

# **Propaganda ‘Worth an Army’**

## **The Norwegian Labour Party, Haakon Lie and the Transnational Dissemination of Cold War Propaganda, 1945-55**

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### **Abstract:**

The working class was the most important target for British and American propaganda in Norway during the early Cold War. The propagandists found eager allies in certain Norwegian Labour Party partisans, who wanted support in their struggle against communist and Soviet influence. Party Secretary Haakon Lie became their key contact. Soon after the war, he started propaganda cooperation with the British Labour Party, as well as the British and US Embassies in Oslo, mostly on his own initiative. New opportunities arose with the onset of the Cold War and the establishment of secret Western campaigns to influence public opinion abroad. From 1948 onward, anti-communist propaganda poured into Norway, reaching a peak during the Korean War. In the early 1950s the British Foreign Office, the US State Department and the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom were all cooperating with the Norwegian Labour Party. This article gives an overview of the transnational dissemination of propaganda through Labour’s party and union apparatus, arguing that the Western propagandists’ remarkable reach towards the Norwegian labour movement and working class was a cultural ‘empire by invitation’.

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### **Keywords:**

Transnational propaganda, anti-communism, The Norwegian Labour Party, Haakon Lie, Early Cold War

## Introduction

In March 1945, two months before the German capitulation in Norway, and amid on-going discussions about forming a united Norwegian labour party of both social democrats and communists, Haakon Lie (1905-2009) wrote a letter from Washington D.C. to his mentor and party comrade Martin Tranmæl. He warned that the rhetoric of reconciliation coming from the communists’ leadership at the time, like that of their ideological brothers elsewhere, was merely a mask for their true intentions:

We should carefully avoid blind hatred towards the communists. What I see here – and what I saw in Canada – however, makes me more and more suspicious. The communists are just as dishonest as before – just as ruthless in their fight for power. [...] There are no grounds for cooperation with such a movement, and if we let them in on us, our own movement will be consumed from within. The communists are obviously enormously strengthened and energized by the Russian prestige. But there were those other than the Russians who contributed in this war. I know a good deal about the contribution of the English-speaking democracies, and in Norway I would like to tell people about that. That is one of the reasons I want to go home.<sup>1</sup>

Haakon Lie had spent much of the Second World War touring the industrial regions of North America, promoting the cause of the Norwegian resistance and securing financial support from the American and Canadian labor unions.<sup>2</sup> Years later, he concluded that he had gotten so attached to American society that he would probably have stayed if he had been younger.<sup>3</sup> Like most of his party comrades, Haakon Lie had enthusiastically supported the building of socialism in the Soviet Union in the interwar years, but turned decisively against the Soviets after the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of the Winter War in Finland.<sup>4</sup> After a short period of aggressive anti-communism, many members of the Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti) reverted to more favorable views of the Soviet Union and the communists, in light of their tenacious fight against Nazi Germany from 1941. Haakon Lie did not share these comrades’ newfound sympathy, and his view of the international communist movement as a treacherous and possibly dangerous adversary was presumably the sharpest expression of a general skepticism that prevailed in the party leadership. The letter to Tranmæl set the tone for Lie’s engagement as an anti-communist propagandist in the coming decade. Entering the Cold War, he would devote much of his energy to convincing both his own party comrades and the working-class public of the

progressiveness of the American and British societies, and of the totalitarian threat represented by the communists and the Soviet Union.

To what extent and how did Haakon Lie cooperate with foreign individuals, organizations and states in the transnational dissemination of political propaganda<sup>5</sup> to and from Norway from 1945-55? Seen through the transnational contacts of Party Secretary Lie, what was the Norwegian Labour Party's position in, and main contributions to, early transnational Cold War propaganda networks?<sup>6</sup> Focusing on Haakon Lie as an important 'node' in a vast transnational network confines the study. I propose the term 'critical editor' to describe Lie's forging of strategic connections and his strong influence on the initiation, creation, translation, adaptation and strategic dissemination of propaganda.

Since the late 1960s the Cold War has been a major field of investigation among Norwegian historians. During the first decades of Norwegian Cold War historiography, the main focus was on foreign and security policy, diplomacy, international economic cooperation, Norway's position in the NATO alliance, military strategy and nuclear policy.<sup>7</sup> Considering Labour's political dominance in the decades after 1945, it was to be expected that many of these studies focused on the inner life of the party and its cabinets.<sup>8</sup> Since the 1990s, works have highlighted political surveillance and anti-Communism in Norway during the Cold War, much of it directly involving the Labour organizations.<sup>9</sup> Internationally the 'Cultural Cold War' has emerged as a substantial new historical field since the 1990s. Works have focused on the international propaganda campaigns run by the US State Department and the British Foreign Office, as well as the regional and national manifestations of the Cultural Cold War.<sup>10</sup> With its intriguing links to the CIA, the Congress for Cultural Freedom has been one major object of interest.<sup>11</sup> The historiography of the early Cold War era in Norway is extensive and some contributions, most notably by Helge Danielsen on US public diplomacy in Norway in the 1950s, have touched upon the battle for the hearts and minds of Norwegians during the early Cold War.<sup>12</sup> Certain pieces of information concerning the US contribution to and financing of some Labour publications in 1950-51 surfaced in the 1990s, yet no historians have done an in-depth analysis of Labour's involvement in the dissemination of propaganda through transnational networks in the early Cold War.<sup>13</sup>

To get a comprehensive picture of Haakon Lie and Labour's position in and main contributions to such networks towards Norway's signing of the Atlantic Pact in 1949 and the consolidation of the Cold War in the 1950s, it is crucial to include the immediate post-war era, when cautious propaganda scuffles between the great powers as well as between

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communists and social democrats took place, long before ‘the Cold War’ was a term on everyone’s lips.

#### **Propagating Westernism**

In 1945 Western Allies were militarily present in most of Norway except for Finnmark, where the Soviets stood with the Red Army. During the autumn these Allied armies left Norwegian soil. Their propaganda apparatuses did not. After the British Labour Party under Clement Attlee had taken over the cabinet in late July, the propagandists at the British Embassy in Oslo started cooperating with the Norwegian Labour Party. To the Foreign Office they reported to have supplied Labour with 34 films ‘for showing at pre-election party meetings.’<sup>14</sup> The report summed up different channels for the dissemination of material in Norway and this was the only mention of contributions to a political party. There is reason to believe that the newly elected Party Secretary of Labour, Haakon Lie, who had returned to Norway in August, was involved in the arrangement. He operated the daily correspondence with all branches and regional offices of the highly centralized party, as well as the party’s international connections. As one of the leading party strategists, he also actively worked on the election campaign. Lie’s major fields of expertise were political schooling and propaganda. It is hard to imagine that the British films could have bypassed his office. It is rather more probable that he tried to make his party benefit from the successful election campaign of the British Labour Party for Norwegian Labour Party’s own campaign before the Norwegian parliamentary elections held on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October.

What we do know is that Haakon Lie initiated similar contacts with the US Embassy, most notably with Walter Galenson, who was sent to Oslo as a Labor Attaché in May 1945. In his first months in Norway, Galenson found it hard to establish contacts within the Norwegian labour movement. That changed in the late summer, when he got acquainted with Haakon Lie. According to Galenson, Lie drew him into a confidential cooperation, even securing technical support in his party’s election campaign:

I went electioneering with him. He was very interested at that time in showing TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] films about how we had harnessed the water falls, because they were pushing that water fall business there. So I got a hold of some of the TVA films. We would go to [a] small town and he would give an election speech, then I would run the machine and he would lecture. So I was...



Probably illegally... When the Ambassador heard about it, he was a little bit worried, but he didn't complain.<sup>15</sup>

Through motion pictures Haakon Lie propagated the story of Roosevelt's New Deal flagship to potential voters. The goal seems to have been twofold, to show the progressiveness of democratic America and to instill in the audience the impression that Labour had equally ambitious plans for the reconstruction of Norway. Approaching the elections, the labour movement was on the offensive. In June, Einar Gerhardsen, a Labour politician recently freed from German captivity, became Prime Minister. Two communists became ministers in his interim coalition cabinet. The Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) and Labour had prepared themselves better for their return to legal political life than the non-socialist parties, which, to a great extent, paused their activities during the five years of occupation.<sup>16</sup> Owing to the broad recognition of the sacrifices made by both the Soviet Union and the communist resistance groups in the fight against Nazi Germany, the NKP had won public support and thousands of new members and adherents during the war, among them many old members of Labour. From a pre-war existence as a political sect, they entered the political scene of liberated Norway as a substantial force with mass support. The NKP had a new, national profile and a conciliatory rhetoric emphasizing parliamentary democracy, cooperation with 'progressive forces' in society and a peaceful road to socialism.<sup>17</sup> Union grassroot demands for a unified labour party led to negotiations between Labour and NKP in the summer, but strong mutual distrust among the party leaders made the joining of forces unfeasible, which created widespread disappointment in the unions.<sup>18</sup> The labour parties faced the elections as independent forces competing for the same working class votes.

