established positions like Airline Liaison Officers.

Blair then disparages the Conservative’s lack of support. Blair notes “the Tories have often done their best to block our proposals, seeking opportunistically to cause us the maximum short-term difficulties in getting our legislation through”, even though this should be irrelevant with Labour’s large majority.

Blair then promises that “we will build on the changes and improvements already made” to make life more difficult for ‘bad’ immigrants. Besides more personnel and technology, it will be far harder to be a ‘good’ immigrant as “we will restrict the right of settlement to skilled workers... phase out low skill migration schemes...” and “end so called chain migration with no immediate or automatic right for relatives to bring in their own dependents”.

Blair takes a final shot at the Tories as he notes “the specific Tory proposals simply don't add up”. Sometimes he derides their lack of details. Conversely, when details are provided, he attacks them, like the “flagship Tory asylum policy: the fantasy island to process asylum claims”, which foreshadows the future Rwanda policy. Blair’s constant portrayal of the opposition as incompetent culminates in “the most extraordinary Tory... claim by Michael Howard that he could achieve all of the above while... halving the amount that the government spends on the Immigration Service.”

Finally, Blair lauds ‘good’ immigrants’ contribution, both from today and the past. He highlights the “million and a half Irish migrants to this country in the 19th century; the 120,000 Jewish people who came here before the first world war... the 160,000 Poles who settled here after the second world war, soon followed by large numbers of Italians and then workers from the West Indies and South Asia and, more recently, significant migration from other European countries within the EU.” They are “part of the rich fabric of our nation...”, and “without them London would not be the financial capital of Europe...” and “how would

the NHS actually work?” He also praises the “generosity of the British people”. Blair posits that the way to solve immigration’s challenges is “not ignoring... and not exploiting... but dealing with the issue... that is our pledge.”

Foregrounding

What view/stance on the discourse of immigration control is promoted? What concepts, issues and ideologies are being emphasised?

The first view on immigration discourse that Blair foregrounds is that he will now take immigration seriously. The fact that he uses an election campaign speech solely about immigration is striking. Clearly, Blair is on the defensive over the issue when he says “Concern over asylum and immigration is not about racism. It is about fairness.” In a very active speech, this is a rare instance of a non-transactive sentence with “concern” a nominalization. We saw above how Immigration Minister Barbara Roche had promoted immigration as part of government policy. Now the proverbial boot is clearly on the other foot as Blair appeals to win back the other two players as he says “People also want to know that those they elect to government get it. That we are listening. We do get it. We are listening.” This shows Blair’s acceptance that the government hasn’t listened to the players, but they do now.

He has little choice. Besides their 75% dissatisfaction with immigration, perhaps the strongest factor that effected the people was Labour’s surprising decision in 1999 to distribute asylum seekers across the country instead of their traditional concentration in big cities like London (Threadgold, 2009, p. 7). This had a huge impact because many traditionally homogenous places, such as the Northeast of England, ended up having the largest numbers of asylum seekers (Walsh, 2023), while the diverse southeast ironically had the least. What this meant is that places that were relatively unaffected by previous waves of immigration now encountered demographic changes to their areas very quickly. So, combined with how the media will always turn to migration when the opportunity arises (Threadgold, 2009, p. 4) and Michael Howard’s successful embrace of the issue, Blair has undoubtedly been forced to accept this pushback. Therefore, he continues to foreground that immigration control is now important with statements like “I also understand concern over immigration controls”, and “It is the duty of government to deal with the issues of both asylum and immigration.”

However, despite this, Blair emphasises that he's really taken the issue of immigration seriously all along with countless measures. For example, he and his government are the clear agents when he proclaims, "we've legislated to make it an offence to enter the UK without a valid passport", "We have doubled the number of immigration officers", and "We have introduced stricter border controls and invested millions", to name just a few. Even when Blair concedes mistakes, like with high "asylum application numbers" he still portrays it as a victory that he has fixed so that the numbers have dropped "twice as fast as... Europe". Blair stresses he has long been busy "talking to a huge range of people involved at every level of the system", to highlight how he's always been pro-active about immigration. This is also implied in his regular use of progressive verbs, like when he says, "we will go on building strong controls... improving systems... returning illegal immigrants".

Although Blair has clearly been forced to accept immigration as an issue, one ideology he will not negotiate on is legal immigration. There may be a lot of pressure from the players, but, for Blair, immigration is vital for success. Blair praises 'good' immigrants who make "such a major contribution to our economy" and are here "rightly and necessarily". Blair finds that legal immigration is vital "to help ensure our economy gets the skills we need" while he highlights that "our diversity is a source of strength, not weakness, a reflection of a modern country striving to be at ease with the modern world." Blair continues this link between the success of the economy and the vital contribution of 'good' immigrants to it. So, when he admits that "more people are entering the UK", he doesn't play this down but, rather, embraces it as "that's precisely what one would want and expect with a strong and growing economy". He notes that with Britain's relatively low unemployment and "600,000 vacancies, there are plenty of jobs that need doing".

However, for Blair to successfully foreground that he both takes immigration seriously yet encourages legal immigration, there must be a group that he pushes back against. Therefore, Blair targets 'bad' immigrants as the real problem. He uses very unflattering language to describe them. Some of it dehumanises them as if they are objects, like when he refers to their numbers as "difficult to measure", or how there is a team "who track down illegal immigrants" and are tasked with "loading them to flights home". When he does refer to them directly, it is only negatively, such as when he refers to "the problem of asylum seekers destroying their identity documents to prevent removal." Of course, the long list of measures from above are all aimed at 'bad' immigrants, and they do have consequences. As a result, today, Britain has a sizable irregular migrant population of roughly

700,000-1.2 million (Walsh, 2020). They are not part of the official population. Despite their claims being rejected, they come from designated countries where they can't be returned (Walsh, 2023) such as Iran, Iraq, Eritrea, Syria, and Afghanistan. As a result of these policies, many of these families, who include British citizens, have been forced into poverty (Yeo, 2022, p. 297-300). Yet what's striking is that while he praises the people as "hard-working taxpayers" and 'good' immigrants for how they "drive our knowledge-based economy", not once does he praise 'bad' immigrants or even give them sympathy.

Finally, Blair portrays the Conservatives as completely useless. He does this in two ways. Firstly, he blames them for the current situation, which is a result of the Tories' negative "legacy" that he's had to dismantle. He suggests that they have tried to impede his attempts at "tightening the system" as Labour's immigration proposals are "often in the face of" Conservative opposition. Even admitted weaknesses, like his "not nearly good enough" deportations numbers, are still "twice as good" as what the Tories achieved. Secondly, he denigrates the Conservatives as shameless opportunists who have no other policies. He uses slogans like "this one-issue campaign" and mocks them as a "one-issue party". He implies that the only reason that they focus on immigration is that their other policies are so weak. He uses descriptive adjectives to highlight how they are both "afraid" and "embarrassed" about their economic plans, how their health and education plans are "unfair and elitist" and how their "extraordinary" figures don't add up. Blair implies that immigration is all they've got.

Ideological Power

What examples can we see that the speaker projects their practice as common sense to promote their position?

Now let's see how Blair uses ideological power to project his practises as universal and common sense. Firstly, Blair implies that he and his policies occupy the safe centre ground, whereas the Conservatives are extreme. While he rationally deals with "the issues of... immigration", it "should not be exploited by a politics that, in desperation, seeks refuge in them", a clear swipe at how the Tories will gladly lurch to the right if it helps them to win. He takes this further when he says, unlike the opposition, "we never use these issues as a political weapon, an instrument of division and discord." To suggest that the Tories will shamefully divide people and "exploit people's fears" demonstrates that they are no longer the 'patrician' party but an opportunist and potentially extremist one driven by panic, whereas

Labour are the calm but effective party that “deal with” issues “with care, responsibly and recognising that... our diversity is... strength, not weakness.”

Furthermore, Blair uses ideological power when he implies that he is not afraid to deal with even the most difficult of issues. For example, he responds to the Conservative campaign that “it isn’t racist to talk about immigration”. The slogan, a Conservative attempt to curry favour with the players, is meant to imply that Labour conveniently suppresses the topic with the mantra that any discussion about immigration is inherently racist. Accordingly, Blair responds that “I know of no senior politician who ever said it was” and stresses that the Conservative’s suggestion that Labour ignore immigration discourse “for reasons of political correctness” is wrong “when actually the opposite is true.” The way he disassociates “racist” from “anti-immigration” helps Blair to claim the coveted centre ground that Michael Howard has fought to take. This takes the sting out of Conservative’s attempts to manipulate the immigration discussion to their own ends.

Another way that Blair projects his practice as common sense is the way he has deftly divided immigrants into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Because he has created two types of immigrants, he is able to make political capital out of ‘bad’ ones. However, whereas the Conservatives have picked on all immigrants, Blair is also able to come across as a friend of immigrants. This gives him the best of both worlds and allows him to portray himself both as compassionate and strong. For example, he implies that he wants to ensure that immigration is not “an issue that divides our... communities against each other. We are a tolerant, decent nation. That tolerance should not be abused. But neither should it be turned on its head.” So, Blair projects an image that is welcoming and tolerant of immigrants. Yet, he doesn’t apply this “tolerance” to ‘bad’ immigrants who he refers to as “child abductors, thieves and bomb hoaxers”. Likewise, Blair maintains this balancing act as the rational leader who calmly takes the required action “one by one... without alarmist rhetoric”. However, his language around ‘bad’ immigrants is strikingly “alarmist” with terms like “weeded”, “root out”, “smuggling”, and “crack down” to name a few.

Power in Discourse

How does the speaker use selective facts/Hidden Power to promote their discourse to their constrained audience?

One of the ways that Blair selectively promotes his discourse is the way he hides the fact he’s done relatively little about the issue of immigration until now. For example, Blair

states “I have been out to see for myself what has been happening, talking to a huge range of people”, as if this equates to actual immigration legislation. He continues with technical and specific job descriptions of all these important people, “From the immigration officers checking passports at Heathrow, to the staff who fingerprint asylum seekers at Croydon, to the team who track down illegal immigrants in North London, to those responsible for redocumenting failed asylum seekers and actually loading them to flights home.” Blair’s copious discussions with these varied “people” may impress a constrained audience. However, this “talking” does not mean that Blair has increased the measures he has taken against ‘bad’ immigrants, nor is it obvious what these measures would be. However, Blair can imply that he has sensibly established good relations with the relevant immigration people, a fact that neither the constrained players nor even the opposition will be able to dispute.

Furthermore, Blair adroitly shows how busy he has been on immigration. He sounds exhausted when he says “I’ve lost count of the meetings I have chaired on this issue, and the number of people in the system I have met”. However, he’d only need to ask his strategist Alastair Campbell how many meetings, if any, he has had as he kept extensive diaries (2007, p. xiv). So, this deceptively makes Blair’s approach to immigration look pro-active instead of reactive.

Another way Blair is selective is his manipulation of the facts. For example, he downplays the rise in “asylum application numbers... after 1997”, with his suggestion that “they did in much of the rest of the EU”. He also blames “external pressures” yet never says what these are. Fittingly, he also omits to mention that this rise happened in 1997 after the Conservatives had been replaced by Labour. So, when he pats himself on the back that “we have legislated to address the situation and the numbers have fallen rapidly... from over 8,000 a month” back “to just over 2000”, he glosses over the fact that it was under his watch that these numbers quadrupled to begin with. While it may sound impressive that the numbers have now “fallen twice as fast as in the rest of Europe”, beneath the surface, immigration restrictions were clearly not Labour’s policy when they came to power. This ties in with another policy against ‘bad’ immigrants, removals. Blair states that Labour “doubled... immigration officers” so they could “double” the “return” of “asylum seekers” to one “removal... every 3.3 refused applications”, twice as good as the “6.6” they “inherited”. He’s accurate about the “12,430 removals in 2004”, a number that passed 20,000 in 2005 (Walsh, 2022). However, this ignores his own admission that the overall number of ‘bad’

immigrants was vastly higher. In 1997 there would have been far less ‘bad’ immigrants to deport. A sixth of a small number is far better than a third of a very large number. Also, there is conveniently no mention of how many ‘bad’ immigrants were regularised to remove them from the statistics.

Another way Blair is selective is how he implies that ‘bad’ immigrants get benefits that they aren’t entitled to. In an effort to resonate with the other two players, he says “People feel it’s unfair if they have to work hard, but see others getting benefits or help they’re not entitled to.” However, asylum seekers only get the right to “benefits” when they have a legitimate claim. Once a failed asylum seeker has used up all their appeals, they are not entitled to any government support (Gibney, 2011).

Blair also exaggerates the difference his legislation against ‘bad’ immigrants will make. For example, his new law ensures that people “from countries which are manifestly safe, like Slovakia, Bulgaria, or Jamaica, can now only appeal against a refusal once they have left the UK.” Yet, two of these are EU countries. Slovakia had free movement from 2004, while Bulgaria would join this later (Gower & Hawkins, 2013). Conversely, Jamaica seems a bizarre target as it’s a relatively small Commonwealth country of 3 million and has the British monarch as head of state. Furthermore, even the government’s own website says that it is not “safe” (GOV.UK 2023). Even then, this doesn’t alter the facts that most asylum seekers don’t come from “safe” countries but, rather, from certain designated countries (Walsh, 2022) that they can’t be returned to. Moreover, Blair trumpets the success of his new policy that makes it illegal “to enter the UK without a valid passport”, yet most irregular migrants are visa overstayers or failed asylum seekers (Walsh & Sumption, 2020) who can’t be removed. Only 2.4 million out of 150 million annual travellers to Britain will need a visa, hardly a noticeable difference (Yeo, 2022, p.101).

Finally, Blair tries to play down the whole immigration discourse with his claim that Britain is “not a high immigration country”. This is misleading on several fronts. First, he mixes ‘net migration’ with ‘high immigration’. If Britain hadn’t had high immigration in the 1950’s, the population would have plummeted as net migration was always negative. While we saw that Britain later became a land of ‘zero’ migration, this all changed under Blair. Furthermore, Blair tries to play down how much Britain has changed under his stewardship when he says the country has less “foreign born” people than other wealthy countries like France, Germany and the US. While this may be true, it was still 5.3 million in 2004, or roughly 8.9% of the population (Sumption, 2015), higher than many neighbouring countries.

Moreover, he deceptively says “net migration... has actually been falling in recent years, and in 2003 was the lowest it has been since 1998.” However, the European accession was in 2004 and Blair clearly expects many more Europeans to come as he plans to “phase out low skill migration schemes” that were previously used for non-EU migrants. Nor does he mention how much the population has grown from 1997 to 2005.

Backgrounding and Scapegoats

Can we see examples of the speaker backgrounding anything negative or using scapegoats?

The irony of Blair’s speech is that he has used the immigration backlash to focus on ‘bad’ immigrants. However, he has completely backgrounded the main issue that the other two players have a problem with, which is immigration itself. The players may have issues with ‘bad’ immigrants, but they also have problems with a system that allows so many ‘good’ immigrants. This is especially the case for the people in places that were previously homogenous, like Merthyr Tydfil in Wales, where immigrants met hostility and “extreme prejudice” despite the local newspaper’s attempt to provide pro-immigration coverage (Threadgold, 2009, p. 9).

The media also assertively took a hostile approach to immigration. For example, The *Daily Mail*’s article ‘Immigration and the demonising of decency’ used “populism” and “scare tactics” (Khosravinik, 2009, p. 489) to dehumanise immigrants. Instead of individual portrayals of immigrants that would invite the people to understand their personal stories, it referred to these immigrants in quantity, such as “huge numbers” or “unlimited”, that presented them as a threat. Furthermore, the article presented non-immigrants as the “beleaguered majority”, represented by their champion Michael Howard who fights in the face of “political correctness” to defend them. “Beleaguered majority” probably means ‘white British’ people, but, either way, what is clear is the level of hostility to immigration generally. The media has clearly reverted to its role as a ‘player’ again, and now they have the momentum, they are clearly not going to let up. For example, the Daily Mail praised Michael Howard for ‘standing his ground’ on immigration, one of many articles that showed their support for him on this issue (Khosravinik, 2009, p. 490). To give an example of the reach of the media, even people who don’t buy them can’t help but be influenced by them as they pass their headlines every day at local shops. Below is an example of how this works.



Image 2- Typical Newsagents
(AP Photo, Cliff David, 2022)

However, as we have seen, Blair has embraced ‘good’ immigrants, so he has little choice but to background this. When he does mention it, he says “more people are entering the UK” than before his reign, but he suggests “that’s precisely what one would want”. Notably, he hides the large numbers with the word “more” which sounds more harmless.

Since he has backgrounded overall immigration, he tries to deflect attention over to ‘bad’ immigrants. As the media’s immigration coverage always revolves around ‘control’ (Threadgold, 2009, p. 10), Blair targets anything that enables ‘bad’ immigrants. He accuses ‘bad’ immigrants themselves when he refers to “the problem of asylum seekers destroying their identity documents to prevent removal.” He blames the system that has “hampered” immigration officials “when it should have been helping them”. He scapegoats the lawyers and legal system when he says, “we’ve limited the scope of legal aid, and we’ve weeded out cowboy immigration advisers.” “Cowboy” here has a negative value, connected to very cheap or poor-quality service (Macmillan Dictionary, 2023). The irony is that it is the government that provides legal representation to those who can’t afford it (GOV.UK, 2023). If these lawyers were “cowboys”, they probably wouldn’t have had enough success with their clients for Blair to mention them. Another additional scapegoat is the “courts” who “aren’t taking” ‘bad’ immigrants “seriously”. Finally, he castigates the “employers” who hire them.

However, Blair scapegoats the Conservative party most. He suggests they're no better than Labour on illegal immigration when he says "Michael Howard himself admitted... 'There are no official estimates of the number of illegal immigrants'". He also complains that the Tories "opportunistically" hinder Blair's immigration legislation to make Labour look bad. He claims that because they are so incompetent on all their other policies, they are "left with this one-issue campaign on asylum and immigration." It is as if Blair blames the Tories for immigration's challenges. Fittingly, however, not once does he target his own MPs. With such a huge majority, Blair could have easily passed restrictive legislation years before.

Power behind Discourse

How does the speaker use power behind discourse such as formality/informality or connotations of particular words/metaphors to support their immigration discourse?

As the discourse type is a public speech, the tone is very informal. The main way this can be seen is Blair's constant use of "we". Occasionally he uses this as a sign of inclusion and collectiveness for the players like when he says, "we are a tolerant, decent nation", or "we are not a high immigration country." However, this is rare, as he mostly uses "we" to refer to his government. Sometimes it is on the defensive, like when he asks, "Why do they say we 'pussy foot' around on this issue". However, it mostly asserts what the government has done or will do, like "The progress we have made comes from being clear", or "we will build on the changes and improvements already made."

