




UNIVERSITY OF AGDER

Master in Development Management

**Vote Buying and Its Effect on Democracy and Development in Uganda. A Case of
Rwamucucu Sub-County, Kabale District, South Western Uganda.**



By

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This Master's Thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this education. However, this does not imply that the University answers for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.

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ABSTRACT

In this study, I have investigated vote buying and vote selling as a phenomenon in Uganda, using Rwamucucu Sub-County as a case. The major aim has been to understand local people's perception of vote buying and selling and its effect on democracy and development. I have utilized a qualitative research strategy, using mainly semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and field observations. The data were collected during the time of the 2016 Uganda general elections.

Results indicate that vote buying has been extensive in Rwamucucu, and that it had increased significantly during the last 20 years. The study also shows that the majority of residents in the Sub-County participated in to vote buying, although not always voting in favor of the vote buyer. Money was the most used vote reward, although essential items like hoes and iron sheets were also issued during the campaigns. Both ruling party's political candidates, agents, and candidates from the opposition were key players in handing out vote rewards. The main purpose of handing out rewards was to get votes in return.

Several reasons featured as causes for people selling their votes, including betrayal by leaders, poverty, and rampant corruption at top levels of leadership. There were also many explanations behind candidates buying of votes, e.g. the political candidates knew that people were in dire need for money and other material rewards, but obviously money was used as a competition strategy. The study reveals several negative effects of vote buying on democracy and development, such as, deprivation of political and gender equality, undeserving leaders, and limited attention to service delivery. Despite some petty individual benefits accrued from the vote buying practice, its effects on democracy and development are negative and far-reaching.

Key words: Vote buying, Rewards and Voting.

DECLARATION

I, **Collins Kwarisima**, declare that this study titled “Vote Buying and Its Effect on Democracy and Development in Uganda. A Case of Rwamucucu Sub-County, Kabale District, South Western Uganda” is my original work, and has not been submitted to any other University for an academic degree, than the University of Agder, Norway. Statements from other scholars and writers, that I used, have duly been acknowledged as references.

Place: **Kristiansand**, Signature:  , Date: **31st May, 2016**.

DEDICATION

I passionately dedicate this work to my father, Mr. Justus Mbahungirehe, for being my overall inspiration, in everything.

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I would not have successfully accomplished this study without support from the following;

First, I present my thanks to God, for His grace and favour throughout my education. I had no special abilities as such, to accomplish this study, other than God's favour.

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More still, I am very grateful to my father, mother and the entire family, for the moral support and encouragement in my two years of study abroad. I equally extend my appreciation to all the friends and colleagues in Uganda for their encouragement and support during my two years of education in Norway. The list includes; Dr. Ephraim, Michael, Francis, Doreen, Joseph, Robert, Christopher, Juliet, Helen, Deus, Denis, Alex, Elnathan, to mention but a few. Similar thanks go to friends and colleagues in Norway, whom I socialized with directly during the two years of study. People including Torbjørn, Stephen, Nathalie, Anne, Samuel, Linda, Joe, Sharma, Egil, Odd Bjarne, among others, were of great help.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

EU EOM: European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM)

Fig: Figure

GoU: Government of Uganda

MP: Member of Parliament

NRM: National Resistance Movement

UBoS: Uganda Bureau of Statistic

USD: United States Dollar

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

Vote buying, understood as offering particular benefits to a voter in exchange for him or her voting at a particular candidate (Nichter, 2008) has become a popular term used in relation to election activities. Transparency International (2004) shows that vote buying is a wide form of electioneering in the developing world. Surveys conducted in South East Asia as well as many African countries find that a very high percentage of respondents admit to have received goods or favours from political candidates in exchange for voting at him or her (Gonzalez, Jonge and Nickerson, 2014).

Vote buying has been pronounced in Uganda's elections for a long period of time. The General Elections Report (2011) by the Electoral Commission of Uganda shows that bribery and commercialization of elections in many parts of the country was one of the main issues raised by electoral observers. Equally, a study about corruption in the electoral system in Uganda by Tabachnik (2011.p.5) reveals that, "because of the desperate need of people—especially in the village—to acquire money, they were willing to accept bribes in order to feed their families, pay school fees or buy clothing. Political parties—including both the opposition and the ruling party—understand this immense need so they go door-to-door to buy votes before elections—a kilo of sugar in exchange for a tick on the ballot". This evidence gives ground to investigate perception of vote buying and its effect on development in Uganda.

There are, of course, several consequences of vote buying. On the positive side, Gonzalez et al.(2014, p.198) assert that citizens who agree to participate in vote-buying exchanges enjoy immediate consequences such as accruing material goods during the transaction, consolidating relationships with influential or generous neighbours and community leaders, and avoiding punishments by powerful political machines. In other words, people who choose to cooperate with powerful political machines or parties in the vote buying transaction can avoid punishments such as denial of jobs in employment sectors where those political machines are influential. On the negative side, vote buying leads to what Stokes (2005) terms as perverse accountability that is bad for democracy: it reduces the pressure on governments to perform well and to provide public goods, keeps voters from using elections to express their policy preferences, and undermines voter autonomy (Stokes, 2005, p.316).This gives a two sided picture on effects of buying and selling votes. Nevertheless, it remains noticed that vote buying

is not a “neutral” matter. It is a “break of confidence” on a social level even if it may have a positive effect on the individual level. This study will be contextualized to specifically uncover the effect of vote buying in regard to the development of Rwamucucu community in Uganda.

Rwamucucu is one of the Sub-Counties of Kabale district in South Western Uganda. My own experience as a native of Rwamucucu is that many political candidates distribute material goods and rewards such as sugar, salt, soap, beer as well as monetary rewards to voters in order to get elected into office. Having seen several voters who welcomed these rewards and a few who criticized the same rewards, triggered inquiry into the varying perceptions on vote buying and selling. Hence, this study investigated rural perception of vote buying and its effect on development in Uganda, but specifically using Rwamucucu Sub-County as a case.

Data for this study were collected during the time of the 2016 Uganda general elections. Therefore, I was able to do on-ground observation of many election aspects, including the issuing of monetary rewards at rallies, and listening to people’s local chats about vote rewards. This yielded to an in-depth analysis of findings obtained through semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions.

1.1 Main objective:

The main objective of the study has been to investigate local people’s perception of vote buying and selling, and how they relate it with democracy and development.

1.2 Research questions:

The research questions guiding the study were:

1. To which extent (according to both local leaders’ and local commoners’ perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?
2. What is Rwamucucu people’s conception of vote buying?
3. How do the local people explain the causes for selling their votes?
4. How do the local leaders explain the reasons for buying votes?
5. How do the local people narrate the democratic and development effects of selling votes in their community?

1.3 Problem statement

Rwamucucu is one of the rural Sub-Counties in Uganda with many development challenges, yet its residents regularly participate in electing political leaders who will have the authority to take charge of development decisions. Constrained health care, inefficient transport and communication network, inadequate water and electricity supply, among others are development challenges that Rwamucucu people grapple with .However, amidst these

challenges, it continues to come out that some leaders elected by the people of Rwamucucu to spearhead decision making processes get into offices through election activities associated with vote-buying. Similar to this, Collier & Vicente (2012, p.1) reveal that, in several elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. By evidence, the Uganda electoral commission report (2011) confirms that vote buying transpired in many areas of the country during the 2011 general elections.

Rwamucucu Sub-County has had many incidents of vote buying, for instance, issues regarding political candidates giving hoes, salt, sugar and soap to the electorate during elections have been a common practice in the Sub-County's political elections. This situation raises questions on whether the underdevelopment of the locality has connection with electing leaders through corrupt voting practices. Additionally, though vote buying is not legal in Uganda's elections and has a number of undesirable development consequences, its occurrence in Rwamucucu elections ignites questions on local people's perception of vote buying and its impact on development. More so, I found that no study had come up to investigate local people's perception of vote buying and its broader effect on development.

1.4 Area of study

Rwamucucu Sub-County is the geographical area of this study. It is a rural sub-county located in Kabale District, South Western Uganda. The residents regularly participate in voting activities including electing the President of Uganda, Members of Parliament, Sub-County chairperson, councilors and other local leaders. Vote buying, given my own experience in Rwamucucu as a home area, has been happening in a number of elections of the Sub-County, hence Rwamucucu was a suitable locality for this topic of inquiry. Further, Rwamucucu remains underdeveloped yet leaders are regularly elected to change the situation. This discrepancy that arises amidst vote buying cases qualified the area as suitable to study vote buying and its effect on development.

Map of Uganda showing districts and the particular area of study



Location of Kabale District where Rwamucucu Sub-County is found

Source: Wikimedia Commons (2015)

1.5 Concepts of particular importance

Vote-buying. In this study, the clientelist vote buying definition by (Nichter 2014, p. 316) has been used; “the distribution of rewards to individuals or small groups during elections in contingent exchange for vote choices.”

Rewards are defined as cash, goods (including food and drinks), and services.

Voting has been used in the context of political elections at local, district or national level, which leaves out the contexts such as committee elections in organizations.

Community has been used, in most cases, to mean Rwamucucu Sub-County.

Contextual has been mostly used to mean something applying to Rwamucucu community.

General, in this study, has been used to imply something crosscutting or applying to other contexts beyond Rwamucucu or Uganda.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Chapter introduction

This section presents existing literature and theoretical information related to the topic of study. The section has been arranged in sub-themes, namely: Meanings attached to the vote buying concept; perspectives on magnitude of vote buying; viewpoints on outcomes of selling and buying votes in relation to mainstream development; and notions about Uganda's elections, democracy and vote buying. The section also highlights lawful perspectives related to voting and vote buying, how vote buying connects with democracy, and then gives a theoretical framework to the study.

2.1 Meanings attached to the concept of vote buying


There are quite varying definitions of vote-buying, but with common ingredients. Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004, p.67) present vote buying as one of the dimensions of "political clientelism". They define vote buying as, the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote (Brusco et.al, 2004, p.67). This definition looks at vote buying as perpetuated by political parties. Similarly, vote buying is understood as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices (Nichter, 2008, p. 19). Though related to the above, this definition is more open and can be applied where individual political candidates, parties or both are involved in buying votes.

In a very specific way, Gonzalez et.al (2014, p. 197) conceive vote buying as exchange of private goods for votes during electoral campaigns. This definition is about exchange of private goods, meaning vote buying is considered unofficial. Equally, the same definition looks at vote buying during electoral campaigns, and not before campaigns, for instance. This definition is most relevant to this study because in Rwamucucu Sub-County, voter rewards are issued as private offers, not official. It is also relevant to the study because issuing of benefits to voters in Rwamucucu mostly happens during campaign periods. Based on the above conceptions, vote buying can also be considered as a transaction where both parties get what they want.

