Institutionalized Resistance?

Public School Responses to Contradictory Institutional Logics

Puguh Prasetya Utomo

UiA University of Agder

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Puguh P. Utomo

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This dissertation represents my new interest in organizational studies, which are different from the study of public policy, which has been my research interest for a longer time. Diving into a "new" field to make theoretical contributions was a challenging adventure. The dissertation is the beginning of my efforts to contribute to organizational institutionalism, and this dedication will continue throughout my academic career in the future. This end of the beginning can be completed because of the supports of several people.

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Summary

This doctoral thesis is an organizational study that explores the institutional and organizational issues behind education inequality in Indonesia that has been perceived as taken-for-granted. By examining a case in which public organizations experienced and responded to an intra-institutional contradiction, i.e., conflicting institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actor, this work draws on and contributes to the institutional theory of organizations, commonly called organizational institutionalism. In doing so, this thesis answers the following two research problems:

- *How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional contradiction?*
- *How can both institution-level influences and organizational attributes explain the organizational responses?*

This monograph consists of 10 chapters, starting with the introduction outlining both the theoretical and empirical background of the study that are then elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Chapter 4 describes the methods employed in the study. Chapter 5 to 8 provides the empirical data describing the findings, followed by the discussions in Chapter 9 highlighting the study's theoretical contributions. The thesis concludes with a chapter that presents the answers to the research questions, the limitations of the thesis, and suggestions for future studies.

The introductory chapter outlines the study's points of departure, highlighting the current discussions and theoretical gaps in organizational institutionalism studies. Based on the findings, the study's essential contributions are briefly presented: (1) the empirical evidence of isomorphism occurring in the prevalent circumstance of institutional complexity; (2) the notion of *stereotypical isomorphism* reflecting a cognitive influence of the institution on organizations; (3) organizational perception management as a resistance strategy; and (4) the role of organizational attribute configurations with identity as the core element. The introduction links the study to the global, persistent issue of educational inequality in Indonesia, which was selected as the broader empirical context of the study. The case of public school responses to conflicting institutional demands related to school admission systems in an Indonesian city, i.e., the long-existing practice of

selectivity versus the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, provided theoretically relevant conditions and, therefore, was selected to further illuminate the research problems.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical survey that outlines existing knowledge of organizational responses to institutional complexity and their determinants. Furthermore, the review also identifies several possibilities when organizations experience an intra-institutional contradiction as a kind of institutional complexity. The possible institutional influences and the complexity level of the institutional contradiction are considered as institution-level determinants, whereas some relevant organizational attributes are considered as organization-level determinants. By taking an iterative approach, the concept of organizational perception management is woven into the theoretical review after the preliminary findings revealed organizational identity expression as one of the resistance tactics used by some of the observed organizations in responding to the emerging demand for inclusivity.

Chapter 3 describes the empirical context of Indonesia's education systems, which is, in general, characterized by both the educational tracking system and school differentiation at the senior secondary level. The merit admission system has long been the practical instrument of the tracking system—representing the institutionalized practice of selectivity in school admission—which has caused educational inequality in districts across the country. While international pressure from UNESCO's "*Education for All*" (EFA) movement has strengthened the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, Indonesian decentralization reform has led to variations in the implementation of inclusive education principles across the country. Nationally recognized as one with stronger commitments to improving vulnerable children's access to education, the selected district provided a relevant case where the contradicting institutional demands coexisted. In the case city, the emerging demand manifested in the implementation of the three programs intended to increase the access of academically at-risk children to quality education. The different groups of vulnerable children included low-performing students from economically disadvantaged families (the *Quota Program*), students with disabilities (the *Inclusion Program*), and students from ethnic minorities sent from the most remote areas (the *Affirmative Action Program*).

Chapter 4 sketches out the methods used in this thesis. A comparative multiple case study covering all eleven public schools in the city was employed to

address the research questions. Data collection consisted of in-person, semi-structured interviews involving 155 informants from the schools (i.e., principal, vice-principals, teachers, and students) and the local office of education. The fieldwork, divided into two stages, was conducted throughout 2016. The exploratory stage captured the nature of the institutional contradiction, the initial information regarding the schools' organizational attributes, and the broad strategies adopted by each school in responding to the institutional conflict. In the second stage, more informants in each school were interviewed to further understand the response strategies and the schools' attributes influencing the strategy selection. The interviews were also supported by observations during the 2016 school admission cycle and the use of secondary data.

The analysis aimed to identify organizational response strategies, examine institution-level influences, and assess the role of organizational characteristic configurations. The analysis was carried out in two stages, first through a within-case analysis and continued by a cross-case analysis. To assess the role of organizational attribute combinations, crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (cs-QCA) was employed. The configurational analysis considered five dichotomous conditions already confirmed during the data collection (i.e., school status, power balance structure, identity, and decision-making mechanism) and a dichotomous outcome (i.e., a high or low resistance level).

Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings from the schools' responses to the intra-institutional contradiction—which formed interesting patterns. First, it demonstrates the homogeneity of school responses on both sides of the intra-institutional contradiction, i.e., schools wish to comply with the long-institutionalized practice of selectivity while simultaneously resisting the emerging demand for inclusivity. This pattern indicates isomorphism, characterized by compliance with one demand (while resisting the other) and convergent bundles of responses on both sides of the institutional conflict. These homogenous responses also suggest that an institutional influence for compliance played an essential role. The second finding showed high variation in the strategies of resistance to the *Quota Program* (an emerging demand with high specificity), while low variation was identified in the strategies of resistance to *the Inclusion Program* and the *Affirmative Action Program* (medium and low specificity levels, respectively). Therefore, these patterns show that the controversial institutional demand's complexity determined the variability of resistance within the

organization population. The high variation in resistance strategies specifically indicates that organization-level determinants played a role in specifying resistance levels in a particular circumstance, that is, when organizations faced a highly tight controversial demand.

Chapter 6 provides more empirical evidence of the critical role institution-level influences play. This chapter highlights stereotypical isomorphic influence, a cognitive mechanism through which a prevalent institutional logic affects organizational actors' perception of the contradicting demands. As empirically found, the cognitive mechanism can shape the organizational actors' beliefs and perceptions. The three identified perceptions included the glorification of the long-institutionalized practice, skepticism towards the new demand's prescriptions, and negative stereotypes about vulnerable children benefitting from the new demand.

Chapter 6 also shows that the level of institutional contradiction complexity can provoke either homogenous or heterogeneous response strategies from organizations. The empirical case has illustrated how complexity levels, identified from the specificity of the controversial demand, played a critical role in determining the variability of resistance strategies. The new, controversial demand with tight prescriptions (or high specificity) stimulated internal conflicts amongst organizational actors. This internal conflict activated the role of power balance structure and other relevant organizational attributes in specifying organizational responses, enabling heterogeneity in resistance levels across the organizational population. In contrast, homogenous resistance strategies occur when organizations face a new, controversial demand with ambiguous prescriptions (or low specificity). This means that organizational actors can avoid such internal conflicts. The absence of such an internal conflict makes the role of power structures and other organizational attributes less relevant in specifying response strategies.

Chapter 7 highlights four organizational attributes that play an essential role in determining resistance levels when facing a new, controversial institutional demand. The attributes include organizational identity, decision-making mechanisms, organizational status in the field, and power balance structure. The configurational analysis results show that organizational identity is the primary determinant. A strong *identity resistor*, characterized by both an identity unaligned with an institutional expectation and insiders' convergent perceptions of organizational identity, is necessary and sufficient for high resistance to the

institutional demand. However, a weak identity resistor is only a necessary condition for low-level resistance, and therefore needs to be combined with other relevant attributes (i.e., either with a command decision-making mechanism or peripheral organizational status).

Chapter 8 focuses on the use of perception management as an identity-based response. It reflects, in particular, an empirically found resistance strategy that can be added to Oliver's (1991) list. This strategy was adopted by organizations with a strong identity resistor to softly refuse the controversial institutional demand. Organizational identity is expressed to maintain or develop particular impressions that may attract outsiders' interest to join the organization, particularly those compatible with the organization's identity. However, the strategy is also simultaneously meant to deter unwanted outsiders, namely those who either do not align with or threaten the organization's identity. For instance, when a school's image caused a program's target group to stay away from (or voluntarily not choosing) the school, the school adopting perception management could avoid direct rejection of the controversial demand while making it irrelevant for consideration. Moreover, the chapter reveals the mechanism of reciprocal identity-image interrelationships in perception management, pointing out the processes in which the observed schools adopt a 'soft-but-high-level' resistance strategy when experiencing institutional complexity.

Chapter 9 unpacks the empirical findings by connecting them to the current theoretical discussions of organizational institutionalism. As a result, it elaborates upon several theoretical contributions. First, the thesis highlights the nature of *stereotypical isomorphic influences* representing other symbolic and activity-based carriers of an institution's cultural-cognitive element. Second, the thesis also reveals the way in which the complexity of intra-institutional contradiction determines the variability of organizational resistance strategies. In doing so, it highlights the existence or absence of internal conflict between the proponents of each side of an institutional contradiction, which enables (or disables) the role of organizational attributes in strategy selection. By zeroing in on the specificity levels of a controversial demand, the thesis suggests that the presence (or absence) of discretionary power is not the only determinant of organizational resistance.

Third, the study promotes the notion of an identity-based resistor: a composite condition of organizational identity that reflects both identity strength and alignment with a controversial institutional demand. The identity resistor is

found to be the main element of organizational attribute configurations determining resistance levels. Fourth, emphasis is also given to perception management through organizational identity expression as a novel type of response strategy. This work also illuminates the dynamic relationships between organizational identity and institutionalization. Finally, this study explores the complex nature of managing organizational perceptions internally and externally. In doing so, it sheds light on the interrelationship between organizational identity and image as a mechanism through which perception management is used as a resistance strategy.

Chapter 10 answers the initial research questions, which suggest that both institutional influences and organizational attributes (and their alignment) should be considered in studying resistance behavior. The essential contributions to the different streams of literature, i.e., organizational institutionalism, perception management, organizational identity, and public administration (particularly, discretion study), are highlighted. Furthermore, suggestions for future studies are outlined by considering the limitations of the current study. For instance, one suggestion emphasizes the need to further identify the nature of convergent response bundles as a form of isomorphism occurring in the context of institutional complexity. Further research should also study the adopters' motivations and the characteristics of organizational fields where such isomorphism appears. Another limitation here is related to the type of organizations studied, i.e., public organizations fully controlled by the government. Therefore, research into relatively more independent organizations like private schools or hospitals is needed to find out whether organizations with greater discretion and less risk of resistance exhibit different behaviors. Furthermore, it would be valuable to investigate additional relevant organizational attributes, such as ownership, size, social capital, culture, or performance, that may shed light on their potential role in determining organizational responses to institutional complexity.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Backdrop and Purposes of the Study

This dissertation represents an organizational study, which is an important area in public administration field as listed in Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance edited by Ali Farazmand (2018). Despite the close ties between the classics of public administration and the precursors of organization theories (e.g., Blau, 1955; Gulick & Urwick, 1937; Merton, 1952; Selznick, 1948, 1953; Simon, 1947; M. Weber, 1921/1978), and the inclusion of organizational studies in the list of topics in the current encyclopedia of public administration, it must be admitted that the development of organizational studies in the last decades has, to a certain degree, separated itself from the public administration field,[1] dominated by sociology researchers and management scholars from business schools (Kelman, 2008; Vogel, 2014). However, as highlighted by Vogel (2014), the potentially strong connections between the two fields exist, in which institutional theory of organization is one of the brokerages that can play an essential role in the transfer of knowledge from organizational studies to public administration. This present dissertation, therefore, employs institutional theory (i.e., sociological/organizational institutionalism) as an attempt to make theoretical contributions while signaling that organizational studies are still, and will remain, relevant and essential in the field of public administration.

Institutional theory, particularly organizational (sociological) institutionalism, has been the central approach employed to study organizations (Alvesson & Spicer, 2019; Greenwood, Oliver, Lawrence, & Meyer, 2017;

[1] As identified in the bibliometric analysis conducted by Vogel (2014) based on 16 European and North American top journals in the two fields spanning the period 2000 to 2010, the nine clusters of current research (from 'local government' to 'performance management') have been dominated by public administration field, while eight other clusters (from practice theory to new institutionalism) have been the main domain of organization studies. The public administration field has very little representation in organization studies' research clusters and vice versa.

Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008; Vogel, 2012). In the last four decades, there have been several essential shifts in institutionalists' theoretical concerns, including the shifts from isomorphism or organizational homogeneity to institutional pluralism and organizational heterogeneity (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; Kraatz & Block, 2017); and from *macrostructural determinism* to *embedded agency* and *multi-level influences* (Mutch, 2019; Ocasio, Thornton, & Lounsbury, 2017). Since Friedland and Alford's (1991) seminal work, and more comprehensive explanations and some adjustments provided by Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury (2012), the institutional logics perspective has become one of most influential theoretical perspectives in organizational institutionalism (for recognition of the importance of institutional logics, see Scott, 2017; see also Mutch, 2019 for conceptual development and constructive criticism).

Considering current developments of organizational institutionalism, including the institutional logics perspective, Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury (2011) provide a comprehensive framework of how multilevel influences (i.e., institutions, organizational fields, and organization levels) affect organizational responses to institutional complexity. This well-known article on the topic has inspired almost all empirical studies on organizational responses to institutional complexity. However, such empirical studies only examine one level of influence, i.e., either institution, field, or organization level (e.g., Aharonson & Bort, 2015; Berente & Yoo, 2012; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Sillince, Jarzabkowski, & Shaw, 2012), rather than looking at the multilevel influences. In contrast, this dissertation examines the influences of the two levels suggested by Greenwood et al. (2011), i.e., institution and organization, while going one step further to consider the individual level.

Typical studies of institutional complexity more frequently examine inter-institutional contradictions (i.e., multiple expectations imposed by different institutional actors) while neglecting *intra-institutional contradictions* (i.e., the coexistence of conflicting institutional demands promoted by the same institutional actor). The latter carries different characteristics than the former and, therefore, the features of organizational responses may differ. This study contributes to the research stream by providing empirical evidence of organizational responses to an intra-institutional contradiction.

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following broad questions:

- *How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional contradiction?*
- *How can organizational responses be explained by both institution-level influences and organizational attributes?*

Indonesian schools constitute an optimal case for studying intra-institutional conflicting demands on organizations. The case of public school responses to conflicting institutional demands related to student admissions (i.e., the long-institutionalized practice of selectivity versus the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity) in an Indonesian city provided theoretically relevant conditions, in which similar organizations in a particular field face the same institutional conflicts imposed by the government. Therefore, the case was selected for in-depth study.

How educational reforms occurred in several countries, i.e., the transformation of educational tracking systems into comprehensive one or the adoption of inclusive education principles with varying degrees, have attracted great attention from scholars within the sociology of education (e.g., Blossfeld, 2018; Forsberg & Lundgren, 2010; Hammack, 2004; Powell, 2014; Powell & Pfahl, 2019; Sahlberg, 2015). However, how schools as organizations respond to such changes and transitions are relatively neglected in this line of research. Meanwhile, the other research stream developed by scholars of organizational and institutional studies holds long-standing concerns with organizational responses to institutional demands (see Greenwood et al., 2011; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). However, the current situations are different from those faced by schools in J. W. Meyer & Rowan's (1977) classic study on school resistance to change in the USA. They observed a circumstance in which schools faced an institutional change characterized by institutional actors' intention to replace the old system with a new one. In contrast, the current circumstances reflect institutional *complexity*, such as in this dissertation where schools experienced contradicting institutional demands, i.e., the coexistence of both "old" and "new" systems, a typical situation more recently studied by organizational institutionalism scholars.

1.2 The Contributions of the Study

In public administration literature, the resistance or unwillingness to implement new policies is a consequence of tight institutional demands—for instance, those with high specificity enabling a low level of discretion, experienced by implementers. Tight institutional demand limits discretion (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Tummers, Bekkers, & Steijn, 2012), and decreased level of implementers' discretion in the introduction of emerging institutional demands, e.g., new policies that promote changes or are widely perceived as controversial, negatively affect the intention to implement them (Tummers, Bekkers, Thiel, & Steijn, 2015). However, there is a notable paucity of scientific literature specifically relating to the effect of such conditions on the variation of the types and levels of resistance adopted by organizations in a particular field. A more comprehensive understanding of how organizational characteristics contribute to the variety is also lacking. Whilst Greenwood et al. (2011) have theoretically highlighted the potentially significant role of organizational attributes, their work and existing empirical investigations on the subject consider the role of organizational characteristics (e.g., field position, identity, power structure, and governance) as single and separate attributes, rather than as configurations.

This thesis expands insights into organizational institutionalism—particularly related to organizational responses to institutional complexity—in several ways. First, while prior work examined organizational responses to conflicting prescriptions imposed by multiple institutional orders, the current work examines a situation in which organizations experience two conflicting institutional demands, which are both derived from values and desirable goals endorsed by the same institutional actor, e.g., government, representing an intra-institutional contradiction. It allows the attempts to study the uniqueness of organizational resistance to a newly emerging demand that contradicts a long-institutionalized practice in the public sector. In the face of such a circumstance, organizations experience a far greater dilemma since they may lose legitimacy when defying any institutional demands.

In this case, neither power differentials between separate institutional referents nor the level of organization's dependence on institutional actors (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010) are irrelevant as a basis to predict specific resistance strategies. Therefore, it is proposed that the variation in types and levels of

resistance can be predicted by considering the specificity of emerging demand and the varied combination of organizational attributes. As a developing country struggling with democratization and public sector decentralization, Indonesia provides an interesting context in which the rooms for organizational discretion in program implementations or public service provision are, in general, still limited. Conducting a research study in this context could reveal resistance strategies that differ from the existing insights based, for the most part, on empirical evidence from developed countries. In this dissertation, resistance strategies were initially identified using Oliver's (1991) response strategies as a starting point while keeping open the possibility of other strategies and their applications. As a result, *organizational perception management* was identified as a relatively high resistance strategy. Therefore, this present study provides an answer to Christine Oliver's (1991) call to extend the response strategy set available to organizations.

Second, by considering varying levels of demand specificity and contradiction between emerging and existing institutional demands, this thesis offers the cases in which a higher level of intra-institutional complexity in the public sector exists. It is fertile ground for exploring under which circumstance (i.e., level of demand specificity) highly varied types and resistance levels emerge in facing institutional contradiction. Although institutional complexity has long been a concern of institutionalist scholars, e.g., perceived as multiplicity (Oliver, 1991), the extent to which the characteristics of a controversial new demand determine the variety of organizational resistances remains largely unexplored.

Third, by exploring the role of organizational attributes, this thesis highlights how combinations of organizational characteristics specify the types and levels of resistance. This research study diverges from prior work exploring the role of single attributes, such as organizational identity (e.g., Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014), the power structure of internal representatives (e.g., Pache & Santos, 2010), ownership (e.g., Miller, Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011), and field position (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).

Fourth, as still related to the highlighted organizational configurations, this work examines the role of organizational identity as a composite attribute in determining resistance strategies when organizations face conflicting institutional demands. Furthermore, this dissertation expands upon previous works that assess the contributions of organizational identity, e.g., Kodeih and Greenwood (2014)

and Raffaelli and Glynn (2014), by highlighting its essential role as a critical reference for organization insiders in managing organizational images or outsiders' perceptions of the organization, as a response strategy. Furthermore, by linking the works on organizational identity to perception management research (see Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Elsbach, 2006; Ravasi, 2016), this dissertation assesses the interconnection between organizational identity and image on the use of the response strategy.

Fifth, this work considers organizational responses to both institutional expectations as a response bundle. Through this approach, the structure of responses to contradicting institutional demands can be observed more carefully. Moreover, by assessing a unique configuration of the two features of isomorphism, i.e., *compliance* and *convergence* (see Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009), isomorphism occurring within institutional complexity can be identified. The finding of isomorphism characterized with the convergence of response bundles is a response to Boxenbaum and Jonsson's (2017) call for research studying the relevance of isomorphism under conditions of institutional complexity.

Finally, this thesis contributes to organizational institutionalism by introducing *stereotypical isomorphism*, which is argued as a kind of cognitive institutional influence. The notion of *stereotypical isomorphic influence* can be differentiated from the classic ideas of mechanisms leading to isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983; see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). However, without intending to propose a fourth institutional pillar, this work emphasizes the other kinds of carriers (or mechanisms) of the cultural-cognitive pillar, which differ from ones proposed by Scott (2014) and institutional logics scholars (see Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012).

The following subsections describe the critical context of the study: educational inequality as a persistent global issue and its manifestation in Indonesia, a country with the fourth largest education system in the world[2] (World Bank, 2014b). The city case and the reason for its selection are then presented, followed by the formulation of the research problem and questions that direct the empirical investigations.

[2] With more than 50 million students, 2.6 million teachers, and 250,000 schools, the Indonesian education system is behind only China, India, and the United States.

1.3 Linking the Study to the Issue of Educational Inequality

Inequalities remain a prevalent characteristic of education systems across the globe (Benavot et al., 2016; Borgna, Brzinsky-Fay, Dieckhoff, Holtmann, & Solga, 2019; Chzhen, Rees, Gromada, Cuesta, & Bruckauf, 2018; Schleicher, 2018; Torpey-Saboe, 2018). The tracked educational systems applied to senior secondary or earlier levels, characterized by student grouping and placement into separate schools or tracks based on academic abilities (e.g., prior school achievements), have been empirically found as an institutional cause of educational inequalities in many countries (Batruch, Autin, Bataillard, & Butera, 2019; Betts, 2011; Robert, 2010; Triventi, Kulic, Skopek, & Blossfeld, 2016). Under such systems, socioeconomically disadvantaged children are likely overrepresented in less preferred tracks, such as vocational or low-quality schools (Francis, Taylor, & Tereshchenko, 2019).

At the same time, their advantaged peers tend to dominate favorite tracks, for instance, in academically oriented schools with more adequate resources (Buchholz et al., 2016; Contini & Triventi, 2016; Horn, Keller, & Róbert, 2016; Skopek, Triventi, & Buchholz, 2019; Teese, Lamb, Duru-Bellat, & Helme, 2007). Therefore, solving the gaps in educational opportunities and outcomes has become a fundamental goal of educational reforms both in developed and developing countries (Schleicher, 2018). Reforming tracked educational systems into comprehensive schooling systems, which provide equal opportunities for all children to access quality education regardless of their abilities and backgrounds, is an important policy goal (Blossfeld, 2018; Forsberg & Lundgren, 2010; Hammack, 2004; Rasmussen & Werler, 2015; Sahlberg, 2015).

The rise of a global norm for inclusive education has also strengthened the new institutional demand for eliminating school differentiations and segregations (Powell, 2014). Inclusive education has been the internationally expected educational service model providing opportunities for children with disabilities, previously only offered at isolated and segregated services, to learn together with other children in regular schools (UNESCO, 1994, 2006). After the Dakar conference in 2000, inclusive education became aligned with the international shared understanding of “Education for All” and posited as an achievement instrument (UNESCO, 2000). Inclusive education is an approach to fulfill the

rights of vulnerable children in accessing quality education. This is not only for children with disabilities but also many other academically at-risk children, such as those from low-income families, working children, remote rural dwellers, ethnic minorities, as well as those with special learning needs (Powell & Pfahl, 2019; UNESCO, 2000). Countries have increasingly ratified the global mandates for inclusive education, i.e., the Salamanca Statement and the UN's Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNESCO, 2016), indicating a rise in the need for educational reforms in each participant country.

Both comprehensive schooling systems and inclusive education reforms are the manifestations of the *institutional logic of inclusivity* in educational service provision, which contradict the *institutional logic of selectivity* manifested in tracked educational systems, school segregations, and merit-based admissions (Powell, 2014; Powell & Pfahl, 2019; Skopek et al., 2019; Triventi et al., 2016). It has been empirically proven that the reforms do not develop easily. Despite the strengthening of global pressures for inclusion, the practices of educational separation and segregation persist in the forms of rebranding or renaming special settings as particular forms of inclusive education without significant reforms of curricula, organizations, and culture (Powell, 2014).

Similarly, not all countries successfully shift their educational systems toward comprehensive schooling systems (Jenkins, Micklewright, & Schnepf, 2008; van de Werfhorst, 2018). For instance, Finland is one of the few countries that has successfully transformed its educational tracked systems into comprehensive ones (Sahlberg, 2015). Following the system's transformation, Finland has much lower educational inequalities and has been labeled as an "educational superpower country" (Kilpi-Jakonen, Erola, & Karhula, 2016). In contrast, Germany is still a country with high inequalities, despite its long efforts in educational reforms after unification (Blossfeld, 2018; Buchholz et al., 2016; Kruse, 2018; Schneider, 2008).

Similar system transformations with varied results can be found in other countries, giving rise to the variation in secondary education systems in contemporary societies (Robert, 2010; Triventi et al., 2016; van de Werfhorst, 2018). Recently, countries adopting early tracking systems, in which educational track differentiations occur at the upper or senior secondary school level, are Germany (Buchholz et al., 2016; Schneider, 2008), Hungary (Horn et al., 2016),

the Netherlands (Dronkers & Korthals, 2016), and Switzerland (Buchmann, Kriesi, Koomen, Imdorf, & Basler, 2016). Despite educational reforms, several other countries have continued to employ the dominant features of educational tracking systems combined with comprehensive schooling models. Some countries can be categorized as the adopters of this hybrid system, such as Italy (Contini & Triventi, 2016; Panichella & Triventi, 2014), France (Farges, Tenret, Brinbaum, Guégnard, & Murdoch, 2016), Estonia (Saar & Aimre, 2014; Täht, Saar, & Kazjulja, 2016), Russia (Kosyakova, Yastrebov, Yanbarisova, & Kurakin, 2016), and Israel (Blank, Shavit, & Yaish, 2016). In contrast, comprehensive school systems have been the main feature of Nordic countries' education system, such as Finland (Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2016; Sahlberg, 2015), Sweden (Rudolphi & Erikson, 2016), and Denmark (Wahler, Buchholz, & Møllegaard, 2016).

Ability tracking systems are also prevalent in Asian countries, such as China. Although China's central government has only allowed ability grouping at the senior secondary and higher education levels since 2006, such practices have been continuously maintained by schools at the junior high school level (Li et al., 2018). The practices of ability grouping in Singapore and Hong Kong result in educational inequality, in which children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families are mostly accommodated in the less prestigious class or school types. For instance, in Singapore, "*Melayu* and Indian students are underrepresented in the most prestigious and top schools, where most students are Chinese and from wealthier family backgrounds" (M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018, p. 196).

Similarly, children from low-income families tend to be naturally excluded from elite schools in Hong Kong because of the high tuition fees and the meritocratic admission system. These realities show that parents' socioeconomic status has played a more significant role in children's educational achievement, leading to educational inequality (M. Lee & Morris, 2016). Furthermore, ability tracking systems in Asian countries have reproduced social and academic stratifications (Byun & Kim, 2010; M. Lee & Morris, 2016; M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018; Li et al., 2018).

In recent years, introduced and imposed by international institutions, demand for inclusiveness aligned with the comprehensive schooling model gathers more intensity. However, because the tracked and segregation schooling systems have become "legitimated practices" and represented "societal values" for a long

time (Powell, 2014), gradual changes, rather than radical ones, are typically moderate strategies adopted by many countries. This approach potentially creates a circumstance in which the two contradicting logics or demands coexist. For instance, the introduction of an inclusive education system—by partially applying it in pilot areas or schools—typically occurs without abolishing the "old" system, resulting in paradoxical tension.

The coexistence of the logics of segregation and inclusion is also indirectly caused by the maintenance and the strengthening of academic standards (i.e., input, process, and output through accreditation and benchmarking systems). They are parts of mainstream strategies to increase the quality of educational services, address the uneven distribution of quality education provided by schools, and match the educational outputs to the needs of the labor market. Such educational standards reproduce school categorizations (e.g., based on quality) and stimulate school competition, which may strengthen the need to preserve merit or ability tracking systems. Powell (2014, p. 324) highlights that "increasing inclusive education rates do not automatically reduce segregation rate." Moreover, they have been a paradox (Richardson & Powell, 2011), representing the coexistence of segregated schooling (as a consequence of the ideal of meritocracy legitimating inequality in contemporary society; see Meyer, 2001) and inclusive education and/or comprehensive educational systems (as a means to address social inequality; see Powell & Pfahl, 2019). Such institutional contradictions or complexities have been prevalent the world over as more and more countries ratify the global ideals of education for all and inclusive education but apply gradual, partial, and symbolic strategies in their application (Powell, 2014; Richardson & Powell, 2011).

1.4 Indonesia as the Context of the Study

Inequality in educational opportunity and attainment is also a persistent problem in Indonesia (Moeliodihardjo, 2014; Muttaqin, 2018; Suharti, 2013). As a thousand-islands country encompassing 34 provinces and 514 districts with inequality in economic development (i.e., between Java island and the other islands, between urban and rural areas, and between the east and west parts of the country; see Kurniawan et al., 2019; OECD, 2013b) and populated by more than 250 million people representing 630 different ethnic groups (Ananta, Arifin,

Hasbullah, Handayani, & Pramono, 2015) with a substantial gap between the wealthiest and the rest (Gibson, 2017), Indonesia faces a considerable challenge in providing equal opportunities for all children to access quality education. In fact, children with socioeconomically disadvantaged conditions, such as those from low-income families, with disabilities, and/or living in remote areas, have much lower opportunities to access quality education (Mukminin & Habibi, 2019; OECD, 2015).

Based on data from the national socioeconomic survey (Susenas), Table 1.1 shows the progress of net enrollment rates for different levels of educations during 1997-2019. Based on per capita expenditure, the gap between the richest and poorest households in accessing education is particularly noticeable at the senior secondary level[3]. While the gap at the junior secondary level has narrowed (decreased from 37.7 percentage points in 1997 to 4.19 points in 2019), the striking disparity at the senior secondary level remains. In 2019, the rate was still 50 percent, indicating that children aged 16-18 years old from the poorest 20 percent families have the lowest participation rate in the senior secondary level, compared with 66 percent of the wealthiest 20 percent families.

Table 1.1 NER by Household Expenditure Quantile, 1997-2019 (%)

Levels of Education	1997			2006			2019		
	Q1	Q5	Q5-Q1	Q1	Q5	Q5-Q1	Q1	Q5	Q5-Q1
Elementary	90.3	92.4	2.1	92.6	93.2	0.6	97.32	97.52	0.2
Junior secondary	37.7	75.1	37.4	55.1	75.4	20,3	76.52	80.71	4.19
Senior secondary	12.4	60.9	48.5	25.0	64.1	39.1	49.95	66.27	16.32

Source: based on microdata from the National Socio-Economic Survey (*Survei Sosio-Ekonomi Nasional, Susenas*).

Note:
NER stands for Net Enrollment Rate
Quintile 1 (Q1) is the poorest, and quintile 5 (Q5) is the richest, 20 percent of households.

Internationally known as a "big bang" (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002) and one of the world's most radical decentralization practices (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003), Indonesia's 2001 decentralization policy has led to significant changes in educational provisions. A wide range of responsibilities, including elementary and

[3] The same pattern in the different time frame was presented in Suharti (2013, p. 25).

secondary education management, has been transferred to local governments. The central government only keeps five policy domains: foreign policy, defense and security, monetary policy, the legal system, and religious affairs. This distribution of extensive power was followed by the transfer of almost two-thirds of the central government workforce (including more than 2.6 million teachers; see Muttaqin, 2018), more than 4.000 provincial and district-level offices of the central government, and more than 160.000 public service facilities, including public schools, to provinces and districts throughout the country (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002). Therefore, this governance reform has established Indonesia as one of the most decentralized countries in the world, which was previously categorized as one of the most centralized (Hofman & Kaiser, 2002).

However, these radical changes in educational governance did not result in equitable improvements across Indonesia's regions. Significant disparities in educational access, particularly at the senior secondary level, are still observable across the provinces and districts. In 2016, the enrollment rates varied from 43.48 percent in Papua Province, one of the country's poorest regions, to 72.40 percent in Bali Province (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016, p. 123). Disparities between urban and rural areas across 18 provinces were substantial, i.e., more than ten percentage points, with the widest gap observed in Papua, with 38.43 percent (based on BPS, 2016, p. 121-122).

The most recent data (2019) shows that inequality issues remain and are more salient at the senior secondary level than within lower education. While the differences in enrollment rates between urban and rural areas were less than 1 percent at the elementary level and 5 percent at the junior secondary level, the rate was more than 8 percent at the senior secondary level (based on BPS, 2019, p. 54). The gap between rich and poor families at the senior secondary level is also more salient than that at the two previous levels. The difference in enrollment rates between the 20 percent poorest and wealthiest households at the senior secondary level was 16.32 percentage points, compared with 0.2 points at the elementary level and 4.19 points at the junior secondary level, respectively (based on BPS, 2019, p. 55). These points indicate that, after more than a decade of decentralization, Indonesia has significantly increased the enrollment rates of children from disadvantaged families at both the elementary and junior secondary levels. However, this trend is accompanied by only a modest improvement at the senior secondary level (Al-Samarrai, 2013; BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016, 2019).

Under the decentralization system, particularly from 2001-2016, district governments became the central players in providing primary and secondary education.[4] Performance is critically determined by district governments' capacity to manage the sector (Muttaqin, 2018). Despite the large allocations of district financial resources to education, as highlighted by Al-Samarrai (2013), local governments' ability to effectively use resources to improve educational performances vary considerably. In fact, studies suggest that spending is not a key determinant of education outcomes, as pointed by Al-Samarrai (2013). Some districts with below-average spending on education were found to reach higher secondary enrollment rates than the national average, while some other districts spending more than the average district have lower or much lower enrollment rates than the national average. A similar pattern is also seen in comparing districts based on their spending (input) and student scores on the national examination (outcome). These conditions indicate that decentralization has enabled variations in local government performance in fulfilling national targets and standards related to the improvement of access to, and quality of, education (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Idzalika & Bue, 2016; Muttaqin, 2018; Suharti, 2013).

Because quality education is not evenly distributed throughout the country (Muttaqin, 2018; OECD, 2015) and merit-based admission was applied at public secondary schools (generally regarded as higher quality), inequality in opportunity to access such schools was experienced by most children from disadvantaged families and has become a core feature of Indonesia's educational system (OECD, 2015). Therefore, local governments' capacity to provide accessible, quality education can be reflected in each local government's willingness and ability to apply inclusive education principles, i.e., international norms of educational service provision ratified by the national government. However, variations are also found among districts in this regard. Many local governments provide financial aid for socioeconomically disadvantaged children already accepted in schools. A small number of local governments have a somewhat more substantial commitment to increasing students' access to quality schools. For instance, few local governments

[4] Since 2017, the authority and management of senior secondary education provision have been relocated to provincial governments, while primary and junior secondary schools are still under district governments. This transfer of authority primarily aimed to reduce the gaps in the access to and quality of senior secondary level education between districts, which was prominent when the district government had a dominant authority in managing this level of education.

ensure that their school admission system increases the opportunity for those from socioeconomically disadvantaged families to attend public schools—most of which struggle to have high academic performance because of their lack of resources.

In such localities, tensions arose as the emerging demand for inclusivity inevitably clashed with the long-existing demand for selectivity manifested in the merit-based admission. The latter has long been a widely-shared, taken-for-granted practice at public secondary schools across the country, in which the acceptance of students is based on their prior academic achievement, i.e., the score of national examination at the lower-level education (OECD, 2013c, 2015). Under this selective system, only children with a high score can attend public schools, which are preferred due to their low cost and better quality than most private schools (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006; OECD, 2015). Due to a lack of resources and supportive environment for (high) academic achievement, vulnerable children tend to have more limited opportunities to find acceptance in such schools.

At the senior secondary level, competition between children for public schools, particularly those regarded as the best type (i.e., general or academically oriented ones; compared with vocational schools and *madrasah* or Islamic faith schools managed by the government*)*, is exceptionally fierce. As explained in Chapter 3, the adoption of this formal educational track combined with the existence of a quality gap between school types and the use of merit-based admission has led to inequality of opportunity. Socioeconomically disadvantaged children tend to have more limited chances to be accepted in their most favorite track (particularly in schools perceived as ones with better reputations). They are overrepresented in less favored tracks or even in low-quality private schools (Asadullah & Maliki, 2018; Stern & Smith, 2016).

1.5 The Case City

An urban district located on the island of Java is one of the very few districts indicating its willingness to commence a moderate adoption of inclusive education principles by imposing the institutional demand for inclusivity into schools. This emerging demand was manifested into three programs for helping three different target groups: children from low-income families, children with disabilities, and

those from left-behind regions. As detailed in Chapter 3, these programs have different arrangements in providing opportunities for those socioeconomically disadvantaged children to attend public schools.

Educational inequality in the case city was compounded by a supply-side problem rather than demand. The province where the city is located has a high percentage of junior secondary school graduates continuing to senior secondary levels, i.e., 96.56 percent, which is the highest in the country, while the national average in 2019 only reached 89 percent (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019). The senior secondary net enrollment rate at the city is relatively high (i.e., 72.60 percent or eight percentage points higher than the national average and 10.7 points higher than the province average). The data indicate that the willingness of the school-age children to attain a higher education level and their access to senior secondary schools in this city were better than those in many other districts (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019; BPS-Statistics of D.I. Yogyakarta Province, 2019; BPS-Statistics of Yogyakarta Municipality, 2019). However, the total capacity of *SMANs*[5] in the city is limited, i.e., only 22 percent of the total capacity of all types of senior secondary schools in the city. These conditions generated much tighter competition in the *SMANs* admission, which was entirely based on student prior achievement in the grade 9 national exam.

Under the meritocratic admission system, *SMANs* in the city were occupied only by high-performing children, i.e., those with a high prior academic achievement. They were more likely to come from socioeconomically advantaged families. Meanwhile, the low-performing students, many of whom came from low-income families, had to attend private *SMAs* or other senior secondary school types (i.e., vocational schools and *madrasahs*) managed by either the government or private institutions. Therefore, the meritocratic admission system enabled educational inequality, in which poor children in the city have less opportunity to

[5] *SMA (sekolah menengah atas)* is one type of Indonesian schools at senior secondary level that provides academic oriented education (different from vocational one: *SMK*). *SMANs* are managed and fully supported by the government, while *SMAS* are organized by private institutions. Further explanation about these school categorizations are provided in Chapter 3.

study in the *SMANs*[6]. Such phenomena also occurred in almost all districts in the country.

The attempts of the local government to combine and impose the two demands have produced a situation in which public secondary schools in the city experience the two conflicting institutional demands in school admission, stemming from existing and emerging logics, i.e., the demand for selectivity and inclusivity. In this case, the new demand was perceived as controversial because it offered different prescriptions than those of the long-held and deeply institutionalized demand manifested in the merit-based admission system. The emerging demand for inclusivity can result in more heterogeneous classes (in terms of student academic ability) in public schools, which is undesirable for teachers working at schools that can otherwise maintain homogeneity by attracting high-performing students.

The tensions between the two institutional demands in the selected city were much more apparent, at both district and school levels, than those in many other districts in Indonesia. This was especially the case given that the local government initiated the two local programs and supported a national program intended to increase the access of vulnerable children. Furthermore, the studied city was nationally recognized as a leading district in introducing inclusive education in Indonesia, which issued a local regulation on the implementation of inclusive education before the central government set it up in the national regulations (Mulyadi, 2017).

1.6 Research Questions

School responses to contradictory demands might determine the success (or at least, the continuity) of adopting inclusive education principles. Therefore, the central issues here are both the variation in school responses and the extent to which the institutional demands and school characteristics affect the schools'

[6] In Indonesia, *SMANs*, particularly those perceived to be most favorite ones in each district, can be categorized as elite schools because of the merit admission system. The difficulties experienced by children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families to access such elite schools are very common in many other countries, such as in Singapore (Lee & Morris, 2016), Hong Kong (Lee and Gopinathan, 2018), China (Li et al., 2018), Germany (Buchholz et al., 2016; Kruse, 2018), the Netherlands (Dronkers & Korthals, 2016), and many other countries adopted the educational tracking systems.

responses to institutional demands. The observed city provided compelling cases of school responses to an intra-institutional complexity, in which public schools at the senior secondary level, particularly those with academic orientation (i.e., *SMAN*), experienced the coexistence of the two conflicting demands in school admissions.

The selected case was studied to illuminate the research problems as stated earlier: *How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional contradiction, and how can these responses be explained by both institutional-level influences and organizational attributes?*

These research problems have been operationalized into the following research questions:

1) What are the variations and similarities in school responses to the intra-institutional contradiction?
2) Through what mechanisms do isomorphic influences, emerging in the intra-institutional contradiction, affect the variability of school responses in the organizational field?
3) Why and to what extent do complexity levels determine the variability of school responses?
4) What are the organizational attributes individually influencing school resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity?
5) How do specific organizational attributes play a joint role as necessary and/or sufficient conditions to determine levels of resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity?

Finally, as perception management was empirically found as a response strategy adopted by several of the observed schools, this question has been added:

6) Why and how do organizational perceptions determine strategies adopted by schools in responding to the given intra-institutional contradiction?

1.7 The Structure of the Monograph

This monograph is organized into ten chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework developed to analyze organizational responses to an intra-institutional contradiction. It starts with the explanation of intra-institutional contradiction as a kind of institutional complexity, types of organizational responses, organization-level determinants (i.e., organizational

attributes such as identity, status, decision-making mechanism, and power balance structure), and institution-level determinants (i.e., isomorphic influence and complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction).

Chapter 3 describes a more empirical context for the relevance of the study. It explains the contradictory logics of school admission systems in Indonesia and their implementation in the observed city. The manifestation of both the long-existing demand for selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity (that is, in the form of the three different programs: The *Quota Program*, the *Inclusion Program*, and the *Affirmative Action Program*) is described, which is then continued by the elaborations of tensions between these two institutional logics and/ or demands.

Chapter 4 delves into research design and methods. It includes the reasons for employing a comparative case study involving 11 public schools with the same type (i.e., *SMANs*) operated in the city. The chapter also describes how data collection and analysis are carried out to answer research questions.

Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical findings. Chapter 5 describes the schools' various strategies in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction. This chapter presents the patterns of variations and similarities of the response strategies in each circumstance of the intra-institutional contradiction. Chapter 6 presents the role of institution-level determinants, which are an isomorphic influence and complexity level of the intra-institutional contradiction. While the former (i.e., the stereotypical isomorphic influence) was identified as the cause of convergence of general responses on each side of the conflicting institutional demands, the latter determines the variability of resistance levels to the emerging demand perceived as controversial.

Chapter 7 describes the role of organizational attributes in determining the levels of school resistance or response strategies. It begins with the influence of individual attributes (i.e., organizational status or field position, identity, power balance structure, and decision-making mechanism) and proceeds with the consequence of attribute configurations.

Chapter 8 presents in greater detail the use of organizational perception management as a resistance tactic. While this is not listed in Oliver's (1991) strategic responses, it is relevant to be included as a high-level resistance tactic.

The chapter also describes the role of identity-image interrelationship in the use of the above tactic.

In Chapter 9, the findings are discussed for generating and articulating the contributions of the work for theoretical development on relevant topics: (1) stereotypical isomorphism, as a novel type of isomorphism which is relevant in the case of intra-institutional contradiction; (2) complexity levels and the variability of resistance strategies at the field level; (3) the critical roles of organizational attributes as configurations in leading to either high or low resistance; (4) perception management as a resistance strategy; and (5) reciprocal identity-image interrelationship in the use of perception management as a resistance strategy.

Chapter 10 finalizes the thesis by presenting the conclusion or the answers to the research questions, extracted from the interpretation of the findings. Furthermore, the research implications are stated by addressing the study's limitations and providing suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Foundation

Institutional and resource dependence perspectives suggest that, when facing competing institutional demands, organizations are more likely to prioritize and comply with those enacted by institutional referents in which the organizations receive more significant institutional support and legitimacy (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b; Oliver, 1991). However, power differentials between institutional referents become irrelevant as a basis for predicting response strategies to conflicting demands stemming from the same institutional actor. While prior research highlights that conforming to one demand might require losing legitimacy from the others (J. Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), this thesis questions how organizations maintain their legitimacy when experiencing conflicting prescriptions imposed by the same institutional actor. In the face of such intra-institutional complexity, organizations may lose legitimacy when defying any demands.

This chapter presents an elaboration of intra-institutional contradiction, followed by the overview of these topics: (1) various responses strategies and their resistance levels; (2) the role of institution-level influences in determining similarity and variation in organizational responses, on each side of an intra-institutional contradiction, at field level; (3) the role of organizational attributes in specifying resistance levels or strategies particularly in responding to a new, controversial demand; and (4) managing organizational perceptions as a potential response to an institutional contradiction.

2.1 Intra-institutional Contradiction and Controversial Demand

Recent works within organizational institutionalism have increasingly paid close attention to institutional pluralism and complexity (Ocasio et al., 2017). The former refers to circumstances in which organizations and individuals are faced with multiple institutional logics providing different values, understandings, and expectations (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Yu, 2015). Referring to a more challenging circumstance, the latter points to how organization actors deal with and respond to

contradicting logics that are simultaneously prescribed by different audiences (Greenwood et al., 2011; Raynard, 2016). Institutional logics, referring to socially constructed beliefs in the organizing principles of institutions (Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012), are the central element of such situations.

Meyer & Höllerer (2014; 2016) propose a categorization of institutional heterogeneity by differentiating intra-institutional complexity from inter-institutional complexity. The favored situation explored in prior works is inter-institutional complexity, a circumstance in which organizations experience contradicting logics arising from different institutional orders; for instance, institutional contradictions between market, state, and family logics (e.g., Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010), conflicting logics involving state, professional, managerial, and market logics (e.g., Blomgren & Waks, 2015), professional vs. market logics (e.g., Broek, Boselie, & Paauwe, 2014), community vs. market logics (e.g., Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), professional vs. market and corporation logics (e.g., Murray, 2010; Perkmann, McKelvey, & Phillips, 2018), or religion vs. other logics (Aysan, 2017). In contrast, intra-institutional complexity refers to contradictory demands emanating from the same institutional order, such as care vs. science logics within medical professional (Dunn & Jones, 2010), Weberian traditional bureaucracy vs. managerial logics within state order (R. E. Meyer, Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014), and Anglo-American vs. continental European business model within corporation order (R. E. Meyer & Höllerer, 2010).

