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Moments of Goodness: An Analysis of Ethical and Educational Dimensions of the Terror Attack on Utøya, Norway (July 22, 2011)

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Abstract The analysis is based on some moral experiences taking place during a terrorist attack on the Norwegian Labor Party's youth camp on the island of Utøya (outside of Oslo) July 22, 2011, where 69 young people were killed and several seriously injured. After the attack many of the survivors told stories of how strangers spontaneous had helped and cared for each other. In the midst of the horror there occurred sudden "moments of goodness" or "points of light" that revealed hope for the persons involved, as well as for the society. The article examines these spontaneous moral practices in light of moral educational theory, as well as discusses the terrorists own way of thinking and acting. The spontaneous practices point toward another basis for a moral approach then a cognitive development tradition. The importance of community is underlined, as well as an interpersonal dimension. In the last section the fostering of moral and ethical thinking and acting is discussed in light of general education and the three functions of education proposed by Biesta (Beyond learning: democratic education for a human future. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2010). It is suggested that moral education could contribute something to all of the three dimensions but based on the experiences from Utøya, there will be a particular emphasis on the subjectification function of education.

Keywords Spontaneous moral practice · Community · Goodness · Proximity · Terrorism

Introduction

The following analysis is based on a specific event, namely the terrorist attack on the Norwegian Labor Party's youth camp on the island of Utøya on July 22, 2011, where 69 young people were killed and several seriously injured. After the attack, those involved could tell stories of how strangers had helped and cared for each other. In the midst of the

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horror, sudden "moments of goodness" occurred, revealing hope and a sense of community. Retrospectively, these "points of light" turned out to be of great significance not only for the youth involved and their families, but also for Norwegian society as a whole.

In the following I wish to explore these spontaneous moral practices further, as well as discuss the terrorist's own way of thinking and acting. The latter is derived from his own description 1 year later. During the trial he gave a detailed account of his mental training before the attack and the extensive practical preparations. My assumption is that this very dramatic event that involved death and life, darkness and light, might indicate some basic knowledge about meaningful moral practices, as well as the contrary. Several of the experiences and stories coming out of Utøya may be characterized as a form of spontaneous moral practice. The spontaneity seems to be triggered by the situation and by other persons' needs. In light of ethical theory, this spontaneity may be worth further exploration. I will argue that the spontaneous actions are in sharp contrast to the terrorist's various well-planned techniques, which were intended to create distance and to close himself off from "disturbing" influences from surroundings and from other people. On the contrary, I wish to explore how the spontaneous ethical practice emphasizes involvement and community.

The article has the following outline: I will start by providing a presentation of the attack and various examples of concrete situations where help and care were given. These are in contrast to the terrorist's deliberate use of various distancing techniques. I will then relate the descriptions of various people's acts to moral educational theory, starting with Stuart Dreyfus' and Hubert Dreyfus' distinction between moral practice as either a deliberate or a spontaneous practice. Further, a special focus will be on the spontaneous character of the acts and on exploring the interpersonal dimension involved. This will lead to another basis for the moral approach. Inspired by the thoughts of Knud E. Løgstrup, spontaneity is understood to be an expression of connection in a common life-world. In the final section, I will discuss the different moral approaches in light of general education. Normative dimensions currently tend to be ignored within the general field of education. I wish to prove the relevance of these dimensions and will do so based on Biesta's (2010) descriptions of three general functions of education. Based on the experiences from Utøya, the dimension of community is of particular significance.

The Terror Attack on Utøya

On July 22, 2011, a Norwegian right wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik, set off a huge car bomb in front of the Government Quarter buildings in Oslo, seriously damaging these as well as other buildings in the vicinity. Nine people were killed in the blast. The extremist's intention was to destroy the core of the present political leadership, the government, the top state administration and Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg from the Labor Party. Immediately after this bomb attack, the culprit went on to the island of Utøya where the Labor Party's future elite had gathered for their annual summer camp. Here, about 600 young people between 14 and 25 years of age were gathered and his goal was, as he explained during the trial against him, to kill them all. Equipped with several guns, he landed on the small island and opened fire. He chased the young people around the island in an attack which lasted about 90 min. The trial revealed that both the bomb explosion in the Government Quarter and the killings on Utøya were a result of a long, meticulous planning process that started as far back as 2006. Everything had been planned down to the smallest detail: the purchase of weapons, a uniform and chemicals for the construction of

bombs, the bomb construction itself and the actual implementation of the terror attacks. In the courtroom, the perpetrator spent hours explaining all the details of the planning process, plans that succeeded and plans that failed. For example, due to a lack of chemicals, he had to resort to what he called a "shooting-based operation" on Utøya, which he considered to be more risky and demanding compared to a "bomb operation".

