Conflicting Identities: The Meaning and Significance of Popular Music in the GDR

Michael Rauhut

Charged with a special significance not attributed to it in the Western world, popular music[1] had a particular relevance in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The fans recognized the music's subversive power—a power which would eventually help topple the Wall. Peter Wicke, the German Nestor of popular music studies, argues:

> Music is a medium which is able to convey meaning and values which—even (or, perhaps, particularly) if hidden within the indecipherable world of sound—can shape patterns of behavior imperceptibly over time until they become the visible background of real political activity. In this way, rock music contributed to the erosion of totalitarian regimes throughout Eastern Europe long before the cracks in the system became apparent and resulted in its unexpected demise. (Wicke 1992, 81)

Critics counter that Eastern Bloc dictatorships tolerated these genres because they saw them as pressure relief valves; as a way for people to release pent up frustrations. According to those scholars, the state maintained continuous control, even going so far as to subsidize the music—a strategy that eventually led to the domestication of those supposedly rebellious sounds and rhythms. As emphasized by the Polish musicologist Jolanta Pekacz, "relationships between the socialist state and rock were more often symbiotic than contradictory, hence many rock musicians were more interested in 'adapting' to the *status quo*, rather than in destroying it." The "rock 'revolt' was not *against* the dominant culture, but *within* it." (Pekacz 1994, 48) Both positions are worth discussing, as they approach a complex phenomenon—one riddled with contradictions—from different perspectives. Popular music was reclaimed as

an identity-forming medium by both the fans and the state for their own respective purposes. In the end, it was precisely those contradictions that functioned as its driving force.

This contribution outlines popular music's particular conditions of existence in the GDR; and how those were reflected in the meaning and significance of that genre. I will describe the power struggles linked to opposing identity ascriptions through an analysis of music-based youth cultures in socialist East Germany.

State Policies

The GDR was founded as a socialist state in 1949. It defined itself as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and was led by the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* [Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)], which was guided by Marxist-Leninist principles. The GDR was centralistically organized and governed by ideology—and those mechanisms of control would affect the development of popular music. The state greatly limited the scope of action for private actors and monopolized the production and distribution of popular music. It possessed all decision-making power, which was manifested through a widely ramified network of institutions and legal directives. The entire media sphere and event sector were under its control. An elaborate security apparatus monitored the day-to-day dynamics. The popular music scenes were completely infiltrated by the secret service's "*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*" [unofficial collaborators]. They wrote confidential reports in which they recorded even the slightest deviation from accepted political principles, thereby triggering counteractive measures. Press, radio, and television were all forced into line as well. In contrast to Western pluralism, public opinion was censored and polished with party doctrine.

Over the decades, popular music has been discussed as a medium instrumentalized in the clash between different political systems. In the fifties and sixties, jazz, rock 'n' roll, and beat

music got caught between the fronts of the Cold War. The SED used them as a populist vehicle for their anti-Western propaganda. During difficult political times, it identified the music as a dangerous medium of ideological diversion, as a 'neurotoxin,' which would lead young people away from the path of socialism. Their attacks were directed primarily at the U.S., which was considered the "reactionary center of global imperialism" (*Kleines politisches Wörterbuch* 1973, 350) and was therefore the number one "class enemy." The SED's aversion to the genres was nourished by the fact that the U.S. was the birthplace of modern popular music; and that its state department celebrated jazz, blues, and rock as an expression of Western ideals of freedom—even dispatching entertainment artists to Eastern Bloc countries on state-sponsored tours (see Eschen 2004). Their animosity was also fed by press announcements such as the one on November 6, 1955 on the front page of *The New York Times*: "United States Has Secret Sonic Weapon – Jazz." (Belair Jr. 1955, 1)

Depending on which way the political wind was blowing, the SED exploited jazz and beat music in different ways. During brief times of détente, it was accorded a certain progressive potential, and was heard as the anticapitalist cry of the underpriviledged and subjugated. The state used Lenin's theory to argue that there were two cultures within Western societies, which were mutually antagonistic: the prevailing reactionary bourgeois culture, and the progressive-democratic culture represented by the working class. Depending on the political circumstances of the times, jazz and beat were interpreted as either a symptom of the decay of capitalism, or the domestic opposition's soundtrack of resistance.