2.2 Perspectives on magnitude of vote buying

Transparency International (2004) shows that vote buying is a wide form of electioneering in the developing world (Transparency international, 2004). Related to the seriousness/widespread practice of vote buying, evidence indicates that the use of the term "vote buying" has increased

sharply in recent decades. Its mentioning in “published books has quintupled since 1980” (Nichter 2014, p.315). This is as shown in figure 1 below:



Source: Nichter (2014, p.316)

From the figure above, it is clear that vote buying is presented as a practice that is increasing. Though vote buying takes place in Rwamucucu Sub-County, it was not evident whether residents of the area perceived it as increasing or not, hence opinions on the extent of vote buying in the area were sought so as to gauge its contextual magnitude.

2.3 Conceptions on likely triggers of buying and selling votes

There are various conceptions on the reasons for vote buying and selling. Brusco et al. (2004,p.78) advance that, people who “sell” their votes, or whom parties see as good prospects for doing so, are people who are particularly skeptical about future rewards. Those people may simply have a strong time preference for current over future consumption, or they may attribute a high level of uncertainty (skepticism) to programmatic appeals, believing that promised party programs are unlikely to take shape or to help them (Brusco et al., 2004). In Rwamucucu, many political leaders have been blamed for not fulfilling their development promises, hence the voters’ disbelief in promised programmes could be a relevant cause. This study will endeavor to find out the respondents’ personal views about their belief in the promises for service delivery in relation to accepting immediate gifts for their votes.

Additionally, when voters see parties as ideologically close to one another, vote buying is more likely to occur (Stokes, 2005,p.325). This implies that people can decide to sell their votes in a situation where rival political parties do not have credible differences in their development principles and values. Equally important, as presented by Stokes (2005), can be that vote buyers

target poor people, for whom the payoff of even a small reward outweighs the expressive value of voting for one's preferred party. This means that poverty causes people to attach much value on vote rewards such as money, implying a high likelihood of poor people to give votes in return compared to well-off individuals.

In a similar version, Gonzalez et al. (2014,p.199) assert that people receiving gifts in exchange for votes tend to be poor and less educated, and exhibit high levels of reciprocity. This implies that poverty could be one cause of selling votes and at the same time a reason why campaigning political candidates find it compelling to give gifts. Poverty, even in terms of basic needs such as food, is evident in many households of Rwamucucu. Whereas the above scholars relied on data from other countries, such as, for instance, from Argentina in Stokes' case, I have used interviews to analyze how poverty, education and ideology explain the practice of buying and selling votes in the Rwamucucu case.

Simpser (2013,p.7) argues that, political systems where power is initially disproportionately concentrated in the hands of the party in government, and where constraints on the discretion of government action - whether domestic or external in origin -are relatively weak, constitute fertile ground for excessive and blatant electoral manipulation. Vote buying is one way of electoral manipulation. Also, for Uganda's case, much power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling government. I wanted to confirm whether this argument can explain vote buying in the Rwamucucu.

The logic of a gift is another conception. Graziano (1976) points out that, in primitive societies, it is the personal bond created by exchanges or gifts that compels a person to return a gift. Brusco et al. (2004,p.78) emphasize this by arguing that people comply to vote buying because they feel a normative obligation to respond in kind to the campaign-handout-as-gift. This tells that even when voters are not planning to sell their votes, receiving rewards from political candidates during campaigns somehow obligates them to give their votes in return. If political candidates are aware of this power of gift, then they are most likely to use it to induce voter choices. Rwamucucu is a local community where valuing of gifts is important, as the local culture treasures gifts. Nevertheless, in my study I did investigate whether it is true that the valuing of gifts can explain buying and selling of votes and inquired more on what happens when people receive rewards from more than one political candidate vying for same position.

2.4 Outcomes of selling and buying votes in relation to mainstream development

Literature shows that exchanging rewards for votes mostly leads to negative development consequences. Buying votes comes out as one way that maintains corruption in government undertakings. This is likely because “candidates who win an election through massive spending will definitely endeavour to recover such costs which easily encourages corruption” (Muhumuza 1997, p. 176). Indeed in Uganda, it is known that leaders who spend money buying votes try as much as possible to recover these expenses, especially when they are later given administrative positions where they find easy ways to snatch on public funds.

Equally mentioned is that electoral malpractice, such as vote buying, “reduces critical citizenship” (Bratton 2008, p.16). Loss of critical citizenship can be dangerous as leaders will not be held responsible for their actions by an uncritical population. This in a way derails development. It was in the interest of this study to uncover the on-ground effect of vote buying where such issues as a critical population would be explored as well.

Additionally, it is indicated that bought votes have negative impacts on service delivery by leaders. On this, Gonzalez et al. (2014,p.198) point out that politicians who reap the fruits of vote buying have few incentives to improve public services and the overall living standards of the poor because they benefit from subjecting certain constituencies to a poverty trap. In Rwamucucu, public services such as schools, roads and water are really wanting. This study became an opportunity to ascertain whether the poor service delivery by leaders was connected to buying votes.

Vote buying as a dimension of political clientelism (Brusco et.al, 2004) is associated with hindering the institutionalization of authority (Graziano, 1976). Institutionalization makes authority roles independent of the person of a particular incumbent and allows the perpetuation of the basic organizational principles of a society through socialization of new actors (Graziano 1976, p.169). This study wanted to find out whether people of Rwamucucu are aware of this institutionalization consequence or if they have experienced it already as a result of some residents selling their votes.

2.5 Notions about Uganda’s elections, democracy and vote buying

Uganda’s democratic process has had challenges since independence in 1962. Until 1986, Uganda was a two-party system with the Democratic Party (DP) and the Ugandan People’s Congress (UPC). These parties were originally divided along religious and ethnic lines. This situation was interrupted first by a brief one-party rule under Milton Obote from 1968 to 1971,

and then by the long no-party military dictatorship of Idi Amin from 1971 until 1979. After Amin, a brief and violent election period led to the return of Obote and UPC to power after what many termed as flawed elections in 1980 (Helle, 2011, p.57). Though the use of money is not mentioned here, the flawed elections, especially in terms of vote rigging, imply a deficit in democracy.

Given the outcome of 1980 elections, Tabachnik (2011,p.8) explains that “while a bitter dispute ensued with allegations of fraud and vote rigging, presidential aspirant Yoweri Museveni declared an armed rebellion and waged a guerilla war against Obote’s government. Finally in 1986, Museveni’s National Resistance Movement party (NRM) took power”. During the NRM government, one would expect reform of the electoral process since this was a major reason that brought them into power.

However, electoral manipulation, especially the use of money, shows up in the first general election organized under NRM government in 1996. Here, it is asserted that the monetization of elections influenced the 1996 Uganda's electoral outcome; “it affected the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections which marked a major stage in the transition to democracy under the NRM government” (Muhumuza 1997, p.168). To date, voter bribery remains a pronounced phenomenon in Uganda’s popular elections.

A statement about 2016 Uganda general elections by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) shows that in Uganda, vote buying is still present; ‘two weeks before the election, the EU EOM observed NRM candidates and mobilizers gathered in Kampala receiving so-called "facilitation" cash. In the following days, the EU EOM observed cash being distributed to voters in locations across the country’. In line with this, Tabachnik (2011, p.15) notes that “even though it is illegal, as stated in the Ugandan constitution, bribery has become an accepted and integral piece of campaigning”

2.6 Lawful perspectives related to voting and vote buying

In the Uganda Constitution, the right to vote is provided for and it excludes such issues as voter influence or coercion. The Constitution states that; (1) Every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above has a right to vote; (2) It is the duty of every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above to register as a voter for public elections and referenda; (3) The State shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all citizens qualified to vote register and exercise their right to vote; (4) Parliament shall make laws to provide for the facilitation of citizens with disabilities to register and vote (Uganda Constitution, 1995).

In a special way, the existing electoral regulations in Uganda cater for the citizens with disabilities to exercise their right to vote. For instance, where a voter due to blindness, illiteracy, old age or any other disability is unable to fix the authorised mark of choice on the ballot paper, that voter may report at the polling station accompanied by a person of his or her choice to assist the voter to fix the authorised mark of choice on the ballot paper. If necessary, this will be on the voter's behalf. The voter may also request that another person will be present at the polling station to assist the voter for the purpose (Presidential Elections Act, 2005; Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005). Similarly, at the international level, the Compendium of International Standards for Elections embraces special procedures for persons unable to mark the ballot paper themselves, such as illiterate or physically impaired voters (European Commission, 2007). Indeed, these legal provisions carry an element of inclusiveness in the voting exercise. In this study, it was in my interest to find out how legal provisions were being manipulated to implement vote buying, for various groups of people, such as ordinary persons, the illiterate and the physically impaired.

In an explicit way, the electoral laws of Uganda illegalize the practice of vote buying. For example, a person who, either before or during an election, directly or indirectly tries to influence another person to vote or to refrain from voting for any candidate, or gives any money, gift or other consideration to that other person, commits the offence of bribery and is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding seventy two currency points or imprisonment not exceeding three years or both. And, a person who receives any money, gift or other consideration also commits the offence of bribery (Presidential Elections Act, 2005; Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005). However, the above laws do not apply in respect of the provision of refreshments or food offered by a candidate or candidate's agent as an election expense at campaign planning and organisation meeting (Presidential Elections Act, 2005; Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005)

At the international level, influencing voters through inducements, is also condemned. For example, in the Compendium of International Standards for Elections, it is stated that, persons entitled to vote must be free to vote for any candidate, and for or against any proposal submitted to referendum or plebiscite, and free to support or to oppose government, without undue influence or coercion of any kind. Voters should be able to form opinions independently, free of violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or manipulative interference of any kind (European Commission, 2007).

In the same vein, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) also recognizes people's right to choose their own representatives, without any influence or coercion. With these regulations, it seems that at a global level, vote buying is an illegal practice. However, like in Uganda, the fieldwork I did from Sri Lanka in June 2016 indicates that vote buying had happened during the 2015 presidential elections of Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, this study was able to explore how the vote buying practice takes place in Rwamucucu.