Afterwards, when the terror attack was over, the young people told horrible stories about the mass killings. In contrast, they also told "ordinary" stories of goodness and community, as well as remarkable stories of great courage and bravery. For example, there was a story of a person that silently grasped another person's hand, a teenage girl who gently comforted a younger child, a boy who lent his jacket to another boy next to him who was desperate, wet and shivering. A girl was hit by several bullets and cried for help. Some youngsters came running and carried her to a safer place. They used their clothes to press against her wounds and were able to stop the bleeding. At the risk of their own lives, they promised to stay with her until the shooting was over. They kept their promise and they all survived (*Fædrelandsvennen*, May 16, 2012). There was the story of a girl who, while running to escape the bullets flying all around her, stopped to help a boy whose pants had gotten caught in some scrap metal lying on the ground and who, in his panicked state, was unable to pull himself loose. She stopped and bent down in order to help him, and once they had succeeded in freeing him, began running, hand in hand, away from the shooter (*Verdens Gang*, Oct. 5, 2011; *Fædrelandsvennen*, Oct. 8, 2011).

There was a mainland campground (Utvika Camping) located approximately 600–700 meters across the lake from Utøya. As soon as the tourists staying at this campground realized what was happening on the island, they immediately set out in their leisure boats and brought seriously injured young people to the ambulances and helicopters waiting for them on the mainland. They did so while in danger of being killed themselves; many very moving stories have been told about their heroic efforts (*Verdens Gang*, Dec. 22, 2011). Interviews conducted with the group of volunteers reveal what appears to be a common reaction when these people realized the gravity of the situation; they acted immediately and threw themselves into the many emergency rescue activities that were taking place: Several people ran to their boats and drove through the hail of bullets in order to pick up swimmers while others ran back to their camp sites to get dry clothing. Yet others offered comforting words as well as food and drinks to the soaked survivors. An interview with rescuers Bjørn and Aase Margrethe Juvet (*Aftenposten*, Aug. 23, 2011) is illustrative of the fact that jumping into the rescue operation came naturally to several of those involved. Bjørn Juvet was one of the first to go out to rescue young people from the water, while his wife stood on the pier in order to receive the survivors as they were brought to shore. They said, "Our first reaction was to help. We saw human beings in a crisis situation who were fighting for their lives. Even when we were being shot at, our focus the whole time was on the young people in the water, getting them into the boat, getting them into the boat…. That was all that mattered" (Interview in *Aftenposten*, Aug. 23, 2011).

Care and assistance were given in many situations on this day: the young people on the island helped one another when they could and the mainland rescuers helped young people in need. These acts were carried out irrespective of previous acquaintance, ethnicity or gender. While I have no empirical data to support the following claim, at the time of the horrific events, any "differences"—which can often create distance between people—were considered irrelevant and were therefore ignored, as it was far more important for these people to experience a connection with one another than to promote their own unique characteristics and sense of being different from the others present. Rather, this connection provided these individuals with strength under trying circumstances since the experience of

being met with care, help and comfort was significant for them. Furthermore, their sense of community and connection appeared to create a kind of insight to which they could cling—both during the attack and during the weeks and months that followed and their stories touched something basic that was echoed in the rest of the Norwegian society.

The example I have chosen here is extremely dramatic and quite unique in Norwegian history. Those involved were ordinary people—not professional health care personnel. Their actions ranged from small and nearly invisible ones, such as grabbing another person's hand, to selflessly heroic acts of courage despite mortal danger. For instance, as the Juvets explained in their newspaper interview: "We did not make a conscious decision to help, it just happened. It was not a choice we made; we acted on autopilot without thinking it over for very long. We could not watch people drown without trying to help them with any means we had available to us" (*Aftenposten*, Aug. 23, 2011). There may be several reasons why the Juvets acted on autopilot, including the fact that, when coming face to face with hardship, people tend to feel a strong impulse to act. However, a common feature of all these people was that they nearly always acted immediately and instinctively, which was in stark contrast to the terrorist's systematic, detail-oriented planning and his effort to develop a distance—involving social, emotional and language dimensions.

The Terrorist's Different Distancing Techniques

The issue of distance played a profound role for the terrorist both during the attack, as well as in the planning process beforehand. Even the terrorist's outfit on the day of the attack indicates distance. It could be seen as an attempt to masquerade the agent of the act and to avoid any kind of human togetherness (Arendt 1998, p. 180). He was dressed in a police-like uniform with home-made police badges. The outfit was chosen deliberately. In a Norwegian context, the police enjoy a high degree of trust among the population, and the terrorist used this to attract the young people. At the same time, this kind of outfit helps anonymize personal traits, as the uniform is a service uniform used by persons in a group.

The language used by the terrorist appears distancing and depersonalizing. He used a technical, military-inspired jargon, a manner of speaking also inspired by Islam-critical circles, computer games and online role-playing games such as *World of Warcraft* (*Verdens Gang*, Dec. 2, 2011). To provide some examples: The terrorist described the attack as "spectacular" and "grand" and classified victims as "legitimate" and "non-legitimate" targets (legitimate targets were those who supported multi-culturalism). He referred to the terror attack as an "operation" and bombs as "tools", and the executions were described in detail, for instance in terms of whether "follow-up shots" were required. The original plan was to chase the young people into the water and thereby use the water as a "weapon of mass destruction".