Rock 'n' roll, however, left no room for interpretation. It was condemned as a clear symptom of crisis, of a "dying" social system gasping out its last breath of aggressive rebellion. Aesthetic resentments whipped up a fatal rhetoric that frequently used the language of the Third Reich. The press caricatured stars such as Bill Haley and Elvis Presley as marionettes of political interests, as moral scum twisting their music into an overture for a new world war.

Toward the end of the sixties, a paradigm shift occurred in the wake of a relaxation of state policy around cultural and youth issues. In spite of all the government's prohibitions and repressive measures, the underground scenes were thriving and expanding uncontrollably. So the state began to channel that energy. In 1967, "jazz" was introduced into the secondary schools' curriculum in the GDR. Once condemned and persecuted, it was finally being rehabilitated as "an expression of protest against exploitation and racial oppression." (Pezold and Herberger 1973, 167) Starting in 1969, the state broadcasting company sent out talent scouts to the most remote corners of the Republic. They were supposed to discover young rock bands and work with them on developing songs worthy of production. The company's only requirement was that the young talents express themselves in their mother tongue and avoid any extreme behavior. The media wanted to create a "socialist youth dance music," which would differentiate itself from the West and distinguish itself by maintaining its "autonomy." In reality, this concept never took off; aesthetic norms in the GDR were also set by global developments. The sole remaining statement of "autonomy" was the German lyrics, which were held over the Western-influenced sounds like a fig leaf. The history of popular music in the GDR is a history of capitulation to the overwhelming dominance of the West. Sooner or later, even the trends they had fought most vehemently were authorized and embraced by the bureaucracy's tentacled arms; it had simply become impossible to ignore their real importance in everyday life. In retrospect, the relationship between popular music and state power could be described as a permanent back and forth, as a pendulum swing between aversion, prohibition, and recognition.

In 1971, the change of government from Walter Ulbricht to Erich Honecker brought in a new era, accompanied by a new path toward "consumer socialism." The SED declared that the "increase in the material and cultural living standards of the people" was their "main

objective." (Honecker 1971, 61) In that context, popular music was recognized as an important factor for youth and cultural policies.

The governing bodies took on a pragmatic approach, revising the former, rigid strategy of differentiation. The SED leadership was now underscoring the following point: "Our dance music can never develop if it is shackled by Western trends; on the other hand, it cannot grow in a closed off, self-contained greenhouse either." (Hager 1972, 46) In the following citation, this attitude was even more clearly expressed: "We will not renounce jazz, beat, and folk just because the imperialistic mass culture is misusing them, manipulating people's powers of aesthetic judgment in the interest of maximizing profits." (Rackwitz 1972, 4) From then on, rock and pop music[2] would be extensively funded and subsidized—while also being monitored and corrupted. The state set up a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus to administrate the music scene and to guarantee total control. Nevertheless, there were glaring gaps in that system. On paper, it appeared as though the entire party hierarchy enjoyed monolithic unity. In reality, however, that was subverted by conflicts of interest, pragmatism, corruption, and resistance—their goal of uniform behavior remained an illusion. And although they had intended to direct daily cultural processes by decree, that never came to be. Even the state's vast arsenal of repressive strategies could not stop fans from continuing to develop niche scenes.