However, one notable example of when Blair is more formal is when he uses the word "one" instead of "you". This would make more sense if Blair never used the word "you", yet he uses it five times. The reason why he does this can be seen in the quotes themselves. Firstly, he uses "one" when he defends increased immigration with "that's precisely what one would want and expect with a strong and growing economy." He uses "you" when he refers to the Conservatives, like when he says "you might at least expect them to have a coherent policy on it", "Under Michael Howard, asylum applications rose- by 13% if you compare his last 12 months as home secretary with his first", "You would have expected... that Mr Howard and the Conservatives would have supported these changes", and "So the next time you see a Tory poster, or the next time you hear a Tory spokesman squirm". Clearly, he uses "you" to appeal directly to the players to talk down the Conservatives and Michael Howard. However, when he promotes an opinion that he knows the players will reject, like high

immigration, he does not talk to them directly. Rather, he backgrounds this with his use of “one”.

Blair also frequently uses metaphors to support his discourse. Perhaps the most dramatic is when he says the Tories’ immigration policy is “an approach... that Labour would have looked askance at in 1983, let alone any election since.” Although he doesn’t mention him by name, this is a reference to former Labour leader Michael Foot and a comparison with Michael Howard. Foot had a disastrous election campaign from that year when the party’s manifesto was known as the “longest suicide note in history” (Vaidyanathan 2010). Another comparison is when he refers to the people as “hard-working taxpayers who deserve to know that others are playing by the rules.” On one front, this is an attempt to praise the people. Of course, not all the people are necessarily “hard-working” or “taxpayers”, and, indeed, most British jobs are professional (Annual Population Survey, 2022), but it is clearly an attempt to win them over. Conversely, his suggestion that they “deserve to know that others are playing by the rules” suggests that some immigrants have cheated these “rules”. Moreover, not once in this speech does Blair refer to ‘bad’ immigrants as “hard-working”.

Blair also consistently uses colourful language, like when he says that the issue of immigration is “hard to tackle, as if he’s a defender in a football match. Some of his expressions are strong, like his description of Conservative policy as a “joke, an incoherent babble”. However, his most loaded words are used against ‘bad’ immigrants with nouns like “child abductors”, “thieves”, “bomb hoaxers”, “clandestines” or a “source of unfounded asylum applicants” and verbs like “weed”, “crack down” and “tighten”.

Collocation and Repetition

Any examples of collocation to promote ideology about immigrants? Or repeated words/phrases to drum home a point.

We can see how Blair promotes his ideologies in the discourse by the way he both recycles words and uses them with other words. One of the most prominent examples is the way he consistently uses the word “economy” when he refers to ‘good’ immigrants. He drums home their economic value when he offers that they are vital “to help ensure our economy gets the skills we need” and that “the many who come, rightly and necessarily, for our economy, to work, study or visit here can do so”. Often “economy” is accompanied by words like “contribute”, like when he praises ‘good’ immigrants “who make such a major

contribution to our economy”, “We will not turn our back on these or other migrants contributing so much to our economy and our society”, and “Foreign students alone contribute £5bn to the UK economy”. Other times it is associated with words like “growing” and “strong”, like when Blair notes immigrants are needed “to build the strong economy” or when Blair stresses that higher numbers of immigrants are “precisely what one would want and expect with a strong and growing economy”.

Blair also consistently recycles words for his attacks on the Conservatives that imply that they manipulate the immigration issue. One common example is “exploit”, like when he describes their campaign as “an attempt... to exploit people’s fears”. He says that the Tories should not be “exploiting the issue but dealing with” it in the correct way. Another example is “opportunistically”, like his accusation that the “Tories have... done their best to block our proposals, seeking opportunistically to cause us the maximum short-term difficulties.”

He also consistently uses the same words when he focuses on ‘bad’ immigrants that are generally used to give a negative impression of them. One notable example is “fair” and “unfair” like when Blair notes that “People feel it’s unfair if they have to work hard, but see others getting benefits or help they’re not entitled to.” Sometimes “fair” appears near “concern” like when Blair says “Concern... is about fairness.” Blair also often uses words like “listen” and “hear”. Sometimes, it’s to acknowledge the players, like “we are listening”. Other times it’s to show how involved he is like when he’s been “listening to those who we ask to keep our borders secure and giving them the right rules and the right tools to do the job”. He also uses these words to show how much he’s learned about the issue of ‘bad’ immigrants like how he “heard... of asylum seekers destroying their identity documents.”

Blair also repeats modal verbs to underline his position, normally with a clear agent. One example is “can” with its expressive value of ability. For example, Blair says “the issue is... what more we can do to crack down on illegal immigration.” However, the modal verb he consistently uses the most is “will”, with its expressive value of a promise and this is almost always active. For example, he asserts “We will put in place strict controls that work”, “we will go on building strong controls to protect our borders”, and “we will use technology to help us”. He does not use the modal verb “must”, with its expressive value of obligation, although he comes close to it when he says, “we know we have to tighten the asylum system further”. However, “have” is generally an auxiliary verb (Huddleston & Pullum, 2018, p. 39), which is how Blair actively uses it. Statements like “we have been working hard at it”, “we have been legislating on it”, “the progress we have made”, and “we have changed asylum

procedures and laws” are all used to promote Blair’s past yet hidden achievements against ‘bad’ immigrants.

Summary

Through CDA I have established that Tony Blair’s discourse portrays legal immigration positively. However, Blair clearly has been forced to respond to a backlash from both the players and the opportunistic opposition against immigration. As a result, this speech comes across as both defensive and on the counterattack. On one hand, Blair takes a strong, non-negotiable position on ‘good’ immigrants, who he defends and praises to the hilt. On the other hand, he tries to deflect all the players’ blame onto ‘bad’ immigrants. He also regularly attacks the “one-issue” Conservatives who he implies are only conveniently focused on this one issue because their other policies are useless. However, Blair fails to address the players’ main motivation, high immigration, with the hope that the measures that he takes against ‘bad’ immigrants, as well as proposed new rules that will make it harder to be a ‘good’ immigrant, will be enough to appease them. The reality is that ‘bad’ immigrants only make up a small percentage of immigrants generally, and even if they were all removed or regularised, the issue would not go away. In fact, it would be worse, as Blair would not be able to use ‘bad’ immigrants as a shield against the players’ main target, immigration. So, this speech comes across as one by a pro-immigration Prime Minister who has been reluctantly forced to address the issue, an issue where we can see the roots of how toxic it will become.

Theresa May's 2015 Speech

The second speech that I will examine is the one given by Theresa May at the Conservative Party Conference in October 2015 when she was still the Home Secretary. I will continuously cite her speech as I analyse it (May, 2015). In keeping with the research questions, my focus is twofold. I will use CDA to primarily look at how May portrays immigration, while I will also look for signs of whether May takes charge of the immigration discourse or if she has been forced to accept her position due to the influence of the other two players, the media and the people.

Background Information

The political landscape was very different to 2005 and just a few months after the 2015 General Election where Prime Minister David Cameron had led the party from a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to a small outright majority. There were many notable features of this surprise victory. The Liberal Democrats were mostly wiped out, the SNP's emergence in Scotland negated any possible Labour gains while the ascendant UKIP failed to make any inroads despite a 9.5 % rise in their share of the vote (BBC News, 2015). However, arguably the main reason the Tories won was because Cameron had promised that any future Conservative government would have an EU referendum. The primary reason that Cameron made this promise was pressure from UKIP. The party had stunned the UK with a majority at the 2014 European elections, the first party to win that wasn't Conservative or Labour in over 100 years (Osborn & Faulconbridge, 2014). UKIP appealed to the people who felt exasperated by what they saw as uncontrolled immigration and a political elite that failed to listen to them. Their leader, Nigel Farage, won over BNP voters who had an issue with immigration but didn't want to vote for a perceived racist party (The Telegraph, 2022, 31:41). Therefore, Cameron's referendum promise helped his party win, but the battle had just begun, with a key weapon immigration. However, just before this speech, another dramatic event had occurred, the tragic drowning of the Syrian Kurdish immigrant Alan Kurdi (Devichand, 2016). This further muddied the waters for May's immigration discourse. My expectation is that it will generally be negative towards immigration as it tries to appease the other two players.

The structure of May's immigration discourse

Firstly, let's investigate how May has structured her speech to frame her argument. Her introduction does not start immediately with the immigration issue, but rather commences with her praise of the previous speaker Baroness Helic as a prime example of a former refugee who has now become a 'good' immigrant by her full integration into British society. She follows this with a lengthy tribute to a recently murdered police officer. What this achieves is it positions May as someone who is fair on immigration, strong on law and order but also compassionate.

May then proceeds to address immigration, particularly the Syrian crisis "2000 miles away". She details the suffering of the divisive crisis with eleven million displaced, four million refugees and 250,000 killed but says that while Britain will do what it can militarily, it is "too simplistic to say that there is a single intervention..." and there is "no easy solution to the civil war in Syria."

May then presents her main argument. While she is "proud of the difference we are making" which includes a paltry number of refugees, she stresses that larger numbers of refugees are not the answer. To her, the best action is to instead donate large amounts of material things such as money and food, and she highlights how generous the UK has already been.

May then starts a pushback against the claimed "'great age of migration'". She suggests, with no evidence, that everyone, "from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left", conflates refugees with economic migrants. She says "we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country" as she targets these 'bad' immigrants. She takes a strong stance against most immigration generally "Because when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it's impossible to build a cohesive society."

So, May not only favours strictly controlled migration but comes up with examples of how she's effectively limited it. However, she concedes that immigration has since doubled again under her watch. Rather than accept her share of responsibility, she blames a variety of scapegoats. However, notably, she doesn't blame the main culprit, which is the EU's free movement. Rather than accept that legal European migrants are attracted by available jobs, she instead blames what she perceives as the attractive benefits system.

She admits that her goal of "reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that's no reason to give up. As our manifesto said, 'we must work to control immigration

and put Britain first””. It may be a coincidence, but Britain First is the name of a far-right, anti-immigrant group (ADL, 2017). May frames her argument that only with limited immigration can Britain take more refugees.

While May states her position, she continues to find scapegoats to blame for immigration, such as the “system”. She then rejects the idea of a common European approach to migration with one of her most notable lines, “not in a thousand years!”. Ironically, shortly after she proposes a new “international approach”.

After more complaints about immigrants, May proposes tougher ways to stop them, particularly those who’ve managed to make it to Britain on their own. She wants a new definition of what a ‘good’ immigrant is and reiterates that Britain can only be more generous when it has stopped the ‘bad’ ones.

She then concludes, similarly to Blair that “we have until recently always been a country of remarkable population stability... of gradual, moderate, sensible change”, but then, ironically comes up with a list of refugees through the ages who’ve come in large numbers. She finishes with “For the people who need our help and protection the most, let Britain be a beacon of hope,” which is striking, as according to the rest of this discourse, most of them won’t be allowed in.

Foregrounding

What view/stance on the discourse of immigration control is promoted? What concepts, issues and ideologies are being emphasised?

The first concept that May foregrounds is a warmer side of herself. While she wants to show agency on immigration, she doesn’t want to come across too negatively as her speech was badly received in some quarters like the Institute of Directors who condemned its “irresponsible rhetoric”. Therefore, May balances her ‘crack down’ on immigration with the concept that she is still the ‘good’ immigrants’ friend. For example May describes Baroness Helic as “From Bosnia to Britain, from arriving here as a refugee to serving the public in government and in the House of Lords, your story is an inspiration to us all.” Another example is how she concludes with pride in how Britain has “always been able to show great responsibility to the people who need our help in their darkest moments: the country that accepted the Huguenot Protestant refugees from France, the Jews escaping the pogroms of Russia and the persecution of the Nazis, the Asians of Uganda expelled by Idi Amin.” Furthermore, May notes that not only has Britain already “granted asylum to more than 5000

Syrians”, but “We’ve also created a resettlement scheme to find- working with the UN- the most vulnerable refugees in the region and bring them to our country”. The numbers that will be resettled will be “20,000 Syrian refugees”. So, May foregrounds her compassion and care for those worse affected by the crisis.

However, the other ideologies she emphasises are much more hostile towards immigration and reflect May’s other, more determined side. May notes that while she wants to help, “the best way of helping the most people is not by bringing relatively small numbers of refugees to this country but by working with the vast numbers who remain in the region” a rare use of the passive voice in what is a very active speech. This establishes two purposes. First, she makes it clear that only “relatively small” amounts of people will be allowed to come. This is supported by the statistics. Since the 20,000 refugees will be resettled during the term of the Parliament, it means they will arrive over 5 years, which is only 4,000 a year. Compared to countries like Germany and Sweden who took hundreds of thousands, Britain’s total was only 1% of all Syrian refugees (The Guardian, 2015). Secondly, however, she posits that more migrants are not the answer, and she implies, if anything it’s the problem. Her alternative to immigration is money with Britain “spending £1 billion in and around Syria on humanitarian aid, caring for refugees and helping the governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to cope with the huge numbers of refugees they’ve received.” May makes it very clear that she does not want immigration to increase and she’s quite happy to splash the cash instead as she notes that “After the United States, Britain is the biggest donor country in the region, and no European country has come close to matching the amount we’re spending there.” Not only does this foreground her hard-line immigration policy but it also helps her maintain the moral high ground against Europe, and May held true to this belief in practice as by 2017 Britain was Europe’s most generous donor to Syria with £2.46 billion (McGuinness, 2017).

The next issue that May promotes is that any refugee, or indeed any undocumented immigrant should not come to Britain full-stop. While she empathises that “their desire for a better life is perfectly understandable,” she says that “their circumstances are not nearly the same as those of the people fleeing their homelands in fear of their lives.” What’s really at play here is net migration. The Conservatives are very keen to bring the numbers down any way they can. The only way they can control refugee numbers is if they bring them over themselves, not if they show up. Furthermore, failure to do so risks the wrath of the other two players, already long hostile to immigration. Unlike much of the European media at this time,

the British media continued their anti-immigrant stance and ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality (Berry et al, 2016). Meanwhile, the situation with the people remained so volatile that Labour MP Rachel Reeves warned that failure to control immigration could see this “tinder box... explode” on the streets (Stewart & Mason, 2016). So, while May concedes that Britain “must fulfil our moral duty”, she has also made it clear that that’s only on Britain’s terms and only those random few selected from a camp should be allowed to come.

Finally, in a sentiment shared with the players, the biggest theme that May highlights is that immigration is a problem. She angles with another use of passive voice that current immigration levels are morally wrong as “thousands of people... have been forced out of the labour market, still unable to find a job”. This implies that immigration has not benefited most British people. Moreover, she assertively adds that “We have to do this for the sake of our society and our public services – and for the sake of the people whose wages are cut, and whose job security is reduced, when immigration is too high.” So, May claims that high immigration hurts integration, leads to worse public services, and badly affects the job market, particularly for working-class people. She warns that “without the right policies it’s going to get even harder to keep the numbers down” and comes up with reasons why “reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder.” However, showing her steely spirit, she proclaims “that’s no reason to give up”. Not only will she not “give up”, but she shows she’s ready to fight, like when she expresses that she will “put Britain first” and “Not in a thousand years.”

Ideological Power

What examples can we see that the speaker projects their practice as common sense to promote their position?

Now let’s see how May uses ideological power to project her practises as universal and common sense. One way she effectively does this is to position herself in the middle as opposed to those who disagree with her view. She describes them as “people on both extremes of the debate - from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left.” Not only does this portray them negatively, but it also lumps them together, as if they’re part of one group. She then suggests, again without evidence, that both groups “conflate refugees in desperate need of help with economic migrants who simply want to live in a more prosperous society.” In this way, May can maintain that, unlike these ‘extremists’, she is the sensible one who avoids heated rhetoric and has the practical solutions to deal with

immigration's challenges. She also states, "we need our immigration system to continue that British tradition of gradual, moderate, sensible change". This is a way to show that her anti-immigration policies will not be kneejerk reactions or gimmicks but calm, rational solutions.

Another way May uses ideological power is through foreign students. They receive much of her focus and she's constantly aimed to pass draconian laws on students to make their lives much more difficult, a stance that would later lead her into conflict with future prime minister and fellow cabinet colleague Boris Johnson (Watts, 2017). However, while she wants to impress the other two players with her toughness, she doesn't want to be seen as an enemy of students either. So, she adroitly says "Students, yes; over-stayers, no. And the universities must make this happen." This way she differentiates between most students and those who overstay their visa, while she also puts the onus on universities to keep their side of the bargain.

Finally, May uses ideological power in her approach to European migrants. While she acknowledges that "The numbers coming from Europe are unsustainable", her solution is to target the benefits that low-paid EU workers receive. She states, "That is why the PM is right to target the amount we pay in benefits for those coming to the UK to work and put these arrangements on a sensible basis." Through this emphasis, May deflects from the reason that large numbers of Europeans come, which is to fill vacant jobs, and glosses over the fact that the tax credits that EU workers received are broadly similar to what other foreign workers got (Migration Observatory, 2016). She implies that it is these benefits that are the problem and that now that the Tories have realised this, they will regain control of the situation with their typically sensible solutions.

Power in Discourse

How does the speaker use selective facts/Hidden Power to promote their discourse to their constrained audience?

One of the ways that May promotes her discourse is by her claim that she is the one who pushes back against the pro-immigration lobby. This way she can not only make her case but demonstrate that she is on the side of the anti-immigration players. For example, she says "some people have argued that we're on the verge of a 'great age of migration', in which national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life." May never says who "some people" are but it certainly suits her argument. She implies that there's strong, powerful voices who want her to cave into their

agenda, but she won't fold. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it cements her strong image, an image that would soon lead to her ascension as prime minister. Secondly, it shows that the players can always rely on her. She also famously says, "These problems have led some people to say we need a new approach, a new European approach that would involve a common immigration and asylum policy. To those people, I have a very clear answer. Not in a thousand years." May not only conceals who "some people" are, but she doesn't even say what political angle they are from, even if it appears to be the left. Moreover, May misrepresents the argument. The campaign at the time was not about "a new European approach" but higher numbers of Syrian refugees (Migration Observatory, 2015). This way May can argue that she's not only tough on migrants but also on Europe. This is particularly ironic, because just a couple lines later she calls for "a new international approach with nation states working together."