He also distanced himself socially. He did have contact with right wing extremists and Islam-hostile movements online, but, in the time before the operation, he isolated himself more and more from former friends, spending an increasing amount of time in front of the computer in his childhood home.

Perhaps the most important form of conscious distancing is what the terrorist himself referred to as "de-emotionalization". This was something he had been practicing since as early as 2006. During the trial, he said that carrying out acts like those on Utøya is contrary to human nature. To be able to do so, he had to prepare himself mentally for a very long

time. In this preparation process, he used various meditation techniques, which he referred to as “daily stimulation”, and computer games to “hammer out” emotions and build a contempt of death. He said, “It is very, very difficult to implement something as barbaric as a firearm-based operation”. During the executions on Utøya, he behaved in a “de-emotionalized” manner. Simultaneously, he said he felt threatened, which is why he was in a state that he referred to as a “flight and fight mode”.

These examples show how the terrorist consciously created distances in various areas of life. He saw himself as a warrior, using the concept of war in his manner of speaking and acting. The many different distancing techniques were intended to provide a mental shield. When asked by the judge: “Are you an empathetic person, Breivik”, he answered “yes, absolutely”. He said during the trial that what he did was “just awful” and “barbaric”, but a necessary sacrifice for the cause. During the shooting on Utøya, he shot young people face-to-face, also those who had curled up in the fetal position, begging for their lives.

What the terrorist was attempting has certain commonalities with techniques used by the Nazis, as described by Bauman (1987). According to Bauman, the Nazis succeeded in overcoming the most formidable of obstacles to systematic and non-emotional cold-blooded murder of people, namely “animal pity” or the urge to help those who suffer. This is, in his opinion, a very elementary condition, and the Nazi regime focused on neutralizing the impact of primeval moral drives (Bauman 1987, p. 185). The killings were isolated from the sphere where such drives arise, by neutralizing, isolating and marginalizing Jews. The process became a rational, bureaucratic, technical task According to Bauman (1987) the importance of proximity to the Other is a building block of all moral behavior:

> Proximity means responsibility, and responsibility *is* proximity” … And “the alternative to proximity is social distance. The moral attribute of proximity is responsibility; the moral attribute of social distance is lack of moral relationship, or heterophobia (Bauman 1987, p. 184).

Bauman describes the distancing techniques of a political regime. In the case of Utøya, it was an individual person that committed the terror. He was not following orders, and his actions were not directed by obedience to an authority. His training of different distancing techniques was well-organized and carried out with discipline and effort. As such, the terrorist appeared to be responsible for and aware of the consequences of his actions. He did not appear to be an agent within a chain of evil actions. His behavior was based on his own choice and he acted independently. Vetlesen (2013) suggests that the evil involved can be seen as “subjectivity run wild” (Vetlesen 2013, p. 27). However, similarities can be seen in the “coldness” toward the Other, as well as the horrible consequences of the use of distancing techniques.

The event at Utøya gives rise to many different challenges and issues. The following discussion is limited to two aspects: Firstly, from the field of moral education: Based on the descriptions of various people’s acts, what kinds of moral approaches are involved? One key tradition in the field is a cognitive developmental tradition, raising the following issue: What could the event at Utøya tell us about the limitations of cognitive approaches to moral education? And what other bases of moral education can be seen? In the following I wish to suggest that there are also other options. Secondly, in the very last section, I wish to discuss how the different approaches may have a role to play within the context of general education. The theoretical framework for this section is inspired by the three domains of education, according to Biesta’s book *Good Education in an Age of Measurement* (2010).

Spontaneous Moral Practice in Light of Moral Education

In Norway, unlike countries such as Britain and the USA, moral education is not a distinct field of research and knowledge. Ethics and morals are considered to be integral parts of the general education program. According to Rich and DeVitis (1985), moral education, in short, refers to instruction in moral rules of conduct for the purpose of developing good character traits and ethical behavior (Rich and DeVitis 1985, p. 6–7). The research approach is broad; likewise the issues involved. Chazan (1985) writes: “While moral education would appear to be the most practical of educational ventures, encompassing the everyday realities of school and classroom life, it actually involves some of the most basic and profound issues of human existence” (Chazan 1985, p. 1). The following discussion is first limited to what Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus refer to as two different “camps” in the field of moral education: The first camp understands moral practice as a deliberate act, whereas the second camp regards moral practice as a spontaneous act.

Two Different Approaches to Moral Experience

In their article titled “What is Moral Maturity? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise” (1990), Dreyfus and Dreyfus present two approaches to understanding ethical expertise. The first “camp”, according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, identifies with Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Jürgen Habermas, according to whom ethics is, in principle, restricted to judgment. The moral act is defined as a will-based and intentional act in which the person has a goal and an intention to be realized. The second “camp” (in which the Dreyfuses place themselves) understands moral practice as a spontaneous or immediate response to a current interpersonal situation.