In the early 1970s, the state began expending great cost and effort to pursue their grand vision. The government wanted to raise every single individual as a "socialist personality," with the help of art and culture. That was defined as a "fully developed personality, which possesses comprehensive political, technical, and general knowledge, which holds a firm class standpoint based on a Marxist-Leninist worldview, which is characterized by high mental, physical, and moral qualities, which is imbued with collective thought and action, and which actively, consciously, and creatively contributes to the shaping of socialism." This ideal

person was declared to be the “fundamental goal of the socialist society.” (*Wörterbuch zur sozialistischen Jugendpolitik* 1975, 249) Rock and pop music were also supposed to contribute and work as a catalyst for the formation of a socialist identity. The state stoically preached the following guiding principles all the way up until its fall: “Rock music is suited to promoting the beauty of a life of peace and socialism, to strengthen the courage to face life, to show pride in achievements, to encourage civic behavior and activities and also to make contradictions transparent, and use its resources to take sides in the battle of our time.” (Generaldirektion beim Komitee für Unterhaltungskunst 1984)

Dimensions of the Everyday

There was a divide between the state’s ideological goals—used as propaganda to reinforce the state’s promotion of popular music—and the reality within the scene. As was the case for industrial nations of the Western Hemisphere and the Eastern Bloc, the popular music scenes in the GDR were hooked up to the pulse of the Anglo-American market, the source of their musical standards and cultural symbols. The sounds and images were communicated through the media in West Germany, but also in Luxemburg, Austria, and through the Allies. Almost all of the trends of the West found their East German counterpart at some point in time (see Rauhut 2002). Electronic rock and the disco wave had to first overcome the technical hurdles of an economy of scarcity, while punk had long been impeded by state repression. Psychedelic rock played almost no role in the GDR, as there was no constitutive moment of collective drug experience there. Technically ambitious playing styles, such as art rock and classic rock, exhibited much greater longevity than in their lands of origin, owing to the media’s high expectations of artistic value and the special qualifications of professional

musicians. Trends that maintained an aura of the “handcrafted” and “authentic” demonstrated considerable persistance, such as folk rock, southern rock, and the blues.

Popular music also elicited cultural youth movements in the GDR, where there was fertile ground for them to have an enormous effect. The particular climate produced by such a “closed society” increased the value of the music’s social and communicative power. The music became an allegory for “freedom,” “resistance,” and “otherness.” Under those guiding stars, fans established autonomous communication spaces, in which they were able to experience forbidden activities and act out their emotions. The fans’ habitual attitudes and peculiarities, their group dynamics, and rule-breaking concepts of sexuality, morality, and pleasure generated continuous sources of conflict. The state developed elaborate security strategies to curtail their loss of influence. Up until 1965, it was the SED who dealt with the youth cultural phenomenon, which had bloomed under the influence of the beat music scene—afterwards, the police and the Stasi were fully responsible for the day-to-day security surveillance of the people. A ministerial “directive on the political and operational fight against political and ideological deviations and underground activities among youth groups in the GDR” from May 15, 1966 defined longterm strategies. The document also provided action and interpretation schemas that would affect the way the Stasi handled the popular music scenes up until the fall of the Wall. It laid the strategical foundation for the observation and “*Zersetzung*” [subversion] of “*negativ-dekadente Jugendliche*” [negative-decadent youth], as they were generally labeled. It read: “constant operational control can be ensured by the targeted recruitment of members of Western-oriented music groups and their fan base.” (*Dienstanweisung* 1966, 43)

Discussions about domestic youth cultures were mainly held internally and under ideologically biased conditions up until the end of the eighties; the media took no notice of them. Official statements referred exclusively to the West. Hippies, punks, and skinheads

were seen as disillusioned and manipulated youth; as a symptom of the crisis of capitalism. The following was written about the “flower children,” for instance: “The rejection of a meaningful life, using escape into drugs and narcotic music as a ‘critique’ of a society of exploitation; that is precisely the lifestyle required by this doomed social order in order to extend its lifespan.” (Hofmann 1971, 72) Even though it was almost impossible to overlook the importance of punk in the day-to-day life of many East German youth at that time, the state declared that punk had “no influence whatsoever” in the GDR: “First, the musical elements originate from rock music’s earliest forms, and are thus meaningless to any evolved form of rock music. Second, punk can only be understood in its specific social context. Third, punk contradicts our socialist norms of morality and ethics.” (Lasch 1980, 94)

