

Rethinking Music Practise-
Sessions beyond *Poiesis* and
Praxis

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Towards Practising Democracy

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Abstract

How can the (seemingly isolated) process of practising a musical instrument in the context of practice sessions be seen as enabling students to develop skills “that are needed to keep democracies alive” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 2). How can we encourage this further? The approach is to explore the various potentials of the practise session to be something more than mere training. An exploration that can be instrumentally fostered in a study environment (formal or informal) through a practical pedagogical approach, not to reach a specific end — i.e. defined learning outcomes — but to result in the student transcending the professional competence acquisition situation to gain wisdom for a broader perspective. What is more, in the present article we will focus on the more autonomous aspects of the every-day, informal practice session of developing musicians and bring in perspectives from philosophy, particularly focusing on the relation between state policies and the individual performer. First, we explore the practise session-case as an aesthetic event. Secondly, we address the individual within the situation in relation to the exterior world while proposing an approach to serve as a framework for further exploration. We apply interaction through social media as a case for this section of the article. Thirdly, we seek to further develop the practice-session as a potential activity for personal growth. Next, we make a note of the related context of ensemble practice. Finally, we propose a logbook exercise to strategically enable this growth-process in practice.

Keywords: *music performance, practising, learning, phronesis, pedagogy*

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Towards Practising Democracy

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Introduction

Becoming a professional performing musician is a painstaking and enduring process. When we are sitting in a small room, pursuing our daily practising-sessions (i.e., the time spent alone practising an instrument to improve one's skill) we often focus on scales, technique, learning a piece of music, adjusting our tone-production, getting inspiration from listening to other performances of the same work, etc. This may be a process of habit, habituation, naturalisation and mechanical and mental accommodation. But, to paraphrase Seneca, we need time alone to nurture and develop our virtues without being misdirected and disrupted by all the various impulses that demand

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attention (Seneca, 1917, p. 5). In this paper, we pursue a philosophical approach ultimately leading us to take an existing practical pedagogical activity using a logbook exercise to enable more reflective higher education student work between performance classes, to propose a continuation and development of it through a supplementary logbook exercise to further explore additional activities promoting philosophical perspectives to ascend the cognitive levels of *poiesis* and *praxis*. This practice can be seen as both (a) philosophical perspectives as means for analysis (an act performed by the researcher(s)) and (b) philosophical inquiry as a part of a learning process (an act performed by the student). We do this on the basis of the assumption that the practice sessions occurring between main instrument performance classes have potential to be more than mechanical and artistic practising to be a reflective space in which we can aspire to grow as individuals and which can stimulate life-long learning. In the present context, we identify this potential at a practical level within a sort of instrumental constructive alignment approach (Biggs, 2020). In this perspective, the starting point is some conception or even defined expectation of what should be as a result of the practice. This can be the conception of the individual teacher or the student. Or as defined by state regulations, for instance. The teacher then uses relevant pedagogical activities to ‘transport’ the student from where they are at the present to that ideal.

Our understanding of Biggs’ *constructive alignment* is open-ended. That is, rather than transporting the student from A to a predefined subject related B, we seek to align a pedagogical practice from A to x — instrumental for the unexplored. Although such an inquiry cannot through its implementation distance itself from some sort of political and ideological ideal, our interest and emphasis rest with the pedagogical activity rather than with a preferable conception of ulti-

mate political and ideological demarcation. As such, we respond to a similar reality as that presented by Almqvist, Benedict and Kanellopoulos (2017) when they ask the [following] questions: ‘how can we re-think the political dimensions of creative music education pedagogies in the face of recent educational policy trends? ... How can we create forms of music education practice and research that induce a continuous interplay between acting and thinking?’ (p. 6). But we do so from the perspective of *phronesis*, as in the practical competence and wisdom developing over time. As such, it is important to emphasise that such development is seen through the lenses of the practising performer in between classes, rather than during them.

From a perspective rooted in music education we ask: What more can the time spent learning an instrument offer beyond a mechanical accommodation of sensor-motor skills and the realisation of an artistic vision? More specific, what space of personal maturing and self-reflection does the same situation provide? The approach is, through philosophical perspectives and particularly through the neoliberalist-policy-critical lenses of Martha C. Nussbaum, to explore how the practise session can be something more than mere training. This exploration can be instrumentally fostered through a formal or informal study environment and through a practical pedagogical approach. The goal is not to reach a specific end — i.e., defined learning outcomes — but rather to result in the student transcending the professional competence acquisition situation to gain wisdom for a broader perspective.

We will here address how we perceive the conceptual ecology in which our modified alignment will proceed. *Phronesis*, as many other Aristotelian concepts, has imbued many, sometimes contrasting, readings (see e.g. Surpresant, 2012; Svenaeus, 2014; Wivestad, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2014; Noel, 1999). We will assume the approach

to *phronesis* suggested by Hansen (2007; Table 1) which we understand as a sort of compartmentalisation of various steps leading from the particular-present-human to the transcending-universal-*cosmos* (Figure 1). Identifying scientific understanding of education, he remarks, as a *normative* practice supported by ‘empirical evidence-based research[,] can tell us what *worked*, but cannot tell us what works’ as we miss out on some of the potential education research may offer (p. 16). That is, rather than setting out to qualify education praxis objectively in retrospect with a clear, preconceived agenda for already known ends, we lose sight of the more experienced and intuition based notions of what works here and now, in the situation, and what may work in the future (p. 16). This instrumental view is not favourable for ethics, he argues while pointing to the underrepresentation of the more existential and ontological dimensions, as it often represents more *poiesis*-based notions of *phronesis* in terms of ‘an emancipated citizen who is very conscious about his or her own values and norms, and who acts according to those deliberated and chosen values ...[, becoming] a political means for something else ... [—] a conservative element’. The application of *Sophia*, Socratic *Eros of Sophia*, and his own conception of *authenticity*, he suggests, can help put things in perspective and situate the *phronesis* as a lower level wisdom on the path towards higher level *Sophia* (cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). *Authenticity*, however, has also often been used in an instrumental way. *Phronesis*, in much educational research, is often closely linked to professional practice within a given society and culture. It is ‘... to find the general *within* the particular and see it from an ethical perspective, that is, how can this activity make the life of the student a more wise, good and beautiful life?’ (p. 19). Moreover, Hansen warns us: ‘*Phronesis* can so easily, in a modern conceptualisation and use, be transformed into something quite different [i.e., instrumental and conservative applications] ... the concept of *phronesis* is often misused in contemporary educational research and theory in subtle ways’ (p. 19). *Authenticity*, on the other hand, (as outlined by Hansen) illuminates

the same practice from an existential point of view. That is, ‘one’s ontological relation to Being itself — it is not necessarily identical with the process of reflecting on the ethics and values of tacit and practical knowledge in professional actions and in the culture in which this profession is embodied’ (p. 23). It would be interesting then to create a space within which existential reflection beyond *episteme* (scientific knowledge, to know), *techne* (craftsmanship, crafts, art) or *phronesis* can foster a Socratic *Eros*; ‘That is, the ability to wonder over fundamental issues and to long for knowledge or, better yet, wisdom about what the Good Life is, [... to be] lovers of wisdom, that is, *philo-sophers*’ (pp. 17–18, 20 and 22–24). Or as Stein M. Wivestad holds, ‘[p]hronesis is ... an active condition for inexact practical wisdom...’ (Wivestad, 2008, p. 310). The present article then seeks to theorize and, in the end, also propose a practical pedagogical means (instrumental, no less) of promoting this endeavour based on this worldview, drawing particular support from Martha C. Nussbaum.