Since institutional logics are embedded in institutions, which can be identified not only at institutional orders of society, it is not surprising that scholars also explore institutional logics at other levels (Ocasio et al., 2017). For instance, contradictions among organizational field-level logics have been extensively studied (e.g., Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Colaner, 2016; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; M. P. Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Mercado, Hjortsø, & Honig, 2018). In the education sector, an example is provided by Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), studying contradictory logics faced by business schools in France: *Ecoles de Commerce* logic with vocational orientation vs. international business school logic focusing on academic orientation. Another example is multiculturalism vs. Indigenous distinctiveness logics in educational services for Indigenous People in Canada (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016), in which the former highlights that all citizens are equal, while the latter emphasizes the

importance of respecting the rights and cultures of Indigenous students in Canadian schools.

Following Meyer & Höllerer's (2016) attention to intra-institutional complexity, this work addresses a more specific circumstance called *intra-institutional contradiction*[7], in which similar organizations operating in an organizational field face conflicting demands imposed by the same institutional actor within an institutional order, i.e., the state as the institutional order imposes a new demand contradicting a long-established one still in force. The circumstance studied by this work diverges from common situations theorized by Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury (2012) that different institutional logics are embedded in, or imposed by, different institutional orders. In the observed case, the state enforced two contesting institutional demands related to school admission, one of which was from another institutional order: the long-existing demand for selectivity derived from the logic of competition/segregation versus the emerging demand for inclusivity extracted from the logic of inclusiveness/integration. While the inclusion represents an educational arrangement endorsed by the state, the competition is more relevant to, or even the manifestation of, values or norms promoted by market order. However, when this logic of competition was stipulated by the state, as occurred in the observed case, the source of both legitimacy and the mechanism through which it is imposed into the observed organizations (schools) must be more relevant with state order, rather than market order.

The principles of inclusive education prescribing to educate students with disabilities together with others in regular schools (not in special schools) are increasingly promoted while traditional views of special education that idealize segregation are still the mainstream worldwide (Haug, 2017; O'Rourke, 2015). The mainstream practices of education service provision for different groups of students, based on their academic abilities or physical conditions, reflect schools' compliance with the institutional demand for selectivity in school admission. Such widely institutionalized practices are commonly characterized by their strong attractiveness for organizations in which they are imposed into, embodying resistance to change (Dacin & Dacin, 2008) or, for instance, to accept the contrary

[7] Henceforth the terms "intra-institutional complexity" and "intra-institutional contradiction" are used interchangeably to denote the circumstance studied. In this case, intra-institutional contradiction is a type of intra-institutional complexity.

demands derived from the logic of an inclusive school (de Boer, Pijl, & Minnaert, 2011). Therefore, governments' efforts to adopt inclusive education principles in many countries are typically perceived as controversial (Armstrong, Armstrong, & Spandagou, 2011; Chowdhury & Panday, 2018). Moreover, the adoption of inclusive education principles causes regular schools to experience intra-institutional complexity indicated by the coexistence of conflicting institutional demands imposed by the government (Richardson & Powell, 2011): the long-existing demand for selectivity versus the emerging demand for inclusivity.[8]

Under such situations, the emerging demands are typically perceived as counter-normative practices by organizational actors (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017), especially during their introduction in a field (see Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Jonsson, 2009) and, consequently, subject to refusal (Dacin & Dacin, 2008). Therefore, organizations are likely to maintain their compliance with mainstream demands while resisting new ones by using various strategies. Although field-level actors may try to accommodate such new demands institutionally, e.g., as a pilot project, an initial step, a gradual shift, or a partial and limited adoption (for instance, see Biermann & Powell, 2016; Opoku, Agbenyega, Mprah, Mckenzie, & Badu, 2017; Utomo, 2014) to give legal space for the new practices, the

[8] This institutional contradiction occurs in many other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that experienced the long-held practice of segregation or separation models of educational provision (Richardson & Powell, 2011). After ratifying global norms on "Education for All" and "Inclusive Education", these countries gradually reform their education system, enabling the coexistence of educational separation and inclusion practices. Such circumstances are also experienced by several European countries. Richardson and Powell (2011: 219) classified countries based on the 1999-2001 segregation index, a measure indicating proportion of students with special education needs who are served in special schools or spend most of the day in separate classes. Several countries classified as ones with more established inclusive school traditions (segregation index <20 percent), i.e., Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, and Finland, may experience relatively lower level of difficulties in complying with the current pressures for the adoption of inclusive education. In contrast, other European countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and France, which had educational segregation cultures (segregation index >80 percent), may experience a tough educational reform. Observing beyond education services for children with disabilities, Triventi et al. (2016) highlight the comparison between the Scandinavian models of comprehensive schooling (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and the more traditional tripartite system (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland). Whereas the former essentially practiced integrated and inclusive programs in primary and secondary education levels, the latter was characterized by separation of students into different types of schools at those two educational levels. The two contrasting models passed down this contradiction to the current day paradox.

incompatibilities perceived by organizational actors clearly reflect the existence of intra-institutional contradictions.

2.2 Organizational Responses to Intra-institutional Contradiction

Studies on organizational responses to institutional demands are mostly developed from Oliver's (1991) generic typology of strategic responses from non-resistance to the highest level of resistance: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation (Table 2.1). Acquiescence or compliance is the response that may lead to isomorphism or homogeneity in an organizational field (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017, p. 84). However, when organizations experience controversial demands, Oliver (1991) proposed that adopting a non-conforming strategy is more likely.

Table 2.1 Levels and Types of Resistance Strategies and Tactics

Levels of resistance	Strategies	Tactics	
Low	Compromise	Balance	The least resistant tactic ↓
		Pacify	
		Bargain	
Moderate	Avoidance	Conceal	
		Decouple	
		Escape	
High	Defiance	Ignore	
		Challenge	
		Attack	
Very high	Manipulation	Co-optation	
		Influence	
		Control	The most resistant tactic

Source: Author's own, based on Oliver (1991).

Based on Oliver's typology of resistance strategies, *compromise* refers to the lowest level of resistance characterized by partial compliance with institutional expectations. This strategy involves either balancing the competing demands, conforming to the minimal requirements of a demand that is followed by devoting resources to placate the other(s), or bargaining demand alteration through clandestine negotiations. *Avoidance* is the attempt to circumvent the conditions that make compliance with certain institutional expectations necessary. This moderate-level resistance can be exercised through exhibiting symbolic

compliance, decoupling real activities from organization programs, or escaping from the field where the pressure is imposed.

A high-level resistance, *defiance* refers to the rejection of institutional demands in a public manner, enacted by ignoring institutional expectations, overtly challenging the prescriptions exerted, or even aggressively attacking them. As the highest-level resistance, *manipulation* refers to proactive efforts to change institutional demands by co-opting the sources of institutional contradiction and then neutralizing their conflicting prescriptions. This can be done by actively influencing institutional actors to adjust their demands or by controlling the source of pressure.

Oliver (1991) argued that organizational preference in adopting response strategies is determined by the degree of organizations' dependence on the institutional actors imposing the demands. An organization is likely to conform to institutional demands enforced by ones with stronger influences on its existence. The lower the degree of an organization's dependence on an institutional actor, the higher the level of its resistance to demands imposed by that actor. However, when organizations experience an intra-institutional contradiction, in which the same institutional actor imposes the coexistence of contradicting demands, it is unclear which response strategy is more favored than others.

While experiencing institutional complexity, particularly in the forms of inter-institutional contradictions, compliance to institutional demands is troublesome for organizations, particularly in managing their legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). Organizational institutionalism scholars have identified varied strategies adopted by organizations in responding to such situations. The response strategies include *defiance* by ignoring one side of conflicting demands or through co-optation and controlling tactics (Marquis, Yin, & Yang, 2017; Quirke, 2013), *avoidance* through decoupling (Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), *compromise* by developing hybrid organization (Almandoz, Lee, & Marquis, 2017; Battilana & Lee, 2014), and compartmentalizing (Sinha, Daellenbach, & Bednarek, 2015). These response strategies all represent resistance strategies, which indicate an organization's aversion to fully accept emerging demands that contradict more established ones.

The increased interest of institutionalists in studying institutional complexity has given rise to the idea of solving *structure versus agency debate* in the institutional theories of organization (see Heugens & Lander, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012), otherwise known as the *institutional logics* perspective (Ocasio et al., 2017). This perspective provides a new approach in consolidating theoretical assumptions and explanations of the two competing views. The structuralist view believes that isomorphism or homogeneity in organizational fields is an inevitable consequence of institutional influences (coercive, normative, and mimetic or cultural/cognitive) and organizational actors' motivation to gain legitimacy and survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In contrast, the agency approach argues that organizational actors play a more active and significant role in responding to isomorphic influences, enabling the potential for deviance, heterogeneity, entrepreneurship, and change in organizational fields (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; Oliver, 1991). The institutional logics perspective provides a bridge by focusing on the prevalence of institutional pluralism, integrating top-down (structure) and bottom-up (agency) mechanisms, examining the interrelationships between institutions, organizations, and individuals, and placing organizations and individuals as embedded agents. Therefore, this perspective is critical in better understanding the role of institution-level influences and organization-level factors in affecting organizational responses to an intra-institutional contradiction.

The following sections briefly review the potential roles of the two levels (i.e., institutions and organizations) in framing how organizations first perceive institutional demands and then select the available strategic response options.

2.3 Institution-level Determinants

2.3.1 Institutional influences

According to the structural approach, organizational responses are determined by isomorphic influence (i.e., coercive, normative, and mimetic or cultural/cognitive), enabling isomorphism or homogenous organizational structures or strategies in organizational fields. Without denying the possibility of isomorphism, the institutional logic perspective proposes an alternative view of institutional influences and how organizations and individuals as embedded agents respond to them.

a. Isomorphic pressures

The core idea of institutional isomorphism is that low variations in organizations' structures and strategies in fields result from organizational conformity to taken-for-granted modes of organizing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such institutional expectations are imposed into organizations through isomorphic pressures, i.e., coercive, normative, or mimetic (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b). Organizations structurally or strategically become similar for a number of different reasons. They can be pressured to conform to the expectations of institutional actors who have coercive mechanisms (e.g., regulations, accreditations, evaluation, legal requirements, or contractual responsibilities); expected to comply with the code of ethics and standards of professionalism promoted by relevant professional associations through education, training, and certification processes; or have the desire to voluntarily imitate other organizations perceived as ones with best practices when responding to uncertainty in their fields. Widely accepted institutional demands practiced for a long time, such as grouping students based on their academic ability and physical condition, reflect the homogenization of organization practices through isomorphic processes. These three isomorphic forces "can overlap and intermingle" in influencing organizations (Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 285).

To identify the existence of isomorphism, Ashworth et al. (2009) suggest the importance of considering isomorphism's different traits. The first characteristic is *compliance,* which refers to organizations' direction in responding to institutional expectations, particularly intended to increase their compatibility with those demands. The second is *convergence,* pointing to a condition in which organizations within an organizational field exhibit their similarity in responding to institutional demands due to an isomorphic influence. Finally, another essential characteristic of institutional isomorphism is that organizational responses are motivated by the intention to manage legitimacy, such as being regarded as organizations with institutionally accepted actions and structures, not by efficiency-seeking (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017).

In circumstances in which organizations experience institutional contradictions, however, DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) seminal work on the role of three types of isomorphic influences lacks explanatory power. Moreover, under such situations, heterogeneity responses have been more prevalent in

organizational fields, and organization compliance on all sides of conflicting institutional demands is certainly impossible practice. While the relevance of institutional isomorphism in field heterogeneity, or conditions of institutional complexity, is recently questioned (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017), it is argued in this dissertation that *compliance* and *convergence* as the two features of isomorphism should be observed in a different way.

When organizations face contradicting demands, conformity to one demand while resisting the other is acceptable as the characteristic of response exhibited by single organizations. Convergence or similarities in response strategies adopted by all organizations in a field, therefore, should refer to "the resemblance of a response bundle" to both sides of contradicting demands—complying with one demand while resisting the other. By employing that approach, this thesis intends to capture isomorphism occurring in institutional complexity and identify an alternative isomorphic pressure that enables its emergence.

b. Institutional logics

While isomorphism or the homogeneity of organizations in organizational fields was the central proposition of neo-institutional theory highlighting the dominant role of macro-social forces or structural influences (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), organizational heterogeneity in structure and strategy has been the more recent concern of institutionalists spotlighting the active role of organizations and individuals as agents. Although the institutional logics approach is the extension of the agency perspective, it aligns with the structuralist view on the influence of "cultural rules and cognitive structures on organizational structures" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 100). Consistently, Ocasio et al. (2017, p. 524; an emphasis added) suggest that the role of agency "in adaptation and intentional action," including the decisions to resist an institutional demand, should be "shaped by social and cultural structures."

However, in contrast to the structuralists' focus, the institutional logics promoters highlight that organizations and individuals are embedded agents under the prevalence of institutional pluralism, in which multiple logics coexist as the references containing particular prescriptions for actions (Thornton et al., 2012). As embedded agents, organizations or individuals experience and learn the practical applications of particular logics. Furthermore, those active agents can act

strategically, shaped by influential logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Ocasio et al., 2017) and internal dynamics inside organizations (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013) in responding to conflicting institutional demands derived from divergent, incompatible logics (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016).

Introduced first by Alford and Friedland (1985), the concept of institutional logics was initially recognized in organizational institutionalism as society-level influences that configure organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Integrating Jackal's (1988, 2010) structural-normative approach and Friedland and Alford's (1991) structural-symbolic approach, Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) define institutional logics as "the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their daily activity." The inclusion of structural and agency approaches (Ocasio et al., 2017), as well as macro-structural (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and micro-processes perspectives (Zucker, 1977), is reflected in Thornton and Ocasio's (1999) aforementioned definition of institutional logics.

The two other perspectives in organizational institutionalism propose the existence and influence of separate institutional carriers, such as DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) coercive (structural), normative, and mimetic (symbolic) mechanisms of structural isomorphism and, similarly, Scott's (1995, 2014) regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillars. In contrast, the institutional logics perspective postulates that those influencing mechanisms are "integral parts of any institutional order—family, religion, state, market, profession, corporation" (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 51). Thus, individuals and organizations live in local contexts of multiple institutional orders. Each contextualized order represents a governance system providing different logics (e.g., organizing principles) that shape individual cognition and organizational behaviors through several mechanisms. They include individual and organizational identification with collective or field-level identities, competition for status promoted by prevailing institutions, socially constructed classifications and categorization, and organization decision-makers' allocation of attention to particular institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, pp. 111-114).

Although the institutional logics perspective believes in institutional influences, this perspective pays more attention to structural elaborations

producing local variations (Lounsbury, 2001; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010). Institutional logics are "frames of reference that precondition actors' choices for sensemaking" (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 54), while sensemaking itself is an ongoing retrospective process rationalizing individual and organizational behaviors (Thornton et al., 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2010). Such reasons of actions "are shaped by institutional logics that actors have learned, experienced through practices, and with which they identify" (Ocasio et al., 2017, p. 525). This explanation differs from rational choice perspectives that view organizational preferences as the reflection of individual interests. Despite the foundational assumption of embedded agency and the increasing prevalence of institutional pluralism, the institutional logics scholars do not "negate the existence of isomorphic pressures" and argue "that shared commitments or conformity to institutional logics will lead to isomorphism among organizations" (Ocasio et al., 2017, p. 524).

2.3.2 Complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction

As mentioned, prior studies focus more on institutional complexity resulted from contradictions between institutional logics or demands imposed by different or multiple institutional actors. Two aspects of complexity observed in this research line are the number of logics (or demands) and the degree of incompatibility between them (Greenwood et al., 2011). The latter considers complexity based on the difference between intended goals (e.g., Purdy & Gray, 2009) or between chosen means (e.g., Dunn & Jones, 2010) and on specificity levels (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996).

Pache and Santos (2010) argue that the tensions arising from incompatibility or conflict between institutional demands on goals or ends are more problematic, that they endanger institutional legitimation more than those related to means. Highlighting the degree of specificity of institutional demands and the opportunity for taking discretionary actions, prior works (e.g., Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999) suggest that, when facing ambiguous demands related to means, the selection of response strategies is mainly determined by organizational interests.

Demand specificity has also received wide attention from public administration scholars, particularly in the policy implementation and behavioral

public administration literature (e.g., Evans & Hupe, 2020b; Gilson, 2015; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lipsky, 2010; Tummers, 2013). Demand specificity in these literature strands is considered as a condition in which street-level bureaucrats (e.g., teachers, nurses, or social workers) have or do not have discretion in implementing a policy. Despite its multiple meanings, discretion can generally be defined as "the extent of freedom a worker can exercise in a specific context [of policy implementations]" (Smith, 1981 as cited by Evans, 2016, p. 2; an emphasis added). This freedom can be either "prescriptively granted by a rule maker," "actually being used by the implementers" (Hupe, 2013, p. 435), or "subjectively perceived by the implementers" (Tummers & Bekkers, 2020, p. 168). The core idea is that policies with highly specified prescriptions can eliminate the discretion of policy implementers.

In a theoretical framework explaining behavioral public administration, particularly psychological perspective about discretion, Tummers (2017) introduces the notion of policy alienation by defining it as "a (public service worker's) cognitive state of psychological disconnection from the policy program to be implemented" (p. 571, an emphasize added). Several works in this line of research have shown that policy alienation negatively influences behavioral support for policy effectiveness (see, e.g., Kerpershoek, Groenleer, & de Bruijn, 2016; Tonkens, Bröer, Van Sambeek, & Van Hassel, 2013; Tummers, 2011; van Engen, Tummers, Bekkers, & Steijn, 2016; Van Loon & Jakobsen, 2018).

Among the five dimensions of policy alienation constructed by Tummers (2013), *tactical* and *operational powerlessness* are relevant to this thesis. While tactical powerlessness reflects "the workers' perceived lack of influence on decisions concerning the way policy is implemented within their own organization," operational powerlessness constitutes "the perceived lack of freedom in making choices concerning the sort, quantity, and quality of sanctions and rewards on offer when implementing the policy" (Tummers, 2017, p. 573). Both indicate that organizational actors do not have discretionary autonomy or room for maneuver in policy implementation (see Evans & Hupe, 2020a; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Hupe, 2013; Lipsky, 2010), which is an implication of facing an institutional demand with a high level of specificity (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996).

Tummers et al. (2015) empirically found that, when feeling alienated from a policy, implementers are reluctant to carry out the policy as expected.

Furthermore, Tummers and Bekkers (2014) and others (see Hill & Hupe, 2014; May & Winter, 2007; Maynard-Moody & Portillo, 2010; Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007; Sandfort, 2000; Tummers, 2013) highlight that *discretion* can strengthen a public service policy's effectiveness as it increases public servants' willingness—or decreases their resistance—in implementing policy. However, it is important to note that, as emphasized by Tummers and Bekkers (2014; see also Barrick, Mount, and Li, 2013; Hill and Hupe, 2014; May and Winter, 2007), the influence of discretion on the willingness to implement a policy is more substantial when their relationship is mediated by the more *perceived client, and societal, meaningfulness* (i.e., public servant's perception that a public service policy is valuable for a client or, in general, for society). According to the institutional perspective, such values represent particular institutional logics or expectations that affect the perceptions and behaviors of policy implementers or organizational actors (Thornton et al., 2012).

Although the level of specificity (or ambiguity) of institutional demands in affecting types of organizational responses has been studied, whether and to what extent this institution-level factor determines variation in response strategies or resistance levels is still poorly understood. Greenwood et al. (2011) convincingly explain that organizations exhibit variations in response strategies when they experience institutional complexity while having attributes with different conditions. However, there is still a limited understanding regarding whether the specificity levels of institutional demands have different effects on the role of organizational attributes in resulting response variation, particularly when organizations face the circumstance of intra-institutional contradiction. Therefore, it is critical to understand what level of demand specificity enables divergent responses to the controversial demand and, conversely, prevents the influence of organizational attributes so that the opportunity for convergent responses increases.

In the context of intra-institutional contradiction, the contrarieties can have varying levels of complexity, ranging from low to high. Each level represents an implication of the clash between a long-existing (preferable) demand and a new (undesirable) one with a certain level of specificity. Under such contradiction, problematic levels of complexity can be determined by the specificity level of the new, controversial demand. The more rigid the new demand, the greater the complexity faced by organizations. Organizations face a problematic situation

when the long-existing demand is preferable while the new demand is rigid. A less problematic situation may be experienced by organizations when the new demand contains ambiguous prescriptions.

Complexity levels, in this case, can therefore be identified from both the specificity levels or the availability of the room for discretionary actions (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011) and the risk level of losing legitimacy when refusing the new demand (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). It is generally expected that the complexity levels, representing configurations of specificity or ambiguity level (high or low) and risk level of losing legitimacy (high or low), determine the selection of strategies in responding to the new, controversial demand and enable either homogeneity or heterogeneity of resistance strategies and levels in organizational fields.

In the context of facing a new institutional demand perceived as controversial (or challenging the long-existing practice), homogeneity of resistance strategies within organizational populations is likely to arise when the prescriptions of the new demand have moderate or low specificity. This can occur because institutional demands with less specificity provide larger opportunities, and flexibilities, for organizational actors to reject or avoid them. In this event, resistance levels tend to be more determined by the levels of risk of losing legitimacy. While low risks allow the adoptions of high or very high resistance levels, high risks enable the tendencies to adopt lower resistance strategies. In contrast, heterogeneity of resistance strategies within organizational populations is likely to occur when the controversial emerging demand has high specificity prescriptions. In such situations, the selections of resistance strategies are more determined by organizational characteristics, enabling variations in response strategies among organizations in particular fields.

2.4 The Role of Organizational Attributes

Despite their similarities, organizations within a given field have unique characteristics that distinguish them from each other (Scott & Davis, 2014). Greenwood et al. (2011) argued that organizational attributes, such as field position, power structure, identity, and governance, “frame how organizations experience institutional complexity and how they perceive and construct the

repertoire of responses available to them" (p. 339). That is why organizations operating in the same field (e.g., healthcare or education), or located in a specific jurisdiction, may perceive the same institutional pressures differently and therefore respond to them distinctively (Greenwood et al., 2011; Yu, 2015). Such attributes are interrelated with each other (Fiss, Marx, & Cambre´, 2013) and, therefore, should be viewed as a configuration rather than in isolation. This thesis argues that, in the context of facing a new institutional demand with strict prescriptions that contradict the long-established one, the variation of resistance strategies adopted by similar organizations in a field is caused by different combinations of the organizations' attributes. What follows below is a review of the four organizational attributes identified by Greenwood et al. (2011).

2.4.1 Position or status

Organizations with diverse structural positions or statuses (i.e., either as a central or peripheral organization within their field) tend to have different preferences in responding to emerging institutional demands (Greenwood et al., 2011). Central organizations (i.e., ones with more prestigious status as the advantage of compliance to the existing institutional arrangements) are likely to be more resistant to emerging institutional expectations, especially those perceived as controversial and potentially threatening their current positions (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Marquis et al., 2017). In contrast, peripheral or low-status organizations, particularly those disadvantaged by mainstream institutional demands, are more likely to accept alternatives or act as institutional entrepreneurs by creatively building novel practices (D'Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002).

However, with its theoretical explanations of mechanisms by which institutional logics influence individuals and organizations, the institutional logics perspective provides an alternative possibility. According to this perspective, both central and peripheral organizations tend to be relevant and correspond to pervasive institutional logics, i.e., long-standing and widely institutionalized ones. Competition for status is one of the ways by which particular institutional logics, manifested as the rules of the game, are maintained and reproduced in an

organizational field[9] (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Therefore, when experiencing a new demand that contradicts the mainstream one, both central and peripheral organizations are likely to favor the long-practiced demand to maintain the status they have been competing for. Since central organizations relish more significant advantages under the mainstream arrangement, these organizations (compared to peripheral ones) are likely to exhibit a higher level of resistance when responding to the emerging demand.

2.4.2 Power structure

Inside organizations, individuals and groups make sense of and interpret institutional demands (Binder, 2007) and then decide to either be a local proponent or 'opponent' of them (Brandl & Bullinger, 2017). Although there is a sense that individuals with a higher social standing or hierarchical position (e.g., organization leader) have a greater influence in determining organizational response (Marquis & Lee, 2013; Shaked & Schechter, 2017), its acceptance tends to be higher when the prescribed practices are widely accepted throughout the organization (Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). In this context, structure is not always about the number of units within an organization, structural positions with various levels of influence, or division of tasks. More generally, it is rather about the power structure inside an organization. Thus, organizations are categorized into: a) those with an unbalanced power structure (i.e., the role of organization leader, who is either the proponent or opponent of particular institutional demands, is dominant in decision-making, neglecting the opposing group/people); and, b) the ones with a more balanced power structure, characterized by the existence of individuals or groups able to counterbalance the leader's role in decision-making.

In confronting a new demand that contradicts a long-established one, wherein organizational leaders are officially assigned by the institutional actor to

[9] The other mechanisms are individuals and organizations' identification with collective identities, social classifications or categorizations, and organizational decision-makers' attention (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Thornton and Ocasio (2008) note that institutional logics exert their effects on individuals and organizations when: (1) organizational actors identify with the collective identities of an institutionalized group, organization, profession, industry or population; (2) individual cognition is determined by socially constructed systems of classifications that categorize organizations in their fields; and (3) decision-makers' attention to and understanding of issues and solutions are determined by prevailing institutional logics.

oversee the coexistence of conflicting institutional templates, organizations with an unbalanced power structure are likely to show low resistance strategies (i.e., compromise with its varied tactics). Conversely, response strategies indicating higher resistances (i.e., avoidance, defiance, or even manipulation) are likely to be adopted by organizations with a balanced power structure as a solution reached by the conflicting insiders.

2.4.3 Decision-making mechanism

Greenwood et al. (2011) highlight that organizational responses to institutional demands represent the most influential group or person's interests, such as organization owners, leaders, or functional groups of professions. However, it is argued in this thesis that the essential features are not only the actors or groups that either own organizations or have a more decisive influence but also the decision-making mechanism institutionalized within organizations (Heimer, 1999). Decision-making mechanisms are a critical aspect of governance that signifies how strategic decisions are made (Levi-Faur, 2012) through either a command (top-down/ hierarchical) or persuasion (negotiated/ democratic) mechanism.

An organization with traditional command-and-control mechanisms is characterized by leaders' dominant role in the decision-making process. In contrast, organizations adopting more inclusive, persuasion-based mechanisms focus on "the elaboration of values, preference, and interest as well as the rationalization and framing of options for action and the exchange of ideas and information in a deliberative manner" (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 9). This democratic mechanism, in turn, enables the rise of opposing groups or individuals (e.g., groups of professions or senior members of an organization) taking part in interpreting institutional demands (Weick et al., 2010) and shaping repertories of possible responses, which are based mainly on their preferences.

In the face of a new demand challenging the long-held one, organizations with a command-and-control mechanism are likely to adopt low-level resistance. This is because organization managers, especially those in the public sector, are likely to defer to government expectations (Berg & Pinheiro, 2016), regardless of the new expectation's controversies. Those managers could potentially confront organization members who become opponents of a new demand at odds with institutionalized norms, values, and practices. Such domination is unusual in

organizations that adopt a more inclusive, persuasion mechanism in decision-making. Consequently, under the aforementioned circumstance, organizations with a persuasion decision-making mechanism are likely to exhibit higher resistance levels.

2.4.4 Organizational identity

Organizational identity (OI) can be defined as an organization's key trait that confirms a member within particular social categories or the sameness of social categories—such as schools, banks, or small and medium enterprises (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010). Simultaneously, it also indicates the organization's uniqueness that differentiates it from other similar organizations in an organizational field (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013). While the former represents the social actor view of OI that posits OI as an organization's self-proclaim as a part of social categories at the field level, the latter reflects the social construction view of OI, seeing OI as a product internally constructed through insiders' mutual understandings (Foreman & Whetten, 2016).

Several studies on OI, such as Gioia and Hamilton (2016) and Brickson (2013), have started to integrate those two views of OI as "interdependent and mutually constitutive nature" (Besharov & Brickson, 2016, p. 398). In short, OI considers the questions around *who we are* and *what we do* in which either can be influenced by institutional pressures. Therefore, OI is an essential attribute to understand how organizations cope with institutional complexity (Foreman & Whetten, 2016).

OI's two critical dimensions that determine an organization's orientation in responding to institutional contradiction, as suggested by institutionalists and identity scholars, are *identity alignment* and *identity strength* (Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Greenwood et al., 2011). *Identity alignment* is the main consideration of organizational actors in screening institutional prescriptions, particularly based on the suitability between OI and institutional identities manifested by such demands, and in specifying response strategies (Glynn, 2017; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). In the face of contradicting institutional demands, organizations would rather embrace those aligned with their OI and exhibit their reluctance to accept the contrary (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). Depending on how organizational members perceive the alignment between

their OI and the institutionally intended changes, OI could stimulate organizational members to either resist, accept, or initiate such changes (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016; Knippenberg, 2016).

Identity strength, indicating the extent to which an organization's identity is widely believed and expressed by insiders (Ashforth, 2016), is the other dimension of OI used to better understand an organization's confidence in responding to institutional expectations. Pointing a similar aspect, Kraatz and Block (2008) suggest that organizational responses to institutional demands depend on whether insiders have either more coherent or fragmented perceptions about their organization's identity. Those with a strong identity, meaning that insiders have convergent perceptions of their organization identity—as Ashforth (2016) classified into an *"it-is"* level of the identity emergence processes—tend to have "confidence in its ability to ignore or comply with external demands" (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 348). However, when insiders signal different identity claims in the circumstance of OI emergence, as Ashforth (2016) categorized into *"I-think"* and *"we-think"* levels, or when an organization has multiple identities (Pratt & Kraatz, 2009), it is argued here that organizational response to institutional demands will be more ambiguous. Such a vague response is likely to emerge because of insiders' divergent interpretations of external forces, framed by varied beliefs and perceptions of their organization (Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Dejordy & Creed, 2016).

While *identity alignment* reflects the existence (or the absence) of interconnection between OI and institutional identities or expectations (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), *identity strength* represents strong (or weak) interlinkage between OI and organizational members' identification (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Reissner, 2019). Considering both these two dimensions of OI (*identity-based resistor*), therefore, is more useful in understanding combinations of conditions causing organizations' particular resistance levels in responding to institutional demands.

Each organizational attribute briefly reviewed above may individually determine response strategies adopted by organizations, as empirically found or theoretically proposed by prior studies (e.g., Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). However, this thesis argues that these attributes are interrelated and, therefore, the

existence of certain configurations of organizational attributes may strategically cause certain levels of resistance. The *Identity-based resistor* potentially becomes the main consideration for organizational actors in perceiving institutional expectations and making a decision to respond to them. Furthermore, the organization's *identity-based resistor* is likely to influence the cognition of each party involved in internal contestation stimulated by an institutional contradiction. Therefore, it is hypothesized that an *identity-based resistor*, as a composite identity characteristic, is likely to be a key component of configurations of organizational attributes determining organizations' resistance levels to a controversial institutional demand.

2.5 Perception Management as a Response Strategy

This subsection was particularly added as the consequence of the preliminary findings related to the forms of response strategies employed by the observed schools. As presented in more detail in Chapters 5 and 8, several schools were identified to use perception management to respond to the *Quota Program*. This empirically found tactic is not listed in Oliver's catalog of resistance strategies and would be relevant to include as an additional tactic under high resistance strategies. This subsection briefly reviews relevant concepts and theoretical explanations related to organizational perception management as a starting point for making contributions.

Organizational identity, image, and reputation are different but interconnected concepts, indicating how an organization is perceived (Elsbach, 2006; Ravasi, 2016). While "organizational image" can represent both internal and external perceptions about a particular organization, "organizational identity" (OI) and "organizational reputation" refer to either insiders' or outsiders' perception of an organization (Gioia, Hamilton, & Patvardhan, 2014; Hoon & Jacobs, 2014; Ravasi, 2016; Whetten, 2006). Internal and external organizational perceptions can influence each other. In a situation, an organizational image may intentionally be developed by insiders through communicating their aspirations or beliefs about how external audiences should perceive them. Despite referring to "a connecting door" between organizational identity and image, scholars used different terms such as "desired future image" (Gioia & Thomas, 1996), "construed external image" (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994), "projected image" (Rindova, 1997),

or “intended image” (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). Organization leaders and members can deliberately arrange communicative actions to shape outsiders’ perceptions so that there is a possibility of conformity of perceptions between insiders and outsiders.

Organizations tend either to retain what they believe about “who we are” and “what we do as an organization” (Ravasi, 2016) or to realize what they wish to become (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014) by expressing their OI to respective stakeholder groups, including those who are (or not) expected to be part of the organization, such as prospective students or employees and the unwanted ones. Those actions might be intended to fulfill an institutional demand, e.g., by attracting the target audience to join the organization and support it in fulfilling that institutional demand. For the same reason, however, such communicative actions structured by internal stakeholders might also be intended to resist another institutional demand, e.g., by creating voluntary aversion for unwanted people to join such organizations.

However, on the other hand, external perceptions about the organizations might be a reference for insiders to either retain or shift their organizational identity. Maintaining an OI can be a strategic alternative when outsiders’ perceptions have been matched with insiders’ for a long time. As external images tend to be sticky and inertial (Tripsas, 2009), organizations may feel “trapped” in a problematic situation when experiencing a new institutional demand with controversial prescriptions that challenge organizational identity (and image). An organizational image can also challenge, influence, or even change members’ claims and beliefs about their organizations (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000). It may occur when outsiders’ perceptions are different from insiders’ and motivate insiders to question and reconsider their organizational identity (“who are we really?”).

This nature of identity-image interrelations points to the works of organizational perception management. For contributing to this line of research, further explanations of under which circumstance an organizational identity determines external perceptions and vice versa are required. Since organizational perceptions held by insiders and outsiders are assumed to be mutually interrelated and influential, it is critical to identify organizational response strategies resulting from such interactions between them.

Chapter 3

Educational Inequality and the Contradictory Logics of School Admission Systems in Indonesia

As sketched out in Chapter 1, this thesis examines how Indonesian public schools respond to conflicting institutional demands related to student admission systems: the long-institutionalized demand for selectivity versus the emerging demand for inclusivity. The rise of the new demand is intended to address the unequal opportunity vulnerable children experience in accessing quality education, which is a consequence of (formal and informal) school differentiations and uneven distribution of quality education provided by schools in Indonesia (Moeliodihardjo, 2014; Mukminin & Habibi, 2019; Muttaqin, 2018; OECD, 2015; Suharti, 2013).

The following subsection provides a brief overview of the Indonesian education systems, particularly those representing educational tracking and school differentiation, and the key reforms intended to increase vulnerable children's access to education. This overview is followed by a more detailed description of the merit admission system, representing the institutional demand for selectivity, which has enabled educational inequality in districts across the country. The emerging institutional demand for inclusivity, manifested in the implementation of the three programs in the case city, and the tensions that emerged because of the conflicting institutional demands are then presented in sequence.

3.1 The Indonesian Educational Systems in a Nutshell

Indonesia's education system consists of four levels of education, which include primary school (grades 1 to 6), junior secondary school (grades 7 to 9), senior secondary school (grades 10 to 12), and higher education. Since 2014, Indonesia's compulsory education has been extended from 9 years (i.e., primary and junior secondary school) to 12 years (i.e., until senior secondary school). At the senior secondary school level, students aged 16 to 18 can choose one of the two tracks: generalist academic-oriented schools (*Sekolah Menengah Atas,* or *SMA*), which

educates those who want to continue their study in higher education institution (HEI) or, alternatively, more vocationally oriented schools (*Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan,* or *SMK*), which prepares those who prefer finding particular jobs directly after graduation.[10] This categorization also applies to the country's Islamic school system, which differentiates Islamic general senior secondary schools (*Madrasah Aliyah, or MA*) and Islamic vocational senior secondary schools (*Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan,* or *MAK*).[11]

Responsibility for managing the education system is shared across two ministries: 84 percent of schools are under the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC), while the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) manages the rest, known as *madrasahs* or Islamic schools (Kingham & Parsons, 2013; OECD, 2015). As part of decentralization reforms implemented since 2001, MoEC and local governments share responsibilities and resources in managing education service provision at the primary and secondary levels, as specified in Law 20/2003 of the National Education System. While the central government or MoEC is responsible for establishing the national policy, curriculum, standards, and school accreditation, district governments have an enormous responsibility for the overall

[10] In practice, *SMK* graduates can continue their studies in higher education institutions (HEIs), with a more limited choice of study programs, if they pass the entrance selection test. Because *SMK* teaches more practical skills than theoretical knowledge (which is the main difference with *SMA*), their students or graduates must prepare themselves more in order to pass the HEI entrance test, e.g., by taking additional training programs provided by tutoring agencies (which is known as the phenomena of *shadow education*). However, most commonly, *SMK* tends to be an option for children from low-income families because they do not have a sufficient financial support to study at the higher education level. Unfortunately, as stated by the OECD-ADB's review team (OECD, 2015: 164), "(Indonesia) vocational education training at the senior secondary level is of inadequate quality that does not address the needs of industry or the job seeker." This review is consistent with the World Bank's study highlighting the employers' report on the weaknesses of Indonesian SMKs: the school curricula are not based on the labor market requires, and the learning facilities are outdated and not adapted to current technologies and innovations (World Bank, 2010; see also Di Gropello, 2013 and Di Gropello, et al., 2011).

[11] *Madrasah* are education service providers under MoRA that deliver general education combined with Islamic studies from primary to senior secondary levels. At the senior secondary level, *madrasahs* provide either general or vocational education. In contrast to education in *SMA* and *SMK*, the proportion of Islamic religious education in *madrasahs* is much larger. Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs manages *madrasah* resources (i.e., teachers, facilities, and learning materials), their learning processes, outputs, and teacher qualifications must follow the educational standards set and controlled by the Ministry of Education and Culture.

management of primary and secondary education,[12] including infrastructures, facilities, and teachers. Moreover, local governments can also issue local regulations specifying their education standards in terms of inputs, processes, and outputs, as long as they comply with the minimum standards set by MoEC.

However, the decentralization does not apply to MoRA in managing *madrasahs* at the primary to senior secondary levels. The management system remains centralized, and thus MoRA is responsible for the overall management and governance of *madrasahs*. The system has been the major obstacle in improving the quality of *madrasahs* because these Islamic schools have no relationship with local governments and, therefore, do not receive resources and financial support from the provincial and district governments where they are located (Kingham & Parsons, 2013).

Private institutions play an essential role in the provision of education in the country. While the government dominates the provision of education in both primary and junior secondary levels,[13] private institutions (mostly religion-based foundations) play a significant role in providing senior secondary schooling, especially vocational schools (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2016). More than 60 percent of senior secondary schools (SMA, SMK, MA, and MAK) are privately administered. However, they only have less than half of the total senior secondary school students. These facts indicate that private parties have a significant role, but most have insufficient capacity to provide educational services.

[12] Since 2017, the authority that manages education at senior secondary level has been relocated to the provincial governments.

[13] *Madrasahs* or Islamic Schools are the exceptions. Most *madrasahs* at the primary to senior secondary levels are privately run. The 2019 MoRA data show the dominant proportion of private *madrasahs* to the total *madrasahs* at each level of education: *Madrasah Ibtidaiyyah*, which is equivalent to primary school (23.868 units or 93.3 percent); *Madrasah Tsnawiyah*, which is equivalent to junior secondary school (16.557 units or 91.5 percent); and *Madrasah Aliyah*, which is equivalent to senior secondary school (8.064 units or 90 percent). These *madrasahs* are mostly managed by Islamic civil society (non-profit) foundations, such as Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah—the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia.

Table 3.1 Percentages of School and Students Numbers

Levels of Education	Percentage of school number		Percentage of student number	
	Public	Private	Public	Private
Primary	89,5	10,5	87,55	12,45
Junior secondary	60,38	39,62	74,77	25,23
General senior secondary (SMA, MA)	49,96	50,04	73,33	26,67
Vocational senior secondary (SMK, MAK)	25,94	74,06	42,8	57,2

Source: based on BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2017, pp. 11-12).

Considering the overall quality of different senior secondary school types, people prefer SMA over SMK or *madrasah.* Moreover, the first choice of most children is public secondary school. Many children are forced to enroll in private schools only after failing to obtain the national examination score required to enter public senior secondary schools, especially those perceived as favorite schools in each district. Although there are important exceptions[14], SMK and *madrasah* have typically been considered a second, or even the last, option for most families.

Such a trend is mainly due to the shortcomings of many SMKs in terms of their quality, particularly related to teaching and facilities, which is consistent with the employees' perceptions regarding the central weaknesses of SMKs in Indonesia (Di Gropello et al., 2011; World Bank, 2010). Furthermore, SMK graduates tend to find themselves at a disadvantage when they turn towards higher education because of the academic emphasis of HEI entrance tests, including those in polytechnics that provide vocational education (OECD, 2015). Such selection tests give an advantage to SMA graduates rather than SMK graduates. It is important to underscore that SMK students (compared to SMA students, in general) tend to come from economically disadvantaged families and, therefore, have a higher tendency to drop out for financial reasons (OECD, 2015).

[14] The competition to enter a small number of high-quality SMKNs can be tight, which is primarily determined by prior academic achievement, i.e., the national exam scores at the 9th grade. Such SMKs could attract 30 per cent of the top 25 per cent of academic achievers in its district (OECD, 2015). A much more limited number of quality Islamic schools is also an exception. In 2021 there are only 35 quality Islamic schools managed by MoRA throughout Indonesia (i.e., 23 prototype boarding schools, 10 Madrasah Aliyah with a special language program, and two pilot vocational Islamic schools), with a total capacity of 2.883 students. The selection is centrally conducted by MoRA, including academic-skill test, interview, Al Quran reading test, and Arabic and English language proficiency test (Caesaria, 2021).

The great majority of *madrasahs* have similar conditions. Characterizing the *madrasahs* that are mostly private, Kingham and Parsons (2013, p. 68) note that:

> "The majority of private *madrasah* has a lower income base, fewer resources, and poorer facilities than the state-funded schools, and thus deliver a significantly lower standard of education. They are disproportionately represented in remote or disadvantaged areas and generally have higher proportions of poor students than their state school equivalents."

Many private *madrasahs* are affordable or even free and serve children from low-income families, while few others charge high fees and cater to children from wealthy families (Asadullah & Maliki, 2018; Rahman, 2016). Based on the government's 2019 national data of accreditation, only 14 percent of private *madrasahs* were accredited "A" (officially considered eligible ones with sufficient quality). In contrast, more than half of public *madrasahs* obtained an "A" accreditation (World Bank, 2020).

Over the past two decades, after the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia has implemented a broad range of education sector reforms. Several institutional arrangements have been reformed, mainly intended to improve the quality of and the access to compulsory education (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Muttaqin, 2018; Tobias, Wales, Syamsulhakim, & Suharti, 2014). Significant reforms include decentralizing education management to local governments, allocating a minimum of 20 percent of the annual government budget for education, providing financial support both to schools and children from disadvantaged families, establishing new schools and increasing the number of administratively qualified teachers, and improving teachers' quality and professionalism (OECD, 2015; Suharti, 2013).

Table 3.2 Educational Investments and Reforms

Educational investments	Detailed efforts and/or results (at the senior secondary level)
The establishment of new schools	• The total number of schools rose from 14.260 units in 2000 to 26.350 units in 2016 (increased 85 percent in less than 20 years) • The increase in the number of vocational schools was more massive than that of general/academic schools in five years from 2012 to 2016 (24 percent compared to 8.5 percent) • The increase in the number of private vocational schools was slightly higher than that of public vocational schools during 2012-2016 (30 percent compared to 27 percent). • The number of public general schools increased by 18 percent, while private general schools were only 8 percent from 2012 to 2016.
The massive teacher recruitment	During the first nine years of the decentralization of educational management (2001-2009), the number of teachers (excluding those in Islamic schools) rose by 72 percent (compared to 41 percent at the primary level and 45 percent at the junior secondary level). This increase has reduced student-teacher ratios.
The improvement of teachers' quality and professionalism	• The Law on Teachers and Lecturers (Law 14/2005) requires all primary and secondary level teachers to hold at least a bachelor's degree and complete a certification process to upgrade teacher's competencies, as the requirements to obtain a professional allowance (known as *tunjangan profesi guru*, or TPG). This regulation has forced existing teachers to take higher education programs. • Since 2013, teachers have also been required to take a competency test associated with the 2013 (new) curriculum. • The percentage of teachers holding the minimum qualification increased from 68.4 percent in 2000 to 94.03 percent in 2016, with significant gaps between regions. • In 2019, 41 percent of SMA teachers and 28.5 SMK teachers were certified.
The provision of financial support to school	• Since 2005, the central government has provided *School Operational Assistance* or BOS fund, allocated to schools based on student number in each school, to abolish school fees for all students by financing school operations.

Educational investments	Detailed efforts and/or results (at the senior secondary level)
	• According to the World Bank (2014), the BOS fund has positively impacted enrollment rates, especially among students from low-income families. When the amount of BOS was increased significantly in 2009, household education spending decreased, especially among the poorest families.
The provision of financial support to disadvantaged students	The "cash transfer for poor students program" (known as *Program Kartu Indonesia Pintar*, or KIP), is intended to prevent school dropout and relieve the financial burden on poor families to pay for schooling. KIP is a national program to help children from the poorest 25 percent of households by covering indirect educational costs. In 2015 the program covered 21 million eligible beneficiaries, which has doubled the number of beneficiaries covered by BSM, the precursor program.

Source: based on Ministry of Education and Culture (2021), Ministry of Education and Culture (2012), BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2016), Suharti (2013), World Bank (2020), World Bank (2014a), OECD (2015), UNICEF (2020).

The existence of several school alternatives and the government's growing investments in the sector have made enormous progress in improving access to secondary education (Faisal & Martin, 2019; Jasmina, 2017; Suharti, 2013). This improvement can be observed from the significant increase of net enrollment rates at the junior secondary level (from 50 percent in 1994 to 78 percent in 2016) and senior secondary level (from 33 percent in 1994 to 60 percent in 2016) (Figure 3.1). Despite the government's decision to extend the length of compulsory education (from 9 to 12 years in 2015), enrollment rates at the senior secondary level remain low, with a slight increase between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points annually in 2016-2019 (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2019).