Specific Characteristics of the Youth Scenes

As in other places around the world, popular music was at the core of identity creation in the GDR. It functioned as a brace between a diverse reservoir of symbols, behavior patterns, and attitudes that served as markers of differentiation. Only a circle of initiates could decipher their codes. Their cultural context was a space of self-discovery and self-realization. The British sociologist Simon Frith made the following, justifiable claim:

> The first reason, then, we enjoy popular music is because of its use in answering questions of identity: we use pop songs to create for ourselves a particular sort of self-definition, a particular place in society. The pleasure that pop music produces is a pleasure of identification – with the music we like, with the performers of that music, with the other people who like it. (Frith 1987, 140)

That social positioning held a strong political connotation in the GDR. The state did hold some aesthetic reservations about popular music; it stoked generational conflicts—but it was the social effects that were continuously interpreted as a threat. The fact that youth were

vering off the predetermined path, and discovering their own pattern of socialization, was seen by the state as a frontal assault on its authority. That which the state had wanted to regulate and direct was in danger of spinning out of control: the comprehensive realization of the ideal socialist personality, including outside of official spheres of school and work. The state reacted in a correspondingly negative fashion. The youth caught in the crosshairs responded with denial or resistance. And so the politicization of popular music found itself in a vicious cycle following the law of action and reaction. The permanent suspicion and hypersensitivity of the censors and security agencies conferred a particular symbolic power to the music and the cultural activities linked to it, which it did not hold elsewhere. The close-knit regulations, which were supposed to guarantee influence and control, elicited the opposite effect: They awakened a creative desire for the forbidden, encouraging people to search the system for vulnerabilities and to develop nische scenes.

Youth cultures created around popular music thus possessed a special quality due to the effect of the social and political relations in the country. They moved within a field of tension determined by both global influences and contradictions within the socialist system. The following section will analyze the defining characteristics of these scenes to provide an idea of the part the music played in everyday life. I will limit this discussion to one particular example: a scene whose representatives called themselves "*Blueser*" [bluesers] or "*Tramper*" [hitchhikers], who could be considered the East German version of the hippies. Not only was it the longest-lasting and liveliest youth culture to have existed, it was also the most flamboyant in the country. Born in the wake of Woodstock, the blueser scene began to lose its significance in the eighties due to competing pressure from punk, heavy metal, and other more attractive modes of self-identification. The scene enjoyed its heyday in the second half of the seventies. Successive generations of bluesers followed the guiding principles of the hippie era. "Freedom," "authenticity," and "non-conformism" were the primary values

reflected in their behavioral patterns, their artistic preferences, and their attire (see Rauhut 2016).

Style

GDR youth cultures can be distinguished from communities in other countries by looking at their stylistic repertoire, only partly inspired by the images and behavior codes transferred from the West. Both groups revelled in their long hair, men grew beards and women enjoyed wearing flowing skirts. Bluesers and hippies alike wore jeans and sandals, headbands, necklaces, amulettes, and the obligatory peace sign. However, if you were to put bluesers from the East next to hippies from San Francisco, you would notice subtle, but important, differences in their outfits. For example, bluesers mixed in their own everyday, traditional and regional items with typical Western dresscode items. They wore work shirts, climbing boots, which were actually meant for mountain climbers, and preferred to stow away their belongings in an old-fashioned midwife's bag, taking the bricolage principle a step further with their mishmash of "originality" and "innovation." These added style elements were not just cheap and easily attainable, they were also perfectly suited to the group's aesthetic concept.