In the present article, we will focus on the more autonomous aspects of the everyday, informal practice session of developing musicians and bring in perspectives from philosophy. First, we explore the practise session-case in particular. Secondly, we will address the individual within the situation in relation to the exterior world while proposing an ecology to serve as a framework. Here we apply interaction through social media as a case. Thirdly, we seek to further develop the practice-session as a potential activity for personal growth. Next, we make a note of the related context of ensemble practice. Finally, we propose a logbook exercise to strategically enable this growth-process in practice.

	<i>Poiesis</i>	<i>Praxis</i>	<i>Phronesis</i>	<i>Authenticity</i>	<i>Socratic Eros</i>	<i>Sophia</i>
<i>Description</i>	Incorporating critique in practice. Connects scientific knowledge and practical skills.	Exercising judgement when practising to make the right decisions according to context. Connected to propositional and tacit knowledge.	Situates poiesis and praxis as part of the human condition. The ability to introduce ethical perspectives within and from the particular and how one relates to the community.	An existential perspective	The pursuit of divine wisdom (Sophia) using philosophy to transcend the current knowledge and values of a given society and culture.	An achieved state of divine wisdom and a way of living

Table 1: Hansen’s (2007) categorisation of Aristotle’s concepts.

A figurative, rough approximation of Hansen’s (2007) compartmentalisation of poiesis, praxis, phronesis, authenticity, *Eros* and *Sophia*. Rolfhamre’s illustration.




Figure 1: A figurative, rough approximation of Hansen's (2007) compartmentalisation of poiesis, praxis, phronesis, authenticity, Eros and Sophia. Rolfhamre's illustration.

The practise-session

What is particular in music performance, in our view, is that it effectively brings together two rather opposing concepts: interpretative practices to understand the ideas and thoughts of others and phenomenological approaches based on our own perspectives. Musical interpretation can, thus, not be effectively equalled with interpretative practices alone, but it also needs to accept the premises of phenomenological activities as well; it is a matter of both interpreting (and understanding) and experien-

cing. (This is also what makes study fields such as artistic research, or arts-based research, difficult to define normatively, reaching a consensus, because where do we draw the line between dichotomies such as research/not-research, arts-based/not arts-based, etc.).

It is rather commonplace that the practise-session forms an important context for the development of the performing artist. This is where we patiently spend our time to become better than we currently are at doing something through repetitious meditations, so to say. We can, then, regard the practise-session itself as an aesthetic event, because it is an integrated part of the aesthetic object we seek to create to present to the audience.

We can utilise Denis Dutton's (2002) seven aesthetic universals to compartmentalise and sort the matter out:

- I *Expertise or virtuosity*: Admiration of recognisable, technical skills
- II *Non-utilitarian pleasure*: Artwork as pleasure itself, rather than a practical tool or knowledge
- III *Style*: According to rules of form and composition. Involves borrowing and alteration
- IV *Criticism*: Artwork experienced through the critical language describing or discussing it.
- V *Imitation: Mimesis* in its relevant historical context
- VI *'Special' focus*: Something different from normal life. Experiencing the other
- VII *An imaginative, poetic experience for both producers and audiences*: Experiencing a dream-state

The practise-session has the potential of offering a 'space' where the performer can experience a sensation from which they may deduce their current level and development of virtuosity (Dutton first aesthetic universal; D I). When they become technically better at a certain exercise, it can be rewarding when a certain level of skill is

achieved. We can also set ourselves new goals from the admiration of someone else's skills. But this is not only true for future states, because they can equally be satisfied by their current level of skill. Thus, the practise-session can function as a praxis in the Aristotelian sense.

We may also practise for the sake of pleasure itself, because we like doing it without there necessarily being a good reason for it. Simply spending time alone (or with others) to enjoy music as a practice-session, can be a good enough reason to sit hour upon hour playing (D II). At some point, we can, furthermore, possibly reach a state where something special occurs by, for instance, reaching a state of flow where time 'ceases to exist' and we can work 'forever' without feeling the need to stop. We can achieve a state of 'special' by experiencing a new mental state, such as suddenly gaining new wisdom about our practise, or something completely different (D VI; cf. D II). In this respect, the practise-session can also enable a sense of transcendence from the mundane to some higher order existential state and make room for Socratic *Eros*.

We can experience our practice-session through how we relate to style. Both relating to performance practice and -tradition, we can value our activity according to us knowing or learning more of certain rules of engagement. We may experience positive feelings from performing a musical style that fits us or enhances our present mental status, etc. As such, it can *enhance our sense of being part of a given artistic community* (because we relate to a certain style which is socially and culturally dependent), *pinpoint a sensation of continuity and development both as performing artists and as human beings*.

We may contextualise our practice-session when speaking to others, not only colleagues and professionals, but also with family and friends. We can learn more both about ourselves, as well as the music we perform. This critique can also be an inner

dialogue with ourselves, where we put words and discourse (expressed or imagined) onto our practice. Therefore, it can effectively combine the above situation contingent agencies with *reflection*, *self-awareness* and *kinetic pleasure*.

We can experience our practice-session by imitating a certain context, or idol. We can pretend to be someone we admire for inspiration. In certain music there is a clear imitative feature, which we can seek to reproduce according to its dedication (e.g. birdsong and other instruments), etc. This can also induce or inspire states of pure fantasy where we can be swept away, while performing, to distant lands, vast oceans or even non-existing places.

The attentive reader may have noticed that, embedded in our reading of Dutton's aesthetic universals, a parallel compartmentalization offered by David Hesmondhalgh who aptly writes about the potential offered by the sounding arts has been present. According to him, and which has already been hinted to above but, now, presented collectedly, music can: (1) 'heighten people's awareness of continuity and development in life'; (2) 'enhance our sense of sociality and community'; (3) 'can combine a healthy integration of different aspects of our being, combining reflection and self-awareness with kinetic pleasure'; (4) 'heighten our understanding of how others might think and feel'; (5) be 'potentially good at being a practice in the Aristotelian sense' (Hesmondhalgh, 2012, pp. 371–373). Dutton's aesthetic universals outlines a way of understanding artistic practices in a performance related way in which the act of practising transcends the mechanics of the situation and offers a space for philosophy to join procedure. Supported by Hesmondhalgh's fitting potentials of music, we can regard the practice session as a way of practising art that has transformative potential and agency as aesthetic acts themselves. Another author arguing down these lines is Nussbaum who emphasises this 'potential space' in particular when she writes:

I have said that the ‘potential space’ of aesthetic activity is a space with which we investigate and try out some of life’s possibilities. ... The aesthetic activity, which takes place in a safe and protected ‘potential space’ where our own safety is not immediately threatened, harnesses the pleasure of exploring to the neediness and insufficiency that is its object, thus making our limitations pleasing, and at least somewhat less threatening, to ourselves. (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 243–244)

It is just because ‘... we are in a context of safety, we are also encouraged to have a range of reactive emotions’ (p. 246) that the practice-session can function as a humanistic free-space in which we can be able to see things from new perspectives — both known and un-known, or provocative and pleasing to us — and try on new roles without us being judged by others. We are suddenly allowed to behave well or badly, proper and improper, without having to mean it for real. At a superficial, musical level, we can choose to perform unmusically or in a manner completely different from what we usually prefer without that being a truth of our aesthetic ideology. Rather, we can use it as an exercise in ethics, to learn more about how that feels to better ‘understand’ those who play in that manner. We deliberately use quotation-marks here because we, of course, cannot know the perspectives of others simply by imitating them; but that is not at all the point, because what is interesting is to broaden our vocabulary of perspectives that are different from ours and, hence, improve our ability to see different sides of others in a democratic sense. However, it is interesting to note that this imitation is an embodied and multisensorial experience and thus involves us as human beings in a more complete manner than simply using our imagination and empathy in our attempts at relating to others. Put simply, during the practise-session, as an aesthetic event and potential space, we can ‘walk in someone else’s shoes’, if only for a short period of time. This also emphasises our

earlier point that music performance is both an interpretative practice and a phenomenal one.