Another way May uses hidden power to promote her discourse is her distortion of the evidence. A quote Mike Pence borrowed, "You're entitled to your own opinions, you're not entitled to your own facts" (Niemi 2020) is relevant here. May claims that "after the first two years as Home Secretary, net migration... fell to 154,000." Our chart above confirms this, and that net migration has by 2012 dropped substantially from about 437,000 in 2010. However, her 2005 figures are completely wrong as net migration is not 320,000 but less than 200,000. Furthermore, this speech is given in 2015 when net migration has risen again to over 260,000. Admittedly she does concede that "the numbers have doubled once more." However, where she places her blame is on foreign student overstayers. Yet foreign students are not an obvious target when we think of immigration, and there has been much debate on whether they should even count as part of net migration or not. Moreover, the statistics don't bear out her argument. Only 18% of students end up staying long-term in Britain anyway (Walsh, 2022), and this is because they've successfully found jobs and contributed to the economy. As 82 % of students leave when their studies are complete, that means that the difference to net migration is negligible. What's striking here is that May seems to highlight their importance to net migration. Evidently, if they weren't there, then the figures would really expose the main reason for net migration, European free movement. Furthermore, May's use of labels like "the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left" is also deceptive. Her implication that liberal migration is a far-left policy is not supported by the evidence, nor does it follow that right-wing governments will be anti-immigration. A primary example is Ronald Reagan's amnesty to nearly 3 million illegal immigrants in 1986

(NPR Staff, 2010). Therefore, a person who supports ‘liberal’ immigration is not necessarily left-wing, let alone an extremist. However, this use of labels helps May to position herself as the only trustworthy, balanced person on the issue. Also, May consistently blames “some countries...” who “deny the nationality of their citizen and refuse to take them back” in “thousands of cases.” Yet the reason that most migrants aren’t returned is government policy. Britain deems them either ‘unsafe’, like say Eritrea, or Britain is unwilling to risk that they are safe, like Iraq, or even Sudan (Walsh, 2023). Another way May is selective is her claim that “The evidence – from the OECD, the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee and many academics – shows that while there are benefits of selective and controlled immigration, at best the net economic and fiscal effect of high immigration is close to zero.” The evidence on migration, both mass and limited, is inconclusive. Strikingly, studies from this time have shown that economically Britain would be far better off with high migration than low, and it is inaccurate to say that the economic and fiscal effects are “close to zero” (Migration Observatory, 2014). In fact, while these studies disagree on immigration, it is not for economic but social reasons.

Another way May is selective is the way she promotes a positive fact to background another one. May balances her compassionate side and her tough side like a trapeze artist. One example is Britain’s generous aid to Syria, which as we saw above is easily the second highest. May selectively claims that “by working with the vast numbers who remain in the region”, Britain’s doing the most to help as it implies that it’s better to help local people on the ground rather than token gestures like taking migrants. This plays down the miniscule number of Syrian refugees that Britain will take, and even this is disguised as it is 20,000 over five years, not one. It also doesn’t address the factors that have drawn people to leave the camps to begin with. When May says that the “humanitarian aid” will be spent “in and around Syria,” she neglects to mention any details of its use. By her own admission, most of these people are stuck in camps, which is why she says much of the money will go to the aforementioned “governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey” and their “huge numbers of refugees.” However, there’s no indication that these countries will be held accountable for how they use the money, or that enough of the money will reach the people that need it.

Another example of hidden power is how May implies that her anti-immigration discourse is not because she is against immigrants but because she cares. For example, May says “there are costs of immigration” and “not all of the consequences can be managed”. “We need to build 210,000 new homes every year to deal with rising demand. We need to find

900,000 new school places by 2024.” If these numbers were true, that would be a legitimate argument. However, these numbers don’t hold up. Firstly, as May notes herself, most of the migrants she refers to are young adult males, not school kids. Secondly, immigration can’t be blamed for the Conservative’s failure to build even one of their 200,000 planned starter homes (Syal, 2019). May’s ‘care’ also applies to working people because of the “thousands of people who have been forced out of the labour market”, yet more British citizens were employed than had been for years (Rowthorn, 2015, p. 31). If unemployment had been an issue, then the Tories could have tried an approach such as former prime minister Gordon Brown’s notorious slogan “British jobs for British workers” (Summers, 2009). Yet that would fly in the face of the Tories policies regarding big business. She also ‘cares’ for those outside Britain. She blames the benefits that attract European workers “on very low salaries... – which makes the UK a hugely attractive destination. This is not good for us – or for the countries those people are leaving.” This implies May’s concerns for the countries left behind when what she really cares about is the stats. May doesn’t show this same ‘care’ for these same countries when she says, “we should try to attract the best talent in the world”.

Backgrounding and Scapegoats

Can we see examples of the speaker backgrounding anything negative or using scapegoats?

Perhaps the most striking aspect of May’s speech, with its clear view about immigration is not what May says but what she leaves out. May has completely backgrounded the EU’s free movement. Rather, she has tried to blame immigration numbers on everything else. However, as we have seen above, groups like asylum-seekers make up only a small percentage of immigration compared to legal EU migrants. Making their life more difficult barely dents the immigration statistics. Furthermore, the other two players clearly blame this EU free movement, and it was this issue that was a primary factor in Brexit. For example, the Daily Mail in a 2013 article accused “immigrants” of taking 500,000 affordable houses while 1.8 million families were on the waiting list (Doughty, 2013). The tone of the article is typically negative and alarmist towards these immigrants with expressions like “record high”, “record numbers”, “mass immigration”, “a great deal more”, and so forth. Free movement was at the heart of anti-immigrant sentiment and also used as a campaigning tool for Brexit. Radziwinowiczówna and Galasińska note “This attack on the FoM regularly took the form of ridicule; the pro-Leave press nicknamed FoM ‘free

movement of criminals’ (*Daily Mail*, 29/03/2016 and 26/06/2017, and *The Daily Telegraph*, 21/07/2017), ‘free movement of down and outs’ (*Daily Mail*, 15/12/2017) and even ‘free movement of terrorists (sorry, citizens)’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, 30/03/2016)” (2021, p. 75). The temperature in the streets got so high that it led to the tragic murder of the Labour MP Jo Cox just seven months after May’s speech (Holden & Faulconbridge, 2016). Another example that really struck a chord with the people is this famous pro-Brexit poster.



Image 3- Pro Brexit poster with Nigel Farage
(*The Telegraph*, 2016) CREDIT: AFP or licensors/DANIEL LEAL-OLIVAS

So, it’s very clear what the players are upset about, but May almost completely avoids the issue as if it doesn’t exist. Even when she acknowledges it as an issue, she selectively blames benefits, not free movement itself. Indeed, she is very happy to accuse everything but free movement.

May finds plenty of other scapegoats who have failed to help in her quest to reduce immigration. She blames “the free movement rules” not for Europeans but non-Europeans because they allow residency to “anyone who has married a European”. She blames the university lobbyists when she says, “I don’t care what the university lobbyists say: the rules must be enforced” and the universities when they “must make this happen.” The “growing economy... that is creating huge numbers of jobs” is also not immune nor is the fact that

immigrants aren't as destitute and immobile as before. The problem is that "relative prosperity for many people in the developing world that..." along with "modern forms of communication" and "cheaper international travel" means that "it's going to get even harder to keep the numbers down", a point she emphasises with expressive grammar "even harder". She accompanies this with blame for "The system" which "is geared towards helping those most able to access it, and sometimes manipulate it..." and "those who are young enough, fit enough, and have the resources to get to Britain". Conversely, there are the "the criminal gangs" who "smuggle people into Europe... unimpeded". Meanwhile, the Schengen area (The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration) "means that once a migrant arrives in a country... they can make their way across Europe... up to the British border... Many will eventually get EU citizenship." While she acknowledges Germany's "compassion and decency", she accuses their naïve expectations "to receive 800,000 asylum seekers", which "prompted hundreds of thousands" to come. "Half of them- were migrants from other parts of the world", not Syria. Finally, she targets those who enable 'bad' immigrants with different names like "immigration campaigners", "advocates of open- door immigration", or "human rights lawyers". So, she makes it very clear "whose side I'm on", which is the players, not immigrants. Yet she still never says she's against legal Europeans, the primary mover of the immigration needle.

Power behind Discourse

How does the speaker use power behind discourse such as formality/informality or connotations of particular words/metaphors to support their immigration discourse.

Firstly, as the discourse type is that of a televised public speech, the tone is very informal. A good example of this is when May appears to directly address 'bad' immigrants herself, using both "you" and "we". "If you've spurned the chance to seek protection elsewhere – but we cannot return you to that safe country and you still need refuge – you'll get the minimum stay of protection and you won't have an automatic right to settle here. But for those who really need it, we will offer a longer stay of protection." She takes a similar tone with the pro-immigration crowd when she states "you can play your part in making this happen – or you can try to frustrate it. But if you choose to frustrate it, you will have to live with the knowledge that you are depriving people in genuine need".

May also frequently uses colourful language and metaphors to make her point. Some of the language is very powerful. For example, she says that "With more than 430,000

migrants... the countries of Europe..." are "resurrecting borders they'd once removed...". "Resurrecting" is a very powerful word with significant religious connotations that implies European borders have been 'brought back to life'. There is another angle to this though. The Resurrection is the most important part of the Christian calendar (Webster University, 2023) and represents great news. May appears to imply that this is also good news as if to say the borders should never have been dismantled to begin with. After all, it is much easier to keep illegal immigrants away if other countries also have restrictive policies. Another use of powerful language to promote her anti-immigration ideology is scaremongering. May implies that there is a pro-immigration discourse that promotes the 'great age of migration' where "national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life" where everyone is "powerless" to stop these "travelling" hoards. Then, she strikes back with "but that's no reason to give up." This use of language shows a couple of things. Firstly, it portrays May as strong. She's created an image of an unstoppable wave of migrants on the march who no one seemingly has a chance against, but that won't stop her. It's almost like she's borrowed a famous phrase from Winston Churchill when he famously said "we shall never surrender" after Britain was left alone against the Nazis in World War II (Churchill, 1940). Secondly this portrays Britain's European neighbours as weak.

Some of the language May uses implies compassion to show, that despite the hard rhetoric on immigration, she really cares, whether it's the focus on "humanitarian aid", "caring for refugees" or helping countries with refugees. Indeed, Britain's Syrian aid of £2.46 billion proportionately dwarfed the 3 billion Euros the EU donated (Mance, 2017). However, the motivation may not have been for altruistic reasons, but to get Turkey to agree to stop any more migrants coming through (Terry, 2021). Moreover, most of May's language about immigrants is derogatory, whether it's "We rooted out abuse", "we will crack down on those who abuse it", or many of the other examples we have seen above. Even May's language about 'good' immigrants isn't particularly complimentary like how they "plug skills shortages", as if they're only there as a last resort.

Collocation and Repetition

Any examples of collocation to promote ideology about immigrants? Or repeated words/phrases to drum home a point.

We can also see signs of how May promotes her ideology in the discourse by the way she both recycles words and uses them with other words. For example, let us take the word

“system”. We saw before how May used the “system” as a scapegoat for immigration’s challenges. Some of the words that co-occur with “system” in this setting give it a negative connotation like “abuse”, “manipulate” and even “visa”. For example, May says “We rooted out abuse of the student visa system, and the numbers went down.” Later she complains that “The trouble is, the asylum system was abused for years. Under Labour it was just another way of getting here to work.” She reflects that its weakness is that “people abuse the system by claiming asylum when their visa ends or by making spurious legal appeals to stay in the country for as long as possible.” To make matters even worse for May, this “system is geared towards helping those most able to access it, and sometimes manipulate it, for their own ends – those who are young enough, fit enough, and have the resources to get to Britain.”

However, she makes it clear that the “system” also has the answers. When words co-occur with “system” like “immigration”, “control” and “strict”, the connotation is positive. May’s stance can be seen by “We have to be a country in control, stricter with people who try to abuse the system” and “An approach with strict new rules for people who abuse the system in Britain.” She states that “we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country” while later she says “but we need our immigration system to continue that British tradition of gradual, moderate, sensible change.” As we have seen, she is quite happy to praise her achievements on this front like when she claims, “We now have much more control in the system than we’ve had for a long time.” Sometimes she uses both the negative and positive side of the “system” to compare how the situation was with how she will fix it. This can be seen when she says “For the first time we’ll distinguish between vulnerable people resettled from their region and those who claim asylum after abusing the visa system”, and “So we will end this absurdity, creating space in our asylum system to help people who really need our protection.”

Another one of May’s keywords is “approach”. One word that consistently appears next to approach is the word “new”. However, the difference is that it can be both negative and positive. If Europe is included, it is negative like when May retorts “a new European approach that would involve a common immigration and asylum policy. To those people, I have a very clear answer. Not in a thousand years.” However, while May is clearly not onboard with European cooperation, “we do need a new British approach and we do need a new international approach with nation states working together. An approach that combines hard-headed common sense with warm-hearted compassion. An approach with strict new rules for people who abuse the system in Britain, and greater generosity for people in parts of

the world where we know they need our help.” As with “system” she uses “approach” to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants like when she says “By taking a tougher approach to those who do not need our help, we can give more support to vulnerable people”, or “...with a new approach to asylum, with the massive humanitarian support we are already providing in Syria and its neighbouring states, and with the right kind of diplomatic leadership, Britain can play a leading part in alleviating the suffering of the Syrian people and others like them around the world.” Her answer “to deliver this new approach to asylum...” is “to distinguish carefully between economic migrants and genuine refugees”.

May repeats modal verbs to underline her position. One such verb is “must” that has an expressive value of obligation. For example, May says, “While we must fulfil our moral duty to help people in desperate need, we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country.” She often harks back to immigration control with “they must return home”, “the rules must be enforced”, “the universities must make this happen”, “we must work to control immigration and put Britain first”, and “they must be made to leave the country quickly”. May also frequently uses “will”. Sometimes it has an expressive value of a promise. She asserts, “we will take in 20,000 Syrian refugees over the course of this Parliament – a decision not imposed on us by Europe, but a decision taken by Britain, an independent sovereign country.” Other such promises include “we will review their need for protection”, “we will seek to return them to their home country rather than offer settlement here in Britain”, “we will take retaliatory measures”, “if other governments don’t play by the rules, there will be consequences”, and “We will also – for the first time – invoke ... the ‘Spanish Protocol’” amongst many. However, other times “will” is used more as a warning for the future like “Many of those people will eventually get EU citizenship and ... free movement” or “Without controlled immigration, there will be less public support.”

Summary

Through CDA I have established that Theresa May’s discourse paints a negative picture of immigration generally. All of the aspects that I have examined show this. However, notably, May tries hard to balance an image of herself as both strong yet compassionate and tries to pass this image onto immigration. So, while she actively shows agency on immigration control, she is careful to look fair. Her negative, strong language is reserved for ‘bad’ immigrants so she can use sympathetic language for potential immigrants if these refugees are randomly selected from a refugee camp. May favours donations over

immigration. It is also evident that her party is under pressure from the two players to respond to the now toxic immigration issue, and this has clearly influenced her discourse. However, rather than take responsibility for the players' main motivation, she blames everything but free movement. The solutions she offers are severe to 'bad' immigrants but don't address the players' concerns about legal ones and won't work. Therefore, unless Britain suddenly becomes so poor that people queue to leave, the only way the Conservatives can control immigration is to leave the EU. Fittingly and ironically, May favours neither, but we can see signs here of the roots of Brexit.

Boris Johnson's 2022 Speech

The third speech that I will examine is the one given by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022 (Johnson, 2022). I will often cite his speech as I analyse it. In keeping with the research questions, my focus is twofold. I will use CDA to primarily look at how Johnson portrays immigrants, while I will also look for signs of whether Johnson takes charge of the immigration discourse or if he has been forced to accept his position due to the influence of the other two players, the media and the people.

Background Information

This speech, about the plan to deport some migrants to Rwanda, reflects how much Britain has changed since Theresa May's speech in 2015. The Brexit 2016 vote led to David Cameron's resignation and Theresa May's subsequent accession to prime minister. However, it soon became clear that there was very little agreement on Brexit's implementation, making any acceptable EU deal a challenge for Parliament. Therefore, a confident May decided to solve this with another General Election. This proved disastrous as the Conservatives lost their majority (Baker et al, 2019). Her struggles continued as she survived a Tory vote of no-confidence (BBC News, 2018) before she finally resigned in June 2019 (BBC News, 2019). This paved the way for a buoyant Boris Johnson to take over. However, he knew that, like May, he would need a loyal majority to finalise Brexit, so he called another General Election. Johnson succeeded with 365 seats (Uberoi et al, 2020) and a large majority of 80 which gave him the mandate he needed to make a deal with the EU and subsequently led to the end of European free movement in January 2021 (Sumption et al, 2022).

As the Covid lockdowns started to thaw, Britain, like many countries, found it difficult to fill jobs. 2022 saw 1.19 million vacancies (Francis-Devine & Buchanan, 2023), which threatened small businesses and supply chains alike. The end of European free movement has challenged employers' ability to find labour, particularly lower-paid (Foster, 2023). This has, in turn, caused employers to try to attract workers through higher pay, causing high inflation (Nelson, 2022). Simultaneously, many refugees have arrived through a new route, small boats from Europe. In the first few years, there were roughly 8,500 migrants arriving this way as asylum claims fell dramatically due to other routes being closed off (Walsh, 2021). However, numbers have now risen dramatically to over 45,000 in 2022 (Elgot, 2023). This caused a strong reaction both from the government and the players. Boris Johnson has shown that, compared to Theresa May, he is much more relaxed about high

immigration numbers (McElroy, 2022), but with mounting pressure from the two other players, Johnson introduced the controversial Rwanda policy, a plan to send some of these refugees to Rwanda (Walsh, 2022). My expectation is the immigration discourse will be warm to ‘good’ immigrants and cold to ‘bad’ ones.

The structure of Johnson’s immigration discourse

Firstly, let’s see how Johnson has structured his speech to frame his argument. Johnson’s starts with praise for ‘good’ immigrants that extends much further than the two other speeches and is far more accepting of refugees as ‘good’. He starts historically, “From the French Huguenots to the Jewish refugees..., to... the Empire Windrush, to the South Asians fleeing East Africa, to... many others ...” who all “contributed magnificently to the amazing story of the UK.” Johnson also connects refugees to his personal life and those of his cabinet. He shares how his “great-grandfather came from Turkey in fear of his life, because our country offered sanctuary for his outspoken journalism”, while “.... colleagues of mine like Nadhim Zahawi who escaped ... Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Dominic Raab, whose Jewish father came to Britain from Czechoslovakia to escape Nazi Germany, and Priti Patel, whose family fled persecution in Uganda” are also included.

Johnson further embraces the vital role both immigrants and their descendants have played in British society, “ultimately responsible for many of those working in our hospitals and on the front line of our response to the pandemic, for more than 60 per cent of the England football team at the final of Euro 2020, for many of our country’s leading figures in the worlds of business, art and culture, and, I’m pleased to say, for ever growing numbers of people serving in public life”.

Johnson then positions his main theme, controlled immigration. He posits that British immigration has been so successful because of its control. For example, he proudly notes that “Since 2015 we have offered a place to over 185,000... seeking refuge, more than the entire population of Sunderland and more than any other similar resettlement schemes in Europe.” This is true, although the period from 2015 includes several previous Conservative governments as well as his from 2019. Moreover, as we saw above, Britain has resettled more because most countries’ refugees have not been resettled but arrived freely. Johnson lists details of “100,000 British Nationals Overseas threatened by draconian security laws in Hong Kong, 20,000 through our Syrian scheme, 13,000 from Afghanistan and to whom we owe debts of honour, and around 50,000 Ukrainians.” Johnson notes that “potentially hundreds of

thousands...” more will be coming, particularly from Ukraine and lauds the people’s generosity for “one of the biggest movements of refugees to this country that we have ever known.” So controlled immigration and generosity go together.

“But,” Johnson notes, “the quid pro quo for this generosity, is that we cannot sustain a parallel illegal system”. A lack of control fails as “Our compassion may be infinite, but our capacity to help people is not.” Johnson then cites all the problems that uncontrolled immigration creates before he moves to another problematic aspect, the “rank unfairness of a system” where it’s mostly young men who arrive from safe countries. Boris warns that uncontrolled immigration “can be exploited by gangs”.