The election results demonstrated that the war had moved the public opinion dramatically to the left. For the first time, the labour parties together received more than 50 percent of the popular vote. The NKP got 11.9 percent, while Labour got 41 percent, which won the latter a parliamentary majority it would retain until 1961. Shortly after the elections, the labour educational organization Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund (AOF) published a pamphlet on American productivity committees during the war based on material gathered by Haakon Lie in the USA. Marjorie Galenson from the US Embassy, an academic married to the Labor Attaché, had prepared it for publication.<sup>19</sup> In return for their services to the Norwegian Labour Party, the Galensons were kept informed about labour politics and communist-linked topics, information that they reported back to the State Department.<sup>20</sup>

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In early 1946 Haakon Lie worked to publish a pamphlet on the heroic war effort of the British unions. He had written the text in Great Britain during the war and had Fabian Society in London revise and update it with the British Embassy as intermediary.<sup>21</sup> Though it is unclear whether the re-publication materialized, it represented one of the first of many attempts by Lie in the post-war era to present the British labour movement as a positive and relevant model in Norway. By that time, he had established confidential contacts with the two British propagandists Press Attaché Kit Kenney and Press Reader John Inman. In January 1946 Lie began to receive background material from Inman. In a letter Inman thanks Lie for an 'enjoyable evening' at Lie's home, then emphasized that the origin of certain articles he supplied, the likes of which he offered to continue providing, had to be kept secret: 'You can make any use you like of these, provided that my name is not mentioned and there is no kind of reference to the Embassy or Foreign Office.'<sup>22</sup>

As with Haakon Lie's cooperation with the Americans, such *ad-hoc* and small-scale efforts were initiated by Lie and his personal contacts at the British embassy. They were not the result of a coordinated policy. Presumably, that was the background for a dispatch from Ambassador Laurence Collier to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in March 1946, where Collier emphasized the importance of the attitude of the Norwegian labour movement for positive British-Norwegian relations. He advised that further efforts should be made to support a group within the Norwegian Labour Party that wanted to see closer connections to the British labour movement, 'because they want to develop united labour action on an international basis, but also because they want to set up a focus of interest which would counter the inclination towards Russia which might otherwise exist in the Norwegian working class.'<sup>23</sup> Only much later would Bevin respond to such encouragements with a coordinated British propaganda policy to counter pro-Soviet sentiments in Norway.

Lie's propaganda seems to have been quite uncontroversial within the labour movement in the first post-war year. The pamphlet on US productivity committees was even recommended by the communist daily *Friheten (The Freedom)*, illustrating that such texts were not perceived as anti-Soviet.<sup>24</sup> A conciliatory spirit prevailed in the political debate. Few saw the East-West divide as unbridgeable and there was hope for the possibilities of international cooperation through the United Nations, which was even headed by the former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Labour politician Trygve Lie. The Gerhardsen cabinet followed a policy of 'bridge building' in foreign affairs, characterized by a restrained noncommittal approach to East-West

relations and polite cautiousness towards the Soviets, but no real efforts to construct any diplomatic or ideological bridges.<sup>25</sup>

### **Skirmishes with the communists**

The slowly rising international tensions after 1945 were paralleled by developments within the Norwegian labour movement. At some point in late 1946 or early 1947, Haakon Lie distributed a paper to trusted associates in the party leadership, where he sketched up a new propaganda strategy for the party. In regard to the communists, Lie emphasized that Labour had to come out on the offensive:

It does not serve us well that our guys accept NKP as just another labour party. They must now take up the fight and drive out the rats everywhere where they have dug in. [...] We can't have a fight with the communists without simultaneously putting a spotlight on Russia, and the methods applied there. The struggle is one of principle, and we have to mark our distance to the dictatorship, the violent revolution, the terror and the suppression of the most fundamental human rights.<sup>26</sup>

The campaign was already in motion. One of the first initiatives was the publication of the Chairman of the British Labour Party Harold Laski's *The Secret Battalion*. Laski and General Secretary Morgan Phillips had visited Norway in August 1945, as the first British delegates ever to attend a Norwegian Labour Party congress.<sup>27</sup> That same summer the first round of negotiations for a united labour party broke down and fights for control of unions ensued between NKP and Labour.<sup>28</sup> Labour now framed that interparty conflict in an international context. Through propaganda for 'unity', it was claimed in Labour's preface to *The Secret Battalion*, 'communist parties everywhere seek to create a united front with socialist parties – with the aim of destroying them.'<sup>29</sup>

In November 1946 Labour released the trade union journal *Arbeidsplassen (The Work Place)*, edited and for a large part written by the Party Secretary.<sup>30</sup> Haakon Lie had intentionally chosen a 'sharp, insensitive tone', and attacked the 'sanctimonious' communists for speaking 'the fairest words of democracy and rule of the people', while apparently forgetting all about their own ideological ABC of 'class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat'.<sup>31</sup> From the first edition onwards the journal highlighted social conditions in the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe, contrasting policy, wages and prices with the situation in

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Norway: ‘Both the Russian and the Norwegian governments have the tremendous task hanging over their heads of stopping rising prices and inflation. The numbers show how much better we have handled this issue.’<sup>32</sup> The comparisons were made tangible by listing up how much bread, butter, sugar, textiles and shoes you could buy for the average monthly salary in the Soviet Union. The underlying argument was hard to miss: Was this really the worker’s ideal state?

Haakon Lie’s attacks on the Soviet Union were controversial in his party. Pro-Soviet sentiments prevailed among many members, and ‘bridge building’ was still the official party policy. On grounds of its anti-Sovietism, some leaders of local party branches even protested the distribution of *Arbeidsplassen* to their members.<sup>33</sup> Lie was a partisan in a struggle between loose fractions of the governing party. In this internal struggle he reaped benefits from the position as Party Secretary that enabled him to utilize resources from a network transcending both national and party borders. Until the dollars started to flow in 1948-49, in connection to the Marshall Plan and other US initiatives, the foreign support Lie received was in the form of propaganda material secured through his transnational connections. One significant example is his cooperation with Denis Healey, the Secretary of the International Department of the British Labour Party. As both were in charge of their parties’ international connections, they had met at socialist international conferences, at which Lie had encouraged the establishment of the Socialist Information and Liaison Office (SILO) that emerged as a small information bureau managed by Healey in London.<sup>34</sup> Yet, in the first post-war years, the international socialist movement was torn between East and West, and SILO could not be used for the dissemination of anti-communist propaganda without taking the risk of a serious organisational backlash. Channels bypassing the established framework of the international labour movement were preferable.

In the spring of 1947, Healey wrote the pamphlet *Cards on the Table* in an attempt to persuade party supporters of Moscow’s ‘sustained and violent offensive’ against British interests.<sup>35</sup> He claimed that it was unrealistic to believe in the possibility of Britain’s neutrality in the emerging global conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union. Great Britain had to take a more pro-American position. That message was something Haakon Lie could use domestically to support his position in the party debate. He soon translated the pamphlet into Norwegian himself.<sup>36</sup> In a letter he told Healey that he was uncertain as to whether the party’s Executive Committee would agree to publish it, but then a month later confirmed that they would indeed go ahead with the publication.<sup>37</sup> As the international

situation was changing rapidly in the summer of 1947, Lie also discussed the pamphlet with Kit Kenney. As some time had passed since its publication in Britain, Haakon Lie emphasized the need for an extra chapter to be added on the implications of Secretary of State George Marshall's recent declaration of the US' commitment to European economic recovery, and the subsequent international conference in Paris. In a letter to Denis Healey, Kenney expressed his sincere hope that Lie's request could be met, as the Embassy attached great importance to the pamphlet's circulation in Norway.<sup>38</sup> Healey accepted and added his reflections on recent developments.