Belonging to the first “camp”, an approach to moral education that has attracted much scholarly attention is the research by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates. Their research focuses on a person’s judgments of moral dilemmas and on the criteria that are involved when the person tries to solve the different dilemmas. Kohlberg calls their research a cognitive approach (1980), “… because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual education, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the child about issues and decisions. It is called developmental because it sees the aims of moral education as movement through moral stages” (Kohlberg 1980, p. 20). Moral expertise is developed through universal and invariant stages of moral development and reasoning. The development toward higher moral expertise requires active social participation and a discussion of legal and political issues. The approach is rooted in John Dewey and Jean Piaget’s thinking about moral stages but also influenced by the philosophy of Socrates and Plato. This influence can be seen in what Kohlberg considers as a sixth and highest stage of moral development “… a stage of universal principles of justice, of equity and respect for human personality” (Kohlberg 1980, p. 20). At stage 6, the individual is able to act on universalized moral principles and to find a balance and prioritize among different demands in the situation.

The second “camp” sees moral expertise as an unreflective and spontaneous response to a current interpersonal situation. Dreyfus and Dreyfus are interested in people’s everyday moral comportment and aim to develop a theory of moral expertise that is adapted to practices such as care, friendship and love (*Information*, Sept. 21, 1990). In their opinion, a moral expert will see what needs to be done and will give an intuitive response to the concrete situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990, p. 242–244, Benner 1991). For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting to note that the context of the Dreyfuses’ study is

interpersonal relations, and they focus on rather ordinary but fundamental forms of moral practice that are part of people's everyday moral comportment.

In order to more clearly distinguish between the two camps, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990) quote from the work of Maurice Mandelbaum (1955), who offers a phenomenological approach to moral experience. Like Piaget and Kohlberg, Mandelbaum also seems to restrict ethics to individual moral judgments (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 31). However, Dreyfus and Dreyfus state that, in doing so, Mandelbaum does not seem to realize that he has already made a fateful exclusionary move, dismissing the fact that "…our moral consciousness expresses itself chiefly in everyday ethical comportment which consists of unreflective, egoless responses to the current interpersonal situation. Why not begin our investigation of ethical experience on the level of this spontaneous coping?" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990, p. 239) Thus, Dreyfus and Dreyfus proceed to do so.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus appear to allow for the possibility of a type of moral expertise that Mandelbaum seems to promote, namely the understanding of ethical expertise as reacting directly and spontaneously to whatever immediately confronts a person: "I see a child in danger and catch hold of its hand, I hear a crash and become alert to help" (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 48). On the contrary, Mandelbaum believes that these actions are not sufficiently anchored in the self, and the action does not seem to spring from the self: "…in such cases I am reacting directly and spontaneously to what confronts me…. In such cases it is appropriate to speak of "reactions" and "responses" different from willed actions where the I has a central place in the action: The action is felt as "mine". "The I," he continues, "…is experienced as being responsible for willed action…. When we envision a goal which transcends what is immediately given, and when we see ourselves realizing that goal, we feel the action to be *ours*" (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 48). There is a demand in the situation, a feeling of being called upon; nonetheless, the response to the demand should be based on willed actions in which the person has a goal or intention. After the action has been completed, we can study the I in light of the person's goals and reasons as to why the moral action has succeeded or not. In response, Dreyfus and Dreyfus begin their analysis concerning what competent people actually do in concrete situations. They use the term "egoless" to mean "free of mental content. It does not imply selflessness, self-sacrifice and the like" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990, p. 260). If a competent person sees a person in need, she or he will intuitively know what to do in the actual situation.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest that moral acts in our everyday life consist of unreflective and egoless responses to the current interpersonal situation. This seems to be consistent with what the campers experienced—the fact that their response was more or less automatic and instinctive. One month after the Utøya event, when Mr. and Mrs. Juvet were asked to comment on the reason for their actions, they responded that they were acting on some kind of "autopilot" and merely "did what they had to do". There is a difference between saying after the fact that an action has been executed because "I had no choice" and stating that "I acted at that moment based on such and such objectives and principles." Mandelbaum (1955) writes the following about willed action: "…asked to explain our action, we feel no hesitation in attributing it to the value of the goal which we aimed to achieve" (Mandelbaum 1955, p. 49). In the case of the campers, when asked, they were unable to give a proper reason for their actions and they seemed incapable of articulating the principle behind their decision to help. "It just happened," they said but the rescue operation was well organized. In other words, the response seemed to be unreflective and almost instinctive but the rescue operation itself was systematic and rationally organized based on the means they had at hand.

These experiences suggest that it is a complex moral practice that is being expressed, appealing to emotions, reason and concrete action. It would be too limiting to consider this

practice mainly a willed, goal-oriented form of practice. Someone is in distress, needing help. The response seems to be an automatic reaction to the situation at hand, but the act also expresses subjective autonomy. The further implementation of the act is characterized by a number of assessments. In the following, I wish to demonstrate how adequate reasoning abilities and subjective autonomy are involved.

The Immediate Moral Act and Subjective Autonomy

The campers perceived the situation such that they simply "had to act" on what they had seen and heard. This is not tantamount to saying that the campers "just went with the flow", and thus claiming that their actions entail an exclusion of autonomous subjectivity. On the contrary, their actions are in stark contrast to those of "the Establishment"—the police and rescue crew. They awaited orders and therefore entered the rescue work later. To borrow an expression from Juhl (2012), the acts of "the Establishment" seem "frozen" and "congealed", whereas the campers in this phase appeared as players who took responsibility and made brave choices.