We once made a trip to Italy (which was Rolfhamre's first visit there) to perform a concert and present research papers during a seminar in Tarquinia. On our way back to the airport, we also made a short trip to Rome to let Rolfhamre see what all the fuss was about. As a first timer, what hit him when he wandered about trying to make the most of the short trip, was a phenomenologico-epistemological revelation. Being in Italy suddenly gave Rolfhamre a new sense of understanding Italian music. 'Of course, the aesthetic design is the way it is, because this is Italy'. In terms of Research-practice (capital R intended), this is easily dismissed as nonsense, but in terms of personal artistic practice it is not. What happened was that he got a sense of culture, context and social flow (sitting at a coffee-shop, watching people walk by) which gave him a better sense of the other, the Italians. In retrospect, this experience has completely changed how (in parallel to his studies of Italian folk music) he relates to both their music and them as persons whenever he meets with them. Sound research-practices aside, the meta-ethical, as well as normative ethics values, are evident. And, because of this external experience, his potential space during the research-session, at least when performing the related styles of music, was changed. In this respect, Rolfhamre expanded the practise-session to include external experiences, which he brought with himself into the practise-room the next time. Indeed, as Marcel Cobussen once pointed out, '... through music ..., ethics, hospitality and alterity come into existence and receive (specific) meaning. ... The relation between ethics and music affects and thus changes both' (Cobussen & Nielsen, 2016, p. 23).

It is just because of this, that the practise-session, as an aesthetic activity and potential space, can encompass democratic values. It is not governed by codes of conduct, we are free to say whatever we wish to say, we can use music to better understand the perspectives, thoughts and practices of others, we have devoted time to be

ourselves and ask questions about who we are and what matters to us. This can also bring us to think of the psychoanalyst and pædiatrician Donald W. Winnicott who speaks of the ‘transformative space’ in which, he argues, the arts preserve and cultivate a growing-space for, most prominently, empathy. The ‘play space’ refers to a continuation of children’s games and roleplaying (Winnicott, 2005; Nussbaum, 2010, p. 101).

Let us now turn our focus away from the individual alone and return to the matter of social media. Particularly in light of Dutton’s aesthetic (D IV, in Table 1 above), how does sharing influence our practise-session? This is obviously a vast, multi-faceted subject which we cannot treat in full here, so we will let YouTube and Facebook suffice as a starting point for the discussion.

Auto-biographical exposure, and bursting the bubble

If one joins social networks such as YouTube or Facebook-groups (among many other possibilities), it is easy to argue that what is among the most popular things to share for guitarists and lutenists, for instance (Rolfhamre chooses this instrumental group because of his own disposition as a performer and because he has followed them for years), are films of themselves performing at home or at a concert (other competing categories involves films of colleagues in action and links to source material). Sticking with the focus on the practise-session, now caught on film, this is interesting because the musicians are effectively inviting people into their potential space and aesthetic activity. They are tearing down the walls surrounding their ‘context of safety’, using Nussbaum’s earlier phrasing, and exposing themselves for criticism and inclusion into the public discourse.

It seems to us that we, perhaps unconsciously, often adopt a somewhat platonic view of the mimetic object in Classical music performance, in which we assume that there is some perfect template somewhere out there that we must imitate through our musical activities. Of course, any such template is socially and culturally constructed rather than universal truths of the cosmos, but such a point of view insists on an up-down perspective, where the ‘almighty correct performance’ is to be adopted and cultivated by the performer. It constitutes not only how we place ourselves within society, but also what we can contribute to it. In that sense, we are adopting a perspective where each individual’s musical activity contributes to shape what a musical activity is and will be expected to be. Then, rather than simply following Foucault’s example of unveiling the social ‘templates’ to which society wishes us to conform, we can see our role as individuals to accept that template or not. What we are suggesting here is not by any means anarchy or asking for a utopia, but merely to understand our responsibility to shape music, as a field of study and aesthetic object, through our activities within it, noting that ‘responsibility’, here, extends beyond being just a matter of accepting this or that social ‘template’. Again, the practise-session provides not only a space for contemplating meta-ethics, but it also offers a forum to contribute to what musical practise could or should be. And when we later expose ourselves to the public, or meet the exposure of our fellow musicians, we can meet them with respect to cultivate new perspectives, rather than exercising our judgement according to the present template. We easily take the position that we know how music should be performed better than people did before us, but so did they (at least theoretically), and so shall future generations think of us. But this continual ‘improvement’ of an ‘objective work of art’ is not the most fruitful perspective. Rather, the work as experience has greater transformative potential. In Gadamer’s words: ‘... that the work of art is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who

experiences it' (Gadamer, 2013, p. 107). This may be true for all experiencing it, both the audience and those producing the experience, as they perceive their own creation. Arguably, developing an ability to see and emphasize with the perspectives of others does not a democracy make, but it supplies important prerequisites for democratic processes to be possible and effective for the common good. And, the process of exposing oneself to such transformative spaces, while exercising critical thinking and shifts of perspectives, also serves the purpose of the Socratic *Eros* well.

Moving on, what we can begin to see here is an ecosystem-like procedure where one activity or state of being leads to another in a circular manner (Figure 2). This circulation of acts can, furthermore, cumulatively enable the practice-session to function as an incubator for Humanistic values and a preparation for social acts and democratic contribution.




Figure 2: A suggested ecology for the practice-session as an incubator for Humanistic values and preparation for social acts and democratic contribution. Rolfhamre's illustration.

First, we have the practise-session as an aesthetic event.

Secondly, through the practise-session, we can unleash a potential space in which we can safely experience, explore and develop ourselves and our understanding of the other. These perspectives form an important part of who we are as humans, musicians and social actors, as well as how we treat and relate to others.

Thirdly, we expose ourselves to the non-safe outside-world — in this particular case, through social media — to receive feedback and, hopefully, also praise. As this proceeds over time, sharing more and more material of us performing, we are starting to create a digital, auto-biographical representation of whom we are as persons which others use to make an opinion of us. Subsequently, their opinions take our whole ‘self’ as subject, as they perceive it. And it is when there is a dissonance between this judgement and our own, perceived self-image that we may experience negative critique towards our person. It is important to emphasise that the exposition through social media is a more vulnerable position than other activities leading from the creative isolation of the practice room to the ‘outer’ world. In such cases, the activity is more prepared and in more direct contact with the ‘outer’ world, whereas the nature of social media is precisely that the private ‘potential space’ of the practice session is exposed. When posting videos or recordings of the practice session, it transforms from a ‘safe, potential space’ to that of a performance situation. The personal nature of social media blurs the lines between a more prepared and formal performance and a practice session, exposing the performer in a more vulnerable situation and may, as such, affect the performer differently from other more moderated situations such as non-published, individual practice or pre-planned concerts.