*Cards on the Table* was published in Norway in October 1947, shortly after establishment of Moscow's Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).<sup>39</sup> Cominform was taken as a general propaganda threat to US interests in Europe and represents another significant step towards the consolidation of antagonistic ideological blocs in Europe. Two days after the proclamation of Cominform, Director of the Office of European Affairs in US State Department, John Hickerson, summed up how the situation in Norway related to the broader picture, based mostly on reports from the Embassy in Oslo:

The danger to the United States from Soviet propaganda in Norway is not in the field of Norwegian internal politics, but rather in the international field. It does not appear that the tenets of Communism itself are making great progress in Norway. The Social Democratic Labor Movement is vigorously led and has not only been successful in withstanding Communist offensives but has even succeeded in whittling down the Communist party strength. Where the Communists have had their success is in throwing doubt on the United States as a world leader.<sup>40</sup>

In this regard, Hickerson highlighted the negative focus in the Norwegian press on the 'negro problem' – the segregation of African-Americans in the USA. Hickerson presumed that this interest was initiated or at least stimulated by communist propaganda. Another negative focus was that the Labour press, the leading one in Norway according to Hickerson, 'often discusses the matter of capitalist economic policy in socialist terms which are unfavorable to the United States'.<sup>41</sup> There was no policy response to the such propaganda 'dangers' to the US interest in Europe, but in the late fall of 1947 measures were under way.<sup>42</sup> In the absence of an American propaganda policy, Haakon Lie personally put a lot of work into efforts to eradicate negative views of the US on grounds of its capitalism. In December, the party's publishing house Tiden published Lie's book *The Labour Movement in the United States (Arbeiderbevegelsen i*

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*de forente stater*), presenting the American unions as an influential and progressive factor in the US economy. The book was filled with updated statistics and charts, probably supplied to Lie by the US labor attaché. In late 1947 and early 1948 Lie repeatedly emphasized the involvement of the American unions in what amounted to a campaign of public lectures, co-edited and pamphlets arguing for Norwegian participation in the Marshall Plan.<sup>43</sup>

So far, I have shown how Haakon Lie, by 1948, had sought and received propaganda support and material from three main sources: the British Labour Party and the British and US Embassies in Oslo. His competence in propaganda, his transnational network and his strategic position in the dominant political movement in Norway made him a valuable partner for Western propagandists engaged in piecemeal measures. In the following section I will explore how Lie’s Western connections laid the grounds for his becoming a key actor both in Norway and internationally when different Western state agencies initiated comprehensive propaganda campaigns to combat Soviet communism. Repetitive deadlocks in the UN in 1947 made it painfully clear for the Labour cabinet that the foundations for its foreign policy were crumbling under its feet. What then was the alternative for a small state like Norway that had its dream of neutrality burst on German bayonets in the last war? In late 1947 there were no defence alliances available to consider. Lie therefore eagerly awaited a new policy from the emerging ‘West’. When it materialized, it came with propaganda to support it.

#### **The Information Research Department**

On the 22 January 1948, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin signaled a change in British foreign policy. To the House of Commons, he claimed that the Soviet ‘police State’ was consolidating territorial gains from the war by ruthless suppression of non-communists, and yet, ‘she is not satisfied with this tremendous expansion’.<sup>44</sup> To resist it, Bevin proposed a military ‘Western Union’ of Britain, France and the Benelux-countries – and possibly ‘other historic members of European civilisation’. Was the latter an invitation to Scandinavia? Haakon Lie contacted Denis Healey for clarification. Healey answered that it was difficult to give guidance on the interpretation, but that he would arrange for someone in Oslo to give Lie ‘a more authoritative off the record talk about it’, and after a few days he was provided a confidential brief from the labour attaché John Inman.<sup>45</sup> This was likely the background for Martin Tranmæl’s editorial in *Arbeiderbladet* (*The Worker’s Daily*) on the 30 January, calling for decisive action and unity from the Western democracies, because continued ‘neutrality or passivity may lead to disaster for all.’<sup>46</sup> Such statements reveal that latent pro-Western attitudes prevailing amongst

the party elite were coming to the fore as international tensions intensified. Yet, it seems, those attitudes did not perfectly align with the general attitudes on the party grassroots. There was therefore a need for propaganda to support a shift of orientation.

The day after Bevin's speech, the British Foreign Office sent a circular to the embassies, informing them that a coordinated anti-Soviet propaganda campaign would accompany the new foreign policy. The target audiences abroad were to be the 'broad masses of workers and peasants', and the embassies were ordered to prepare channels for dissemination.<sup>47</sup> As the very existence of the campaign was cloaked in secrecy, a new Foreign Office department was created with the innocuous name Information Research Department (IRD) that was to base its dissemination of propaganda globally on confidential personal contacts.<sup>48</sup>

While the portfolio of propaganda papers was being prepared, ambassador Laurence Collier in Oslo advised Ernest Bevin that the IRD had to take into account the mind-set of the locals:

[...] as a people the Norwegians are tenacious of their established opinions, slow to accept new views, independently-minded and consciously wedded to the ideal of objectivity, with a sturdy reliance on the merits of their own judgements. Failing that, they may accept the views of a fellow-Norwegian, but for foreign views they have little use, unless they can assimilate them unconsciously and then regard them as Norwegian.<sup>49</sup>

Not long after Bevin's speech the international tensions intensified. As a reaction to the communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen held a watershed speech at Kråkerøy on the 29<sup>th</sup>, harshly attacking the communists for threatening the freedom and democracy of the Norwegian people. Gerhardsen called for an open fight with 'democratic means and intellectual weapons' against them - basically what Lie had argued for a long time.<sup>50</sup> The consolidation of communist rule in Eastern European countries through evident political suppression undermined the NKP in Norway, as their real intentions were increasingly questioned. These developments played into the hands of Haakon Lie.

The first IRD material reached Norwegian audiences in late April, in the form of an article by Lie in *Arbeiderbladet* on the poor living conditions of industrial workers in the Soviet Union, in parts based on the 'basic paper' *The Real Conditions in Soviet Russia*.<sup>51</sup> Soon afterwards Kit Kenney attached Lie's article in a report to London to show that IRD material was presented to target audiences, boasting that it did so from 'the pen of the most vigorous and able anti-Russian propagandist in Norway':

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As you will see, M. Lie has a very skillful technique of laying damning facts about Communism before a working class audience in such a way as to give no impression of anti-Communist propaganda. Moreover, his method of allowing facts to speak for themselves is a singularly telling one and constitutes by far the best means of exposing the Russian regime without alienating a public which until quite recently was disposed a priori to be sympathetic to it. [...] M. Lie has emphasised to me on several occasions that the main policy for our anti-Communist publicity here must be to convince the Norwegians Labour movement that Communism means a sinking standard of life.<sup>52</sup>

Haakon Lie’s fact-based strategy was in line with that of the IRD. In the Foreign Office, the prevailing view was that conditions in the Soviet sphere were such that exaggeration was unnecessary - straight news and facts about the harsh realities were sufficient, but were nonetheless more likely to be believed if the British source was kept secret.<sup>53</sup> The setup of Lie’s article shows how he interweaved fragments from the IRD paper. He started by conveying personal impressions from visits to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and then compared Soviet and Norwegian wages and prices in a detailed survey based on official statistics, just as he had done in *Arbeidsplassen* for well over a year. The last part of the article covered Soviet housing conditions based on the IRD paper, with only a few sentences directly translated from the original. No wonder Kit Kenney was pleased. The IRD material was reaching its target audiences in small portions presented by a credible local with no reference to the original source - exactly the practice of the ‘unconscious assimilation’ of foreign views and information that Laurence Collier had recommended.

A survey from November 1948 showed that the Embassy in Oslo was making good use of the IRD material, and few embassies worldwide received more.<sup>54</sup> By that time IRD basic papers were distributed to intellectuals, politicians and newspaper editors across the Norwegian political spectrum, yet, following on from the focus on the working class audience, the Foreign Office particularly emphasized the importance of reaching the Labour Party Secretary.<sup>55</sup> Translation and publication of complete IRD papers as Labour pamphlets was rare, but did occur.<sup>56</sup> As with Haakon Lie’s April article, most of the IRD material found its way into Norwegian articles, pamphlets and public lectures as fragments of text and information.

Early on, Haakon Lie became a key contact for the IRD in Norway following on from his already close relation to British Embassy personnel and the IRD’s emphasis on covert



dissemination through confidential personal contacts. For years Lie had sought and received propaganda support from the same channel, but in the spring of 1948 a steady stream of propaganda papers covering a variety of topics replaced *ad hoc* measures. Lie used it to serve his own agenda, which clearly neither he nor his British partners saw as conflicting with that of the British Foreign Office.

### **Comparing superpowers**

The US State Department did not respond to the Soviet propaganda challenge in the same coordinated fashion as the British Foreign Office, and their anti-communist propaganda was piecemeal and improvised for most of the period leading up to the signing of the Atlantic Pact in 1949.<sup>57</sup> At the Embassy in Oslo, the United States Information Service (USIS) informed Norwegian press agencies on US policy and supplied documentary material throughout the period, one example being the broad distribution of photos covering the Western airlift to Berlin during the Soviet blockade in 1948, but more targeted anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda was rare.<sup>58</sup> However, there was one significant exception comprising an effort involving the Norwegian Labour Party of extraordinary importance to State Department. Intriguingly, it all started with a Soviet initiative.