Johnson then reemphasises his control theme that “The British people voted...” for. He appeals to any potential refugees, “whether you are fleeing Putin or Assad, our aim is that you should not need to turn to the people smugglers or any other kind of illegal option.” Of course, he fails to mention that only those “fleeing Putin” have a legal route into the country, while the only hope those “fleeing Assad” have is to show up, illegally. Johnson warns them “that those who try to jump the queue... will find no automatic path to settlement in our country, but rather be swiftly and humanely removed to a safe third country...”, the first indirect mention of Rwanda.

Johnson then repositions the ‘bad’ immigrants as victims with horror stories about the small boat crossings who have been exploited by “those vile people smugglers”. Even when they’ve safely arrived, they are still vulnerable to the “brutal abuse of ruthless gangs” who make their lives miserable.

So, Johnson lists actions he will take to defeat these ‘gangs’, including yet another law, “The Nationality and Borders Bill”. Then he follows with familiar discourse. There is talk of crackdowns and repercussions for countries that refuse to take back migrants, even though we have seen above that most migrants come from countries Britain will not send them back to. There will also be more new equipment, processing centres and money spent.

However, Johnson announces expressively that they will go “still further” with the Rwanda plan. The plan is to send new asylum seekers to Rwanda, that “dynamic country” where they will be allowed to claim asylum instead. “The deal we have done is uncapped and Rwanda will have the capacity to resettle tens of thousands...” in the future. Johnson must have foreseen a potential uproar against his plan because he proceeds to challenge those who disagree that this is “fully compliant” with international law. He implies that he is the only one with a sensible solution and challenges them to come up with an “alternative”.

Johnson concludes that no action means uncontrolled immigration, a concept that “... the British people have consistently rejected ... at the ballot box – in favour of controlled immigration.” He finishes enthusiastically with thanks for Rwanda, hope for a migrant deal with France, victory over the smugglers, immigration lawyers and ‘bad’ immigrants, and “sanctuary for those in need”.

Foregrounding

What view/stance on the discourse of immigration control is promoted? What concepts, issues and ideologies are being emphasised?

The main view that Johnson emphasises is that Britain needs to have controlled immigration. What’s notable is that it is often emphasised in a non-transactive way. For example, when Johnson warns of the consequences of when it’s not controlled, he says “Uncontrolled immigration creates unmanageable demands on our NHS and our welfare state, it overstretches our local schools, our housing and public transport, and creates unsustainable pressure to build on precious green spaces.” “Uncontrolled immigration” may be the grammatical subject, but it certainly isn’t the semantic one. “Immigration” cannot be an active agent as it can’t ‘do’ things but, rather, is a nominalization. Another way Johnson expresses this ideology is when he uses the passive to say, “It is controlled immigration, through safe and legal routes, which enables us to make generous offers of sanctuary while managing the inevitable pressures on our public services such that we can give all those who come here the support they need to rebuild their lives, to integrate and to thrive.” There is a likely reason why Johnson uses so many non-transactive sentences. The Rwanda policy is potentially explosive, and Johnson doesn’t want to be seen as anti-immigrant. While Johnson is clearly stating that Britain needs controlled immigration, he says it in a more indirect way, as if he’s hiding the agent, which in this case is himself or his party. Johnson, despite this speech, is by his own admission pro-immigration (ITV News, 2016), far more than Theresa May (Merrick, 2018). So rather than say “I will stop illegal immigrants,” he rallies around “controlled immigration”.

There are other more active ways he foregrounds controlled immigration without including himself like “The British people voted several times to control our borders, not to close them, but to control them.” Here he implies that it is “The British people” themselves who expect this control, but not closed borders. This is another way to say that controlled immigration welcomes ‘good’ immigrants but rejects ‘bad’ ones. When he does mention

himself, he makes sure he is not alone, such as when he compares uncontrolled immigration to “a call for open borders by the back door... We reject it, as the British people have consistently rejected it at the ballot box – in favour of controlled immigration.” Implicit in all this is that Johnson implies that he is in tandem with the people, and by extension, the media.

The soft tone of this speech fits in well with another concept that Johnson foregrounds, which is that ‘good’ immigrants are welcome. We have already seen above how much Johnson has embraced both Britain’s diversity and its immigrants, including his own background. Furthermore, Johnson links controlled immigration with ‘good’ immigrants, like when he discusses how he plans to help all those who have arrived and those yet to come, many of whom have no obvious place to live. Johnson plans to help them “as we work with local authorities and the devolved administrations to welcome those coming from Ukraine into our communities,” while he also plans to “find accommodation across our whole United Kingdom for all those who have come here previously but who are currently in hotels, because it makes absolutely no sense for the taxpayer to foot those bills, running to almost £5 million a day, with the sum total of those we accommodate being concentrated in just a third of local authorities.” Clearly, Johnson aims to integrate accepted immigrants into society, “And we must do this in the spirit of our history of providing refuge... to thousands fleeing persecution.”

On the other hand, ‘bad’ immigrants are not welcome, although Johnson tries to say this in the politest possible way. He says the reason they are unwelcome is economic because “We can’t ask the British taxpayer to write a blank cheque to cover the costs of anyone who might want to come and live here.” He suggests there are “80 million displaced people” out there and Britain can’t be a “haven for all of them”. The fact that he inaccurately suggests that “80 million” people may all plan to come to Britain is more than enough to drive home his point that Britain can only take a designated few. He notes “We simply cannot have a policy of saying anyone who wants to live here can do so. We’ve got to be able to control who comes into this country and the terms on which they remain.” Furthermore, he notes that “seven out of ten of those arriving in small boats last year were men under 40”, which “is particularly perverse as those attempting crossings, are not directly fleeing imminent peril” but pass through “manifestly safe countries, including many in Europe, where they could – and should – have claimed asylum.” Johnson finds this is unfair “on those who are seeking to come here legally, if others can just bypass the system”.

However, Johnson also emphasises that his actions will help ‘bad’ immigrants who have been “exploited by gangs.” He portrays them as victims of horrendous “exploitation” and “drowning in unseaworthy boats and suffocating in refrigerated lorries.” In this way, the discourse portrays ‘bad’ immigrants almost bizarrely as both unwanted visitors yet victims who deserve sympathy.

In relation to these ‘bad’ immigrants, Johnson promotes his Rwanda plan. In yet another passive sentence he states that “... from today, our new Migration and Economic Development Partnership will mean that anyone entering the UK illegally – as well as those who have arrived illegally since January 1st – may now be relocated to Rwanda.” The concept means that in theory that anyone that arrives in the UK illegally will be automatically seen as a ‘bad’ immigrant in Britain but will have the chance to be a ‘good’ immigrant in Rwanda. Strikingly, Priti Patel is the inspiration behind the Rwanda plan (Syal, 2022).

Ideological Power

What examples can we see that the speaker projects their practice as common sense to promote their position?

One way that Johnson uses ideological power is to portray his discourse as being in the middle whereas other positions are presented as extremes. For example, he implies that one side thinks his policy is too soft when he says, “I know there are some who believe we should just turn these boats back at sea.” Conversely, he acknowledges the “open borders” proponents with “I know there will be a vocal minority who will think these measures are draconian and lacking in compassion”. Johnson never says who “some” or “a vocal minority” are, but it implies they are on the fringes while he takes the common-sense middle ground without being reactionary. He also portrays other potentially sensible parties as unrealistic when he states, “I know there are others who would say that we should just negotiate a deal with France and the EU. And we have made repeated and generous offers to our French friends and we will continue to press them and the EU...” In other words, Johnson implies that he’s already at work on every sensible option. So, when he asks, “those who would criticise our plan... what is your alternative?”, he has established that only his policy is acceptable.

Another way Johnson projects his practice as common sense is with his theme ‘controlled immigration’. We saw above how he proclaimed that the “British people voted to

control our border... not close... but control". This is skilfully done, for as a Brexit proponent who won a landslide election that enabled him to conclude the final deal, Johnson's stance appears to be common sense. However, it all depends on what he means by the "British people". If he means the whole electorate, then he has a strong case as in 2022, the majority of the people favoured maintaining or increasing this 'controlled immigration' for the first time since polls were taken (Sumption & Portes, 2023, p. 21). Clearly, the views of the people have changed. However, most people who voted Brexit and for the Conservatives in 2019 voted not for 'controlled' but lower migration. Saying "controlled but not closed" works well because it sounds like it stops 'bad' immigrants and thus, lowers immigration, even though legal immigration rose dramatically, with net migration over 500,000 in 2022 (Sumption & Walsh, 2022).

Another example of ideological power is how Johnson balances his attack and sympathy of 'bad' immigrants. One moment he refers to them as mostly "men under 40" who "queue jump" by paying "people smugglers". Because of their actions they are "taking up our capacity to help genuine women and child refugees", which implies that these 'bad' immigrants are not "genuine" at all but just opportunistic frauds. Yet Johnson then goes on to describe these same people as victims as he focuses his ire on the people smugglers. Suddenly, they are depicted as "desperate and innocent people" who have had "their dreams of a better life exploited by ruthless gangs". So, Johnson implies that the actions he will take against them are not to make their lives miserable but is for their own good.

Of course, the fact that asylum seekers can only come to Britain legally if they come from Hong Kong or Ukraine is another example of how Johnson uses ideological power. He states that it is "not fair on those who are seeking to come here legally, if others can just bypass the system." But while that sounds sensible, as I have shown previously, for most 'bad' immigrants, any legal route to claim asylum is closed unless they show up.

Power in Discourse

How does the speaker use selective facts/Hidden Power to promote their discourse to their constrained audience?

One of the ways Johnson uses selective facts to justify his ideology is to imply that Britain has been one of the countries that has been very generous towards refugees, like the fact that "Since 2015 we have offered a place to over 185,000..." This may be "more than any other similar resettlement schemes in Europe", but as we saw earlier, most countries

don't resettle irregular migrants but deal with them once they've arrived. Even when Britain resettled 20,000 Syrian refugees and allowed others already in Britain to remain, they still only took 1%. Furthermore, Johnson conveniently conflates Hong Kong migrants with refugees. People may have good reason to leave Hong Kong and Britain has a strong historical connection with it. However apart from a few high-profile cases (Reuters, 2021), most Hongkongers who come to the UK are not in fear of their lives. In fact, surveys have shown economic motives, while those who plan to come are younger and more educated (Migration Observatory, 2021) and often take their time to decide. So while Johnson has shown a moral commitment to Hong Kong citizens, it is deceptive to describe them as genuine refugees in desperate need of help while simultaneously labelling 'bad' immigrants who have fled their homelands as "economic migrants taking advantage of the asylum system".

This ties in with another way Johnson uses hidden power to promote 'controlled immigration'. We saw above how he states that without it will create an "unmanageable" situation across the board. Yet Johnson generously offered free entry to up to 5.2 million Hongkongers initially, a number which has since been increased (Home Office news team, 2022). While the number of recent Hong Kong arrivals since the scheme's implementation is a relatively modest 144,500 (Lee, 2023), this is not far off the "185,000" refugees Johnson proudly announced. Tied in with "welcoming unlimited numbers of refugees from" Ukraine the concept of control is conveniently disguised so that it is far less relevant for 'good' immigrants but suddenly a problem for 'bad' ones.

Johnson also disguises convenient facts to support his discourse. He praises the Ukrainian scheme, one that has had much popular support, to highlight the success of 'controlled immigration'. However, due in part to his hard-line and divisive home secretary, Priti Patel (Picheta, 2021), perhaps appointed to appeal to the players, Britain's initial welcome to Ukrainian refugees was far more restrictive than the EU. While the EU allowed Ukrainians visa-free access for at least three years, Britain would only let Ukrainians in if they had either family connections, or if they could get someone to sponsor them (Walsh & Sumption, 2022). Moreover, they had to apply for the visa in advance before they were allowed entry. This meant that there were often long delays between when visas were issued and when Ukrainians arrived, as opposed to the more seamless EU route. Another fact Johnson disguises is his own personal story. While it is true that his journalist great-grandfather Ali Kemal "came from Turkey in fear of his life," there are two facts that are not

mentioned. Firstly, Kemal was relatively prosperous and politically prominent (Karpazli, 2022). He had lived in Switzerland before his first move to England. Secondly, Kemal moved back to Turkey several times, where, ultimately, he was tragically killed. Unfortunate as this may be, Kemal's immigration status pales in comparison to 'bad' immigrants, many who are in desperate straits both before and after they arrive and don't have the luxury of choice that he had. Also, Johnson says that uncontrolled migration will create "unsustainable pressure to build on precious green spaces." However, Johnson didn't show this same concern for green spaces when he gave the go-ahead for work on the HS2 high-speed railway project between London and Manchester despite clear warnings that environmental adjustments had to be made (The Wildlife Trusts, 2023).

Finally, Johnson's description of "that dynamic country", Rwanda, is selective. Johnson is full of praise for "welcoming" Rwanda. However, even non-powerful, constrained participants of this speech will find his assessment that Rwanda is "one of the safest countries in the world" optimistic. This is, after all, a country that had a genocide in 1994 (History.com Editors, 2023). Rwanda may have markedly improved to the degree that "... it will welcome leaders from across the Commonwealth," while "before the pandemic... the IMF said Rwanda was the world's fourth fastest growing economy". However, this is an ambitious and selective sell. Rwanda may be "growing", but it's a long way down the world list. Rwanda's gross domestic product (GDP) was recently ranked only 146th in the world (WorldData.info, 2023), its rank individual purchasing power only 171st, and it scores poorly on the corruption index. Moreover, it's easy for Johnson to disguise Rwanda's growth as impressive as it starts from such a low base. Any modest increase will be much higher than that of a wealthy country, but that doesn't make it prosperous. Furthermore, Johnson's claim that the deal is "uncapped" for potentially "... tens of thousands" doesn't hold water as, even in the best-case scenario, the maximum 'bad' immigrants that Rwanda has capacity for is 200 (Lee & Faulkner, 2022) and, as of now, no one has been sent there.

Backgrounding and Scapegoats

Can we see examples of the speaker backgrounding anything negative or using scapegoats?

While Johnson is quite open about his pro-immigration stance, he is careful to tone it down under the framework of 'controlled immigration'. Therefore, his speech doesn't promote the record numbers of legal net migration that has happened under his watch. This is

significant because overall legal immigration was over a million (Sumption & Walsh, 2022). 45,000 annual small boat arrivals would make less than 5 % of that total. But Johnson undoubtedly feels he must find the right balance with the players. On one hand, they are far more positive towards legal immigration than they were during the Brexit period, and it is not just the people's opinions, as we saw above, that have changed, but the media's too. For example, a *Daily Telegraph* article praises the impact of vital 'good' immigrants like Nigerians in the NHS (de Quetteville, 2022). This is part of a post-covid trend where sudden job shortages combined with a lack of EU migrants has led to a strong demand for labour. Meanwhile, *The Daily Express*, led by a new editor, has taken a conscious decision to change the tone of the paper away from anti-migrant and racist stories (Waterson, 2019). Even *The Daily Mail's* gets in on the act with an article about how British track star Mo Farah was a victim of trafficking (Associated Press, 2022). The piece praises Farah's honesty for helping other trafficking victims, yet, ironically, these victims would have traditionally been seen as 'bad' immigrants who had come to the country illegally. Clearly, after Brexit, the mood towards immigrants is lightening up. However, even though attitudes to migrants have changed, some sentiments still remain, and this is compounded by the fear of the small boat crossings. For example, even though the people's attitudes have changed, their feeling to illegal migration is still strong. New studies have shown that the people are now more flexible to changes in the immigration criteria, such as allowing in dependents or low-paid workers, but this is not reciprocated to illegal immigration (Sumption & Portes, 2023, p. 28). Furthermore, 29% of the people, a sizeable minority, still have a problem with immigration and don't think it's been a force for good (Sumption & Portes, 2023, p. 22). The small boats crossing has helped to get immigration discourse back on the agenda (Stowers, 2023). The fact that Johnson backgrounds both legal migration's high numbers and the related jobs shortages reflects that he wants to use this speech to reinforce he has control.

Johnson also backgrounds the Rwanda policy details. We will focus more on modal verbs later, but what's striking is how he uses the word 'may' when he says that 'bad' immigrants "may now be relocated to Rwanda". 'May' in this case has an expressive value of possibility. We saw above that a best-case scenario would see Rwanda house 200 migrants until Britain eventually helped them to build more accommodation. So, Johnson appears to be deliberately vague at best to play down Rwanda's limited capacity.

Simultaneously, Johnson seems prepared for the Rwanda plan's failure as he writes the speech with a list of scapegoats who will cause it not to happen. He expects to have to

fight against “a formidable army of politically motivated lawyers” and he acknowledges he won’t win “overnight”. However, he demonstrates a determination to beat this legal “army” and to “clean up the abuse of our legal system” so that he can have his way. So, he talks like a general who rallies the troops before battle with “though the way ahead will be hard, and though we can expect many challenges and many obstacles to be thrown up against this plan...”, he will lead them to victory.

Johnson also needs scapegoats to make the Rwanda policy seem the best ethical alternative. So, he targets “people smugglers”, “gangs”, the ones who conduct this “appalling trade”, and “those piloting the boats”. He occasionally portrays ‘bad’ immigrants negatively too, who he sees as mostly “men under 40” and blames the “system” and “those countries that refuse to accept returns of foreign criminals and failed asylum seekers.” Of course, as we saw above, ‘bad’ immigrants generally come from countries that Britain won’t return them to. However, Johnson continues as he uses expressive grammar to proclaim, “But we need to go still further in breaking the business model of these gangs”, hence the Rwanda deal.

So, Johnson has clear targets to blame both for the need for his plan and if his plan fails. Notable, however, he doesn’t blame other countries, but, rather, refers to them as “friends”.

Power behind Discourse

How does the speaker use power behind discourse such as formality/informality or connotations of particular words/metaphors to support their immigration discourse.

As the discourse type is a public speech, the tone is, like the other speeches, very informal. For example, Johnson uses “you” and “your” eleven times. “You” addresses the general public, the ‘bad’ immigrants, the “smugglers” and even the critics when he asks them “what is your alternative?” He uses “my” a couple of times, like when something “is simply not practical in my view”. Johnson also occasionally uses “I”, like when he wants to attribute something personal to himself, like “I’m proud” or “I’m pleased to say”. However, the informal word he uses most is “we”, a sign of inclusion and collectiveness for the players, but not for ‘bad’ immigrants. For example, he represents the players when he says “we owe debts of honour” to Afghan newcomers, or “we must halt this appalling trade” of the smugglers, or “the deal we have done is uncapped” with Rwanda. Yet there is no use of “we” to refer to ‘bad’ immigrants. Then it is only “you”, such as “you should not need to turn to the people smugglers”.