Fourthly, the manner in which we are met shapes not only how we perform one particular piece of music, or how we relate to that social group, but it also has the potential of having us re-evaluate ourselves, both as humans and as musicians, and re-

consider our values. To make a very short, efficient example, by repeatedly being negatively met within a group of musicians whom we admire and aspire to be part of, we may over time build a grudge towards them which in its most severe repercussions can result in us feeling insecure about ourselves, lose the pleasure of performing music and perhaps even stimulate a scepticism towards the arts in general — ‘I never managed to fit in; I always felt excluded and frowned upon. But perhaps they were right? Maybe I should spend my time doing something more constructive than wasting it on mere leisure?’ In this particular, fictional case: note how it insinuates issues relating to people being discouraged to contribute with their wits alongside their working-abilities. We will soon return to this matter. (There are, of course, many less dramatic variants that could have been mentioned, and the development described here is highly context-dependant, but this shows the situation’s negative potential at its fullest. It may not happen, but it could.)

Fifthly, we bring our assessments of our meeting with the outside-world with us when we once more return to the practising-session, starting the cycle all over again, once more.

Why it matters – the ecology-like procedure in context

In 2010, Martha Nussbaum made an important claim, in her manifesto *Not for Profit: Why the Democracy Needs the Humanities*, that: ‘Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive’ (p. 2); and, furthermore, that ‘[e]ducation is not just for citizenship. It prepares people for employment and, importantly, for meaningful lives’ (p. 9). What she points to, here, is the dangerous development (at least in terms of the democracy) throughout the World’s societies, to undermine the human-

ities in all levels of education. Effectively, this means that the World's governments systematically seek to provide their citizens with less education in critical thinking, less training in self-reflectiveness and compassionate morality. But these are important parts of what constitutes the Humanities and its everlasting contribution to society and democracy. Nussbaum writes: 'These abilities are associated with the humanities and the arts: the ability to think critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world problems as a "citizen of the world"; and, finally, the ability to imagine sympathetically the predicament of another person' (p. 7). Such features are dangerous to the quest of the modern governments, she claims: '[i]n the context of the old paradigm of what it is for a nation to develop, what is on everyone's lips is the need for an education that promotes national development seen as economic growth' (p.17). That is, nations around the World increasingly seek to strengthen economic growth, sustainability and productivity — that is quantifiable data — at the cost of the humanities, which rather represents the qualitative:

The goal of a nation, says this model of development, should be economic growth. Never mind about distribution and social equality, never mind about the preconditions of stable democracy, never mind about the quality of race and gender relations, never mind about the improvement of other aspects of a human being's quality of life that are not well linked to economic growth. (Empirical studies have by now shown that political liberty, health, and education are all poorly correlated with growth.) (p. 14)

To express this concept in another way, we can look to the basic metaphors that support this worldview. In our culture, time is a valuable commodity, and we see it as a limited resource, used to accomplish our goals.

These practices are relatively new in the history of the human race, and by no means do they exist in all cultures. They have arisen in modern industrialized societies and structure our basic everyday activities in a very profound way.

Corresponding to the fact that we act as if time is a valuable commodity — a limited resource, even money — we conceive of time that way. Thus we understand and experience time as the kind of thing that can be spent, wasted, budgeted, invested wisely or poorly, saved, or squandered (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, loc.168).

Living by such metaphorical concepts as ‘time is money’, ‘time is a limited resource’ and ‘time is a valuable commodity’ conceptualises time by using our everyday experiences with money, limited resources and valuable commodities. This is a part of our culture, not a truth, and it is important to remember that there are cultures where time is none of these things (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, locs.168–179). Linking this to a society where economic growth is the goal and where we apply these metaphors to how we view time, this entails a competition for our time resources. How we spend our time, then, can be measured in terms of profit and how it benefits economic growth. It is evident that the Arts and Humanities rarely measure up in the competition for direct financial output, compared to business expansion and profitable growth. This is important to note, because, as we mentioned initially, deliberate practise takes time. How we prioritize our time, then, in today’s competitive world, is of the outmost importance. And we argue that time spent on deliberate practice within the Arts and Humanities, actually is time well spent, both for each individual and society and democracy as a whole.

To complement this point of view further, on a side note from music performance learning, we read in a recent news-article by Lucy-Emilie Andersen (2018), in *Utrop: Norges første flerkulturelle avis & tv* (i.e. ‘Shout-out: Norway’s First Multi-Cultural Newspaper and TV’), how fruitful it is to employ immigrants:

Gir global fordel

Ifølge den kanadiske undersøkelsen «Mangfoldets utbytte: Canadas globale fordel» forfattet av Bessma Momani og Jillian Stirk, er det viktig for samfunnsregnskapet at innvandrere kommer ut i arbeid, noe bedriftene også vil tjene på.

– I nesten alle sektorer er det et betydelig og positivt sammenfall mellom flerkulturelt mangfold og økt produktivitet og inntekt. Momani og Stirk argumenterer for at mangfold i arbeidslivet er et viktig bidrag for å styrke Canadas konkurransevne.

Undersøkelsen avslørte at bedrifter som øker andelen innvandrere i staben med én prosent i gjennomsnitt øker inntektene med 2,4 prosent og produktiviteten med 0,5 prosent. I deler av næringslivet der omstillingene er størst og veksten høyest er forskjellen atskillig større. (Andersen, 2018)

(Gives a Global Advantage

According to the Canadian study ‘Diversity Dividend: Canada’s Global Advantage’ [i.e. Momani and Stirk, 2017], authored by Bessma Momani and Jillian Stirk, it is important for the society’s accounts that immigrants achieve employment, which is something that the corporations also will benefit from.

– In almost all sectors, there is a considerable and positive relation between multi-cultural diversity and increased productivity and income. Momani and Stirk argue that diversity in work-life is an important contribution to strengthen Canada’s competitiveness.

The study revealed that corporations that increase their share of immigrant workers by 1%, increase their average pay-off with 2.4% and their productivity with 0.5%. In the areas of work-life where the adjustments are the greatest and the growth the highest, the difference is even more prominent.) (Our own translation)

The problem addressed by Nussbaum, for instance, is very prominent in the above symptomatic news-article. Diversity is not at all mentioned as being good for compassion, tolerance and understanding, but good for increased income and productivity (read: work better, earn more and think less). Or as put to words by Epictetus, written in A.D. 135 in his *Enchiridion*: ‘No man who loves money, and loves pleasure, and loves fame, also loves mankind, but only he who loves virtue’ (2004, p. 25). The value of diversity is even quantifiable, and it increases competitiveness. ‘Competitiveness’ itself, is not even a socially or morally stimulating word; appearing not until well into the nineteenth century, it establishes something pertaining or involving competition (from Latin *competit-*, past participle stem of *competere*; the latter with relations, as we know and use the word today, back to the fifteenth century’s Middle French *compéter*, meaning ‘to be in rivalry with’) (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2018a and 2018b). Clearly, ‘to be in rivalry with’ someone is not naturally compatible and equal to inclusion, selflessness and concurrency which are often valued factors when stimulating a moral and social community.

Returning to music performance learning, then, we may understand how having the time to practice and learn music is a privilege, that is, we have the time to spare or invest in becoming prolific and flourishing music performers. But, we must choose carefully and deliberately how we utilise and manage that privilege and for what ends—noteworthy, in cases where music performance is a person’s occupation or vocation. Do we, for instance, do it to win the competition over others and secure market shares with an added hope of financial prosperity? Or, is the aim of the activity to connect with the listener on an emotive plane? Is it perhaps an act of self-indulgence or the desire to experience an aesthetic event for its own sake? Rhetorical questions aside, the aim and scope of why we practice and learn music and how we approach it, arguably, have direct influence on what we achieve from doing so. And, similar to the diversity-themed news-article above, we must be careful to detect to what degree ethics plays a defining role in what we do. To put it bluntly for a rhetorical point: Are democratic perspectives, diversity and compassion good because they are related to kindness and love, or are they good only if they are profitable?