In July 1948, the Norwegian trade union federation (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon – AFL) received an invitation from the Soviet central organization of labour unions to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. The invitation was obviously based on hopes of a positive propaganda effect abroad but would backfire spectacularly. The invitation was laid before the party-union cooperative committee, who accepted it.<sup>59</sup> In the middle of August, a delegation left for a three-week trip to Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and Sochi. The decision that the delegation's impressions would result in a report aroused interest from the US Embassy in Oslo, who noted that all delegates were entirely 'anti-communist'.<sup>60</sup> After they returned, the Embassy reported on promising public statements by the delegation's leader, Trond Hegna, who would edit the upcoming report. 'There is probably no other country in the world' the Embassy quoted Hegna, 'where the authorities hold the nation's living standard so mercilessly and deliberately low in order to accomplish the objectives of reconstruction'. Hegna's emphasis on the Soviet top-down dictation of collective labour agreements, the militarization of society, the calculated isolation vis-à-vis the outside world and the poor living conditions for workers, clearly impressed the Embassy, who praised his 'well-developed faculties of observation'.<sup>61</sup>

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It is safe to assume that Trond Hegna’s sober comparisons of Norwegian and Soviet prices, wages and housing conditions were influenced by the approach Haakon Lie had pioneered since early 1947. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Lie had any direct involvement in the appointment of the delegation or its report. However, he and US embassy personnel in Oslo soon realized and tried to exploit its propaganda potential. In late November, AFL decided to send a second union delegation abroad; this time to the USA, led by Haakon Lie himself.<sup>62</sup> The goal was clearly to draw a revealing comparison between the two superpowers. With this aim, Lie cooperated with the newly established European Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Oslo, which sponsored the trip to the USA. It was one of the first, if not *the* first, of many Marshall-aid sponsored European labour delegations to America over the coming years.<sup>63</sup> Just before the delegation left in late December, Lie informed the ECA mission that their organization could freely translate and publicly use the first delegation’s report, as well as the future report from the delegation to the USA.<sup>64</sup>

On the 30 December 1948 the US Embassy in Oslo forwarded a translated version of the first report to State Department and the US Embassy in Moscow, and Ambassador Charles Bay commented on its domestic importance in Norway:

Though the report itself is couched in matter-of-fact language, it is political dynamite in Norway, since its middle section thoroughly demolishes Norwegian Communist claims that the Russian economic system provides a substantial standard of living for the workers and equitably distributes the products of Russian industry [...] It is the feeling of Labor Party officials that this down-to-earth, bread-and-butter exposé is just what they need to help to hammer home an understanding of what the Soviet system means for the working class.<sup>65</sup>

A few weeks later, the Minister at the Embassy in Moscow, Foy Kohler, responded to the report, claiming that it represented an ‘almost unparalleled propaganda opportunity’: ‘If this report from convincing source speaking in simple language and with penetrating insight about matters of major interest [for] common people everywhere could be placed in hands [of] every American and European worker, it would be worth an army.’<sup>66</sup> In February, as the State Department was preparing dissemination of the full report, the Soviet newspaper *Trud* attacked Trond Hegna for being a ‘pupil’ of the Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels and a servant of the US bourgeoisie, who ‘lies, pretends, betrays and slanders at every step’. This fierce denunciation led Kohler to believe that Soviet authorities were ‘seriously hit in vulnerable spot by delegation’s report’.<sup>67</sup>

In early March 1949, the full text of the Norwegian report from the Soviet Union was disseminated by the State Department to diplomatic stations around the globe in the *Soviet Affair Notes*, which resembled the British IRD's basic papers.<sup>68</sup> In the adjoining circular, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended maximum use of this 'especially important' report, and indicated that advantageous comparisons could soon be made with the upcoming Norwegian delegation report from the USA. Two months later, the ECA's office in Paris disseminated the translated report from the Soviet Union to all countries participating in the Marshall Plan, praising it as the 'most important single piece of ammunition we have so far obtained for use in opposing Communist efforts to block recovery by political disruption'.<sup>69</sup> After an extended period of waiting and repeated requests from Acheson to the Embassy in Oslo, the report from the delegation to the US, authored by Haakon Lie, was finally published in early June both in Norwegian for distribution to the unions and in English for foreign audiences.<sup>70</sup> Not surprisingly, the report was positive, focusing mainly on the high wages and good living standard of American workers. However, it also covered what the Norwegians saw as fundamental challenges to American society, especially the problematic race relations. USA was 'still wrestling with many and great problems', the report concluded, yet it was 'moving *forward* both culturally, socially and economically'.<sup>71</sup> The translated version of the report clearly satisfied State Department, as it was soon distributed to US diplomatic missions and consulates on all continents.<sup>72</sup> Not long thereafter, highlights from the two reports were published in one joint pamphlet by the ECA's information office in Paris for dissemination in non-communist Europe.<sup>73</sup>

On the two Norwegian union reports' long road to global audiences, the Labour party congress of February 1949 decided that Norway would sign the North Atlantic Treaty, and soon thereafter broad parliamentary support was secured. The Gerhardsen cabinet had negotiated with the Danish and Swedish governments for months in order to accomplish a Scandinavian defence union, but the effort floundered when meeting Swedish resistance to formal military cooperation with the Western powers. The joining of an alliance with the Western capitalist powers was controversial in the party, and Prime Minister Gerhardsen had therefore rushed the final decision before an opposition had time to get off the ground.<sup>74</sup>

The USA and Great Britain did little in terms of propaganda to influence Norwegian labour audiences in favor of Western military alignment before the 1950s. There is evidence of cautious approaches towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs Halvard Lange concerning propaganda in 1948-49, but it came to nothing.<sup>75</sup> A series of party publications supported the

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shift in foreign policy orientation, but no documentation has been found to suggest that these were supported in any way by the Western embassies. This further supports the impression that the Western great powers were cautious to avoid giving any impression that the Norwegians were pressured into joining NATO.

The dramatic escalation of the Cold War in 1948 and the signing of the Atlantic Pact in early 1949 did not result in an immediate increase in US anti-Soviet propaganda abroad. In 1949 the British Embassy and the British Labour Party were still Haakon Lie’s major foreign suppliers of propaganda more directly attacking the Soviet Union and communism. The US State Department was still reluctant to go beyond public diplomacy, that of mostly open and sober presentation of American society, politics and culture, and establish exchange programs for workers, engineers, students, academics and military officers. In a biannual report in the summer of 1949, the British Embassy reported to London that little was seen of US pamphlets and booklets in Norway.<sup>76</sup> Within a year, that would change dramatically.

#### **The ‘Campaign of Truth’**

In April 1950, President Harry Truman launched the ‘Campaign of Truth’ to counter alleged Soviet ‘deceit, distortion, and lies’ on the global scene.<sup>77</sup> The campaign was intensified after the outbreak of war in Korea in June and resulted in a flood of fresh resources. From 1950 onwards, two of the most important US objectives in Norway were to secure governmental and public support for the Western alliance and to develop the country’s ‘ability and willingness’ to oppose the Soviet Union ideologically and militarily.<sup>78</sup> Since much of the remaining ‘misunderstanding of the United States and distrust of its motives’ was to be found among the working class, and since the Labour Party dominated national political life after securing its parliamentary majority in the elections of 1949, the Norwegian working class and union members were the ‘first priority target’ for the US propagandists in Norway.<sup>79</sup> One way to influence this key audience was to supply Labour officials with the State Department’s *Soviet Affair Notes*, whilst another was to engage in broad propaganda efforts to reach the working class in general.<sup>80</sup>

Haakon Lie seized the new opportunities. Labour’s party publications had for years been characterized by black and white texts on cheap brown paper. In the wake of the Campaign of Truth, the quality of the party’s pamphlets improved radically, as better paper, smart charts, multiple photos and colored illustrations became the new norm. Most importantly, the

circulation figures soared. In October 1950, the US Embassy in Oslo reported that they had produced pamphlets for distribution through the Norwegian labour movement to consolidate popular support for the UN's action in Korea, to boost support for NATO, to lift moral and to counter 'the spirit of growing defeatism'.<sup>81</sup> As the front moved rapidly back and forth on the Korean peninsula in the summer and fall of 1950, Labour released the colorful pamphlets *War in Korea (Krig i Korea)*, legitimizing the US led UN-coalition for the defense of South Korea, and *Danger Ahead (Fare på ferde)*, arguing for heavier taxes for military spending in Norway. Both were printed in high numbers (150 000 and 200 000 respectively) and distributed to all branches of the Labour Party.<sup>82</sup> About the same time, Labour published the pamphlets *Slave Labour in the East (Slavearbeid i øst)* and *Nuclear Energy – for War or Peace? (Atomenergi for krig eller fred?)*. The latter criticized the alleged Soviet reluctance to accept international nuclear arms control and presenting the productive potential of radionuclides supplied to friendly states by the United States. None of the pamphlets stated any foreign support.