Once they leapt into it, the operation was well organized. A number of assessments had to be made and various tasks were distributed between the guests at the campground. The entire campground suddenly became involved in the rescue work at hand. In an interview (*Aftenposten*, Aug. 23, 2011) with one of the volunteers from the campground named Tone Merethe Nilsen Kjøle, she said: "None of us had any previous experience doing such work, but at this particular moment, everyone acted rationally and managed to figure out what kind of help was needed and where." Everyone helped out with the rescue work as best they could.

When discussing the rationality involved, the following description by Sartre (1986) could be helpful. In his book Etik (1986), he provides a detailed account of the many assessments that take place between person A, who reaches out his hand to help person B, who is running to catch the bus. We do not know what triggers this response in person A, but by reaching out his hand, person A manifests an intention to help. This act will then adapt to the need, according to Sartre, and thus constitutes a judgment and an assessment of the situation based on the goal of helping the other person. Person A reaches out his hand at the correct height, bracing himself to take the weight of the other person. Sartre writes, "This act has consisted in allowing an extra point of support to emerge in the world" (Sartre 1986, p. 178). The person running knows that the hand has not been reached out inadvertently. As far as he is concerned, according to Sartre, something new emerges, a new creation, something unexpected, undetermined, completely modifying the situation for him and causing him to make a new choice. The hand is reached out for him to grasp it. He can decide not to grasp it—for instance if he suddenly recognizes an enemy—but, by accepting the help, person B helps materialize person A's "helping act" (Sartre 1986, pp. 178–179).

The campers ran for their boats, while person A on the bus reached out a hand. In both cases, the act is triggered by something seen and heard. The situation calls for a mobilization of the person's whole capacity: Emotions, cognitions and a willingness to act. The "initial act" seems spontaneous, but the further help and action contain many rational assessments. There is also an interpersonal dimension involved. The helping immediacy that is given and received by the other person creates unexpected mutuality. Acceptance of the extended hand produces a community of free individuals, as Sartre could have put it. The sudden kindness is accepted and materialized between them. Could the resulting mutuality create grounds for "a moment of goodness"?

"Moments of Goodness"

Inspired by the thoughts of Martin Buber, a "moment of goodness" is linked to the specific situation when a helping hand is reached out and accepted by the other person. It happens between concrete persons, in a particular situation, and it arises suddenly. Martin Buber would say that the Thou meets me through grace (Buber 2004, p. 17). Interpersonal phenomena like love, trust and goodness cannot be forced; they are not acquired skills and, as such, cannot be a result of human mastery (Adorno 1998).

In her description of "good works", Arendt (1998) discusses "goodness". She writes that good works manifest themselves within the world. They take place within the public sphere, like other activities. Good works depend on this sphere—the common world we tread in from birth to death. While goodness is truly not of this world (Arendt 1998, p. 76), the character of goodness does not fit in because it is destroyed when turned into an instrument, or when defined as being "good for" something or as "excellent" practice. Goodness in an absolute sense must be forgotten immediately. When a good work becomes known and public, it loses its specific character of goodness, of being done for nothing (Arendt 1998, p. 74).

Neither the information from interviews, nor the stories told afterwards, indicate that the helpers were extraordinary moral individuals or heroes. They were ordinary people that suddenly found themselves in a desperate situation. Some were not even aware of their good work until after the attack was over. People afterwards praised them for their actions, for actions some had hardly thought about. This seems to be consistent with the experience expressed by Walker et al. (2010): In retrospect, many moral heroes deflect praise for their actions, holding that, under similar circumstances, "anyone would have done what we did" (Walker et al. 2010).

Those involved express modesty with respect to their own effort. At the same time, they operate as "players", demonstrating a high level of action competence in terms of responding adequately to what they had seen and heard. What I have called "a moment of goodness" and what Bauman (1987) calls "a moment of generosity" is perhaps morality at its best? Inspired by Emmanuel Levinas, he describes this as follows: "Someone plays without winning…. Something that one does gratuitously, that is grace" (Bauman 1987, p. 214). "The autonomy of moral behavior," he writes, "is final and irreducible. It escapes all codification, as it does not serve any purpose outside itself. Being purposeless, it escapes all possibility of heteronomous legislation or rational argument; it remains deaf to *conatus essendi*, and hence elides the judgment of 'rational interest' and advice of calculated self-preservation…." (Bauman 1987, p. 214). The act is purposeless and not triggered by fear of sanction or promise of reward; it does not bring success or prosperity. However, the experience of goodness might leave a trace that nurtures hope and bears witness of human community and solidarity in the midst of an inhuman situation.

The description of spontaneity induced by others and the interpersonal dimension involved could imply another moral base that is different from both a cognitive approach and an approach that considers the habits and common practices of a society as the most important. This alternative base will be discussed in the following.