2.7 Perspectives on the vote buying - democracy nexus

Literature shows links between vote buying and democracy. The freedom to vote for own leaders, and people's participation in decision making are common ingredients of a democratic society. As put by Stokes (2007, p.132), democratic theorists insist that "citizens in a democracy have, or ought to have, political rights and political opportunities in common and in equal proportion". Thus, concern is whether monetized elections enable people to freely vote for their leaders, and have equal influence on political processes. In line with this, it is stressed that "one danger of monetization of electoral process is an unpopular candidate wins an election on the strength of his or her money" (Muhumuza 1997, p.177). This means that people's real power has been overshadowed and democracy becomes an illusion.

Similarly, it is shown that vote buying has an adverse impact on equality in elections in that the intrusion of money into elections "undermine democratic norms of political liberty (by depriving voters of free choice) and political equality (by benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor)" (Bratton, 2008, p.15). The issue of vote buying eroding political equality is also hinted on by Tobin (1970) as quoted in Kochin and Kochin (1998, p.648): "A vote market would concentrate political power in the rich, and especially in those who owe their wealth to government privilege". Indeed, individuals who are poor financially but blessed with leadership skills can shun electoral competition, the end result being rich persons in power, also meaning that it is their interests that will be passed at making decisions.

Stressing more on the issue of interests, democracy implies that popular interests should take center stage in an election. Contrary to this democratic feature, it is presented that the votes of the vote sellers carry "little information" about their interests (Stokes, 2007, p.132). This is important because bought votes cannot tell, for instance, whether voters elected a leader to push for a review of taxes or something else. In this study I have investigated the perceptions of Rwamucucu people in regard to how vote buying and selling connects with the above

democratic consequences such as people's free choice, political equality and people's own interests in an election.

Additionally, Nichter (2008, p.29) opines that vote buying may be seen as unambiguously pernicious for democracy – it is “a mockery of democratic accountability”. This in a way shows that when masses sell their votes, they lose power to hold their leaders accountable for development programmes. It also implies a break of the social contract between leaders and their followers. Stressing the vitality of accountability, Stokes (2005) claims that accountability in democratic systems is a good thing, since it means that voters can keep elected officials from misbehaving, and pressure governments to be more responsive to voters.

2.8 Theoretical framework

I have found no theoretical approaches that directly discusses rural people's perception of the connection between vote buying and development. However, five theoretical approaches relating to the topic will be applied to shed conceptual light on rural people's perception of vote buying and its effect on development. These include; critical theory, actor oriented theory, ideas from theory on social contract, theory on gift, and Barth's concept of transaction in interpersonal relationships.

Regarding critical theory, Horkheimer (1982, p.188) provides that, critical theory is social theory oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a whole. A theory is critical to the extent that it seeks human emancipation-“to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer 1982, 244). Vote buying being a challenging situation in a society, I used the ideas of critical theory to inquire how Rwamucucu people perceive vote buying in relation to having a change.

The actor oriented theory looks at social actors as responsible for what happens in their society. In actor oriented theory, it is considered that “the precise paths of change and their significance for those involved cannot be imposed from outside” (Long, 1990, p.7) .The differential patterns that arise are in part the creation of actors themselves (Long, 1990).In this study, the leaders and people of Rwamucucu were considered to have experienced vote buying situations and their effect on their community. Actor oriented analysis therefore qualified as a conceptual guide to carrying out this study.

The social contract theory acknowledges people's common will in determining how they should be led and guided by in development. Quoting Rousseau, on social contract (1920, p.63), argues that “each of us places in common his person and all his power under the supreme direction of

the general will". Though this is the source of bigger leadership institutions such as the State, it also applies to related leadership structures, for instance, to the Sub- County level in Uganda. This is because people elect leaders for their nation and localities, and in effect place their common will under them. The theory on social contract thus gives conceptual light to the study, which encouraged me to find out whether people's true will was being exercised amidst selling of votes, and again whether the leaders elected worked for development after getting to power through bought votes.


In the same vein, theoretical ideas about the gift shed light on vote buying, especially based on the aspect of reciprocity. Graziano (1976, p.160) indicates that in the absence of political and economic conditions (juridical coercion) "what induces a person to return things received is a gift". A gift in this study was (only) used because it reflects the aspect of reciprocity embedded in voter rewards. Mauss (2002, p.3) emphasizes this by revealing that "a present given always expects one in return". Thus, rewards during electoral campaigns can work as a social contract that naturally induces the return of a reward. This study therefore adapted this theoretical conceptualization to explore how voter rewards could be inducing vote choices.

According to the Social Anthropologist Fredrik Barth, vote buying can be looked upon as a "transaction" between the vote buyer and the vote seller as transaction is directly connected to reciprocity which we impose on ourselves and others. In any social situations, people are involved in a flow of "presentations and counter presentations" of appropriate valued goods and services (Barth, 1966, p.3). In my case, presentations and counter presentations reflect voter rewards by campaigning candidates and how they elicit vote choices among the electorate.

Barth continues to present that reciprocity implies that each of the parties interacting are satisfied with the transaction taking place between them. Thus, we may call transactions those sequences of interaction which are systematically governed by reciprocity (Barth, 1966).Indeed, voter rewards induce vote choices because of the aspect of reciprocity that they carry. This study as well adapted this theoretical view to uncover how vote buying and selling, in a picture of a transaction, happens in Rwamucucu community and the associated development effects of that transaction in the same community.

Drawing from the five theories adapted to shed conceptual light on this study as above, I have developed a working theoretical framework for this study that will be used to reflect on my findings. The framework is as below:

Working theoretical framework to the study



The above frame work theorizes that, out there in the geographical area of study, the community comprises residents (actors) who influence the different aspects of their community including vote buying. These actors are individuals and organized groups such as, for instance, the credit and savings associations found in Rwamucucu. During election periods, candidates establish connection with actors through campaigns, breeding the electoral transaction where exchange of rewards for vote choices likely emanates. It is this exchange that induces contextual reciprocity among voters to give votes in return, -“a present given always expects one in return” (Mauss, 2002, p.3). However, the study assumes that context specific causes of this vote buying

transaction exist in Rwamucucu community. Consequently, after certain candidates go through as leaders because of the vote trade, this study considered that the successful transaction carries situation specific development effects during the course of that leadership. These effects could mainly apply to democracy, service delivery, social contract and values. Hence, findings from this study were also examined through lenses of the above theoretical framework to confirm its on-ground applicability in Rwamucucu Sub-County.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.0 Chapter introduction

This chapter focuses on the methodological choices of the study, as influenced by the study's main research objective and research questions. The section thus presents the research strategy and design, population of the study, sampling considerations, data collection, ethical considerations, data analysis, and encountered limitations.

3.1 Research strategy and design

This study has used a qualitative research strategy and a case study design. As noted by Bryman (2012, p.399), “qualitative researchers are more influenced by interpretivism” and they “express a commitment to viewing events and the social world through the eyes of the people that they study”. Equally, Hennink et al. (2010, p.8) point out that, qualitative research is that approach that allows you to identify issues from the perspective of your study participants, and understand the meaning and interpretations that they give to behavior, events or objects. I therefore used qualitative research strategy to find out how Rwamucucu people explain vote buying events and their effect on development in their locality. The strategy was, for instance, used to explore how Rwamucucu people explain *causes* for selling votes.

I used a case study design in this study. Bryman (2012,p.67) asserts that the most common use of the term “case” associates the case study with a location, such as a community or organization. This research therefore used Rwamucucu Sub-County as a single case of this study. Case studies should be used when “you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study” (Baxter & Jack 2008, p. 545).Vote buying has been a common talk in Rwamucucu especially in the elections of political leaders such as president, members of parliament, Sub-County chairperson and councilors among others. This context qualified Rwamucucu as a viable case to study perception of vote buying and its effect on development.

Further, when research questions require an intensive and “in-depth” description of some social phenomena (Yin 2013, p.4), a case study design is relevant. The study has questions of this nature: To which extent (according to both local leaders’ and local commoners’ perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County? What is Rwamucucu people’s conception of vote buying? How do the local leaders explain reasons for buying votes? And, how do the local people narrate the democratic and development effects of selling votes in their community? These questions necessitated obtaining details from study participants as

well as providing in-depth description of the ‘how’ parts hence making case study a matching design for this research.

3.2 Population of the study

In a methodological context, a population is the total number of potential subjects/respondents for a study (Mbabazi, 2007, p. 102). Rwamucucu has a total population of 26,725 people; 12,727 males and 13,998 females (UBoS, 2014). The total number of voters is 13,763 (Electoral Commission of Uganda, 2015). Residents who are of voting age (18 years and above for Uganda) are the qualified population of this study. However, given that this is a qualitative investigation, this study reached out to only key categories of voters considered able to provide meaningful data.

These voters were picked from different parishes of the community to obtain various perspectives. They included both men and women of different statuses (rich, poor, literate, non-literate, etc.). In short, respondents were sampled from relevant categories of people that qualify in the voting age. Categories of people in voting age bracket were targeted as respondents because they are the center around which vote-buying rotates.

3.3 Sampling

A sample is “the segment of the population that is selected for investigation” (Bryman, 2012, p. 187). It is indicated that sampling is not necessary if the population is small (Mbabazi, 2007, p.36), but for the large population of Rwamucucu, sampling was necessary. It is further revealed that, “in qualitative research based on a single case study the researcher must first select the case or cases; subsequently, the researcher must sample units within the case” (Bryman, 2012, p.417). Rwamucucu being a case, sample respondents were selected from four groups; (a) political leaders, (b) Sub-County technical staff, (c) religious leaders and opinion leaders, and (d) local commoners of voting age. By their experience with development and election activities, these groups were deemed capable of providing relevant information to this study.

3.4 Sample size. Given (2008) argues that in qualitative research, the concern is with the richness of the information, and so sample size is not a determinant of research significance. Hence, in this research, I did not initially specify the exact sample size but collected data from the four groups until *saturation*, i.e. when no new information seemed to be coming up. By the time I reached the saturation point, I had interviewed a total of 88 respondents. The details of actual numbers per groups of people I interviewed are given in data collection subsection 3.6 under.

3.5 Sampling technique

I used the purposive sampling technique. Mbabazi (2007, p. 106) indicates that purposive sampling is where the sample reflects the researcher's personal judgement and interest. People within the study sites are selected because of their relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2012). Thus, in this study, persons including political, opinion and religious leaders were accessed through purposive sampling because they are knowledgeable about election and development issues given the nature of their leadership work. Similarly, I deliberately went contacting a proportion of local commoners, who, because of their voting age and low socio-economic level, are likely to be subject to vote buying. This process of contacting respondents was continued to a point of saturation where no new data seemed to be coming up.