Embassy reports and correspondence reveals that the US Embassy in Oslo supported all of these pamphlets, either creatively, financially or both. In the 1990s, confronted with documentary traces of his collusion with the US embassy personnel in making the pamphlets on the Korean War and nuclear energy, Lie conceded to having written them together with the US Press Attaché Theodore Olson and let the US Embassy cover costs for printing and distribution. It was a quite natural thing to do, claimed Lie, as Olson was a close friend and the Americans 'our allies who we totally depended on'.<sup>83</sup> Even so, Lie did not see any reason to inform the common party members of the propaganda cooperation between the Party Office and the US Embassy. Neither did he inform his comrades in Labour's Nordic sister parties that the pamphlet *Peace with Freedom (Fred med frihet)*, published as a part of their joint social democratic 'peace campaign' in January 1951, was in fact a result of his cooperation with the Americans – a delicate matter as both Finland and Sweden were formally neutral in the Cold War.<sup>84</sup>

The US support for Labour pamphlets came to a halt by the end of 1950, about the same time as Haakon Lie's primary contact at the US Embassy, Theodore Olson, left Norway. Half a year later the Embassy reported that the lack of any competent replacement to run the Campaign of Truth had left the USIE organization ineffective at the very time it most required full-fledged operation.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, in the following years the Embassy repeatedly stressed to the State Department that excessive propaganda could backfire on the grounds of the

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Norwegians’ psychological ‘over-sensitivity’ to it.<sup>86</sup> This attitude goes a long way towards explaining the Embassy’s emphasis on open ‘public diplomacy’ rather than covert propaganda after the short period of frenzied activity in 1950.

So far, I have showed how Haakon Lie, by 1950, established himself as the key contact of the US and British propagandists targeting the Norwegian working class. This made him an influential and maybe indispensable intermediary with heavy influence on the initiation, creation, translation, adaptation and strategic targeting of that propaganda – a powerful and critical editor. His growing transnational propaganda network, the escalation of the Cold War, and the establishment of Western propaganda campaigns gave Lie an ever-wider supply to choose from. Next, I will explore the culmination of Lie’s work as a critical editor of Western propaganda in the early Cold War, his connection to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) cultural front.

#### **Propaganda for cultural freedom**

In late June 1950, Haakon Lie was invited to participate at the Congress for Cultural Freedom’s (CCF) first conference held in West Berlin, after being recommended to one of the central initiators, Melvin Lasky, by the German social democrat Willy Brandt.<sup>87</sup> Brandt was well known to Lie from his years of exile in Norway (1933–40), and was working as a correspondent for *Arbeiderbladet*. Lie accepted the invitation and went to Berlin with a few other party comrades. The Congress was an idealistic initiative by mostly left-wing intellectuals, yet from the outset was intimately entangled with the power politics of the Cold War. From the start, the CIA covertly supported the CCF organizationally and financially. In the early 1950s the organization grew to become a key institution of the international propaganda wars, much thanks to its seemingly unlimited funds, which Lie was eager to exploit for his party projects in Norway. Haakon Lie’s experience as an organizer with special expertise in anti-communist propaganda was presumably decisive when he was given a seat in the panel on the second day of the Berlin congress together with a handful of famous intellectuals, academics and politicians. Following the conference, he became the alternate member of the Executive Committee for the American unionist Irving Brown, and in 1950-53 participated in meetings and conferences in Brussels, Versailles, Paris, Stockholm and Rome.<sup>88</sup> Until the mid-1950s, he corresponded with François Bondy, Michael Josselson, Nicolas Nabokov and Denis de Rougemont in the CCF main office in Paris – all of whom

were on the CIA's payroll and knew it.<sup>89</sup> The evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not Lie himself knew that CCF's funds stemmed to a large extent from the CIA.



*The Hungarian-British writer Arthur Koestler giving his keynote speech at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in West Berlin on the 27th of June 1950. The panel in front, from the right: Sidney Hook, Alfred Weber, Jules Romain, Ernst Reuter and the man looking at Koestler, Norwegian Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie. Photo: The University of Chicago Library.*

Lie wanted to make the organization a facilitator of propaganda primarily directed towards international working-class audiences. At the meeting in Brussels in late November 1950, he argued for a general line similar to the one he had pioneered in Norway:

We have to work among the masses. [...] It is not a question of standard of living only. The Communists are strongest among metal workers who are the best paid workers. In order to fight Communism it is important to kill the myth of Soviet Russia as Soviet community.<sup>90</sup>

What then was the most effective way to 'kill the myth'? Lie's answer, judging by his statements in the CCF forum and his propaganda activities of the period, suggest that it was to expose the Soviet forced labour camp system (the GULag). At the meeting at Versailles in

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February 1951, Lie strongly encouraged focus on the Soviet ‘slave labour’ camps, comparing the situation with the 1930s when many people did not quite believe in the existence of Nazi concentration camps.<sup>91</sup> The first CCF-related publication in Norway did indeed focus on the similarities between the German and Soviet camp systems, as *Tiden* in April 1951 published Lie’s CCF acquaintance, ex-communist Margarete Buber-Neumann’s *Under two dictators – Prisoner of Stalin and Hitler (Fange hos Stalin og Hitler)* and in May Lie arranged a party publicity tour for the German author in Norway.<sup>92</sup> Whether it was Lie’s accomplishment or not, the CCF also focused on the GULag in one of its first realized publications: *Les Procès des Camps de Concentration Soviétiques* – the protocols of a French defamation lawsuit on the existence of ‘concentration camps’ in the Soviet Union.

In the preparation phase of the organization in the autumn and winter of 1950-51, CCF officials clearly acknowledged Haakon Lie’s pioneer propaganda work, and tried to benefit from it. Many titles in a tentative portfolio of pamphlets presented in Brussels, covering a variety of topics ranging from the ‘Truth about the totalitarian world’ to ‘Problems of the Free World’, were conspicuously similar to previous initiatives by Norwegian Labour, which suggests that Lie had considerable influence on the making of the list.<sup>93</sup> Another indication of his influence on CCF’s early publication work is the organization’s preparation of a pamphlet on ‘social justice on both sides of the Iron Curtain’, focusing on ‘level of life, wages, buying capacity, working conditions, freedom of work and domicile, freedom of travelling, feeding, housing’.<sup>94</sup> It is reasonable to assume this pamphlet was inspired by Lie’s down-to-earth East-West comparisons in Norway (and the Norwegian union delegation reports of 1948-49). A letter where CCF Executive Secretary René Lalive d’Epinay presented the project to Lie supports that assumption. He claimed to know that Lie was ‘in possession of even more important’ documentation than that which the CCF had already gathered, and kindly asked him to send all documents that might be of interest.<sup>95</sup>

Furthermore, Lie was also a network connector for the CCF. In spring 1951, he invited the CCF to contribute to a campaign he had initiated through the Committee of the International Socialist Conference (COMISCO) for the release of the Hungarian social democratic political prisoner Anna Kéthly. Lie remarked to the CCF’s Swiss Publication Officer François Bondy that nothing was more important than to ‘symbolize the fight against tyranny in one single person suffering from it’, to which Bondy responded positively and promised to secure media publicity in Europe.<sup>96</sup>



In Lie's correspondence with Bondy in the fall of 1950 and into 1951, there were sporadic mentions of CCF channeling of funds for his publication activities in Norway. In a letter in October, Bondy made it clear that the Paris office did not demand to be credited for its future contributions. Rather, the publications could 'just as well appear sponsored by trade unions – like your pamphlet which I am expecting.'<sup>97</sup> This comment most likely referred to the *War in Korea* pamphlet, that had been mentioned in earlier correspondence, and indicates that Bondy was informed about the US Embassy in Oslo's support for Labour's propaganda and envisioned similar arrangements with Lie in the future.<sup>98</sup> The fact that the Labour controlled-parliament, as a measure against potential (communist) fifth columnists, had criminalized citizens receiving 'economic support to influence the public opinion about the state's form of government or foreign policy or for party purposes' in the interest of 'a foreign power, party or organization' in December 1950, made financial propaganda support to Labour's Party Secretary a delicate matter.<sup>99</sup> However, Lie clearly wanted to keep the connection to secure such support for activities in Norway. This might explain why, in the spring of 1951, he saw a need for another outlet of his propaganda, independent of both the official party publisher and Tiden. Here he could exert complete control over the publishing process and, probably most importantly, the ledger.

### **The ghost editor**

The publishing activities of Fram Publishing House would be the culmination of Haakon Lie's work as a critical editor in the early Cold War. As the ghost editor (his editorship of Fram was seldom, if ever, stated publicly), Lie controlled all parts of the publishing process from the selection of suitable material from mostly foreign sources to the translation and tailoring of the material for Norwegian audiences, and finally the important publicity work. The latter was facilitated by his key position in the nation's dominant political organization, his influence on party journalists, and Fram's access to free advertisement in local and national party newspapers.