There were also shifts in emphasis as far as the music was concerned. As the scene-goers self-given name indicates, their focal interest was the blues. Of course, that genre was also part of the hippies' sound cosmos; they celebrated Janis Joplin and the Doors and had their guitar god in Jimi Hendrix. What was specific to the scene in the GDR was the central importance of the blues and the suppression of any psychedelic elements, as represented by bands such as the Grateful Dead and Jefferson Airplane. There were two sources of their quasi religious glorification of the blues: it was a relic of romantic, European patterns of interpretation while also being an expression of the youths' rejectionist attitude. The demand for "authenticity"

and “pure emotion” was projected onto this African American music; the oppression of the former slaves was seen as the bluesers’ ancestral tale of woe.

Autonomy

Even though they were motivated by international trends, youth cultures enjoyed a certain level of autarky in the GDR. Specifically defined social positions and lifestyle concepts were obscured behind that iconic, seemingly standardized surface. Youth cultures in the East drew much of their substance from their own country’s potential for social conflict. All the West provided was the raw material, the stylistic repertoire. Or as the sociologists Manfred Stock and Philipp Mühlberg put it, “The ‘blueprints’ are used to manifest one’s own experiences, in the placing of the building blocks, in the combination of signs.” (Stock and Mühlberg 1990, 236)

The blues genre was reassessed in the GDR, becoming the sound of the silent resistance, a cipher for individuality and non-conformity. Blues fans heard songs detailing experiences of exclusion and marginalization, and related that to their own circumstances. Their committment to the music functioned as a symbolic act of self-empowerment, as a protest against a repressive system. For the majority of fans, that aspect was implicit to the music, even as their main motivation—enjoyment—persisted.

Relevance

Youth cultures in the GDR had a lengthy half-life, socially speaking. They gained traction a bit later than in West Germany, but ended up lasting longer in the end. The phenomenon continued long after the hippie wave had passed its peak and the punk explosion had lost its spark in the West. This anachronistic tenacity was the result of biotopic conditions: Youth cultures in the East were not subjected to market logic, or calculated into the industrial chain

of exploitation. The British pop music critic George Melly summed up this typical Western behavior in a succinct formula: “What starts as revolt finishes as style—as mannerism.” (Melly 1972, 43) That was not the case in the GDR, at least not in regards to its commerical inevitability. The hippie, punk, goth, and metalhead looks and associated attitudes were not recognized as sources of economic capital and thus robbed of their rebellious posture. Those marketing mechanisms did not exist in the GDR. The clothing and acessories that constituted the scene’s style and functioned as symbols of differentiation could not be bought in stores; acquiring them often required a considerable amount of energy and struggle. But they retained their explosive cultural and political power—much longer than they had in their source countries.

Politics

The specific meaning of youth cultures in the GDR was politically determined. It is true that Western role models provided them with their basic stylistic repertoire and ideological benchmarks—but those were in turn absorbed into the fields of social conflict, only to reemerge within new contexts of meaning. This was a multistage process. Anybody in the GDR who was a blueser or a punk had made the decision to act against the political norm, against the ideals of a socialist upbringing and personality profile. The automatic response to that was to charge them as “enemies of the state,” which led to penalties, or to incarceration in the most extreme cases. This stigmatization resulted in resistance, causing the scenes to self-identify increasingly as political. There was one last step in the confrontation between the power of the state and the scene: cultural-political appropriation. This strategy proved to be the most effective path toward the paralysis of oppositional groups, and all in all had the same effect as commercialization in the West. Youth cultures mutated into public assets, into an official form of entertainment, forfeiting their polarizing power.