Figure 3.1 Net Enrollment Rate by School Level, 1994-2019 (%)



Source: based on microdata from the National Socio-Economic Survey (*Survei Sosio-Ekonomi Nasional*, *Susenas*).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, net enrollment rates for poor households have significantly improved, but a substantial gap between the wealthiest (Q5) and poorest (Q1) households in access to secondary education remains wide. Given the government's strong commitment to investing significant resources in the education sector, access to education at all levels is likely to continue to increase, including among children from low-income families. However, the issue lies in the quality of Indonesian education, which is still lacking despite various policies aimed to improve it. The increase in educational access has only been accompanied by a modest improvement in quality (Al-Samarrai, 2013; World Bank, 2020). The low quality of Indonesian education can be identified from students' failures to fulfill both national standards, such as the national examination administered by the MoEC, and international standards like the OECD's Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), which assesses the competence of 15-year-old students in reading, mathematics, and science.

Although no longer employed as determinants of student graduation since 2015, the grade 9 national exam (the final junior secondary year) and grade 12 (the final senior secondary level) can still be used as a measure to evaluate the fulfillment of educational quality standards. When the minimum passing score set

by the government was 55 (out of 100 points), the average score across all subjects and school types at the senior secondary level was only 51 points in 2017, 46.72 points in 2018, and 48.03 points in 2019 (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2019). This indicates that the academic abilities of Indonesian students, on average, were below the standards set by the government. Student performance based on the examination scores, and their comparison between school types (general, vocational, and Islamic schools) and school status (public and private schools) varies considerably across provinces and districts, signaling the varied quality of Indonesian schools.[15]

Indonesia has participated in PISA tests since 1990, and the results show that Indonesian students' academic abilities are consistently below the averages of the participating countries, both OECD members and partner countries. In the 2009 PISA test, in which 65 countries participated, Indonesia was ranked 58th in reading, 63rd in mathematics, and 62nd in science (OECD, 2010). Based on the 2012 PISA results and data of participating schools provided by the Ministry of Education and Culture, the OECD (2015) highlights that senior secondary public school students performed better than private school students in all three subjects. In its report on the 2018 PISA results, the OECD (2019b, p. 16) states that "between 2003-2018 Indonesia enrolled many more 15-year-olds in secondary education (i.e., almost 1.8 million, to participate in PISA tests) without sacrificing the quality of the education provided." The 2018 PISA results show the share of low achievers in all three subjects (below Level 2) was 51.7 percent, while the proportion of top performers in at least one subject (Level 5 or 6) was below 1 percent (OECD, 2019b).

The above shows that most Indonesian schools still suffer from lower quality, despite the significant allocation of financial resources (Kurniawati, Suryadarma, Bima, & Yusrina, 2018). The massive increases in resources allocated to the sector in the last two decades—for instance, to establish new infrastructures and facilities, increase the supply of teachers, and provide

[15] On the 2018 national exam for senior secondary level (grade 12), the gap between the three top performing provinces and the three lowest performing provinces was 21 points (on a 100-point scale). Among the 34 provinces, only 4 provinces (i.e., DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, Central Java, and Riau Islands) had an average score above the minimum passing score of 55. The results are even lower for vocational schools and Islamic schools (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2019).

enormous teacher allowances—have yet to meaningfully improve the quality of education. Lower student-teacher ratios have not increased learning (OECD, 2015), and there is no convincing evidence of any difference between certified and uncertified teachers in their actual competencies or their impact on student learning outcomes. Moreover, Indonesia still struggles to provide equitable quality education for all its citizens, marked by a high variation of education quality between regions and school types (Suharti, 2013; Tobias et al., 2014).

International measures also indicate prominent learning inequalities in Indonesia. Based on the 2011 PIRLS data that assessed students' reading skills, the World Bank (2019) shows that the achievement gap between the poorest-quintile students and the wealthiest-quintile students in Indonesia was significant (35.4 points) and tended to be growing. A similar condition was also found in the PISA tests. The OECD points to persistent gaps between socio-economically advantaged and disadvantaged students in Indonesia, such as in reading skills. The performance difference between the two groups in the PISA test was 52 score points in 2018 and 44 score points in 2009 (OECD, 2019a).

Given the uneven distribution of education quality among regions, school types, and school status, such a learning inequality may reflect a more severe problem: educational inequality. The latter is a condition in which children with different socioeconomic statuses or other conditions obtain education services with a highly varying quality gap. Increasing access to schools is insufficient when it is not accompanied by a more equitable improvement in the quality of education. There have been more attempts to increase access to schools alone without addressing the causes of systematic educational inequality, such as institutional demand for selectivity manifested in the merit-based admission system.

The decentralization in the governance of primary and secondary education is one of the significant reforms. After the larger authorities to manage those education levels have been decentralized to the provincial and district governments since 2001 (Heyward, Cannon, & Sarjono, 2011; Tobias et al., 2014), the local governments have played a more central role in managing and financing education provisions and in specifying sectoral priorities. Therefore, variations among local governments in providing adequate access, equity, and quality education can be more easily observed (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Muttaqin, 2018; Suharti, 2013). Local governments' efforts to introduce a new institutional demand

for inclusivity that increases vulnerable children's access to quality education, while maintaining the mainstream practice of merit admission, have caused public schools to undergo an institutional contradiction. Because of decentralization, schools in different localities may experience diverse levels of such institutional complexity.

The last two subsections of this chapter describe the case city in greater detail, where the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity imposed onto the public schools resulted in the coexistence of two conflicting demands. Because of the local government's willingness to put inclusive education into practice in 2008 (Hanjarwati & Aminah, 2014), the public secondary schools in the city with competitive admissions were also pressured to provide special opportunities for socioeconomically disadvantaged children. Hence, the institutional contradiction in the selected city was more salient than those in other districts[16] and was therefore considered an appropriate research setting. Furthermore, the public senior secondary schools in the city were chosen as the cases because the tensions of those two conflicting demands were more experienced by schools at this education level, as explained in-depth below.

3.2 The Long-existing Demand for Selectivity

As mentioned, because of fully government-supported resources and higher academic achievements of most of their graduates, public schools in Indonesia are, in general, considered to be of higher quality, despite substantial variation among schools within and across provinces (OECD, 2013b, 2015). Although local governments do not publish any list of "quality schools," students and parents tend to be influenced by public schools' reputations in each district. Consequently, the competition for placement in public secondary schools, commonly perceived as low-cost-better-quality ones, is intense in most districts.

[16] The studied city was nationally recognized as a leading district in introducing inclusive education in Indonesia. The city government had issued a local regulation on the implementation of inclusive education before the central government set it up in the national regulations (Mulyadi, 2017).

Until 2016, admission to public schools at both junior and senior secondary levels was based entirely on students' prior academic ability.[17] This practice has long been applied nationally since 1950 and cannot be separated from the final examination system, i.e., the national examinations taken by students in the last year of elementary school (grade 6), junior secondary (grade 9), and senior secondary (grade 12). Although the final examination system itself changes quite often, particularly related to its management and its usage as an evaluation instrument (see Table 3.3), its result (i.e., student scores) has consistently been used to "rank students for competitive entry to the next level of education" (OECD, 2015, p. 313). Although the national exam results have no longer determined student graduation since 2015, they are still used in student admissions to public schools at the junior and senior secondary levels.

Table 3.3 The Final Exams and the Use of Its Results in School Admission

Aspects	Periods				
	1950-1971	1972-1979	1980-2001	2002-2009	2010-2020
The official name of the final exam	- *Ujian Penghabisan*/ Final exam (1950-1964) - *Ujian Negara*/ State exam (1965-1971)	School exam	National Final Learning Evaluation (*EBTANAS*)	National exam (*Ujian Nasional/ UN*)	National exam (*Ujian Nasional/ the new UN*)
Organizer	The Central Government (Ministry of Education)	Schools or groups of schools	The Ministry for *EBTANAS* and the schools for school exam	Independent organization (involving HEIs in monitoring & evaluation)	the National Education Standards Agency

[17] In 2017 the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) decided to change the public school admission system, which was previously based entirely on the prior academic achievement (i.e., the Grade 6 national exam scores for junior secondary and the Grade 9 exam scores for senior secondary) to one prioritizing the student's house-to-school distance. The new admission system, commonly known as the "school zoning system", allows the children living near public schools to enroll. This new system is expected, particularly by the central government, to address inequity in access to quality education across the country. More specifically, this new system is intended to provide more low-performing, poor students access to the public schools. Based on their study conducted in junior secondary schools in Yogyakarta, Berkhout and Tresnatri (2020a, 2020b) show the results of the new system and persistent problems occurred under the new system implementation, i.e., such as the reluctance of low-performing, poor children to choose high-quality public schools.

Aspects	Periods				
	1950-1971	1972-1979	1980-2001	2002-2009	2010-2020
Student pass criteria	100% based on the result of the exam	100% based on the result of the school exam	Combination of three components: teacher evaluation, school exam, and *EBTANAS*	Based on the result of the *UN* (each year the government set the minimum standard of passing, which was annually increased)	• 2010-2014: Combination of the results of teacher evaluation, school exam, and UN • Since 2015: the new UN no longer determines student passing
The use of the exam results for competitive admissions at the junior and senior secondary levels	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: based on Puspendik Kemdikbud (2018), Alhadza and Zulkifli (2017), OECD (2015) with emphasis.

While only 43 percent of students in OECD countries attend schools with selective admission, 67 percent of Indonesia's students attend such schools (OECD, 2013b, p. 78). Under this competition-based admission system, public secondary schools in Indonesia have traditionally been occupied by students with higher academic scores (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011). The system groups students based on their academic scores so that each public school always has relatively homogeneous classes containing students with relatively similar academic abilities. Moreover, as highlighted by the OECD (2013b), 35 percent of Indonesian students attended a school whose principal reported that the school would likely transfer students to another school because of low academic achievement, behavioral problems and/or special needs.

Selectivity is also stimulated by competition among schools on academic matters (Maulana & Yudhistira, 2019). Such a competition is commonly measured by student scores in the national examination and the number of successful graduates entering public HEIs. While the former was based on the government's official indicators in evaluating schools, the latter was frequently considered by children and their parents in choosing a quality school. The number of successful

graduates entering public HEIs is based particularly on academic scores during the senior secondary school period (formally referred to as *Seleksi Nasional Masuk Perguruan Tinggi Negeri*/SNMPTN), which differs from test-based admissions (Ikhsan, Massie, & Kuncoro, 2019; Logli, 2015; OECD, 2015). The school ranking that shows graduates' academic achievement, published annually by the local government, has always intensified school competition. Therefore, schools have more adequate resources to compete when they have more students with higher academic abilities. As highlighted by Newhouse and Beegle (2006, p. 529), "higher-quality inputs at public secondary schools promote higher test scores" and increases school achievement as a whole. In short, the logic of competition associated with the institutional order of the market has generated the demand for selectivity (OECD, 2013b).

At the senior secondary level, general senior-secondary schools (*SMAs*), particularly those fully managed by the government or public schools (*SMANs*), are the best track to be competitively admitted in public HEIs. The fact that graduates of this type of school dominate the proportion of students admitted to public HEIs in Indonesia—more than 65 percent (Moeliodihardjo, 2014)—has generated a widely shared assumption that *SMANs* are of higher quality, as compared to both private schools (particularly government-dependent private schools; see Stern and Smith, 2016) and other types of public schools at the same level of education, i.e., public vocational schools (*SMKNs*) and public madrasah or Islamic schools managed by the government (*MANs*).

Moreover, because of their reputations (primarily related to the number of graduates successfully admitted in highly ranked public universities), few *SMANs* in each district have become a stronger magnet for the best prospective students. For the first time in the 1980s, such favorite schools existed when the government developed model schools in several districts. During the same period, the government established a new admission system based on student scores of the national examination (*EBTANAS*), replacing the school entrance examination system. As a result, those model schools, considered ones with better quality, became preferred choices for high-performing students.

From 2007 to 2010, favorite schools were designated as the pilot of international standard schools (*Rintisan Sekolah Bertaraf Internasional*/ RSBI). These schools, commonly the best in each district, were particularly assigned and

facilitated by the government to adopt the educational curriculum and evaluation systems of OECD member countries (OECD standards). They were allowed by the government to adopt a more selective admission system, that is, by considering prior academic ability and/or entrance test scores. However, the public widely criticized this system, and the Constitutional Court then annulled this system's regulatory basis (Dharmaningtias, 2013). The Court agreed that the adoption of International Standard Schools had violated the principle of "Education for All" and enlarged social gaps among students. In 2011, the government then decided to (re-)apply the single standard of national education for all schools; hence, the national examination score is the only criterion of selection in public schools. The competition-based admission system using national exam scores remained unchanged when the government changed the educational curriculum into the most recent version in 2013.

Unfortunately, the use of a competition-based admission system in Indonesian public schools has caused equity problems. This is consistent with OECD's study concluding that "the more differentiated and selective education systems tend to show not only much larger variation in school performance, but also larger performance differences between students from more and less advantaged family backgrounds [who study in separate schools or tracks]" (OECD, 2004, p. 264, with emphasis). Indonesian public secondary schools were dominated by students who had not only higher test scores but also came from wealthier households (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006) and/or better-educated parents (Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011). Considered cheaper but better in providing higher opportunities to be accepted in public HEIs, *SMANs* are always more favored by Indonesian children and occupied mainly by those with better social and economic support to obtain higher academic scores (Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011).

Meanwhile, low-performing students, particularly those categorized as academically at-risk, such as children from low-income families or those with disabilities, have less opportunity to be accepted in such selective schools (Stern & Smith, 2016; UNESCO, 2009a). Consequently, some of them voluntarily choose other types of public schools (i.e., *SMKNs, MANs, MAKs*) or private schools, while others are thrown into alternative options after failing *SMANs'* selective entrance.

As highlighted by the OECD (2012b), particularly at the senior secondary school level, the socio-economic background of Indonesian students who attend publicly managed schools tends to be more advantaged than that of students who attend privately managed schools (p.26). By categorizing and comparing Indonesian private schools, Stern and Smith (2016) note that children with socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to attend government-dependent private schools, which in general are of a lower quality than government-independent ones. The latter tend to serve more advantaged children with much better educational environments and resources. Furthermore, Newhouse and Suryadarma (2011, p. 318) showed that "children of highly educated parents tend to select general schools, rather than vocational schools; (and) private vocational schools are the last resort, serving students with the lowest test scores and the least educated parents." These facts indicate an inequality problem caused by the availability of many school alternatives (but with quality disparity) and the use of competition-based-admission system which does not benefit vulnerable and academically at-risk students.

3.3 The Emerging Demand for Inclusivity

Based on the logic of competition, the institutional demand for selectivity might be part of the government's efforts to reduce the quality gap among schools and increase the quality of education in Indonesia. However, as mentioned above, this causes equity issues related to vulnerable children's access to quality education. This global issue has raised the resolution of inclusive education which supports the principle of "Education for All" by encouraging regular schools to accept all school-aged children, including ones with disabilities, to learn together in the same social environment (Powell & Pfahl, 2019; Richardson & Powell, 2011). This new demand for inclusivity requires that schools accommodate all children, regardless of socio-economic background or educational need, by reducing marginalization and exclusion of vulnerable children from and within schools. The aim of inclusive education is to increase the access of vulnerable children to school and fulfill equality in education (Andreozzi & Pietrocarlo, 2017). Because the management of primary and secondary education provision has been decentralized to lower levels of government (Al-Samarrai, 2013; Muttaqin, 2018; Tobias et al., 2014), the adoption of inclusive education in Indonesia districts or cities varies (UNESCO,

2009a) depending on the strength of local governments' commitment and willingness.

This research study was conducted in the city nationally recognized as a leading district in introducing inclusive education, which issued a local regulation on implementing inclusive education before the central government made it a national mandate (Mulyadi, 2017). To improve vulnerable children's access to public schools, which were usually competitive in their admission, the city government implemented three programs to encourage public schools to improve their inclusivity and accessibility practices for three different groups of students.

The two programs were purely local ones initiated by the local government. The first was the *Quota Program* (a pseudonym[18]), in which the local government established a special quota-based admission system for poor students who want to study in public schools despite low academic achievement. The second was called the *Inclusion Program* (not the exact real name), in which the local government developed initial supports to educate students with disabilities together with other students in regular schools.

In contrast, the third program called *Afirmasi Pendidikan Menengah (*abbreviated as *ADEM;* hereafter called the *Affirmative Action* Program) was developed by the central government to provide an exceptional opportunity for children living in Papua and West Papua (the most disadvantaged provinces in Indonesia) to attend schools in developed provinces. The studied city is one of the program locations that has accommodated many of the Papuan students.

3.3.1 The Quota Program

First implemented in 2010, the *Quota Program* was principally meant to increase the number of children from low-income families attending public schools in the city, especially at junior and senior high school levels (Fatony, 2011; Sidik, 2014). Because of their competitive admission, public schools at these education levels were usually much less accessible for low-performing children. The problem is that less advantaged students (i.e., those with low socioeconomic status) are at higher risk of low academic performance than their more advantaged peers, as

[18] The pseudonyms are used to maintain the anonymity of the studied city.

commonly found in Indonesia and many other countries (OECD, 2013a; Torpey-Saboe, 2018).

Although some children from low-income families have high academic abilities, many others do not perform well because of the lack of economic and social resources.[19] Consequently, such children's access to public secondary schools, widely perceived as quality schools with a meritocratic admission system, tended to be lower.[20] To increase such children's opportunity to attend public secondary schools, the *Quota Program* was designed as a special admission system with a much lower competition level than regular admission. The government provides tuition fees and a monthly scholarship for three years for those accepted through the program.

As a mandatory measure, the program represented a coercive institutional influence with tight (or high specificity) prescriptions that did not allow school actors' discretion in its implementation. Depending on the quota annually set by the government, each school must provide five to nine percent of its capacity for poor children, who are the city residents and officially registered as a member of a low-income family, to be accepted through this less competitive admission system. Through this special admission system, such students have a higher chance

[19] The PISA results indicate that socio-economic status significantly influenced academic performance of students in all PISA participating countries (i.e., the OECD countries and partner countries, including Indonesia), in which socio-economically advantaged students (compared to disadvantaged students) obtained higher scores in mathematics, science, and reading. In Indonesia, the performance gap between these two groups was most evident in reading: 52 score points in 2018 and 44 points in 2009. Despite their lower performance, some 14 percent of poor students in Indonesia scored amongst the highest performers in reading within the country (OECD, 2019: 4).

[20] Neither national nor local data, showing the proportion of poor students in each type of senior secondary schools, are available. However, as mentioned, several studies have clearly highlighted this educational inequality issue in Indonesia (e.g., OECD, 2015; the World Bank, 2020; Stern & Smith, 2016; Heyneman & Stern, 2014; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011). The World Bank (2020:49) states that "schools attended by poor students have a lower proportion of classrooms in good condition and are less likely to be A-accredited. The differences in the characteristics of schools catering to the poor and the nonpoor increases as students reach upper secondary school." Similarly, OECD (2012b) highlights that the socio-economic background of Indonesian students attending public schools tends to be more advantaged than that of students attending private schools, particularly government-dependent private schools (Stern and Smith, 2016). Furthermore, private vocational schools tend to be the last resort accommodating students with the lowest test scores and the least educated parents (Newhouse and Suryadarma, 2011: 318).

of being accepted in public schools since they only need to compete with other poor students applying to the same school. Those with a low academic score can be accepted as long as the chosen schools' quota has not yet been fulfilled (Sidik, 2014). These accepted students must be served together with other students enrolled through regular admission.

3.3.2 The Inclusion Program

Children with disabilities are the other marginalized group with limited access to schools. Initially, the special school[21] was the only choice for such children to access educational services. On November 30, 2011, Indonesia ratified the *UN's Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*. Article 24 states that persons with disabilities are not excluded from educational services and can access inclusive, quality, and free primary and secondary education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live. Five years after the ratification, Indonesia's central government issued the *Law on Disabilities* (No. 8/2016) and needed two years afterward to provide more operational regulations. Even though in 2009 a lower-level regulation of inclusive education for children with special needs had been introduced (i.e., Ministry of Education Regulation No.70), the local efforts to fulfill the right of persons with disabilities to educational services in Indonesian provinces and districts varied greatly. Moreover, few schools showed the willingness to adopt a moderate model of inclusivity by adapting the inclusion services to the readiness of individual schools (Andriana & Evans, 2017).

The studied city was nationally recognized as one of the few pioneers of inclusive school development in Indonesia (Helen Keller International, 2013). The city was chosen as a pilot project of inclusive education development managed by the cooperation between the government of Indonesia (including at provincial and district levels) and international institutions, such as the Norwegian Government through *Braillo Norway* (1998-2002) and *Helen Keller International* (1978-1984) (Heung & Grossman, 2007) as well as *Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund* in Germany (since 2006) (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009). The local government's more active effort began in 2008 by issuing a local regulation of inclusive education, a year before the Ministry introduced its national-level regulation.

[21] Special schools are exclusive, separated schools for students with disabilities.

The second program developed by the local government is in line with the global agenda of inclusive education, that is, by encouraging regular (public and private) schools in the city to accept and facilitate students with disabilities to learn together with other students. The local government gradually increased the number of regular schools appointed as schools providing inclusive education (Rahayu & Dewi, 2013). In 2014, 57 regular schools, from kindergarten to senior secondary level, were officially registered as inclusive schools in the city, including 5 (of 11) public schools at the senior secondary level. The local government supports the so-called "inclusive schools" by providing financial resources for students with disabilities and schools and training regular teachers to educate such students in an inclusive school environment. Teachers at the special schools located in the city (and other districts within the same province) are also empowered to support regular-school teachers at the appointed schools (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009).

The specificity of this program, however, is quite different from those enforced by the *Quota Program*. While the *Quota Program* is a tight institutional demand that leaves no room for discretion, the *Inclusion Program* can be categorized as a moderately tight demand or one with ambiguous prescriptions. Although the local government encourages all the schools to be inclusive, and the public schools in the city are particularly not allowed to reject students with disabilities, it does not set a specific quota. Neither does it establish a special admission system for such students. Furthermore, the government's strategy of gradually adding the number of regular schools to be officially appointed as inclusive schools in the city, as highlighted by Rahayu and Dewi (2013), points to the program's ambiguity. Consequently, the adoption of this strategy weakens the program's power in encouraging all the schools to become inclusive. This program's intent is in accordance with the enthusiasm and ideas of inclusive education, a normative institutional pressure or an idealized practice of education stipulated by both international human rights law and the Indonesian Constitution but still lacking operational clarity.

Significant challenges have consistently emerged during the implementation of the program, such as low awareness and understandings of the orientations of inclusive education and resistances from both internal school stakeholders and the wider community regarding the presence of children with disabilities in regular schools (Pertiwi & Lissa, 2009; Utomo, 2014; Villeneuve et al., 2016). Despite facing significant challenges for supporting the local

government's efforts, the case city was appointed by UNESCO in 2013 as a model for the development of inclusive schools that is not only to be replicated across Indonesian schools but also in Southeast Asia (Muryanto, 2013; Villeneuve et al., 2016).

3.3.3 The Affirmative Action Program

Unlike the two other programs, the *Affirmative Action Program* (a pseudonym but similar to the original name) was initiated and developed by the central government. This program was intended to increase the access of senior secondary school-age children from the least developed provinces in Indonesia, i.e., Papua and Papua Barat, to quality education by selecting and sending them to the schools on the islands of Java and Bali (UP4B, 2014). The two provinces were chosen as the target since they were ranked lowest in the human development index (HDI) and have a low literacy rate and inadequate educational service provision (UP4B, 2014). While the national literacy rate average of the above 15 age group reached 93.25 percent in 2012, Papua Province had a literacy rate of 65.69 percent, which was the worst in Indonesia (Badan Statistik Indonesia, 2012). In general, educational services in Papua, from primary to senior secondary level, suffer from the lack of teacher quantity and quality, proper learning materials, and appropriate infrastructure (Myriad Research, 2015; UNCEN, UNIPA, SMERU, BPS, & UNICEF, 2012; UP4B, 2014). Therefore, the *Affirmative Action Program* is an integral part of the government's efforts to accelerate social and economic development in the provinces.

Started in 2013, the *affirmative secondary education program* (ADEM) sends 500 students from 42 districts in the two provinces to 179 senior-secondary schools in 6 other provinces to the islands of Java and Bali. The studied city was one of the participating districts which, in the first year of program implementation, accepted a total of 90 Papuan students; the largest number, compared with those accepted in other participating districts at that time. At both provincial and district levels, the local government invited both public and private schools in the city to voluntarily take part in the program by accepting those Papuan students. This indicated that the program had a low-level specificity.

The Ministry of Education and Culture makes available financial resources for the selected Papuan students, including three years of tuition fees and living

costs. Because Papuan students come with different cultural backgrounds and traditions, assimilation and character-building are integral to the program. The participating schools are responsible not only for both academic and non-academic activities at school but also for after-school activities of the Papuan students. They are educated together with—and have the same responsibility as—other students. After finishing three years at senior secondary school, the Papuan students are encouraged to continue their studies at an HEI through a similar program, entitled *ADiK* (Afirmasi Pendidikan Tinggi—Affirmative Action Program at HEI level).

3.4 The Tensions between the Logics of Inclusivity and Selectivity

The two contradicting institutional demands are first derived from the contrasting models (or logics) in educational service provisions. In this case, the models are *comprehensive schooling* versus *educational tracking* (Skopek et al., 2019; Triventi et al., 2016). The strengthening of the global norm of inclusive education, which has shifted its focus from including students with disabilities in regular schools to fully inclusive education provisions by ensuring education for all children with different backgrounds and conditions in schools (UNESCO, 2009b), increased these tensions (Powell, 2014).

The comprehensive model promotes inclusive educational provision for heterogeneous students as adopted with varied applications in secondary schools across the Nordic countries (Jenkins et al., 2008; Kilpi-Jakonen et al., 2016; Rudolphi & Erikson, 2016; Wahler et al., 2016). In contrast, the educational tracking model applied in Germany, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Japan, Korea, and Singapore is generally characterized by sorting out or grouping students based on interests and academic abilities (i.e., prior school achievements), placing them into various types of secondary schools or classes with different curricula, orientations, and even quality standards (Betts, 2011; Buchholz et al., 2016; Horn et al., 2016; Jenkins et al., 2008; Kruse, 2018; M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018; OECD, 2013b; Triventi et al., 2016). In fact, some countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the Netherlands) apply school differentiation and stratification for placing students into separate schools as early as age ten (Buchholz et al., 2016; Dronkers & Korthals, 2016; Horn et al., 2016; Schleicher, 2018).

The comprehensive model tends to result in schools and classes containing students with variations in their academic abilities. In contrast, the educational tracking model is characterized by school differentiation in which each school contains students with relatively homogeneous academic abilities. The trade-off between these two models is perceived to be between equality and efficiency (Thiemann, 2017; van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). The expected benefit of tracking models is to enable more conducive learning environments in which schools can efficiently deliver focused curricula and learning instructions to students with certain needs, talents, and capacities, thereby increasing overall students' academic performance (Betts, 2011; Booij, Leuven, & Oosterbeek, 2017; Duflo, Dupas, & Kremer, 2011; Krueger, 1999; OECD, 2004). As highlighted by Hallinan (1994, p. 79), "a good fit between a student's ability and the level of instruction is believed to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of the instructional process." Furthermore, tracking systems allow higher-level schools or classes to challenge high-performing students and lower-level tracks to provide more attention and resources to low-performing students or those with learning difficulties or special needs (Duflo et al., 2011; Francis et al., 2019).

However, it has been criticized and empirically proven that the tracking system can lead to inequalities (Chzhen et al., 2018; Hanushek & WÖßmann, 2006; Hattie, 2009; F. T. Pfeffer, 2008). Based on research conducted in nine countries, van de Werfhorst (2018) suggests that such inequalities can be reduced when countries reform their educational system, from tracked to comprehensive school systems.

Table 3.4 Institutional Contradiction Related to School Admission

Dimensions	Demand for Selectivity	Demand for Inclusivity
The logic or educational model/ approach behind the institutional demand	Ability tracking system	The comprehensive school system and the international norm of inclusive education
The manifestation	School differentiation or segregation: schools provide specific curricula, programs, classes, or tracks for children with homogeneous abilities.	Inclusive education: schools provide comprehensive curricula or educational programs for children with heterogeneous abilities, educational needs, socioeconomic backgrounds, and conditions.
The expected benefit	Enabling conditions in which teachers can efficiently target instruction to students' needs	Providing equitable access of all children to quality education
Basic principle(s) and/or assumptions	Students achieve better if they are grouped based on their academic ability and placed in classes/ programs containing those who are more alike with each other, especially regarding existing capabilities.	• Lower-performing children may benefit from mixing with higher-performing peers without hampering the latter (e.g., the latter can be peer tutors for the former). • Inclusive education enables children with different abilities and conditions to learn how to accept differences, respect each other, and live together in heterogeneous social environments.
Perspective on the rights and opportunities of children to access educational services	Children have the right and equal opportunities to access educational services most suitable for their abilities, needs, conditions, and preferences.	Regardless of their different abilities, conditions, and socioeconomic backgrounds, all children have the right to quality education.
Perspective on the access of vulnerable children to school	Vulnerable children (e.g., ones with disabilities) can be served in special schools separated from regular schools.	Such children can be served together with other students in regular schools by providing additional services to fulfill their special needs and customizing learning activities and evaluations.
Perspective on the efficiency of	Academically learning activities can be more efficient with students grouped more	Efficiency occurs when schools or classes contain children with diverse

Dimensions	Demand for Selectivity	Demand for Inclusivity
teaching and learning activities	homogeneously because the classes are easier to manage.	academic abilities and conditions. Teachers can encourage students to help each other in learning activities and motivate children from socio-economically disadvantaged families by providing them with better learning environments and resources.
Benchmarks	Germany, Hungary, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, China, and Singapore	Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden)

Source: based on Triventi et al. (2016), Dovigo (2017), Andreozzi and Pietrocarlo (2017), Heung and Grossman (2007), Robert (2010), OECD (2004; 2012), (Francis et al., 2019), and Oakes and Wells (2004).

In contrast, comprehensive school systems focus on educational equality by stressing the importance of providing equitable access for all children to quality education. Although managing learning activities in heterogeneous classes requires more effort, the proponents of comprehensive school systems argue that it can be an efficient approach because of the opportunities of joint learning that can enable positive peer-group effects. Low-achieving students, often those from less advantaged families, can benefit socially and academically (i.e., motivation and better classroom discussions) from interactions with enthusiastic and higher-achieving peers in heterogeneous classes (Hanushek & WÖßmann, 2006; Robert, 2010; Triventi et al., 2016). Moreover, inclusive education promotes behavioral outcomes beyond academic aspects. The opportunities within inclusive education range from being "a resource that helps us cope with the complex society we live in" (Dovigo, 2017, p. xi) to reproducing an inclusive and democratic society (Ainscow & Miles, 2008; Powell, 2014), as well as being a community that can accept social differences and uphold the principle of anti-discrimination.

Another essential difference between comprehensive and tracking educational systems is their perspective on children's access to educational services. Tracked systems operate on the recognition that children can access educational services that are most suitable for their preferences, abilities, needs, and conditions (Oakes & Wells, 2004), which can legitimize school segregation or differentiation, educational tracking, and ability grouping of the students.

Meanwhile, comprehensive educational systems acknowledge that quality education is the right of all children, regardless of their different backgrounds, abilities, and conditions (Richardson & Powell, 2011; Slee, 2001; UNESCO, 1994).

These two systems also differ in their perspective on how to fulfill the right of children with disabilities to access education. While tracked systems require such children to be placed in special schools separated from regular schools to obtain unique educational treatments, comprehensive systems embrace such children within regular schools (Richardson & Powell, 2011). In regular schools, as prescribed by the proponents of inclusive education, while children with disabilities can benefit from the school environment's inclusiveness, schools can provide additional services to support their special needs and customize learning activities and evaluations to be adapted to their conditions (Suleymanov, 2015). At this point, these two different streams of educational equality ideas, each of which historically had a different focus and separate path of development, now have the same concerns. A fully inclusive education system that expands the focus of inclusive education, from giving special treatment to children with disabilities to promoting inclusion for all children regardless of their socio-economic conditions, is matched with the global goal of providing education for all (Powell, 2014). This shift also aligns with the purpose of comprehensive school systems that idealize the elimination of school differentiations and segregations.

Triventi et al. (2016) identify several forms of between-school differentiations, categorized as *formal* and *informal* differentiations. Referring to "regulated forms of diversity that are recognized by law and are visible in school certificates and qualifications" (Triventi et al., 2016, p. 11), formal differentiations include ones based on the owner status (public vs. private schools), the school specializations (general/academic vs. vocational schools), and the educational programs provided in different types of schools. In contrast, informal differentiations refer to contextual features of individual schools such as school ranking or reputation, resources, and student composition that may indicate school quality.

Both formal and informal school differentiations may become problematic when children from less advantaged families are more likely to be placed in less favored tracks. Moreover, such tracks characterized by lower quality can affect the

children's personal and professional future (OECD, 2012a; Skopek et al., 2019; Triventi et al., 2016). These phenomena of social inequality in education, particularly at the senior secondary level, have been highlighted by several studies, such as in Germany (Buchholz et al., 2016), Hungary (Horn et al., 2016), and Italy (Contini & Triventi, 2016).

The Indonesian educational system at the senior secondary level has also been characterized by both formal and informal school differentiations, in which children were tracked by ability. Public school admissions were run based on competition, in which high-performing children competed for reputable public schools. As highlighted by the OECD, Indonesia is one of the countries with a school admission system that allows for school competition. While fewer than 50 percent of students in countries adopting the comprehensive secondary school system (such as Norway and Finland) attend schools that compete with others for students, over 90 percent of students in Indonesia attend such schools (OECD, 2013b, pp. 134-135, with emphasis). This competition is more obvious at the senior secondary school level, where a tracked educational system or school differentiation is adopted. Therefore, the tension between the two demands is more pronounced at this level of education, particularly in public schools, because of tighter competition involving both students (competition for schools perceived to be of better quality) and schools (competition for prospective students).

The formal differentiation of senior secondary schools in Indonesia are characterized by school providership (public vs. private schools), school specialization (*SMA* or general/academic vs. *SMK* or vocational schools), and school types (faith schools—*madrasah* and religion-based private schools vs. non-faith schools; as well as regular vs. special schools). However, between-school differentiations in the country are also featured by informal aspects. The most common informal feature differentiating (public) schools at secondary levels is school reputation, which is mainly determined by student academic achievements, i.e., the percentage of graduates successfully accepted in public universities and the national examination scores. Children and their parents prefer *SMANs* with great academic reputations. Ability tracking in the form of a selection-based admission system (i.e., based on prior academic achievement) creates a segmentation in which high-performing students dominate such schools. In contrast, their peers with lower academic abilities are overrepresented in schools with a lower academic reputation. As it commonly occurs in other districts in the

country, *SMANs* in the city (13 percent of the total capacity of various senior secondary schools in the city) are contested by prospective students.

Selectivity or ability tracking is the source of inequality with regard to educational opportunities in Indonesia. Furthermore, a competition-based admission system can affect differences in social composition between secondary schools (OECD, 2013a). Children with a disadvantaged socioeconomic background are more likely to attend less preferred schools (mostly alternative private schools) after unsuccessful entry into the public school system. Research conducted in Indonesia reveals that family background (parental education and income) has a fundamental impact on the type of school attended (Bedi & Garg, 2000; Newhouse & Suryadarma, 2011) and students' academic performance (OECD, 2013a; Torpey-Saboe, 2018). Parents with higher education or those wealthier can boost their children's opportunities to attend public secondary schools by providing additional coaching and/or tutoring (Bedi & Garg, 2000) and a more conducive home environment for learning and academic achievement (Newhouse & Beegle, 2006). Parents who place greater value on education are also more likely to send their children to public schools, which are more favorably and generally viewed as higher quality in Indonesia.

More motivated students or those from socioeconomically advantaged families are more interested in enrolling in and have a greater chance of attending public schools (Bedi & Garg, 2000). Meanwhile, vulnerable students, such as those from lower socio-economic backgrounds or with disabilities, are particularly affected by academic selection. In contrast to those from wealthier families, this group tends to have limited resources and support that would boost their chances of acceptance to such selective schools, and many of them must choose a lower quality school and even with higher costs. Studies also confirmed the influence of parental socioeconomic characteristics on children's educational opportunities and academic achievement in many other countries (Buchholz et al., 2016; Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2013; M. Lee & Morris, 2016; M. H. Lee & Gopinathan, 2018; Robert, 2010; Schnepf, 2003).

Affirmative actions are required to increase vulnerable children's access to public schools. Following the principles of inclusive education (Andreozzi & Pietrocarlo, 2017; Dovigo, 2017; Heung & Grossman, 2007; Powell, 2014), the local government of the studied city has indicated some initial efforts in

encouraging the schools to accept and educate all children—including those who are likely to have not only low academic scores but also diverse needs, backgrounds, and abilities. This situation has raised tensions and inevitably fostered the coexistence of the two conflicting demands: the long-existing demand for selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity. The latter contradicts and challenges the widely adopted (or institutionalized) norms that have guided the competition-based school admission tradition.

The flaring tensions in Indonesia are similar to those in many other countries, particularly in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (Richardson & Powell, 2011). Such friction has emerged from the contradictions between the two institutional logics in educational service provisions. The *logic of segregation* manifests itself in tracked educational systems that focus on selection and competition. In contrast, the *logic of inclusion* is found in comprehensive school systems and inclusive education norms that pay more attention to equality of opportunity. Although inequalities in educational opportunities have attracted international attention and many efforts have been developed to overcome the issues, school segregation is still the dominant, legitimate, and influencing organizational modes of educational service provisions (Powell, 2014; Richardson & Powell, 2011).

The coexistence of these contradicting demands can be understood as the implication of both logics' simultaneous institutionalization at international, national, and local levels. Richardson and Powell (2011) highlight the paradox resulting from institutional forces with different directions, i.e., the simultaneous diffusion of segregated schooling and inclusive education. In many countries, the adoption of inclusive education does not automatically reduce or replace segregation practices (Powell, 2014). Moreover, the educational reforms face fierce resistance by the implementers, especially teachers and school managers, who spark local conflicts involving the proponents of segregation and inclusion. Therefore, many governments have chosen to adopt inclusive education systems gradually, namely through pilot schools or regional trials. Such approaches, however, have very often thrust schools into experiencing the coexistence of those contradicting logics (Biermann & Powell, 2016; Powell, 2014).

The increasing demand for improving school performance by institutionalizing academic standards and achievement measures has contributed

to the strengthening of competition, which can positively encourage school quality improvement. At the same time, however, it can also strengthen schools' tendency toward admission selectivity, a typical characteristic of the tracked systems. The use of benchmarks, league tables, and rankings—both formally and informally—has become increasingly popular at all levels. Examples include the OECD-PISA studies (international level), the mean scores of national examinations, and the percentage of school graduates successfully accepted in public universities based on their academic achievements in senior secondary school (national and local levels in the Indonesian case). Such measures encourage schools to opt for high-performing children as they are the necessary resources to become instant winners in a league table at the local level. This has advanced the institutional logic widely accepted in the practices of schooling that legitimizes the sustainability of the informal tracked educational systems in Indonesia, establishing barriers to both the diffusion of inclusive education and the installment of comprehensive school systems in educational reform. Consequently, education can remain the arena of and reproduce social inequalities in Indonesia, as occurred in many other countries where the tracked systems have been adopted (Buchholz et al., 2016; Contini & Triventi, 2016; Hanushek & WÖßmann, 2006; Horn et al., 2016; F. T. Pfeffer, 2008; Triventi et al., 2016).

Teachers are likely to resist the emerging demand since it requires considerable changes in approaches, strategies, and traditions—from handling homogeneous classes to managing classes containing students with heterogeneous academic abilities, needs, and conditions. Moreover, there is a presumption that the fulfillment of the demand for inclusivity can decrease school performance, measured with student scores, and in turn, affect its reputation and attractiveness to prospective students. The finding of OECD's study, which notes that "teachers instructing socio-economically disadvantaged children are likely to face greater challenges than teachers teaching students from more advantaged backgrounds" (OECD, 2014, p. 36; see also OECD, 2013a), similarly point to why teachers tend to resist the demand for inclusivity.

Chapter 4
Methods

This thesis employed a comparative multiple case study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2014) to generate insights into organizational strategies in responding to intra-institutional contradiction and the role of institution-level influences and organizational attributes in determining response strategies. The research was conducted in a city located on Java Island in Indonesia, where the local government is nationally well-known for its relative willingness to commence adopting inclusive education principles while the logic of selection is still the mainstream. The site was chosen because their opposing practices of school admission were relevant to the theoretical context highlighted in this thesis, specifically the intra-institutional contradiction characterized by the coexistence of conflicting institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actor.

To address the research questions, this thesis involved all 11 *SMANs* (public senior secondary schools) located in the city. Due to confidentiality concerns, the real name of the schools (i.e., *SMAN 1, SMAN 2, and so on*) was replaced by the pseudonyms (Schools A, School B, and so on; in which the sequence was randomized: School A does not refer to School 1 and so on). These cases were selected for several reasons. First, as aforementioned, these schools experience conflicting institutional demands that stem from both long-standing and emerging logics that were tried to be combined by the government, i.e., the demand for selectivity (or competition) and the demand for inclusivity in school admission. Thus, the organizations in the selected site provide interesting cases relevant to the theoretical issues with the potential to contribute to theory building (Yin, 2014). Second, by observing similar organizations, i.e., public schools at the same level of education operating in the neighborhood, this study aims to identify the variations of organizational attributes and their role in determining organizational responses to the intra-institutional contradiction.

4.1 Data Collection

The fieldwork was conducted in two stages throughout 2016 to collect the data using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews involving 155 informants from the schools (i.e., managers, teachers, and students) and the local office of education. The interviews were all conducted by the researcher in the local language, i.e., Indonesian, and sometimes in the Javanese language. Different sets of open-ended questions were used to collect information from the various groups of informants. The interviews were recorded after permission was given by each informant (by signing the consent letter), and all audio recordings were then transcribed verbatim.[22]

4.1.1 The exploratory stage

The purpose of the first stage was to ensure that the schools did indeed face contradicting institutional demands. This was also meant to identify conflict among organizational actors—for instance, between principals who tended to be the proponent of both demands and group(s) of teachers who tended to oppose the emerging demand—which would delineate that the contradictions were internally represented.

In this stage, interviews were conducted with six informants who had relevant responsibilities in the district education office, including the head of the office, and two persons in the provincial education office. The central aim of the interviews was to gather information related to the admission systems (both the regular, competitive one and the special, less competitive one), including the three programs demonstrating the demand for inclusivity, the coexistence of the two contradicting demands, and school responses. In addition, relevant archival data were also collected from both the office and the online admission system's official website. Items included regulatory documents, admission procedures, and the annual data of admission in each school, such as the number of applicants for the regular and quota-based admission system.

[22] Analysis using NVivo was carried out on transcriptions and recorded interviews in Indonesian. Translations into English were only done for the parts of interviews cited in the dissertation.

Interviews were also conducted with two to three informants (school managers and teachers) in each observed school. Several types of response strategies to the contradicting demands were initially recognized. The attempts to identify relevant organizational attributes were also commenced. The result suggested that the most critical attributes needed to be explored more deeply in the second stage included: (1) school status in the "local" field, which differentiated the observed schools into two categories: a central organization (favorite school) or peripheral organization (non-favorite school); (2) power balance structure of the proponent/opponent of the emerging demand for inclusivity, i.e., balanced or unbalanced structure; (3) organizational identity alignment with the long-established demand for selectivity (aligned or not aligned); (4) organizational identity strength (strong or weak identity); and (5) organizational governance, particularly referring to the decision-making mechanism, i.e., command or persuasion.

4.1.2 The second stage

In the second stage, interviews involving more people were conducted in the schools. Interviews were done with 11 to 14 informants in each school, including the principal, two to three vice-principals, four to six teachers, and four to five students. Two main criteria were used in choosing teachers to be informants: they must have worked at the current school for at least six years and performed duties as the committee of new student admission in the last six years (2010-2015). Students chosen as informants were those accepted either through the competitive admission system, the *Quota Program* and, if any, students with disabilities and Papuan students admitted through the *Affirmative Action Program*. The data of the participants are summarized in Table 4.1. The shortest interview lasted 20 minutes, while the longest went on for more than 2.5 hours.

Table 4.1 Data of Informants

Organization	Category of informants	Number of informants
District Education Office	Top and middle-level manager	6
Provincial Education Office	Middle-level manager	2
School 1	School managers (principal and vice-principals)	4
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
School 3	School managers	3
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
School 8	School managers	3
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
School 2	School managers	4
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
School 4	School managers	3
	Teachers	5
	Students	5
School 6	School managers	5
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
School 9	School managers	4
	Teachers	4
	Students	5
School 5	School managers	4
	Teachers	7
	Students	2
School 7	School managers	4
	Teachers	4

Organization	Category of informants	Number of informants
	Students	3
School 10	School managers	4
	Teachers	5
	Students	5
School 11	School managers	4
	Teachers	5
	Students	4
	Total	155

Note: Certain informants in each school were interviewed more than once to seek clarifications. They were also asked to evaluate some interpretations made by the researcher.

In the schools, interviews were mainly intended to identify the following relevant issues: teachers' and school managers' perceptions towards the two conflicting demands, response strategies adopted by the schools, and students' experiences in the admission process. Questions delivered to informants were always adapted into ones that were more easily understood by them, for instance, by translating the *conflicting demands* into the *contradiction between the regular, competitive admission system and the opposite system manifested in the three different programs*. For the same purpose, the *school's response* was also translated into *what the school does in the face of the contradicting demands, including each program manifesting the emerging demand for inclusivity*.

The interviews were also conducted to confirm the five school attributes that influence responses. The status of each observed school—whether it is a favorite or not in the local field or public school population—was determined by comparing the number of applicants to school capacity[23]. Interviews were then

[23] Schools with the number of applicants choosing the school as the first choice reached at least 80 percent of the school capacity were categorized as favorite or highly competitive schools, while ones with a more limited number of applicants choosing the school as the first preference were classified as non-favorite schools or schools with a lower level of competition. The school admission data in the last 6 years (2011-2016) shows that there was no change of the schools' field position, i.e., six schools were favorite schools and five others were categorized as non-favorite schools (source: the website of PPDB online managed by the City Office of Education).

used to understand how school managers and teachers consider their school's position in perceiving the demand for inclusivity and its consequences. The interviews were also designed to learn about the connections between the other attributes and school response to the intra-institutional contradiction.