Haakon Lie exerted decisive influence on all parts of CCF's activities towards Norway, personally selecting material and often requesting fundamental changes or the initiation of new projects. Letters in April, as preparations were being made for Fram, illustrate the different ways he exerted his influence. Most CCF proposals in this period were dismissed by Lie, even particularly recommended material was rejected as 'too special for our country'. Lie saw one pamphlet, on the rearmament of Soviet satellite countries, as useful as long as the

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emphasis was turned exclusively towards the situation in Germany, an issue that was ‘brought up at every single union meeting’.<sup>100</sup> Haakon Lie found that it was better to use the CCF documentation in a series of three or four articles in the Labour press, but François Bondy insisted that a ‘black book’ would be more impressive and more widely read. Bondy emphasized that this did not exclude publishing the same material in a series of articles.<sup>101</sup> This solution clearly satisfied Lie. In the summer of 1951, Fram published the pamphlet *A New Wehrmacht Marching (En ny Wehrmacht marsjerer)* and about the same time a series of articles on the East German ‘Volkspolizei’ appeared in *Arbeiderbladet* signed by correspondent Willy Brandt.<sup>102</sup>

Haakon Lie’s propaganda cooperation with the CCF both narrowly targeted selected party and union officials and broadly aimed at the party’s rank-and-file and the Norwegian working class in general. An example of this is a letter where Lie requested 50 copies of the CCF-associated German journal *Ost-Probleme* for distribution to carefully selected people. At the same time, Lie presented the estimated production cost of a Norwegian translation of the French ‘concentration camps’ lawsuit with a circulation of 10 000, of which Bondy approved.<sup>103</sup> Haakon Lie had ambitious plans for his cooperation with the CCF in 1951. Far from all projects were realized. The most prominent of these were the establishment of a monthly Norwegian magazine published by Fram and aimed at the ‘intellectual elite’, in line with the CCF journals *Preuves* and *Kontakte* and using translated material from these journals, an idea discussed by Bondy, Lie and Irving Brown.<sup>104</sup> ‘The journal should aim at influencing intellectuals [sic], fellow-travellers and wavering members of the Communist Party in Norway’, Lie emphasized, and this called ‘for a careful selection of material. The magazine must from its very start acquire the reputation for being 100 % reliable. Its effectiveness will entirely depend upon the weight of the facts it brings out’.<sup>105</sup> Haakon Lie indicated a 6000-dollar annual budget. Why this magazine did not see the light of day is unclear, as Lie’s CCF contacts were positive, but a comment by Lie that they would probably know in a few weeks if they could go ahead indicates that he needed party approval for such an ambitious plan. Presumably, Lie did not get such an approval, as there were no mentions of the magazine after the correspondence with Paris in August.

Other initiatives, mostly publications of books and pamphlets, did materialize and most often the CCF covered the expenses for translation into Norwegian. Two of Fram’s 1951 publications centered on the very topic Lie found most useful to ‘kill the myth’ of the Soviet Union. The translated version of the French defamation lawsuit on the existence of Soviet

‘concentration camps’ was given the grandiose title *Slave Labour in the 20th Century* (*Slavearbeid i det 20. århundre*). The other publication, Ragnar Rudfalk’s book *I Worked in the Soviet Union* (*Jeg har arbeidet i Sovjet*), was bought from the Swedish social democratic publisher Tidens Förlag. Rudfalk, a Swede, had survived years in Soviet forced labour camps and also worked for a period in a kolkhoz (collective farm), and Lie expected his story would become ‘a real hit’ in Norway.<sup>106</sup> By publishing Rudfalk, Lie pioneered in Norway a new GULag-literature sub-genre of Scandinavian autobiographies on experiences in the Soviet camps. This genre localized the abstract horrors of the vast camp system and became popular among Norwegian readers, peaking with the 1956 bestselling book *Moscow Knows No Tears* (*Moskva kjenner ingen tårer*) about the Norwegian partisan Osvald Harjo’s thirteen long years in Soviet camps, co-written by Lie’s close associate Paul Engstad.

Haakon Lie’s enthusiasm for the CCF connection seems to have been dampened after the first year and a half of the organization’s existence, and his correspondence with the CCF became more sporadic. In the fall of 1951, different publications were discussed and costs estimated, but this all came to nothing. However, Lie continued to receive magazines and publication proposals on a regular basis, and on occasions contacted Paris if he regarded material suited for publication or to request the creation of material. Over the next years Fram published a few publications a year, some of which did not have any direct connection to the CCF. Nevertheless, the general impression is that the organization was by far the most important foreign contributor and supplier to Fram. One notable example is the sociologist Philip Selznick’s *The Organizational Weapon – A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*, which was published as *The Cadre Party* (*Kaderpartiet*) in 1954. It created a massive controversy in Norway, but the CCF financial support for royalties and translation was kept secret – probably to great relief for both Haakon Lie and his CIA partners in Paris.<sup>107</sup> It would be one of Fram’s last publications.

To the regret of Michael Josselson, Lie withdrew from the CCF’s Executive Committee in February 1955.<sup>108</sup> Lie had expressed doubt about the expediency of his participation since back in January 1952, on grounds of the CCF’s focus on artists and intellectuals rather than workers.<sup>109</sup> In October 1953, Lie asked to be replaced and thanked the CCF for all the support in ‘the form of valuable publications which would never have appeared without your advice and help’.<sup>110</sup> On behalf of Irving Brown, Denis de Rougemont, Nikolas Nabokov and himself, Josselson politely asked Lie to at least delay the final decision until after a meeting in Rome

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in November.<sup>111</sup> Lie was swayed and did indeed participate in Rome, but it would be his last appearance in a CCF forum.

Fram’s publications covering Cold War topics came to a halt soon after Lie’s withdrawal from the CCF Executive Committee and the fizzling out of correspondence with Paris. It is likely that Lie did not see the same need for Fram after his withdrawal from the CCF and the drying up of dollar funds. Furthermore, the fierce anti-communist stance Lie had fought for years for was quite unrivalled in the party by the mid 1950s. The communists were not considered a serious threat to either the Norwegian political system or Labour’s dominance within it. In this atmosphere, Lie might have sensed, or been told, that his relentless attacks on the communists were reaching a saturation point and that the propaganda should be relaxed in order to avoid overkill.

### **Conclusion**

The Norwegian Labour Party’s contributions to the early transnational Cold War propaganda networks went well beyond Norway’s position as a small-state actor in international affairs. The party, through its activist Party Secretary, was heavily involved with most major Western agencies and organizations engaged in propaganda internationally: the British Labour Party, British and US foreign services, the ECA and CCF. By studying different but related Norwegian and Western initiatives and campaigns over a relatively long period of time this article provides a comprehensive overview of the shifting strategic emphases and goals of the propagandists involved. New sources, most notably those showing the creation and far-reaching dissemination of the Norwegian labour reports in 1948-49, gives new insight into the dynamics of the global propaganda conflict in the earliest phase of the Cold War.

The Norwegian Labour Party’s Cold War connections to Western foreign and secret services have been hotly debated among Norwegian historians and in the general public for decades and much speculation have centered on the character of Haakon Lie’s connections to the CIA. The question that looms large in the background is whether or not the Labour Party Secretary was an American agent. In light of evidence presented in this article, it makes little sense to speak of the self-reliant and independently minded Lie as an agent for foreign powers. In an interview late in his life, former US labor attaché Walter Galenson was asked whether the US Embassy in Oslo had used Haakon Lie. He replied that Lie had used the embassy more than the other way around: ‘That’s the way Haakon operated, you see, he pressed everybody into

service [...] So he used me, yeah, but it was very good propaganda for the United States'.<sup>112</sup> This quote touches some key points that should be made about the Norwegian Labour Party and Haakon Lie's propaganda cooperation with the US embassy throughout the period 1945-55, and also applies to the cooperation with Lie's other American and British suppliers of propaganda.

First, there was a striking sense of community and common purpose among the governmental, semi-governmental and non-governmental elite personnel from the United States, Great Britain and Norway engaged in these activities. They had found each other as a result of common interests, and it seems that all of them got what they wanted from the cooperation with few, if any, downsides. The latter were of course to a large extent due to the secrecy surrounding the arrangements. Second, Haakon Lie was a remarkably independent and influential actor in the activities. He was often the initiator of the contact and the first mover on a wide range of initiatives. This was most evidently the case with his propaganda in 1945-47, before the British and US governments engaged in comprehensive campaigns against Communism and the Soviet Union, but was also the case when these great powers *did* fully engage in such activities. By virtue of his abilities as an organizer, network builder and propagandist, his vehemently anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes and, most importantly, his key political position, Lie was quite indispensable for Western propagandists following on from their emphasis on certain target audiences in Norway. It is indeed hard to imagine that the British and Americans could have reached the labour movement and the working class as broadly and effectively as they did without active partnership with Lie. This gave him the authority of a critical editor over all aspects of the propaganda publishing process targeting the Norwegian labour movement and working class. His abilities and contacts also gave him influence on propaganda activities that went well beyond the borders of Norway.

The Western propaganda support was sought after and welcomed by the most influential propagandist in the Norwegian labour movement, probably mostly due to the fact that Lie, as a local intermediary, had the final say in all the important matters from the creation to the selection, translation and targeting of the material. As such, the Western influence through propaganda in the dominant political movement in Norway should be seen as a cultural 'empire by invitation' where a peripheral actor played a decisive role.<sup>113</sup> I hold that the Western propagandists' flexibility and willingness to let their Labour counterparts have the final say in all aspects of these propaganda activities to a great extent explains their remarkable reach. As a byproduct of the close cooperation with the Norwegian Labour Party,

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Western propagandists got hold of material ‘worth an army’ in their fight against Communism and the Soviet Union, and subsequently placed it in the hands of workers around the globe.