The blueser culture also bore the marks of political influence; and there was a snowball effect. With their long hair and parkas, the security agencies' had them in their sights from the very beginning. They were labelled as "*politisch-negativ*" [politically negative], "*westlich-dekadent*" [decadently Western], and "*asozial*" [antisocial]. As they continued to grow in numbers, so did pressure from the police and the Stasi. The movement reached its zenith toward the end of the seventies—as did the state's strategy of repression. On January 14, 1978, the head of the secret service at the time, Erich Mielke, ordered an increase of "political and operational work" and "strict compliance with socialist criminal law" (*Dienstanweisung* 1978) in the case of emergency. Step by step, the Ministry for State Security refined its strategic repertoire and perfected its system of informers. Work instructions, training, and graduation theses from the *Juristische Hochschule Potsdam* [Academy of Law in Potsdam] provided detailed analyses and planning. "*Operative Vorgänge*" [operational procedures] and "*Operative Personenkontrollen*" [operational identity verification] with code names such as "*Blues*," "*Penner*" [riffraff], "*Tramper*" [hitchhikers] or "*Diestel*" focused particularly on musicians and on the suspiciously "long-haired." It was not uncommon for them to be observed for years, which limited their field of activity and gradually disabled (or to use the Stasi's word: "*zersetzt*" [subverted]) them by way of a slow campaign of subtle terror.

At its heart a hedonistic youth culture, the scene's fringe came into increasing contact with oppositional trends as a result of political persecution. The Protestant church's "*Offene Arbeit"* [open work] which catered to a non-denominational clientele, became a gathering point for non-conforming youth. Quite a few of them were self-defined bluesers. Between 1979 and 1986, East Berlin "blues masses" were aimed specifically at that target group (see Rauhut 2017); they also found a home in the Church's environmental and peace movement. Bluesers were inadvertently spared the last phase in the downward spiral of politicization: state appropriation. In the mid-eighties, the scene began to suffer from a lack of fresh

members, as new youth cultures became more attractive. Now there were loud, mohawk-wearing punks raising their fists up against the system, heavy metal fans who were shocking people with their muscles and leather—and the growing swarm of skinheads represented a striking rebuttal to the claim that neo-Nazism did not exist in the GDR. The security agencies were confronted with other, larger problems. It was only a question of time until the terrifying spectre of the bluesers disappeared from the political agenda.

Conclusion

The antagonistic relationship between the contrasting identity constructions worked as an important driving force in the development of popular music in the GDR. Both sides, the state and the fans, imbued the music with their own particular meanings. According to the will of the power structure, music should uphold the principle of social equality and contribute to the upbringing of a new kind of human being. The "socialist personality" must accept a subordinate role to the collective, and complete the metamorphosis "from I to we," a common slogan at the time. Music fans, however, strove for the opposite; they were looking for individuality and differentiation. They thought of popular music as the ideal medium for emancipation and self-realization. In the musical trends of the West, they heard the sound of freedom. Jazz, blues, and rock allowed them to flee to another world emotionally and mentally; a world beyond the Iron Curtain.

In the GDR, popular music possessed a true political dimension. The state recognized its potential as a tool in the ideological clash between systems and implemented elaborate mechanisms to monitor and control the public. The integration of popular music into the cultural and security policy apparatus involved an enormous potential for conflict. Breaking the rules was unavoidable for musicians and fans, who saw their basic interests being

violated. As far as the government was concerned, that constitued the undermining of socialist power structures—but its reaction to that subversion ended up accelerating the downward political spiral. Pressure generated resistance. These frictions remained characteristic of the GDR from its foundation to its collapse. They released an energy that, despite all the obstructions and prohibitions, yielded a productive result. The bulk of popular music's appeal in East Germany came from its frictional relationship with the system. That continuous conflict between antagonistic identity patterns nourished a music culture that was of both high quality and relevance.

Translated by Jessica Ring

References

Belair Jr., Felix. 1955. "United States Has Secret Sonic Weapon – Jazz." *New York Times,* November 6: 1 and 42.

Dienstanweisung. 1966. *Dienstanweisung Nr. 4/66 zur politisch-operativen Bekämpfung der politisch-ideologischen Diversion und Untergrundtätigkeit unter jugendlichen Personenkreisen in der DDR,* May 15. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (BStU), ZA, MfS VVS 008–365/66.

Dienstanweisung. 1978. *Dienstanweisung Nr. 8/78,* January 14. BStU, ZA, VVS MfS 008–8/78, Dok. 102433.