The Silent Demand in Interpersonal Relations

The Danish philosopher Knud E. Løgstrup (1905–1981) develops his ethical philosophy as a critique of what he characterizes as an illusion from the Period of Enlightenment, namely

the idea that a human being is "…an isolated, independent and rational individual" (Løgstrup 1987, p. 14). Rather, his outlook is that human beings thrive in relationships. A basic characteristic of human existence is that human beings live in relationships of mutual dependence, a characteristic he calls "interdependence", or "mit-ein-andre-sein, or "l'être avec" (Løgstrup 1987, p. 14). He turns our attention toward ethical phenomena of human existence, such as openness, forgiveness, compassion, love, and trust—elementary phenomena of our existence with respect to interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, while these phenomena may be described as facts, according to Løgstrup, this in itself is insufficient, as the phenomena place demands on people as well. Løgstrup argues that since both descriptive and normative elements are inherent in interpersonal phenomena, a sufficient description must also include the phenomena's inherent demands (Løgstrup 1976, p. 48). His concern here is to point out that there is an intimate connection between fact and demand; to a great extent, the demand grows out of the fact. "In other words", he writes, "the fact forces upon us the alternative: Either we take care of the other person's life or we ruin it…. To accept the fact without listening to the demand is to be indifferent to the question whether life is to be promoted or ruined" (Løgstrup 1997, p. 9).

For example, consider the issue of trust. In describing its nature, Løgstrup uses different expressions like a person "…surrendering himself, going out of himself, placing something of his own life into the hands of the other person" (Løgstrup 1997, p. 16). Such an act places an expectation on the other person. How much or how little is at stake for a person who has placed his or her trust in another varies greatly, according to Løgstrup, as it depends on several different factors:

> But in any event this trust means that in every encounter between human beings, there is an unarticulated demand, irrespective of the circumstances in which the encounter takes place and irrespective of the nature of the encounter. Regardless of how varied the communication between persons may be, it always involves the risk of one person daring to lay him- or herself open to the other in the hope of a response. This is the essence of communication, and it is the fundamental phenomenon of ethical life (Løgstrup 1997, p. 17).

The ethical demand present in any human relationship is unspoken, and it is not voiced in expressed or implied expectations. Although Løgstrup elaborates upon this idea in great detail, I am forced in this paper to limit myself to stating his conclusion, which is that the silent demand is implied as an interdependent fact of human existence, and that human lives are interwoven. Therefore, since we are connected in a common life-world, we owe it to one another to care for each other in the interdependent state to which we all belong. However, even if the essence of the demand is to take care of the other person's life, the ethical demand does not tell us how this caring should be carried out: "It is the essence of the demand that with such insight, imagination, and understanding as he or she possesses, a person must figure out for him- or herself what the demand requires" (Løgstrup 1997, p. 22). In other words, individuals must take responsibility for how the ethical demand in interpersonal encounters is to be met—especially if conflicts or fractures arise. In these instances, the individual must justify his or her actions and choices.

One interesting aspect of Løgstrup's presentation is what he asserts as the ideal moral practice, namely when it is done spontaneously—for example, when trust is immediately safeguarded. He argues that, under normal circumstances, people tend to encounter one another with natural trust, even when it comes to strangers. This may indeed seem strange, but it is part of what it means to be human. He continues:

> We would simply not be able to live: our life would be impaired and wither away if we were in advance to distrust one another, if we were to suspect the other of thievery and falsehood from the very beginning (Løgstrup 1997, pp. 8–9).

When we respond spontaneously to the other person, Løgstrup would say that the demand inherent in the interpersonal relationship is fulfilled. It is the presence of the other that induces the first person's trust and sincerity; the other person's misfortune induces the first person's compassion—and in light of the openness and connection that have been established, the ethical demand is fulfilled (Løgstrup 1976, p. 22).

According to Armgard 1981, this means that "…the person's attitude and practice are determined by an immediate focus on the situation and on the person's need" (Armgard 1981, p. 113). At this point Løgstrup draws a line between responding to the need of the other, and establishing community. The responding person opens up to the other, and is thereby drawn into the community.

To summarize so far: Previously, moral practice from Utøya has been elaborated on in light of ethical theories and based on the field of moral education. A cognitive development-oriented approach appears too narrow. The basis of the moral acts cannot be limited to rational and intellectual skills alone. This must also be seen in relation to the dramatic nature of the situation, as opposed to discussing real and imagined moral dilemmas in a relaxed atmosphere. Proximity to other people's distress seems to activate a wide range of human capacities: Reason, emotions, the ability to be attentive and the willingness to act. Furthermore, a moral basis in which morality is primarily linked to habits and common practices will also have its limitations. "The true subject", according to Heilman (2005), can be lost under the insidious effects of institutions and instrumental rationality. When a person is giving a spontaneous expression, he or she will merely copy what they have learnt and thus merely express values and ideals that exist in the established system (Heilman 2005, pp. 117–118). In this case, it is especially the people at the campground who acted contradictory to "the Establishment", such as the police and rescue crew. This demonstrated a high degree of subjective autonomy combined with an ability to plan and organize. This ability to go beyond the given has created a desire to explore another basis for the moral acts. Knud E. Løgstrup has presented a philosophical approach to ethics based in an interpersonal dimension where spontaneity is considered the best way to fulfill the ethical demand involved. In addition, there are the various stories of how help was given and received and how this created "moments of goodness". The moments arose from concrete relations, but went beyond these.