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<sup>1</sup> Lie to Tranmæl, 4 March 1945, [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek – Martin Tranmæl correspondance, 1940-45] 2511.

<sup>2</sup> Hans Olav Lahlum, *Haakon Lie – Historien, mytene og mennesket* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2009), 176-209.

<sup>3</sup> Trond Gabrielsen, *Menn og meninger* (Oslo: Dreyers forlag, 1976), 90.

<sup>4</sup> Eirik Wig Sundvall, *Gerhardsens valg – Arbeiderpartiets tunge avskjed med Sovjetunionen, 1917-49* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2016)

<sup>5</sup> David Welch, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box’, in *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion* (London: IBTauris, 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Margaret E. Keck, *Activists Beyond Borders – Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Helge Pharo, ‘Post-Cold War Historiography in Norway’, in *The Cold War – and the Nordic Countries*, ed. Olesen, Thorsten B (Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2004).

<sup>8</sup> Magne Skodvin, *Norden eller Nato?* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971); Knut Einar Eriksen, *DNA og NATO* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1972).

<sup>9</sup> ‘Report to Stortinget from the commission appointed by Stortinget to scrutinize claims about illegal surveillance of Norwegian citizens (‘the Lund report’)’ (Stortinget, 1996); Trond Bergh og Knut Einar Eriksen, *Den hemmelige krigen – Overvåkningssystemet bygges opp 1914-1955* (Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 1998); S. Bones, ‘I oppdemningspolitikken grenseland – Nord-Norge i den kalde krigen 1947-70’ (Ph.D dissertation, University of Tromsø, 2007); Tony Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951* (Oslo: Unipub, 2010); I. Bjørnsson, ‘Norse Brothers – Social Democratic anti-Communism in Norden, 1945-1962’ (Ph.D dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe – Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Andrew Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953 – The Information Research Department* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004); Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left, and the Cold War – Calling the Tune?* (Psychology Press, 2003); Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way – U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Francis Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? – The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 2000); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture – the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony*, Routledge/PSA Political Studies Series (London, New York: Routledge, 2002).

<sup>12</sup> Lars Borgersrud, *Fiendebilde Wollweber* (Oslo: Forlaget Oktober, 2001); Bones, ‘I oppdemningspolitikken grenseland’; Helge Danielsen, ‘Mediating Public Diplomacy – Local Conditions and U.S. Public Diplomacy in Norway in the 1950s’, in *The United States and Public Diplomacy – New Directions in Cultural and International History*, eds. Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2010); H. Danielsen, ‘Making Friends at Court – Slow and Indirect Media in US Public Diplomacy in Norway, 1950–1965’, *Contemporary European History*, 2 (2009); H. Danielsen, ‘“A military ERP”? Military assistance and US public diplomacy in Norway in the early 1950s’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 4 (2017); H. Danielsen, ‘Pro-atlantisk påvirkningspolitikk i Norge i årene rundt 1949’, *Internasjonal Politikk*, 1 (2019).

<sup>13</sup> Co-eds in *Dagbladet* 20-30 July 1994; K. Skogrand, ‘Vikarierende aktører og asymmetriske allianser: Norge og Koreakrigen 1950-1953’, *Internasjonal Politikk*, 3 (1995); O. Njølstad, ‘Leviatan på norsk’, *Internasjonal Politikk*, 3 (1995); Gunnar Yttri, ‘Ei historie om Marshall-misjonen, Haakon Lie og den “psykopatiske redsla” til næringslivet’, in *I teknologiens tegn*, eds. Einar Lie, Sissel Myklebust and Torben Hviid Nielsen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 132.

<sup>14</sup> Paper 601A, ‘Overseas Planning Committee – Plan of Propaganda for Norway’, 9 October 1945 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 371/47504.

<sup>15</sup> Morris Weisz, ‘Interview with Walter Galenson’, Library of Congress, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Labor Series, 15 March 1992, <https://cdn.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004gal01/2004gal01.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> Trond Bergh, *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge – Storhetstid 1945-65* (Oslo: Tiden, 1987), 10.

<sup>17</sup> T. Halvorsen, ‘Kampen mot kommunistene i de skandinaviske land etter krigen’, *Arbeiderhistorie*, 1995, 20-1.

- <sup>18</sup> E. Christensen, 'Fra samlingstrang til normalisering – Omkring samlingsbestrebelsene mellom DNA og NKP i 1945' (M.Phil, University of Oslo, 1970); Tore Pryser, *Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge – Klassen og nasjonen, 1935-1946* (Oslo: Tiden, 1988), 546–57; Halvorsen, 'Kampen mot kommunistene', 25.
- <sup>19</sup> Haakon Lie, *Produksjonsutvalgene i De forente Stater under krigen* (Oslo; AOF, 1945). Galenson's involvement was stated in the preface.
- <sup>20</sup> Weisz, 'Interview with Walter Galenson'.
- <sup>21</sup> Report 'Norway – P.W.D. Activities taken over by Press Department', 7 Nov. 1945, FO 930/268; Lie to Fjeld, 26 April 1946 [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek - Norwegian Labour Party papers] 1001/Da/box 9/fo. 13.
- <sup>22</sup> Inman to Lie, 21 Jan. 1946 [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek – Haakon Lie papers] 2483/Dc/box 3/fo. 4.
- <sup>23</sup> Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*, 51-2.
- <sup>24</sup> 'Nye bøker', *Friheten*, 21 Dec. 1945.
- <sup>25</sup> Jakob Sverdrup, *Inn i storpolitikken, 1940-49* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 199-244.
- <sup>26</sup> 'Opplegget av propagandaen', [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek – Aake Anker Ordings papers] 1025/D/box 42/fo. 6.
- <sup>27</sup> Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*, 48.
- <sup>28</sup> Halvorsen, 'Kampen mot kommunistene', 26.
- <sup>29</sup> Harold Laski, *Den skjulte bataljon* (Oslo: Det norske Arbeiderpartis forlag, 1946), preface.
- <sup>30</sup> Halvorsen, 'Kampen mot kommunistene', 27.
- <sup>31</sup> 'Opplegget av propagandaen', ARK 1025/D/box 42/fo. 6.
- <sup>32</sup> 'Prisene i Moskva', *Arbeidsplassen*, 2, (1946).
- <sup>33</sup> 'Opplegget av propagandaen', ARK 1025/D/box 42/fo. 6.
- <sup>34</sup> Haakon Lie, *Skjebneår 1945-50* (Oslo: Tiden, 1985), 182.
- <sup>35</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953*, 50.
- <sup>36</sup> Lie, *Skjebneår 1945-50*, 192.
- <sup>37</sup> Lie to Healey, 27 June and 29 July 1947, ARK 1001/Da/box 15/fo. 18.
- <sup>38</sup> Kenney to Healey, 10 Sept. 1947 [Manchester, Peoples History Museum, British Labour Party's International Department], Denis Healey papers/box 9/fo. 1.
- <sup>39</sup> Denis Healey (uncredited), *Kortene på bordet* (Oslo: Det norske Arbeiderparti, 1947)
- <sup>40</sup> Hickerson to Armour, 7 Oct. 1947, [College Park, United States National Archives, Record Group 59,] S[tate] [D]epartment C[entral] D[ecimal] F[iles] 1945-49/ 711.57/10-747.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup> Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 30-2.
- <sup>43</sup> 'Den amerikanske arbeiderbevegelse og Marshallplanen', *Arbeiderbladet*, 22 Nov. 1947; Circular 15, [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek – Norwegian Trade Union Federation] 1579/D/Dd/box 48.
- <sup>44</sup> Ernest Bevin, 'Address given to the House of Commons, 22 January 1948', [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/9/9/7bc0ecbd-c50e-4035-8e36-ed70bfb204c/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/9/9/7bc0ecbd-c50e-4035-8e36-ed70bfb204c/publishable_en.pdf).
- <sup>45</sup> Healey to Lie, 28 Jan. 1948, ARK 2483/Dd/box 3/fo. 11; Lie, *Skjebneår 1945-50*, 241-2.
- <sup>46</sup> 'Demokratiets besøkelsestid', *Arbeiderbladet* 30 Jan. 1948; Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*, 75.
- <sup>47</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953*, 88.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid, 16, 63–101.
- <sup>49</sup> Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*, 140.
- <sup>50</sup> Bergh og Eriksen, *Den hemmelige krigen – Overvåkningssystemet bygges opp 1914-1955*, 153. Note my idiomatic translation of 'åndelige våpen' that directly translates to 'spiritual weapons'.
- <sup>51</sup> 'Levestandarden for industriarbeidere i Sovjet-Samveldet', *Arbeiderbladet* 29 April 1948; Basic Paper 'The Real Conditions in Soviet Russia', FO 975/fo. 1.
- <sup>52</sup> Kenney to Information Policy Department, 26 May 1948, FO 1110/27.
- <sup>53</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953*, 81, 93.
- <sup>54</sup> Insall, *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*, 145.
- <sup>55</sup> Foreign Office to Kenney, 12 Jan. 1949, FO 1110/27.
- <sup>56</sup> Basic Paper 'Soviet Labour Discipline – Reactionary Decrees Restrict Freedom of U.S.S.R. Worker', FO 975/fo. 15; *Arbeiderfientlige lover i Sovjet-samveldet* (Oslo: Det norske Arbeiderparti, 1950).
- <sup>57</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953*, 138-9.
- <sup>58</sup> US Embassy in Oslo to Secretary of State, 15 Nov. 1948, SDCDF 1945-49/811.20200(D)/11-1548.