During the 2016 admission process, observations were conducted in three schools (Schools A, B, and D), particularly to observe the interactions between the school admissions committee and (prospective) applicants. Some interviews were then conducted with the admission committee members to confirm what they did when interacting with the applicants or prospective applicants. Although such observations were not conducted in the other schools, similar questions related to the three schools' practices were relevant to confirm whether similar practices were also carried out in the other schools.

In addition, in order to verify data regarding strategies adopted by the schools in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction, relevant information obtained from an informant was always double-checked with other informants in the same school and even partially confirmed with actors from other schools or the education office. Moreover, the interview data were triangulated and supplemented with other sources like archival materials of complaints obtained from the ombudsman quarterly and annual reports (from 2010 through 2016), local newspapers, as well as relevant research and monitoring reports.

4.2 Data Analysis

4.2.1 Identifying institution-level influences

The analysis was carried out in two stages: within-case analysis in the first stage, followed by a cross-case analysis. The within-case analysis was conducted to identify strategies adopted by each of the 11 schools to respond to the contradicting demands, including each of the three programs representing the emerging demand for inclusivity. This was undertaken by reading all the transcripts for each school carefully, particularly identifying the school practices in responding to each demand. The school responses were then categorized and coded based on Oliver's (1991) typology of generic response strategies. School responses different from any tactic mentioned by Oliver (1991) were considered as the other tactic(s). Coding in this stage helped compile extensive quotes regarding the schools'

response strategies and the teachers' and school managers' perceptions of the contradicting demands, which were the essential consideration in determining the school responses.

By developing an analytical matrix, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), a cross-case analysis (Bazeley, 2013; George & Bennett, 2005) was then conducted to understand the similarities and variations in response strategies across the observed schools and their potential causes. In this stage, the schools' responses to each demand were compared to identify their similarities and variations. It was identified that these 11 schools exhibited similar responses, that is, complying with the long-existing demand for selectivity while resisting the new demand for inclusivity.

The analysis was then directed to identify institution-level factors enabling the two tendencies: (1) the low variability or homogeneity of the response bundles, i.e., the schools' responses on both sides of the intra-institutional contradiction; and (2) various resistance strategies adopted by the schools in response to emerging demands for inclusiveness. By comparing school actors' perceptions of the conflicting demands, three dominant perceptions were identified: the glorification of the long-institutionalized practice based on the mainstream demand, skepticism towards the new demand's prescriptions, and negative stereotypes about vulnerable children benefitted by the new demand. These dominant perceptions indicate the existence of an isomorphic institutional influence (i.e., *stereotypical isomorphic influence*), which is the cause of the first tendency mentioned above. The explanation of stereotypical isomorphism and its isomorphic influence is provided in Chapter 6.

Meanwhile, the explanations of the second tendency are based on the existence (or the absence) of internal conflict triggered by the intra-institutional contradiction, which was experienced or observed by school actors (teachers, vice-principals, and principals). The open and intense conflict was only found in a circumstance in which the specificity level of the program reflecting the emerging demand for inclusivity was high (i.e., the *Quota Program*). Such conflicts were relatively unnoticeable, or could be avoided, when the school actors faced the two other programs that contained ambiguities or medium and low specificity (i.e., the *Inclusion Program* and the *Affirmative Action Program*). This suggests that the complexity level of intra-institutional contradiction has a critical role in

determining the homogeneity (or heterogeneity) of resistance strategies in the field, which is explained in greater detail in Chapter 6.

Two approaches were adopted to minimize analytical biases. The first was to cross-check interview data gathered from various informants, particularly in interpreting school responses to institutional demands. The second approach, as Bazeley (2013) recommends, was to conduct supplementary interviews with key informants or school representatives to consult about school-level findings, i.e., school's attributes and response strategies.

4.2.2 Assessing the role of organizational attributes

The within-case analysis was conducted first to gather an in-depth understanding of each observed school as single cases. This was done particularly to identify the school's organizational attributes and how school actors consider each attribute when perceiving the conflicting demands. It was intended to evaluate the fitness between the empirical evidence, i.e., each attribute's role in determining certain resistance levels, and those theoretically predicted in the literature review (Paterson, 2010). To ensure both quality data of individual schools and comparable findings required in cross-case analysis, the insights originated from within-case analysis of a single school were used to validate the within-case analysis of other schools previously observed and guide the analysis of subsequent ones.

Comparative analysis was then conducted to identify similarities and differences among the schools (Marx & Duşa, 2011) regarding their organizational attributes, which were linked with the schools' resistance levels, as found in the preliminary study. This analysis resulted in a set of data presenting the connection between each school's resistance level and organization attributes (as presented in the truth table), which will be the basis for further analysis.

A variant of qualitative comparative methodology (QCA) called crisp-set QCA, as recommended by Rihoux and Mour (2009), was then used to systematically identify the combinations of organizational attributes in specifying the resistance levels (either high or low). Crisp-set QCA (csQCA) was employed since the data presenting the schools' conditions (i.e., organizational attributes) represent dichotomous variables, which is only suitable for csQCA (comparing to mvQCA and fsQCA). Using the Tosmana v1.5.2 software program developed by

Cronqvist (2016), the study explored under what conditions a high-or low-level resistance strategy was adopted. The stages of analysis included: (1) data preparation (transforming data into dichotomous ones, entering data into the Tosmana's working sheet, and processing data into the truth table—a list that presents certain combinations of conditions associated with a given outcome; (2) configurational analysis by using Tosmana to identify organizational attribute combinations leading to high and low resistance; and (3) result evaluation to assess the fit of the set-theoretic relations to the underlying data.

A number of strategies were applied to address both the internal and external validity of the csQCA results. Internal validity refers to the degree of confidence regarding the relationship between the sufficient and necessary conditions and outcomes identified in csQCA. To ensure the internal validity, the use of csQCA was complemented by within-case knowledge (i.e., in-depth understanding of each observed school as single cases) before, during, and after the truth table analysis (for a more detailed argument, see Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). As mentioned, data regarding conditions and outcomes processed in the truth table were supplied based on case knowledge, i.e., the inductive element of the employed csQCA. The case knowledge was also considered when evaluating the csQCA results, i.e., whether the formulas indicating the relationship between sufficient and/or necessary conditions and specific outcomes makes sense and conforms to the case knowledge.

External validity refers to the extent to which the csQCA results can be generalized widely beyond its boundaries, i.e., relevant with other organizations and situations. External validity is typically required by deductive studies involving large-N cases to assess the applicability of existing knowledge. However, the proponents of QCAs argue that, as highlighted by Thomann and Maggetti (2020, p. 366), "small-N, case-oriented deductive studies can also make conclusions about the applicability of propositions to cases that satisfy the scope conditions—although this precludes an interpretation in terms of more general applicability." Therefore, as recommended by QCA experts (e.g., Berg-Schlosser, Meur, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2009; Thomann & Maggetti, 2020; Wagemann & Schneider, 2015), the external validity of the present csQCA study was attempted by involving *logical remainders*, that is, cases with configurations of studied conditions that were not empirically observed but may occur in other settings. Meur, Rihoux, and Yamasaki (2009, p. 154) suggest that "by going beyond the

observation of phenomena that are present in a limited variety, we can thus support theoretical inquiries beyond observed cases."

As presented in Chapter 7, the *logical remainders* were included in the analysis to solve the limited diversity of the observed cases (a small set of purposively selected cases). Furthermore, this procedure enabled the assessment of the scope conditions using *Boolean minimization* (Wagemann & Schneider, 2015), resulting in reduced formulas describing sets of the observed cases in logically simple expressions (for a more detailed explanation, see Meur et al., 2009). Such expressions represent generalizations that are much more modest than statistical inference, a typical external validity of QCA results (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020). Therefore, the csQCA results can only be applied to other similar cases, i.e., ones that satisfy the scope conditions or share a reasonable number of characteristics with the observed cases (see Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, pp. 11-12).

As stated in Chapter 2, this thesis has a deductive element—particularly in the subsection that reviews existing knowledge and formulates theoretical expectations of empirical findings. Therefore, to obtain both external and internal validity, iterative processes were carried out to ensure that the logically short expressions resulted by the csQCA correspond to both the theoretical expectations and the in-depth understanding of the observed cases. The case knowledge was used to clarify the causally interpretable aspects of QCA results by discussing each sufficient path through the case study and then connecting them with the theoretical expectations.

Chapter 5

School Responses to the Intra-Institutional Contradiction

As previously described in Chapter 3 and 4, the institutional demand for selectivity is manifested by the competitive admission system, while the new demand for inclusivity was reflected through the three programs: the *Quota Program* with high specificity, the *Inclusion Program* with medium specificity, and the *Affirmative Action Program* with low specificity. The following subsections present strategies adopted by the schools in responding to the institutional contradiction. This chapter concludes with the discussion related to the patterns of the schools' responses to the intra-institutional contradiction.

5.1 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with High Specificity

When facing the institutional contradiction with a high complexity level (i.e., the new demand's prescriptions had high specificity), the schools exhibited their preference for complying with the mainstream demand for selectivity while resisting the new demand for inclusivity, which was perceived as controversial. As indicated by many other teachers and school managers, a vice-principal of School G explained why the selection-based admission system is preferred:

> *"Children with higher academic achievements should get better opportunities. Being accepted to public school, especially in a favorite one, is an incentive for them. Public schools, with greater achievements, also deserve to be favored by children. These show that the competition is fair and can encourage both children and schools to excel. […] Giving a special opportunity for children with low academic achievement to be easily accepted in public schools can endanger the fairness and the positive spirits developed by the system." (vice-principal, School G)*

Based on the above interview excerpt and many others with similar observations, the schools' conformity to the mainstream demand was not caused by the coercive influence of the demand for selectivity, but rather the school actors' awareness of the advantages of the practices prescribed by this long-existing demand. A senior teacher in School I provided a revealing statement: *"if in the future the schools*

have the autonomy to manage the new student admission, we will continue to adopt the (selection) system."

Meanwhile, as shown in Table 5.1, the schools resisted the *Quota Program*, which manifested the new demand for inclusivity with coercive pressure and high specificity. Response strategies with varied resistance levels were adopted: very high resistance (1 school), high resistance (4 schools), moderate-level resistance (2 schools), and low resistance (4 schools). School K was the only one embracing a very high resistance strategy: *manipulation* through *an influencing* tactic. High-level resistance was observed at four other schools (Schools A, F, G, and I), in which they adopted a similar strategy and tactic, that is, by managing organizational perceptions (the school identity, image, and reputation) both to attract the most desirable prospective students (ones with high academic achievements) and to filter undesirable ones (academically at-risk students). This practice is not on the list of Oliver's (1991) resistance strategies.

Two other schools employed two different strategies categorized as moderate-level resistance: School J adopted an *avoidance* strategy with a *decoupling* tactic combined with a low-level resistance strategy, i.e., *compromise* through a *pacifying* tactic, whereas School C undertook an *avoidance* strategy with *concealing* as a tactic. Meanwhile, low-level resistance was found in the remaining four schools. These low resistance schools adopted *compromise* strategies with *a pacifying* tactic (School B) or a *balancing* tactic (Schools D, E, and H).

Table 5.1 Response Strategies when Facing the *Quota Program*

Levels of Resistance	The Current Main Strategy (Tactic)	Other Strategy (Tactic)	Organization
Very high	Manipulation (influencing)	Avoidance (decoupling)[1]	School K
High	*Filtering through perception management*	Avoidance (decoupling)[1]	School A
			School F
			School G
		Avoidance (decoupling)[2]	School I
Moderate	Compromise (pacifying)	Avoidance (decoupling)[2]	School J
	Avoidance (concealing)	Avoidance (decoupling)[1]	School C
Low	Compromise (pacifying)	Avoidance (decoupling)[1]	School B
	Compromise (balancing)	-	School D
			School E
			School H

Note: the "1" sign indicates strategy replacement (the other strategy that was previously used and then replaced by the current primary strategy), while the "2" sign indicates

strategy coexistence (the second strategy used together with the primary strategy). The resistance level was identified based on the current primary strategy. When a double strategy was adopted, the resistance level was identified based on either the main or the second strategy (whichever is higher).

5.1.1 A very high resistance school

School K, a favorite school in the city, adopted a high-level resistance strategy by proactively influencing the local government to add a special requirement and lower the quota offered for poor students to be accepted into the favorite schools. As indicated by a vice-principal of the school:

> *"[…] we [school] gave suggestions, that is why it was then decided [by the government to adjust the requirement and quota]. We knew that the school could not refuse a policy. But I think we have the right to give suggestions based on our real experiences, [and] difficulties, in implementing the program." (vice-principal, School K)*

The local government added a special prerequisite in 2014 that required children from low-income families who wanted to enroll in Schools A, F, G, and K to have at least the average score of the national exam for junior high school. The local government also set fewer quota for each of those four schools, i.e., a maximum of eight persons in each period.

Another vice-principal added that, from 2010 to 2013, some teachers and school managers complained about the program on numerous occasions, e.g., in the local agency of education meetings or the local parliament's evaluations. The most frequent complaint was that most poor students accepted through the program typically lacked academic performance. The vice-principal expressed dissatisfaction or annoyance related to the teachers' difficulties in handling the classes containing some students with much lower academic performance:

> *"[…] in a meeting with the Local Agency of Education, at the district level, I explained, again and again, the difficulties experienced, [and] frustration felt, by most teachers in School K. Teaching several students with much lower [academic] abilities was challenging. The gap [of student abilities in each class] was too wide. I am sure that teachers in other schools, particularly favorite ones, also experienced the same things. They kept silent, however. People who dared to speak loudly were needed at that time. … one day, this school was visited by several members of DPRD [the local parliament]. [That*

was] a perfect opportunity [to complain]. They need to know the real problems faced by schools." (vice-principal, School K)

In 2010-2013 (before the local government finally adjusted the requirement and quota), School K also employed an *avoidance strategy* with a *decoupling tactic* by filtering such children before the formal processes of admission, such as when such prospective students or their parents visited the school and inquired about their chances of acceptance. On these occasions, only those with tolerable academic scores were recommended to officially register. Meanwhile, students with a very low academic score were subtly asked to enroll in another school because the competition at School K would be too intense. This was mentioned by a senior teacher in School K, as quoted below:

"[…] there were no rejections here. […] We would accept them, but we just wanted them to understand their choice [to attend the school] and its challenges, and the alternative as well, first. Then, they realized whether they were fit or not at the school. [If they push themselves to study here], they would only be an observer here, not players. […] We have no [negative] experience regarding their academic performance; all students are always promoted to the next grade because, indeed, we have made sure from the beginning [at the pre-admission process]. […] I said to the teachers who became the admission committee that it [the filtering practices] is not a violation." (teacher, School K)

The practice undertaken by the school did not completely conform to the local government's expectations. This can be categorized as an *avoidance* strategy with *decoupling* as the tactic because the school actors covered up the violation they committed. The poor students accepted through the *Quota Program* were only those with higher academic achievements, while the soft rejection (eliminating prospective students with too low academic scores) was covered up. Furthermore, as mentioned, the school also adopted a very high resistance strategy by influencing the local agency of education to adjust the institutional prescriptions.

5.1.2 High resistance schools

The four other schools (i.e., Schools A, F, G, and I) employed another resistance strategy, which is not on the list of Oliver's (1991) response strategies. Despite its softer approach, the perception management tactic undertaken by those four schools can be categorized as a high-level resistance because of its intended effect

on the targeted students' reluctance to enroll in these schools. As explained in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8, these schools have relatively strong organizational identities recognized in the (local) field. By echoing their strong identity through the dissemination of school programs and achievements, each of these four schools intentionally managed the perceptions of outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents or the general public) about the school. As further described in Chapter 8, it was found that these perception management strategies were intended both to attract the most desirable prospective students and softly deter academically at-risk children, including those from low-income families with low academic achievements who are the target group of the *Quota Program*.

The statement of a vice-principal at School F reflected the use of perception management as a resistance strategy:

> *"It [the quota] was not fulfilled for several years. [We did] not reject them. [...] Children not interested in academic achievements, reluctant to study hard, [with] low motivation, will not consider our school. It is natural, their own decision. […] On several occasions [such as] in competitions for [junior high school] students or social events organized by the school and the student council in this school or ones conducted in a village, we exhibit the school's performance: student academic and non-academic achievements, school's facilities, and student extracurricular activities. […] We want people to know what we have, what we do to obtain all those things. It (such information) is good for prospective students, the parents as well. They need to know which school is more suitable for them (or) for their children, encouraging a spirit to learn harder and obtain more achievements. Is School F a suitable choice or not?" (vice-principal, School F).*

Although they did not experience an explicit rejection, such children avoided the more demanding learning processes firmly attached to the four schools' identities as either with excellent academic achievements or with a strong ambition to achieve them. A student at School D, a beneficiary of the *Quota Program*, expressed her perception of schools with academic excellence.

> *"[…] [I am] not choosing School F, or School A. […] [My house] is close to School F, but [I am] not choosing that school. It must be hard to study there; difficult to make friends. They study and study and cannot relax." (student, School D)*

This explains why the government's annual quota for poor students with low academic achievement, particularly in Schools A, F, and G, was not fulfilled in the three years of the program implementation (2010-2013). Such students fear the tight competition since other students accepted through the regular admission have much higher academic abilities.

For a rather different reason, some students interviewed in non-favorite schools (i.e., Schools D, E, and H), did not include School I in their list of the selected schools in the admission process because of the school's strong ambitions to compete with prestigious schools in the city (such as Schools A, F, or G) and its strong identity as an Islamic public school—both of which influence its learning activities, orientations, and social environment.

> *"School I is really like Muhammadiyah schools [ones managed by Muhammadiyah, an influential Islamic organization in the country]. While some of my friends chose that school, I did not. […] ([I] would feel uncomfortable with religious activities there, so many Islamic-related activities while I am not a Muslim. […] I [also] do not like how teachers there [are] always pressuring students to learn harder, exercise and exercise every day. […] I heard about it from my friend studying there." (student, School J)*

As practiced by School K, an *avoiding* strategy through a *decoupling* tactic was also adopted by these four schools, especially when 'risk takers' or highly speculative students tried to enroll. Statements by teachers in Schools F and I indicate how this tactic was used in practice.

> *"[…] when their NEM, [meaning, the score of national exams obtained in junior high as the basis for selection] is too low, we said 'You can be accepted as long as the quota is still available. However, have you thought about your decision once again? The NEM of many other students [accepted through the regular admission system] must be much higher. Are you ready to take the risk [of school failure when you study here]?' for instance." (teacher, School F)*

> *"That [possibility of low-performing children choosing the school] has been anticipated. Teachers assigned to the admission committee have understood their tasks, including asking for the NEM of applicants. There are always teachers, experienced teachers, who handle the task, asking and providing appropriate suggestions for the prospective applicants or their parents." (vice-principal, School I)*

The key difference here was that Schools A, F, and G employed the tactic only in the early implementation of the program (i.e., in 2010-2013), while School I continuously used the tactic to deter undesirable students from applying.

5.1.3 Moderate resistance schools

As the schools with a moderate level of resistance, School J and School C opted for different strategies. While the former undertook the combination of moderate and low-level resistance strategies, the latter adopted a single moderate-level resistance, i.e., a *decoupling* tactic at the beginning of the program implementation that shifted toward a *concealing* tactic in the later years. More recently, a *compromise* through *pacifying* tactic was adopted by School J by declaring that, as a general public school in the city, the school is more suitable for students from low-income families who have limited opportunities to continue post-secondary studies. School J provided practical skill training programs, which are more common in vocational schools and useful for financial earnings after graduation. Such programs are more common in vocational schools and rarely provided by a general (or academic) school like School J.

The tactic adopted by School J increased the number of prospective poor students interested in enrolling there. As a result, the competition between poor students who want to be accepted through the special scheme becomes much higher. It means only those with higher academic achievement will be accepted in the school, a condition that is certainly more desirable. A vice-principal of the school explained further:

> *"[…] [The tactic used by the school] increases the number of prospective poor students interested in our school, tightening the competition in school admission and increasing the school's opportunity for having poor students with higher academic achievement." (vice-principal, School J)*

However, as a backup strategy, the *avoidance* with *decoupling* tactic undertaken by the above-mentioned schools was also adopted by School J. A statement by a school manager indicated the use of this tactic:

> *"The quota is limited; should we prioritize such children with lower academic abilities while the ones with higher abilities also want to [enroll]? They can choose another [public] school, School H or School E. It is good for them to know it earlier. [If they do not bear this in mind], they could be rejected by the*

system, not by us, and 'thrown' to a lower school—their second choice. If unlucky, they would also lose their chance to be accepted there, (because the student's spot) would be prioritized for other children choosing those schools as their first choice. If so, they will have to study in private schools. So, why do they not choose School E as their first choice? That can increase their chance of being accepted there. This is a good strategy; better for them. […] There is no intention to reject them here." (school manager, School J)

Like other favorite schools, between 2010-2013, School *C* also adopted *avoidance* with *decoupling* as a tactic to subtly filter poor students with low academic scores. However, under the current principal, this tactic became a *concealing tactic.* Low-achievement students from low-income families were accepted without filtering measures and without providing special services for them, such as social and psychological counseling and extra lessons outside school hours. As described by the school's principal:

"They [low-performing children from disadvantaged families] are just children with the same obligations and rights. They must follow the same standard [of learning and evaluation]. Because of the government program, they were accepted easily. We have done our task in the program [to accept such children]. Now, they must compete with others without special treatments." (principal, School C)

This non-filtering action in the admission process can be interpreted as a symbolic behavior intended to disguise non-compliance with the essential missions for educating children from low-income families. In this case, the acceptance of such children was not followed by adequate care, such as recognizing their social problems and special needs in learning and ensuring that the learning processes dominated by high-performing students are also beneficial for them. A teacher in School C explained a reason behind the adoption of this strategy:

"Some of them [the applicants] were not eligible to be the program beneficiaries. It is true that they have low academic abilities, but there are poorer students than them. […] Many of them do not understand that the government and the school have helped them. [For instance,] they used the money [state financial aid] to buy a cellular phone, not something else relevant to their learning needs. Some of them do not come to school, making problems. They and their parents always avoided us when we visited them. So, [they do]

many other negative things; [they are] naughty, always attracting attention from other people, teachers, [and] their friends. That is why the principal said, 'That is enough; it is time to treat them more professionally, more equal to other students. Do not spoil them anymore.'" (teacher, School C).

The above excerpt, generally, represents school actors' views, which tended to see the negative behaviors of students admitted through the *Quota Program* while neglecting that such behaviors might reflect psychological problems resulting from the lack of attention and socio-economic support from their parents. Furthermore, some teachers interviewed in School C supported the school managers' policy to provide no special treatments for the program beneficiaries, indicating a characteristic of the moderate resistance level.

5.1.4 Low resistance schools

Low-level resistance was observed in four other schools: one was a favorite school (School B), and the three others were non-favorite ones (School D, E, and H). School B undertook an *avoidance* through *decoupling* tactic in the early implementation of the Program (in 2010-2013). However, the school then decreased its resistance level by adopting a *compromise* strategy with a *pacifying* tactic. School B accepted poor students with a low score through the special scheme without any filtering actions. However, unlike School C, School B provided more attention to such students. A teacher at School B explains further:

"The principal really pressures the teachers [here] to serve such students [the program's beneficiaries: low-performing children from low-income families] more than those accepted through regular admission […] for making sure they could fulfill the standard of learning and evaluation. [We are also asked] to monitor not only their academic achievement but also their social and psychological problems." (teacher, School B)

When the principal was confronted, he asserted that:

"They [Low-performing children from low-income families] just need more attention. They do not get [such attention] from their parents. They [the parents] are too busy: some work as a porter in a [traditional] market, or a pedicab driver, so they are rarely at home. […] It must be difficult for those children. We need to help them [not only] fulfill their right to attend school [but also] solve their psychological problems. … they cannot perform better if they face such problems." (principal, School B).

Meanwhile, three other schools undertook another low-level resistance strategy. Despite the schools' involvement in the competition to attract prospective students and maintain school performance, these non-favorite schools were less reluctant to accept poor students with low academic achievement. These schools undertook a less resistant tactic—a *balancing tactic*—by accepting such students without filtering actions but then quite simply expelling those who underperformed. As mentioned by the principal of School E,

> *"Despite the 'lower level' public school in this city, [...] those who could not perform as expected will be 'transferred' to another school. We have the [school] rule based on government rules and standards. We are allowed to do that. Like doctors, they can send their patients to the hospital because the patients need more help. We have helped them [the program beneficiaries], but some could no longer be helped. They always got the lowest scores, or rarely came to school. [As a result, they are] not eligible to continue to the next grade. […] If they were not sent to another school, the school's performance would also decrease. That is the consequence." (principal, School E)*

A vice-principal of School H mentioned a similar practice:

> *"There is no special [treatment] with students accepted through the program. … Without the [Quota] Program, we always accepted and taught such students [with lower academic abilities]. [Moreover], the government also assigns this school to operate a special class for students with sports talents—we must serve regional-level athletes who have great achievements in certain fields but low academic abilities. […] This is not special treatment. Children committing serious violations will be expelled from the school. So, the common problems are not related to their academic performance but [more related to] ethical issues. […] I do not know [why, but] such children tend to have similarities related to their attitude behavior." (vice-principal, School H)*

5.2 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Medium-level Specificity

When experiencing the institutional contradiction with a moderate level of complexity (i.e., the new demand's prescriptions were ambiguous), conformity to the mainstream demand for selectivity was also seen in all observed schools. For similar reasons, many teachers and school managers expressed their preference for

complying with the competition-based admission system. For instance, a vice-principal at School A stated that:

> *"The [selection] system is important both to schools and children as prospective students. For [public] schools, it is to make sure that they have students who are ready to follow [the learning] processes in the school, [and] to compete with other students [during the learning process.] For children, the [selection] mechanism is needed to place them into a school that is suitable for them." (vice-principal, School A)*

Related to the opportunity of students with disabilities to be accepted in regular schools, a senior teacher in School K noted the following:

> *"It is clear that the admission system is mainly based on the competition mechanism. [Only] children with high academic achievement can be accepted [in public schools], including those with disabilities—why not? If they have great academic performance, it will be fine. But the problem is that it is still unclear which [public] regular schools should accept them." (teacher, School K)*

The above statement indicates the ambiguity associated with the *Inclusion Program*, which can also be identified from government regulation. On the one hand, the local government stated in its regulation that the so-called "inclusive schools" were only those officially assigned to accept students with disabilities and educate them together with other students. On the other hand, however, the local government also set the annual targets stating that the number of inclusive schools in the city will continuously increase. Concerning the latter, the government consistently encouraged all regular schools in the city not to reject such students as they transitioned into inclusive schools. Because of this ambiguity, school actors perceived a risk of losing legitimacy when defying the demand. However, at the same time, they also realized that the program had a loophole, providing them with a chance to avoid the demand without losing legitimacy.

In responding to the *Inclusion Program*, characterized by its normative pressure with ambiguous prescriptions, the observed schools exhibited low variability in resistance strategy. Strategies representing a moderate-level resistance were identified in all the schools. While seven schools adopted an *avoidance* strategy with a *decoupling* tactic, *escaping* (either as a single tactic or combined with another variant of *avoidance* strategies) was the second most

chosen tactic found in three other schools. Schools with *decoupling* tactics only accepted students with disabilities who have high academic achievement and are thus "still manageable." School actors in the seven schools assumed that those who passed the selection-based admission system have the potential to be successful learners, as expressed by a teacher in School K:

> *"[If they have] passed the tight selection [of school admission], such children must already possess the ability not only to handle their limitations or to fulfill their needs of learning but also to compete with others." (teacher, School K)*

The above reasoning is hard to interpret as the manifestation of the willingness to accept such students. Moreover, it does not sufficiently show that the government's intention to develop inclusive schools has gained widespread acceptance across the city's schools.

There were two facts indicating pre-admission filtering and the school actors' reluctance to serve professionally. Even though the law guarantees the fulfillment of the rights of children with disabilities, their parents are still worried about the willingness and readiness of regular schools to admit their children. Commonly, before officially registering through the centralized and web-based admission system, the parents first consult with the desired schools to gauge their child's likelihood of being accepted or getting disabled-friendly services in the school(s). However, schools' subtle rejections frequently happened in these consultations, for instance, by stating the school's lack of support and facilities and, instead, recommending such students choose another school. As the principal of School F explained:

> *"When they [children with disabilities or their parents] came here for asking the chance to be accepted here, […] I think it is more important for them to know about the services, facilities, and how the readiness of our teachers, whether our school could offer them what they need. Moreover, it is good for them to know other schools that are better equipped to serve them." (principal, School F)*

The second indication of an *avoidance* strategy was related to the absence of professional services in the learning process, despite the strong commitment of the government to provide financial and technical support. In this case, schools, especially those already accepted students with disabilities, "transferred" such

students to another school due to teacher's inability to manage the student's needs. A teacher in School I expressed it as follows:

> "*[…] it was especially intended for their future. We do not have the ability to teach them. They need something much better from other schools." (teacher, School I)*

Table 5.2 Response Strategies when Facing the Inclusion Program

Levels of Resistance	The Current Main Strategy (Tactic)	Other Strategy	Organization
Moderate	Avoidance (escaping)	Avoidance (decoupling)[2]	School F
	Avoidance (escaping)	Avoidance (concealing)[2]	School A
	Avoidance (escaping)	-	School G
	Avoidance (decoupling)	-	School B
			School C
			School E
			School H
			School I
			School J
			School K
	Avoidance (concealing)	-	School D

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

Note: the "2" sign indicates the adoption of strategy coexistence (the second strategy used together with the primary strategy). The resistance level is identified based on the current primary strategy. When a double strategy is adopted, the resistance level is identified based on either the main or the second strategy (whichever is higher).

Escaping was another *avoidance* tactic practiced by three other schools (A, F, and G). Schools with *escaping* tactics avoided the demand for accepting students with disabilities by declaring themselves as *special inclusive schools*, which provided particular concerns for those who have special talents that produce much higher academic achievements than average. By reframing the concept of inclusive education and adapting the *Inclusion Program* to their concern, these schools claimed that the *acceleration class program* was the manifestation of inclusive education.

In the Indonesian context, acceleration classes pertain to special classes managed by a small number of schools that have received approval from the local government. These classes were a manifestation of both ability grouping and grade skipping in which students with superior intelligence (i.e., getting an IQ test score of 140 or higher) may complete their studies in a shorter time, graduate earlier, and

move on to higher education. By organizing this acceleration class program, the three schools claimed that they had taken part in the *Inclusion Program* by accepting and educating only one type of children with special needs in learning:

> *"[…] it is a kind of distribution of tasks; specialization in serving children with special needs. This school serves children with superior intelligence, while other schools may serve another kind of students with other special needs such as those with physical disabilities." (teacher, School G).*

Both Schools F and A combined this tactic with either a *decoupling* or *concealing* tactic. In practice, children with physical disabilities would only be included if they had excellent academic achievement and demonstrated both the willingness and ability to independently fulfill their learning needs despite their limitations and lack of school support. Those schools with *decoupling* tactics were less willing to accept children with disabilities and recommended them to other schools. In contrast, a school that exhibited a *concealing* tactic showed a slightly higher commitment to accept students with disabilities, but the learning successes were more dependent on those students' ability to adapt to the mainstream system. This condition was indicated by a teacher in School A who illustrated the experience of a student with disabilities:

> *"She [a student with disabilities] tries to fulfill her needs by herself, sometimes with the help of her classmates. She has special equipment and always brings it in the classroom […] so that she could follow the learning processes in the class." (teacher, School A)*

Another teacher similarly added,

> *"I did not need to prepare special [learning] materials for her. She always participated in the learning activities [and] was able to adapt to the class." (teacher, School A)*

Concealing as a primary response was observed in School D. This school accepted a student with severe physical disabilities regardless of his academic achievement and kept this student until graduation. Despite the widespread social empathy towards the student, the school's enduring internal conflict regarding educational treatments for such students in a regular school undermined the school's efforts to provide a more customized learning process for the referred student. As mentioned by a teacher:

"The headmaster decided to accept him. […] While some of us have always learned to serve him in proper ways, some others still resist and treat him like many others." (teacher, School D)

The student was included in the learning processes that still inappropriately viewed the "Education for All" principle as providing the same treatment and evaluation for all learners.

5.3 Selectivity versus Inclusivity with Low-level Specificity

When all public and private senior secondary schools in the city were expected by the local government to voluntarily participate in the *Affirmative Action Program*, which has low specificity in its prescriptions, the observed schools exhibited low variation in their responses. High-level resistances with three different strategies were identified in 10 schools, while a low-level resistance strategy was observed only at one school (School E). The *defiance* strategy (by ignoring the demand) was adopted by most high-resistance schools (Schools B, C, D, H, J, and K). Despite the obvious invitation (clearly confirmed by the provincial agency of education), these schools did not take part in the program for various reasons, such as they did not get an official mandate to participate, they considered it as voluntary (not an obligation), or did not receive clear information about the program.

Table 5.3 Response Strategies when Facing the Affirmative Action Program

Levels of Resistance	The Recent Main Strategy (Tactic)	Other Strategy	Organization
High	Defiance (managing organizational perception)	-	School A
			School F
			School G
			School I
	Defiance (ignoring)	-	School B
			School C
			School D
			School H
			School J
			School K
Low	Compromise (balancing)	-	School E

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

Striking differences in academic abilities and life habits of Papuan students, compared to other students, were the main reasons behind these schools'

reluctance to take part in the program. At School J, for example, a teacher stated that:

> *"We all know the behaviors of Papuan students. […] we believe that their negative habits will be the main obstacle to their learning success and will distract the entire learning activities in the school." (teacher, School J)*

The majority of teachers and school administrators interviewed assumed that all Papuan students have low academic ability and that it would be inappropriate to include them in public school classes in the city. This clearly indicates that school actors still preferred the long-existing demand for selectivity. Some worried that accepting Papuan children could endanger their school's performance, or teachers would find it difficult to manage the learning activities.

> *"We can understand why they have low academic abilities. Many schools do not operate normally there [in Papua]. The poverty rate is high. It may be the highest [in the country]. We very often hear from the mass media that tribal warfare frequently occurs there. We can imagine that. Can we expect that there are Papuan children who have good academic performance? I cannot imagine how we teach them here. Should we teach them from the zero, teaching them how to read or to count first?" (teacher, School G)*

Among strong-identity schools were three schools (Schools A, F, and G) widely recognized by local citizens as ones occupied by high-performing students. These three favorite schools relied on their strong identities to signal the high-risk challenges that underachieving students would face if they choose to attend the schools. School I, a peripheral school with a strong identity, also adopted a similar strategy. In the early phase of program implementation (2013-2014), School I was one of the two public schools in the city accepting Papuan students. However, after experiencing difficulties, the school decided to no longer participate in the program.

Instead of explicit and direct reluctance, School I took a subtle approach by declaring that the school would continue accepting Papuan students, especially those with characteristics that match the school's identity as a faith-based public school—a strongly internalized and externally recognized identity. More specifically, school actors claimed that the school could educate optimally when participating students embrace a religion in accordance with the school's identity. However, because the religious majority in Papua is different from that expected

by the school, it is unlikely they will receive students that match the preferred criteria.

School E, a peripheral school, was identified as an outlier with a low-level resistance. Since program implementation in 2013, School E accepted Papuan students without any filtering approaches. However, disobedient students were expelled from the school or transferred to private schools. Instead of acquiescence, this practice can be categorized as a low-level resistance by employing a *compromise* strategy with a *balancing* tactic. As expressed by a school's administrator, this practice was intended to save the school's performance, that is, by removing such students from the calculation of average scores.

5.4 The Patterns of School Responses: An Initial Analysis

As summarized in Table 5.4, the data described in this chapter reveals three interesting patterns of school responses: first, the pattern of whole responses (or response bundles); second, the patterns of responses to each program; and three, the relationship between the level of resistance and specificity. The following subsections provide initial analyses of the findings.

Table 5.4 Variations in Resistance Levels

Resistance Levels	**Manifestations of The Emerging Demand for Inclusivity**		
	The Quota Program	*The Inclusion Program*	*The Affirmative Action Program*
Very high	***(1 school)*** School K	-	-
High	***(4 schools)*** School A School G School F School I	-	***(10 schools)*** The observed schools, except School E
Moderate	***(2 schools)*** School J School C	***(11 schools)*** All 11 schools	-
Low	***(4 schools)*** School B School E School D School H	-	***(1 school)*** School E

5.4.1 The pattern of response bundles

It was found that all 11 schools adopted a similar response bundle, i.e., responses on each side of the conflicting demands. The schools exhibited their preference for the long-existing demand for selectivity while resisting the emerging demand for inclusivity manifested in the three programs. These findings suggest the existence of isomorphism.

Ashworth et al. (2009) characterize organizational isomorphism by using both *compliance*, i.e., organizations' conformity to an isomorphic pressure, and *convergence*, i.e., homogeneous structures or actions exhibited by organizations in an organizational field or population because of institutional influences. However, in the context of an institutional contradiction, this thesis shows that those two criteria must be employed in a different way to observe organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands.

First, the fulfillment of the first criteria must be reflected from organizations' *compliance* with (at least) one of the contradicting institutional demands. The observed schools all indicated the preference for complying with the long-established institutional demand while resisting the new demand that runs counter to that mainstream demand.

Second, the two responses (i.e., organizations' conformity to one side of conflicting institutional demands and organizations' resistance to the other) should be considered as "a bundle of responses" to the contradicting demands. The homogeneity of such a response bundle points to the *convergence* in an organizational field, which is the second characteristic of organizational isomorphism (Ashworth et al., 2009).

Due to the fulfillment of isomorphism criteria, it is argued that the similar response bundles represent the existence of isomorphism. Further discussions in Chapter 9 illuminate *stereotypical isomorphism* as a novel type of isomorphism, which is relevant to understand isomorphic responses that occur in the context of institutional complexity.

5.4.2 The patterns of responses to each program

Different patterns of similarity or variation in responses to each program representing the emerging demand were visible. One could observe high variation

in the responses to the *Quota Program* (an emerging demand with high specificity). In contrast, low variation was identified in the responses to the *Inclusion Program* and the *Affirmative Action Program*, which have medium and low specificity levels, respectively (see Table 5.4).

These patterns align with the theoretical expectations, in which resistance strategy homogenization within organizational populations is likely to occur when the prescriptions of the controversial institutional demand have moderate or low specificity. When facing an externally controversial expectation, organizations tend to resist because it runs counter the long-standing, institutionalized practice (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). The tendency towards resistance (Tummers & Bekkers, 2020) is facilitated by the ambiguity of the new demand prescriptions (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996), which produces homogeneous resistance strategies in the organizational population. In the face of such an ambiguous controversial demand, as anticipated, the tendency for adopting response strategies with higher resistance levels gives organizations more room to maneuver, and the selections of resistance strategies are determined by the levels of risk of losing legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017). Therefore, the lower the specificity of demand prescriptions, the higher the level of resistance. The related findings are presented in Chapter 6 and discussed further in Chapter 9.

The pattern of responses to the new demand with high specificity is also consistent with the theoretical expectation. As predicted, when facing a counter-normative practice with high specificity prescriptions, organizations tend to resist by adopting different strategies that suit their respective organizational characteristics, which results in the heterogeneity of resistance levels at the organizational population. As described further in Chapters 6 and 9, the high specificity demand intensified the internal conflict between proponents and opponents of the new demand, activating organizational attributes as the filters in perceiving the contradiction and selecting appropriate response strategies.

Chapter 6
Institution-level Determinants

The school responses contained two conditions, which may suggest that institution-level factors exist, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The first condition was the similarity of the "bundle" of strategies adopted by each school in responding to the contradicting demands. The bundle of response strategies here refers to the school response to each conflicting demand. When each school's response bundle indicates a similarity, i.e., preferring the long-existing demand for selectivity while resisting the emerging demand for inclusivity, this raises a question: *is there isomorphic institutional influence in the observed cases, and how does it determine the low variation in the response bundle?*

The second identified condition of the school responses was the variability (i.e., either high or low) differences within the strategies that schools adopted to respond to each program manifesting the demand for inclusivity. Since the three government programs had different specificity levels, it is therefore relevant to identify the role of the specificity level in this manifestation of the new, controversial demand. The remaining sections of this chapter present the role of these two institution-level determinants, respectively.

6.1 The Role of Stereotypical Isomorphic Influence

In general, the teachers and school managers in the observed schools had negative perceptions concerning the various prescriptions that would include academically vulnerable children, i.e., those from low-income families, underdeveloped regions, or those with disabilities. These negative presumptions were mostly following the strong belief in competition as the most appropriate school admission mechanism.

Despite the emergence of the demand for inclusivity, traditional views and practices of school segmentation are still the mainstream. From their perspective, *favorite public schools* are only for children with high academic performance, *non-favorite public* and *private schools* are for those who mostly have lower academic achievement, while *special schools* are allocated for students with disabilities. The

long-standing selection-based admission system, regularly and centrally administered by the city's government, helped institutionalized such segmentation (OECD, 2015). As one senior teacher put it:

> *"In the centralized admission system, children have the right to choose three alternative schools and sort them out as the first to the third choice. However, children with a lower score have limited options. They do not want to take a risk and tend to choose non-favorite public schools. Such schools are always occupied by few children intentionally choosing them and by many others who were not lucky and 'thrown into' their second or third choice." (teacher, School G)*

Since the admission system results in student categorization based on academic achievement, the city's public schools were traditionally occupied by students with a relatively homogeneous academic ability. Teachers in favorite public schools are more accustomed to serving students with high academic performance, while those in non-favorite ones are used to teaching students with lower academic ability. Despite this categorization, in general, all the public schools were occupied by more competitive students, perceived as a given advantage and essential trait of the public schools. The mainstream demand for selectivity cultivated a strong belief that competition is the best admission mechanism, which, consequently, created negative perceptions about the new demand for inclusivity and the people who would benefit from it.

Because of its effect on the emergence of response similarity, both to the mainstream demand and the undesirable emerging demand, the mechanism is therefore considered as an *institutionally stereotypical influence,* i.e., a novel type of isomorphic pressure different from coercive, normative, and mimetic ones (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991b). This conclusion is based on the aggregate dimension of the three critical themes identified from the interview transcripts, particularly those associated with school actors' perceptions of the contradicting demands. The themes highlight the following institutionalized perceptions: (1) glorifying the long-institutionalized practice, (2) doubting the new demand's prescriptions, and (3) stereotyping people who benefit from the new demand. Together, they form the circumstances that led to the homogeneity of the response bundle, that is, organizational responses to both the mainstream and the new, controversial demand. The following subsections present those identified themes.

6.1.1 Glorifying the long-existing practices

One of the themes that surfaced from the interviews with school actors is the *glorification* of the long-institutionalized practices of selectivity. Glorification here refers to a collective belief that the long-standing practices of selection-based admission are far better than other alternatives. Such beliefs were very easily identified during interviews with school actors, particularly when asked to explain the rationale behind the school's response to the contradicting institutional expectations.

Some school actors highlighted the advantage of the competition-based admission system long practiced at public secondary schools. The principal of School I, for example, praised the online system used by the local government in managing the admission of public secondary schools in the city. In so doing, he noted:

> "*Actually, we already have a good system which is still used until now. Competition is the best way to guarantee fairness in admission. In this city, we have practiced RTO, [a real-time, online admission system managed by the local government], to facilitate children and their parents choosing schools. The city is one of the pioneers in using this web-based system. The selection process is open, fair, and much more efficient. Many people have recognized the value of this system." (principal, School I)*

As quoted below, a vice-principal of School D outlined the benefit of the selection system, particularly for prospective students:

> *"[There are] so many schools with varied quality and so many children with different academic abilities. Competition in the admission system can categorize children based on their ability and distribute them into suitable schools. It is efficient for schools and useful for students. The system will not make mistakes by 'sending' children with high academic abilities to 'low-level' schools or 'sending' children with low academic performance to favorite schools. Children will be accepted in schools where they can learn better. They will have friends with similar [academic] abilities. That is good for students since the gap [of academic abilities] is not too wide." (vice-principal, School D)*

The practice of school tracking, i.e., grouping children based on their academic abilities and sending them into different schools, is perceived positively

by most school actors as necessary for effective learning. A teacher's statement in School H below represents similar accounts from many other teachers in different schools:

> *"By grouping children with comparable [academic] abilities, learning processes will be effective and efficient. It is much easier for teachers to manage the classes containing students with similar abilities. The targets of learning activities will efficiently be met because students can start and arrive at the finish line at the same time. The current curriculum is rather tough, so the admission system [which is based on competition]) is helpful, particularly in conditioning the composition of students." (teacher, School H)*

The glorification of the long-institutionalized practice was also reflected in school actors' expectations of its full adoption. For instance, a vice-principal of School K stated that:

> *"The competition should be a tight race. The existing system still provides a chance for each applicant to choose three [public schools] so that a school may still accept a student who does not really want to be admitted there. The single option will be much better for schools to get the best and most interested students." (vice-principal, School K)*

Similarly, a senior teacher in School F enthusiastically asserted that:

> *"The system would be better if the government allows schools, especially favorite schools in the city, to manage their selection tests so that the schools can determine the forms of the entrance examination and the passing standard." (teacher, School F)*

Such aspirations reflect a strong desire of school actors to maintain the existing admission system and, moreover, to improve its application.

Glorification can also be seen from school actors' disappointment over the government's efforts to adjust the system—or combine it with another. For example, a vice-principal of School G considered such efforts had damaged the advantages of the admission system. He argued the following:

> *"The [competition-based admission] system should not be combined with other systems. It can spoil a well-established tradition. What is wrong with the system? The system has helped us in putting students in the places that suit*

their academic abilities, which is required for the success of the educational process in each school." (vice-principal, School G)

A senior teacher in School A also expressed a similar opinion. He emphasized the difficulties experienced by teachers in managing classes that contained students with significant academic ability gaps. He noted:

"The teachers in this school are increasingly experiencing difficulties since they have to educate children with diverse academic abilities in some classes. It happens since the admission system is combined with non-selective systems." (teacher, School A)

The representative interview quotes all express the glorification of the competition-based admission system. In general, the interviewed school actors admire the system's advantages, mainly related to its procedural aspects (claimed as a fair, efficient, and transparent process) and its results, such as student grouping (considered as one required to enable efficient and effective learning activities).

6.1.2 Skepticizing the new demand's prescriptions

A second theme identified from the interview data pertains to the *skepticism* surrounding the new demand for inclusivity. Although it was not explicitly asked during the interviews, many informants expressed their doubts about each program's prescriptions that manifested the new demand for inclusivity. Interestingly, the worries about the three programs frequently followed the statements glorifying the competition-based admission.