3.6 Data collection

Interviews (59 respondents), focus group discussions (three) and field observations were employed as data collection methods. Desai and Potter (2006) emphasize that interviews need to target a diverse range of people who might have different opinions or perceptions based on their own experiences or context. Hence, I used semi-structured interviews to collect data from the four categories of respondents. These interviewees were able to put aside some time for an interview upon my request. At first, I used a recorder to take interviews, but I realized that it made people too suspicious given the sensitivity of the topic and as it was during election time. I thus resorted to recording using a pen and paper. This made people freer to speak. Since I was aiming at richness of information and not quantity, I did not limit myself to a given number of interviews. However, much as I detected the saturation point a bit early due to campaigns in Rwamucucu that made vote buying common to all, I insisted and managed to interview 30 local commoners, 10 political leaders, 5 religious leaders, 8 opinion leaders, and 6 Sub-County technical staff. At this point, things were just repeating themselves and I stopped. Thereafter, I went for focus group discussions including 29 local commoners, thus making a total sample of 88 respondents.

As stated above, I used focus group discussions to collect more data, but now from groups and not from individuals. A focus group is where there are several participants (usually at least four in addition to the moderator/facilitator) tackling a specific theme or topic. The importance of the focus group is the joint construction of meaning (Bryman, 2012, p. 501-502). I used the focus group method to obtain more data from local commoners. In Rwamucucu, local people belong to groups such as village credit and saving group. Since I used already existing groups as a strategy to recruit focus group members, these groups were bigger than four persons. I

used to meet the groups after their ordinary meetings, and it would have been culturally rude to chase away some members or to talk to only a few of them. The advantage was that the existing groups already had a culture of all members sharing their views openly, which helped to have active discussions irrespective of sex or ones status in the group. I also acknowledged that, a single focus group will rarely be sufficient to provide a valid representation of people's points of views (Desai and Potter, 2006, p.161). As such, I was able to hold three group discussions, two with women only and one mixed, all together making 29 respondents. Due to men's dominating positions of responsibility in Rwamucucu, I found out that I had got many male respondents compared to females during individual interviews, so the two women-only groups helped cover up some of the differences in perspectives that could be brought in by sex disparity.

I used a semi-structured focus group discussion guide to manage group conversations as this allowed flexibility in the discussions to accommodate all other arising and relevant aspects. Like in the individual interviews, I abandoned a recorder and instead took notes during discussions because this made group members not to suspect where I am taking the information and equally made them freer to speak.

3.7 Ethical considerations

Research ethics emphasize the need to protect the welfare and rights of respondents. In this study, respondents choice of voluntary participation and withdraw was observed. Given sensitivity of the topic, respondents' identities were left anonymous save for those who permitted disclosure. The purpose of the study being academic in nature was equally stressed to respondents so as to cooperate on student terms without being suspicious or over expecting rewards from me.

Further, I sought a research introductory letter from my department in the University of Agder which used to prove to doubting respondents that I am a student and I need their support to complete my studies. Also, the introductory letter was presented to local leadership of the Sub-County who sanctioned my study (sanctioned letter attached in appendix). In many instances, I had to first present this letter to skeptical respondents to feel at home and provide information to the study, which they did.

Fulfilling the principle of "do-no-harm" to participants was a bit challenging in this sensitive research but using the anonymity strategy together with acknowledging respondents' freedom

to refuse answering questions that they feel trespass their private sphere, I was able to try protecting participants of this study. That is why in the findings, I use pseudonyms and respondents titles such as a councilor, a mother and a retired technician, and the like.

3.8 Data analysis

The data analysis stage is “fundamentally about data reduction” (Bryman, 2012, p.13). Reducing data implies compressing the large corpus of collected material to get meaning out of it. Thematizing while utilizing coding method is the approach I used to analyze my data. “Themes are abstract (and often fuzzy) constructs that link not only expressions found in texts but also expressions found in images, sounds, and objects” (Ryan, & Bernard, 2003, p.87). In this study, themes that link respondents’ expressions to abstract ideas in regard to perception of vote buying and development were generated during data analysis. Coding therefore aided in grouping expressions and statements from respondents to create themes in relation to research questions.

Ryan and Bernard (2003) show certain methods for generating themes. The following three methods were used in this study: (a) identifying similarities, (b) repetitions and (c) differences in respondents’ statements. I used the different colours of a highlighter as codes to segregate different aspects, such as, for instance, segregating repetitions from differences. Code expressions that came out with same colours were thus grouped together to find common theme. Thematizing aided to arrive at various theoretical positions regarding the kind of perception about vote buying and general impression of its effect on development of Rwamucucu community. Also, verbatim reporting, photographs, and own field observations were used to strengthen the analysis. Further, clear and categorical information about respondents that included gender, age and education levels, among others was presented and analyzed using simple distribution graphs and diagrams such as pie charts generated from computer excel and SPSS.

3.9 Encountered limitations

I collected data during the time of the 2016 Uganda elections. As such, many respondents appeared fearful to be asked about questions related to voting. However, as a native of the area, I used the advantage of trust and knowledge of the local language to create a trustful relationship with respondents. Consequently, they were able to give information. Also, I told them that I would keep their names anonymous in my study, save for a few who were bold to declare that I go ahead I quote their real names. This also helped many to open up and give information.

Similarly, because of the election period, political candidates were busy in campaigns. As a result, I did not manage to interview some of them (especially hopeful Members of Parliament in Rwamucucu). This made me miss their voices as politicians. Yet, I observed many participating in the issuing of vote rewards. Nevertheless, attending their rallies made me observe real issues relating to vote buying, for instance, seeing how people share the money issued by those candidates. Besides, the study accessed a reliable proportion of Rwamucucu local leaders who provided information from the political dimension.

I encountered one life threatening situation while at a rally of one of the political candidates. The candidate was declaring money he wanted to give people at the end of his rally in one of the villages of Rwamucucu. On realizing that I was somewhere taking photos and recording him, he suspected me as someone who wanted to sue him in courts of law .He immediately threatened that I would not win him in court, just in case I planned to do so. His supporters stared at me and I was scared what would happen next. However, many realized I was a native of the area and I remained safe from harm.

CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSION

4.0 Chapter introduction

To repeat, this study has been directed by the five research questions: To which extent (according to both local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County? What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying? How do the local people explain causes for selling their votes? How do the local leaders explain reasons for buying votes? How do the local people narrate the democratic and development effects of selling votes in their community?

Data were obtained using both semi- structured interviews and focus group discussions as earlier presented in methodology part, Chapter 3. In addition, it was a lucky situation that data were collected in the period of January and February, 2016 which was the critical campaign time of the 2016 Uganda general elections. As a result, I was able to take on-ground observations of many vote buying situations.


I have used pseudonyms and mere titles to present findings from the respondents to ensure that they remain anonymous. I mention real names for a few peculiar cases where those respondents granted quoting their names. The presentation of empirical findings from this study is thus based on data from individual participants, focus groups, and personal observations from the field. The study findings will be discussed concurrently, in relation to the reviewed literature and the theoretical framework presented in Chapter two. The theoretical framework includes a couple of thoughts/assumptions I held before conducting the study .Thus, the discussion of findings comprise an analysis of to which extent the assumptions that I held became relevant to interpret the findings. My main assumption was that the causes and effects of vote buying are contextual to the community. To present and discuss the findings, I begin with biodata of the respondents to show their demographic characteristics. This is followed by a presentation and analysis of findings based on themes corresponding to the research questions, done chronically from research question number one to five.

4.1 Biodata of respondents

Through individual interviews and focus group discussions, respondents' bio data was recorded based on the following factors: age, sex, marital status, level of education level, type of work, and parish of stay in Rwamucucu. These aspects were considered important because they provide insights on how the study selected participants who were able to give responses based on different perspectives and experiences about vote buying and development.

4.1.1 Age

I had planned to access respondents starting from the age of 18 years because by the Uganda constitution, a person qualifies as an eligible voter after he or she clocks 18 years. However, data from the field showed that among the respondents I accessed, the youngest was aged 20 years. I thus categorized respondents in the following age brackets: 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50 and above. Results on age categorization, both in terms of frequency and percentage, are as presented in figure (Fig) 2 below.




Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

From the figure above, although the four age brackets (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50 and above) attracted unequal number of respondents, my aim was that the study should access respondents of different age groups. Hence, the study findings portray perceptions from all the groups in the voting age. In Rwamucucu, the young adults from age 20-29 years are believed to have more hunger for money compared to older people of 50 years and above. Thus, having 18 respondents representing those young adults and 15 respondents representing the older people means that the varying perceptions on taking vote rewards was captured. During the fieldwork, I observed many voters, both the young adults, middle adult age and the old, complying with vote buying, for instance, seeing them line up for vote rewards at rallies. However, this study did not manage to broaden its scope so as to obtain a thorough comparison of vote buying among the age groups, for example, ascertaining whether the old people are more vote-selling minded than the young people. What was obtained in the study were the varied opinions from the different age groups in regard to the perception of vote buying and its effect on development in Rwamucucu.

4.1.2 Sex

This study accessed 41 male and 47 female respondents. Percentages are used to illustrate this as shown by fig. 3 below.



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

As evident in Fig.3 above, 53% of respondents were female and 47% were male. It was in the interest of this study to achieve a gender balance among respondents. However, the slight gender disparity emanated from the three focus group discussions where the existing local groups that were interviewed comprised more women. This is captured in the picture below

Picture 1: Women domination of men in a mixed focus group



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

The reason for more presence of women in existing local groups' meetings was that as men are the majority of income earners in the community, many of them were far away on work during

the study. The wives represented the families in the group meetings. For this study, the larger number of women in the group discussions became an advantage because in a way, the women of rural Rwamucucu who are in most cases “culturally quiet” when men are present, now felt stronger, hence were able to participate actively in giving opinions about vote buying and development in their community. Also, results from a cross tabulation of age group and gender indicate that in each age group, men and women were represented, as captured in the table below.


Table 1: Age group * Gender Cross tabulation

		Gender		Total	
		F	M		
Age group	20-29	Count	11	7	18
		% of Total	12,5%	8,0%	20,5%
	30-39	Count	19	15	34
		% of Total	21,6%	17,0%	38,6%
	40-49	Count	8	13	21
		% of Total	9,1%	14,8%	23,9%
	50+	Count	9	6	15
		% of Total	10,2%	6,8%	17,0%
Total		Count	47	41	88
		% of Total	53,4%	46,6%	100,0%

As can be seen from the table, the total number of females in the whole sample was 47 (53.4%) and that of males was 41 (46.6 %). In the field, my experience was that men dominated in the distribution of vote rewards, but that women just like the men, received the vote rewards. Nevertheless, the coverage of women as respondents of the study did not establish an estimation of gender differentials in responding to vote rewards, say for instance, establishing whether men take more vote rewards compared to women. Instead, the results on gender remained within the boundary of the study’s interest to capture both the views of men and women on the topic of inquiry. Generally, a total of 88 respondents gave confidence that gender sensitivity was observed in regard to obtaining perceptions about vote buying and development in Rwamucucu.