However, Johnson's desire to show he cares is reflected not only in the positive way he expresses himself, but also his tendency to exaggerate. We have already seen how he praises 'good' immigrants' contribution "to the amazing story of the UK", as if Britain's "amazing story" is one of the wonders of the world. Clearly, Johnson embraces Britain's diversity and how "that proud history of safe and legal migration" has contributed to it. Furthermore, he encourages more 'good' immigrants to come as Hongkongers flee "draconian security laws" while "unlimited numbers" arrive from Ukraine "as the British people open their home". He expects Britain to have a "world-leading asylum offer, providing generous protection". However, he maintains his 'controlled immigration' ideology where Britain's limited "capacity" can't match its "compassion". Nonetheless, his positivity continues even for the people he plans to remove to "dynamic" Rwanda, as if it's a great opportunity.

For although 'bad' immigrants "are betraying all those who do the right thing, who try to come here legally", rather than be overtly negative towards them, Johnson saves his most colourful language for those who support them, like the "...formidable army of politically motivated lawyers". His primary focus is for the "brutal abuse of the ruthless gangs" and "these vile people smugglers... turning the Channel into a watery graveyard". So Johnson projects his plan as a way to "defeat the people smugglers" and "disrupt" and "tackle" the gangs' "business model" as "we must... stop these boats now, not lose thousands more lives while waiting for a deal that just doesn't exist." Therefore, Johnson embraces the Rwanda deal, a plan he finds "most exciting".

Collocation and Repetition

Any examples of collocation to promote ideology about immigrants? Or repeated words/phrases to drum home a point.

We can also see signs of how Johnson promotes his ideology in the discourse by how he both recycles words and uses them with other words. For example, the word "immigration" often has positive connotations when it is used with words like "control" or "legal". For example, he says "controlled immigration... enables us to make generous offers", and "Brexit allowed us to take control of legal immigration". Even when he says, "we are also taking back control of illegal immigration", "illegal" has positive connotations because it has "control" just before it. Conversely, "immigration" has more negative

connotations when used with “uncontrolled”, as we saw earlier with “uncontrolled immigration creates unmanageable demands”.

Another word that fits this pattern is “borders”. When Johnson says, “control our borders”, “full sovereignty over our borders”, and “confidence in our borders”, he promotes the ideology of control. He also shows the negative side of this when there is no control, “a call for open borders by the back door”. There are also other examples of collocation. He often uses “model” with “gangs” preceded by a strong, metaphorical lexical verb. For example, he twice says “break the business model of these gangs” as well as “disrupting”. On another occasion he says, “we will continue... to tackle the gangs.”

However, the most striking example of collocation is with “smugglers”, which is always accompanied by “people”. We saw how, as one of his scapegoats, Johnson reinforces the idea that these “people smugglers” are bad news who are behind the “barbaric trade in human misery”.

Johnson also repeats modal verbs to underline his position. However, he does it in a way that is far less assertive than May. While he sometimes uses “must” with its expressive value of obligation, he refrains from using ‘bad’ immigrants as semantic objects. For example, while Johnson states “we must first ensure that the only route to asylum in the UK is a safe and legal one”, “we must end with this approach”, and “we must have sovereignty over our borders”, the only time he uses “must” against individuals are the “gangs”, like when he passively says “the people smugglers must be stopped” or actively says “we must halt this appalling trade”. Johnson also uses “will” differently. Most of the time “will” has an expressive value of a promise, but agency is hidden. So, rather, Johnson uses non-transactive sentences such as “it will end the absurd practice” or “This will send a clear message”, or “it will clean up the abuse of our legal system”. The few times agency is shown is when Johnson expresses a positive tone such as “we will also find accommodation across our whole United Kingdom for all those who have come here previously...” or “we will continue to work with our French friends... we will continue to lead co-operation with crime and intelligence partners across Europe, we will continue to seek a returns agreement with the EU or with France.” Clearly, Johnson does not want to portray himself as anti-immigration. Strikingly, Johnson also occasionally uses the verb “may”, a word unused by the word’s namesake Theresa May. The most significant example is when he says “anyone entering the UK illegally – as well as those who have arrived illegally since January 1st – may now be relocated to Rwanda.” It’s not entirely clear if “may” has an expressive value of permission

or possibility, but what is evident is it certainly hasn't got one of obligation or promise. It is almost as if Johnson is not entirely convinced himself that the Rwanda policy will succeed, or even happen.

Summary

Through CDA I have established that Boris Johnson's discourse portrays immigration positively if it is 'controlled', irrespective of whether it's high or low. On the other hand, 'uncontrolled immigration' is painted negatively and must be dealt with. However, this is a very indirect speech with little agency and many non-transactive sentences. With some minor exceptions, Johnson does not put too much focus on 'bad' immigrants themselves, but, rather, focuses on the factors that are behind their arrival, and it is only these factors that receive occasionally strong and negative language. Even with that, he maintains a noticeably positive and friendly tone throughout. 'Bad' immigrants are mostly portrayed as victims, and the policy to send them to Rwanda is presented as a great opportunity rather than some form of punishment. Implicit in his speech is the idea that these 'bad' immigrants are actually 'good' immigrants as long as they're in another country. It is also evident that there is relatively little pressure from the two other players about immigration, except for what was a relatively new issue, the small boats crossings. This will undoubtedly have had much to do with the success of the Brexit vote and Johnson's close affiliation to it. So, perhaps appropriately, this speech comes across as one by a pro-immigration Prime Minister who proposes a crackdown on a small proportion of immigrants.

Analysis

I have examined in detail three government speeches about immigration from three different times in the last 20 years. The first speech is by then Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005 (Blair, 2005), the second is by Conservative home secretary Theresa May in 2015 (May, 2015) shortly before she became prime minister, while the third is by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022 (Johnson, 2022). Through CDA, I used and cited these speeches, along with references, to determine my research questions. My goal was to investigate whether British immigration discourse now goes in a circle, and following on from that, if government discourse and policy on immigration is heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people, in the battle over the power of language and subsequently how the language is used to sway the message. For this to be the case, my task was to find out if both the first and third speeches have a discourse that promotes ‘good’ immigrants yet denigrates ‘bad’ immigrants, while the second speech contrasts to this with a negative tone on immigration. Along the way, I attempted to establish if the other two players have influenced these speeches and the government’s immigration discourse. I will now examine the results of the three speeches with a comparison of what I found from the different sections.

Background Information

At first glance, all three speeches are given at a time when the speaker’s parties appear to be in a position of strength. Blair’s Labour has had eight years in power with huge majorities and called two early elections. May’s Conservatives have just won the election after a previous power share with the Liberal Democrats, while Johnson has one of the Tories largest ever majorities. However, at a closer glance, the first two are under pressure, a pressure that has been influenced by the player’s reactions to immigration. In Blair’s case, he faces the first strong political opponent of his career, Michael Howard, who has successfully focused on the immigration issue to win support. In May’s case, her party may have won outright victory, but it comes with the condition of an impending EU referendum, a vote which will be heavily influenced by immigration discourse. Simultaneously, she has to try to balance this with the Alan Kurdi tragedy and not come across as heartless. On the other hand, Johnson is in a much more comfortable position. As the champion of a now completed Brexit, he doesn’t have to contend with fringe anti-immigrant parties like the BNP or UKIP like his predecessors did. Moreover, due in part to Brexit and Covid, the people were now far

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more relaxed about immigration than in previous times and the media followed suit, happy in the knowledge that there was an established Conservative government. While Blair had to contend with 75 % dissatisfaction with immigration in 2005, and May's Tories were under pressure from UKIP voters, by 2022 most voters favoured maintained or increased immigration. This is particularly notable as 2022 saw one of the highest levels of net migration. This does not mean that Johnson would have enough support from the players to grant an amnesty for the potentially more than a million irregular migrants or have an 'open-door' policy. But the comparison of the three backgrounds shows that he is in the most comfortable situation to promote his immigration discourse.

Structure

One aspect that the speeches have in common is that they all trumpet Britain's immigrant past as something to embrace. All of them proudly mention past waves of both immigrants and refugees to Britain from different time periods. The fact that these three speakers from very different angles go out of their way to praise newcomers and their descendants is significant. It tells us that they want to make it absolutely clear that race is not a factor in this debate, even if it is potentially there in the background. They also want to highlight that while their policies may be strong, they are still sympathetic and compassionate. If there is a minor difference, it is that Blair and May position this at the conclusion of their speech whereas Johnson has this right at the start. The most probable reason is that Blair and May wanted to get straight to their argument while Johnson wanted to tone his down, an approach that included both his and half of his cabinet's own immigrant background. Also, May's live speech started with praise for the previous speaker, a former Bosnian refugee, so this may have been a factor for her. Significantly though, none of them had this lost in the middle somewhere, so it's clear that this is an important point that they want to posit.

This ties into how Johnson's speech differs from the first two. While Blair and May's speech goes right on the attack, Johnson's takes its time. What's particularly ironic is that in theory, Johnson's planned proposal would have far worse consequences for 'bad' immigrants than the proposed measures of the other two. Yet Johnson treats it as positive opportunity. On the other hand, we can really feel the bite from the other two. After his acknowledgement that immigration is an issue, Blair alternates between attacks on 'bad' immigrants and the Tories. May attacks high immigration across the board and makes it very clear that the only

refugees welcome in Britain are those that have been selected. Both try to dampen this in their own way, like Blair's praise of 'good' immigrants and May's proposal to give aid rather than refuge to Syrians.

Finally, while all three acknowledge the players, Blair and May appear pressured to react to them while Johnson doesn't. For example, right from the start, a defensive Blair says that "concern" about immigration is not "racism", a very different policy to what he had before. An assertive May's strongest statement against immigration is "not in a thousand years!" Conversely, Johnson doesn't appear to feel the need to win the players over. While Johnson says "the British people voted" for control, he implies that this was to give Britain ownership of the immigration process with the removal of European free movement, not to lower immigration. As one of the champions of Brexit, he clearly feels comfortable enough to set an agenda that includes high legal migration.

Foregrounding

What view/stance on the discourse of immigration control is promoted? What concepts, issues and ideologies are being emphasised?

All three speakers say that 'bad' immigrants are an issue to the degree that they imply they should not be in the UK. However, while Blair and May are at times disparaging, Johnson is almost polite about it. His attacks are mainly limited to the "gangs" who have "exploited" these 'bad' immigrants. Moreover, while Blair and May either discuss measures that will be taken or express sentiments against 'bad' immigrants, Johnson takes a different approach. Johnson is like an enthusiastic salesperson when he presents his Rwanda plan as an excellent opportunity. It is presented as a win-win situation where 'bad' immigrants have the chance to live in another "dynamic" country where they can thrive as 'good' immigrants whereas, simultaneously, it will rid Britain of these undesirable newcomers.

However, only May foregrounds immigration as a problem full stop. While Blair and Johnson embrace 'good' immigrants and the benefits of legal migration, May presents a list of reasons that make it clear that immigration has hurt most British people far more than it has helped. To May, high immigration has not been a force of good for Britain and she makes it her rallying call when she says "that's no reason to give up". Her pushback against immigrants can also be seen in phrases like "Britain First" and the powerful "Not in a thousand years."

Strikingly, in a discourse that can elicit strong feelings, only Blair attacks the other party. He consistently attacks both Michael Howard and the Conservatives. However, not once does May or Johnson target Labour or any other party. May's main pushback, besides immigrants, is against anyone who may object to her policies, and Johnson follows this line in a slightly softer way.

Another unique feature with May that ties in with her seemingly anti-immigrant sentiment is that her answer to stop 'bad' immigrants is money. She says, and indeed her policies show, that she would rather spend vast amounts of money than bring in higher numbers of immigrants. In practice, Johnson's Rwanda policy could also be very expensive as Britain would need to pay to upgrade facilities that at the moment can only hold a small number of people. However, it's not clear if Johnson planned for that many people to be sent there, and at this point, no one has been sent there.

Ideological Power

What examples can we see that the speaker projects their practice as common sense to promote their position?

When it comes to ideological power, not surprisingly, there is very little difference between the three speakers. In fact, it would be a surprise if there had been. After all, to successfully win control of the immigration discourse, the speaker will have to subtly make their ideologies look the most natural and sensible. The main way our speakers do this is by their implication that their practices occupy the safe centre ground, whereas the opponents are some types of extremists. In Blair's case, he paints the Conservatives with this brush, like when he accuses them of lurching to the right to use immigration "as a political weapon, an instrument of division and discord." May and Johnson on the other hand create their own targets. For May, it is "people on both extremes of the debate - from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left." For Johnson, there are some "who believe we should just turn these boats back at sea", and "open-borders" proponents who are a "vocal minority who will think these measures are draconian and lacking in compassion". This enables all three speakers to present themselves as the safe, sensible leader that the players can trust as opposed to their opponents who are on the fringes.

Another way the speakers successfully use ideological power is when they pretend to do something significant to make them look strong on one hand yet compassionate on the other. In Blair's case, his division of immigrants into two types, 'good' and 'bad', gives him a

flexibility that Michael Howard's anti-immigrant Conservatives don't have. While he can claim the Tories have pinned themselves into one extreme political corner, Blair can both praise and pick on immigrants when it suits him. In May's case, she focuses on foreign students who overstay their visa even though the small minority of overstayers are a fraction of European legal migration. She wants to show that she will not tolerate abuses of the system, but she still wants to be a friend of students. So she says things like "Students, yes; overstayers, no", and then puts the onus on the universities to take ownership for this despite it not being their responsibility. In Johnson's case, he makes it clear that he has to take action against 'bad' immigrants who he implies are not genuine, yet he also sympathises with them as victims of the "ruthless gangs". He implies that if anything, he wants to help them. In all cases, the speakers suggest that they calmly take the strong, yet appropriate action with care.

Power in Discourse

How does the speaker use selective facts/Hidden Power to promote their discourse to their constrained audience?

One of the main differences between the approach that Blair takes, compared with the other two, is he does not use hidden power to show his generosity. There are a couple of reasons for this. Firstly, when he is generous, it is not hidden as he is very open about his praise for 'good' immigrants, and this stance is present throughout his speech. Secondly, it will not help him to try to look more generous. Of the three speakers, he is under the most pressure from the players to the degree that to win control of the immigration discourse, or at least partial control, he has to compromise his previous 'open borders' approach for one that only accepts 'good' immigrants. The players feel that he's already been far too generous, so if anything, the onus is on him to be on the attack more.

May, on the other hand, feels pressure not to look too cold, particularly in light of the large number of Syrian refugees and others that came to Europe after the Kurdi tragedy. May feels the need to find the balance with the players, who she feels will agree with her, and look compassionate. So, her way is to imply that her policy is far more generous than most countries because she offers money instead of refuge. She tries to turn the argument to resettle more than the miniscule number of Syrians on its head with her claim that it's far better to work "with the vast numbers who remain in the region" than to bring in more. That way, she can claim that she's done more to help than most other countries. Of course, she neglects to mention how this money will be used or whether the countries with refugee camps

who receive the money will be held to account. She also implies that it is because of her caring side that her discourse is against immigration. She says the “costs of immigration” are unsustainable. However, immigrants aren’t to blame for the Tories’ failure to provide enough school places or build any new homes.

Johnson also uses hidden power to show his generosity. For example, he implies that Britain has been one of the world’s most generous countries to refugees since the Kurdi tragedy. Yet he uses very selective facts to support this claim. While Britain may have resettled 185,000 since 2015, to imply that Britain accepted more refugees is an overstatement, to put it mildly. We saw how Britain only took about 1% of Syrian refugees. The difference is that most of these refugees were not resettled from camps but came of their own accord. Johnson also conflates Hong Kong migrants with refugees which again distorts the numbers.

What the speakers do have in common is that all of them manipulate the facts to present their arguments. Blair, for example, tries to imply that he’s done a successful job with ‘bad’ immigrants that’s far better than anything the Conservatives would have done. However, he plays down the fact that the rise in asylum seekers happened under his watch and not the Tories. The argument that Labour has twice as many deportations is also selective as there are disproportionately far more ‘bad’ immigrants and that doesn’t include those that have been regularised.

May also manipulates the statistics. She at times uses inaccurate numbers and selectively places blame on students, a small proportion of net migration. She also consistently blames countries that “refuse to take” ‘bad’ immigrants back yet she neglects to say that most come from countries that the British government will not return them to. So, even if a country like Iran, Eritrea or Syria asked for their return, the British government would say no.

Johnson does not focus much on numbers like the other two, but he also plays with the facts to suit his discourse. For example, he praises the Ukrainian scheme for refugees as a great success but neglects to mention that his home secretary Priti Patel did everything possible to hold this up. His praise of “that dynamic country” Rwanda is also selective. His claim that he will give ‘bad’ immigrants the chance to become ‘good’ immigrants in Rwanda is not only extremely optimistic, but it hides the fact that they only have capacity to hold 200 people, a small fraction of 45,000. Johnson even manipulates his own family story to make his point. While his Turkish great-grandfather was tragically murdered in Turkey, the fact is

he had chosen to move back to Turkey on several occasions and was wealthy enough to pick and choose where he lived to begin with.

Backgrounding and Scapegoats

Can we see examples of the speaker backgrounding anything negative or using scapegoats?

Strikingly, all three speakers background the same thing, which is high legal immigration. This is much more of a challenge for Blair and May because the pressure from the players is so strong, but even Johnson does not highlight the fact the net migration is far higher under him than it was under their previous governments. It is continuously high immigration that caused Blair to make his speech, that caused May to attack immigration, and even for Johnson in a much more immigrant-friendly environment to feel the need to relabel it as “controlled immigration” while stressing it is not “open-borders”. Blair shifts the focus to ‘bad’ immigrants and implies that’s what the players are upset about. May focuses on groups like students and potential refugees but ignores the European freedom of movement, where the bulk of immigration comes from. This is particularly ironic because May’s speech is in essence anti-immigration, yet she never once says it’s this free movement that is the primary mover of the immigration needle. Johnson shows much more freedom to manoeuvre but even he plays down the idea he endorses high immigration. Rather he sticks to the moniker “controlled immigration”, which he stresses the people voted for with Brexit.

As a result, there are a lot of similarities in the scapegoats that the speakers use. All of them target ‘bad’ immigrants, who they often depict as young, single, and strong men. They also attack anyone who enables these ‘bad’ immigrants like the “system”, “immigration campaigners”, “advocates of open- door immigration”, or even the courts or employers. There are differences too. One of Blair’s biggest targets is Michael Howard and the Conservative party. Perhaps the most unusual scapegoat for May is the “growing economy”, as if to say that if Britain was poorer there’d be less motivation for immigrants to come. She also laments how much easier it is for migrants to come to the UK. Johnson focuses on the “criminal gangs”. Interestingly, he doesn’t blame countries that don’t take back migrants like the other two, but, rather, refers to them as “friends”.

Power behind Discourse

How does the speaker use power behind discourse such as formality/informality or connotations of particular words/metaphors to support their immigration discourse.

All three speeches are very informal, although there is one occasion when Blair suddenly appears to be more formal when he uses “one” instead of “you”. This is when he defends his stance on ‘good’ immigrants with “that’s precisely what one would want and expect with a strong and growing economy.” This is undoubtedly because he feels he can’t talk directly to the players as he promotes a pro-immigration opinion that they will reject. However, he uses “you” when he criticises the Tories, as he wants to remind the players that the Conservatives are incompetent and untrustworthy. On the other hand, May and Johnson use “you” when they’re talking to ‘bad’ immigrants or those who support them. A good example is when May says “you can play your part... or you can try to frustrate it. Also, Blair uses “we” by far and away the most, normally when he refers to his government. Strikingly, none of the speakers use “we” to include ‘bad’ immigrants.