The school actors' worries about the *Affirmative Action Program* were related to how the program selected and included Papuan students in schools located in better-developed provinces. As stated by a vice-principal of School G:

"We fear that the program could endanger our school's conducive learning environment. For a long time, until now, we have adopted a selection-based admission system. By using the IT system, we only accept children with high academic performance. Our learning environment is [therefore] always conducive because we only accept ones with high motivation to learn or become a champion, as indicated by their high academic score. It would be different if we include Papuan students through the Affirmative Action Program. We do not know how they were selected there. [There are] so many questions, [such as], are they the best ones there? I think it is not a program

[that can] provide opportunities for high achieving Papuan children. If so, it is too dangerous to take part in that program, which is not well designed." (vice-principal, School G)

The school actors also criticized the implications of including Papuan students in the Public Schools in the city. A teacher in School D, for instance, stated that:

"When a school decides to accept them, this school is responsible for everything, not only their studies but also their social and personal lives. They have much lower academic abilities, so teachers must be more patient. It must be difficult to handle a class containing one or two Papuan students. The [ability] gap between our students and Papuan students is very wide. And again, it is not only about academic matters. How [do we] change their negative habits; often get drunk, violent behaviors? How do we ensure that our other students are safe and not affected by their negative habits? Including them in public schools in this city is not a simple thing." (teacher, School D)

The *Inclusion Program* was also criticized. This program was considered to have ignored the risks faced by children with disabilities in regular schools. Furthermore, teachers at regular schools are not prepared to manage inclusive classes containing students with different physical abilities and mental health conditions. A vice-principal of School J argued that:

"Please think about the risks potentially faced by them [students with disabilities]. They need more attention, need more recognition. What if they do not get what they need here? What if teachers do not understand what they need? What if they are not able to compete, or at least to adapt to conditions here? That will potentially damage their motivation and enthusiasm. Regular public schools, characterized by greater competition for achievements, are not suitable for them. The government wants to help them, but delegate it to [public] schools which are not suitable and do not have the preparations [in place] to do it." (vice-principal, School J)

Such risks were believed to be even greater when children with disabilities are included in favorite public schools as competition between students tends to be higher than in other public schools. Such criticism was reflected in the statement of a vice-principal in School A:

"Our school is publicly categorized as a favorite school and, therefore, the competition in our school admission is much tougher than in other public schools. […] Whether it would be more suitable and beneficial for such students [with disabilities] to join our school or, even, whether they are able to study here is still a big question." (vice-principal, School A)

Criticisms were not only expressed by teachers in the favorite schools, however. Many teachers in non-favorite schools also criticized the *Inclusion Program* by emphasizing the lack of government efforts to prepare teachers and regular schools in advance. The statement of a teacher in School E illustrates such criticism from the side of teachers:

"We [teachers] do not have any knowledge and skills to teach them [students with disabilities]. Our colleagues in special schools have such skills—but we do not. This will result in a serious problem if the government pressures the schools to accept such students without making sure the schools are ready." (teacher, School E)

Even though all of the observed schools accepted students from low-income families through the *Quota Program*, it does not mean that the school actors considered the program better than the other two programs. Almost all school actors interviewed perceived the program negatively. They thought it had good intentions but resorted to the unfair means in helping children from low-income families. Furthermore, the program beneficiaries were considered to be the program's main weaknesses, as stated by a vice-principal in School K:

"*Not all children from poor families have low academic abilities. In fact, some of them have outstanding academic achievements. The government should focus on this group of children. Financial aids or scholarships should be provided for such children, not those with low academic abilities or low motivation. […] In my opinion, the program wastes financial resources because we support children with either academic problems or psychological problems, or both. […] They are only a burden for schools." (vice-principal, School K)*

Additionally, school actors were concerned about the potential impact of making it easier for students to be admitted to public schools. Many teachers warned that such a special treatment could lower students' motivation to study

harder. The quoted statement below, from a teacher in School J, is representative of such criticism:

> *"This [Quota] Program may potentially coddle such children. They can be accepted without having a high score on national exams [at junior secondary school]. Those who are aware of this special treatment might always study harder to avoid failure—or even be a champion. It is, unfortunately, hard [for this] to happen. Because of the easiness, they become spoiled and are not motivated to study harder. The program will not help much." (teacher, School J).*

The prescriptions of each program have attracted doubts and criticisms from the school actors. All of those reflect skepticism towards the three programs or the manifestation of the demand for inclusivity. As seen in the interview quotations, this skepticism was frequently expressed before or after the informants asserted the competition-based admission system's excellence. This suggests that school actors preferred the long-established demand for selectivity over the emerging demand for inclusivity.

6.1.3 Stereotyping people benefited from the new demand

The third theme identified from the interviews with school actors is the negative stereotypes of the three programs' beneficiaries. Each program has a specific beneficiary, and stereotypes were attached to each group of low-performing children from low-income families, children with disabilities, and Papuan students. These stereotypes were found to be the main reason behind the schools' responses to the intra-institutional contradiction.

Negative stereotypes of Papuan students were identified in the interviews with the school actors. For example, a teacher in School F shared his perception of Papuan students. He noted:

> *"It is a typical characteristic of children who live outside Java Island, particularly those from Papua. They [Papuan students who are the program's beneficiaries] might be the best in their habitat (Papua). However, when they go to public schools in this city, they tend to be in the bottom rank. Moreover, they would surely always experience difficulties during their study here." (teacher, School F)*

The teacher's statement above is an example of the common perceptions expressed by interviewed teachers and school managers. Table 6.1 below presents additional school actors' perceptions of Papuan students when they were asked about their participation in the *Affirmative Action Program*, including the reasons (for participating or not participating) or the experiences (while taking part).

Table 6.1 Characterizations of Papuan Students

School categories	Characterizations
Participating in the Affirmative Action Program (School D and I)	Negative: • "slow to learn." • "cannot solve simple math." • "have not mastered basic language skills." • "need extra guidance." • "some were lazy." • "the girl cannot wake up early." • "one child rarely went to school." • "have a different religion." Positive: • "good at playing basketball." • "excited when singing." • "some were friendly enough."
Non-participant schools (the nine other schools)	• "violent." • "unruly." • "foolish." • "super lazy." • "intoxicated." • "criminal." • "belligerent (warlike behavior)." • "aggressive."

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

As indicated in Table 6.1, there are differences in perceptions expressed by those from two different groups of schools. Despite being limited, positive perceptions were expressed by school actors who had direct experiences with Papuan students. Furthermore, teachers and managers in the participating schools expressed negative images of Papuan students less excessively, but based on their direct experiences instead, e.g., not unintelligent, but slower in learning; not all Papuan students, only some of them. In contrast, teachers and school

administrators who did not have direct experiences with Papuan students tended to overstate their negative opinions.

Most of the negative perceptions excessively expressed were neither supported by adequate knowledge nor based on prior experiences, therefore reflecting stereotypes. Despite having no information about and/or direct experience in interacting with Papuan students (particularly the *Affirmative Action Program's* beneficiaries studying in other schools in the city), most interviewed teachers indicated their widely held prejudice. A teacher's statement at School J below is an example of this stereotype or preconceived opinion:

> *"We all know the character of Papuan people from TV programs, newspapers, social media, or on the streets. I do not see differences between those who are there [in Papua] and those living here, [mostly as] university students. We can see on the streets [when] they do not use helmets, violating traffic rules while intoxicated. We also often hear [from mass media] that they are involved in tribal warfare and violent behaviors. […] I teach civics, [where we] very often discuss the rights and duties of citizenship. I cannot imagine [what it would be like] if they are included here. It would be very chaotic. They do not know how to be good citizens." (teacher, School J)*

The teacher's statement above clearly shows that stereotypes of Papuan people are widespread in the country. The images of Papuan people represented and reproduced in media, i.e., by newspapers and popular media (novel and film), reflect the existing stereotypes. Critical discourse analysis conducted by Dalimunthe, Irawanto, and Budiawan (2020), for instance, shows how Indigenous Papuans are represented as a dangerous group in a local newspaper in Yogyakarta, an urban city where many Papuans go to university. Similarly, Papuan people are portrayed in movies and novels as aggressive, unfriendly, harsh, and inseparable from violence (Anggraeni, 2011); their primitive ethnic group (Larasati, 2014); as well as ignorant and malicious (Rosalia, Krisdinanto, & Fiesta, 2019). This demonstrates how the media confirm and strengthen Papuan stereotypes already widely accepted in society.

Similar prejudices were also found against students with disabilities. In this case, however, the stereotype was expressed more subtly. In fact, this stereotype, contained in the statements, appears to show concern for such students. This was

reflected, for example, in the statement of a teacher in School B. She mentioned that:

> *"It [the concept of inclusive school] is a good thing, actually. […] There are many types of disabilities. People with disabilities, however, have similarities in their behavior and psychological conditions. They do not have abilities like normal people [and can become] frustrated, prone to anger, and highly sensitive. In the educational context, such emotional conditions can hamper the learning processes of students with disabilities, or moreover, can disrupt the whole class. That is why special schools are more appropriate for them. Their needs for attention will be met there." (teacher, School B)*

By emphasizing the importance of academic ability as the criterion for accepting students with disabilities, a vice-principal at School K considered that students with disabilities, particularly those without high academic ability, would experience difficulties in regular schools. He stressed that:

> *"I do not think it would be a problem as long as they are academically eligible for acceptance. If they [students with disabilities] have a high academic score, it indicates they learned effectively and would be able to learn here. The academic requirement must be enforced to select and accept students with disabilities. If not, we all will be in trouble since they will not be able to take in the lessons well, only burdening the teachers." (vice-principal, School K)*

The above interview excerpt is an example of a school actor's perception of students with disabilities, i.e., children with low academic ability being a burden for teachers. Table 6.2 below presents more dictions used by teachers and school managers in interviews, particularly when answering questions related to the *Inclusion Program* in which they frequently expressed their image of students with disabilities.

Table 6.2 Characterizations of Students with Disabilities

School categories	Images of students with disabilities
Ones that currently have, or previously had, students with disabilities (School A, F, and D)	Negative: • "quiet." • "loner." • "difficult to socialize." • "sometimes too sensitive (easy to cry)." • "a burden for teachers and other students." Positive or neutral: • "some can be independent, although more often need others." • "having a strong will." • "can follow the lessons with certain assistance."
Ones that do not have students with disabilities (the other eight schools)	Negative: • "very sensitive." • "easily offended." • "mentally unstable." • "unfriendly." • "having a low academic ability." • "incompetence." • "low-performing due to poor health." • "always depending on the help of others." • "a burden for teachers and other students." • "unable to participate in learning activities." • "unable to compete with others." • "unproductive." • "from poor families." Positive or neutral: • "pathetic." • "unlucky." • "different to normal people."

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

As shown in Table 6.2, negative images of students with disabilities were more identified from schools that historically or currently have not served such students. Their perceptions were based on very limited knowledge and experiences in different contexts, such as the behaviors of a neighbor with disabilities, or simply their assumptions and imaginations. A teacher in School J, for instance, expressed their opinion about the *Inclusion Program* based solely on the story of their friend who was an administrative staff in a special school. However, teachers and school managers who have interacted with students with disabilities, and knew

that their prior assumptions about such students were not always accurate, still expressed stereotypes of students with disabilities—including negative ones—in interviews. They did not only describe the characteristics of specific students with disabilities, but also made generalizations regarding the typical characteristics of such students.

The beneficiaries of the *Quota Program* were also stereotyped. However, this kind of characterization was somewhat different from the stereotypes towards Papuan children and students with disabilities. Since the program had a high level of specificity and was strictly enforced, all teachers in the observed schools had direct experiences teaching students from low-income families, particularly those accepted with low academic abilities. However, they inaccurately presumed that all children accepted through the program would have the same tendencies, as expressed by a teacher in School A:

> *"There is a significant difference (between students accepted through regular admission system and ones accepted through the Quota Program) in terms of their 'rhythm' of learning [and in understanding the lessons.] I am a homeroom teacher, [so] I know their performance in the class. While I had my previous assumptions, I now believe that they [poor students with low academic ability] are difficult to be included in highly competitive schools, just like here in our school. They all tend to be the same." (teacher, School A)*

However, in several schools, the expressed stereotypes were more associated with the beneficiaries' attitudes and behaviors. As stated explicitly by a vice-principal in School C:

> *"It is fine to help children from poor families […] [since] some of them have good academic standing. However, it is different if the government pressures schools to help low-performing children from poor families. They must be lazy. That is why they have low academic achievements. [They can be] troublemakers [and] have no enthusiasm to learn. We often visit their home [and realize that] their parents do not give them adequate attention. We then understood why their children are like that. So, it is like a template. If the scheme of the program is not fixed, students accepted [through the program] will remain the same." (vice-principal, School C)*

While low academic performance was stressed in the schools assigned to accept smaller numbers of the program's beneficiaries, negative attitudes such as

"laziness" were highlighted more often in the schools with larger quotas. Although there was a difference in emphasis, similar stereotypes of the program's beneficiaries were expressed by school actors in both categories of the observed schools (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 Characterizations of the *Quota Program*'s Beneficiaries

School categories	**Images of the *Quota Program's* beneficiaries**
Ones with a small quota (School A, F, G, and K)	Negative: • "low-performing children." • "academically incompetent." • "always 'at the bottom'." • "slow learner." • "having lower enthusiasm in learning." • "not fit to be in a competitive environment." • "less motivated." • "inferior." • "lazy." • *"cunning."* Positive or neutral: • "some can be high achievers." • "do not have financial resources to excel in learning."
Ones with a larger quota (the other seven schools)	Negative: • "lazy." • "frequently absent from school." • "unmotivated." • "troublemaker." • "lower academic achiever." • *"cunning."* Positive or neutral: • "having inattentive parents."

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

The fact that the program beneficiaries typically *were* low-academic performing students only strengthened the stereotypes of children from low-income families and their ability. The problem is that such perceptions went beyond facts by generalizing the beneficiaries' attitudes and behaviors, as seen in Table 6.3. Another negative implication of stereotyping can be seen when the program's beneficiaries are called "cunning," which refers to an assumption that they administratively falsify their poverty status in order to be accepted into a

public school through the *Quota Program*. Actually, students from low-income families (i.e., the actual targets of the program) were victims suffering from the few cases of manipulation of program administration requirements in the past. Several interviewed school actors used the past manipulation cases as a reference, or justification, of their resistance to the *Quota Program*, and moreover, to stereotyping poor children.

As mentioned, the local government made some efforts to ensure that the new demand for inclusivity goes hand-in-hand with the mainstream demand for selectivity. These efforts included establishing a limited quota for poor students to be accepted through special admission and gradually adding the number of schools assigned as the inclusive ones. However, the schools' resistance to the new demand endured. This case suggests that the long-institutionalized practices of competition-based admission have not only established positive beliefs about it but also reinforced reluctance to accept new demands with opposing prescriptions. Since the competition-based admission system was structurally maintained by the government and widely practiced in the field, it consequently formed similar beliefs and negative perceptions toward the emerging demand for inclusivity—and academically vulnerable children as the beneficiaries. These beliefs and perceptions, as previously mentioned, then led to isomorphic responses to both sides of the contradicting institutional demands.

Because the shared beliefs in this case study were formed by a structural cause, i.e., the long-institutionalized practice maintained through governmental policy and widely accepted by society, it can be said that an institutional influence played an important role in leading to homogeneous responses in the field. This is in line with recent works on stereotypes and discriminations, which increasingly give significant attention to social structure and institutional settings as deterministic factors (see Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). As highlighted by Burn (2011), the concept of *structural discrimination* argues that stereotypes and exclusions are not only a matter of interpersonal relationships but also relate to institutional issues. In any social environment, there are always institutional prescriptions manifested in government regulations, mechanisms, societal norms, or legitimized category systems, which intendedly (or unintendedly) institutionalize stereotypes and/or discriminatory treatments toward certain groups of people (Burn, 2011; Rupande, 2015). Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov (2004, p. 40) therefore concluded that such perceptions are not

"individual attitudinal predilections" but rather "socially shared knowledge." resulting from institutional mechanisms (Burn, 2011; Dovidio et al., 2010; Stevens & Görgöz, 2010).

The institutional mechanism playing an influential role in the case study was no longer the government regulation with its coercive pressure. Instead, the long-institutionalized practice reproduced socially shared knowledge that glorified the long-established demand. Moreover, it negatively stereotyped the newly emerging demand that imposed opposite prescriptions. The competition-based admission system represented the legitimized category system, providing a much larger opportunity for children with high academic achievements to access public schools. From ecological and institutional perspectives, categories are "socially constructed" (Greenwood et al., 2017) and "not purely cognitive, but socio-cultural," reproduced and embedded in social environments (Glynn & Navis, 2013). However, this practice not only marginalized children with low academic performance but also stereotyped certain groups of vulnerable children—such as students from low-income families, those with disabilities, and children from backward regions—as academically at-risk (Larose & Tarabulsy, 2014). Moreover, the new institutional demand for inclusivity, which prescribes affirmative actions for such children, was perceived as rather controversial by school actors. These conditions point to the existence of *stereotypical isomorphic influence* as an institutional mechanism leading to homogeneous responses to the intra-institutional contradiction.

6.2 The Influence of the Controversial Demand's Specificity Levels

The next research query explores how complexity levels of intra-institutional contradiction specify certain strategies of resistance to the controversial emerging demand and, in turn, determine the variability of resistance levels in the local organizational field. The findings presented in Chapter 5 indicate that, as expected, the variability of resistance strategies adopted by the schools was different in the face of the three programs. Each program's prescriptions manifested the new demand for inclusivity with different levels of specificity.

The observed schools exhibited low variation in response strategies or resistance levels when experiencing programs with low specificity levels (i.e.,

either the Inclusion Program with moderately strict prescriptions or the Affirmative Action Program with loose prescriptions). In contrast, when facing a program with a high specificity level (i.e., the *Quota Program* with tight prescriptions), the schools' response strategies showed a high variation. The following sub-sections illustrate how specificity levels play a critical role in determining the variability of resistance strategies.

6.2.1 The new demand and its ambiguous prescriptions

Teachers' and school managers' negative perceptions of the controversial new demand did not automatically lead to low variability or homogeneous strategies in responding to programs manifesting it. Homogeneity in the field was only found to occur when the schools faced a less complex contradiction; that is, when prescriptions associated with the new demand imposed into the schools contained either looseness or ambiguity (i.e., those with either loose or moderately tight prescriptions). Under these circumstances, there were two main advantages obtained by school actors: the opportunity available to avoid internal conflicts stimulated by the intra-institutional contradiction while resisting the controversial perceived prescriptions of the new demand.

Internal conflicts were absent in each school because the local actors were not necessarily polarized into different positions regarding their perceptions toward the new institutional prescriptions. As a vice-principal at School H explained:

> *"No one here wants to do that. No one wants new problems. We are experiencing many other problems—and we have worked hard on those issues. We do not want to burden ourselves by accepting them (Papuan students), who would be much more difficult" (vice-principal, School H).*

The absence of such a conflict occurred not only in non-favorite schools like School H but also in favorite schools such as School F. The principal of School F highlighted that both himself and the teachers doubted the possibility of including Papuan students in the school.

> *"I have told the teachers here, then they replied, 'Please rethink it, sir. Is it possible?' […] I do not know whether the positive traits we have here can be transmitted to them [Papuan students]. Or, otherwise, all those things [academic excellence, competition, and other relevant things] will make them*

uncomfortable to study here. We cannot make speculations. That was the teachers' response, which I need to consider seriously." (principal, School F)

The absence of internal conflict also occurred when the schools faced the demand not to reject students with disabilities. At School K, for example, a vice-principal noted,

"We must always encourage our students to compete for academic achievement because it continuously stimulates them to study hard. However, if we accept students with disabilities in our school, we really do not know how to handle them. Can they compete with others? It is not about the readiness of teachers, as the teachers said, and I agree with them, but rather the readiness of children with disabilities to become students here." (vice-principal, School K)

The question of whether certain students can compete with others indicates that the logic of competition has been widely institutionalized. This, in turn, determines how school actors perceive and manage educational services. Competition has become the central instrument in learning activities at the expense of the inclusion of children with disabilities.

Similar conditions were found in other observed schools. For example, a teacher working for School J, who was a member of the committee of school admission in 2015, recounted her experience when a parent accompanying their son with disabilities wanted to enroll in the school. She said:

"I asked her to meet the principal directly to explain her desire. At that time, to be honest, we thought and worried that the principal would accept the child. But we were wrong; he politely asked the mother to choose another school." (teacher, School J).

The principal confirmed this, but he denied that he had rejected the child. He argued that he only asked the parent to reconsider because the school was not ready to serve students with disabilities. He noted:

"[…] the school building is not ready yet, [and] some classes and facilities are on the second floor. The teachers are also not ready, I guess. […] I know that [the local government] rule [does not allow schools to reject students with disabilities]. Until now, this school is not on the list [assigned as an inclusive school], and we are not ready yet. Should I force the teachers?" (principal, School J)

These words signal that, despite knowing the rule, the principal of School J decided to avoid conflicts with his colleagues, preferring not to accept children with disabilities.

Ambiguity is manifested in both programs, albeit differently. The *Affirmative Action Program* was perceived as "an open invitation" or "a voluntary action," meaning that it represented a loose demand or risk-free offer. The interview with an official at the Provincial Office of Education, as quoted below, reflected the program's looseness.

> *"I really [understand that] they have something else to prioritize more. Despite the little possibility for a positive response, we always ask them [public schools] to participate in this program by showing the participating schools' experiences, just to make sure that they are well informed about this program." (government official, Provincial Office of Education)*

A school principal, assigned as the coordinator of participating schools in the city, indicated the program's leniency:

> *"Although I have a good relationship with almost all other principals in the city, I do not want to force them to take part in this program. As mentioned by the government, it is a voluntary service. Those with a great willingness to voluntarily participate would be better in serving Papuan children, rather than those that are forced to do it; I am sure about this. […] Educating Papuan students is just part of the worship; that is our main motivation." (principal and coordinator of participating schools)*

Both teachers and principals, who naturally have similar stereotypical perceptions of the new demand for inclusivity,[24] relished the occasion to freely ignore or turn down the program without the fear of losing legitimacy. The principals were *not* under intense pressure to open their schools to Papuan children. Therefore, they did not feel it necessary to take a different position from the teachers who were reluctant to include ethnic minority children in the school.

Under this circumstance, it makes sense that the schools favored defiance strategies, reflecting a high level of resistance. When there was no institutionally

[24] The institutional logic of selectivity/competition has for a long time underpinned the prevalent practices in school admission. Therefore, the school actors tended to have negative beliefs about the demand for inclusivity, which led to promoting the opposing prescriptions.

stimulated conflict between school actors, organizational attributes differentiating the schools such as power structure, decision-making mechanisms, status, and organizational identity were not necessary conditions shaping organizational responses. Instead, the absence of such conflict allowed the other institutional-level determinants (i.e., stereotypical isomorphism) to take center stage, which in turn enabled a homogeneity of resistance strategies across the entire field.

A similar condition occurred when the schools were under pressure to support the implementation of the *Inclusion Program*. In this case, the difference was that this program was perceived as a rather ambiguous one. On the one hand, the government stated that the so-called inclusive schools were only those officially assigned to accept students with disabilities and educate them together with other students. However, on the other hand, the government set annual targets that the number of inclusive schools in the city would continuously increase and, therefore, consistently encouraged all regular schools not to reject such students as the starting point to become an inclusive school. In describing this contradictory expectation, a local government official mentioned,

> *"It is true that some schools have been assigned as inclusive ones—we can see this on the list. But it does not mean that the other [regular] schools can reject students with disabilities. Gradually, all the [regular] schools in the city will be inclusive ones. No exception. Those which have not yet been included in the list are also encouraged to start becoming inclusive by not rejecting such children." (government official, Local Agency of Education)*

School actors, however, perceived the ambiguous prescriptions differently. As reflected in the interview with a vice-principal at School G below, many school managers and teachers argued that the schools were not allowed to refuse children with disabilities when they can fulfill the academic requirement:

> *"We must understand the rules carefully. […] Since there is no special admission mechanism for such children, they must follow the regular admission rules. They will be accepted if they have high academic abilities. Schools make a mistake when they reject children who have already met academic requirements, regardless of their physical abilities or disabilities. All children have the same rights. As expected by the rule, we cannot treat them differently. That is my understanding." (vice-principal, School G)*

Such interpretations indicated that the prevalent logics of selectivity or meritocracy influenced how school actors perceived the demand for inclusivity manifested in the *Inclusion Program.* As a result, the access of children with disabilities to quality schools remains low. Those with low academic abilities were screened prior to official admission, while those categorized as high-performing children were accepted but did not receive adequate, friendly, or customized services.

A teacher in School F who had been part of a committee for school admissions (from 2014 to 2016) indirectly mentioned schools' common practices in refusing children with disabilities.

> *"What if there are no children with disabilities trying to register? During the admission period, some parents of children with disabilities often try to collect information [and] identify the possibilities for their children to be accepted here. However, we do not count them when they decide not to continue the process of admission. How can we accept or reject them?" (teacher, School F)*

Because of the *Inclusion Program's* ambiguity, school actors perceived that they would face a higher risk of losing legitimacy when refusing the demand for including children with disabilities. However, at the same time, they also realized that the program had a loophole, providing them with a chance to avoid the demand without losing legitimacy. An *avoidance* strategy with various tactics was, therefore, adopted by the schools. Despite the widespread aversion to comply with the demand for inclusivity, avoidance as a lower resistance strategy has been selected by most schools when responding to the *Inclusion Program.*

6.2.2 The high specificity prescriptions of the new demand

As mentioned, the *Quota Program* expressed the new controversial demand with either tight prescriptions or a high specificity level. As written in the Decree of the Head of the Local Agency of Education and announced to the public, the local government set several prescriptions, including a strict quota (i.e., the number of poor children with low academic scores to be accepted) for each public school, schedules, registration procedures, and requirements. Since everything was strictly regulated, there was no room for discretion in its implementation. Furthermore, the schools faced a high risk of losing legitimacy if they refused this strict program. This can be inferred from the following interview with an official of the Local Agency of Education:

"It is a government policy and must be obeyed because it has clear purpose, criteria, mechanism, schedule, and quota. All of these have been stated formally in the Decree of the Head of the Local Agency of Education. The consequence [of the offense] is also clear. The public schools are owned and financed by the government, the teachers are paid by the government, and the principals are assigned by the government. So, they have no reason to refuse it." (government official, Local Agency of Education)

In the face of this strict program, internal conflicts stimulated by institutional contestation were much harder to avoid by organizational actors in each school, especially between the principals and teachers. Such tensions were easily revealed in each observed school, as expressed by a vice-principal at School D:

"My question is why [the poor students with low academic abilities] were not placed in other schools. Why this school? Is it because this school has a timid headmaster, who was always afraid to do something, afraid to say no? Or because the teachers always feel pessimistic because of our school's position as a non-favorite school in the city? We always became the victim; pressured to accept […] more children with low academic performance, and many other things." (vice-principal, School D)

Because the principals are appointed and evaluated by the government, they were strongly expected to be obedient to the government's institutional demands. It was hard for the principals to go against the government's expectations, regardless of their controversies. Although they had negative perceptions and skepticism toward the program, as perceived by the teachers, the principals realized that they were government agents assigned to ensure the program's successful implementation or institutionalization. As a result, the principals experienced not only a role conflict regarding their position (see Lane, 2006) as both the government agents and organization leaders but also internal conflicts with teachers at their schools (for comparison, see Loder & Spillane, 2005; Msila, 2012; Selznick, 2011). The principal of School B indicated such difficulties:

"I really understand what the teachers are worried about. I am also still a teacher. We face difficulties. It is a fact. However, this is a government policy that must be implemented. All things have been ruled, [such as] the requirements, the procedures, and the number of quotas. We just need to follow

the rules. Many teachers have been complaining. I know, I understand. It is really challenging." (principal, School B)

Just like the principals, the teachers are also governmental agents who have similar tasks regarding program implementation. However, as the leading school manager, principals faced stronger, direct pressures from the government.[25] Ensuring that teachers fully support the program was one of their essential tasks. In doing so, principals were often in conflict with teachers who did not comply with the new program's prescriptions (for theoretical discussion, see March & Olsen, 2006; Tolbert & Zucker, 1999). While internal conflict could be avoided in the two other program implementation cases, the *Quota Program* implied that institutionally stimulated conflicts at each school were unavoidable.

The conflict sparked by the institutional contradiction consequently activated the role of organizations' attributes in specifying resistance strategies. Based on the interview data, schools with different attributes were found to have distinct preferences regarding particular strategies and different abilities in handling the (higher) risk. One of the pivotal organizational attributes found was the schools' status or position in the organizational field. The critical role of this attribute in determining organizational responses has been highlighted by several prior works (e.g., Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Marquis et al., 2017).

The position or status of a school influenced the school's way of reacting to the program, resulting in variations in schools' responses. Teachers in favorite or elite schools, who previously always served the brightest children, were consequently more reluctant to include the *Quota Program's* beneficiaries, that is, children from low-income families, particularly those with lower academic achievements.

[25] Sanctions for violating school actors were not stated in the *Quota Program* documents. However, in Indonesia, teachers and principals of public schools are part of the state civil apparatus, strictly required to comply with the regulations, evaluated and paid by the government. According to government regulations on the state civil apparatus (Law No. 5 of 2014 and its derivative rules), public servants who commit violations will be sanctioned, e.g., mutation, suspension, demotion, and even dismissal. Especially for teachers and school principals (according to Law No. 14 of 2005), penalties can also include revoking teacher or principal certification and withholding allowance.

"[…] No student with a score below 20[26] has ever been accepted in this school. I am sure that people in the city understand [that] they would test themselves before choosing this school. We do many social activities in the community, such as community services in villages, charity, or our students' programs that invite junior high school students' participation. On these occasions, we present what our school looks like. […] It is really to motivate them to join us. We need them to know our achievements, facilities, and learning programs. We want children who are interested in this school, academically eligible, and ready to compete or study hard." (principal, School F)

Although having more students with high performance is preferred, teachers in peripheral or non-favorite schools have become accustomed to serving students with lower academic achievements. This condition made the peripheral schools less resistant to the program, as stated by a vice-principal at School E:

"That is why the government sets more quotas for such students [to be accepted in this school]. The government's reason is that the [score] gap between those accepted through regular and special admission is not so wide; it will not be problematic. Still, their academic performance here is lower than regular students. However, the [performance] gap here is not as bad as those at favorite schools." (vice-principal, School E)

This variation in organizational status contributed substantially to determining organization actor perceptions of the *Quota Program* and filtering the organization's response to it, resulting in heterogeneous resistance strategies among the observed schools.

As described further in Chapter 7, other organizational attributes affecting the selection of response strategies include power structure, identity, and the decision-making mechanism frequently practiced. The influence of each attribute was also observed more clearly when the schools experienced the demand for inclusivity with high specificity, i.e., in the *Quota Program*. When the principals and teachers were in conflict caused by the contradicting demands, both the school actors' power structure and the schools' decision-making mechanism determined their differentiating response strategies.

The following statement of a teacher in School C indicates how those two attributes determined the response strategies adopted by the school:

[26] The maximum score of the final exam for grade 9 junior high school was 40.

"[The principal] is still young but very assertive. When the vice-principals, who are much more senior than him, are likely to disagree with him or reluctant to comply, he always makes decisions by himself [without consulting with the vice-principals]. He prefers to do activities [related to the consequences of his decision] by himself or by encouraging young teachers to support him [or] to be the committee of school admission, for instance." (teacher, School C)

The above statement was given when asked about the reason for the acceptance of more students with lower academic abilities at this school than those accepted at other favorite schools through the *Quota Program*. That statement indicates disagreements between the principal and the vice-principals or senior teachers over the *Quota Program's* implementation. The principal of School C confirmed the situations he faced:

"In the K3S meetings (i.e., between the school principals and the Education Office), we are always warned to obey the rules of program implementation. Schools that have committed violations always got into trouble in the meetings. Harsh reprimands are common, but social punishments are much crueler. […] Some principals face difficulties in carrying out the program in the way that the government expects. Including in this school, I faced a very challenging condition here [since] some senior teachers have negative perceptions of the program. I can cope with this issue, however." (principal, School C)

Those two interviews also indicate a balanced power structure and a command decision-making mechanism at School C. Hence, the conditions associated with those two organizational attributes partly explain the adoption of *avoidance* strategies (i.e., *concealing* and *decoupling* tactics) at School C, particularly when responding to the *Quota Program*.

As mentioned in the previous subsection, such internal conflict was neither observed at School C nor the other schools when dealing with the two other programs. Both the *Inclusion Program* and *Affirmative Action Program* had lower specificity levels and, therefore, provided more space to resist the demand for inclusivity. The *Affirmative Action Program's* looseness enabled more opportunities for most schools to adopt high-level resistance strategies, such as defiance by ignoring the program or by managing organizational perception as the preferred tactics. Similarly, the *Inclusion Program's* ambiguity provided greater

chances for adopting moderate-level resistance strategies (i.e., *avoidance* with *escaping*, *decoupling*, or *concealing* tactics).

Chapter 7

The Role of Organizational Attributes

How organizations experience and cope with institutional complexity and contradictions have become institutionalist scholars' central concern in the last decade. The literature on organizational responses to such circumstances typically describes that similar organizations in a field tend to exhibit response heterogeneity (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Bjerregaard, 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Such a variation may occur because organizational attributes determine how organizations perceive imposed institutional pressures and thus construct a possible range of responses to such demands (Greenwood et al., 2011; Y.-K. Yang, 2016).

Although various organizational attributes have been identified as influential filters through which the complexity and contradictions are perceived and interpreted, they were assessed separately as single attributes in previous works. Kodeih and Greenwood (2014), for instance, have highlighted how organizational actors consider their identity both in framing the institutional complexity they experience and in specifying their responses. The role of other single attributes in such circumstances has also been studied, such as field position (e.g., Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and internal power structures (e.g., Pache & Santos, 2010).

Since every organization has interconnected and functional attributes, it is crucial to understand the role of organizational characteristics as configurations (Fiss et al., 2013) in determining response strategies and their resistance levels, which is still poorly understood. By taking a closer look at the influencing combinations of organizational attributes, one can identify the necessary and sufficient ones and their joint mechanisms in specifying resistance levels. This work is, therefore, an attempt to fill this knowledge gap.

The findings described in Chapters 5 and 6 show that organizational characteristics play a significant role in specifying types of resistance strategies, enabling variations in the level of resistance across the schools in the field. This influence was more significant when organizations experienced a high specificity

(tight demand) rather than moderate or low specificity (moderately tight or loose demand).

This chapter presents the influences of organizational attributes in determining strategies, particularly in responding to the *Quota Program*, which expresses the emerging demand for inclusivity with a high specificity level and no room for discretion. As explained in Chapter 5, the observed schools embraced various strategies with different resistance levels in responding to that strict program. This chapter is guided by two questions: (1) What are the organizational attributes individually influencing organizational resistance to a controversial demand that ignites institutional complexity? (2) How do certain organizational attributes play their collaborative role as necessary and/or sufficient conditions to determine resistance levels?

7.1 The Influencing Organizational Attributes

As mentioned in the method section (4.1.1), the within-case analysis undertaken during the data collection and earlier data analysis identified five school characteristics that determine the selection of resistance strategies. These emergent findings of organizational attributes include: (1) organization status or position in the field; (2) power balance structure between opponent and proponent of the emerging institutional demand for inclusivity; (3) the relevance of organizational identity (OI) to the more established institutional demand; (4) the strength of OI; and (5) governance, specifically referring to decision-making mechanism.

7.1.1 Organization status

In this thesis, organizational status relates to the schools' position in the local field, i.e., either favorite or non-favorite schools. Favorite schools, referring to those highly competitive in school admissions (i.e., the number of applicants choosing the school as their first choice during regular admissions in 2010-2016 reached 85% to more than 100% of the school's capacity), were categorized as *central* organizations. In contrast, those with a lower level of competition, or non-favorite schools, were classified as *peripheral* organizations. Based on these criteria, Schools A, B, C, F, G, and K were categorized as *central* organizations, while Schools D, E, H, I, and J were classified as *peripheral* ones.

The data show that the schools' position or status influences how the schools respond to the specific program, resulting in variations across the observed schools. Teachers in favorite schools, who typically serve students with high academic abilities, were generally more reluctant to include children from low-income families, particularly those with much lower academic achievements than those accepted through the regular admission system. As expressed by a teacher in School A,

> "[…] *some of them [the Quota Program's beneficiaries] are clearly different from those accepted through the regular admission; difficult to compete with others. All the teachers [in School A] realize that gap*". (teacher, School A)

Furthermore, a vice-principal in School A confirmed that:

> *"[…] when such children accepted in this school have low national exam scores, the teachers are worried […] that they will not be able to serve them properly. Because of the school's status as a favorite school, we always educate top-tier students who can learn faster. In fact, we very often accept ones with the highest score in the city, or even in the province. That is why some teachers said, 'If possible, we do not have to accept such students [through the Quota Program] who may be a hassle.'" (vice-principal, School A)*

Widely recognized as the competitor of School A, School F also had a similar preference when accepting students. As a favorite school in the city, School F expected the program beneficiaries to consider the school's status when choosing a school. This can be inferred from the statement of a teacher at School F below when explaining why students from disadvantaged backgrounds accepted in the school through the *Quota Program* had relatively good academic achievement.

> *"Such negative cases never occur in School F [meaning that all poor students accepted in School F through the Quota Program successfully passed and moved on to the next grade]. […] They should not consider registering here if their academic score is too low. They must already know the excellence of School F, and they should consider their abilities; [and see] whether they would be able to attend the school." (teacher, School F)*

This indicates that the school actor(s) also determined the school's status and used it as an advantage in selecting their response strategy. Showing off their current students' academic excellence was the school's attempt to influence the program beneficiaries' and outsiders' perceptions of School F as a highly competitive one.

School status or position was also an important aspect considered by School K in selecting a response strategy. This is reflected in the following school principal's statement:

> *"Favorite public schools in the city are always more competitive and vied for children with higher academic achievement. However, because of the [Quota] Program, we are forced to accept children with much lower academic scores. A wide gap inevitably exists in the school: the lowest academic score of students accepted through the regular system reached 36 [the maximum is 40], while those accepted through the Quota Program may only have 20. […] Including such children in a very competitive environment is problematic for teachers when organizing their classes. It is also problematic for such children; they would feel inferior, and so on. This reality is an important consideration for us."* (principal, School K)

Because of the wide gap in academic abilities that resulted from the incompatibility between the existing advantage of the school's position and the beneficiaries' privilege provided by the program, the school's actors employed two strategies to cope. As mentioned, School K adopted an *avoidance* strategy with a *decoupling* tactic in the early years of program implementation but then replaced it later on with a *manipulation* strategy by employing an *influence* tactic. This tactic was done by actively encouraging the local government to make several adjustments to program prescriptions.

In contrast, schools with lower competitive admission or *peripheral* organizations were less resistant to the *Quota Program*. For example, a vice-principal in School E admitted that:

> *"[…] we have been accustomed to teaching students with low academic achievement. Those accepted through the Quota Program are still tolerable […] the achievement gap [between those accepted through the special quota and the regular system] is, sometimes, not so observable." (vice-principal, School E)*

Another vice-principal at School E added their opinion:

> *"Honestly, we always need to motivate students accepted here because this school was not their first choice in the admission process. They typically place the school as either the second or the third option. We are not a favorite school.* […] *The [performance] gap here is not as bad as those in favorite schools.*

[…] Some of them [the low score students accepted through the Quota Program], however, have a bad attitude. We can identify their academic abilities based on their scores in advance [i.e., at the admission process], but how about their attitudes? We only know about it after they have been accepted." (vice-principal, School E)

The statements above imply that school position is a critical determinant in selecting a response strategy, in which teachers and managers working for a non-favorite school indicated a low level of resistance towards the *Quota Program*. The concerns expressed were related to the potential for negative student behaviors rather than low student academic achievements per se.

A teacher at School D was also concerned about the attitude of several students accepted through the *Quota Program*. He said:

"It is fine if they have low academic abilities. However, some of them are troublemakers. That is the problem. […] How can we help them if they do not show commitment to learning, are often absent in the lessons, always get low scores, and fight with other students. If they do not take their learning seriously and continuously make problems, should we continue to help them?" (teacher, School D)

Similarly, a vice-principal of School H mentioned that expelling children is sometimes unavoidable. He argued that:

"[…] children whose grades are low because of their [academic] abilities can still be helped. If their low grades are caused by their negative characters, [such as being] lazy, not respecting their teachers, not being serious with their education, skipping school—then that is a different story. [There are] no other choices anymore." (vice-principal, School H)

In contrast to teachers at favorite schools, those employed at non-favorite schools were more tolerant of students with low academic abilities. The responses exhibited by these schools to the *Quota Program*, therefore, tend to show less resistance.

School position or status can determine the condition of school input, i.e., quality of accepted students, which in turn affects the quality of outcomes. When schools with different statuses compete for outcomes, field position becomes an essential consideration for managing the input. This is reflected below in a statement from the vice-principal at School I.

> *"For parents who emphasize academic achievements for their children, then our school is not their first choice. Their first choice is schools with a higher level in the city[27]. But, in the quota-based admission system, poor children with lower academic abilities tend to avoid such schools. It is our challenge. We need to work harder to increase our students' achievements, despite the lower input. We continue to strive to prove that our school is also the best choice. […] Input [students accepted] and process [learning activities managed by the school] are the two critical factors determining the quality of outcome, however."* (vice-principal, School I)

An *avoidance* strategy with a *decoupling* tactic was adopted by School I to ensure that students accepted through the *Quota Program* were those with acceptable or *tolerable* academic abilities, i.e., quality input. Therefore, it is concluded that the variations in organizations' status in the local field fundamentally contributed to determining actors' perceptions of the *Quota Program* and filtering the organizational responses. This, in turn, resulted in heterogeneous resistance strategies across the field.

7.1.2 Power structure

The second influencing attribute relates to the power balance structure between opponents and proponents of the emerging demand for inclusivity. In the school cases, the principals were aware of the roles expected by the government for the success of the *Quota Program* in their schools. This positioned the principals as the "local/school-level" proponents of the emerging demand for inclusivity, despite their negative perceptions of the program. In each school, however, the principal faced the emerging demand's internal opponent: individuals or groups of teachers.

Schools characterized by a group of teachers (including ones assigned as vice-principals) who counterbalanced the principal's role in decision-making were categorized as schools with a *balanced* power structure. Meanwhile, schools characterized by the absence of such groups were classified as schools with an *unbalanced* power structure, meaning that the principal was the dominant school actor. Seven schools (A, C, D, F, I, J, and K) were categorized as belonging to the

[27] The informant mentioned three other schools: Schools A, F, and G.

former, while the four remaining schools (B, E, G, and H) were categorized as belonging to the latter group.

As quoted below, the School K principal's statement indicated a balanced power structure at the school. He admitted that:

> *"The practice [of rejecting poor students with low academic achievement in the pre-admission process] was a mistake, a bad practice. But I understand the reasons behind it. I must hear teachers' aspirations and understand the difficulties they face." (principal, School K)*

A teacher at School K confirmed that reality by saying that:

> *"As a leader, he [the principal] must hear the aspirations [and the] problems we face. That is a good character of a leader. […] When the principal has doubts, Mr. X [a senior teacher assigned as a vice-principal] always convinces him. […] [For instance], how to deal with students with low abilities—and the Quota Program. He seriously struggled to convey our aspirations to the Head of Education Office, the mayor, and [members of] the local parliament. […] Mr. X has worked for this school for a long time; he is a senior teacher and has more experience. That is why he is assigned as a vice-principal here. Some teachers are comfortable with him because he understands the problems here. […] [Meanwhile], the principal is 'the newcomer' from another school, who is assigned here [by the government], [and it is] his first assignment." (teacher, School K)*

A balanced power structure was also identified at School D. A vice-principal of the school recounted his experience directly protesting the previous principal's acquiescence to the local government's demand. He also made a comparison between the previous and current principals, as quoted below:

> *"Our [new] principal is much better than the previous principal. He always hears us; he can understand us. He is different from the previous principal, who was always submissive and said 'yes' to all the government's demands, [such as] accepting children with much lower [academic] abilities, or children with disabilities. What next? Why can't we say 'no'? [That was what] I said directly to her […] At that time, many teachers had similar worries, and some also protested. […] We were also supported by the school committee chairman, who previously had a high position in the local government. […] Now, the vice-principal of academic affairs always asks the teachers, [i.e.,] homeroom teachers, to evaluate the performance of students accepted through the program. Children who underperformed and were difficult could be expelled*

from the school and sent back to their parents or another school. I agree with him [the vice-principal of academic affairs]. The [current] principal can also understand this. It did not occur in the past. She [the previous principal of School D] was difficult, but we always criticized her." (vice-principal, School D)

Both the open criticism of the former principal and the compliment to the new principal indicates that the teachers as a group of actors balanced the principal's power at this school. Moreover, as mentioned in the interview excerpted above, the new principal tended to allow the practice of expelling the underperformed students—particularly ones with problematic behaviors—which can be categorized as a form of resistance strategy in responding to the *Quota Program*.

Different conditions were found in the schools categorized as ones with an unbalanced power structure, in which the principals were the dominant actor. A statement by the principal of School B confirms such a condition:

"It is a common thing, one or two teachers did not understand, [or tried] to be an outlier […] I just needed to approach them personally. They needed to understand the government's goal. […] It is a public school, a unit of service managed by the government. [Thus], obeying the rules is mandatory." (principal, School B)

A vice-principal at School B confirmed that:

"Previously, in the school meetings, there were always teachers complaining [about the program]. But recently, they do that outside the meeting and only grumble among [themselves as] teachers. That means more people have understood. […] Maybe they hesitate to [criticize] the principal [as] he is a senior teacher from a more favorite school. But I am sure that the complaints remain." (vice-principal, School B).