4.1.3 Marital Status

Respondents of this study were categorized as single, married, separated/divorced, and widowed. Figure four below captures results of each category.




Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

Figure 4 above indicates that the majority of respondents (51%) were married, followed by the single (23%), widowed (14%) and separated/divorced (12%). The married dominated because the study accessed respondents of 20 years and above, and according to local culture such persons are expected to be married and with families. As an advantage, accessing respondents who hold responsibilities at family or societal levels helped in obtaining substantial perspectives on vote rewards and their effect on the development of Rwamucucu community.

4.1.4 Level of education

Respondents were categorized into five levels of education: no-education, primary level education (seven year of school), secondary level education (four years of school), advanced level (2 years), and tertiary or University level education (two to five years). Figure 5 below shows the results per category.




Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

Figure 5 above indicates that the dominant category of respondents (49%) were of primary level education, followed by secondary level (28%) and advanced level (10%). Tertiary or university level were eight percent and no-education were five percent. In Uganda, university education ranks the highest in the education system (Uganda Ministry of Education, 2016). Given that more than half of the respondents had not attained advanced, tertiary or university levels of education means respondents were largely of low educational status. Scholars such as Gonzalez et al. (2014) claim that, a less educated population can be a good target for vote buying. The claim by those scholars partly helped to inform the analysis of findings, and for Rwamucucu community, evidence (as presented in sub section 4.5) indicates quite a variety of reasons as to why they have been prone to vote buying. I did not manage to extend the scope of the study to relate the level of education with taking vote rewards, to see if, for instance whether the highly educated were taking less vote rewards than the un-educated. But, at rallies, I saw a few educated people such as head teachers of primary schools taking vote rewards just like the un-educated. Nevertheless, the results on respondents' levels of education mainly confirm the study's desire for a fairly balanced representation of people with different educational attainments, to capture wide-ranging opinions pertaining to vote buying and its effect on the development of the community.

4.1.5 Type of employment

Figure 6 below illustrates the types of employment among the 88 respondents of the study.



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

Figure 6 indicates that most respondents of the study (52%) were peasants/farmers, followed by the “any other” category- including persons such as those doing art and craft, pottery, knitting etc., (21%), politicians (11%),civil servants (7%), religious leaders (6%),and least were the business persons (3%). To ascertain the nature of gender distribution in each employment category, I did a cross tabulation of employment and gender. The results were as indicated in the table below.

Table 2: Employment * Gender Cross tabulation


			Gender		Total
			F	M	
Employ't A	Count	10	8	18	
	% of Total	11,4%	9,1%	20,5%	
B	Count	1	2	3	
	% of Total	1,1%	2,3%	3,4%	
C	Count	2	4	6	
	% of Total	2,3%	4,5%	6,8%	
P	Count	29	17	46	
	% of Total	33,0%	19,3%	52,3%	
PO	Count	3	7	10	
	% of Total	3,4%	8,0%	11,4%	
R	Count	2	3	5	
	% of Total	2,3%	3,4%	5,7%	
Total	Count	47	41	88	
	% of Total	53,4%	46,6%	100,0%	

As presented in the table above, A = Any other, B = Business people, C = Civil servants, P = Peasants, PO=Political leaders, and R = Religious leaders

Even in these employment categories of respondents, it can be seen that the inclusion of gender regarding the perceptions about vote buying and development was ensured. A significant observation from the results in the table is that the biggest group of respondents were peasants (46%), which echo the assertion in the State of Uganda Population Report (2014) that agriculture is the predominant economic activity in Uganda, more so in the rural areas, of course. And that peasants are the biggest group of respondents indicates that most participants in the study did not belong to the wealthy class. Accessing this class of respondents, i.e. the poor, was of the interest of this study to ascertain on-the-ground evidence on how poverty relates with vote buying because, according to academics such as Stokes (2005), vote buyers target poor people.

4.1.6 Parishes of study stay in Rwamucucu

There are seven Parishes in the Rwamucucu Sub-County. However, this study selected 88 respondents from four different parishes. Figure 7 below illustrates the percentage of respondents as selected from the four parishes.



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

As the figure indicates, the big proportion of respondents (31%) came from Noozi Parish, followed by Mparao (28%), Kitojo (24%) and Ibumba (17%). Noozi dominated because it is my parish of birth. Here, I had many existing contacts and could easily reach more respondents. Ibumba had the lowest number of respondents because I did not succeed to form a focus group there but was able to form one group from each of the other three parishes. Nevertheless, getting those proportions of respondents from the four different parishes was important to take care of the various perspectives on vote buying and development from the different areas of the Sub-County.

4.2 Magnitude of buying and selling votes

This section presents findings on how widespread the voting buying practice is in Rwamucucu. Analytically, I categorize the findings from the respondents under the following sub-themes: general receptiveness to vote handouts; area coverage in supplying vote rewards; how serious the present issuing of campaign rewards is compared to the past; and extent of actual voting as a return of the rewards issued.

4.2.1 General receptiveness to vote handouts

The respondents were asked how receptive¹ they believed that the people in the Sub-County are in relation to vote handouts. Results were as presented in the table below.

Table 3: Receptiveness to vote handouts

Degree of receptiveness	Frequency	Percentage (%)
<i>Highly receptive</i>	79	90
<i>Less receptive</i>	9	10
Total	88	100

Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)


As seen from the table, the majority of the respondents indicated that most people are highly receptive to vote handouts, whereas a small minority believed that people are not that receptive to the vote rewards. Among the respondents who stressed that people in general are very receptive to vote handouts was the Sub-County's extension worker: *"people will not attend a candidate's rally if they do not hear about him/her planning to give them money"*, he stated. Similarly, a religious leader was lamenting *"our people are now money hungry, all they want from aspiring candidates is money, not brains"*. Equally, a local commoner told that she refused to vote for someone in the last election just because his agents by-passed her when issuing money thinking that she was not their supporter.

In the same vein, a political leader told that now they do not waste time calling people for rallies if they do not have money to distribute. *"Now, it is difficult to convince people to attend your rally if you do not promise to give money"*, said a female councilor in the Sub-County. On one of my walks during data collection, I passed a small group of ladies on the way running to a rally. They said to each other that they should not be late because they might miss the money. They did not care missing anything else such as a candidate's programmatic appeals, only money. This gives an indication on to which extent people are receptive to campaign rewards.

¹ Receptive, in the context of Rwamucucu, has been used to mean how people were inclined or amenable to receive vote rewards.

Below I use the picture try to illustrate the receptiveness to vote rewards.

Picture 2: Receptiveness to vote rewards



Source: Author, modified from Shutterstock (2016)

The illustration shows that some one’s hand is already open, willing to receive a reward or money. I use the illustration to emphasize that when many people are receptive, i.e. hands are not closed, then it is easy for such rewards to be issued extensively. Rwamucucu being an underdeveloped community, the extensive issuing of vote rewards in that community confirms the assertion by Transparency International (2004) that vote buying is a wide form of electioneering in the developing world.

However, Transparency International could be having different reasons that account for the wide practice of vote buying other than the high receptiveness among the people. In this study, I held the assumption that residents influence various aspects of communal behavior, including vote buying. Indeed, Rwamucucu people being highly receptive to vote rewards, means they have contributed to the practice of vote buying. Nevertheless, among the community members, their levels of influence or contribution to certain practices could differ depending on ‘other’ factors such as poverty and power. For instance, the well-off people could have a different level of influencing vote buying compared to the poor. This study did not try to validate such a comparison. Though, the implication of ‘other’ influencing factors points in the direction that many residents were highly receptive to vote buying due to poverty. I discuss the poverty issue a bit more under the subsection 4.4.1.2.

4.2.2 Area coverage in issuing vote rewards

In each of the four parishes, I asked the respondents if they had heard about issuing of vote rewards by political candidates. The findings indicate clearly that all the four parishes had experienced the issuing of vote rewards almost in the same way. All respondents in the four parishes were aware that the first batch of 250,000 Uganda shillings² per village³ (for sharing between individual voters in every village) was given by the incumbent president, and that the second batch of 250,000 shillings per village was to be on the way, coming just before the voting. One opinion leader⁴ from Kitojo parish stated that, *“every village in this Sub-County has received 250,000 from the president.”*

A young, local commoner in Mparo parish informed that she had received campaign money but complained that the amount issued per person was too small to help. Also, some respondents told that candidates would first listen to how much their rival issued in a given place so that they could give more for a better appreciation. On this, a political leader in Ibumba parish had this to say, *“in these campaigns, candidates are careful to know how much their rival gave people in a certain place so that they can give more”*. In my native parish, Noozi, my experience is that all villages in this parish received the second batch of 250,000 shillings from the president through the ruling party’s Member of Parliament candidate.

The result from my study bring clear indications that issuing campaign rewards happens in all the four parishes of Rwamucucu. The fact that the issuing strategy was to reward *individuals* in ‘every village’ implies that all the villages in Rwamucucu are beneficiaries of vote rewards. Therefore I think it is safe to say that vote buyers were using the strategy of rewarding individuals in every village in Rwamucucu. Looking at the vote buyers, their intention of using that strategy was to maximize the votes they could expect in return for rewards, irrespective of whether people liked the rewards or not. Here, the expectation of the vote buyers to get votes in return for the rewards irrespective of whether people liked the rewards or not, depicts a belief in a kind of reciprocity that follows not because of the fact that all parties were satisfied

² By the time of data collection, one US dollar was equal to 3400 Uganda shillings. Hence, 250,000 Uganda shillings per village was equivalent to about 74 US dollars. This was little money but it could buy an equivalent of a half kilogram of salt or sugar for voters in each village by then.

³ The “per village” strategy, used by the vote buyers to handout monetary rewards in Rwamucucu, did not mean the rewards were directed to the community. Rather, the rewards were being offered for sharing by voters (individuals) in those villages, and the vote buying agents had veto powers on who should receive the rewards in those villages.