All of them use powerful examples to support their discourse. Blair compares Michael Howard to former Labour leader Michael Foot, known as one of the least successful leaders in the party’s history. This speaks volumes when we consider that rather than find a Tory villain, Blair chose to compare him with someone from his own party, albeit two decades before. May dramatically describes how European countries are “resurrecting borders they’d once removed” as if these borders have been brought back to life and is something to be celebrated. Johnson enthusiastically celebrates the impact that ‘good’ immigrants have made “to the amazing story of the UK”. as if Britain’s “amazing story” is one of the wonders of the world. Clearly, Johnson embraces Britain’s diversity and how “that proud history of safe and legal migration” has contributed to it. ‘Bad’ immigrants on the other hand, “are betraying all those who do the right thing”.

One difference is that while Blair and May often use negative terminology to refer to ‘bad’ immigrants, Johnson treads lightly. He portrays them as victims and focuses more on the “ruthless gangs” who endanger them as they cross “the Channel into a watery graveyard”.

Collocation and Repetition

Any examples of collocation to promote ideology about immigrants? Or repeated words/phrases to drum home a point.

All three speakers repeat keywords to help naturalise the immigration discourse. Blair often uses the word “economy” when he talks about ‘good’ immigrants to highlight how important they are. When he attacks the Tories, he often uses the word “exploit” and “opportunistically”. May often uses words like “system” and “approach” when she discusses the need to clamp down on immigration. She calls for a new “approach” to immigration, but she rejects a common “European approach” where she exclaims “Not in a thousand years.” For Johnson, an often-recycled word is “control”.

All have examples of collocation. For example, when Blair targets ‘bad’ immigrants, he often places the word “fair” close to the word “concern”. For May and Johnson, the words that appear near these keywords affect the connotation of the word. For example, when May uses the word “system” it has a negative connotation if it co-occurs with “abuse”, “manipulate” or “visa”. Conversely, when words like “immigration”, “control” and “strict” co-occur with it, the connotation is positive. This also happens with Johnson and the word “immigration”. When he uses it with “control” or “legal”, “immigration” has positive connotations, but when it’s next to “uncontrolled”, it is negative.

All of them consistently use modal verbs but in different ways. Besides Blair’s extensive use of the auxiliary verb “have” to show how much he’s achieved, he often uses “will”. “Will” has an expressive value of a promise and he regularly accompanies it with “we”, like when he promises “we will put in place strict controls”. However, he never uses one of May’s favourite modal verbs “must”, with its expressive value of obligation. A primary example is when she says, “they must return home” or “they must be made to leave the country quickly”. Johnson also uses “must” but in a much less assertive way than May, and even then, he never uses ‘bad’ immigrants as the semantic objects. When he uses modal verbs, he’s far more likely to use it in non-transactive sentences like “the people smugglers must be stopped” or “it will end the absurd practice”.

Summary

Through CDA we have seen that both Tony Blair and Boris Johnson portray legal immigration positively, while Theresa May portrays immigration negatively. However, there is variation in the way they present their discourse which is influenced by the pressure, or lack of it, from the other two players, as well as their own individual points of view. For example, while both Blair and Johnson praise ‘good’ immigrants, we can see how Blair has been forced into this speech from the players. Johnson’s speech, conversely, reflects a

complete lack of pressure, even though he responds to the issue of the small boats crossing with a controversial proposal. Nonetheless, both speeches come across as pro-immigration in their own different ways, whereas May's speech comes across as, and indeed was received as, hostile to immigration. May, like Blair, would also have been under pressure from the players as, with the impending Brexit referendum, immigration would be one of the biggest issues. As a result, we can see similarities in the active approaches of both Blair and May where they or their government are the clear agents who seek to "crack down" on immigrants, while Johnson's speech is far more passive. While May and Blair focus on numbers, Johnson is relaxed about numbers as long as there's "control". Where their speeches have bite, Johnson's comes across at times as an enthusiastic salesperson with a good pitch. There are other differences too, like how Blair and Johnson define a 'good' immigrant vs a 'bad' one. However, both speeches embrace immigration while May's speech views it as a problem.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was twofold. My aim was to use the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis to determine the two research questions stated below.

1. Has British immigration discourse gone in a circle in the last 20 years?
2. Following on from that, is the government's discourse and policy on immigration heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people?

My expectation was that these questions would be very much inter-related. The idea was that immigration discourse is not just controlled by one party but rather involves a struggle in the battle over the power of language and subsequently how the language is used to sway the message. As these questions themselves are difficult to answer with so much available information, I therefore determined that the best way to approach this question was to examine three government speeches from three different times in our time period that shared the fact that they focus solely on immigration. The first speech is by then Labour prime minister Tony Blair in April 2005, the second is by Conservative home secretary Theresa May in 2015 shortly before she became prime minister, while the third is by Conservative prime minister Boris Johnson in April 2022. In order for my main research question to hold water, I would need to establish that both the first speech and the third speech promoted a similar ideology, whereas the second speech went in a totally different direction. What would these ideologies be? The idea would be that both the first and third speeches would have a discourse that promotes 'good' immigrants yet denigrates 'bad' immigrants, while the second speech contrasts to this with a negative tone on immigration. As I proceeded, I attempted to also determine if the other two players have influenced these speeches and the government's immigration discourse or if the government is not really affected by this.

The first thing that I had to determine is exactly how I would use CDA. As we saw earlier, "there is no single view of what CDA actually is" (Paltridge 2022, p. 214). So I had to find a version of CDA that worked best for me. I drew inspiration from the idea that CDA uses language to demonstrate "structural relations of ... power" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10). However, the power relations I would investigate were not between those with power and those without such as immigrants, but rather between three powerful groups, the government, the media, and the people. So I determined that I would examine what Fairclough calls "interpretation" (1989, p. 26), or the "interaction" between the party that is producing the text, in this case the three government speakers, and the ones on the receiving

end, which would be the two players. From this “interpretation” I would seek to find an “explanation” for why the speakers have said what they have said and what it really means. I expected that at the root of my two research questions we could find evidence that there was a power struggle between the government and the players for control, in this case control of the immigration discourse. Moreover, this power struggle never ends but evolves. As Fairclough says, “power... is never definitely held by any one person or social grouping because it can be won... and lost” (1989, p. 43). Therefore, if this power struggle continues to evolve and change, it implies that the immigration discourse would follow suit and could very well go in a circle over time. So, I needed to create a blueprint for how I would use CDA to examine how the three powerful actors used their speeches to manipulate the immigration discourse so that they could maintain, or try to maintain, control, and thus power.

However, before I applied CDA I needed to establish why this potential immigration discourse circle started 20 years ago and not before. The historical background section explained how the triangular relationship between the three players came to exist to begin with. What we established was that all three stakeholders have a degree of power over each other. The government can implement policy against the other two and makes the laws. However, the media can choose to be a ‘player’ and get the government in trouble to the degree it could be voted out by the people or humiliated. They do this through popular sentiment to stir the people. The media can control the people, but they are also dependent on them. If the people don’t hear what they want, they will stop buying the papers. Therefore, the media sometimes must decide to be a ‘spectator’ and not a ‘player’. However, the reason all of this became relevant roughly 20 years ago is that before that, Britain had been one of the few Western lands that had ‘zero’ net migration. Even during times of mass migration, like after WWII, just as many people left as arrived. This changed shortly before Blair’s election, and during most of his administration, Britain saw a sharp rise in net migration that has continued to this present day, including during the reign of all three speeches.

I then applied CDA. The aspects of the speeches I looked out for were the background, the structure, foregrounding, the use of ideological power, power in discourse, backgrounding and scapegoating, power behind discourse, and finally, collocation and repetition. After I had analysed them, I did a comparison between them.

I found a generally positive answer to both of my research questions. For the first on whether British immigration discourse has gone in a circle in the last 20 years, I found that Tony Blair and Boris Johnson’s speeches had far more in common with how they portrayed

immigrants and immigration than the middle speech by Theresa May. Blair and Johnson both portray legal immigrants positively. Theresa May does not and paints a rather bleak picture of immigration generally. However, there are some ways that Blair and May's speeches have much more in common than Johnson's. Their speeches come across as much more assertive, almost aggressive even, while Johnson's passive speech is full of enthusiasm. May and Blair focus extensively on numbers and statistics, whereas that seems like an irrelevance to Johnson, whose main focus is control. Besides this, the fundamental differences between Johnson and Blair is that while both promote 'good' immigrants and denigrate 'bad' ones, their definition of 'good' immigrants differs, as does their approach. While Blair sees most 'good' immigrants as economic migrants, Johnson embraces some refugees as 'good', as long as they come from the right places like Hong Kong or Ukraine. Furthermore, while Blair demonises 'bad' immigrants as he panders to the players, Johnson mostly portrays them as victims. So the immigration discourse does not go in a symmetrical circle but, rather, a slightly different shape like perhaps a sphere.

This ties directly into the second question of whether the government's discourse and policy on immigration are heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people. There is no doubt that this is the case. The reason that Blair and May take the tone that they do is because of the pressure they have felt from the players. They also feel other pressures, like Blair's from Michael Howard and May from the impending Brexit vote but, these are still directly influenced by the players. The media was able to become a 'player' with Howard in a way they couldn't previously because the people responded to the immigration issue. Similarly, the immigration debate was a huge part of not just the Brexit vote but the preceding years when UKIP came to prominence. On the contrary, the only pressure Johnson feels is to deal with the small boats crossings. However, he is under no pressure about legal migration, which reaches record levels under his watch, due to the change in tone of the players. As we saw, the players, perhaps affected by Brexit and Covid, had certainly changed their tune in 2022. However, irrespective of if they're for or against immigration, the players influence the government. So, whether it's ideological or hidden power, repeated or emotive words, or any of the other facets that the CDA analysis revealed, all three speakers use every tactic they can to impress. They wouldn't feel the need to do this if they didn't think they had to impress the players.

To conclude, it is evident that Britain's immigration discourse has alternated back and forth in the last 20 years. It has gone from one that promotes 'good' immigrants and pushes

back against 'bad' ones to a discourse that portrays immigration negatively before it reverts to the first narrative. Both the government's discourse and policy on immigration are heavily influenced by the other two players, the media and the people. That doesn't mean that the government will just blindly accept the players' prerogative. Even though Blair was forced to cede ground, he still found a way through his ideology of 'good' and 'bad' immigrants to continue with at least some of his pro-immigration policy. Moreover, it's unlikely that May would have been as generous as Johnson was when he opened the doors to Hong Kongers. What is clear however, is that while certain tweaks can be made one way or the other, the government cannot let its immigration discourse sway too far from the players. Otherwise, it risks an embarrassing climbdown, and a potentially long wait in opposition.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Tony Blair's Speech on Asylum and Immigration (Blair, 2005)

I said at the manifesto launch that I would deal with the issue of asylum and immigration during this campaign. I do so today, and have chosen to do so in a detailed speech so that this issue can be examined in detail and in perspective.

Concern over asylum and immigration is not about racism. It is about fairness.

People want to know that the rules and systems we have in place are fair - fair to hard-working taxpayers who deserve to know that others are playing by the rules; fair to those who genuinely need asylum and who use the correct channels; fair to those legitimate migrants who make such a major contribution to our economy.

People also want to know that those they elect to government get it. That we are listening. We do get it. We are listening.

It is precisely because we have been working hard at it that, over the past few years, asylum claims have fallen in Britain faster than anywhere else in Europe. But we know we have to tighten the asylum system further.

I also understand concern over immigration controls. We will put in place strict controls that work. They will be part of our first legislative programme if we are re-elected on May 5.

These controls will include the type of points system used in Australia, for example, to help ensure our economy gets the skills we need.

But I never want this to be an issue that divides our country that sets communities against each other. We are a tolerant, decent nation. That tolerance should not be abused. But neither should it be turned on its head.

It is the duty of government to deal with the issues of both asylum and immigration. But they should not be exploited by a politics that, in desperation, seeks refuge in them.

There is a position around which this country can unify; that we continue to root out abuse of the asylum system, but give a place to genuine refugees; that we ensure immigration controls are effective so that the many who come, rightly and necessarily, for our economy, to work, study or visit here can do so; but that those who stay illegally are removed; but that we never use these issues as a political weapon, an instrument of division and discord.

We deal with it, but with care, responsibly and recognising that, in our nation today, our diversity is a source of strength, not weakness, a reflection of a modern country striving to be at ease with the modern world.

Let me also make clear my objection to the Tory campaign on this issue.

Their campaign is based on the statement that it isn't racist to talk about immigration. I know of no senior politician who has ever said it was. So why do they put it like that? Why do they say we "pussy foot" around on this issue when they know perfectly well we have been legislating on it, from 1998 onwards, and tightening the system - often in the face of their opposition.

It is an attempt deliberately to exploit people's fears, to suggest that, for reasons of political correctness, those in power don't dare deal with the issue, so that the public is left with the impression that they are being silenced in their concerns, that we are blindly ignoring them or telling them that to raise the issue is racist, when actually the opposite is true.

The Tory party have gone from being a one nation party to being a one-issue party.

Afraid to talk about the economy, embarrassed by the sheer ineptitude of their economic plan, unable to defend their unfair and elitist NHS and schools policies, unable to explain how they would finance the extra police they are promising, they are left with this one-issue campaign on asylum and immigration.

Worse, since it is the issue they are pushing so hard at local constituency level, street by street, you might at least expect them to have a coherent policy on it.

Instead, as I shall show, their policy on asylum is a joke, an incoherent babble, while their policy for a quota on immigration is utterly meaningless unless they tell us roughly what it should be and how it is to be calculated.

It is an approach to policy-making that Labour would have looked askance at in 1983, let alone any election since.

So why is this issue so easy to exploit? Because it is hard to tackle. Britain is not alone in facing it. Every EU nation is facing it. So is America. So are all the major economies of the world.

It is part of a changing modern world. As the Tories know perfectly well, the solutions are complex, the systems hard to administer.

That's why, on asylum and immigration, I have been out to see for myself what has been happening, talking to a huge range of people involved at every level of the system.

From the immigration officers checking passports at Heathrow, to the staff who fingerprint asylum seekers at Croydon, to the team who track down illegal immigrants in north London, to those responsible for redocumenting failed asylum seekers and actually loading them to flights home. I've lost count of the meetings I have chaired on this issue, and the number of people in the system I have met.

I listened to these people, and what I heard was people working tirelessly to make our country and borders secure, but too often frustrated by a system that hampered them when it should have been helping them. It was from them that I heard about the problem of asylum seekers destroying their identity documents to prevent removal.

So we've legislated to make it an offence to enter the UK without a valid passport, without a reasonable excuse. The power is being well used and is making a real difference. And now we are rolling out by biometric visas to deal with the problem at source. It was from them that I heard about asylum applicants playing the system through an over complex appeal system. So we've introduced a single tier of appeal, we've limited the scope of legal aid, and we've weeded out cowboy immigration advisers.

It was from the front line that I heard the courts aren't taking illegal working seriously so, in our manifesto, we are committed to bring in fixed penalty fines of £2,000 on employers for each illegal employee we find.

But the progress we have made, the progress that we will continue to make doesn't come from grand rhetoric, it doesn't come from clever-sounding wheezes. The progress we have made comes from being clear about what matters. It comes from clarity about the real nature and scale of the problem. It comes from listening to those who we ask to keep our borders secure and giving them the right rules and the right tools to do the job.

It comes from policy derived from the facts. These are the facts.

First, asylum. Asylum application numbers did rise after 1997, as they did in much of the rest of the EU, due to external pressures, but we have legislated to address the situation and the numbers have fallen rapidly. Asylum applications have fallen from over 8,000 a month at the peak in the autumn of 2002 to just over 2,000. The next set of statistics will show that monthly applications are back to their lowest level since March 1997, and have fallen twice as fast as in the rest of Europe.

Asylum applications are being dealt with far quicker than ten years ago. More than four in five asylum decisions are now made within two months. And far more of those whose claims are rejected are being removed - 12,430 removals in 2004, as against 4,820 in 1996. Now the

facts on immigration. More people are entering the UK than was the case ten years ago to work or study. But that's precisely what one would want and expect with a strong and growing economy and world-class universities successful in attracting record numbers of international students, and helping to drive our knowledge-based economy.

Foreign students alone contribute £5bn to the UK economy, including a growing proportion of the funding for our universities. With unemployment half the rate it is in France or Germany and 600,000 vacancies, there are plenty of jobs that need doing.

But what Michael Howard doesn't point out is that net migration - the number of people entering the country, minus the number leaving - has actually been falling in recent years, and in 2003 was the lowest it has been since 1998.

Nor does he like to admit that, in international terms, we are not a high immigration country. Even today, we have lower levels of foreign-born nationals as a proportion of our total population than France or Germany and half the foreign born workforce proportion of the United States.

On illegal immigration, no-one, of course, knows precisely how many people are here illegally. Michael Howard himself admitted as much when he said in 1995: "There are no official estimates of the number of illegal immigrants into the United Kingdom. By its very nature, illegal immigration is difficult to measure and any estimates would be highly speculative".

So those are the facts. On asylum, there are continuing issues to be addressed to make the asylum system more efficient and effective - and on immigration, we have nothing to fear from legal immigration, and the issue is whether we are attracting as many of the highest value immigrants as we can, and what more we can do to crack down on illegal immigration.

Let me now turn to the position we inherited from Michael Howard as home secretary in 1997 and give the facts there, too.

Under Michael Howard, asylum applications rose - by 13% if you compare his last 12 months as home secretary with his first.

The backlog of asylum applications rose - and had reached 60,000, six times current levels, by the end of 1996.

The time taken to deal with applications rose and had reached an average of 20 months for initial decisions by April 1997.

And the number of failed applicants removed from the country was minimal. As I said a moment ago, it was only 4,820 in 1996, which was one removal for every 6.6 refusals of applications.

Step by step, we've been working to deal with this legacy.

We have doubled the number of immigration officers - from 2,400 in 1997 to 4,800 today. It is this doubling of capacity which has, for example, enabled us to double the rate at which we return failed asylum seekers: there is now one removal for every 3.3 refused applications, which though not nearly good enough is twice as good as the one removal for every 6.6 which we inherited.

We have changed asylum procedures and laws so that, for example, those trying to claim asylum from countries which are manifestly safe, like Slovakia, Bulgaria or Jamaica, can now only appeal against a refusal once they have left the UK.

We have introduced stricter border controls and invested millions in strengthening Channel Tunnel security and installing x-ray equipment to scan every lorry going through Calais and automatic fines for drivers trying to bring in clandestines.

Over 500 UK immigration officers are working in Northern France and Belgium to stop undocumented passengers getting on ferries or trains to the UK.

Airline Liaison Officers are now located at key airports around the world stopping passengers boarding where there is high risk of abuse. Last year alone, 33,000 individuals intending to come here were denied boarding at airports as a result of checks by these liaison officers.