The principal's domination was perceived negatively by some teachers at this school. For example, as quoted below, a teacher at School B criticized the principal's approach:

"[…] his way in leading the school is really like people who are splitting a large stick of bamboo into two parts by using the traditional way: stepping on the bottom while lifting the top to break it apart. In this case, the teachers are the bottom part. [They are] pressured to follow his desire and, at the same time, his reputation as the principal and the school's position in the city must be raised. … The [Quota] Program itself and its implementation are just

political issues; people in different levels obtained 'points' [seen as person in good standing], the actual benefits. The beneficiaries are not [only] children from poor families who have low academic abilities but also the local mayor. The city can attract more public attention; [and the attention] from the central government because of a positive image in helping poor children. The principals [are also the beneficiaries of the program], particularly those who want to build a positive image." (teacher, School B)

The above statement reflects the unbalanced power structure at School B. Teachers who boldly expressed opposing opinions, including the negative implications of the *Quota Program* and its beneficiaries, were suppressed. Moreover, the informant also criticized the *Quota Program*, which was implicitly perceived as ineffective and benefiting certain people rather than children from low-income families.

Such a condition was also found at School G, another favorite public school in the city. Several of the interviewed teachers mentioned the principal's dominance, indicating that the school had an unbalanced power structure. A teacher assigned as the committee for school admissions characterized the principal's leadership style.

"He has been the school's principal for two periods[28]. Moreover, he has worked at this school for a long time since he was a teacher. He also became a vice-principal several times. [That is why he] really understands the school's conditions. […] He prefers to be accompanied by young vice-principals. Some task forces are also dominated by young teachers, [such as] the school admission committee, curriculum team, and many others. He fully controls these teams. Almost every day, the team leaders are always invited by him to report the work progresses. […] Although there are three vice-principals, he very often supervises the teams directly. […] He just asked me to report the daily data [of school admission], how many children have registered, and about their scores. I did the same things [i.e., providing the oral reports] in the Quota Program, [which] ended last week. We must report the problems we faced. […] When I have doubts, I would consult with him directly. Last week, for instance, I consulted with him first before I made a decision. It was about a poor child who wants to apply through the Quota

[28] Based on the government rule, a principal is assigned to a school for 4 years and can be extended.

Program. The total score is acceptable, but she has a low math score." (teacher, School G)

The above informant pointed out the conditions in which the principal is the dominant actor at the school. The informant's statement implicitly indicated that the principal ensured that the teams consisted of people who could be controlled and fulfill his expectations. During the interviews, a situation that distinguished this school from other observed schools was that almost all interviewed teachers either had just met, had an appointment to meet, or were suddenly called by the principal. Such conditions indicated the principal's dominating power, signaling an unbalanced power structure.

Unbalanced power structures were not only found at favorite schools but also non-favorite ones. School E was a peripheral school characterized by its unbalanced power structure. The principal, who was a senior teacher previously assigned at a favorite school in the city, was the dominant internal actor. The statement below points out the principal's awareness that teachers at the school do not dare to complain or protest openly. This implicitly indicates that he understands his dominant power at the school or firmly expects that all teachers follow his direction.

"It is prevalent for teachers in this school to deal with low-performing students. Only two or three teachers complain about the program, as I heard indirectly from other [teachers]. But they never talk to me directly or in the school meetings. [They would] not dare to do that. It is because I always assert that conforming to the rule is our obligation as civil servant teachers paid by the government." (Principal, School E)

The principal's attitude, which ignored several teachers' complaints regarding the *Quota Program,*[29] reveals the reluctance or unwillingness to listen to teachers' voices. There is no doubt that the principal was required to comply with government demands. However, to ensure that the program was implemented in the school as expected by the government, the school principal consciously

[29] The school principal's dominance was also identified from the *Affirmative Action Program* implementation at School E. None of the teachers interviewed knew the reasons why schools participated in this 'optional' program, and all indicated that it was solely the will of the principal. Despite a number of complaints, the principal also did not provide any opportunity for the teachers to share their experiences in teaching Papuan students at the school.

chose to neglect the teachers' issues rather than encourage teachers' enthusiasm or simply explain the program's rationale. The principal also did not try to figure out the teachers' difficulties and find practical solutions. Moreover, the absence of open protests from teachers indicated that a balance of power in the school did not exist.

A statement of a vice-principal at School E, which frequently quoted the principal's expressions,[30]confirms that the school's power structure was centralized in the principal.

> *"[…] because the criticism was only by a few teachers, the principal told me [things like]: 'just ignore it,' 'it is not significant,' [and] 'the rule is the rule.' All teachers here should understand that this school has become the last choice for students who want to attend public school. We have long been a place for children from poor families and those with low academic abilities. Those are the main characteristics of most students here, honestly. 'We cannot avoid the fact,' the principal always mentions this. After we accept them, it will be seen whether they have the will to learn or not. If they are not serious, cannot be educated, then we can take action. […] We have expelled several children; they were the worst, cannot be helped. […] We are allowed to do that; we have reasons, and [we also have] authority to do that." (vice-principal, School E)*

The informant's statement above also indicates how this unbalanced power determines the school's response to the *Quota Program*, in which the principal played a dominant role in specifying the chosen strategy. The phrase "not significant" used by the principal shows that he has determined the power dynamic between his colleagues. Furthermore, the principal's decision to ignore the teachers reflects his dominant control in the school, i.e., that there was nothing to worry about from the teachers' silent protests. The silent protesters' powerlessness can be inferred from a teacher stating that they no longer submitted complaints knowing the consequences.

[30] The relation between the school principals and vice-principals could indicate the schools' power structure. Three vice-principals in the schools with an unbalanced power structure, i.e., School B, E, G, and H, were appointed and, therefore, tended to be easily controlled by the principals. This tendency differed from that in the seven other schools, where the vice-principals were mostly elected by the teachers to support the principals assigned by the Local Office of Education. The latter tended to be the balancing groups or, at least, could represent the teachers' interests.

The unbalanced power structure in this school can also be recognized from the way some teachers perceive certain questions as sensitive. Some teachers interviewed at this school frequently used short answers, particularly when they were asked about the school's response to the program. Examples include: "It would be better if you ask the principal directly," "that question can only be answered by the principal," or "have you met the principal?" Such answers reveal that these teachers were hesitant to provide information about school-level policy and reluctant to disagree with the principal. These conditions reflect a paternalistic culture, one of the prevalent characteristics of Indonesian bureaucracy, which was influenced by society's cultural values and social structure before and during the colonial periods. To some extent, paternalism still exists today (for further explanations, see Dwiyanto et al., 2006).

7.1.3 The decision-making mechanism

The next key attribute delves into the decision-making mechanism most frequently used by the schools. It was identified that (the principal of) the school used either a *persuasion* mechanism or *command* mechanism. A persuasion mechanism, in which the decision for how to respond to external prescriptions to some degree involved "the exchange of ideas and information in a deliberative manner" (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 9), was identified in Schools F, I, J, and K. As presented later, the selection of response strategies in these schools was not determined unilaterally by the principals but was discussed and agreed upon among the school actors. Consequently, the internal opponents of the demand for inclusivity who could balance the principal's power contributed significantly to the determination of the school's strategy in responding to the *Quota Program*. On the contrary, the principals in the other seven schools typically adopted a command mechanism, in which compliance to demands imposed by higher-level structures was the most preferred practice. In other words, the principals in these seven schools played a dominant role in determining response strategies.

This attribute is closely related to the power structure. Schools with an unbalanced power structure tended to have a command decision-making tradition. However, it was identified that schools with a balanced power structure did not automatically have a persuasion "decision-making" mechanism. Only four schools (F, I, J, and K) were found to have the combination of a balanced power structure

and a persuasion mechanism. In contrast, the rest had a command "decision-making" mechanism.

School K was an example of schools with a persuasion mechanism. A vice-principal (who is more senior than the principal) shed light on how the school decided on the strategy used to respond to *the Quota Program*. The following excerpt highlights the principal's approach in dealing with teachers' complaints about the program:

> *"The principal always mentions that it is a governmental policy [so that] we cannot refuse it. However, he is always willing to discuss with us [and] hear our voices. The [Quota] Program imposes several arrangements, while the school has certain conditions needed to consider in responding to that program. Suggestions, [and] complaints, from the teachers were listened to. We discussed [in order] to find solutions. Finally, that [the avoidance strategy] was adopted as the best [alternative]. It does not mean that we refuse children with low academic achievement who are from low-income families. [We] just gave understandings for such children and their parents. We do not want them to regret their decision to study here."* (vice-principal, School K)

Instead of forcing teachers to comply with all program requirements, the school principal listened to teachers' wishes and grievances and tried to find common ground. Although he was aware that what had been initiated by senior teachers and had been done in the early years of program implementation showed the school's non-compliance with the program, the principal did not try to prevent that resistance tactic.

When asked about this, the principal of School K emphasized the other strategy employed by the school. He said:

> *"I am the principal. I have an obligation to implement each government policy, not only the [Quota] Program. However, I must consider the existing conditions of our school. I need to discuss with the teachers here. I pointed out the policy's purpose and then identified what we should do. […] Schools are government agencies. It is, of course, difficult to refuse policies. I consulted with some senior teachers here [and] vice-principals [as well], and we decided to propose some adjustments to the government to make the Quota Program more acceptable and implementable."* (Principal, School K)

As mentioned in Chapter 5, School K was the only school that adopted a very high resistance strategy. Some school actors, particularly the principal and a vice-principal, actively raised complaints, protested, and even proposed several adjustments to the program prescriptions whenever the opportunity arose.

School F was yet another school with a persuasion 'decision-making' mechanism. As it occurred at School K, decision-making at School F was not dominated by the principal. Almost all the interviewed teachers provided positive testimonies about the principal's management of the school. Although he initiated many new programs and innovations, the initial ideas were always openly presented, and teachers were allowed to discuss and criticize them. Such a democratic approach was also used when the school worked to overcome critical issues. For example, when several teachers complained about the Quota Program, the principal explained the approach as follows:

> *"I told the teachers that it is a government policy with a good purpose, despite its weaknesses. I do understand their complaints because they face such children directly in the classroom. But I continue to show my understanding and motivation to them. Their experiences [and their complaints] became critical inputs for us in deciding what we should do."* (principal, School F)

He then explained his agreement with the teachers regarding the orientation of response strategies adopted by the school. Creativity, effectiveness, and not violating the main rules were mentioned as principles considered in the strategy selection. He noted that:

> *"The key is how to understand teachers' concerns, then try to find the solutions—something effective without breaking the rules. […] The main issue is how to find and attract children from low-income families with an outstanding achievement to enroll in this school; [so that we can] fulfill the quota." (principal, School F).*

The principals' persuasive approach at Schools K and F welcomed the participation of other school actors in decision-making. Consequently, the response strategy selection was influenced by the internal opponent of the demand for inclusivity, i.e., teachers who negatively perceive the *Quota Program*. In these schools, the internal opponents' contribution to specifying response strategies was more significant because they could balance the principal's power. Although such a persuasion mechanism can prevent the escalation of internal conflicts, it may

also increase the possibility of adopting response strategies with higher resistance levels.

In contrast, schools with the combination of a balanced power structure and a command mechanism, i.e., Schools A, C, and D, were observed to have an apparent internal conflict resulting from the intra-institutional contradiction. The statement of a vice-principal at School A, as quoted below, indicates the existence of such a conflict.

> *"The principal was not originally from this school, but from another—non-favorite one*[31]*. […] Many things are entrusted to us [i.e., the vice-principals]. However, on the other side, especially for something related to policies or regulations, the principal becomes very rigid. In meetings, the principal always brings very thick documents of regulations and always says, 'These are the rules, we must do this, not that,' and so on; 'schools only need to implement them.' In this school, we cannot accept that model [that is, the command mechanism]. Hence there were often conflicts because of such a managerial approach."* (vice-principal, School A)

The principal of School A confirmed that an uncompromising attitude was taken to make sure that the *Quota Program's* objectives could be achieved. As expressed below, she had predicted that the local teachers' reluctance would be higher than at other schools.

> *"It has been my task to always remind the teachers here that accepting poor students with low academic achievement is a must. 'Do not reject such students'; that is what I always say to the teachers assigned to be on the admission committee. […] I knew that the school is a favorite one; [consequently], students accepted here must be those with high academic abilities. Many of them are typically from wealthy families. When all the public schools, including this school, are required to accept children from poor families, including those with low academic abilities, teachers in this school reacted negatively. [They are] not allergic to poor students, but students with below-average academic abilities. That is the problem. That is why I am strict; [because] there is indeed a reluctance here. […] When the government transferred me here, I felt something like, […] 'Oh my goodness! God, please give me the strength.'"* (principal, School A)

[31] the informant clearly mentioned the other school in the city.

A similar condition occurred at both Schools C and D. As indicated in Chapter 5, internal conflicts involving the principal and local teachers, particularly those triggered by the intra-institutional contradiction, were observed at these two schools. The principals' command mechanism, particularly in deciding the school's response to the *Quota Program*, was found to have escalated the internal tensions. As a result, these schools' response strategy reflected either a kind of mutual concession or the absence of understanding between the principal and the opposing group(s).

At School A, an *avoidance* strategy with a *decoupling* tactic was only used in the early years of program implementation and then replaced by another strategy, i.e., perception management or filtering at-risk children by emphasizing organizational identity. The *decoupling* tactic was carried out in the former principal's era and continued into the current principal's second year. Under the new principal, the first strategy was adopted when there was no understanding between the principal and the opposing group. The principal was aware of the *decoupling* tactic at the school but was unable to prevent it. Mobilized by several senior teachers, the strategy was employed without the principal's support. As a result, internal conflicts triggered by the intra-institutional contradiction continuously occurred during this time.

The replacement of the first strategy followed a mutual concession between the principal and the opposing group by agreeing that the *decoupling* tactic is a form of violation and will not be practiced anymore. The use of perception management as the alternative response strategy was more acceptable for the principal because of its softer approach. A vice-principal confirmed:

> *"The initiator, a senior teacher, has retired. That [decoupling tactic initiated by the senior teacher] happened a long time ago [2010-2013], which was no longer allowed. […] We want children from poor families with high academic abilities [to choose our school] to fulfill the quota. […] People should not think our school is only for children from rich families. It is okay if children with low scores are reluctant to choose this school. That is good. However, it is dangerous if people still think that this school is a bourgeois school. […] the principal said, 'That is fine.'" (vice-principal, School A)*

The statement, '*it is dangerous…'* indicates *a safe margin* for their resistance to the demand for inclusivity. While the tendency of low-achieving students to avoid

favorite schools is understandable, rejecting children from low-income families could attract public attention and is therefore a riskier course of action.

Similar conditions related to the decision-making mechanism at School C led to a *decoupling* tactic as the first response strategy, which was then replaced by a *concealing* tactic. This approach meant accepting low-achievement students from low-income families without filtering actions and without providing support services for them. The latter was conditioned by a conflict between the principal and internal opponents and represented a mutual concession. A *compromise* strategy with a *balancing* tactic adopted by School D—accepting low-performing children from low-income families and expelling academic underperformers and troublemakers—reflected such a mutual concession. Thus, it can be inferred that the schools that combined a balanced power structure with a command mechanism tended to employ response strategies with low to medium levels of resistance or another strategy with high resistance but a softer approach.

Meanwhile, silent internal conflicts were identified at the remaining four schools (i.e., B, E, G, and H), which combined an unbalanced power structure with a command mechanism. In these schools, teachers who previously criticized the *Quota Program* typically remained silent because of pressures from the schools' principals. As confirmed by the principal at School B:

> *"Teachers' complaints must be solved internally at the school [and] not exposed publicly. […] I approached such teachers to make sure that they understand the importance of this program, that we must accept and serve such students. I knew those [difficulties experienced by teachers because] I still do teaching tasks. But we cannot and are not allowed to reject them. […] I emphasized that we must be wiser in educating them. Do not treat them normally as other students [because] they are different. They have lower academic achievement and tend to feel socially inferior. […] They are from poor families with inadequate learning facilities, so we must understand their lack [of support]. If we only pressure them without giving special support, they will not want to learn here. They will withdraw themselves from school activities, as occurred several times here. But, more importantly, this is the rule we must obey, despite its weakness. We need to compensate for its weakness."* (principal, School B)

This statement reflects the school's primary consideration regarding the *Quota Program*. Previously (2010-2013), this school undertook an *avoidance*

strategy through a *decoupling* tactic but then decreased its resistance level by adopting a *compromise* strategy with a *pacifying* tactic instead. Under the current strategy, School B accepted poor students with low academic scores through the *Quota Program* without any filtering actions and provided several supplementary programs for such students, such as psychological counseling and additional learning services. The school expected that, by providing such supports, the low-ability students could fulfill the school's expected learning outcomes. This strategy represented what the principal wanted to do, even though it meant suppressing criticism and extinguishing internal conflicts.

However, instead of disappearing, such conflicts simply remained out of view, as illustrated by a teacher at School B:

> *"[I] said 'yes' to him (the principal), ended the conversation quickly, and left his room immediately. Many questions are always on my mind, and other teachers have the same questions. […] Sometimes, we meet up just to share what we experienced, [that is] our struggle in teaching students accepted through the quota system. One student always receives very low scores in my subject. I have done many things […], but nothing changes. There is something wrong with the program [and] with the school in accepting them. […] I just do my job professionally [and] control myself during school meetings [and] school evaluations. Evaluations for what? Everything must follow his [the principal's] will. [But even] an ant would get angry when stepped on!"* (teacher, School B)

A similar condition was also found at School G. A vice-principal shared the decision-making mechanism frequently used by the principal while emphasizing that:

> *"[…] here, the principal has absolute power. The vice-principals do difficult tasks, have a difficult position, hear varied voices from teachers, try to accommodate all things, and prepare alternatives. However, the principal often refuses them. […] He wants us to follow the rules, to believe that children [with low academic achievement] know the best fit for them and the risks of their choices. They have [their own] filter, [the school, therefore] does not necessarily need to filter them. […] He said, 'Because the opportunity to choose schools is open, we just need to make sure that people really know School G [and] would not make a mistake in choosing the school." (vice-principal, School G).*

The informant indicated that School G's principal played a dominant role in managing the school, including determining its response to the *Quota Program*. This confirms that, in schools with a command "decision-making" mechanism and unbalanced power structure, the principal alone determined the response strategy. Most strategies adopted were therefore characterized by low-level resistance or high resistance with a softer approach.

7.1.4 Organizational identity

The fourth and fifth attributes identified as the organization-level determinants were related to organizational identity (OI), especially its strength and alignment to the mainstream demand for selectivity. A school was classified as one with a *strong OI* when the school's unique characteristics (i.e., the school's allure) were not only widely realized and expressed by the principal and teachers (insiders) but also well recognized by students before they enrolled at the school (outsiders). Meanwhile, schools were categorized as having *weak OI* when the school's unique qualities were only perceived, or still only aspired, by the principal and some teachers—or it was still an object of debate among the internal community. Schools A, F, G, and I were characterized by a strong OI, while a weak identity was, in contrast, identified in the remaining seven schools.

School A was identified as one with strong OIs. This school's condition is reflected in interviews with teachers and school managers.

> *"The quota [for poor children with low academic performance] annually set by the government is rarely fulfilled [in this school] because they [the target of the program] feel inferior first. ... [They] worry that they would not be able to follow the lessons well. [They must be] feeling inferior because other children accepted through the regular admission have a much higher academic score and can be accepted in prestigious universities […] [In addition] most students here are publicly seen as ones from wealthy families. [That is why] they [the program's beneficiaries] worry that they would struggle to make friends and so forth. […] But, as I know, those in a very small number accepted here [through the Quota Program] were not inferior and could mingle with other students. They do extracurricular [non-academic] activities such as conducting social events, just like other students. In fact, they are not seen as poor students. Despite their lower academic performance, they are generally able to adapt to the school environment. [It is because] they*

already knew the characteristics of our school and realized what they should do to be a successful learner here." (vice-principal, School A)

The above statement indicates that the typical students who dominate School A—ones with high academic abilities, a strong interest in student organizations and non-academic activities, and from wealthy families—have been well recognized by people in the city. As the informant mentioned, when poor children accepted by the school through the *Quota Program* can successfully adapt to the school's social environment, it can be assumed that they had already known the school's characteristics and the consequences of being a student there. In short, poor children enrolling at this school through the *Quota Program* were those ready to attend it, as expected by the teachers and school managers. The school's OI was widely recognized by outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents), confirming its reputation. As presented further in Chapter 8, this is confirmed by students previously categorized as school's outsiders, i.e., prospective students.

School I was also found to possess strong OI. While School A was recognized as a 'secular' public school, School I was widely identified as an 'Islamic' public school. A senior teacher at School I described the characteristic of the school as follows:

"Parents who are religious and want their children to get a good education, that stimulate children not only to be smart but also to be religious, must be choosing this school. Despite our school's status as a public school [or not a faith-based school], many people include our school as a Muhammadiyah school[32]*. This term is initially and widely used by many people outside—[in] the society, not by us. They are enthusiastic […] to send their children here because they expect their children to become polite, obedient, and religious children. A smart child is easier to develop, while educating a child to be a sholeh child (i.e., a religious child) is much more difficult."* (teacher, School I)

School I's popular image as an 'Islamic' school required internal solidity and consistency in managing the school, including its daily activities. What distinguishes School I from other public schools is the shared belief guiding the insiders in operationalizing learning activities at the school. Although it was not a

[32] Private religious schools managed by Muhammadiyah—one of the largest Indonesian Muslim-faith based organization.

formal status, the label of ‘a Muhammadiyah school’ demonstrated that people acknowledged that Islamic values are truly attached to the school’s activities.

School I was also found to have a strong identity with the ambition to become excellent in academic terms, which can be juxtaposed with the label of “favorite” schools in the city. This ambition can be seen in the school's consistent and above-average efforts to increase students’ academic achievements, particularly in the final examination. As presented further in Chapter 8, these extra efforts and their results are advertised to the public to strengthen the school’s attractiveness, although the outcomes still fall short of the school actors’ expectations.

Schools F and G were two other schools with strong OIs. Although it was known as a public school with a social environment characterized by strong Islamic traditions, School F can be differentiated from School I in its academic achievements. School F is consistently categorized as a favorite public school because many of its graduates are successfully accepted at the country’s best universities. Relatively comparable achievements are held by Schools A and G. Excellence in academic achievement has differentiated these three schools (A, F, and G) from other public schools in the city. Furthermore, this characteristic reflects a shared belief that motivates teachers to maintain or even improve school performance.

The remaining seven schools identified as ones with weak OIs had varied conditions, all indicating the early stages of identity emergence processes, following Ashforth’s (2016) categorization of *“I think”* and *“we think”* levels. While an in-depth description of each school OI condition is provided in Chapter 8, two examples of weak OI found at two different schools are briefly described in the following paragraphs.

School’s C claim as a research school was identified as a weak OI, as indicated by its principal:

> *“[The practices as] a school of research may distinguish our school from others that emphasize score-oriented learning, grades, and exams. We do not want to merely pursue academic achievements such as good grades, but rather strengthen students’ understandings through research activities as the main learning program. In the conventional learning model, students find it difficult to understand the lessons because they are only expected to memorize the*

lesson's materials, be successful in the examinations, or receive a high score. Through research-based learning activities, they can learn more deeply and come to greater understandings because they see the real things, not just memorizing learning materials. […] The results [of the research-based learning activities] must be better […] obtain better scores, but it is not the main purpose. Ironically, many teachers [at the school] criticize the research school's essence. If I could choose teachers to be assigned here, [reinforcement of research-based learning practices] would be done more quickly. But, of course, I am not allowed because this is a public school. […] We can only develop what we already have [through] gradual development." (principal, School C)

Teachers' perceptions of the practices of the research school diverged. Some teachers had a criticism (e.g., research activities are beyond the curricula expectations or learning targets; burdening the teachers), while others indicated their lack of understanding (e.g., "*it is only relevant for academic Olympics*[33]") or lack of ability (e.g., *"it requires high creativity, while I only know the standardized learning activities"*). These diverse perceptions indicated that the research school was only the principal's OI aspiration, which was only supported by some teachers but challenged by others. As described in Chapter 8, this identity aspiration was intended to maintain what had been more successfully developed in the past.

A condition found in School K reflected another weak OI. Even though it recently became a favorite school, School K does not have a unique characteristic distinguishing it from other favorites in the city. The principal of the school explained that identity aspirations were still objects of internal debate at the school. Reflecting Ashforth's (2016) "I think" category, School K teachers had numerous identity aspirations.

"Indonesia still has a serious problem associated with public officials and parliament members' corrupt behaviors. So, we want our graduates to be people who are not only academically competent but also have high integrity. That is the idea I continuously communicate with the teachers in order to have mutual understandings and collective actions in developing relevant learning programs. However, the teachers have different aspirations: some want to strengthen students' nationalist and religious characters, while others told me

[33] Academic Olympics here refers the national competitions in various academic subjects, such as math, science, or any other subject, conducted regularly by the government or non-government organizations.

that whatever we choose, it should be intended to strengthen students' academic achievements. It is a challenge [and] we need more time to reach a mutual understanding." (principal, School K).

A weak OI was also found at School J. The school provided a unique entrepreneurship extracurricular, which helped differentiate the public school from others and attract more *Quota Program* beneficiaries. However, the school's special characteristic was still interpreted differently by insiders, as pointed out by a teacher:

"Some teachers enthusiastically run the program, while others criticize it by saying that our general school has turned into a vocational school. Some teachers still have a narrow view that the school's learning program is limited to what is stated and determined by the national curriculum. Based on the [new] 2013 curriculum, the learning activities should be more flexible. For instance, in the economics course, we as teachers may encourage students to learn by practice. So, our 'vocational-like' learning programs are, in my opinion, suitable. Then someone said it could be risky if many children from poor families with low academic abilities favor our school." (teacher, School J)

Regarding the second dimension of OI, i.e., *identity alignment*, it was identified whether or not the identity—established or in current and future development—is aligned with the demand for selectivity. Schools A, C, F, G, I, and K were characterized by the existence of OI (identities or identity aspirations) aligned with the demand for selectivity even though each of these schools emphasizes certain features. The remaining five schools (B, D, E, H, and J), in contrast, were found to have an identity that was either not aligned with the demand for selectivity or even more aligned with the demand for inclusivity.

As described previously, Schools A, F, G, and I had strong OIs related to academic excellence. Consequently, these four schools prefer prospective students with higher academic abilities. It means that the OIs of these schools were more relevant or aligned with the demand for selectivity. Despite their weak condition, identity aspirations emerging and developing in both School C (as a research school) and School K (multiple aspirations, such as a school of integrity or a nationalist, religious school) were still relevant. Additionally, both School C and K did not eliminate the schools' priority of academic excellence. Such identity aspirations would maintain the schools' preference for prospective students with

high academic abilities and are, therefore, more aligned with the demand for selectivity.

Meanwhile, an identity recognized in School B represented one not aligned with the demand for selectivity. Its principal, who was internally perceived as the dominant actor at the school, intentionally promoted the adoption of art-based learning activities. Despite its role as a complementary learning system (not replacing the conventional system), the strengthening of practices linked to this learning model indicated that their learning processes were not focused solely on academic matters. The principal of School B expressed the following approach:

> *"We want to be a public school that is not only academically oriented but also excels in non-academic [areas, such as] art skills. I believe that art-based learning builds positive character [in students]. [In this school], students are encouraged and facilitated to learn and practice Javanese culture*[34] *through* gamelan[35]*, classical dances, and Indigenous language. Javanese culture is […] characterized by typical attitudes and interpersonal relations such as being calm, polite, and peaceful. We want our students to have such positive characters [and] who respect others, by conditioning through Javanese art-based learnings. Although some teachers still [have] doubt, we hope those activities can balance academically-oriented demands. […] society needs to realize that this school produces not only academically intelligent children but also ones with good manners. Other schools often overlook this. […] Life is not only about academic achievement." (principal, School B)*

Since the learning orientation at School B was not solely to achieve high academic scores, the reluctance to accept academically at-risk children was lower. It means the school's OI was more aligned with the demand for inclusivity, despite its weak condition (i.e., characterized by insiders' divergent perception of OI).

School J was also identified as one with an identity not aligned with the demand for selectivity, as indicated by a teacher.

> *"This school is a favorite one for children who are eligible to enroll through the Quota Program. […] We have an attractive program for them. Through this program, we train such children to become entrepreneurs, such as craftsmen or in food-related startups. It is different from programs in*

[34] The culture of the Javanese ethnic group, an Indonesia ethnic with the largest population.
[35] A set of traditional Javanese musical instruments.

vocational schools. Our programs are like extracurricular activities that can be integrated into relevant school lessons. If they cannot continue their study at university, they already have entrepreneurial skills to start their own business. That is why they are interested in joining us." (teacher, School J)

The existence of this special program reflected the school's concern for children from low-income families. Moreover, the school portrayed an identity not aligned with the demand for selectivity because it demonstrated its willingness to accept academically at-risk children. Although it has been running for several years, this program has not yet received full support from all teachers, suggesting that the identity was still in a weak condition.

As presented above, each dimension of OI (i.e., identity strength and alignment) determined the schools' selection of response strategies. When these two dimensions are considered together, as Besharov and Brickson (2016) suggest, it is expected to be a more robust indicator of OI conditions leading to either high or low resistance to the emerging demand. The conditions representing the two dimensions of OI were thus merged into a single condition termed identity-*based resistor*; that is, whether the characteristics of OI strongly resist the emerging demand or not.

Schools A, F, G, and I were categorized as having a strong *identity resistor* as their identities were strong and aligned with the more established demand. The interview excerpts below exemplify a strong *identity resistor* of schools I and A. The two schools' identity was aligned with the demand for selectivity, and insiders had a convergent perception of its core.

"We have a very clear purpose and strategies to preserve it [the school's academic achievement]. The teachers really understand what they should do, and prospective students and their parents recognize this. Those [efforts, achievements, and public recognition] could finally attract more students with higher achievement. […] For children with low academic abilities, particularly those from poor families, [it depends on] how much they want to study hard; the desire to be anak sholeh (i.e., a pious child). […] The school can consider it." (vice-principal, School I).

"People see School A as a favorite, always sought after by high-performing children from within and outside the city. This [school status] is firmly attached to society. … However, unlike those of School F and other favorite

schools in the city, our students are not interested in the OSN[36]. The children here are more interested in self-development activities, fostering leadership, and organizational skills. That is why we emphasize that 'leadership' is the identity of our school. It is relevant to the students' interest and to strengthen student excellence. The teachers here provide more spaces and opportunities for children to develop themselves through student organizations and extracurricular activities. We do not restrict and require them to only focus on academic matters. [...] [The teachers] already understand the characteristics and orientation of our students. That is what makes them more attracted to School A than other public schools. However, please do not think that we want students here to have a strong interest in leadership and organizations, while their academic abilities are weak. Academic ability remains the basic requirement to succeed here." (vice-principal, School A)

The statements above implicitly point out how a strong *identity resistor* fostered school actors' intentions and preferences in school admission, namely, to attract more prospective students with higher academic abilities and/ or to avoid academically at-risk children, including the *Quota Program's* target group. Chapter 8 presents and elaborates on how the school actors strategically manage organizational perceptions in particular ways to maintain their preferences.

Conversely, a school is included in the group of schools with a weak *identity resistor* if and when: a) it has an identity that is characterized as both weak and aligned with the established demand for selectivity (Schools C, H, and K); b) it has an identity that is both weak and aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity (Schools B, D, E, and J); or c) it has an identity that is both strong and aligned with the demand for inclusivity (no observed cases).

Statements by a teacher and a vice-principal at School H below indicate a weak *identity resistor.* Although the local government has officially assigned the school to provide special classes for children who excel in a particular non-academic field, the informant was concerned that an inappropriate image of the school could form.

[36] OSN refers to the Indonesia National Science Olympiad, an annual science competition for Indonesian students held by the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture.

"Wrongly, people identify our school as one with excellent non-academic achievements[37]*. Some of us [teachers] enjoy the label, but many others do not. […] It has decreased the school's ranking; we have so many talented students in that field with low academic performance. […] We want another, more appropriate, more advantageous label to highlight something different from other public schools, which encourages us to increase our [academic] ranking. Divergent ideas [about school identity] have been contested." (teacher, School H)*

Differences in teachers' perceptions and aspirations about the school's organizational identity clearly point out a weak condition regarding its OI. A vice-principal at the same school added the following:

"The group of social science teachers raised an important aspiration; [that is] expecting this school to have excellent academic achievements in social studies, in school competitions [and] in student scores in the national exams. […] Some of our graduates were also successfully accepted by UGM, [one of the prestigious public HEIs in Indonesia], in Social and Political Sciences, the Faculty of Law, and the Faculty of Cultural Studies. […] That indicates the school's academic achievement. While the favorite schools in this city excel in the natural sciences, maybe we can have an advantage in social studies in the future. When more children who are interested in social studies join us, that will be a possibility. However, we know such students are inappropriately but commonly perceived as 'second class citizens,' students with lower academic abilities [comparing to those who excel in the natural sciences], and so on. That is the challenge." (vice-principal, School H).

In the above quotations, both informants highlighted several points that indicate a preference for academic matters.

Another informant at School H, a senior teacher, provided information about the school's history, highlighting that it was a part of a favorite school in the city well recognized for its academic excellence. By highlighting the story, the informant signaled that the prevalent identity aspiration emerging at this school was about academic excellence and, thus, more aligned with the demand for selectivity.

Such a school preference can also be inferred from two other schools (C and K) with the same identity-based resistor conditions. Weak OIs trying to be

[37] The informant mentioned a specific field. At the beginning of the interview—before recorded, he mentioned that the number of the special classes is only two.

developed, or re-developed, at these two schools aligned with the institutional demand for selectivity. There are two potential implications of such conditions. First, the OI may or may not attract the most desirable prospective students, depending on the public's recognition of the school's OI (see Chapter 8). Second, the OI could not be managed to block most undesirable students, meaning that other resistance strategies ranging from low to very high are required (see Table 7.1; the results of csQCA; and Chapter 8).

The remaining four schools (B, D, E, and J.) also had a weak *identity resistor* with different configurations, namely, a weak OI that was not aligned with the institutional demand for selectivity (or more aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity). Because of OI's internal divergent perceptions (the OI's weak condition), the OI's alignment with the institutional demand for inclusivity could not prevent the schools' resistance to *the Quota Program*. Despite the School B principal's desire to strengthen its identity as the (Javanese) art school, internal resistance to the *Quota Program* was still observed.

> *"I believe that there are no unintelligent people. Many children have bad behaviors, but [they are] not stupid, I am sure. They are just crying out for attention, … [and] need recognition for their existence; [They are] full of energy. We just need to channel their energy toward positive activities. We chose art-learning activities for that purpose. When they can be managed, they calm down, and then we can effectively educate them. That takes time, of course. […] That is why I said, 'It is no problem for us to accept such children.' I believe that they can be managed. […] Maybe in small numbers at first. […] because some teachers still do not understand [and] question its relevance." (principal, School B).*

The principal's identity aspiration—which had been operationalized into school programs and activities—has not yet received full support from the teachers. The above excerpt also implicitly infers that School B's weak identity resistor led to the adoption of a low resistance strategy in responding to the *Quota Program*, as described in Chapter 5.

Table 7.1. below summarizes the organizational attributes described above. By pairing the attributes to each school's resistance level (as presented in Chapter 5), organizational attributes' roles in specifying school resistance levels can be identified and categorized. A closer look at the data indicates that these public schools' divergence in resistance levels was caused by differences in their

organizational attributes. Furthermore, as described above, schools with specific organizational attributes tended to have certain resistance levels, suggesting that the attributes played their role in combination(s) rather than individually. Based on these findings, the next section presents a systematic analysis to identify the role of organizational attribute configurations in determining resistance levels.

Table 7.1 Organizational Attributes and Resistance Levels of the Schools

Schools	**Organizational Attributes**						**Resistance levels**
	Status or Position	***Power structure***	***Decision-making mechanism***	***Identity strength***	***Identity alignment***	***Identity-based resistor***	
School A	Central	Balanced	Command	Strong	Aligned	Strong	High
School B	Central	Unbalanced	Command	Weak	Not aligned	Weak	Low
School C	Central	Balanced	Command	Weak	Aligned	Weak	Medium
School D	Peripheral	Balanced	Command	Weak	Not aligned	Weak	Low
School E	Peripheral	Unbalanced	Command	Weak	Not aligned	Weak	Low
School F	Central	Balanced	Persuasion	Strong	Aligned	Strong	High
School G	Central	Unbalanced	Command	Strong	Aligned	Strong	High
School H	Peripheral	Unbalanced	Command	Weak	Aligned	Weak	Low
School I	Peripheral	Balanced	Persuasion	Strong	Aligned	Strong	High
School J	Peripheral	Balanced	Persuasion	Weak	Not aligned	Weak	Medium
School K	Central	Balanced	Persuasion	Weak	Aligned	Weak	Very high

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

7.2 Organizational Attribute Configurations for High and Low Resistance

A more systematic comparison using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) was undertaken to identify general patterns throughout the cases (Marx, Cambre´, & Rihoux, 2013; Marx & Duşa, 2011). The analysis processes and results are presented below.

7.2.1 Preparing the data

As the basis of the csQCA analysis, a dichotomous data table summarizing the qualitative data of conditions (i.e., the identified organizational attributes) and outcomes (i.e., resistance levels) was built based on within-case insights captured from interviews and secondary data. Because the outcome or dependent variable considered here (i.e., the levels of resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity; symbolized as "R") were originally classified into four levels, it was necessary to transform them into dichotomous data as required by csQCA (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). This was done by merging the very high and high resistance levels into the broader category *high resistance* (coded as "1"). In comparison, the low and moderate levels of resistance were recategorized into the broader category *low resistance* (coded as "0"). The recategorization resulted in the cases being split into five high-level resistance schools (Schools A, F, G, I, and K) and six other schools with low-level resistance (Schools B, C, D, E, H, and J).

As mentioned, two attributes related to organizational identity (OI), i.e., OI strength and OI alignment, have been merged into a single, composite one named *identity-based resistor* or *identity resistor*. Given the small number of the observed cases (11 schools), as suggested by Berg-Schlosser and Meur (2009), this merger is also required in the use of csQCA to keep the number of factors (traditionally called conditions in QCA terminology; see Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) quite low. There are, therefore, four organizational attributes considered as the conditions leading to either low or high resistance level, including *organization position* or *status*, *power balance structure*, *decision-making mechanism*, and *identity resistor*.

Regarding *organization position* or *status* in the local field (symbolized as "P"), each school was categorized as either a *central* organization (coded as "1") or *peripheral* organization (coded as "0"). The second influencing attribute was the *power balance structure* between opponents and proponents of the emerging demand for inclusivity (symbolized as "B"). Schools with a *balanced power structure* are coded as "1," while those with an *unbalanced power structure* are coded as "0." The third attribute is about the schools' *decision-making mechanism* (symbolized as "M"). The schools were classified into two: the ones in which the principal used either the *persuasion mechanism* (coded as "1") or the *command mechanism* (coded as "0"). The last condition is *identity resistor*, differentiating

the schools into two groups, i.e., ones with a strong *identity resistor* (coded as "1") or with a weak *identity resistor* (coded as "0").

Following the csQCA protocol, the necessity and sufficiency analyses are carried out based upon a truth table that presents certain combinations of conditions related to a given outcome representing both observed cases and non-observed cases or logical remainders (Rihoux & Mour, 2009). The Tosmana software program (Cronqvist, 2016) processed the data of the resistance levels (the outcome) and the four organizational attributes (the conditions) of the schools observed (the cases) into the truth table that makes their relationship more apparent. The number of logically possible configurations in the truth table is automatically determined by the formula "2^k," where k is the number of conditions (Grofman & Schneider, 2009). In this thesis, k represents the number of organizational attributes assessed. Thus, the truth table here consists of 2^4, that is, 16 logically possible configurations (see Table 7.2).

The truth table reveals that, out of 16 logically possible combinations, five are linked as the conditions for high resistance schools (R = 1, rows 1–5), and six others are linked to low resistance schools (R = 0, rows 6–10). Despite having 11 schools in the data set, the truth table also revealed that not all logically possible combinations are empirically observed, known as "the logical remainders" (Rihoux & Mour, 2009), i.e., the six cases in rows 11–16. These six logical remainders were plausible or *could* exist in reality and thus could be included in the analysis (for a more detailed argument, see Meur et al., 2009).

Table 7.2 Truth Table of High Resistance Schools and the Four Conditions

Row	Conditions				Outcome		
	P	**B**	**M**	**I**	**R**	***n***	**Case Labels**
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	School F
2	1	1	0	1	1	1	School A
3	1	1	1	0	1	1	School K
4	1	0	0	1	1	1	School G
5	0	1	1	1	1	1	School I
6	0	0	0	0	0	2	Schools E and H
7	1	0	0	0	0	1	School B
8	1	1	0	0	0	1	School C
9	0	1	1	0	0	1	School J
10	0	1	0	0	0	1	School D
11	0	0	1	0	*remainder*	0	-
12	0	0	0	1	*remainder*	0	-
13	0	0	1	1	*remainder*	0	-
14	0	1	0	1	*remainder*	0	-
15	1	0	1	0	*remainder*	0	-
16	1	0	1	1	*remainder*	0	-

Note: P = central position/ elite status; B = balanced power structure;
M = persuasion "decision-making" mechanism; I = strong *identity resistor*;
R = high resistance school

7.2.2 Analyzing the configurations

The necessity and sufficiency of the four organizational attributes leading to either high or low resistance levels were assessed using a counterfactual analysis. By using the Tosmana software program, the csQCA sequentially produces both descriptive formulas (reflecting the configurations of conditions based on the empirical cases) and parsimonious formulas (reflecting the logically possible configurations resulted from the inclusion of the non-observed cases in the analysis), which are considered to interpret the findings (Rihoux & Mour, 2009). The latter shows combinations of organizational attributes considered the necessary and sufficient conditions that would lead to high or low resistance. Table 7.3 shows the two steps of csQCA analysis with Boolean algebra to obtain the intended formulas, representing the results of encapsulating the information in the truth table.

Table 7.3 The Stages of Configurational Analysis

Steps		Results
1	Using Tosmana Program for minimizing the configurations leading to each of the two outcomes (without logical remainders)	1a. the descriptive formula for the *high resistance* outcome P*B*M + B*I*M + P*I*m → R (Schools F, K) (Schools F, I) (Schools A, G)
		1b. the descriptive formula for the *low resistance* outcome i*m + p*B*i → r; it can be reduced into i (m + p*B) (Schools B, C, D, E, H) (Schools D, J)
2	Using Tosmana Program for minimizing the configurations leading to each of the two outcomes (with logical remainders)	2a. the parsimonious formula for the *high resistance* outcome I + P*M → R (Schools A, F, G, I) (Schools F, K)
		2b. the parsimonious formula for the *low resistance* outcome p*i + i*m → r; can be reduced into i (p + m) → r (Schools D, E, H, J) (Schools B, C, D, E, H)
Main conventions and operations of Boolean algebra (Rihoux & Mour, 2009): • The uppercase letter represents the "1" value for the binary variables (see Table 7.2). • The lowercase letter represents the "0" value for the binary variables (see Table 7.2). • The multiplication symbol (*) represents logical "AND." • The addition symbol (+) represents a logical "OR." • The arrow (→) expresses the (usually causal) link between a configuration of conditions and the outcome.		

Formula 1a shows that a high resistance level to the emerging demand (R) is demonstrated by schools with the following combinations:

- Combination 1: a *central position* in the field (P), a *balanced power structure* (B), and a *persuasion "decision-making*" *mechanism* (M); or
- Combination 2: a *balanced power structure* (B), a strong *identity resistor* (I), and a *persuasion "decision-making" mechanism* (M); or
- Combination 3: a *central position* (P) with a strong *identity resistor* (I) and a *command mechanism in decision-making* (m).

These long descriptive formulas present the observed empirical cases and cannot be reduced into simpler ones. Therefore, the next step of the analysis was to consider non-observed cases or logical remainders to obtain a parsimonious

formula presenting the configuration of conditions leading to high resistance (Formula 2a).

The result shows that a high level of resistance is present in schools with the following combinations (see Figure 7.1, presenting the categorization of the schools based on their resistance level and condition configurations):

- Combination 4: a *strong identity resistor* (I), i.e., a composite condition consisting of two conditions of organizational identity (i.e., *identity strength* and *identity alignment*); or
- Combination 5: a *central position* in the field (P) and a *persuasion "decision-making" mechanism* (M).

Figure 7.1 Venn Diagram of the High Resistance Schools' Configurations



Note: the figure was produced by the visualizer tool, TOSMANA 1.5.2 software.

Meanwhile, as presented in Formula 1b (Table 7.3), the low-level resistance schools were characterized by the following combinations:

- Combination 6: a *weak identity resistor* (i) and a *command "decision-making" mechanism* (m); or
- Combination 7: a *peripheral position* (p) with a *balanced power structure* (B) and a *weak identity resistor* (i).

Based on the observed cases, these descriptive configurations show that field position is not a necessary condition for low-level resistance. Two schools with an

elite status or a central position were found to be adopters of low resistance strategies. These two configurations were then reduced into "i (m + p*B)," in which a weak *identity resistor* seems to act as a necessary condition for *low resistance*, yet not as a sufficient condition per se as it always needed to be combined with other attributes. By including the logical remainders (or the non-observed cases) in the analysis, the minimization operator run by Tosmana simplified the descriptive formula into a minimal solution containing configurations of organizational attributes leading to low-level resistance (Formula 2b). It shows that a low-level resistance is conditioned by the following combinations (see Figure 7.2 presenting the categorization of the schools based on their resistance level and condition configurations):

- Combination 8: a *peripheral field position* and a *weak identity resistor*
- Combination 9: a *weak identity resistor* and a *command mechanism in decision-making*.

A weak *identity resistor* is identified as the only necessary condition for a *low-level resistance* to occur. However, as presented by the simpler formula "i (p + m)," this attribute was found not to be a sufficient condition for promoting low-level resistance and thus needed to be combined with two other attributes, namely: *peripheral position* in the field (p) and *command tradition in decision-making* (m).

Figure 7.2 Venn Diagram of the Low Resistance Schools' Configurations



Note: the figure was produced by the visualizer tool, TOSMANA 1.5.2 software.

7.2.3 Evaluating the results

The fit of the QCA results to the underlying data can be assessed by measuring their consistency and coverage (Ragin, 2006). The consistency measurement is done by calculating the proportion of the cases with a given condition or configuration of conditions (X), which are stated in the solution formulas produced by the software program and are followed by the occurrence of a particular outcome to all cases with that exact condition or combination of conditions (Y) (Grofman & Schneider, 2009). A high consistency score (> 75 percent or 0.75; see Ragin, 2006) indicates that a causal condition or combination of conditions is necessary for a particular outcome to occur. Meanwhile, the coverage measurement only makes sense when applied to conditions identified as consistent and sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2006). The coverage score indicates the proportion of cases with a particular path to the outcome (X) to the total cases with the outcome (Y). Grofman and Schneider (2009, p. 665) suggest that "the higher the coverage score for X, the more cases displaying Y are covered by this sufficient condition."