Eschen, Penny Marie von. 2004. *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War.* Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: Harvard University Press.

Frith, Simon. 1987. “Towards an Aesthetic of Popular Music.” In *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception,* edited by Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, 133–149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Generaldirektion beim Komitee für Unterhaltungskunst. 1984. *Standpunkt zur Entwicklung der Rockmusik in der DDR,* May 21. Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch): DY 30/39004.

Hager, Kurt. 1972. *Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED: 6. Tagung des ZK der SED, 6.–7. Juli 1972.* Berlin (DDR): Dietz.

Hofmann, Heinz Peter. 1971. *ABC der Tanzmusik.* Berlin (DDR): Verlag Neue Musik.

Honecker, Erich. 1971. “Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands.” In *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VIII. Parteitages der SED,* Vol. 1, 34–123. Berlin (DDR): Dietz.

Kleines politisches Wörterbuch. 1973. *Kleines politisches Wörterbuch,* 2nd ed. Berlin (DDR): Dietz.

Lasch, Stefan. 1980. *PS: Rock-Musik.* Berlin (DDR): Tribüne.

Melly, George. 1972. *Revolt into Style: The Pop Arts in Britain.* London: Penguin Books.

Middleton, Richard. 2001. “Rock.” In *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* 2nd ed., Volume 21, edited by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, 485–486. London: Macmillan.

Middleton, Richard et al. 2001. “Pop.” In *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* 2nd ed., Volume 20, edited by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, 101–122. London: Macmillan.

Middleton, Richard, and Peter Manuel. 2001. “Popular Music.” In *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians,* 2nd ed., Volume 20, edited by Stanley Sadie and John Tyrrell, 128–166. London: Macmillan.

Pekacz, Jolanta. 1994. “Did Rock Smash the Wall? The Role of Rock in Political Transition.” *Popular Music* Volume 13/1: 41–49.

Pezold, Hans, and Rainer Herberger. 1973. *Musik: Lehrbuch für die Klassen 9 und 10,* 2nd ed. Berlin (DDR): Volk und Wissen.

Rackwitz, Werner. 1972. “Wie steht es mit unserer Tanzmusik? Referat des Stellvertreters des Ministers für Kultur, Dr. Werner Rackwitz, anlässlich der Tanzmusikkonferenz am 24. und 25. April 1972 in Berlin.” *Sonntag,* June 11, Beilage.

Rauhut, Michael. 2002. *Rock in der DDR 1964 bis 1989.* Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Rauhut, Michael. 2016. *Ein Klang – zwei Welten: Blues im geteilten Deutschland, 1945 bis 1990.* Bielefeld: transcript.

Rauhut, Michael. 2017. “With God and Guitars: Popular Music, Socialism, and the Church in East Germany.” *Popular Music and Society* Volume 40/3: 292–309.

Stock, Manfred, and Philipp Mühlberg. 1990. *Die Szene von Innen: Skinheads, Grufties, Heavy Metals, Punks.* Berlin: LinksDruck.

Wicke, Peter. 1992. “The Times They Are A-Changin’: Rock Music and Political Change in East Germany.” In *Rockin’ the Boat: Mass Music and Mass Movements,* edited by Reebee Garofalo, 81–92. Boston: South End Press.

Wicke, Peter, Wieland and Kai-Erik Ziegenrücker. 2007. *Handbuch der populären Musik: Geschichte, Stile, Praxis, Industrie,* new expanded edition. Mainz: Schott.

Wörterbuch zur sozialistischen Jugendpolitik. 1975. *Wörterbuch zur sozialistischen Jugendpolitik.* Berlin (DDR): Dietz.

Notes

[1] For the definition of terminology specific to popular music, see here and in the following: Wicke and Ziegenrücker 2007. On the concept of “popular music,” see Middleton and Manuel 2001.

[2] For a differentiation of “rock” and “pop music,” see Middleton 2001 and Middleton et al. 2001.