We have tightened the rules on benefits so that they only go to those who claim asylum as soon as possible after arriving in the UK, and introduced much tougher controls on legal aid so that it is restricted to legitimate advisers - to weed out the cowboys who were preying on vulnerable migrants.

We've overhauled the appeals system and the new offence of destroying documents has led, with other initiatives, to a fall of over 50% in undocumented arrivals at ports of entry.

We also negotiated successfully with the French government to close the Sangatte refugee camp, which was a major source of unfounded asylum applicants to Britain. And under David Blunkett, we sought to integrate successful asylum applicants better and more swiftly into British society with new language and citizenship requirements.

On illegal immigration, the doubling of the number of immigration officers has enabled us to crack down on illegal working in a wholly more systematic fashion than in the past. Last year, the Immigration Service carried out 1,600 operations against illegal working, a 360%

increase on the year before. There has also been systematic action against addresses purporting to be education establishments for overseas students: more than 1,200 suspect colleges have been investigated, of which more than 300 have been closed as a result. You would have expected, given their rhetoric in this election, that Mr Howard and the Conservatives would have supported these changes - sheepishly, given their poor record, but supported them nonetheless.

Yet far from being supportive, the Tories have often done their best to block our proposals, seeking opportunistically to cause us the maximum short-term difficulties in getting our legislation through parliament into law. While they talk tough today, their voting record tells quite a different story.

They tried to stop us fining lorry drivers caught smuggling illegal immigrants into the country - by voting against our £2,000 civil penalties for hauliers in 1999 .

They voted to restore benefits to asylum seekers in 1999 and argued against our proposals to remove support from families whose claimed were rejected and who had exhausted the appeals system but still refused to go home.

They even voted to allow child abductors, thieves and bomb hoaxers to remain as refugees when the government wanted to exclude anyone sentenced to prison for two or more years from lodging an asylum claim in 2002.

Even as recently as last year, they were voting against simplifying the complex appeals system, and in fact tried to lengthen the process. They also forced us to abandon our ID cards legislation just before this election.

So much for the Tory record, both in government before 1997 and in opposition since then. Meanwhile, we have got on - without alarmist rhetoric - with improving the system and dealing with problems one by one. Our manifesto sets out, in detail, how we will build on the changes and improvements already made.

On both asylum and immigration, there have to be systems which are fair, workable and secure.

People feel it's unfair if they have to work hard, but see others getting benefits or help they're not entitled to.

So we will go on building strong controls to protect our borders; improving systems for tracking and returning illegal immigrants and individuals whose asylum claims are turned down; and ensuring that those who use the health or education services, and claim benefits, are entitled to them.

Today, we are announcing an extra 600 immigration officers, in addition to the 2,400 extra recruited since 1997. They will be targeted, in particular, on removals and enforcement operations in respect of failed asylum applicants and illegal immigrants.

In strengthening controls, we will use technology to help us. That's why we propose to introduce identity cards - to use the technology of tomorrow, biometric cards with retina scans and fingerprints to ensure that we better identify and control who's in the country legally and who's not; that people are who they say they are, and those who have the right to use public services get those rights and those who don't, can't.

If elected for a third term, we will reintroduce the ID Cards bill as soon as parliamentary time allows and challenge the Conservatives to support us this time round, having opportunistically blocked the passage of the bill before the election.

On asylum, we want fast-track processing and removal of as many unfounded applicants as possible with more detention and the use of electronic tagging where there is a risk of asylum applicants disappearing. We have set a target of removals exceeding applications for the first time ever.

To speed up removal of those who lose or destroy their documents before claiming, we will introduce finger-printing of all visa applicants before they travel to the UK to prevent people concealing their identity after entry and we will ask airlines to copy documents before people board on more high risk routes.

On migration, we will bring in a points system so that people who want to settle here are the people we need to build the strong economy and services for Britain's future.

We will introduce targeted financial bonds for specific categories of migrants where there is evidence of abuse to guarantee that they go home when they are supposed to go home - while avoiding the burdens on business of the Tories' blanket scheme.

We will phase out low skill migration schemes in the light of the migrant workforce now available to employers from the new EU states in central and eastern Europe.

We will bring in fixed penalty fines of up to £2,000 for each illegal employee taken on by unscrupulous employers.

For those planning to stay longer, we will restrict the right of settlement to skilled workers like doctors, engineers, nurses or teachers and will introduce English language tests for those hoping to settle permanently.

And we will end so called chain migration with no immediate or automatic right for relatives to bring in their own dependents.

These are practical and sensible proposals to root our abuse - but to maintain the migration that helps underpin our economy and our prosperity.

What about the Tory policies - stripping away all the rhetoric and looking at the specific policies they are proposing?

Today we publish an analysis of why the specific Tory proposals simply don't add up.

Mr Howard says he will introduce a quota on both immigrants and asylum seekers. But he won't give numbers, though we were promised months ago that there would be numbers for these quotas in their manifesto. Nor will he say the basis on which either of these quotas will be calculated.

All these are vital issues. He says that quotas are at the heart of his policy. But he won't give even a ballpark estimate of what the quotas would be - because, as he knows, he would immediately open a Pandora's Box of questions and concerns about those numbers.

The next Michael Howard immigration policy, given a special launch, was to bring in 24 hour controls at all ports. That policy disintegrated in less than 24 hours, when it became clear that there are 650 ports of entry and airports in the UK and they couldn't even afford - let alone practically introduce - 24 hour coverage in even a small fraction of this number.

Another key policy is to withdraw from the Geneva Convention on Refugees. But what would this unilateral treaty withdrawal mean? It would mean Britain standing alone, unable to work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify and manage within the rules those people who have a genuine claim to asylum and those who don't.

Then we come to the flagship Tory asylum policy: the fantasy island to process asylum claims quickly and cheaply without the applicants needing to stay in the UK while this is done. It is two years now since this unnamed offshore island or country was announced - and he still can't say where it would be.

Eighty per cent of asylum-seekers in Britain now claim in-country - ie not at a port but at an inland centre. Is he seriously saying there is some other country that is going to offer to take these people and process their claims for us?

His home affairs spokesman admitted yesterday they had made zero progress on finding anywhere. And Mr Howard's earlier claims of five countries that already had such centres was another fantasy, denounced by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees.

There is a simple reason why he can't say which country would process UK asylum seekers. There isn't one. Furthermore, all the estimates of the costs of such centres - based on Australian experience in using centres located on islands close to Australia to deal with a

small proportion of their claimants - suggest a far higher unit cost than our system - when the Tories claim that it would save money.

But the most extraordinary Tory policy of all is the claim by Michael Howard that he could achieve all of the above while at the same time halving the amount that the government spends on the Immigration Service as part of the James Review which was dreamed up as an exercise to make tax cuts and spending increases add up.

Just consider what his claim that he could save £897.6m a year means. This is more than the combined budget the Immigration Service spends on all of its border control staff, on running detention camps for illegal immigrants and on the in-country enforcement operations to track down illegal workers and failed asylum seekers.

So Mr Howard's policies aren't going anywhere. They aren't practical. And they aren't costed. And if the Tory plans won't work and aren't funded, what will happen? Confusion at best; chaos at worst - and in either event, a loss of national and international confidence in the effectiveness of our asylum and immigration policies.

So it's chaos from Michael Howard or proper, workable controls from Labour.

In all this talk about quotas and caps, many will understandably think there is a new uncertainty, even hostility, to the position of migrants and their families in Britain.

I think most people know the huge contribution that immigrants have made to our country.

Not just historically - the million and a half Irish migrants to this country in the 19th century; the 120,000 Jewish people who came here before the first world war, largely fleeing persecution in Russia and eastern Europe; the 160,000 Poles who settled here after the second world war, soon followed by large numbers of Italians and then workers from the West Indies and South Asia and, more recently, significant migration from other European countries within the EU.

All these migrants are part of the rich fabric of our nation, every bit as British and valued as any other member of our society.

We also see the positive contribution of contemporary migrants all about us today. In the health service, a million people employed, nearly a third of them first or second generation immigrants. In 2003, one-third of all work permits issued were for health service workers. In financial services - a sector which now employs 300,000 and brings billions of pounds into our economy - migrants play a key role in some of the most skilled jobs in the world.

We will not turn our back on these or other migrants contributing so much to our economy and our society. Without them, London would not be the financial capital of Europe. Without them, how would the NHS actually work?

And when people are fleeing persecution, from Rwanda, Kosovo, Zimbabwe, British people extend their generosity.

I don't underestimate the essential generosity of British people.

When the Tsunami disaster hit South East Asia. Who gave the most? The British people. So let no-one say British people aren't decent, aren't generous.

But those same people, working hard, sometimes struggling, sometimes feeling alone in that struggle to get by, they need to know that their worries are being recognised.

And it's our duty as politicians not to exploit those worries, those anxieties, but deliver workable solutions to ease genuine concerns. So we will be dealing appropriately with the issues in asylum and immigration.

What we won't ever do is play politics with them, or use them to undo the fantastic work that has been done - and is being done - to improve race and community relations in Britain.

And alongside the tackling of abuse, we will continue to make the case for the benefits that immigrants bring to our economy and our society.

So the next time you see a Tory poster, or the next time you hear a Tory spokesman squirm when he is asked where the Tory fantasy offshore processing centre is actually going to be, remember - words are easy, change is tough; frightening the people is easy, fighting the problem is tough.

Not ignoring the issue and not exploiting the issue, but dealing with the issue - that is our duty, that is our pledge.

Appendix 2

Theresa May's speech to the Conservative Party Conference – in full (May, 2005)

“Thank you, Arminka, Baroness Helic, for that incredible, personal story. From Bosnia to Britain, from arriving here as a refugee to serving the public in government and in the House of Lords, your story is an inspiration to us all. So, on behalf of everybody here today, thank you.

Before I begin, I'm sure I speak for everyone at Conference when I say that our thoughts and prayers are with the family, friends and colleagues of Police Constable David Phillips who was killed in the line of duty in the small hours of yesterday morning. PC Phillips, who served with Merseyside Police, leaves behind a loving wife, Jennifer, and two young daughters, Abigail and Sophie.

His death serves as a reminder of the very real dangers our police officers face, day in, day out.

Ten days ago I attended the National Police Memorial Day service where we remember all police officers who have died in service to the public. The police put themselves in harm's way to keep us all safe, dealing with dangerous situations and taking risks so that that we can live our lives safely and securely.

I know that officers across the country – particularly here in the North West of England – and the members of the public they serve have been deeply saddened by yesterday's news – and humbled by the bravery that officers such as PC Phillips show.

We owe them all our gratitude.

2,000 miles away, in towns and cities across Syria, eleven million men, women and children have been forced from their homes. More than four million have become refugees. And nearly a quarter of a million have been killed.

More than 600,000 Syrians are taking refuge in Jordan, a country that before the conflict had a population of little more than six million. There are more than one million finding respite in Lebanon, which previously had a population of just over four million. By the end of the year, the United Nations believes there will be a further 1.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

These people are fleeing a civil war that exceeds even the other conflicts of the Middle East in its barbarism, brutality and bloodshed.

Bashar al Assad's forces are committing war crimes on an industrial scale, deliberately targeting civilians and poisoning their own citizens with chemical weapons. ISIL – the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – is engaged in a programme of ethnic cleansing, mass murder of enemy soldiers, systematised rape and sexual violence, kidnappings and murder.

And the other players in this appalling civil war include Hezbollah, Al Nusra Front – a jihadist group affiliated to Al Qaeda – and several other jihadist militias.

These militias in turn are often backed by powerful foreign sponsors, and the forces of Bashar al Assad are supported by Iran and Russia – whose warplanes are engaged in airstrikes against civilians and anti-government fighters.

So it is too simplistic to say that there is a single intervention which will bring a sudden end to the fighting. There is no easy solution to the civil war in Syria, and we must learn the lessons of the past.

But that does not mean Britain should do nothing. We must work to get the states that sponsor the different armies and militias around the negotiating table. We must do what we can to support friendly states and moderate elements within other states in the region. And – because of the clear threat they pose to Britain's national security – we must take action against ISIL not just in Iraq but in Syria too.

To those who question the morality of RAF strikes against terrorists in Syria – and we recently heard those opinions expressed in Parliament – I say these people have taken the conscious decision to make themselves our enemies. They plan to attack our country and kill our citizens. And they need to know – even if they are British nationals – that if they plan to do harm to this country, if they want to take the lives of British citizens, we will make sure that they have no place to hide.

We must also do everything possible to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. Since the start of the war we've granted asylum to more than 5,000 Syrians in Britain. We've created a resettlement scheme to find – working with the UN – the most vulnerable refugees in the region and bring them to our country. And as the Prime Minister announced last month, we will take in 20,000 Syrian refugees over the course of this Parliament – a decision not imposed on us by Europe, but a decision taken by Britain, an independent sovereign country. But the best way of helping the most people is not by bringing relatively small numbers of refugees to this country, but by working with the vast numbers who remain in the region. That's why Britain is spending £1 billion in and around Syria on humanitarian aid, caring for

refugees and helping the governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to cope with the huge numbers of refugees they've received. After the United States, Britain is the biggest donor country in the region, and no European country has come close to matching the amount we're spending there.

Thanks to our help, hungry families are getting food, thirsty people are getting clean water, and children who have been orphaned or separated from their parents are getting help. This is more than Britain has ever spent in response to a humanitarian disaster – and we should be immensely proud of the difference we are making.

The crisis in Syria sparked a debate this summer not just about foreign policy and military intervention but about refugees and immigration. With more than 430,000 migrants having reached Europe by sea this year, the countries of Europe resurrecting borders they'd once removed, and thousands of people in Calais trying to reach Britain illegally, some people have argued that we're on the verge of a 'great age of migration', in which national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life.

But people on both extremes of the debate – from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left – conflate refugees in desperate need of help with economic migrants who simply want to live in a more prosperous society. Their desire for a better life is perfectly understandable, but their circumstances are not nearly the same as those of the people fleeing their homelands in fear of their lives. There are millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain, and there is a limit to the amount of immigration any country can and should take. While we must fulfil our moral duty to help people in desperate need, we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country. Because when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it's impossible to build a cohesive society. It's difficult for schools and hospitals and core infrastructure like housing and transport to cope. And we know that for people in low-paid jobs, wages are forced down even further while some people are forced out of work altogether.

Now I know there are some people who say, yes there are costs of immigration, but the answer is to manage the consequences, not reduce the numbers. But not all of the consequences can be managed, and doing so for many of them comes at a high price. We need to build 210,000 new homes every year to deal with rising demand. We need to find 900,000 new school places by 2024. And there are thousands of people who have been forced out of the labour market, still unable to find a job.

But even if we could manage all the consequences of mass immigration, Britain does not need net migration in the hundreds of thousands every year. Of course, immigrants plug skills shortages and it's right that we should try to attract the best talent in the world, but not every person coming to Britain right now is a skilled electrician, engineer or doctor. The evidence – from the OECD, the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee and many academics – shows that while there are benefits of selective and controlled immigration, at best the net economic and fiscal effect of high immigration is close to zero. So there is no case, in the national interest, for immigration of the scale we have experienced over the last decade. Neither is it true that, in the modern world, immigration is no longer possible to control. The experience of the last five years is that where the Government has the political will to reduce immigration, it can do so. We rooted out abuse of the student visa system, and the numbers went down. We reformed family visas, and the numbers went down. We capped economic migration from outside the EU, and – despite the growing economy – the numbers remained stable. Overall, after my first two years as Home Secretary, net migration – which had reached 320,000 in 2005 – fell to 154,000.

Since then, however, the numbers have doubled once more. One of the reasons is student visas. And let me be clear about students.

We welcome students coming to study. But the fact is, too many of them are not returning home as soon as their visa runs out. If they have a graduate job, that is fine. If not, they must return home. So I don't care what the university lobbyists say: the rules must be enforced. Students, yes; over-stayers, no. And the universities must make this happen.

Another reason is European migration. For years, net migration from within the EU was balanced. The number of people coming to the UK was matched by the number of Brits and Europeans moving to other EU countries. In recent years, the figures have become badly unbalanced – partly because our growing economy is creating huge numbers of jobs.

The numbers coming from Europe are unsustainable and the rules have to change. At the moment, for example, workers coming to the UK on very low salaries can claim over £10,000 on top of their salary in benefits – which makes the UK a hugely attractive destination. This is not good for us – or for the countries those people are leaving.

That is why the PM is right to target the amount we pay in benefits for those coming to the UK to work, and put these arrangements on a sensible basis.

So those are the main reasons why net migration is still too high. But the trouble is, other changes mean that without the right policies it's going to get even harder to keep the numbers

down. Modern forms of communication, cheaper international travel, and the increase in relative prosperity for many people in the developing world mean that larger numbers of people are more mobile than ever before. And this is compounded by several other factors. For years, despite its many other flaws and its criminal leadership, Libya was known as Europe's 'forward border'. British immigration officials worked there with their European and Libyan counterparts to stop illegal immigration from Africa at its source. Now the criminal gangs that smuggle people into Europe have been able to work unimpeded. Free movement rules don't just mean European nationals have the right to reside in Britain, they now mean anybody who has married a European can come here almost without condition. And Schengen – the agreement that abolished borders between EU states apart from Britain and Ireland – means that once a migrant arrives in a country with weak border controls, like Greece, they can make their way across Europe and into Germany, or up to the British border at Calais, without checks. Many of those people will eventually get EU citizenship and the free movement rights that come with it.

Even actions taken with the best of intentions have consequences. When the German Government, motivated by compassion and decency, said they expected to receive 800,000 asylum seekers this year, it prompted hundreds of thousands of people to try to get to Germany. Some of these people were refugees coming directly from Syria or the camps in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, but many – in fact, up to half of them – were migrants from other parts of the world.

So reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that's no reason to give up. As our manifesto said, 'we must work to control immigration and put Britain first'.

We have to do this for the sake of our society and our public services – and for the sake of the people whose wages are cut, and whose job security is reduced, when immigration is too high.

And there's another reason. Without controlled immigration, there will be less public support for taking in refugees. And – while we cannot solve every problem in every corner of the world by granting asylum to everybody in difficulty – we do have a moral duty to help people in need. We should play our part.

The trouble is, the asylum system was abused for years. Under Labour it was just another way of getting here to work. In 2002, there were more than 84,000 applications for asylum. This alone constituted 49 per cent of net migration to Britain. And we ended up with a backlog of nearly half a million cases.

We now have much more control in the system than we've had for a long time – even with Syria, there were just over 25,000 applications last year, which was only eight per cent of net migration – but in truth the whole way in which we manage asylum is not right for the modern world.

The system is geared towards helping those most able to access it, and sometimes manipulate it, for their own ends – those who are young enough, fit enough, and have the resources to get to Britain. But that means support is too often denied to the most vulnerable, and those most in need of our help.