Table 7.4 shows that all four cases with a strong *identity resistor* also display a high level of resistance as the outcome; thus, the consistency of a strong *identity resistor* as the condition for a high resistance is one hundred percent, meaning entirely consistent. As mentioned earlier, an *identity resistor* is a composite condition representing two single conditions: identity strength and identity alignment. Therefore, a strong *identity resistor* in Track 1 cannot be seen as a single condition and should be viewed as a compound condition of a *strong organizational identity* aligned with the more established institutional demand. The combination of *central position* (P) and *persuasion in decision-making* (M) in Track 2 was also found to have perfect consistency as a sufficient combination of conditions for a high-resistance outcome. It demonstrates that the evidence is consistent with the argument that the two set-theoretical relations exist. However, Track 1 has a higher unique coverage score (60 percent) than Track 2 (20 percent). Therefore, it is substantial to indicate the fit of the connection between a strong *identity resistor* as a necessary and sufficient condition with high resistance as an outcome.

Table 7.4 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for High Resistance

Crosstab Showing "I" as a Sufficient Condition for High-Resistance School (Track 1)	Not I	I	
Not R	6	0	6
R	1	4	5
	7	4	N = 11
		Consistency of "I" (4/4 = 100%) Raw coverage of I (4/5 = 80%) Unique coverage of I (5/5 - 2/5 = 60%)	
Crosstab Showing "P*M" as a Sufficient Condition for High-Resistance School (Track 2)	Not P*M	P*M	
Not R	6	0	6
R	3	2	5
	9	2	N = 11
		Consistency of "P*M" (2/2 = 100%) Raw coverage of P*M (2/5 = 40%) Unique coverage of P*M (5/5 - 4/5 = 20%)	
Crosstab Showing the combinations (I or P*M) as a Sufficient Condition for High-Resistance School	Not (I or P*M)	I or P*M	
Not R	6	0	6
R	0	5	5
	6	5	N = 11
		The solution consistency (5/5 = 100%) The solution coverage (5/5 = 100%)	

Note: I = *strong identity resistor* (a composite condition); P*M = the combination of central position and *persuasion "decision-making" mechanism*; R = high-level resistance.

Similarly, the result of the same measurement for the sufficient conditions potentially leading to the low resistance level, as presented in Table 7.5, shows that both tracks have a consistency score of one hundred percent as sufficient configurations for low-resistance schools. However, the unique coverage score of Track 2 (i.e., the combination of *weak identity resistor* and *command "decision-making" mechanism*) is higher than that of Track 1 (i.e., the combination of peripheral position and weak *identity resistor*). The consistency measure results indicate that the set-theoretical argument, i.e., *that the combination of a weak identity resistor and a command style of decision-making is necessary for low-level resistance*, is entirely supported by the representative cases. The coverage measure also ensures that the combination covers a substantial number of cases with low-resistance practice. Therefore, it is substantial enough to show that the set-theoretic relation of the combination of the two conditions and the low resistance practice exists.

Table 7.5 Consistency and Coverage of Conditions for Low Resistance

Crosstab Showing the combination "p*i" as a Sufficient Condition for Low-Resistance School (Track 1)	Not p*i	p*i	
Not r	5	0	5
r	2	4	6
	7	4	N = 11
		Consistency of "p*i" (4/4 = 100%) **Raw coverage of p*i (4/6 = 66.6%)** **Unique coverage of p*i (6/6 - 5/6 = 16.6%)**	
Crosstab Showing the combination "i*m" as a Sufficient Condition for Low-Resistance School (Track 2)	Not i*m	i*m	
Not r	5	0	5
r	1	5	6
	6	5	N = 11
		Consistency of "i*m" (5/5 = 100%) **Raw coverage of i*m (5/6 = 83.3%)** **Unique coverage of i*m (6/6 - 4/6 = 33.3%)**	

Crosstab Showing the combinations (p*i or i*m) as a Sufficient Condition for Low-Resistance School	Not (p*i or i*m)	p*i or i*m	
Not r	5	0	5
r	0	6	6
	5	6	N = 11
		Solution consistency (6/6 = 100%) **Solution coverage (6/6 = 100%)**	

Note:
p*i : the combination of peripheral position and weak *identity resistor*.
i*m : the combination of weak *identity resistor* and *command "decision-making" mechanism*.
r : low resistance level.

In summary, the above analysis revealed the different ways in which organizational attributes play a prominent role in specifying the levels of organizational resistance to a controversial emerging demand imposed by an institutional actor. A strong *identity resistor* was identified as the necessary and sufficient (composite) condition for high-level resistance, while a weak *identity resistor* and a *command mechanism* as the combination of conditions and a low-level resistance as the outcome were found as a set-theoretic relation. These two set relations of high and low resistance exhibit an asymmetric causality, i.e., the path to each outcome is not identical, as emphasized by QCA (Ragin, 2006, 2008). Showing an *equifinality* (Fiss et al., 2013; Marx & Duşa, 2011; Ragin, 2006), there is an alternate path with a combination of conditions for each outcome. It is therefore clear, as first hypothesized, that organizational attributes do play a significant role when combined rather than as separate (single) attributes. However, based on the csQCA results characterized by an asymmetric causality and an *equifinality*, the hypothesis stating that an *identity-based resistor* is the key attribute needs to be modified for further assessment in future studies (for a more detailed suggestion, see Rohlfing, 2012).

Chapter 8

Zooming in the Identity-based Response Strategy

Like many other public schools at the senior secondary level across Indonesia, the observed schools compete for the most desirable prospective students—and they continuously strive to attract such high performers. A strategy commonly used by these schools is to resort to organizational perception management, i.e., by developing school reputation or image. However, in the special context of facing the intra-institutional contradiction of school admission (selectivity vs. inclusivity), such a strategy was also intentionally used to discourage undesirable prospective students (i.e., academically at-risk children). This response reflects a resistance strategy to the emerging demand for inclusivity, which was perceived as controversial. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this tactic represents high resistance. The schools adopting this tactic expressed their identity by signaling an alignment with the long-institutionalized practice of competition-based admission and its incompatibility with the inclusion expectation. Moreover, the tactic indicated that the adopters embraced the long-existing institutional expectation while resisting the *Quota Program* or the manifestation of an emerging institutional demand perceived as controversial.

This chapter presents and discusses variations in the schools' efforts to manage external perceptions, particularly those categorized as the intentional responses to the controversial demand. Furthermore, it elaborates on the influence of organizational identity-image configurations on the orientation of perception management strategies. Schools with the opportunity to employ perception management as a resistance strategy can be recognized based on their organizational identity conditions. Moreover, this can also explain why other schools with certain organizational perceptions still require another resistance strategy.

8.1 Organizational Perception Management by the Schools

Four variations in the orientation of perception management practiced by the observed schools were identified: a) both attracting and blocking; b) attracting but not blocking; c) not attracting but blocking; and d) neither attracting nor blocking. These variations were structured based on insiders' and outsiders' perceptions of the schools, which will be explained in the next subsection.

Figure 8.1 presents both the configurations of organizational perceptions and the variations in the orientations of employing perception management. Four schools (A, F, G, and I) were identified as managing their organizational image to block, or deter, undesirable prospective students. In comparison, the seven other schools' perception management either was not oriented toward or could not hinder such students. Interestingly, substantial differences between schools in each category, particularly as regards their attractiveness to prospective students, were found. As explained below, these variations are determined by the strength of the *identity resistor* and the congruence of internal-external perceptions.

Figure 8.1 The Orientations of Perception Management

	Congruent Internal-External Perceptions	**Incongruous Internal-External Perceptions**
Strong *Identity resistor*	(School A, F, *G*) **Attracting + Blocking** (attractive-blocker intended image)	(School I) **Not attracting + Blocking** (unattractive-blocker intended image)
Weak *Identity resistor*	(School C, *B, K, J)* **Attracting + Not Blocking** (open-attractive intended image)	(School E, *H, D*) **Not attracting + Not blocking** (open-unattractive intended image)

Source: Own compilation, 2021.

8.1.1 Attracting and blocking

Organizational images, both attracting the most desirable prospective students and deterring the undesirable ones, were identified at three schools (School A, F, and G). In these schools, school actors were attentive regarding the expectations of both existing "customers" (i.e., students and their parents represented by the school committee) and outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents) in order to preserve the school identity as the high performing school in the city. The principal at School F, for instance, explained this reasoning:

> *"The members of the school committee also play their role as school advertisers. They help us to spread positive information about the school to the public. […] If we can satisfy their demand regarding the number of our graduates who are accepted to medical school (i.e., one of most favorite programs in universities), [for instance], they would tell the public that the school is great. As a result, parents who want to send their children to such programs at universities would choose our school [to achieve their goal]." (principal, School F)*

School actors in these schools, therefore, consistently maintained an image based on what external stakeholders expected (i.e., a construed external image). To preserve the organizational image as the best schools in the city, the three schools more focused on the "indicator" used by the public, rather than by the government, in measuring school performance: the number of graduates accepted at public HEIs through the *SNMPTN*, based on academic achievements during senior high school period. In this case, the government's school performance parameter, i.e., the school-level average of national final exam scores, was less important to these three schools. At Schools A and G, strategies were based on early identification and mapping students' interests in certain public HEIs and their study programs. To increase their acceptance in HEIs, students were guided into suitable study programs by considering their existing academic achievements. Furthermore, the schools compiled and arranged students interested in the most popular study programs to avoid internal competition. The principal at School G explains further:

> *"We need to avoid internal competition among our students so that we could have a higher number of students accepted through SNMPTN[38]. Prospective students and their parents will primarily look at school's achievement on SNMPTN, rather than the average scores (i.e., school-level average) of national exams, as the main consideration in choosing a school."* (principal, School G)

Disseminating information about school achievement has been a central action of organizational perception management. These three schools used similar strategies to influence public audiences' perceptions of the school, that is, by exposing the school achievements. As a senior teacher at School A noted:

> *"We shared our achievements in a meeting with the school committee members and parents. We pointed out the number of our graduates accepted at UGM, UI, ITB— [the three best HEIs in Indonesia]. They would then circulate such information to the general public so that everyone knows [the quality of our school]. Almost all applicants choose School A because of this."* (teacher, School A)

A vice-principal at School A added that, through social media, they share whatever they are proud of, such as students winning national or international competitions. Such achievements have become a magnet for the school, as indicated by a student when telling her experience: *"*Everyone, like junior-high-school teachers, already know that Schools A and F were the great paths to the best universities. [Therefore,] we were directed to [choose] these schools."

By repeatedly signaling the school's reputation (and image) to outsiders, school actors intentionally worked to attract the most desirable prospective students. When the schools were required to accept a certain number of children from low-income families, these three schools used perception management to attract children from such families with remarkable academic achievements and prevent low-performing ones. To accomplish this, School F empowered a student council or group of students to organize social and/or academic events targeting

[38] SNMPTN is one of nationally integrated systems of public university entrance in which the selection is based on academic achievements of participants during their study period in senior high school.

junior high school students. In these events, student committees were given the perfect opportunity to sell their school to prospective students.

Moreover, the schools use such events to especially attract the most desirable group of prospective students. A student who was a coordinator of such an educational event in School F explained that the event organizer always did *jemput bola* to make the list of potential participants of the events, including those from low-income families. *Jemput bola*, an original term used by the informant, refers to being proactive in looking for the best students by giving special invitations to the top junior-high-school students from favorite schools in the city. The informant mentioned that 60 percent of the participants were priority guests and thus free of charge, while the rest were general registrants who needed to buy tickets to participate. They were provided with all information about the school during the event: the school's achievements (including the data of graduates accepted to favorite HEIs), facilities, and academic and non-academic programs.

This approach has always attracted the most desirable prospective students, who felt challenged and motivated to join such schools. However, at the same time, such actions also created more anxiety for low-performing children to engage in such a highly competitive environment. Those from disadvantaged families with high academic scores but low self-esteem were particularly persuaded to register through the *Quota Program*. As noted by a teacher counselor at School G:

> *"In our school, the number of applicants in the Quota Program was very often low. The applicants were only those who realized the challenges they would experience here, and they mostly had high academic scores".* (teacher, School G)

Another teacher added,

> *"Some of them [poor children with solid academic achievement] were great, actually. They lacked confidence and needed to be convinced to join us. They had the [academic] ability. I know at least two ex-students who were accepted into public universities. That is the proof [that] they can survive. […] Not always, but in some cases. We just need to look for such children. […] The [Quota] Program should help such students [albeit] more selectively."* (a teacher, School G)

Meanwhile, those students who have the same right to benefit from the *Quota Program* but have lower academic performance were left feeling hesitant, as experienced by a student at School D:

> *"I participated in several events held by different schools, i.e., Schools A, F, and J. Actually, I wanted to continue my study at School A. After knowing what the school looks like [exactly], I was reluctant to enroll there. The students must be clever children, and many of them seem to be from wealthy families. When I attended the event, I felt insecure after watching their presentations, video displays, and stories. […] I finally decided to choose another school, although my parents tried to persuade me to enroll there through the quota scheme." (student, School D)*

8.1.2 Attracting but not blocking

Perception management actions producing organization images that attracted desirable prospective students without blocking others were observed at four schools: School B, C, K, and J. The first three schools were categorized as belonging to the second tier of favorite schools, while the fourth was on the upper tier of the least favorite schools in the city. They were attractive not only because of their position in the field but also because school actors took symbolic actions to affect public perceptions of the schools. What differentiated these schools from the previous group of schools was that their public image did not block the Quota Program's target group. A vice-principal at School B explained why and how the school creates its identity as an arts and culture school:

> *"[…] it is impossible to compete with them [Schools A, F, and G] on the academic front. [...] Students with top academic scores would always choose them. Therefore, we look for another interesting field. The school of art and culture was chosen because we won art competitions several times, such as karawitan [Javanese song], [and] traditional dance. The school also has relatively complete facilities to support students in learning art, the Javanese art[39]. […] We always expose our skills so that many children and parents see and like them. We are here not only to master science or to pursue high academic scores. We need a balance, and we are prepared for it. I believe that practicing the arts can stimulate our motor skills and sensitivity, which is important for developing multiple intelligences." (vice-principal, School B)*

[39] The informant showed the set of gamelans—Javanese traditional music instruments.

While School B worked to develop its new identity and image, organizational actors at School C tried to preserve its construed external image as a "research school." As one of the favorite schools in the city, School C has distinguished its identity from other (favorite) schools by having students learn through research activities. For several years, the school successfully attracted prospective students, especially those interested in academia, by advertising how research activities can make education a more engaging process. However, the sustainability of this strategy depends on initiators and key supporters. A teacher at School C, who was a member of the admissions committee, depicted a history of the strategy's development and the challenges to nurture it:

> *"When Mr. R (the initiator's initial) was here, the practices of the research school were great. Students participated in both national and international [research] competitions. Teachers were also encouraged to develop and practice research-based learning activities. […] However, now it is difficult to continue such good practices [since the government transferred Mr. R to another school]. […] The good thing is that it is still embedded in people's memory. Some of the applicants and parents asked me: 'What does the research school really mean? Do the students learn in the labs every day?' I really liked such questions, as it shows that they support the idea of the research school. However, it is much tougher to preserve this identity. […] [Since teachers rotate frequently], not all of them have recently supported it. However, the identity must be preserved. It makes our school attractive." (teacher, School C)*

Meanwhile, organizational actors at School J also exercised what they claimed as their (new) identity, which differentiated them from other public senior secondary schools. To compete, especially with other non-favorite schools and attract prospective students with slightly higher academic performance, School J developed a new identity as a "school for entrepreneurs." A teacher at School J described the following:

> *"What differentiates us from many other public senior secondary schools is our entrepreneurship programs. Besides providing learning programs as regulated by the curriculum, we also invite students to learn how to make cookies or handicrafts and then sell them creatively. Not every student will continue their studies at university, of course. [That is why] we prepare them to face that possibility so that they have hope and another opportunity to be successful in the future." (teacher, School J)*

By piquing the interest of children from low-income families, School J could gather more applicants for the special quota admission. As a result, the special admission through the Quota Program became more selective. The school could, therefore, accept poor students with better academic records. Also, students accepted through the quota scheme were genuinely interested in the school and placed it as their first choice. They were not the students rejected elsewhere or who ranked the school lower on their list. However, this school image could not deter disadvantaged children with excessively low academic scores enrolled through the *Quota Program*. A teacher at this school indicated the use of the other strategy to avoid accepting such children. She said,

> *"The number of poor children with high academic scores increased so that the system selected the ones with higher scores. […] However [what if] all poor children enrolling through the program are those with academic scores that are too low? We have anticipated this. Not to reject them, only informing them about better alternatives [redirecting them to more suitable schools]. A better strategy [would be] to increase their chance to successfully enter a public school through the program." (teacher, School J)*

Strengthening the school image as a school for entrepreneurship was also not directed to block children with low academic achievements from higher-income families in the regular admission system. A vice-principal at the school who initiated the entrepreneurship programs explained that:

> *"Having entrepreneurship skills would be more important and more relevant for the future. It is not only to help poor students but also to help students [in general] to face competition in a changing world. Having academic achievements will not be enough."* (vice-principal, School J)

The "attracting but not blocking" image was also observed at School K. As a relative newcomer in the list of top schools in the city[40], School K actively promoted its achievements to the public. A vice-principal at the school stressed the following:

> *"It is important [to promote the school's reputation continuously] since people need to know the fact that there is an alternative place to send their children. They must know that many of our graduates were accepted by favorite*

[40] School K obtained a reputation based primarily on its academic achievements in the last ten years, that make the school approach the position of Schools A, F, and G.

universities through SNMPTN; some were accepted into prestigious programs such as economics, business, and medical school. […] Our graduates' NEM [the school-average score of national exams] was also high, sometimes as high as those obtained by School G [another favorite school]." (vice-principal, School K)

Regarding the emerging demand for inclusivity manifested by the implementation of the *Quota Program*, however, another vice-principal at School K added:

"Among the schools at the top level, School K is the most disadvantaged by the Quota Program. Those who do not dare to choose Schools A, F, or G [the top three schools in the city], for sure, would choose our school. The three schools have had a reputation for a much longer time, and children with great academic standing always choose them. As a school recently included on the top list, we suffer as a consequence. [Meaning, we] tend to be favored by students who want to study in a top school but do not have high academic scores. They think that competition among students here is not so fierce. … [but they are wrong], they would be disappointed with the reality." (vice-principal, School K)

In contrast to school actors at the three other schools mentioned earlier, in which the unblocking effect of the schools' image was found not to matter, many teachers, including the managers of School K, expressed their disappointment with the effect, which is represented by the vice-principal's statement above. In addition, the absence of the unblocking effect can also be indicated from experience by a student accepted in School K through the *Quota Program*:

"Using the right as a holder of the card [an identity card indicating a low-income family registered in the local government's database] and choosing public schools through the Quota Program was an easier path. However, I knew that both School A and F are always dominated by 'burank'[41]; it was impossible to consider even applying there. [That is why] I chose the other schools, [namely] Schools K and C. And surprisingly, I was accepted here. (student, School K)."

[41] *'Burank'*, which stand for *pemburu ranking* (in English: rank hunter), is a particular term commonly used by school-aged children in the city which is referring to children who are highly motivated in pursuing high academic scores.

8.1.3 Not attracting but blocking

The only school managing its image with the "not attracting but blocking" orientation was School I, one of the non-favorite schools in the city. Like others, School I pragmatically strived to attract more prospective students with higher academic scores as an instant effort to improve school academic achievements. As a part of image management, the school actors propagated the school's achievement as evidence of the school's excellence. Moreover, they want School I to be considered equal to the favorite schools in the city. As a senior teacher explained:

> *"In choosing a school, people primarily look at its academic achievements, [especially] the number of graduates accepted in public HEIs. […] Nevertheless, we have a strong motivation to show the public that we are also a good school. We always received lower input [i.e., accepting more students with lower academic scores]. However, sometimes we released higher output [i.e., the school-average score of the national final exams], even compared to the favorite schools. We show this information to the parents, and the public should also see it. This [the school's academic performance] indicates that the education here is also great." (teacher, School I)*

A vice-principal at the school also added:

> "*Indeed, it needs [more] time. We always post the school's activities [and school achievements] on social media. […] We ranked the sixth or seventh for the input, but our output has been ranked the third or at least fifth. One day, our society will recognize this*." (vice-principal, School I)

Compared to the other schools, School I was still very serious in preparing students to face the national examination to obtain a higher school average score[42]. The vice-principal for curriculum at the school mentioned that, to succeed in the national exams, School I always prepared the students from Grade 10 (three years before the national exams) onward by conducting initial preparation activities. Other preparations included more in-depth learning programs for Grade 11 and 12 every morning before the official class begins. For Grade 12, there are evaluation

[42] Since 2015 the national final exam is no longer a standard of education completion and only aimed to map and analyse students' competences in every region. Since then, schools particularly at senior secondary level are no longer pursuing high average scores on the national exam results. Instead, schools' learning activities are focused on preparing students for school exams and/or university entrance examinations.

tests followed by tutorials, extra learning activities for low-performing students, early start and accelerated learning activities in the second semester, and a simulation test. These substantive arrangements by the school can also be categorized as actions aimed to build positive perceptions of the school.

Rather than highlighting the number of graduates selectively accepted in HEIs through the *SNMPTN*, a measure of school quality more widely used by society, School I was found to prefer another indicator, as mentioned by a teacher above. Although the government still uses the national exam scores to evaluate school performance, this indicator is no longer considered by the public as relevant in assessing the quality of senior secondary schools in Indonesia.

The identity that differentiates School I from the other schools is one that has officially been authorized by the government as a model in Islamic education. As described by a vice-principal at the school:

> *"Everyone has recognized our school as a model in delivering Islamic education by practicing the Islamic values in daily life—during school time. […] Every morning before the lesson begins, we require Muslim students to do 'tadarus,' [a mass recital of the Al Quran]. They also must do 'sholat Dhuhur' [one of the five daily obligatory prayers for Muslims] together and even 'sholat sunnah Dhuha' [a non-mandatory prayer]. […] All those activities are intended to form students with good habits and characters. That is our motivation, not only to produce intelligent children but also those with positive characters based on Islamic values." (vice-principal, School I)*

A senior teacher at School I very proudly mentioned a particular term used by the public to name the school, i.e., a Muhammadiyah public school. The school was perceived to be the same as, or even exceeding, Islamic private schools because of the Islamic traditions practiced at the School. She said, "Parents who desire their children to be 'sholeh' (i.e., pious and devout children), they would certainly send their children to our school."

However, what has been internally regarded as a positive image or unique identity was perceived negatively by many children. The alternative indicator of academic excellence used and echoed by the school was not perceived as attractive. Moreover, the apparent identity as an Islamic public school and persistent efforts to develop a reputation as a quality school focusing on academic achievements

resulted in a blocking effect. The perceptions expressed by a student from another school below confirmed the existence of such an effect.

> *"I am a Muslim, wearing a hijab, but I am not comfortable [if I have] to attend School I or School F that are identical to the Islamic school. Even though my [national exam] score was high, I did not choose School F and preferred to attend School A or C because of its pluralistic and 'free' social environment. The main objective is to learn science. We also study religion as well but not in strict and restraining ways"* (student, School C)

8.1.4 Not attracting and not blocking

Three schools (D, E, and H) were found to use perception management actions that neither attracted nor blocked prospective students. Although typically placed as the second or the third choice by students, these three schools are still preferable compared to private schools. Because of their reputation as "peripheral schools" among public senior secondary schools in the city, they must always work harder to attract prospective students with higher academic achievements. Moreover, the schools' managers and teachers always need to motivate new students in their first weeks of school. A vice-principal at School E explained why: "Many of them often feel discouraged because this school was actually their second or even third choice." This indicates that the three schools were considered less attractive by children. The schools could not overcome public perception, which casts them aside as the last option in the public school admission system.

Despite their differences in content, the three schools' perception management actions were identical. For instance, some teachers in School H indicated their inconvenience with the school's image, which has already been constructed as a sports school, and attempted to show that this particular image does not reflect the school's entirety. A vice-principal clarified that "as one of the schools assigned by the local government to provide educational service for school-aged athletes, we only have two special classes for them. It does not mean that this school is a sports school. People should realize that." A teacher at the school thus lamented:

> *"Because of it, [the inaccurate image], we are stereotyped by the public that our school is only a place for such students [athletes], who commonly have low academic achievement. We worry that many [other] children with low*

academic achievement are now coming here because of it." (teacher, School H)

At every opportunity, school actors made clarifications, such as in parent-teacher conferences or open events hosted by the school. In addition, in efforts to enhance its attractiveness, such as on the school's website, the school highlighted its history (i.e., that School H was historically a part of, and therefore had shared resources and practices with, another school which is now perceived as a favorite school with outstanding academic achievement in the city) and students' achievements in non-academic matters.

Similar actions were also taken by School D. The school actors repeatedly highlighted the existence of a historical building inside the school founded by the Dutch in its colonialism era, which became a silent witness to the history of the Indonesian youth's role in fighting for national independence. This focal point was meant to build an image of the school's long contribution to national development through education. Additionally, information about the school's non-academic achievements, and a small number of graduates accepted at universities through the *SNMPTN* scheme, was circulated to attract public interest.

Another similarity among these three schools relates to their current search for a more relevant and interesting identity that could distinguish them from other (public) schools and generate more local interest. Teachers and managers at these three schools engaged in debates regarding their identity search, which signaled that the school's identity is still weak or in the early phase of its development. For instance, as described by a vice-principal at School E:

"Since we always have so many students from poor families, the chairman of our school committee, who was the former school principal, proposed that being a 'school for the poor' could be a relevant identity. Some teachers think that it could be formalized, but others refuse it." (vice-principal, School E)

Another vice-principal at the school who doubted that particular idea tried to propose an alternative one:

"We are located in a tourism hub [and] could drive the school development as 'an entrepreneurial school' focusing on tourism. […] Students could practice their English on the streets, [and] at tourist destinations. In Economics, [they could] learn how to run a small business, such as producing handicrafts,

promoting and selling them to tourists. […] However, it is difficult to make teachers understand that this challenge is good for us." (vice-principal, School E)

8.2 Identity-Image Configurations

At this juncture, it is relevant to trace the causes of the different orientations of perception management actions taken by the schools (i.e., intended image). This is done by focusing on two substances. The first is the configurations of organization identity (i.e., the *identity resistor*—the combination of two conditions of organization identity: identity strength and alignment). The second is the congruence between *construed image* and reputation (whether an organization is perceived to be the same or different by insiders and outsiders).

8.2.1 The attractive schools

The illustrative interviews above show that schools are perceived as attractive when they have an excellent academic reputation (i.e., many of their graduates are successfully accepted into HEIs, particularly through the *SNMPTN* path); have an interesting identity (or identities) that distinguish them from other schools; or are quite capable of maintaining public expectations or construed external image. Moreover, there was an *agreement* between insiders and outsiders about what the school looks like (image congruence), meaning that either outsiders admitted what insiders wanted their organization to be seen as or insiders followed what outsiders expected. In each school, the internal actors actively propagated school trustworthiness (Elsbach, 2003, 2006), i.e., having abilities to achieve desired goals, namely, to send more graduates into universities through the *SNMPTN* path—or without taking admission written exams (Schools A, F, G, K, B, and C); to develop multiple intelligences (School B, "arts and culture school"); to facilitate learning comprehension through more fun learning activities (School C, "research school"); or to supplement students with practical entrepreneurship skills (School J).

However, among these attractive schools, it was also found that there were three schools (A, F, and G) with a strong *identity resistor* while the rest possessed a weak *identity resistor*. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the former was characterized by the identity as a highly competitive school which does not align with the

demand for inclusivity. This identity was indicated by teachers and school managers alike, without any doubt and internal contradiction. During the interviews, they also characterized their respective schools and differentiated them from the others. This identity guided the school actors in developing strategic and routine programs, including responding to the emerging demand.

The competitive school identity was a central reason for schools' actors to use perception management not only to attract children with high academic achievements but also to prevent those who should be the target group of the *Quota Program*. By highlighting the image as a highly competitive school, the three favorite schools intentionally sent the message that their schools are not suitable for students with low academic abilities, even though the government gives them the right and enables them to attend.

Meanwhile, a blocking effect was not found to result from the intended image managed by other attractive schools with a weak *identity resistor*. Two different configurations characterized this weak identity resistor. The first, which was found in School C and K cases, represented the substance of school identities unaligned with the institutional demand for inclusivity but in weak condition in terms of the solidity of insiders' perceptions about the core differentiating it from other schools. The second, as found in Schools B and J, indicated that the school identities were aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity but in weak condition. Both in Schools B and J, their core identities were still an object of internal debates and, therefore, internal refusal or support towards the institutional demand for inclusivity had not been established.

Because of its weak condition, perception management actions were either not directed (as found in the cases of Schools B and J) or were not able (in Schools C and K) to prevent undesirable students from choosing these schools. The images of School B as the arts and culture school, which highlighted the importance of *academic-and-non-academic balance* in learning activities and outputs, impressed students with lower academic ability, thus attracting those from low-income families. Similarly, such children were also interested in School J as the entrepreneurship school that prepares its students with hands-on business skills.

Despite their identity aligned with the institutional demand for selectivity, the images possessed by Schools C and K were unable to block the undesirable

students. Conversely, such children were interested in these two schools not only because of their status as favorite schools in the city but also due to their attractive images. The research school was seen as a school with more exciting and valuable learning activities that would help students with lower academic abilities overcome their difficulties. As a public school recently included in the four most excellent schools academically, School K was perceived by such children as the alternative favorite school with less competition, both in terms of admission selection and learning activities.

8.2.2 The unattractive schools

The four schools categorized as unattractive, i.e., Schools D, E, H, and I, were all characterized by a mismatch between the organizational image desired by insiders and the one perceived by outsiders. These unattractive schools were unable to accomplish what most expected from public schools, such as a promising path to universities without written admission tests. While the school actors attempted to highlight other advantages of their school, such as being included in the list of schools with high academic achievements based on an alternative indicator, as a school with critical historical importance, or one with excellent non-academic achievements, they were not considered the first choice by most students with strong academic standing.

However, a strong *identity resistor* possessed by School I differentiated it from the other unattractive schools. The school's identity has directed the school's actors not only to attract the most desirable students (despite its failure) but also to deter undesirable ones. Several efforts systematically followed School I's strong desire to be considered equal to other schools with outstanding academic achievements. These included: promoting school achievements by alternative measurements of school performance; managing systematic programs to meet the school's target based on that alternative measurement; and preferring students with more acceptable academic achievements. The latter automatically established the filter for students with low academic scores.

Recognizing that children with juvenile delinquency tend to have low academic performance, School I strengthened its identity as an Islamic school by developing strict Islamic traditions to build students' positive character. The school's focus on Islamic character building, one of which idealizes a submissive

figure, was intended to support the school's ambition to improve students' academic achievements. Therefore, the school also reinforced the efforts by implementing more programs to achieve academic targets. These two concerns became the school's safeguard in preventing children with such behavioral problems from being interested in the school. As a result, the *Quota Program's* target group, especially those with such behaviors and require special attention, tended to exclude School I from their list of school choices. In fact, that identity and image made the school unattractive for non-Muslim children or those who desire more space for freedom during their school-age.

Meanwhile, a weak *identity resistor* identified in the remaining three schools (D, E, and H) did not encourage the school actors to use perception management to block the *Quota Program's* target group. Identity aspirations mentioned by school actors in these three schools were not all aligned with institutional demand for selectivity. In addition, the school actors' divergent perceptions of their school characteristics indicated their weak school identities. Such conditions caused difficulties for the schools to attract students with high academic achievements. Moreover, these schools must accept the reality of being the last resort for children who want to attend a public school in the city.

8.3 Concluding Remarks

Overall, this chapter reveals the mechanism of reciprocal identity-image interrelationship in perception management, which revealed the processes in which schools adopted a type of soft-but-high-level resistance strategy in the face of institutional complexity. The core of this resistance strategy is in the strategic use of organizational images, developed or maintained based on either the current OI or identity aspiration to signal organizations' acceptance of an institutional demand on the one hand and to avoid direct refusal of an undesirable or controversial demand on the other.

The empirical cases show that the insiders (i.e., school actors) disseminated the intended images containing "hidden messages" to reach targeted outsiders. In this way, the target was not the institutional actors imposing demands but rather the program beneficiaries whose interests to the organization are influenced by such demands. When an outsider's perception of an organization is influenced by an intended image signaling that the organization is not the right place for

particular outsiders, such undesirable individuals would voluntarily stay away. Based on the empirical findings of this thesis, such actions were intended to ensure that the organization's compliance with the undesirable demand is no longer relevant.

Thus, this chapter provides novel empirical evidence of the links between the extant literature on managing organizational perceptions (i.e., organization's image, identity, and reputation) and institutional theory. The thesis provides empirical evidence of the interplay between macro, meso, and micro levels, following several previous works (e.g., Ashforth, 2016; Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Besharov & Smith, 2014). It makes contributions to institutional theory by highlighting the interlinkages between *institutions* (the influence of contradicting institutional demands on organizational responses), *organizational factors* (how organization characteristics determine organizational responses to institutional contradiction), and *individuals* (how organizational actors create and communicate their organization images as a response strategy, and how outsiders perceive it).

Furthermore, the thesis confirms the influence of organizational identities (as developed by organizational actors) in shaping organizational images that represent outsiders' perceptions of the organization, as theorized by previous works (see Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019). However, while previous work has primarily focused on the effect of impression management on organizational attractiveness, i.e., to attract potential job applicants (Dineen & Allen, 2016; Turban & Cable, 2003) or prospective students (Pampaloni, 2010; Sung & Yang, 2008), this chapter draws attention to the use of perception management not only for such intentions but also for discouraging those perceived as undesirable or not aligned with organizational identity. As shown above, such a strategy is adopted by organizations with a strong *identity resistor*, i.e., having both an identity incompatible with an institutional expectation and insiders' convergent perceptions of the organization's identity. The theoretical discussions regarding interrelations between organization identity, image, and reputation in the use of perception management as a response strategy are presented in Chapter 9.

Chapter 9
Unpacking the Empirical Findings

While the empirical findings are presented in the four previous chapters (Chapter 5-8), Chapter 9 provides further elaborations on the main findings focused on the five theoretical traditions and literature identified earlier, namely; (i) *stereotypical isomorphism* as isomorphic general responses in the context of intra-institutional contradiction; (ii) complexity levels and their role in enabling variability of responses to the emerging demand perceived controversial; (iii) the role of influencing configurations of organizational attributes; (iv) perception management as a novel type of resistance strategy; and (v) the reciprocal identity-image interrelationship in perception management. The contributions of this thesis to new institutional theory and organizational studies are highlighted in the following subsections.

9.1 Stereotypical Isomorphism

This thesis contributes to the existing literature on isomorphism (see Ashworth et al., 2009; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) by revealing that isomorphism can occur within institutional complexity. Answering Boxenbaum and Jonsson's (2017) call for research that explores the relationship between institutional contestation and isomorphism, this work proposes the notion of *stereotypical isomorphism* to comprehend isomorphic responses occurring in the context of intra-institutional contradiction, a particular circumstance of institutional complexity.

As empirically demonstrated in this work, *stereotypical isomorphism* can be differentiated from the three traditional ones: coercive, normative, and mimetic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, the notion suggested here is not the fourth pillar or element of institution; it does not add another element to Scott's (2014) three pillars framework—regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions. Instead, *stereotypes* following *glorifications* of long-existing practices and *skepticisms* toward a counter-normative one, as presented in Chapter

6, represent other symbolic and activity-based carriers of the cultural-cognitive element of institutions, which will be elaborated upon below.

Following the theoretical explanations of current studies on stereotypes and prejudices[43] (see Burn, 2011; Correll, Judd, Park, & Wittenbrink, 2010; Dovidio et al., 2010; Stangor, 2016; Stevens & Görgöz, 2010), *stereotypical isomorphism* here refers to the homogeneity of practices across organizations in an organizational field or population, that is primarily caused by negative beliefs in practices prescribed by, and the groups of people benefited from, the new demand that runs counter to the long-standing one. Such convergent practices are characterized by the *glorification* of long-institutionalized practices prescribed by a mainstream demand. At the same time, the compliance with the established demand is followed by the resistance to a new institutional demand perceived as controversial. As found in the empirical cases, most of the school actors tended to have taken-for-granted perceptions and preferences for prescriptions derived from the widespread institutional demand. Simultaneously, they negatively perceived all things that contradicted the mainstream demand or schema, i.e., questioning the newly emerging schema and stereotyping groups of people disadvantaged under the mainstream schema or benefiting from the alternative schema. Therefore, without any objective reasons or sufficient knowledge, the organizational actors are likely to resist prescriptions from the controversial demand imposed later by the government.

The *glorification* of the long-held practice reflects that *taken-for-grantedness* has been a basis for compliance and that *constitutive schema* is a basis of the order, both of which are principal dimensions of the cultural-cognitive element of institutions mentioned by Scott (2014, p. 60). The organizational actors' preference for embracing the mainstream schema could be perceived as acceptable, natural, and legitimate actions that followed a widely held cultural belief (see Ocasio et al., 2017; Scott, 2014; Thornton et al., 2012), or the logic of appropriateness (see March & Olsen, 2006), regarding school admission. The

[43] In general, social psychologists define stereotypes as category-based generalizations that link category members to typical attributes (Correll et al., 2010, p. 46). Furthermore, Dovidio et al. (2010, p. 7) highlight that stereotypes not only promote discrimination by systematically influencing perceptions, interpretations, and judgments, but they also arise from and are reinforced by discrimination, justifying disparities between groups.

schema was taken for granted because it has long been institutionalized in the organizational field and society.

However, *glorification* of a long-held practice here should be differentiated from *predisposition*, an activity-based carrier of institutions mentioned by Scott (2014, p. 96). *Glorification* as an institutional carrier is more than "habitualized action," "routines," "standard operating procedures," and "repetitive patterns of activity" identified by Scott (2014, pp. 100-102); "distinctive repertoires of activity providing templates or models" as highlighted by Clemens (1993); or "habitual disposition" proposed by Gronow (2008). Like those other activity-based carriers, *glorification* can also become a central feature of an institution. However, as found in the empirical cases, *glorification* indicates an excessive preference for routines—perceived as "the best" and irreplaceable—despite the awareness of the negative implications. Moreover, this tendency is followed by *skepticism* toward the opposing schema introduced later by the institutional actors to eliminate the mainstream schema's negative effects.

Glorification also tends to strengthen *stereotypes* of people disadvantaged by the established mainstream schema, e.g., regarded as less competent, less motivated, or undesirable. When the alternative schema challenges the mainstream and benefits the undesirable disadvantaged parties, such stereotypes can be the primary fuel for resistance by affecting organization actors' perceptions and behaviors. Therefore, this work proposes *stereotypes* as another symbolic carrier, similar to *categories* and *typifications* already listed in Scott's (2014) symbolic systems as institutional carriers.

Like *categories* and *typifications*, *stereotypes* reproduce a particular category of people and shape interpretation and perception about them. However, *stereotypes* also influence emotion, cognition, and behavior (Dovidio et al., 2010; for comparison, see Scott, 2014), and distortion and bias are very likely (Stangor, 2016). While *categories* or *classifications* are made by employing particular considerations, such as purposes (Zuckerman, 1999), minimum standards (King & Whetten, 2008), prototypes (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), the extensions of causality and goal-orientation (Durand & Paolella, 2013), and socio-cultural reasoning (Glynn & Navis, 2013), *typifications* rely on general knowledge and common sense (Kim & Berard, 2009). In contrast, *stereotypes* reflect oversimplified socially constructed beliefs that often lead to discrimination toward particular

groups of people[44] (see, e.g., Dovidio et al., 2010; Graham & Lowery, 2004; Kunesh & Noltemeyer, 2019; Sacks, 2018). Social psychologists increasingly view that "relatively mild stereotypes and biases are automatically elicited by salient social categorizations and identities," and in turn, enable "the more virulent manifestations of prejudice and discrimination" (Duckitt, 2010, p. 41).

Glorification, *skepticism*, and *stereotypes* fundamentally represent cultural-cognitive elements of institutions (Table 9.1). While *glorification* should be included as the other kind of activity-based carriers, *skepticism* and *stereotypes* can be added into symbolic carriers. These extensions are relevant to new institutionalists' emphasis on cognitive elements rather than regulative and normative elements, highlighting the primary attention on the effect of cultural belief systems (Lindenberg, 1998; Meindl, Stubbart, & Porac, 1994; Phillips & Malhotra, 2017).

Table 9.1 Institutional Pillars and Carriers

Carriers	Pillars		
	Regulative	Normative	Cultural-cognitive
Symbolic systems	• Rules • Laws	• Values • Expectations • Standards	• Categories • Typifications • Schemas • Frames **+ *Stereotypes*** **+ *Skepticism***
Relational systems	• Governance systems • Power systems	• Regimes • Authority systems	• Structural isomorphism • Identities
Activities	• Monitoring • Sanctioning • Disrupting	• Roles, jobs • Routines • Habits • Repertoires of collective action	• Predispositions • Scripts **+ *Glorifications***
Artifacts	Objects complying with mandated specifications	Objects meeting conventions, standards	Objects possessing symbolic value

Source: Scott, 2014, p. 96, *with extensions proposed (marked with bold, italic words).*

[44] This work provides empirical findings of how the school actors' stereotypical perceptions of academically at-risk students determined the schools' responses to the new institutional demand requiring the schools to include such students. How stereotypes of particular groups of people affect discriminatory behaviours of public servants have also been confirmed by many other studies, such as in the education sector (e.g., Kunesh & Noltemeyer, 2019), law enforcement and social service (e.g., Graham & Lowery, 2004), and health care (e.g., Sacks, 2016).

The three additional carriers show that institutions and institutionalization are not only related to those widely known or cultural-cognitively accepted. At the same time, particularly when a schema or an institutional logic has been accepted and practiced for a long time, ones regarded as unacceptable or counter-normative have also cognitively been established. As Scott (2014, p. 57) mentions,

> *"Institutions exhibit stabilizing and meaning-making properties because of the processes set in motion by regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. These elements are the central building blocks of institutional structures, providing the elastic fibers that guide behavior and resist change."*

In the second edition of The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, a book compiling current institutional theories of organizations, Scott (2017, p. 855) reflects that "[…] effective and robust institutional frameworks are likely to involve an admixture of all three elements. The elements are associated with diverse mechanisms—coercive, normative, and mimetic—that work in different ways and varied combinations." However, the interlinkage and interaction between the three mechanisms have not been studied in-depth (Greenwood & Meyer, 2008). This thesis provides an empirical example of institutional contradiction involving the two conflicting logics or demands established through different mechanisms and various elements.

While *stereotypical isomorphism* differs from coercive isomorphism, they had interactive effects in the studied case. Coercive isomorphism occurs when coercive pressures—such as politically exerted by authorities or culturally expected by society—are widely accepted and practiced by organizations to secure legitimacy, leading to homogeneity in a field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Scott, 2014). In the public sector, the government typically uses coercive mechanisms to institutionalize the desired practices by pressuring agencies to comply with regulations. Those same mechanisms can be applied to change institutionalized practices or to implement new practices in a field. In the education sector, several prior works provide empirical evidence of isomorphism at various levels (e.g., Anafinova, 2020; Levitt & Nass, 1989; J. W. Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; J. W. Meyer, Scott, & Strang, 1987; Puttick, 2017).

Such a practice occurred in this study's case. In the observed schools and across Indonesia, merit-based admission was widely applied and became common practice initially due to coercive pressures through government regulations. As a result, the practice was institutionalized and led to isomorphism. However, when this practice became taken for granted, meaning that the institutionally expected practices happen without question or deviation (see Hirsch, 1997), the coercive mechanism was no longer the cause. Instead, cultural and cognitive elements were more dominant than the regulative element, and isomorphism occurring under the intra-institutional contradiction was, as argued in this work, caused by a cultural-cognitive mechanism. This points to the effect of multiple mechanisms in institutionalization processes.

Because of the dominant cultural-cognitive element, the government faced challenges when introducing the new institutional demand for inclusivity through coercive mechanisms. Despite dependence on the government resources and legal authority to change admission rules, the schools' response bundles—embracing the mainstream schema while resisting the new one—points to the relative powerlessness of the new demand's coercive influence. These empirical conditions indicate that DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) coercive isomorphism fails to explain why pressures intended to create compliant and homogenous responses to new institutional demands—especially those conflicting with the mainstream—do not always work.[45]

This empirical finding is not particularly surprising. As institutional pluralism receives greater attention from institutionalists, more current works on the education sector confirm the absence of isomorphism (see, e.g., Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996). Moreover, the notion of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) coercive mechanism, representing a top-down structural perspective, has been criticized by other institutionalists. The institutional logics perspective offers the following prominent criticism that highlights *embedded*

[45] Prior works including the classics have provided theoretical predictions and empirical evidence of organizations' symbolic compliance with coercively institutional demands by employing various resistance strategies (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). However, this thesis differs from previous works in term of both its focus and the context faced by the observed organizations, i.e., studying both isomorphism (homogeneity) and heterogeneity of organizations when facing the co-existence of contradicting institutional demands. As presented, the nature of isomorphism and the variation in responses can be differentiated from those under a neo-institutionalism framework.

agency principles: under circumstances of institutional pluralism and complexity (see Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2017; Yu, 2015), the amalgamation of both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms is more likely to occur, meaning that agentic actions can shape or be shaped by social and cultural structures (Ocasio et al., 2017).

Following Zucker's (1991) concern with institutions' cognitive aspects and the micro-level foundation of institutionalization processes, Phillips and Malhotra (2017) deliver more philosophical criticism. Without rejecting the role of coercive and normative pressures in creating social orders and causing isomorphism, they doubt whether these mechanisms produce real institutions. Phillip and Malhotra (2017) highlight that institutions should be taken-for-granted and widely practiced without any forces, sanctions, and inducements (the features of coercive mechanism) or social obligations (the basis of compliance of normative mechanism). As Zucker (1991, p. 86) argues, "the act of sanctioning may indicate that there are other possible, attractive alternatives." In short, criticism of the coercive pillar centers on its neglect of agency roles and institutions' cognitive aspects.