Moreover, in a discussion of the destructive ideologies, or modern myths, prevalent in the twentieth century, Karen Armstrong explains how myths should demand more of us than pure reason and how they need to emphasise compassion:

They have not been infused with the spirit of compassion, respect for sacredness of all life, or with what Confucius called 'leaning'. These destructive mythologies have been narrowly racial, ethnic, denominational and egotistic, an attempt to exalt the self by demonising the other. We cannot counter these bad myths with reason alone, because undiluted *logos* cannot deal with such deep-rooted, unexorcised fears, desires and neuroses. That is the role of an ethically and spiritually informed mythology.

We need myths that will help us to identify with all our fellow-beings, not simply with those who belong to our ethnic, national or ideological tribe. We need myths that help us to realise the importance of compassion, which is not always regarded as sufficiently productive or efficient in our pragmatic, rational world (Armstrong, 2005, p. 142).

The overarching idea in Armstrong's argument corresponds well with Nussbaum's agenda. We see that society's overall priorities originate in the ideology, myth, metaphorical concepts and ideas that are pervasive in our culture. And reason alone cannot counter 'these bad myths'. Arts and Humanities provide a counter-point in which we operate at another level than reason alone. 'A novel, like a myth, teaches us to see the world differently; it shows us how to look into our own hearts and to see our world from a perspective that goes beyond our own self-interest' (Armstrong, 2005, p. 155). In *Love's Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature* (1990) Nussbaum argues in a similar manner for the need for another mode of expressing truths about the human condition and life. In discussing works by Henry James and Marcel Proust, she presents their claim on the importance of literature:

[...] only the style of a certain sort of narrative artist (and not, for example, the style associated with the abstract theoretical treatise) can adequately state certain important truths about the world, embodying them in its shape and setting up in the reader the activities that are appropriate for grasping them. (Nussbaum, 1990, p. 6)

Nussbaum argues on the same line as Armstrong. Artistic and poetic expressions, as opposed to abstract and theoretical ways of expression, enables humans to grasp certain important truths about the world. Further on she argues the importance of emotions for an ethical life and how literature and artistic expression play a crucial role in strengthening these qualities and supporting an empathetic and ethical outlook on life (Nussbaum, 1990).

How, then, is this relevant to the individual musician sitting in the practising-space, preparing for a concert? Well, it is not much because practising an instrument itself automatically solves the world's problems, but rather because it provides a potential space in which all benefits from the Humanities described by Armstrong and Nussbaum above, can grow alongside the opportunity for self-reflection, alone-time and personal growth. Furthermore, it can also become part of a social interaction in which we learn to relate to others and contribute to social- and cultural constructions. These matters are what concerns us in this article. The aim is to look at the practising-session (or sometimes even a formalised practise-ritual) as something more than a mere preparation-process and unravel its potential as a personal space, self-reflective activity and in turn as a forum for developing the foundation for a sustained, reflected and democratic living.

An ethical perspective

The field of Ethics includes a number of overreaching questions about how we could, should or would lead our lives, alone and together, particularly focusing on matters such as morality, compassion, desire, empathy and others. How we subsequently relate to such issues, determines the framework for how we interact with others, how we regard ourselves and how we seek to contribute to a better present and future. During the practise-session, we spend hours and hours analysing ourselves, our musical abilities and actions; we repeat the same thing over and over until we master it, hopefully resulting in a sense of mastery; we try to develop strategies that make us a better musician and performer by participating or producing pedagogically accurate activities; if rehearsing an ensemble-composition, we also try to relate ourselves to the other parts of the ensemble and attempt to foresee their approach to the music to prepare ourselves for the first rehearsal; we imagine how the audience will receive our performance and if we will be able to gain their approval (if that is of importance to us); and more.

Common to all these activities is the social relationship, either relating to others or to ourselves. Nussbaum makes a special point of music's potential for personal development and growth: 'Music is an especially rich source of emotional experiences and has frequently been taken to offer us insight into the nature of the emotional life' (2001, p. 7). This insight into our emotional life is a vital part of self-exploration, empathy and compassion; both for us to understand who we are, which forms the values by which we relate to the rest of the World, as well as our surroundings, and for us to understand whom others are so that we can meet and greet them with tolerance, understanding and interest. Furthermore, who we are is also culturally and socially constructed locally, nationally and internationally. 'First and most obviously, the criteria for the appropriate behavioural manifestation of emotions such as fear

and anger are socially taught and may vary considerably from society to society' (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 157). In this sense, drawing on post-structuralist thinking, we define much of our being through identifying our sameness and otherness to others. (In a similar fashion, Mary Midgeley asks, when critically addressing more strict, relativistic ethics: '[i]f we can't judge other cultures, can we really judge our own?' [Midgeley, 2010, p. 324]) That is, if I am kind, that means that I also have a sense of what is 'not kind'; if we are a wealthy and prosperous nation, then we have made up an idea of which countries that are not. And here is what makes the news-article mentioned above so striking: first, that it places all nationalities (understood from 'diversity') into a single societal machinery to produce income, productivity and wealth; secondly, that there is a perceived singular solution to how to run the world: economy, sustainability and productivity; thirdly, that emotion, compassion and critical thought is second-rate, not even mentioned in the article, and all that matters is that persons unite for the common economy. To its furthest extent, this last deduction can also be read as an assumption that individuality and self-exploration are unimportant, which strongly constrains a working concept of democracy (in the terms of what democracy is for, and whose voice may be relevantly heard within it). As long as we produce and contribute to 'the greater good,' our personal lives are our own business and, hence, Socratic *Eros* is figuratively pushed downwards (fig. 1 above) towards praxis and poesis to play an instrumental role for society rather than fostering us to transcend society for the sake of not pre-defined wisdom. Wisdom that may later inform and guide democratic processes onward. This is not to say that an instrumental "downward" perspective (again, cf. fig. 1 above) cannot serve democracy well, but it leads to a very different community which arguably strays away from the search of the higher order wisdom and empathy that we have been occupied with here.

On a daily basis, many insist on sharing our personal lives through social media in a belief that what we had for breakfast, how much weight we have managed to lose or

asking for empathy when we are ill are important. As we see it, this creates a sort of parallel reality where we can seek human connection and empathy as it slowly becomes secondary to society. According to Jill Walker Rettberg, '[b]logs and online diaries are obvious descendents [sic!] of the diaries and autobiographies of past centuries' (2014, p. 7). Yes, there is a huge potential here for critical thought and other self-developmental, compassion-stimulating activities, but since we are not normally stimulated to think critically as part of the societal machinery — a 'truth' with modifications and degrees, of course, but for the sake of making a rhetorical point in line with Nussbaum's reasoning above — we do not necessarily know what the potential of that social-media-space is or could be. Rettberg suggests that '[s]ocial media is about communication with others, but we should be equally aware of how we use social media to reflect upon ourselves' (p. 12), and, furthermore, that '[o]ur shared ideas about what moments and milestones should be documented in life act as a cultural filter that affects our choices' (p. 24). Therefore, '[s]elf-representation with digital technologies is also self-documentation. We think not only about how to present ourselves to others, but also log or record moments of our lives for ourselves to remember them in the future' (p. 11). But this is touching on matters that are, for the moment premature, so let us return to this later on.