The event at Utøya was an extreme situation. This could raise the question of whether a discussion about morals and ethics associated with this event could contribute anything to the field of general education. Despite this apprehension, I will discuss how a broad approach to the field of moral education could be of relevance in the current debate on education in general. I will do so in light of the three different domains of education proposed by Biesta (2010).

From Moral Education to General Education: A Discussion

Norway does not have a strong tradition for defining moral education as a particular field of interest and research (Bergem 1994). The fostering of moral and ethical thinking and qualities is considered to be an integral part of a broad, general education program. The school is to provide a broad, general education, which also involves developing skills that

enable the learners to behave morally and to make a commitment to society and to caring for the environment (The Curriculum for the 10-Year Compulsory School in Norway, 1999, p. 55). There will then be a focus on both the cultivation of the human self and on the individual as a member of the civil society (Gustavsson 2001).

In recent years, Norway, as with other European countries, has become influenced by political and ideological ideas that have contributed to a closer connection between education and economic growth. A basic question is how to strengthen the youngster's skills and competence for the world of tomorrow. The implications of these changes are many, for instance a stronger concern for objectives and learning outcomes (Policy Document "Culture of Learning", no. 30, 2003–2004). During this process, it has proven difficult to break down broad, complex objectives to individual, measureable units. Ethical and value-related aspects of education have become less visible and have wound up in the background because these aspects are difficult to adapt to the prevailing ideology. On the other hand, during the last decade, a renewed interest in *Bildung* has arisen, but so far without significant political backing. This interest often acts as a corrective to a perception that education is merely about acquiring of a set of skills that the politicians have defined as important.

Even though there will be differences between the field of moral education and a *Bildung* tradition, they do have one aspect in common, namely an openness toward profound issues of human existence. According to Eidsvåg (2011), the renewed interest in *Bildung* has contributed to renewed acceptance for asking the following types of questions in an educational setting: What is man? What is the purpose of education? (Eidsvåg, 2011, p. 158; Biesta 2006). Within both the field of moral education and *Bildung*—there is room to go beyond the predominant paradigm to basic educational questions.

In the following, I will analyze the previous discussion about moral education in light of a broad, general description of education. This is in order to demonstrate that the field of moral education could contribute something to all of the three dimensions of education suggested by Biesta (2010, p. 19–22). Based on the experiences from Utøya, there will be a particular emphasis on the last dimension.

Three Different Domains of Education and the Role of Moral Education

In his book *Good Education in an Age of Measurement* (2010), Gert Biesta suggests three different but overlapping domains of education: qualification, socialization and subjectification (Biesta 2010, p. 14).

Qualification, according to Biesta (2010), is one of the major functions of organized education. Education aims to provide children and young people with knowledge, skills and forms of judgment that allow them to "do something" (Biesta 2010, p. 20). In this respect, a cognitive moral development tradition could contribute competence in the development of cognitive skills that enable the pupils to carefully investigate and judge complex dilemmas. Thinking skills are stimulated by solving different dilemmas, and schools can enable pupils to gain experience with solving such dilemmas. The pupils will be stimulated to develop their own moral thinking rather than being taught fixed moral rules. Kohlberg's interest is particularly directed toward the cognitive structure and the form of moral judgment rather than toward the content (Rich and DeVitis 1985, p. 99). Cognition can be tested. Different tests have been developed to measure different forms of thinking abilities but the tests have also been criticized (Gilligan 1982; Rest 1986; Bergem 1990). We know that, in the future, we will be faced with a number of complicated ethical

dilemmas within disciplines such as health, technology and welfare. The solutions to these dilemmas will require advanced moral skills and analytical competence to ensure good and fair solutions.

The socialization function, according to Biesta (2010), has to do with the many ways in which, through education, "…we become part of particular social, cultural and political 'orders'" (Biesta 2010, p. 20). The transition can happen explicitly or implicitly, for instance as a result of "the hidden curriculum". Dreyfus and Dreyfus emphasize the importance of moral expertise derived from training and socialization within a certain community. They underline the significance of broad moral training based on the habits and common social practices found within a community. In that sense, transferring morally legitimate examples and stories to children and young people would be important. They argue that, during the formative process, it is decisive that children are active and test out rules in different situations (Information, Sept 21, 1990).