Moving beyond coercion, the homogeneity of the schools' responses neither reflects normative isomorphism nor mimetic isomorphism. Normative pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) representing the currently expected educational practices, e.g., "education for all," "inclusive education," and "child-friendly school*,"* were not found as significant influences that led to isomorphic responses in the empirical case. Instead, stereotypical beliefs drove the schools' actors to perceive and respond to the new demand. In this sense, as mentioned by Ashworth et al. (2009, p. 169), "organizations may converge on the 'wrong' form, that is around (the) alternative institutional logic," in which undesirable behaviors (e.g., resistance to policy) as found in this study, and negative behaviors such as corruption (Venard, 2009; Venard & Hanafi, 2008) and bribery (Chen, Yas¸ar, & Rejesus, 2008; Gao, 2010), have become increasingly common in the public sectors. Therefore, Scott (2017, p. 867; see also Scott, 2014, pp. 273-274) suggests that institutionalists need to examine actions that can either improve or jeopardize organizations.

In the case study, imitations among the schools were also not observed. The notion of mimetic isomorphism predicts that, when organizations experience

ambiguity or uncertainty, they tend to imitate others seen as the ideal model, which leads to homogeneity in a field (Akbar, Pilcher, & Perrin, 2015; Deephouse, 1999; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). The empirical findings show that the *Inclusion Program's* ambiguous prescriptions did not encourage schools' mimetic practices in responding to the program. The schools' responses to the contradicting institutional demands were affected by actors' perceptions of each institutional expectation, rather than by actors' intention to imitate others as suggested by the literature (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Joseph & Taplin, 2012; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; M. Yang & Hyland, 2012).

Competitive pressure, an alternative cause of mimetic behaviors (see, e.g., Beckert, 2010; Hsieh & Vermeulen, 2014; Klenk & Seyfried, 2016), also did not play a role in the observed cases. Despite the existence of school competition both for input (accepting more children with higher academic achievement) and outcome (academic test scores, graduation rate, and university acceptance rate), schools' imitative behaviors in both embracing the long-existing institutional expectation and resisting the new demand, as predicted by the literature, were not found empirically. Prior research findings highlighting that organizations emulate other similar organizations (Greve, 1998), competitors (Gao, 2010), or ones considered successful and prestigious (Haveman, 1993; Joseph & Taplin, 2012; Still & Strang, 2009) were not confirmed in this study. Even though school principals and teachers in the city are connected through professional networks at the local level with regular meetings, as well through periodic tours of duty among principals and teachers administered by the Local Office of Education, these factors did not facilitate mimetic behaviors in responding to the institutional contradiction (for comparison, see Jonsson, 2009; Kraatz & Moore, 2002).

Each school's organizational attributes played an essential role in determining school responses, meaning that school actors considered their school characteristics such as identity and status, rather than copying the actions taken by other schools with different characteristics. Also, the schools' responses to the institutional contradiction mainly considered socially constructed beliefs inherent in school actors' cognition, i.e., the actors' subjective interpretation shaped by broader belief systems and external cultural frameworks as emphasized by institutionalists who have paid considerable attention to cultural-cognitive elements (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991a; Douglas,

1986; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014, 2017; Simon, 2013; Zucker, 1991). The absence of a mimetic mechanism in the empirical case indicates that an alternative cognitive mechanism can lead to isomorphism. As mentioned, *glorification, skepticism, and stereotype* have played an essential role as carriers of the cognitive institution (for comparison, see Scott, 2014). Considering the prominent role of stereotypical beliefs, as empirically found in the studied case, stereotyping is argued here as a variant of cultural-cognitive mechanisms that can give rise to isomorphism. This is consistent with Scott's (2014, p. 69) statement that "cultural-cognitive (pillar) points to the power of templates for types of actors and scripts for action" (emphasis added). However, mimesis is not the only mechanism for establishing templates, and stereotyping is argued in this thesis as the alternative.

The notion of *stereotypical isomorphism* is more relevant to and suitable with the prevailing circumstances of institutional contradictions. It can provide explanations of organizational compliance and homogeneity under such situations, particularly when counter-normative practices are introduced, and conflicting institutional logics (the mainstream vs. the emerging ones) coexist in management or social policies determining citizens' access to public service provision.

9.2 Complexity Levels and the Variability of Resistance Strategies

As presented in Chapter 6, school actors across the field held positive perceptions of the well-established demand, that is, one that had been fully institutionalized (Oliver, 1992; Scott, 2014). However, this was followed by skepticism towards both prescriptions and practices challenging the mainstream demand and stereotypical beliefs about the people benefited by them. As aforementioned, these isomorphic beliefs became the initial factor leading to resistance.

Both organizations' preferences in resistance strategies and variability of resistance levels in the organization population were found to be dependent on the level of complexity experienced by the schools. In the face of an intra-institutional contradiction with less complexity, in which the specificity level of prescriptions within the new demand is either loose or moderately tight (meaning that inherent ambiguity exists), school actors still have an opportunity to avoid internal conflicts stimulated by the institutional contestation. The absence of internal conflict

deactivated the role of organizational attributes in specifying resistance strategies (as visualized in Figure 9.1), which in turn generated homogeneous resistance levels across the population.

Figure 9.1 Mechanisms Leading to Homogeneity of Resistance Strategies



Source: the author's illustration, based on the empirical findings.

Under these circumstances, the resistance strategies adopted by similar organizations were determined by the levels of risk associated with a potential loss of legitimacy. A high level of resistance (i.e., *defiance*) was found as the preferred resistance strategy when the organizations experienced intra-institutional contradiction with a low risk of delegitimization. In contrast, a moderate resistance (i.e., *avoidance*) was detected as the typical strategy when the organizations faced an intra-institutional contradiction with a medium risk of losing legitimacy.

These findings confirm that *legitimacy* is a central concept in organizational institutionalism, influencing organizations' behaviors (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Drori & Honig, 2013). As similarly found in prior institutionalists' research, managing legitimacy becomes an essential motive

behind the adoption of response strategies, as it represents the organizations' survival mechanism in the face of institutional pressures. Deephouse (1996) provided empirical evidence that organizational isomorphism, i.e., following other organizations that conform with government regulations, is related to and increases organizational legitimacy. However, as highlighted by more recent studies (e.g., Scherer et al., 2013), the observed organizations in this study experienced typical institutional conflicts and, therefore, faced more complicated legitimacy challenges. In such situations, organizations encounter a dilemma since they may lose legitimacy when defying any contradicting demands.

This study contributes to the existing literature by revealing that organizational isomorphism can also occur in the circumstance of institutional contradictions, particularly in those characterized by less complexity, i.e., in which the new demand's prescriptions are less tight and contain ambiguity. This finding answers Boxenbaum and Jonsson's (2017) call for further empirical work exploring the relationship between institutional contestation and isomorphism. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that organizational isomorphism is not only relevant for the process of institutionalizing legitimate practices (Caravella, 2011; Deephouse et al., 2017) but also for the resistance to such institutionalization (see Tolbert & Zucker, 1999; Zucker, 1991).

However, a high variability of response strategies in the field was observed when internal conflicts among organizational actors could not be avoided (Figure 9.2). These instances were the consequence of experiencing an intra-institutional contradiction with high complexity, enabling relevant organizational attributes to take important roles in specifying resistance strategies. This finding supports the earlier assumption that varied organizational responses result from the interaction between institutional demand characteristics and organizational attributes (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010). Furthermore, the findings highlight a particular condition under which organizational attributes play an essential role in generating variations of response strategies in a field. In so doing, it suggests the importance of considering complexity levels of institutional contradictions, a topic that has mostly been neglected in prior works.

Figure 9.2 Mechanisms Leading to Heterogeneity of Resistance Strategies



Source: the author's illustration, based on the empirical findings.

While isomorphism or homogeneous response in organizational fields received significant attention in the new institutional theory's earlier phase (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; J. W. Meyer et al., 1997; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), research in the last decade has instead focused on the role played by institutional complexity in assessing variations in organizational responses to institutional pressures (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2017). Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2017) review this development by concluding that "empirical work on contested practices has (continuously) increased, while studies on isomorphism as an outcome have decreased" (p. 86).

Beckert (2010) and Hüther and Krücken (2016) propose an alternative view that all mechanisms mentioned by Powell and DiMaggio (1983), i.e., coercive, normative, and mimetic, can potentially cause either homogenization or divergence. Similarly, this work's empirical findings suggest that both organizational isomorphism and divergence can coincide in an organizational field or population. By combining the notion of institutional isomorphism with the concept of nested organizational fields, Hüther and Krücken (2016) shed light on

the same phenomena of simultaneous processes of homogenization and differentiation among European universities. Hüther and Krücken (2016) explain that homogenization and differentiation of organizations result from their embeddedness in multiple fields (i.e., international, regional, national, and local). In contrast, this thesis provides evidence that the simultaneity of isomorphism and divergence can be exhibited by similar organizations in a single field, located in the same geographic area, while experiencing the same institutional pressures.

These findings are also relevant to public administration literature concerning discretion and willingness (or resistance) to implementing policies (see Evans & Hupe, 2020a; Lipsky, 2010; Tummers, 2013; Tummers & Bekkers, 2020). Those studies, however, largely highlight the positive effects of discretion while neglecting its potentially harmful effect (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014; see also Evans and Hupe, 2020; Sandfort, 2000). The present work particularly examines a circumstance in which organizations experience conflicting institutional expectations involving a new, controversial demand manifested in three different programs with varying levels of specificity. As highlighted by organizational institutionalism scholars, when facing conflicting institutional demands, organizational actors' preferences tend to be determined by both their alignment with the institutional logics underlying the demands and their organizational attributes. The implication is that discretion in a public service provision can result in a negative effect, such as discrimination against a particular group of people, as found in this study.

Despite the different analysis levels, the present work's findings confirm predictions concerning discretion's effect on willingness to implement a policy. Varying resistance levels were identified when the observed schools faced the *Quota Program*, a new institutional demand with high specificity, meaning that school actors had no discretion in its implementation. However, the rest of the findings do not match policy alienation propositions, in which resistance behaviors were also exhibited by the observed schools when facing the two other programs with lower specificity levels. These findings indicate that the presence (or the absence) of discretionary power is not the only determinant of resistance.

In many cases regarding public service delivery, the influence of public service providers as organizations are often greater than that of a public servant as individual, and the effect of organization-level resistance tends to be more

influential on policy success or failure. Therefore, in such cases, examining resistance at the organizational level would make a worthwhile contribution to the research stream. This thesis suggests that institution-level factors (i.e., institutional logics, expectations, or demands), organizational attributes (e.g., identity, status, power structure, and governance), and institution-organization alignments should be considered in studying resistance behavior. By using this approach, one can more carefully study the variations in resistance strategies and levels. Furthermore, as highlighted by the institutional logics perspective (Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012), individual perceptions and behaviors are shaped by institution and organization influences, despite the potential agentic role of the individual in shaping organizations and, even, institutions. In this sense, as discussed further in the next subsection, organizational resistance levels are determined by combinations of organizational characteristics, in which the role of individuals (as local proponents and opponents of particular institutional logics) is inherent.

9.3 The Role of Organizational Attributes as Configurations

The findings, as presented in Chapter 7, reveal that neither OI strength—the extent to which the core of OI is widely shared and densely articulated among members (Besharov & Brickson, 2016)—nor OI alignment—the alignment between the content of OI and the institutional demand (Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014)—are sufficient single dimensions for determining how organizational actors perceive and respond to institutional demands (Greenwood et al., 2011). As a composite attribute reflecting those two dimensions of OI, the strength of the *identity resistor* is suggested here as a more sensitive condition of OI in determining organizational resistance to a new institutional demand igniting institutional conflicts (for a comparison, see Besharov & Brickson, 2016).

The notion that OI may restrict innovation or change has been highlighted in prior research (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016; Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007), for instance, when there is a mismatch between the existing OI and innovative practices introduced in the organization. By proposing the notion of the *identity resistor*, the findings here suggest that the level of organization resistance is determined not only by the lack of alignment between OI and new institutional demands but also by the strength of the OI itself. Furthermore, this study highlights that, when facing a controversial demand, organizations with a strong *identity*

resistor may require no other attributes to exercise high-resistance strategies. This suggests that the combination of identity-alignment and identity-strength play a decisive role in determining how organizational actors perceive and respond to controversial expectations. In this sense, there is an interesting alignment between the findings of this thesis and Kodeih and Greenwood's (2014) as well as Raffaelli and Glynn's (2014) insights on the central role of OI as a condition for either organization resistance or compliance when it comes to emerging institutional demands.

As a component of the *identity-based resistor*, strong OI influences other organizational attributes. In this vein, organizational actors establish "what their organization is" (Ashforth, 2016) or "what it wishes to become" (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014) by embracing selective institutional logics and resisting others either thought to be controversial or seen as threatening to organizational goals, values, and identities (Besharov & Brickson, 2016). In organizations with strong OI, organizational actors have a more convergent perception of the viability of institutionalizing emerging institutional demands (Ashforth, 2016). When OI's content is not aligned with an institutional demand; therefore, it makes sense that its power structure and decision-making mechanism become less relevant. Moreover, in organizations with convergent OI perceptions, it is not easy for a leader to force organizational members to embrace a controversial demand. This finding indicates that a strong *identity resistor* can be both the necessary and sufficient condition for high-level resistance when organizations experience and respond to a new institutional demand conflicting with the mainstream demand.

In such organizations, organizational actors were found to be active agents in persuading expectant stakeholders (i.e., prospective students and their parents; see Baldi, Bartel, & Dukerich, 2016) to see or perceive the school in a particular way (Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Brown et al., 2006). By successfully attracting more prospective students with above-average academic ability, the schools could leverage their ability to manage or even increase their status in the field.

These findings are aligned with previous works suggesting that organizations with different statuses within a field (i.e., whether central or peripheral) may have different motivations for the same direction they take in responding to a new institutional demand. For instance, the adoption of the new demand can be intended to extend, reconfigure, preserve, or improve their current

status in the field (see Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi, 2015; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014). This study sheds new light on the fact that organizational identity is a possible factor for organizations with different statuses to adopt the same direction in responding (either embracing or resisting) to a new institutional demand. More specifically, this study suggests that *identity resistor* may be the central reason for both central and peripheral organizations to resist a controversial institutional demand.

A weak *identity resistor*, which was characterized by insiders' divergent perception of OI, was found to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for low-level resistance. As demonstrated empirically, a weak *identity resistor* needs to be combined either with a command "decision-making" mechanism or a peripheral field position to promote low resistance. *A* weak *identity resistor* enabled variation in insiders' interpretations of the controversial institutional demand and, consequently, opened up the possibility for organizational responses with low resistance levels. However, low-level resistance was exhibited by schools possessing a weak *identity resistor* only when: (1) these schools were led by principals applying a command "decision-making" mechanism, forcing teachers to embrace the controversial demand; or (2) the schools were categorized as non-favorite ones (peripheral organizations), meaning that they experienced less internal conflict when facing the two conflicting institutional demands.

It is important to highlight decision-making mechanisms here as another critical attribute. In line with the studies showing that an organization's command mechanism is critical in the adoption of a new institutional demand, for instance, in the implementation of NPM-inspired reforms in healthcare (Berg, Puusa, Pulkkinen, & Geschwind, 2017), this present study points to the role played by the school principals assigned by the local government to be responsible for school compliance with the emerging demand for inclusivity.

The influencing role of the decision-making mechanism was also empirically found in the high resistance cases. In such cases, the persuasion mechanism enabled the more decisive influence of the internal disputants and, in turn, encouraged the adoption of high resistance strategies, particularly at the elite schools. This empirical finding is relevant to the expectation that the decision-making mechanism is another critical attribute specifying organizations' resistance levels (see Tummers, 2013; Tummers & Bekkers, 2020). In his theoretical

framework of policy alienation, Tummers predicts that *tactical powerlessness*, i.e., a condition in which the workers' perceived lack of influence on decisions concerning how a policy is implemented within their own organization, is one of the policy alienation dimensions that can lead to resistance or unwillingness to implement a policy. Tummers' (2013) empirical work, however, found that *tactical powerlessness* had the lowest influence on resistance. The present study's results indicate a similar condition: the decision-making mechanism, whether *command* (no opportunities for organization members to be involved in decision-making) or *persuasion* (the opportunities exist), was found as a condition that insufficiently determined resistance levels.

Furthermore, the findings contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the role of organizational status or position in a field. Prior research points to a different tendency for *central* and *peripheral* organizations when responding to new demands. It was suggested that elite or *central* organizations (in contrast with *peripheral* organizations) are more resistant (e.g., Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Marquis et al., 2017). However, this thesis suggests that an organization's position in a field is not a sufficient attribute per se and cannot solely promote either a high or low level of resistance to a controversial demand. As empirically found, high resistance was not exclusively exhibited by the favorite schools (*central* organizations). Also, low-level resistance strategies were not the monopoly of the non-favorite schools (*peripheral* organizations). Both the favorite and non-favorite schools that had a strong *identity resistor*, as mentioned, were found to adopt high-level resistance, clearly indicating that the role of a strong *identity resistor* was more decisive than organizational status or position in the field.

9.4 Perception Management as a Resistance Strategy

This work has highlighted a novel type of response strategy intentionally adopted by public organizations in the face of an intra-institutional complexity. Although the government as the institutional actor embraced both institutional logics (selectivity and inclusivity) and managed how the schools should comply with the emerging demand for inclusivity without destroying their compliance to the existing demand for selectivity, the schools were still reluctant to comply with the new demand. Since the emerging demand with tight prescriptions was obligated by the institutional actor possessing governing authorities, resisting the

controversial demand was highly risky for the schools. Under this circumstance, low to moderate level of resistance, such as compromise and avoidance strategies (Oliver, 1991), selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013), or balancing and integrating demands (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016; Kraatz & Block, 2017) could be relatively safer for the schools.

An alternative resistance strategy was identified at the four schools, which had certain identity and image characteristics. By employing *perception management*, these schools could avoid direct rejection of the undesirable institutional demand by making it irrelevant. In practice, the schools' actors never outright rejected the government's demand for including particular children while taking steps to ensure that the target group would voluntarily wish to avoid these schools.

This strategy was found to differ from the traditional *avoidance* strategies mentioned by Oliver (1991). Several tactics encompassing *avoidance* strategies, such as ceremonial acceptance (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Zott & Huy, 2007) or decoupling practices from its structures (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017; Mercado et al., 2018; Moratis, 2016; Rasche & Gilbert, 2015), accentuate how organizations differentiate their real actions from those displayed to institutional actors. However, it was too risky for the observed schools, particularly favorite ones, to employ non-compliance strategies that were easy to be recognized, including *avoidance* strategies such as *decoupling*. This was because the implementation of the strict program (i.e., the *Quota Program*) was closely monitored by the government and non-governmental parties (e.g., mass media, NGOs, ombudsmen, and the parents of prospective students). As mentioned by Greenwood et al. (2011), such a central status could make the organization more visible (see Wry, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011) and therefore attract public attention (see Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004).

Minimizing the risk, the observed schools with a *strong identity resistor* alternatively resorted to resistance through a cognitive tactic, i.e., perception management. When specific school images caused the program's target group to stay away from the schools, it would be hard for the government to blame the schools. When this tactic is successful, it can liberate the schools from the obligation to serve specific target groups.

The perception management tactic can also be differentiated from "selective coupling" mentioned by Pache and Santos (2013). The schools employing a resistance strategy through perception management did not need to selectively adopt practices prescribed by the emerging, controversial demand. Moreover, they indicated their willingness to accept and fulfill the tight demand for inclusivity, i.e., no ceremonial acceptance or decoupling behaviors (for comparison, see Bromley & Powell, 2012; Hasse & Krücken, 2015; Mercado et al., 2018; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rasche & Gilbert, 2015). By managing certain organizational images to cope with the controversial demand, organizational actors could influence outsiders' perceptions of the organization.

Although its perception about the school could also be influenced, the government as the dominant institutional actor in the observed cases was not the main target of image management strategies. Instead, how prospective students and their parents view the school was the critical target to manage. These efforts, however, were not only aimed to attract certain students to join the school, as highlighted by almost all studies on school marketing (e.g., Holm & Lundström, 2011; Kotler & Fox, 1995; Lundahl & Olson, 2013; Oplatka, Hemsley-Brown, & Foskett, 2002; Oplatka & Hemsley-Brown, 2004; Yemini, Oplatka, & Sagie, 2018), but also to deter undesirable students, as found in this study.

Moving beyond school (marketing) studies, the findings of this thesis make an essential contribution to perception management studies, which have so far assessed the critical role of organizational identity expressions in influencing the perceptions and behaviors of external stakeholders, i.e., potential investors, applicants, and customers (Halderen, 2008). Traditionally, this research stream investigates the positive effects of perception management on, for instance, attracting desired applicants (e.g., Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Dineen & Allen, 2016; Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014; Turban & Cable, 2003), increasing consumers' buying intentions towards products (e.g., Berens, Van Riel, & Van Bruggen, 2005; Brown & Dacin, 1997), protecting organizational legitimacy (e.g., Elsbach, 1994), or increasing the economic values of reputation (e.g., Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Therefore, this study makes a significant contribution by providing empirical evidence reflecting not only a positive effect of perception management (i.e., attracting high-performing students) but also its negative effect (i.e., blocking undesirable students). The latter uncovers a dark side

of perception management, which has been insufficiently researched (for exceptions, see Jabbar, 2016; Lubienski, 2007; Wilson & Carlsen, 2016).

The observed schools' attracting and blocking behaviors were considered as the function of organizational identity, supported by other relevant organizational attributes, in perceiving and responding to the intra-institutional contradiction. Whereas both the "old" and early "new" institutionalism frame organizational identity as the consequence of institutionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1957), more recently, institutionalist scholars open up the possibility that identity is the antecedent to, consequence of, and mechanism for institutionalizations (Glynn, 2017).

This present work advances the literature by providing an empirical example of such dynamics of identity-institution relationships. The schools' resistance to the new institutional demand for inclusivity, as empirically found, was only one episode or season, preceded by the previous episodes or seasons of the institutionalization of the logics of selectivity. The predecessor episodes reflected the influence of institutional logics on establishing organizational identity through *typification* (i.e., public schools as competitive schools; selective in their admission) (K. Weber & Dacin, 2011), continued by the long seasons in which the merit-based admission system became a taken-for-granted, legitimized, and institutionalized practice (Scott, 2014). *Glorifications* of the long-held practice were then built, followed by the strengthening of skepticism towards the opposing logics or counter-normative practices and the stereotypes of those who would benefit from them. These latter episodes or sessions reflect how organizations with a preferred identity filtered and resisted a controversial demand. Thus, perception management (by expressing organizational identity and influencing outsiders' perceptions of the organization) represents a symbolic action to serve organizational actors' preferences that are influenced by dominant institutional logics (Ocasio et al., 2017; Thornton et al., 2012).

These empirical findings offer insights into the connections between perception management, organizational identity, and organizational responses to conflicting institutional pressures. Whereas perception management and organizational identity scholars traditionally focus on internal versus external

targeting matters of organizational identity influences,[46] this thesis highlights perception management through organizational identity expressions as a strategy when responding to an institutional contradiction. This tactic is essentially intended to signal a preferred institutional logic or demand and what is expected, and is not, by the organization from targeted audiences primarily to support identity affirmation and avoid identity weakening.

Despite its indirect rejection, this type of resistance strategy can be categorized as high-level because it preferred one institutional demand (mainstream demand for selectivity) over the other (the emerging demand for inclusivity). Based on the characteristics of the *perception management* tactic empirically found, this study suggests that the tactic can be added to Oliver's (1991) list, particularly under the *defiance strategy* (see Table 9.2). More specifically, this additional tactic should be placed before *ignoring*, which was considered by Oliver (1991) as the softest tactic of *defiance.* In the empirical cases, the schools employing *perception management* tactics did not ignore the new institutional demand. Furthermore, they paid attention to the demand they perceived as controversial and responded to it carefully.

[46] While perception management researchers focus mainly on strategies expressing identity labels, informative signals, and their respective meanings to influence outsiders' perceptions and behaviors towards organizations (Baldi et al., 2016; Halderen, 2008; Rindova et al., 2005; Schultz & Hatch, 2008; Wæraas, 2020), organizational identity scholars have focused on the internally strategic role of organizational identity in ensuring members' positive identification with preferred collective identities within the organizations (Ashforth, 2016; Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Schinoff, Rogers, & Corley, 2016; Whetten, 2007).

Table 9.2 Resistance Strategies and Tactics Identified in the Study

Levels of resistance	Strategies	Tactics	
Low	Compromise	*Balance**	The *softest* resistant tactic 
		*Pacify**	
		Bargain	
Moderate	Avoidance	*Conceal**	
		*Decouple**	
		*Escape**	
High	Defiance	***+ Perception management**)***	
		*Ignore**	
		Challenge	
		Attack	
Very high	Manipulation	Co-optation	
		*Influence**	
		Control	The *hardest* resistant tactic

Source: Author's, based on Oliver (1991).

**) tactics empirically found in the current study (i.e., employed by the observed schools in responding to the three programs)*
***) the additional tactic based on the study's empirical findings.*

As discovered, the schools using the perception management strategy did not need to resort to more extreme resistance strategies, such as ignoring or challenging the undesirable demand or influencing the government to adjust the demand. Moreover, those schools did not necessarily need to employ a double strategy, except School I. The blocking effect at Schools A, F, and G, which were widely recognized as the academically high-performing schools, effectively prevented low-performing children from choosing those schools. However, such an effect was weaker at School I. Despite its keen ambition to become a favorite school, School I was not considered as such by the public. School I repeatedly employed a decoupling tactic to deter students with particularly low academic scores, as mentioned earlier in Chapters 5 and 7.

Those findings suggest that the use of perception management as a resistance strategy requires not only organizational identity expressions but also positive images (i.e., outsiders' perceptions of the organization) and the congruence between the two kinds of organizational perceptions. The following subsection elaborates upon the interconnection between organizational identity and image, which played a significant role in the observed organizations that exercised perception management as a response strategy.

9.5 Identity-Image Interrelationship in Perception Management

Previous works have studied the role of organizational identity in shaping how institutional demands and logics are perceived and responded to (e.g., Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). Preferred and expressed identities and their meanings have also been examined as important in influencing perceptions and behaviors of both organizational members and external stakeholders (Ashforth, 2016; Halderen, 2008; Schinoff et al., 2016; Wæraas, 2020). The present study expands upon these earlier inquiries by exploring how identity becomes a critical reference for organizational members in managing outsiders' perceptions as a type of response strategy and unpacking the complex nature of organizational perceptions management.

Following Brown et al. (2006) in differentiating concepts of organizational perception (i.e., identity, image, construed image, and reputation), this thesis provides empirical evidence of the interrelationship between these dimensions of organizational perceptions. The findings show that to attract desirable prospective students, insiders (i.e., school managers and teachers) influenced how particular outsiders (i.e., prospective students and their parents) think about the school by echoing its long-established identity, promoting its new identity, or advertising school history (i.e., identity in the past).

Although each had carried unique aspects associated with the content and development status of identities, there were three primary stages of perception management involving identity-image relationships. The first stage is *reflection*, in which insiders identify *construed images* (*"What do insiders think particular outsiders view their organization?"*). The second stage can be referred to as *establishment* or *development*, in which insiders retain or (re-)build their organizational identity (the answer to "*who are we as an organization, currently or in the future?"*). Finally, the third stage is *dissemination*, where insiders express *intended images* ("*What do insiders want outsiders to think about the organization?*") which could, in turn, determine *organizational reputation* ("*What do outsiders actually think about the organization?").*

Based on the study's findings, which are consistent with prior works (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Ravasi, 2016), *construed image* is suggested as a source of insiders' considerations in managing their organization identity. The findings

indicate that outsiders' perceptions of an organization could determine whether to keep or change the existing organization's identity. By cognitively identifying external audiences' perceptions, insiders (especially organization leaders) engage in a reflective process by positing *construed image* as a referent for organizational identity and questioning, *"Is this our true self?*" Based on the empirical cases, reflections were relevant for all organizations regardless of reputation and intended to evaluate organizations and their existing identities, particularly to identify whether they were attractive or not to outsiders. While reputation has been recognized as a determinant of whether an organization is attractive or not (Dineen & Allen, 2016; Jones et al., 2014), assessing the compatibility of *construed image* and reputation can be the door to unpacking how insiders recognize, learn, and utilize outsiders' perceptions of an organization for maintaining or improving organization appeal.

However, the decision to retain, develop, or change identity is determined not only by insiders' beliefs about external perceptions but also by insiders' current perceptions about their organization (Bankins & Waterhouse, 2019; Ravasi, 2016). At the same time, as highlighted by institutionalists and identity scholars (Gioia et al., 2013; Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Phillips, Tracey, & Kraatz, 2016; Thornton et al., 2012), institutional identities and expectations also affect organizational identities. In the face of conflicting institutional demands, the findings of this thesis support past studies highlighting that organization responses to such institutional pressures somewhat depend on the alignment between organizational identity and institutional expectation on the one hand (Besharov & Brickson, 2016; Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014) and the strength of that identity on the other (Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). When these two OI conditions are considered together, as done in the present study, this composite variable was found to determine perception management's substance and orientation. The substance points to organizational images desired and developed by insiders to influence outsiders' perception of the organization. The orientation of intended image dissemination can be meant either to attract desired prospective members as presented by most prior research, deter undesired ones, or both, as highlighted in this study's findings.

Chapter 10
Conclusion and Research Implications

This last chapter provides conclusions or the answers to research questions. Furthermore, the research implications are emphasized to highlight the theoretical contributions of this research study. By considering the study's limitations, the chapter also presents suggestions for future studies.

The research problems of this dissertation were: How do public sector organizations respond to an intra-institutional contradiction, and how can these responses be explained by both institution-level influences and organizational attributes? In order to address the research problems, the following six interrelated research questions directed the case study:

1) What are the similarities and variations in the school responses to the intra-institutional contradiction?
2) Through what mechanisms do isomorphic influences, emerging in the specific circumstance, affect the variability of school responses in the organizational field?
3) Why and to what extent do complexity levels determine the variability of school responses?
4) What are the organizational attributes that individually influence school resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity?
5) How do specific organizational attributes play a joint role as necessary and/or sufficient condition to determine levels of resistance to the emerging demand for inclusivity?
6) Why and how do organizational perceptions determine strategies adopted by schools in responding to the intra-institutional contradiction?

In answering the above questions, this dissertation analyzed the persistent problems of educational inequality experienced by socio-economically disadvantaged children in Indonesia. In particular, this dissertation indirectly explains why the government's efforts to increase the access of such children to quality education were less effective than expected. By employing the institutional

theories of organization, the thesis highlights how public schools at the senior secondary level experience and respond to the intra-institutional contradiction related to school admission (competition vs. inclusivity) and the influences of institution and organization-levels on the schools' responses.

Based on the findings, it can be concluded that public sector organizations, particularly those facing conflicting institutional pressures imposed by the same, dominant institutional actor (i.e., government), tend to exhibit homogeneous strategy bundles in responding to each side of institutional contradictions. These response bundles indicate conformity to one institutional demand or logic, i.e., the long-institutionalized practice and resistance to the counter normative one. However, closer analysis reveals variations in organizational responses to a controversial institutional demand. The degree of variation in resistance strategies at the field level varies (between the programs or the manifestations of the controversial demand). It was empirically found that an institutional mechanism triggered the schools' isomorphic responses to the institutional contradiction, that is, to both conflicting institutional logics. At the same time, the configuration of complexity levels and organizational attributes played an essential role in determining variation in resistance strategies adopted by the schools in responding to the emerging demand for inclusivity, which was perceived as controversial.

It is, therefore, argued in this thesis that isomorphism could occur in a circumstance of institutional complexity. In interpreting isomorphism and identifying its characteristics (i.e., both conformity and convergence) under such widespread conditions, this study emphasizes the need to observe organizational responses on both sides of the conflicting demands. In the empirical cases, conformity to the long-standing institutional logic was expressed by the observed schools. Meanwhile, a convergent response (i.e., resistance) to the opposing logic was also seen, despite the variation in resistance strategies. Therefore, to identify the two features of isomorphism under conditions of institutional complexity, this study suggests observing each strategy adopted by organizations in responding to each side of conflicting institutional demands. These responses should be examined as a response bundle, e.g., conforming to one side of the conflicting demands while resisting the other side (cf. Ashworth et al., 2009).

The thesis underscores the role of *stereotypical isomorphic influence,* a cognitive mechanism through which a prevalent institutional logic influences

organizational actors' perception of the contradicting demands. The study empirically found that it was the following mechanisms that shaped the school actors' beliefs: (1) *glorifying* the long-existing demand, (2) *doubting* the new demand's prescriptions, and (3) *stereotyping* people benefited by the new demand. As is typical with stereotypes (see Burn, 2011; Correll et al., 2010; Dovidio et al., 2010; Stangor, 2016; Stevens & Görgöz, 2010), *stereotypical isomorphism* is characterized by organizational convergence and compliance caused by an over-generalized belief or oversimplified image of a particular type of person or object. Stereotypes are socially constructed beliefs that shape individual cognition (Dovidio et al., 2010). Therefore, stereotypes can also influence organizational behaviors. This mechanism is distinct from but similar to other influencing mechanisms mentioned by Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Scott (2014).

The thesis also argues that the institutional contradiction's level of complexity can enable a homogeneity or heterogeneity of organizational response strategies. The empirical cases have illustrated how complexity levels, identified from the specificity of the controversial demand, played a critical role in determining the variability of resistance strategies. The study empirically found that homogeneous resistance strategies occurred when the schools experienced low complexity, i.e., when facing the emerging demand with ambiguous or loose prescriptions. In contrast, heterogeneous resistance levels were identified when the schools responded to the emerging demand with strict or unambiguous prescriptions.

The thesis argues that a new, controversial demand with tight prescriptions stimulates internal conflicts among organizational actors. This internal conflict activates the role of power balance structure and other relevant organizational attributes in specifying organizational responses, enabling heterogeneity in resistance levels across the organizational population. In contrast, homogenous resistance strategies occur when organizations face a new, controversial demand with ambiguous prescriptions, in which organizational actors can avoid internal conflicts stimulated by contradicting institutional demands. The absence of such an internal conflict makes the role of power structures and other organizational attributes *less* relevant in specifying response strategies.

The thesis also highlights several organizational attributes that play an essential role in determining resistance strategies: organizational identity,

decision-making mechanism, organizational status or position in the field, and power balance structure. Although power structure is directly related to internal conflict, it was empirically found that organizational identity is the *primary* organization-level determinant. In particular, the study underscores the importance of considering both the strength and alignment of organizational identity with institutional expectations as a composite condition called the *identity resistor.* The configurational analysis results show that a *strong* identity resistor, characterized by an identity that does not align with an institutional expectation and insiders' convergent perceptions of the organization's identity, can be both the necessary and sufficient condition for high resistance to the institutional demand. However, a *weak* identity resistor is only the necessary condition for low resistance, meaning that a combination with other relevant attributes is required (i.e., either with command decision-making mechanism or peripheral organizational status). Furthermore, the thesis emphasizes the importance of approaching organizational attributes as configurations when assessing their role as the organization-level determinant of responses to institutional complexity.

Among the organizational response strategies empirically identified, this study highlights the use of *perception management* as an identity-based response strategy. The findings show that the observed organizations developed or maintained certain organizational images to avoid outright rejection of a controversial demand while simultaneously making it irrelevant. As found, this strategy was adopted by organizations with a *strong* identity resistor. By linking institutional theory, organizational identity, and perception management, this thesis provides essential theoretical contributions regarding the identity-image interrelationship on the use of perception management as a high but imperceptible resistance strategy.

Based on the above conclusions, the key contributions of this thesis to various streams of literature (i.e., organizational institutionalism, perception management, and organizational identity) need to be highlighted. As regards to organizational institutionalism, stereotypical isomorphic influence is suggested as an alternative mechanism through which isomorphism occurs. In this case, stereotype, skepticism (a symbolic system carrier), and glorification (an activity-based carrier) function as the cultural-cognitive pillar of the institution. This study also dedicates its contributions to both the institutional theory of organization and perception management literature by highlighting the use of organizational identity

expressions and management as a strategy in response to intra-institutional contradictions. Furthermore, this work sheds light on mechanisms through which organizational perception management functions as a response strategy, characterized by the interrelationship between organizational identity and image.

Future studies might consider the limitations of this thesis and the potential areas not fully explored. First, more research is needed in examining the similarity and variation in organizational responses to intra-institutional contradictions in other fields. The thesis shows that, under this kind of institutional complexity, isomorphism or similarity in response strategies could occur. Future research should further investigate the nature of convergent response bundles as a form of isomorphism under institutional complexity, such as its organizational dimensions (structures, strategies, or outputs) and its continuity. Additional research could also explore the adopters' motivations and the field characteristics where such isomorphism arises.

Second, examining *stereotypical isomorphism* in different contexts would be particularly valuable to better understand its features and mechanism through which the isomorphism occurs. A *stereotypical isomorphic influence* is interpreted here as the mechanism that socially constructs organizational actors' cognitive beliefs, i.e., the effect of a long-existing governmental policy as the manifestation of a mainstream institutional demand (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While this study highlights prevalent stereotypes as a policy consequence (i.e., shaped by an institutional logic derived from state order), future studies must approach such beliefs as the manifestation of institutional logics emanating from societal/community order. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to study the phenomena of an *institutional logic takeover,* i.e., when a logic that originally derived from and began change in an institutional order has been maintained in another institutional order (cf. Thornton et al., 2012). Future research could examine how organizations face contradicting institutional demands, or logics, resulting from such a *logic takeover*, which is different from other phenomena such as logic *shifts* (cf. Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Russell, 2011; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), *diffusion* (see a review by Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017), or Scandinavian Institutionalism's notion of *translation* (Wedlin & Sahlin, 2017).

Third, the role of institutional complexity levels in enabling, or disabling, the influence of organizational attributes in determining resistance strategies should be studied in more depth in different contexts. The conclusion regarding this specific issue may apply only to organizations controlled by government, in which organization managers (i.e., the school principals) are assigned and evaluated by the government. Qualitative research, or ones with mixed approaches, on independent organizations would likely arrive at different conclusions due to the smaller risk of resistance to controversial institutional demands. In such conditions, internal conflict stimulated by institutional contradiction can be avoided so that several organizational attributes, such as power balance structure, decision-making mechanism, and organization status, are less relevant in determining response strategies.

Fourth, future research should delve deeper into the role of organizational attributes as the determinant of response strategies. This study made contributions by assessing the role of organizational attributes reviewed by Greenwood et al. (2011), despite the inevitable adaptation and enrichment following the empirical contexts and findings, i.e., field position (i.e., organizational status), identity (i.e., *identity resistor*), structure (i.e., power balance structure), and governance (i.e., the decision-making mechanism). This research indicates the central role of organizational identity in specifying resistance levels to a controversial institutional demand. Further quantitative research might consider examining the significance of organizational identities. Future qualitative studies could also explore additional organizational characteristics—such as ownership, size, social capital (network), culture, and performance—that may play essential roles in determining organization responses to institutional contradictions. Furthermore, it is essential to examine the relationship between influencing attributes. For example, as suggested in this study, an organization's decision-making mechanism must be considered together with the power balance structure to evaluate the internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands (cf. Pache & Santos, 2010).

Fifth, the thesis suggests the importance of considering organizational attributes as combinations rather than individual ones. Therefore, it is valuable to employ configurational analysis using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to further measure the role of organizational attributes as an organization-level determinant. This study analyzed the four attributes using crisp-set QCA (csQCA)

and identifying necessary and sufficient combinations of the four observed attributes leading to high or low resistance. However, the use of csQCA as a method is limited by its binary variables. The conversion of the condition values, from the four original categories into two—high and low resistance levels—consequently means losing information regarding moderate resistance. Further research with a more significant number of cases could use multi-value QCA (mvQCA), which extends the analysis beyond dichotomous conditions and outcomes. Based on the csQCA results with modest or limited generalization, this study offers theoretical insights highlighting the essential role of either a strong or weak *identity-based resistor* in promoting resistance levels, which should be considered as a basis for further theoretical development in future studies, as commonly expected from QCAs (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009, p. 16).

Sixth, there is a need for more studies that identify variation in responses to a controversial demand, particularly in intra-institutional contradictions. This research study found perception management as a resistance strategy that can be added on Oliver's (1991) list of strategic responses. By observing other contexts of intra-institutional contradiction, in which organizations face the coexistence of old and new institutional demands imposed by the same institutional actors, various resistance strategies might potentially be identified. This thesis stresses the importance of evaluating strategies adopted by organizations facing an *intra*-institutional contradiction, which might have different or even unique characteristics compared to ones employed when dealing with *inter*-institutional contradictions.

Finally, further qualitative explorations into how public organizations employ their soft resistance strategy are also needed. The use of identity-based resistance strategies, e.g., by managing outsiders' perceptions of the organization, is also an interesting topic for more in-depth examination. While earlier studies (e.g., Dineen & Allen, 2016; Jones et al., 2014) highlight that reputation has been recognized as a determinant of whether an organization is attractive or not to outsiders, the findings of this thesis show that assessing the congruence between *construed image* and reputation is a key to unpacking how insiders recognize, learn, and utilize outsiders' perceptions of the organization. It maintains the balance between organizational attractiveness (to entice people with characteristics suitable for the organization's identity and preferred institutional expectations) and repulsiveness (to deter unfitted outsiders). Future studies may reveal how such a

response strategy effectively complies with an institutional demand while resisting the others. Finally, it is vital to study the effects of such an “inclusion-exclusion” strategy on social inequality at various levels, i.e., organizations, fields, and societies.

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Appendix

Interview Guide

A. Informant: Local Government

Topic: The institutional demands related to school admission

1. To what extent do the central and the local governments assess and encourage school performance/efforts, especially in improving school quality and increasing vulnerable children's access?
2. What do you think about the relevance and urgency of the two demands, i.e., the long-existing demand for competition/selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity?
3. Please provide concrete examples of the current systems, initiatives, or programs relevant to each of the two demands.
4. Do you think that the two demands are contradictory? Why or why not?
5. How does the government ensure that the public schools comply with the demands?
6. What types of incentives are given to schools for complying with both demands?
7. In your view, how do the different schools interpret and respond to these two demands?
8. Why do the schools respond to these two demands differently?
9. How does the government deal with schools that respond differently or fail to comply with these two demands? What are the consequences for schools (e.g., sanctions or penalties)?
10. How have these two demands changed over the last six years?

B. Informants: School principals, vice-principals, and teachers

Topic: The school's response to the demands

1. What do you think about the importance of the two demands imposed by the government, meaning the long-existing demand for competition/selectivity and the emerging demand for inclusivity?
2. Do you think that the two demands are contradictory? Why or why not?

3. What do you think about each program representing the emerging demand for inclusivity, i.e., the *Quota Program*, the *Inclusion Program*, and the *Affirmative Action Program*?
4. What are the tradeoffs between accepting the programs' beneficiaries (i.e., low-performing students from low-income families, students with disabilities, and Papuan students) and managing school performance?
5. How does the school fulfill the two (conflicting) demands? What does the school do to respond to each demand (including each program representing the emerging demand for inclusivity)?
6. What are the reasons for the school's responses?

Topic: School attributes

Subtopic: Status/field position

(Note: the researcher has already used statistical data of school admission [obtained from the District Office of Education] to identify the school's position in the school population during 2010-2016, i.e., categorized as either favorite or non-favorite school)

1. As a favorite school (or a non-favorite school), what are positive and negative consequences related to school performance when choosing to comply with either one or both of the demands?
2. Are those consequences taken into account when making decisions about the school responses? Why or why not?
3. What are the advantages (or disadvantages) when the school considers (or does not consider) the school status in specifying the response?

Subtopic: School's Identity

1. What are the shared characteristics of public schools in the city?
2. Does the school represent a high academic performance or an elite school? If not, is the school an inclusive school?
3. What are the main characteristics differentiating the school from other public schools (in the city)? Are there differences in teachers' perceptions of the school? If so, what are the variations? Why do differences occur?
4. To what extent is the school's identity aligned with the institutional demand for selectivity?

5. To what extent is the school's identity aligned with the emerging demand for inclusivity?
6. Are there any references, such as government regulations, standards, common practices/traditions, or school models, considered by the school when developing its identity?
7. Based on the school's experience, is it possible to be both elite *and* inclusive? What are the advantages and challenges of being both?
8. Does the school identity (or identity aspirations) determine the school's preferences in selecting students? If so, how and why?

Subtopic: Internal representation and power structure

1. How do internal stakeholders (principal, vice-principals, and teachers) perceive the two (conflicting) demands?
2. Are there any disagreements between internal stakeholders on how the school should respond to the two demands?
3. Who are the internal proponents of the long-existing demand for selectivity (and the emerging demand for inclusivity—each of the three programs)?
4. How do the different parties react to the above tensions? How do they articulate their respective opinion?
5. How do the school actors deal with such internal disagreements?
6. Are there different levels of conflict when the school faces each of the three programs? Why or why not?
7. Is there a balance of power in the school? If not, who is more dominant?

Subtopic: Governance (decision-making mechanism)

1. Did you participate in the school's decision-making, especially in responding to the two demands – selectivity vs. inclusivity?
2. How should the school respond to these demands—and why?
3. Is there a consensus among school actors on how the school should respond to these demands? If not, please elaborate what the dominant perspectives or opinions are.
4. How was the school's decision made? Who were the dominant actors in determining the school's response or strategy? How did they affect the decision?

5. To what extent does the lack of consensus among internal actors affect the school's decision in responding to the two demands?

C. Informant: Students

For students who are <u>NOT</u> the programs' beneficiaries

1. When you were in junior secondary school or about to enroll at the senior secondary level, what did you think about the characteristics of this school that differentiated it from other public schools (in the city)? How did you know those characteristics?
2. Did you choose the school because of the characteristics you just mentioned? If not, what were your primary considerations in choosing the school?
3. What do you think about each of the three programs? How do you characterize the programs' beneficiaries (i.e., low-performing students from low-income families, students with disabilities, and Papuan students)? Do you think that they should be accepted and attend the lessons in this school?

For students who are the programs' beneficiaries (including students with disabilities and Papuan students, if any)

1. Could you please tell the story of how you became a student in this school? What was the school admission process like?
2. Do you find any of the learning activities or social interactions challenging at this school? What are the causes?
3. Does the school care about your difficulties? Please provide some examples.
4. Please share keywords that describe the school's unique characteristics. In other words, what distinguishes this school from other public schools?