In the end, the communication and self reflection of social media is not the main arena for the practice session. We argue that the individual, practise-sessions of musicians can serve as a space for developing ourselves as humans and fellow men, because it is dedicated time to spend in our own company, or in the ensemble-situation, in company with the selected few. We shall linger a bit on this personal space before moving on to other matters.

Practising and personal space

Susan Cain presents some interesting perspectives regarding the personalities of the individuals relating themselves to our present society in her *Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can't Stop Talking*. (In this article, we have used a Norwegian translation of the book called *Stille: introvert styrke i en verden som aldri slutter å snakke*, 2013.) In the Western world, we live within a systemised worldview that glorifies the extroverted ideal. This means, that success is to be a socially active and collaborative leader who enjoys being in the spotlight. Such a person, according to Cain's discourse, is one who prefers action before contemplation (also implying quick, spontaneous decisions before slow, calculated ones), risk before caution and certainties before doubts.² They like collaboration and working in teams and are also, socially 'pack-animals'. Technologically gifted introverts, especially those whom have gained a considerable wealth and success, seem to be one exception since they, by their competence, provide the foundation of the technological society we set out to create. They are, therefore, excused. This extroverted ideal is also discernible in children's TV-shows making the ideal available to us already from an early age. Research also shows that we seem to value those speaking at a fast pace as more competent than those speaking slowly (pp. 16–18). What is particularly interesting, when Cain presents her case, is that this development of the extroverted ideal in the USA seems to have coincided with the idolisation of film-stars in the 1920's and -30's. (For whom were better to have as one's ideal than the personal magnetism of a star of the big screen?) And not only did the new up-and-coming ideal present themselves in the cinemas, but also in everyday commercials telling us how to live our lives (of course, as a result of us using their products). Also, with the rise of the extroverted ideal and

2 As Epictetus chose to phrase it: '[i]f you begin by admiring little things, you will not be thought worthy of great things: but if you despise the little, you will be greatly admired' (2004, p. 34).

the new idolisation of the film-star, psychology-researchers started to publish about inferiority for real and articles on children's upbringing began to appear telling us how to raise our children to have 'winning personalities'; it was no longer socially acceptable to be quiet and introvert, because extroversion and continuous social activities were 'the way to go'. Even more symptomatic of this is discussion, Cain points out, is that the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV)* (which has now been succeeded by revised DSM-V) even categorises the fear of speaking in public as a disorder. Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that the type of resulting democracy, to which these acts of sorting out the unsuited, has its preferred agents. That is, those taking leading roles in shaping society should be of a specific caliber rather than representing a cross section of society as a whole. In relation to this, it is important to underline, as the psychologist Hendriksen also does when otherwise praising Cain's book, that introversion and social anxiety often gets mixed up. It is not uncommon to be anxious and introverted, but the concepts are actually quite different. She describes that introversion is born, while social anxiety is made. Further; with introversion, solitude makes you feel good, but with social anxiety, it just makes you less anxious. To specify, social anxiety thrives on perfectionism (of the negative kind). And to sum up the differences: introversion is your way; social anxiety gets in your way, and by contrast, with non-anxious introversion you feel good and confident overall about yourself and how you present (Hendriksen, 2018). So, it is important to value the qualities of introversion, especially in these times, where these traits are often devalued. However, using introversion as an excuse for being socially anxious is not what we are discussing here. Hendriksen emphasises that '[w]e can bring out the best of ourselves—our conscientiousness, our empathy, our deep thinking and feeling, our high standards—through a willingness to try new things and, vitally, some support along the way' (Hendriksen, 2018). She further points out that '[a]s we stretch and grow, what will happen inside our brains? It has been established that

anything you do frequently can change your brain, from driving a taxi to playing the violin...’ (Hendriksen, 2018). Practising both an instrument and the way in which you relate comfortably, empathically and confidently supports our case here in practising for democracy. It may also be pointed out that the practising session can also be understood as an introverted activity as we spend time alone (or in ensemble, a selected few), analysing our own activity over long periods of time.

From the 1940’s on, several prominent American universities decided to, through their application-tests, de-prioritise (sometimes even exclude) those introverted, quiet applicants who did not show this ‘winning personality’ (pp. 36–44). This is also commented by Nussbaum:

So critical thinking would not be a very important part of education for economic growth, and it has not been in states that have pursued this goal relentlessly, such as the Western Indian state of Gujarat, well known for its combination of technological sophistication with docility and group-think. The student’s freedom of mind is dangerous if what is wanted is a group of technically trained obedient workers to carry out the plans of elites who are aiming at foreign investment and technological development. Critical thinking will, then, be discouraged—as it has so long been in the government schools of Gujarat. (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 20-21)

But perhaps this is the very idea itself. If, as Nussbaum put it, ‘In the context of the old paradigm of what it is for a nation to develop, what is on everyone’s lips is the need for an education that promotes national development seen as economic growth’ (p.17), then perhaps this socialising is part of a societal machine to suppress space for contemplation and human self-development in the name of productivity and wealth.

In arguing the case that introversion and its qualities should be appreciated rather than limited, we do not state that introversion is superior to extroversion in relation

to the personal practice session and reflection space. Rather, in both individual and ensemble practice, the role and richness of manifold personalities working together has great value and is encouraged, as it promotes the ability to include several perspectives and encourage further reflection. Yet, it is not always clear what such reflection-space could entail; let us therefore turn our focus to knowledge production through reflected actions.

Practise-session and knowledge-production

Irit Rogoff develops what she calls *criticality*: '[i]n theoretical terms we have moved from criticism, to critique to criticality, to the actual inhabitation of a condition in which we are deeply embedded as well as being critically conscious' (Rogoff, 2006, p. 5). Her idea relates to a sort of being and critically thinking within a certain situation by inhabiting it. She makes a point of not only adding knowledge to the pre-existing, but also unlearning old information to be open for what the situation presents. This is, as we understand her, to secure that one does not anticipate knowledge prejudicially based on expectations formed by past knowledge, but stays open for the unforeseen as it appears and, at the same time, meets that knowledge critically. She writes, "Criticality" as I perceive it is precisely in the operations of recognising the limitations of one's thought for one does not learn something new until one unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding information rather than rethinking a structure' (Rogoff, 2003 p. 1). Rather than standing outside a given situation, one becomes part of it. Rogoff unites 'that being studied' and 'those doing the studying'. You cannot stand outside and objectify it, and criticality is a state of duality in many ways. It is at the same time 'both empowered and disempowered', 'knowing and unknowing'. She names criticality as a mode of embodiment. We are in it, we cannot really exit this state or view it from a critical distance. Criticality 'marries our knowledge and our experience in ways that are not complimentary (Rogoff, 2006, p. 2).

For the performing musician, then, to unlock the practise-session as a potential space is to combine intellectual reflection with being in the moment. It is to 'unlearn' some of the old knowledge to open oneself for the unexpected new. And, it is to meet that new unexpected knowledge critically and openly to learn more about ourselves, others and music itself as a phenomenon. Arguably, with Cain fresh in mind, introversion can be an important feature to achieve this as it very much involves introspective processes, and the safe space of one's own practice to try out perspectives and roles, makes knowledge-creation in a Socratic-*Eros*-sense even more promising.

This is another point in which the Arts, or music in this particular case, shows its true potential for both knowledge-production and social development. It is also why the Arts in recent years has been recognised as a methodological perspective within other fields of study, such as in Social Science (Gergen and Gergen, 2018, p. 54), because it offers alternative, more practical ways of approaching various phenomena which effectively imbues non-intellectual perspectives rooted in, for instance, emotion, experience and tactility. Because, as previously stated, the potential space of the practise-session effectively opens for cultivation of creativity and imagination.