⁴ In Rwamucucu’s context, I use the title “Opinion Leader” to mean an influential person in the community, especially because of his/or her job ranking, financial and material wealth. For example, a head teacher in Rwamucucu qualifies as an opinion leader.

with the transaction taking place between them, as put forward by Barth (1966). Rather, the kind of reciprocity implied was one where -although vote rewards would not be to the satisfaction of the recipients the rewards would still induce a response any way. I would say that this kind of reciprocity that is expected, irrespective of whether both parties are satisfied with the transaction taking place, is basic reciprocity. And the form of reciprocity which actually occurs as a result of both parties being satisfied with the transaction, I consider it to be elaborate reciprocity. In my opinion, the basic reciprocity, as in the Rwamucucu case, makes the giving of votes in return of rewards a bit contextualized to the community, which is relevant to my assumption that reciprocity is contextual, as presented in Chapter two.

4.2.3 How serious the present issuing of campaign rewards is compared to the past

There were 36 respondents aged 40 years and above in my sample. These respondents could answer to the question if campaign rewards, according to their perception, have increased in Rwamucucu elections compared to 20 years back. Their responses indicate that campaign rewards have increased during the last 20 years. Mukasa in his late 50's narrated that, *"I remember during Obote's regime, there was no giving money in elections. What was there was people voting for parties according to religious affiliation, such as catholic and protestant. But today, giving money in campaigns has become the order of the day"*. According to a mother who was in her late 40's, she stated *"looking 20 years back, money has increased in elections today because it is used as in a form of competition"*.

In the same vein, an opposition political leader claimed that 20 years back, money was not issued to voters like it is today. Instead, people would then give gifts to good candidates during campaigns. He categorically stated that, *"a leader, such as the president, has stayed long in power because he uses money to attract support since many people have lost natural love for him."* Also, a local commoner in her early 50's emphasized that, *"vote buying has increased compared to 20 years back because of increase in costs of living which makes more need for money to survive"*, implying that selling their votes has become a strategy for increasing household income in difficult times.

The above responses give a clear indication that vote buying has increased in Rwamucucu compared to 20 years back. This increase reflects the assertion by Nichter (2014) that of recent, vote buying has become a common say. One of the reasons the respondents gave for explaining the increase of vote rewards, was the increase in costs of living. Although this study cannot fully prove the relationship between vote buying and cost of living, it can still be perceived that

vote buying thrives in a situation where the cost of living is high and the people are needy. This prompts a look into findings on whether people actually vote in return for the rewards issued.

4.2.4 Extent of voting in return of rewards

The respondents were asked whether people actually vote in return for the issued rewards. The findings show that a majority of respondents (71 out of 88) believed that people actually vote based on received rewards. A minority (17 out of 88) believed that people accept the reward but that they would anyway vote for their preferred candidate, i.e. the reward would not change their voting behavior. One political leader equated the situation to a slogan- “*no money, no vote*”. A retired old electrical technician, locally respected as a “Muzeyi⁵” complained that, “*except for the few people who care about their respect, the rest vote in return of issued rewards*”.

Picture 3: Interview at home of anti-vote buying dignified technician in Rwamucucu



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

In addition to the view by the technician that many do not care about their respect and sell their vote under influence of vote rewards, a local agent of an opposition politician complained that, “*other than a few youths who care about the future, the other people especially the old ones, just vote for the one who gave them much money because they think he/she she cares so much for them*”.

During a focus group discussion with the Rwakasengo Tweyambe group, they informed that, “*without giving money, no candidate can win the election in Rwamucucu except if people*

⁵ “Muzeyi” is a local title in Rwamucucu, given to respected old persons in the community, especially because of their record of good moral values.

sympathize with him or her on basis of being a first time aspirant.” Additionally, a teacher in the community revealed a contradicting scenario, saying that, *“for me I can receive money from one particular candidate and vote for him/her. But some people in this area receive money from more than one candidate and because of guilt, they refuse to vote for any of them”*. For this teacher, it seems that those who receive vote rewards and do not vote in return are morally wanting.

A small group of respondents told about people receiving rewards but still went ahead to vote for their favourite candidate. On this issue, one local businessman stressed that he had heard about candidates giving money, but still he believed that people will vote for the candidate they want. Similarly, a woman respondent stated *“for me I can receive the money but I do the right thing at the ballot box”*. A young interviewee believed that about 30% of the voters would receive money from political candidates but vote for their preferred candidate.

In general, it seems that most residents actually give-in to vote buying, although not always voting in favor of the reward giver. But even for the few who could receive the rewards but voted for another candidate, it seemed that such people were considered by the others as morally weak, as could be noted from a respondent’s expression that, on her side, she could receive money from one particular candidate and vote for him/her, but some people would receive money from more than one candidate and refuse to vote for any of them due to guilt. This respondent’s position could be equated to the gift mentality emphasized by Mauss (2002, p.3) that *“a present given always expects one in return”*. The question we then could ask is what happens when the voters receive gifts from two or more candidates vying for the same elective position. According to the sentiment of the respondent statement above; it would imply that some who receives vote rewards from more than one candidate should not vote for any. Another answer that was forwarded by some of my respondents, and which I found most applicable in Rwamucucu, was that you should vote for the highest giver. This would, however, turn the elections into a market where votes are auctioned and the highest bidder wins. This requires delving into findings on Rwamucucu people’s conception of vote buying.

4.3 Conception of vote buying

Through the field interviews and focus group discussions, the respondents were able to express their conception of vote buying. Findings fell under three sub-themes: type of rewards issued to voters; good and bad vote buying; and the meaning related to the purpose of giving vote rewards.

4.3.1 Type of rewards issued to voters⁶

At the time of data collection, issuing vote rewards in Rwamucucu was so much more pronounced than what I had expected. I was therefore forced to abandon certain questions, for instance, whether people have heard about campaign rewards in their community. Instead, to show that I was informed on this issue, I started the study by showing that I had already experienced issuing of campaign rewards, and followed up by asking people what they have heard or witnessed being issued as rewards.

The big proportion of respondents (81 out of 88) explained that money (alone) was the most issued voter reward during the campaigns. Only 7 out of 88 said that rewards comprised money combined with materials such as hoes to individuals, and iron sheets to schools and churches. Regarding the amount of money, most respondents told about the first 250,000 Uganda Shillings that was given to voters to share amongst themselves per village. This money was offered to voters by the ruling party's Member of Parliament (MP) candidate, on behalf of the incumbent president. As campaigns were almost ending, the same candidate gave the second 250,000 Uganda shillings (also on behalf of the incumbent president) to the same voters to share per village. This money was openly declared to voters at rallies.

At the time of declaring the money to voters, the ruling party MP candidate emphasized that it was an offer he lobbied from the president. At one of the rallies, I recorded the MP candidate saying *"because of my love for you and our party, I asked the President that you people need to vote when you have money so you are not swayed away by anything"*. A total of about 280 people were present at the rally.

It was the local leaders and the well-known agents of the party who distributed this money. The main criteria for giving the money was first to confirm a person's appearance in the voters' register. As an eligible voter, I had chance to see an agent bringing 4800 Uganda shillings for

⁶ With an exception of iron sheets, as elucidated on, in the content of this subtheme, the rest of the rewards went to individual voters. Even the iron sheets that went to churches and schools targeted individual stakeholders of those schools, as voters. They would be exonerated of their community contribution to purchase such iron sheets for the churches or schools so as to give votes in return.

me as a share on that money. At the time of giving me the money, the agent whispered “we also considered you when dividing money, we need your vote”. While trying to show appreciation for the offer, I asked the agent to use it as a donation to a village development association that he chairs, and where I also belong.

On another rally of an opposition MP candidate, I saw him openly give 100,000 shillings to people to share and a village basis. At that rally, about 300 people had attended (roughly 37 persons from each village, for the 8 villages in that Parish that had hosted the rally) and the money was declared to them by the MP candidate disguising that his offer to them was for something to “drink”. Having attended the rally, I could clearly perceive that the real message in giving a drink to people was a gentle way of asking them to give votes. At the end of the rally, agents of the candidate in each village then asked people to line up in their respective villages so as to receive the money. The candidate asked that the agents should give every registered voter money, including also those they think were not real supporters of him, saying that he did not believe in segregation between voters. Below is a picture of an agent distributing money to people immediately after a rally.

Picture 4: An agent distributing money to village members at end of a rally



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

Regarding materials issued, iron sheets to churches and schools were the most common. Since agriculture is the dominant source of livelihood, hoes were also mentioned among the materials issued to eligible and registered voters. On this issue, one young respondent intimated that,

“my mother received 2000 shillings from a ruling party MP as an offer from the president but she wants to vote an opposition MP candidate who gave her a hoe because she needed it most”.

It is a clear indication from this study that money was the most often offered vote reward, although a few essential items like hoes and iron sheets were also issued. Both the competing parties (ruling and opposition parties), individual candidates and agents were found to be key players in issuing the rewards. This is very much in accordance with Brusco et.al. (2004, p.67) who look at vote buying as the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote. This view does not indicate the timing of vote buying, and whether vote buying is considered as official or not. My study indicated that election campaigns were the single most important timing for issuing the vote handouts. This resonates my assumption (in the working theoretical framework, Chapter two) that during election periods, candidates establish connection with actors through campaigns, breeding the electoral transaction where exchange of rewards for vote choices likely emanates. However, contrary to my assumption, community groups such as saving and credit associations were not found to be important recipients of vote rewards. Rather, the key recipients were individuals and community organizations such as churches and schools. The rewards to voters were given openly, but by using an indirect form of language, for instance giving a “drink.”

The use of the indirect language makes vote buying unofficial (private), done deliberately by vote buyers to maneuver the laws against voter bribery. In the electoral laws of Uganda, e.g. the Parliamentary Elections Act (2005) and Presidential Elections Act (2005), bribery of voters is illegal, but it does not include the candidate buying refreshments or drinks for his or her supporters. Thus, the unofficial part and the timing (during campaigns) somehow echoes the definition by Gonzalez et al. (2014) who conceive vote buying as the exchange of private goods or money for votes during electoral campaigns. Generally, the ingredients of vote buying put together, as in the Rwamucucu case, voting buying means the unofficial offering of monetary and material rewards by competing parties or individual candidates during electoral campaigns, in exchange for the recipient's vote.