In a *Bildung* perspective, a broad cultivation of the child is emphasized. It is not only about acquiring moral skills, but about developing the whole repertoire of human qualities. In addition, there is an assumption that the richness and breadth of a society's moral and cultural expressions could also serve as a barrier against the inhumane—contrasting, in this context, with the terrorist, who reduced training to a narrow field. He trained himself to block out all influence from the surroundings and to pay no attention to others. In his book An Encounter (2009/2013), Kundera, under the heading "Forgetting Schoenberg", writes about the role of art in the ghetto Theresienstadt. Among the prisoners there were many intellectuals and artists. He writes that concerts were a way of maintaining a broad range of emotions under inhuman conditions and keeping an open mind to prevent life from being reduced to only one dimension, namely horror" (Kundera 2013, p. 164). At a different time and in a different situation, the terrorist at Utøya demonstrated what can happen to man when life is reduced to only one dimension. The door to barbarism and dehumanization is wide open. What we can learn from this is the importance of maintaining everyday communities characterized by a wide range of activities. The activities indirectly influence the moral formation of the whole person and can also help people remain open and aware and thereby prevent brutality and terror.

The subjectification function, according to Biesta (2010), is not about the insertion of "newcomers" into existing orders, but about the process of becoming a subject: "… a process that allows those educated to become more autonomous and independent in their thinking and acting" (Biesta 2010, p. 21). Inspired by Hannah Arendt, he writes that subjectivity is no longer seen as an attribute of individuals, but is understood as a quality of human interaction. A human being can only come into presence in the world as a result of the ways in which others respond to him or her (Biesta 2006, pp. 106–107). This illustrates an interpersonal dimension as well as a risk, implying that, within this domain, education can never be reduced to a production process (Biesta 2014).

Previously, in the Løgstrup-inspired approach to morals and ethics, it is suggested that there is an ethical demand inherent in each encounter between people—a demand for trust, openness and charity, and the spontaneous action is triggered by the other person. In our everyday life, the unarticulated demands are often fulfilled without reflection. According to Løgstrup, it is an assumption that, when moral actions fulfil demands for trust, openness and charity, justifications are seldom required. Justifications are only required when the demand is neglected, overlooked or misused. The demand for justification is activated only when spontaneity is no longer functioning, when there are conflicting interests requiring a clarification of various principles. The campers who spontaneously responded to the ethical demand had difficulties explaining and justifying their actions afterwards; but according to

Løgstrup, it is only when a spontaneous challenge goes unanswered that the action needs to be justified.

The terrorist intentionally chose to create a distance to all areas of life that might disturb his plan. He forced himself to not succumb to the ethical challenges that arise in a common life-world. I would also like to argue that he thereby also deprived himself of the right to be an individual, as expressed by Løgstrup: “To be an individual, a self, implies that something is required of me. And this, in turn, means that the moment something is required of me, it is I who must answer for what I do or do not do” (Løgstrup 1997, p. 66). From the very start of the attack, the terrorist wore a uniform. He was a warrior in a battle he had himself defined. All along, he was a man playing a role, and this role he also took on in court. The question is: Is he about to lose himself?

Buber (2004) describes subjectivity as relational, taking the form of either an I and Thou relationship or an I and It relationship. The sphere of the I and It constitutes all mental acts that are directed toward an object. However, when the Thou is spoken, the person is directly confronting a being external to him- or herself (Buber 2004, p. 12). The relationship to the world has now changed from objectification to being. The encounter with the Thou is mutual and can be risky. It contains surprises different from a mastery position like the I and It relationship (Kristiansen 1996). The terrorist demonstrates, to the extreme, a type of mastery position that is frozen and congealed, and where all surprises are threats.

Taking the leap from this discussion into classroom life may be an abrupt transition, but these experiences are apt to demonstrate the importance of a community dimension, not only in terms of developing humanity but also as a barrier against darkness. It is of fundamental importance for a child to develop his or her subjectivity together with others. The I and Thou encounter also bears existential qualities. Friedman (1983) describes it as participation “…the courage to address and the courage to respond” (Friedman 1983, p. 22). Buber is more explicit in stating that the reciprocity also holds an existential dimension—a “liberating insight” (Buber 1978, p. 106) that human beings are not isolated and alone anymore. The feeling of belonging and community creates hope: “Because this human being exists, in the darkness the light lies hidden, in fear salvation, and in the callousness of one’s fellow-men the great Love” (Buber 1978, p. 98). Martin Buber here seems to describe the experience of the young survivors in caring for each other, namely that the proximity and openness toward each other became significant dimensions of meaning—not only during but also after the attack.

Toward the End

Sometimes, crisis situations can tell us what really matters. Spontaneous help and care did not only save lives but also became a source of “moments of goodness” which were meaningful, not only in the situation, but also afterwards. The helping immediacy was an expression of humanity and of great courage amidst the hell that these people were in.

The most frequent debate in the field of education today is not a discussion of how to better foster humanity and provide young people with a capability to care for and help others. Perhaps this discussion should have a higher priority in the future? I have attempted to prove the relevance of various moral educational approaches in a general educational setting. I have suggested that the different types of moral education may have a vital role to play within all of the three dimensions that Biesta (2010) describes as functions of education. However, when it comes to the experiences from Utøya, the issue of subjectivity and the interpersonal aspects are of particular importance. The terrorist’s thinking and

action demonstrated the horrific consequences of the use of distancing techniques in many areas of life. To prevent this from happening, it may be expedient, within an educational setting, to focus on the teaching community and its inherent opportunities for providing experiences of mutual recognition and participation.

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