Ensemble practise: democracy or dictatorship?

Although, it is a distinct matter that deserves its own discourse, when arguing for the democratic value of the practising session it is difficult to overlook ensemble practice entirely. A brief mention of the topic must then be made before we return to the individual performer. As presented above, the potential space of trying out new ideas, other perspectives and points of view in private can be seen as a preparation for being a reflected, democratic citizen. But in an ensemble, the democracy is potentially practised in real-time. We do not talk of larger ensembles with conductors in this case, as they are presented with different challenges, and conductors, to put it in Goehr's

words, are ‘in an uneasy position because they are simultaneously regarded as masters and servants’(in relation to leading the orchestra, but serving the composer’s work) (Goehr, 2007 p.273).

How we relate to each other in an ensemble determines the outcome. In section III, on educating citizens, Nussbaum (2010), explains the process of child development in relation to empathy and reciprocity. Helplessness and insecurity lead to dependency and the need to ‘lord it over others’. As a sense of independency develops, we learn to relate to others as an end and not just means to an end. This fact is important, because as performers in development, insecurity and a certain sense of helplessness can often occur, thus inciting the need to achieve a sense of control, which, in turn, can result in a need to control others and boss them around. Practising alone and being used to stepping forward as the sole focal point as a performer can also enforce this sort of behaviour. A performer seeing the other musicians as a means to their end, mere accompanists to their performance, does not strengthen democracy, rather the opposite. Thus, it is crucial that such prima-donna behaviour is discouraged, and that ensemble training emphasises the competencies identified by Nussbaum (2010). Such qualities are a sense of personal accountability, a tendency to see others as distinct individuals and a willingness to raise a critical voice, not necessarily siding with the majority on all matters.

We, Robin and Inga Marie, have experienced first-hand on several occasions how the complexity of interpretative practices and phenomenology are intertwined in ensemble practise. As we practise and perform as a duo, we prepare material individually and meet to practise together. The qualities named by Nussbaum are essential in a successful practise session on many levels. The practical level of respecting the other individual in holding them accountable and being accountable yourself, in how you prepare, how you spend the time practising together and how you voice opinions and thoughts, are all essential. The empathy in seeing the other as a distinct individual

and relating respectfully to each other creates a safe space for artistic practise. As insecurity leads to the need for control, a safe space is foundational in this context. Further, on a more subliminal level, the emotions that emerge through the artistic practise contribute to the aesthetic experience, and how these are received in the ensemble determines much of the outcome, even though this is a part of the practise that is often uncontrollable. This fact makes the ethical aspect of the ensemble practise and performance all the more important.

Proposing a logbook exercise

Naturally, the topics covered in this article have potentially raised more questions than they can possibly answer. But the answer here is not necessarily what is important, but what Socratic *Eros* they promote. In a form of response to Kristján Kristjánsson's plea for more publications on 'the actual cultivation of *phronesis*' (Kristjánsson, 2014, p. 152), the question that remains is how to initiate that process in the student, or for ourselves for that matter in a systematic, instrumental way? Taking the lead from Julia Annas' (2011) skill analogy of virtue, as something that can be practiced and improved as long as the subject actively aspires to realise some ideals and to improve, beyond inactively (accidentally, even) achieving that sort of status as a happenstance following mere routine. The search for virtue must be driven by the hope and the possibility of it ever to become a reality (Seneca, 1917, p. 22). So, in the sense that *phronesis* is considered one of the Aristotelian virtues (Surpresant, 2012, p. 221), this gives us hope that the practising session — as the potential space it offers, situated within a socio-political context to which the performer must relate to — can be active practices to aspire to transcend the everyday mechanics of the profession to become a contributing part of a greater societal apparatus. As Chris W. Surpresant reminds us, 'possessing *phronesis* requires both knowledge and action' (Surpresant, 2012, p. 226), and, in the words of Fredrik Svenaeus, it is '... an intellectual ability

which is perfected by experience ... [and] a drive and desire to do the right thing' (Svenaesus, 2014, p. 295). Additionally, Aaron Kuntz and Austin Pickup upholds that '[p]hronesis further situates discussions of *what could be* within deliberations of *what should be*' (Kuntz and Pickup, 2016, p. 174; original emphases).

But to interpret Anna's (2011) intelligent virtue ethics as a simplistic alone will not suffice for *phronesis* to manifest itself. As Kristjánsson warns us, 'skills in instrument playing [... is] a single *techné*. *Phronesis* is, however, about the harmonious mastery of one's *whole life*.... it has to be shown that adequately learning a single skill also requires an all-round mastery of surrounding life tasks' (Kristjánsson, 2014, p. 163). In the spirit of Seneca's remark that the search for knowledge is led by those who perform the search' (Seneca, 1917, p. 9), we draw on Rolfhamre's experience in having his higher education musical instrument performance students write logbooks during their practice sessions to focus their work and development, we will propose a supplementary logbook-initiative that is more concerned with *phronesis* and *Eros*, than with *poiesis* and *praxis*.

Logbook exercise 1

The original logbook instruction is handed out at the beginning of the students' study (Figure 3). They ask the student to perform the simple task of using a small notebook (that will fit in their instrument case) and a pencil. During the practice sessions (or even during classes), they should take notes of their achievements using a neutral, problem solving linguistic tone for their flaws and mistakes, and positive, edifying one for their positive acts to achieve a sense of mastery without entering a negative spiral of 'talking oneself down', so to say, by fostering negative expectations from underachievement. In addition to providing traceability and developmental documentation, it, therefore, also provides an element of practising aural analysis, self-reflection to promote insight, a possibility of identifying and treating the cause of

problems rather than the symptoms, and, perhaps the most important, it can be brought to the instrument performance class to enable a grounded student-teacher dialogue in relation to how the student makes use of the time in between classes. The logbook, thus, functions at the level of the poiesis and praxis, with some possibility of entering more higher-level stages of phronesis at the discretion of the student themselves and the teacher. What would be interesting, however, is to introduce a similar activity to address higher level wisdom following the possibilities sketched out above at a later stage in the student's study (Figure 4).

Practice log

Bring to the first 3 lessons to have a dialogue with your teacher, after that you do it for yourself.

By prof. Robin Rolfhamre, 4 February 2020

What to do:

- Buy/find a small notebook and a pencil that fits your instrument case.
- Keep it in your instrument case at all times

Use:

- To take notes during your classes
- To make your practicing a conscious and effective experience.
- To make notes during extra-curricular activities

Purpose:

- Practicing analysis of your playing and development
- Learning to identify problems and positive things in your playing
- Make notes of feedback from tuition
- Dates enable you to track progress.

Content:

- Issues, for instance:
 - o tensions in the left hand
 - o improve planning of finger motion in right hand
 - o what disturbed your concentration, what actions can you do to address the issues?
- Positives, for instance:
 - o Thinking about... really helped the fluidity of bars x-x
 - o On piece A it was a better experience to place the footstool in a higher position.
- What to concentrate on during the next session?

Examples:




Figure 3: Facsimile of the original logbook-instructions handed out to students. Rolfhamre's document.




Figure 4: The paper seeks to suggest a second logbook-instruction to replace the first at a later point in the study to facilitate the student's development towards ethical considerations. Log 1 corresponds to the lower left side of Figure 1, while Log 2 will seek to address the mid-section of the same figure. Rolfhamre's illustration.