4.3.2 Two fold conception-“good” and “bad” vote buying

The study shows that out of the 88 respondents, only two viewed money distributed during the campaigns as essential. The remaining 86 expressed that money was not so important because the amount was too small to be really meaningful. For instance, the members of Rwakasengo Tweyambe group said that 250,000 shillings divided by 200 members of a big cell/village, each will only get 1,250 shillings, which equal 0.4 USD by then. This amount of money can only be used to buy two packets of salt or a half kilogram of sugar, or just half a bar of soap. One interviewee said that, *“most people especially men just use this money to drink a bottle of local beer”*. But from the 86 who said that the money distributed was not so useful (though people receive it), 81 emphasized that such money would be good if it was enough to buy them valuable things. Here, they emphasized money for buying seedlings and hoes for the farmers. For instance, an adult woman said, *“this money would be helpful if it was used to buy seedlings for us in this new planting season”*.

The chairperson of Rweza women group said in a focus discussion that, *“money issued by candidates would be good if it was channeled to development associations so that members could use it to buy long lasting things such as plastic chairs to avoid hiring during time of events”*. However, three political leaders who were contacted individually, about why political candidates do not use the money they issue to voters, to instead buy for them long-lasting and valuable requirements, revealed that such items require a lot more money and proper planning which individual political candidates cannot adequately afford. A politician expressed that one of the MP candidates had succeeded to buy hoes for some women in the Sub-County, but he managed to do so after getting a lot of money from banks as a loan. *“Our MP (incumbent) bought some hoes for women but he will have to repay the big loans he got from banks”*, said a former councilor of the Sub-County.

From the above, it can be noted that though respondents generally held a negative perspective on vote rewards, the majority were negative because too few valuable things were offered. In other words, people are not negative to the rewards as such, but they are negative to the small size and low valuable rewards. This conception means vote buying thrives in a situation where essential needs of people are not being met. In such a situation, vote buying can be likened to a “tiny” short-cut that at least provides something to people who are in need. Perhaps that is why the residents of Rwamucucu see the positive aspects of what they would have actually considered as an undesirable practice.

4.3.3 Meaning related to purpose of giving vote rewards

The 59 local commoners interviewed in the study were asked to explain what they viewed as the major purpose of giving them rewards in campaigns. Some respondents gave more than one answer. However, all the answers given fell under three major purposes; to give vote in return, refreshment facilitation, and candidates' gratitude to people for their support. The table below shows the results.

Table 4: Purpose for campaign reward

Purpose for campaign reward (vote buying)	Frequency	Total sample	Percentage (%)
<i>To give vote in return</i>	44	59	75
<i>Refreshment facilitation</i>	23	59	39
<i>Candidates' gratitude to people for their support</i>	6	59	10

Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

The results from the table indicate that the majority of local commoners (44 out of 59) perceive that the intention behind campaign rewards was that people should give their vote in return. A smaller proportion (23 out of 59) perceive campaign rewards as refreshment facilitation (something for a drink) to voters from aspiring candidates. The smallest proportion (6 out of 59) consider campaign rewards as a sign from the candidates to show his/her gratitude or love for the people (as supporters). The total percentage was more than a hundred because some respondents gave more than one reason.

For instance, one respondent was saying, "*they give campaign rewards for us to give them votes, and they know we need refreshments when we attend their rallies*". Another local commoner had this to say "*politicians say they are giving us money for water to drink but in reality they want votes*". Similarly, a young local commoner emphasized that "*candidates know that the youth are hungry for money and the only way for them to give their votes is to give them money.*"

My own observations in the field showed that campaign facilitation, especially money given to individual voters, is solely intended to solicit votes. For example, in one of the rallies in Rwamucucu where an MP candidate gave money to the voters, the candidate told agents that in case they see a person who wants the money but where they were not sure if the person is a supporter, the person should first promise to make him/herself "blind" (pretend to be blind) so

as to be accompanied to the ballot box by a party agent, to make sure that he/she cast the vote “correctly”. Indeed, on the day of the voting, some people did exactly that, saying that they were blind and had to call an agent for help. Not even their closest friends or family members were allowed to tick for them on the ballot paper.

From the presentation above, it can be observed that even if certain voters cite other purposes for being given campaign rewards, the dominating purpose for them is to give their votes in return for the reward. This is also confirmed by the fact that probable non-supporters are first ‘conditioned’ if they want to receive the reward, for example, to pretend as unable to put a mark of choice on their own on the ballot paper. The Electoral laws of Uganda (e.g. the Parliamentary Elections Act) allow assisting the illiterate and people with disability. For instance, it is stipulated that “where a voter is by reason of blindness, illiteracy, old age or any other disability unable to fix the authorized mark of choice on the ballot paper, that voter may report at the polling station accompanied by a person of his or her choice to assist the voter to fix the authorized mark of choice on the ballot paper” (Uganda Parliamentary Elections Act, 2005, p.30). As I narrated before, I personally saw some people pretending to be blind on the day of the voting and would call the vote buying agent to help. For people to allow to be conditioned just because of small rewards means that they were really in dire need. However, people who bow down to such tough conditions shows a violation of the freedom of choice and the freedom of election, and is in stark opposition to Stokes’ (2007) argument that citizens in a democracy have, or ought to have political rights.

4.4 Causes of selling votes

The 59 local commoners of the study were asked to share the reasons why so many people in their community give-in to vote buying. Some participants gave more than one reason. We may divide the reasons into two major categories: reasons internal to the community and reasons that are external to the community.

4.4.1 Reasons internal to Rwamucucu

The internal reasons will be discussed as betrayal by leaders, poverty, the financial need, and extensive break-down of social values.

4.4.1.1 Betrayal by leaders

The majority of respondents (48 out of 59) stressed that the main reason for accepting rewards was the betrayal by the leaders. Over time, the voters felt they had been disappointed by leaders whom they used to vote for on the basis of trust for development solutions, not for vote rewards. The main expression that many respondents used for explaining betrayal by the leaders was that the leaders were disappearing after winning an election. By leaders disappearing, respondents meant that most leaders they voted for did not come back to them to discuss their development concerns after winning the election. Because of this, the people chose to get the little rewards they could from them during campaigns. On this, one mother was saying *“people receive the money because that is all they feel they can get from the leaders. It is nothing much the leaders help them with after they win elections”*. A similar complaint was advanced by another woman, *“after such leaders go through (win), they disappear from us and they concentrate on looking for money for the next election”*.

Another expression people gave regarding politicians' betrayal was empty promises. The respondents revealed that many people's votes follow the money so as to get something from leaders since most of them do not fulfill their promises after winning the election anyway. *“Leaders do not do what they promise to do, so people vote for candidates who pay them because that is all they can get from leaders.”*, said Mukasa, a Sub-County technical person. Similarly, in the local language, a respondent lamented that, *“abebembezi baraturaganisa embeho”* (*“leaders promise us air”*).

People also felt that they were betrayed by leaders as they lost their hopes. The Bahingi women focus group stressed that loss of hope was an important cause for selling votes; *“People have lost hope due to prior disappointments, they sell votes as a consolation”*.

The photo below show Bahingi woman member showing how their political leaders had failed even to get a market for their locally made products.

Picture 5: Bahingi group member explaining failure by leaders to get them market for their products



Source: Author (Fieldwork, February 2016)

The women explained that they were not happy that their leaders had made a record of betrayal, even to the extent of failing to get market for the products they had struggled to make. From the findings, it can be realized, leaders disappearing from the local community after elections, and empty promises were some of the ways that the leaders had betrayed the people of Rwamucucu. Indeed, Brusco et al. (2004) acknowledge that people who sell their votes are those who are very skeptical (uncertain) to programmes promising to benefit the local people. Though overwhelming disbelief in the development programs was evident among Rwamucucu voters, as they spoke about empty promises by their leaders, skepticism remains too small a word to capture the betrayal sentiments leveled against the leaders.

Simply, people were not only skeptical, but had also lost hope in the leadership. Based on the social contract theory as presented in Chapter two, both skepticism and loss of hope illustrate a dysfunctional social contract between the people and their leaders. Nevertheless, much as the leaders are to blame for disappointing their voters, it was ironic that the residents did not feel that they had betrayed their leaders too by voting on the basis of vote rewards, not merit or competence. This could be compared to paying evil for evil, which yields less. It was equally challenging that the people did not actually feel betrayed when leaders bought their votes. Perhaps because poverty came out as a key reason for selling their votes.

4.4.1.2 Poverty

Rwamucucu is a community reliant on agriculture. As such, many residents are not at all wealthy in terms of material and financial resources. A good proportion of the respondents (23 out of 59) informed that poverty was one of the reasons why people complied to vote rewards. A religious leader explained how poverty had caused selling of votes by giving an example: daily routine work (e.g. labour on agricultural fields) in Rwamucucu is paid 5000 shillings per day, yet a candidate can give 2000 shillings per person for just one hour at a rally. In the same vein, Alex a local youth respondent, had this to say, *“poverty in Rwamucucu needs to be solved so that people can help themselves and not resolve to begging. If people can help themselves, then will not accept bribes.”*

Indeed, from my own experience during fieldwork, I could feel that people were really struggling to make a living. One reason was because many have to plant crops but wait over three months before starting to earn money from those crops. A few people also try to make a living as carpenters, retail traders and house builders, but all these activities are affected by the agriculture as the main activity, an activity depending fundamentally on the local natural conditions and the weather. The picture below gives an image of the state of livelihood in one of the villages in Rwamucucu.

Picture 6: One of the villages in Rwamucucu and its livelihood activities



Source: Author (Fieldwork, January 2016)

The picture above reveals the community's dependence on agriculture for their livelihood. Most houses are built using mud because it is the cheapest material to use in construction. Poverty in terms of material and financial resources is common in Rwamucucu, and comes out as an important reason for selling votes. In tandem, Gonzalez et al. (2014, p.199) assert that, people receiving gifts in exchange for votes tend to be poor and less educated. However, less education did not feature as a reason for selling votes in Rwamucucu. People did not sell their votes out of ignorance but because they were caught up in the need to survive. Given that other scholars too, such as Gonzalez et al. (2014), find poverty as a cause for the selling of votes elsewhere, means poverty is a cross cutting or general cause, not specific to only Rwamucucu as I had thought in my assumption. Meanwhile, the high reliance on crop farming in Rwamucucu meant that they had not yet reached a level of agricultural diversification that could supplement crop farming with other income generating activities, for instance, from poultry rearing. Also, over-dependence on natural conditions for agriculture made it difficult for the residents to come out of poverty, especially in instances where weather vagaries such as too little rain or too much heat afflicted the crops.

4.4.1.3 The financial need

A considerable number of respondents (14/59) informed that the need for money in Rwamucucu was extremely high. People valued money so much that politicians who brought them money became their favorite candidates. On this, an opinion leader had this to say, *“money means so much here, if you do not have it, do not waste time aspiring for leadership”*. Stressing the intensity of desire for money, a religious leader claimed that, *“if people hear a candidate coming to campaign but moving on a motorcycle, they do not waste their time coming to listen to him because they know he has no money”*.