### Article three: Propaganda ‘Worth an Army’

- <sup>59</sup> Protocol of meeting in the party-union cooperative committee (samarbeidskomiteen), 29 July 1948, ARK 1579/D/Dd/47/fo. 7.
- <sup>60</sup> Bay to Secretary of State, 20 Aug. 1948, SDCDF 1945-49/857.5043/8-2048.
- <sup>61</sup> Villard to Secretary of State and US Embassy in Moscow, 25 Oct. 1948, SDCDF 1945-49/857.5043/10-2548.
- <sup>62</sup> Protocol of secretariat meeting, 23 Nov. 1948, ARK 1579/A/Ac/box 16/fo. 2.
- <sup>63</sup> Yttri, ‘Ei historie om Marshall-misjonen’, 129-30.
- <sup>64</sup> US Embassy in Oslo to ECA Administration Washington DC, 16 Feb. 1949 [College Park, United States National Archives, Record Group 469] E[urope] N[orway] D[ivision] 1948-53/box 32.
- <sup>65</sup> Bay to Secretary of State, 30 Dec. 1948, SDCDF 1945-49/857.5043/12-3048 CS/B.
- <sup>66</sup> Kohler to Secretary of State, 19 Jan. 1949, SDCDF 1945-49/857.5043/1-1949.
- <sup>67</sup> Kohler to Secretary of State, 10 Feb. 1949, SDCDF 1945-49/857.5043/2-1049.
- <sup>68</sup> Defty, *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-1953*, 108-9.
- <sup>69</sup> Foster to ECA Administration, Washington DC, 10 May 1949, END 1948-53/box 32.
- <sup>70</sup> Acheson to US Embassy in Oslo, 8 March 1949, SDCDF 1945-49/811.20200 (D)/3-849; Acheson to US Embassy in Oslo, 16 May 1949, SDCDF 1945-49/811.20200 (D)/5-449; Bay to Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, END 1948-53/box 32; Circular to unions and cooperative organizations, 11 June 1949, ARK 1579/B/box 9/fo. 2.
- <sup>71</sup> *Report from America* (Oslo: AFL, 1949), 84.
- <sup>72</sup> Circular to American Diplomatic and Consular officers, 16 June 1949, SDCDF 1945-49/811.20200 (D)/6-1649.
- <sup>73</sup> *Norwegian Labor looks at the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* (Paris: ECA’s Office of Information, 1949).
- <sup>74</sup> Sverdrup, *Inn i storpolitikken, 1940-49*, 303-41.
- <sup>75</sup> Villard to Secretary of State, 28 Oct. 1948, SDCDF 1945-49/711.57/10-2848; Foreign Office to British Embassy in Oslo, 4 Feb. 1949, FO 1110/252; Collier to Foreign Office, 5 Feb. 1949, FO 1100/252.
- <sup>76</sup> Six-monthly report from Information Department at the British Embassy in Oslo, July 1949, FO 953/611.
- <sup>77</sup> Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 40.
- <sup>78</sup> Danielsen, ‘Making Friends at Court’, 180; Bones, ‘I oppdemningspolitikken grenseland’, 155-62.
- <sup>79</sup> Semi-annual report for USIE from US Embassy in Oslo to State Department, 1 Sept. 1950, SDCDF 1950-54/511.57/9-150.
- <sup>80</sup> Olson to State Department, 22 June 1950, SDCDF 1950-54/511.5721/9-650.
- <sup>81</sup> ECA Special Mission to Norway, Monthly Report, 25 Oct. 1950, END 1948-53/Box 7/Despatch number TOECA R-37.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*; Distribution list, 1950, ARK 1001/D/Da/box 37/fo. 18.
- <sup>83</sup> “‘Vi skrev sammen”, Haakon Lie forsvarer propaganda-samarbeid’, *Dagbladet* 21 July 1994.
- <sup>84</sup> ‘Nordisk fredsappell var USA-PROPAGANDA’, *Arbeiderbladet* 21 July 1994.
- <sup>85</sup> Lund to State Department, 11 April 1951, SDCDF 1950-54/511.57/4-1151.
- <sup>86</sup> USIE’s semi-annual report, 9 June 1951, SDCDF 1950-54/511.57/9-150; Nordstrand to State Department, 12 Dec. 1952, SDCDF 1950-54/511.573/12-1252.
- <sup>87</sup> Hannemann, ‘Kalter Kulturkrieg in Norwegen? Zum Wirken des “Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit” in Skandinavien’, *NORDEUROPA-forum Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur*, 2 (1999).
- <sup>88</sup> [Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library] I[nternational] A[ssociation for] C[ultural] F[reedom records]/box 56/fos. 7-8; IACF/box 258/fos. 7-8
- <sup>89</sup> Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?*, 85-112, 395.
- <sup>90</sup> Protocol of CCF International Committee meeting in Brussels, 27 Nov. 1950, IACF/box 56/fo. 7.
- <sup>91</sup> Protocol of Executive Committee meeting at Versailles, 9 Feb. 1951, IACF/box 56/fo. 8.
- <sup>92</sup> ARK 1001/Da/box 47.
- <sup>93</sup> Proposals for pamphlets, presented at International Committee meeting in Brussels, 27-30 Nov. 1950, IACF/box 392/fo. 2.
- <sup>94</sup> d’Epinay to Lie, 6 Jan. 1950, IACF/box 258/fo. 7. As CCF was not established in January 1950, the correct date must be 6 Jan. 1951.
- <sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>96</sup> Lie to Bondy, 17 April 1951, and Bondy’s reply 23 April, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.
- <sup>97</sup> Lie to Bondy, 27 Oct. 1950, and Bondy’s reply 30 Oct, IACF/box 56/fo. 7.
- <sup>98</sup> Bondy to Lie, 2 Sept. 1950, IACF/box 56/fo. 7.
- <sup>99</sup> Norwegian Penal Code § 97a (of 15 Dec. 1950).
- <sup>100</sup> Lie to Bondy, 27 April 1951, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.
- <sup>101</sup> Lie to Bondy, 17 April 1951, and Bondy’s reply 23 April 1951, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.
- <sup>102</sup> ‘Beretning 1951’ (Oslo: Det norske Arbeiderpartis forlag, 1952); ARK 1001/Da/box 41; *Arbeiderbladet*: 17, 18 and 24 July 1951.



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<sup>103</sup> Lie to Bondy, 3 April 1951, and Bondy's reply 6 April, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.

<sup>104</sup> Bondy to Lie, 7 Aug. 1951, and Lie's reply 16 Aug., IACF/box 258/fo. 7.

<sup>105</sup> 'A monthly magazine for Norway', handwritten (undated) proposition by Lie, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.

<sup>106</sup> Correspondence with Tidens förlag, April-Aug. 1951, ARK 1001/D/Da/box 41; Lie to Bondy, 24 Aug. 1951, IACF/box 258/fo. 7.

<sup>107</sup> Co-eds in *Friheten* and *Dagbladet*, Oct.-Des. 1954; Haakon Lie, *De kommunistiske dekkorganisasjonene – Dagbladet og Kaderpartiet* (Oslo: Fram forlag, 1954).

<sup>108</sup> Lie to Josselson, 22 Feb. 1955, and Josselson's reply 2 March, IACF/box 258/fo. 9.

<sup>109</sup> Lie to Josselson, 14 Jan. 1952, IACF/box 258/fo. 8.

<sup>110</sup> Lie to Josselson and Brown, 20 Oct. 1953, IACF/box 258/fo. 8.

<sup>111</sup> Josselson to Lie, 4 Nov. 1953, IACF/box 258/fo. 8.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with Galenson, 2 March 1996 [Oslo, Arbeiderbevegelsens] ARK[iv og bibliotek – Erling Bø's research archive] 2803/box D.

<sup>113</sup> Geir Lundestad, 'Empire by Invitation? – The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952', *Journal of Peace Research*, 3 (1986); Tony Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine – A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, 4 (2000).