At the moment, the main way people claim asylum here is when they're already in Britain. That fails on three counts. First, it encourages vulnerable people to take dangerous and illegal journeys to get here, often by putting themselves at the mercy of gangs of human traffickers and people smugglers. Second, instead of helping those in greatest need, it rewards the wealthiest, the luckiest and the strongest. Three quarters of asylum seekers in Britain are men and the vast majority are in their twenties. And third, it means people abuse the system by claiming asylum when their visa ends or by making spurious legal appeals to stay in the country for as long as possible. More than half of all asylum claims fail, and three quarters of people denied asylum appeal their decision in the courts.

This is not something that Britain alone needs to address. In France, we've seen thousands of people – mainly young men, from a variety of countries – who have travelled unchecked across Europe before amassing in Calais with the hope of getting to Britain. In Germany, generous rules mean that more than forty per cent of people who seek asylum are from countries in the Balkans which thankfully have not seen conflict for twenty years. Since the crisis in Syria began, 291,000 Syrians have claimed asylum across Europe as a whole. But even more – 398,000 people in total – claimed asylum from safe countries in the Western Balkans.

These problems have led some people to say we need a new approach, a new European approach that would involve a common immigration and asylum policy. To those people, I have a very clear answer. Not in a thousand years. We're not seeking to regain control of our borders with one hand, only to give it away with the other.

So to those who say we should do more, I say look at what Britain is doing for Syrians at home and in the Middle East, look at the contributions of other European countries, and think again. To those who say Europe is about to be overwhelmed by refugees, I say less than twenty per cent of Europe's asylum seekers are from Syria, while nearly thirty per cent are

from the Balkans. To those who say the answer to this challenge is more integration, I say look at the countries in Europe who signed up to Schengen but are now putting up fences and re-establishing border checks. To those who say the problem is too great for nation states to resolve themselves, I say it can only be resolved by nation states taking responsibility themselves – and protecting their own national borders.

So we don't need a common European asylum policy. But we do need a new British approach and we do need a new international approach with nation states working together. An approach that combines hard-headed common sense with warm-hearted compassion. An approach with strict new rules for people who abuse the system in Britain, and greater generosity for people in parts of the world where we know they need our help.

So, wherever possible, I want to offer asylum and refuge to people in parts of the world affected by conflict and oppression, rather than to those who have made it to Britain. I want us to work to reduce the asylum claims made in Britain, and as we do so increase the number of people we help in the most troubled regions.

So we'll introduce strengthened 'safe return reviews' – so when a refugee's temporary stay of protection in the UK comes to an end, or if there is a clear improvement in the conditions of their own country, we will review their need for protection. If their reason for asylum no longer stands and it is now safe for them to return, we will seek to return them to their home country rather than offer settlement here in Britain.

For the first time we'll distinguish between vulnerable people resettled from their region and those who claim asylum after abusing the visa system or having travelled to get here through safe countries. If you've spurned the chance to seek protection elsewhere – but we cannot return you to that safe country and you still need refuge – you'll get the minimum stay of protection and you won't have an automatic right to settle here. But for those who really need it, we will offer a longer stay of protection. Humane for those who need our help, tough on those who abuse it.

Sometimes, it isn't the individual person who holds up their deportation but their home country's government. In the absence of specific identification documents – which are often destroyed by the individual themselves – some countries deny the nationality of their citizen and refuse to take them back. This happens in thousands of cases every year. So from now on, we will use alternative documentation – copies of which exist for anybody who first entered the country on a legal, biometric visa – as proof of the individual's identity. If any foreign governments refuse to recognise these documents – which, in many cases, they

helped to produce in the first place – we will take retaliatory measures. The message will be clear – if other governments don't play by the rules, there will be consequences.

We will also – for the first time – invoke what is known as the 'Spanish Protocol' of the Amsterdam Treaty, which allows EU member states to treat any asylum claim by a citizen of another EU country as automatically inadmissible. It sounds crazy, but in the last five years, there have been 551 asylum claims in Britain from people from other EU countries – like Poland and Spain. All but a handful were turned down – but they cost over £4 million to the British taxpayer. So we will end this absurdity, creating space in our asylum system to help people who really need our protection – and saving taxpayers' money.

In the longer term, I want to work with other countries in Europe, and the United Nations, to review the international legal definitions of asylum and refugee status. Because there is a huge difference between a young Syrian family fleeing the tyranny of ISIL or Assad, and a student who claims asylum once he has been discovered overstaying his visa, or a foreign criminal about to be sent to a prison in his own country.

By taking a tougher approach to those who do not need our help, we can give more support to vulnerable people who are in real and urgent need of our protection. So, next year, we will publish this country's first ever annual asylum strategy, which will set out where our help will be targeted – and how we will crack down on those who abuse it.

In Britain, we will make sure that councils get the help they need to deal with people as they arrive. I know the whole country was proud of the generosity of spirit shown by the British businesses and families who offered to shelter Syrian refugees in their own properties this summer. So to help turn these acts of humanity into reality, we'll establish a register of people and organisations that can provide houses for the settlement of refugees. We'll develop a community sponsorship scheme, like those in Canada and Australia, to allow individuals, charities, faith groups, churches and businesses to support refugees directly. And we'll use the aid budget and other funds to take the pressure off local services and make sure councils have the money they need.

People who apply for asylum in the UK will be processed quickly and fairly. If they are approved, they will be granted our protection for the length of time that their home country remains unsafe for them to return. But if they are not approved, they must be made to leave the country quickly – and that's exactly what our new Immigration Bill will do.

What I'm proposing is a deal: the fewer people there are who wrongly claim asylum in Britain, the more generous we can be in helping the most vulnerable people in the world's

most dangerous places. And my message to the immigration campaigners and human rights lawyers is this: you can play your part in making this happen – or you can try to frustrate it. But if you choose to frustrate it, you will have to live with the knowledge that you are depriving people in genuine need of the sanctuary our country can offer. There are people who need our help, and there are people who are abusing our goodwill – and I know whose side I'm on.

We will not be able to solve all the world's problems, we won't be able to help every single person in need, and we won't be able to offer refuge to everybody who needs it. But with a new approach to asylum, with the massive humanitarian support we are already providing in Syria and its neighbouring states, and with the right kind of diplomatic leadership, Britain can play a leading part in alleviating the suffering of the Syrian people and others like them around the world.

But to deliver this new approach to asylum, we need to distinguish carefully between economic migrants and genuine refugees. We have to be a country in control, stricter with people who try to abuse the system so that our help is not denied to those who need it. We will also need to have more control of immigration overall. It's often said – usually by advocates of open-door immigration – that Britain is by definition a country of immigrants. In fact, compared to the countries of the New World and compared to the countries of Europe with their shifting land borders, we have until recently always been a country of remarkable population stability. The people who have moved here down the generations have played a massive part in making this country what it is – but we need our immigration system to continue that British tradition of gradual, moderate, sensible change.

That is how, as a country, we have always been able to show great responsibility to the people who need our help in their darkest moments: the country that accepted the Huguenot Protestant refugees from France, the Jews escaping the pogroms of Russia and the persecution of the Nazis, the Asians of Uganda expelled by Idi Amin.

We have a proud history of relieving the distressed and helping the vulnerable – whether it's through our military, our diplomacy, our humanitarian work or our support for refugees, let us continue this tradition. Let Britain stand up for the displaced, the persecuted and the oppressed. For the people who need our help and protection the most, let Britain be a beacon of hope.”

Appendix 3

PM speech on action to tackle illegal migration: 14 April 2022 (Johnson)

For centuries, our United Kingdom has had a proud history of welcoming people from overseas, including many fleeing persecution.

My own great-grandfather came from Turkey in fear of his life, because our country offered sanctuary for his outspoken journalism.

And when you look back over the centuries as people have come seeking refuge or simply in search of somewhere to build a better life, you see this is the very stuff our history is made of. From the French Huguenots, to the Jewish refugees from Tsarist Russia, to the docking of the Empire Windrush, to the South Asians fleeing East Africa, to the many, many others who have come from different countries at different times for different reasons, all have wanted to be here because our United Kingdom is a beacon of openness and generosity, and all in turn have contributed magnificently to the amazing story of the UK.

Today that proud history of safe and legal migration is ultimately responsible for many of those working in our hospitals and on the front line of our response to the pandemic, for more than 60 per cent of the England football team at the final of Euro 2020, for many of our country's leading figures in the worlds of business, art and culture, and, I'm pleased to say, for ever growing numbers of people serving in public life, including colleagues of mine like Nadhim Zahawi who escaped with his family from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Dominic Raab, whose Jewish father came to Britain from Czechoslovakia to escape Nazi Germany, and Priti Patel, whose family fled persecution in Uganda.

So I'm proud that this government has continued the great British tradition of providing sanctuary to those in need, in fact, doing more to resettle vulnerable people in the UK – through safe and legal routes – than any other government in recent history.

Since 2015 we have offered a place to over 185,000 men, women and children seeking refuge, more than the entire population of Sunderland and more than any other similar resettlement schemes in Europe.

This includes almost 100,000 British Nationals Overseas threatened by draconian security laws in Hong Kong, 20,000 through our Syrian scheme, 13,000 from Afghanistan and to whom we owe debts of honour, and around 50,000 Ukrainians.

And we are not only supporting British nationals and those settled in the UK to bring potentially hundreds of thousands of their extended family from Ukraine, we are also welcoming unlimited numbers of refugees from that conflict, as the British people open their homes, in one of the biggest movements of refugees to this country that we have ever known. And as we work with local authorities and the devolved administrations to welcome those coming from Ukraine into our communities, we will also find accommodation across our whole United Kingdom for all those who have come here previously but who are currently in hotels, because it makes absolutely no sense for the taxpayer to foot those bills, running to almost £5 million a day, with the sum total of those we accommodate being concentrated in just a third of local authorities.

It is controlled immigration, through safe and legal routes, which enables us to make generous offers of sanctuary while managing the inevitable pressures on our public services such that we can give all those who come here the support they need to rebuild their lives, to integrate and to thrive.

But the quid pro quo for this generosity, is that we cannot sustain a parallel illegal system.

Our compassion may be infinite, but our capacity to help people is not.

We can't ask the British taxpayer to write a blank cheque to cover the costs of anyone who might want to come and live here.

Uncontrolled immigration creates unmanageable demands on our NHS and our welfare state, it overstretches our local schools, our housing and public transport, and creates unsustainable pressure to build on precious green spaces.

Nor is it fair on those who are seeking to come here legally, if others can just bypass the system.

It's a striking fact that around seven out of ten of those arriving in small boats last year were men under 40, paying people smugglers to queue jump and taking up our capacity to help genuine women and child refugees.

This is particularly perverse as those attempting crossings, are not directly fleeing imminent peril as is the intended purpose of our asylum system.

They have passed through manifestly safe countries, including many in Europe, where they could – and should – have claimed asylum.

It is this rank unfairness of a system that can be exploited by gangs, which risks eroding public support for the whole concept of asylum.

The British people voted several times to control our borders, not to close them, but to control them.

So just as Brexit allowed us to take back control of legal immigration by replacing free movement with our points-based system, we are also taking back control of illegal immigration, with a long-term plan for asylum in this country.

It is a plan that will ensure the UK has a world-leading asylum offer, providing generous protection to those directly fleeing the worst of humanity, by settling thousands of people every year through safe and legal routes.

And I emphasise this. So whether you are fleeing Putin or Assad, our aim is that you should not need to turn to the people smugglers or any other kind of illegal option.

But to deliver it, we must first ensure that the only route to asylum in the UK is a safe and legal one, and that those who try to jump the queue, or abuse our system, will find no automatic path to settlement in our country, but rather be swiftly and humanely removed to a safe third country or their country of origin.

And the most tragic of all forms of illegal migration, which we must end with this approach, is the barbaric trade in human misery conducted by the people smugglers in the Channel.

Before Christmas 27 people drowned, and in the weeks ahead there could be many more losing their lives at sea, and whose bodies may never be recovered.

Around 600 came across the Channel yesterday. In just a few weeks this could again reach a thousand a day.

I accept that these people – whether 600 or one thousand – are in search of a better life; the opportunities that the United Kingdom provides and the hope of a fresh start.

But it is these hopes – those dreams – that have been exploited.

These vile people smugglers are abusing the vulnerable and turning the Channel into a watery graveyard, with men, women and children, drowning in unseaworthy boats, and suffocating in refrigerated lorries.

And even if they do make it here, we know only too well some of the horrendous stories of exploitation over the years, from the nail bars of East London to the cockle beds of Morecambe Bay, as illegal migration makes people more vulnerable to the brutal abuse of ruthless gangs.

So we must halt this appalling trade and defeat the people smugglers.

That is why we are passing the Nationality and Borders Bill, which allows us for the first time to distinguish between people coming here legally and illegally, and for this distinction

to affect how your asylum claim progresses and your status in the UK if that claim is successful.

It will enable us to issue visa penalties against those countries that refuse to accept returns of foreign criminals and failed asylum seekers.

It will clean up the abuse of our legal system, introducing a one-stop shop that will end the cycle of last minute and vexatious claims and appeals that so often thwart or delay removals. And it will end the absurd practice of asylum-seeking adults claiming to be children to strengthen their claims and access better services.

Crucially it will also allow us to prosecute those who arrive illegally, with life sentences for anyone piloting the boats. And to identify, intercept and investigate these boats, from today the Royal Navy will take over operational command from Border Force in the Channel, taking primacy for our operational response at sea, in line with many of our international partners, with the aim that no boat makes it to the UK undetected.

This will be supported with £50 million of new funding for new boats, aerial surveillance and military personnel in addition to the existing taskforce of patrol vessels, Wildcat helicopters, search and rescue aircraft, drones and remotely piloted aircraft.

This will send a clear message to those piloting the boats: if you risk other people's lives in the Channel, you risk spending your own life in prison.

People who do make it to the UK will be taken not to hotels at vast public expense, rather they will be housed in accommodation centres like those in Greece, with the first of these open shortly.

At the same time, we are expanding our immigration detention facilities, to assist with the removal of those with no right to remain in the UK.

We are investing over half a billion pounds in these efforts.

And this is on top of overhauling our arrivals infrastructure here in Kent, with new processing facilities now operational at Western Jet Foil and Manston.

But we need to go still further in breaking the business model of these gangs.

So from today, our new Migration and Economic Development Partnership will mean that anyone entering the UK illegally – as well as those who have arrived illegally since January 1st – may now be relocated to Rwanda.

This innovative approach – driven our shared humanitarian impulse and made possible by Brexit freedoms – will provide safe and legal routes for asylum, while disrupting the business model of the gangs, because it means that economic migrants taking advantage of the asylum

system will not get to stay in the UK, while those in genuine need will be properly protected, including with access to legal services on arrival in Rwanda, and given the opportunity to build a new life in that dynamic country, supported by the funding we are providing.

The deal we have done is uncapped and Rwanda will have the capacity to resettle tens of thousands of people in the years ahead.

And let's be clear, Rwanda is one of the safest countries in the world, globally recognised for its record on welcoming and integrating migrants.

Later this year it will welcome leaders from across the Commonwealth, and before the pandemic, in 2018, the IMF said Rwanda was the world's fourth fastest growing economy.

We are confident that our new Migration Partnership is fully compliant with our international legal obligations, but nevertheless we expect this will be challenged in the courts, and if this country is seen as a soft touch for illegal migration by some of our partners, it is precisely because we have such a formidable army of politically motivated lawyers who for years who have made it their business to thwart removals and frustrate the Government.

So I know that this system will not take effect overnight, but I promise that we will do whatever it takes to deliver this new approach, initially within the limits of the existing legal and constitutional frameworks, but also prepared to explore any and all further legal reforms which may be necessary.

Because this problem has bedevilled our country for too long and caused far too much human suffering and tragedy, and this is the government that refuses to duck the difficult decisions, this is the government that makes the big calls, and I profoundly believe there is simply no other option.

And I say to those who would criticise our plan today, we have a plan; what is your alternative?

I know there are some who believe we should just turn these boats back at sea.

But after much study and consultation – including with Border Force, the police, national crime agency, military and maritime experts, to whom I pay tribute for all the incredible work that they do dealing with this problem as things stand – it's clear that there are extremely limited circumstances when you can safely do this in the English Channel.

And it doesn't help that this approach, I don't think, would be supported by our French partners, and relying solely on this course of action is simply not practical in my view.

I know there are others who would say that we should just negotiate a deal with France and the EU.

And we have made repeated and generous offers to our French friends and we will continue to press them and the EU for the comprehensive returns agreement that would solve this problem.

We remain grateful to the gendarmes on the beach, for the joint intelligence work and the co-operation that has stopped thousands of boats.

We would like to deepen that work and we continue to believe that a deal with France and the EU is in the national interest of all our countries.

But we must have our own framework for full sovereignty over our borders and we must find a way to stop these boats now, not lose thousands more lives while waiting for a deal that just doesn't exist.

And I know there will be a vocal minority who will think these measures are draconian and lacking in compassion. I simply don't agree.

There is no humanity or compassion in allowing desperate and innocent people to have their dreams of a better life exploited by ruthless gangs, as they are taken to their deaths in unseaworthy boats.

And there is no humanity or compassion in endlessly condemning the people smugglers, but then time and again ducking the big calls needed to break the business model of the gangs and stop these boats coming.

And there is no humanity or compassion in calling for unlimited safe and legal routes, offering the false hope of asylum in the UK to anyone who wants it, because that is just unsustainable.

There are currently 80 million displaced people in the world, many in failed States where governments can't meet their aspirations.

In an era of mobile connectivity they are a call or a text away from potentially being swept up in the tide of people smuggling.

The answer cannot be for the UK to become the haven for all of them.

That is a call for open borders by the back door, a political argument masquerading as a humanitarian policy.

Those in favour of this approach should be honest about it and argue for it openly.

We reject it, as the British people have consistently rejected it at the ballot box – in favour of controlled immigration.

We simply cannot have a policy of saying anyone who wants to live here can do so.

We've got to be able to control who comes into this country and the terms on which they remain.

And we must do this in the spirit of our history of providing refuge.

And in that way we can more than play our part in offering sanctuary to thousands fleeing persecution.

But then of course other countries must play their part too.

And that is what I think is most exciting about the partnership we have agreed with Rwanda today because we believe it will become a new international standard in addressing the challenges of global migration and people smuggling.

So I am grateful for Rwanda's leadership and partnership and we stand ready to work with other nations on similar agreements, as well as wider reforms to the international asylum framework.

As I say, we will continue to work with our French friends to tackle the gangs, we will continue to lead co-operation with crime and intelligence partners across Europe, we will continue to seek a returns agreement with the EU or with France.

But in the meantime, and for the foreseeable future, we need this new approach.

The people smugglers are undermining confidence in our borders.

They are betraying all those who do the right thing, who try to come here legally – through forms of migration or the safe and legal routes provided for refuge.

They are undermining the natural compassion and goodwill that people have towards refugees in this country.

And they are endangering human life day after day.

And though the way ahead will be hard, and though we can expect many challenges and many obstacles to be thrown up against this plan, I believe this plan is the right way forward, because the people smugglers must be stopped in order to save countless lives; and because tackling illegal migration is precisely the way to sustain a safe, legal and generous offer of sanctuary to those in need, that is in the very best traditions of this country and the values we stand for in the world.