Proposition: logbook exercise 2

The remaining question, then, is what such a second, higher-level logbook should entail and what sort of questions it should pose to the student. Returning to the ecology presented in Figure 2, we can extract the individual entries from its ecology, set them up against each other (still pursuing the aesthetic perspective of the growing-space above) to pinpoint a list of possible departures (Table 2).

Table 2: Extraction of methodological tools from Figure 2.

		A	B	C	D	E
		Practising as aesthetic event	Potential space	Autobiographical documentation and quantisation	Exposure and judgement	Assessment and influence
1	Practising as aesthetic event		See A2	See A3	See A4	See A5
2	Potential space	How do we cultivate our practise as an ability to develop and grow? Is it a practise that intrigues us to be in?		See B3	See B4	See B5
3	Autobiographical documentation and quantisation	How do we normatively establish ourselves and what 'reality' are we presenting to ourselves, as well as to others?	What does our creative output and practise trigger in us? How do we interact with ourselves and what could be?		See C4	See C5
4	Exposure and judgement	How do we cultivate the full situation into an expression that we offer to others?	How do the expectation of, and actual reception we get influence our work process and our sense of	Does the collected entity of what we offer to the public contribute and stimulate the desired		See D5

			self?	effects? Does it provoke anything unexpected, and if so, what can we make of it?		
5	Assessment and influence	In what way does our practise offer more than learning a piece of music?	How do we judge the quality of, and what do we gain from our own experience in the present?	In what way does our artistic output influence others, contributing to the discourse? And how is our output influenced by others?	Do the effects produced by our public practise create an environment we wish to contribute to? Can we offer something else or something more?	

This exercise enables a set of phenomenological questions which could be listed accordingly and presented to the student in a somewhat rephrased manner:

Level 1:

(A2): How do you perceive and understand yourself when practising?

(A2): How do you experience your development when practising?

(A3): How do you perceive your identity?

(A3): How do you relate to the identities of others?

(A4): How do you cultivate your identity based on the full situation you are situated in and how does that relate to your artistic expression?

(A5): What additional knowledge/experiences do you gain from your practise session, beyond technically learning to play a piece of music?

Level 2:

- (B₃): What sort of emotion, thought-process, experience does your playing and conscious attempt on improving your playing trigger in you and how do you relate to and act on those sensations?
- (B₄): How does the expectation of what people might think of the musical performance that you prepare, as well as earlier *actual* reception conveyed to us by the audience (live or online), influence your working process and your sense of who you are, what you think you could become?
- (B₅): How do you judge the quality (however you may employ that term) of the experience itself and how do you think that you gain from that experience here and now, in the present?

Level 3:

- (C₄): When presenting your artistic work to an *actual* audience: Does your underlying intentions correspond to their reaction (as you perceive it)? Do you detect anything unexpected, and if so, what do you make of it?
- (C₅): In what way does our artistic output influence others, contributing to the collective artistic discourse? And how is our output influenced by others?
- (D₅): What can we contribute to the collective society?

Additionally, we may add some supplementary questions:

Level 4:

(*phronesis*): How can you generalise the experiences and knowledge that you gain when practising? And how can you transfer those gains to other aspects of your life beyond your professional activities? What is your place/function in society? That is, what role do you want to play in the life of others as well as yours?

(Hansen's *authenticity*): What is your perspective on life, how do you perceive yourself individually and in relation to others?

(Socratic *Eros*): What way of living, and what higher aims do you aspire to? And what measures do you take to pursue that way of living?

One obvious critique of such an approach would be that the exercise is time consuming and irrelevant: 'are we not here to learn how to play an instrument?', one may ask. What is more, when a young student pursues a degree in music performance focusing only on artistry, that study programme alone is responsible for, as the Norwegian state regulations defines it, for example, to promote value creation, sustainable societies, and govern central perceptions of democracy, humanity and care (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2018). But we should not only strive to fulfil fluctuant policy-defined outcomes in an instrumental goal-oriented fashion, but also attempt to discover the world beyond the *polis* and the *sensus communis* in which we can re-think our futures in terms of what might be.

A second objection would be that it needs practice to think in terms of such perspectives, and that a generic student would perhaps not be able to grow properly through them by merely being handed a piece of paper (Logbook instructions 2). It is our belief and experience, however, that the discursive prowess of students should not be underestimated, and that they, following the priming exercise of Logbook in-

structions 1 and the close support of the teacher who may introduce a climate for such perspectives during classes, can utilise the second log proposed here as a toolbox. If further considering the second logbook exercise as superseding the first, they can continue their notes over time, addressing and revisiting different questions at any given moment and bring their notebook to the performance classes to oversee and revitalise their development with the teacher functioning as a sparring partner. (The teacher could, of course, be exchanged for a private sparring partner if the practitioner is not enrolled in a formal training programme.) This transcending knowledge or wisdom, *philo-Sophia*, can trigger important self-reflective impulses which, when situating ourselves as part of a whole, rather than mere ‘victims’ of a judging audience, can make us grow as individuals. It can provide a safe space (provided that we trust our sparring partner) to identify, pursue and explore other developmental values beyond course-curriculum, learning goals and other politically, culturally and socially defined ideals. According to Spinoza, those who have a positive impact on others will feel pleasure, particularly when identifying themselves as the cause of that action, and vice versa (Spinoza, 2015, loc. 1809).

Concluding thoughts

Realistically, a few critical questions during an introverted practising session does not a democratic, empathic citizen make, and that is not at all what we have hoped to achieve either. What is at stake is to bring these matters to the agenda and devise pedagogical tools to initiate a process—plant a seed, so-to-speak—leading to virtue and growth beyond the generally accepted boundaries of learning to play an instrument. As we see music instrument education, it is not a matter of recruiting un-knowing students and learn them a complete skill (such as programming, the use of software, welding, plumbing, etc.). Rather, it is to recruit already experienced musicians and perform an intervention in which we help them stake out a course of development

and accumulating skills long after receiving their degree. Similarly, the method proposed here, as well as the overall philosophical argument of potential spaces, transformative processes, empathy and democracy, is not to be considered learning outcomes to be achieved within the course of the study. Instead, it is to introduce and learn a way of contemplating and exercising critique in life, that develops students in the long run. It is to crystallise and verbalise questions that re-directs attention from *praxis* and *poiesis* to the process of *Socratic Eros* to explore life more constructively, beyond adhering to predefined norms alone to satisfy an instrumental function in a societal machinery.

In this article we propose logbook-writing as a means of verbalizing and concretising such critique, organized by four levels of questions ranging from self-perception and self-reflectiveness, to how one relates to one-self and others contextually, to understanding communicative music performance as an interaction between two parties based on human insight, and to how we can contribute to and play a part in society. Through this method, we hope to stimulate a shift from a music performance learning centred on the particular and practical (e.g. *poiesis*, *praxis* and *phronesis* (cf. fig. 1 above) to one that engages with music creation in a broader context to achieve a move to the universal, idealistic through *Socratic Eros*. Said differently, rather than holding *phronesis* as the end-goal of learning and practising music, it rather becomes a part of the process towards something higher where the *Socratic Eros* enables us to transition between and cumulatively learn to develop from the different stages of *poiesis*, *praxis*, *phronesis*, and *authenticity* (cf. Table 1) to be virtuous “lovers of wisdom”, as Hansen so eloquently put it (Hansen, 2007, p. 24).

So, to all aspiring musicians out there, let us use the privilege that having time and opportunity to sit and practice music performance critically to grow as members of society: ‘let us practise for democracy! Let us play for a prosperous life!’

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