I believe the above expression holds true because during my fieldwork there was a youth MP candidate who had no car, so he moved around on hired local motorcycle, called 'bodababa'. People did not come for his rallies to listen to him since he did not have money to give. However, he just carried on by moving from house to house instead. On the polling station where I voted from, he did not get even a single vote. Though other factors could explain the winning candidate, it was the MP candidate from the ruling party, who gave out most money, who won the election. Thus, monetary needs among the local people was an important cause for selling votes.

4.4.1.4 Extensive break-down of social values

Some few respondents (6 out of 59) expressed that the break-down of social values was an important explanation for the selling of votes. Many said that there had been a rise in individualism to explain the breakdown of the traditional, communal way of living. For instance, a local commoner explained that people no longer valued public amenities such as tapped water and good roads, but instead valued individual benefits. This was the main reason why the voters were interested to know what a candidate would give them personally, not what the candidate intended to do for the community. A top level church leader in Rwamucucu stated that, *“individualism has caused too much desire for money from aspiring leaders.”* Besides, a female local commoner stressed that *“people will not care to ask a politician about impassable roads but they will wait for money from him/her”*

Similarly, one retail trader narrated that people now-a-days want something for themselves not for the community. He categorically explained that, *“people are not interested in community benefits, they want something for themselves from the aspiring candidates”*. This was a bit contradictory to some of my other experiences during fieldwork in Rwamucucu, where I could feel that people were still working together as a community, especially through the village associations and such collective activities as digging field/gardens for each other on a communal basis. However, it seems clear that communal values in political terms had weakened. Based on the field experience, the weakening of communal political values could be linked to the unmet financial needs in the community. Much as the people work collectively, for instance, in digging fields/gardens for each other on communal basis, it did not give them direct cash like the vote buyers did. The lack of better sources of income, moreover in an increasingly monetizing economy of Uganda could have caused the weakening of communal political values in Rwamucucu. The extensive break-down of social values as cause for selling votes features as contextual to Rwamucucu, hence relevant to my assumption in Chapter two that causes of selling votes are contextual to the community.

4.4.2 Reasons external to Rwamucucu

During the study I found three major reasons for selling votes that can be considered to be external to the community; general corruption at the top political level, and politics as business.

4.4.2.1 Rampant corruption at the top

During fieldwork, some of the respondents (8 out of 59) pointed out corruption in the leadership of Uganda as a cause for the selling of votes in Rwamucucu. They presented the negative view of corruption and emphasized that corruption at the top level of government was one of the reasons compelling the people to go for personal rewards during elections. From their experience, corruption at the top level of government meant that they would not gain much from the leadership by voting based on competence. The Tweyambe focus group unanimously supported a member's claim that selling votes was a kind of consolation for local people to get at least something from a "rotten" system. They knew, for instance, that members of the parliament had been bribed by the executive arm of the government to vote for certain decisions, such as removing the term limits for the incumbent president.

An opinion leader explained why the people vote following rewards "*if corruption takes place at the top, then who are we to expect good fruits from leadership at local level*". In other words, people think that corruption at top level of leadership spills over to local level leadership, and that the only way to gain something from this system was to get money for votes during campaigns. This showed that there was an intricate synergy in leadership to the extent that if something went wrong at one level of the leadership, the other levels too inevitably get affected. Besides, rampant corruption at top level of leadership signifies a break of people's trust which equally depicts a breach of the social contract. Relevant to my assumption in Chapter two, rampant corruption at top levels of leadership comes out as a contextual cause for selling votes especially in the bigger perspective of Uganda.

4.4.2.2 Politics as business

A very small number of respondents (5 out of 59) said that selling votes was caused by viewing politics as business. The people sold their votes to politicians since the political candidates were also going to earn money from their positions. For instance, in the Tweyambe focus group, members said that, "*many leaders go to work for themselves and families*". Equally, a youth respondent claimed that, "*leaders go to make own money in government, we also want to get our share before giving votes*". In ordinary or regular business undertakings, this situation could be likened to 'cash with order' where a person demands a service after making a payment. Hence, to give their votes, people want payment first. Clearly, this can be viewed as another version of people's loss of hope in the leadership. It can also be considered as a sign of despair for the less fruitful leadership in Rwamucucu. Politics as business comes out too as a contextual cause for selling votes.

Based on the findings above, it can be observed that the combination of internal and external reasons can explain the selling of votes by local people of Rwamucucu. For a balanced perspective, this necessitates that we look at the findings on what explains the practice of buying votes by local political leaders.

4.5 Reasons for buying votes

The 10 political leaders who were accessed by the study were asked to share the reasons why so many aspiring leaders in Rwamucucu hand out vote rewards. The reasons can be divided into two main categories; direct and indirect reasons. I use the term ‘direct’ reasons because they are precise and straight forward to conditions in Rwamucucu. And I use the term ‘indirect’ reasons because such reasons are strategic and tactical.

4.5.1 Direct reasons

There were mainly two direct reasons; one was what we could call candidates’ understanding of people’s need for money and essential items, the other was a give-and-take mindset.

4.5.1.1 The understanding of the need for money and essential items

According to a majority leaders (8 out of 10), political candidates hand out vote rewards, especially money, because they know that people treasure it. For instance, a Sub-Parish chairperson assured that *“political candidates read people and know it is money they want much as it is not good to give out the money for votes”*. Similarly, a councilor for women submitted that, *“hopeful candidates give out money to voters because they have already interpreted that it is what people are in need of”*. Another political leader openly told that people ask for money from candidates during campaigns. *“Campaigning candidates give that money because people demand for it”*, said a male aspiring councilor. One former speaker of the Sub-County told that campaigning leaders were giving out money because they knew people did not have so much in their pockets.

Besides the money, the respondents revealed that candidates were giving out material rewards especially iron sheets for schools and churches because they knew that such organizations were in dire need for these items. For instance, one aspiring youth councilor showed me a school’s office that had stayed unused because of lacking money to roof it. As an intervention, one MP candidate gave iron sheets to that school for roofing, but they were not enough. I saw this unfinished school’s office myself and many residents were telling about that candidate’s help in roofing the said school’s office. Below is the picture.

Picture 7: An unfinished school's office roofed with a candidate's vote reward



Source: Author (Fieldwork, January 2016)

The unfinished building is a planned school's office. Roofing had completely failed if it was not for the intervention of one of the candidates during his campaigns. One local chairperson informed that when a candidate gives such iron sheets, say for roofing a school, then parents are not charged to contribute money to that project. In the end, the parents feel relieved and because of that, they give their votes in return. Hence, it can be observed that candidates' understanding of people's need for money and essential items propels the buying of votes. In other words, people being in need was an opportunity for political candidates to give out vote rewards. Being in need of money and essential items emphasizes the issue of poverty in explaining vote buying. Indeed, Stokes (2005) opines that vote buyers target poor people. Poverty, as discussed earlier, features as a crosscutting cause for vote buying, not unique to Rwamucucu as I had assumed at the onset of the study.

4.5.1.2 Give and take mindset

A significant proportion of respondents (6 out of 10) informed that the give-and-take mindset among the people of Rwamucucu compelled candidates to give vote rewards. In his own words, a parish councilor claimed that, "*the give and take mindset has worsened the problem of money in campaigns*". The councilor augmented his statement with a saying in the local language "*mpa-nkuhe*" which literally means "*you give me, I give you*". This implies that without offering the rewards, the reverse might be true - *no giving, no receiving*. In the same way, one woman, a member of a local council committee, stressed that politicians are giving out money because people say "*I vote the one who has given me something*". Similarly, an old village chairperson informed that politicians know that people want something to eat first so that they give votes later. It therefore comes out that leaders in Rwamucucu understand the logic of

getting votes; give in order to get. This mindset means that once people are given a reward, they respond by giving back in a form of stimuli-response mechanism, and not because they feel obliged to give back, as put by Brusco et.al (2004, p.78) that, people comply to vote buying because they feel a “normative obligation to respond in kind to the campaign-handout-as-gift”. Simply, the issue in Rwamucucu was that vote rewards work as a stimuli for people to give votes in return (vote rewards just change people’s voting behavior because of the give and take mindset). Here, the give and take mindset- a cause for buying votes, features as contextual to Rwamucucu, which fits my assumption that causes of buying votes are contextual to the community.

4.5.2 Indirect reasons

The two indirect reasons can be described as; money as a competition strategy, and matching the trend.

4.5.2.1 Money as a competition strategy

Findings from the study indicate that money was distributed in elections because it had become a campaign strategy, not only in Rwamucucu, but in the country at large. On this, one woman civil servant had this to say, “*money is a way now used for competition in elections in the country*”. A youth leader also added that, “*candidates give money because that is the best way to compete*”. This means, leaders understood that it was not only about giving, but also how much one gave out. In line with this, one opinion leader I interviewed after the election for the Member of Parliament for Rwamucucu observed that the candidate who gave more money won the election. In his own words, he complained that, “*the incumbent Member of Parliament (opposition) is an intelligent leader but he did not win because he gave less money to people during campaigns compared to ruling party’s candidate who gave more and won the election*”. Vote rewards are therefore given as a “password” to win a competitive election. This is in tandem with the argument by Collier & Vicente (2012, p.1) that, in several elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. This kind of competition based on vote rewards might foster the exclusion of some individuals from aspiring for leadership, for instance, the poor youths and persons with disabilities who might have no resources to give out to voters. Like other scholars reveal, e.g. Collier and Vicente as indicated above, the use of money for competition in elections comes out as a general cause for vote buying. Actually, during my fieldwork in Sri Lanka in 2015, the same cause was true for vote buying in the 2015 presidential elections of that country.

4.5.2.2 Matching the trend

The participants also revealed that aspiring leaders give vote rewards because they were trying to follow the current trend of what to do in the country's elections. The failure to give out money or items to solicit votes was interpreted as being out of 'the-know-how' of the game. On this, one local leader made a local expression "*bela mu kilassi*" to justify the giving of vote rewards. The expression means that wise political candidates "*should be in class*", not out of class. In other words, a candidate who fails to give rewards during campaigns was considered to be out of class or even ignorant within the political game. In fact, one village chairperson insisted that, "*if a candidate does not give out money while campaigning, he/she will be considered as young in politics of the country*". Hence, matching the trend is a justification for vote buying in Rwamucucu.

In my view, the political leaders in Rwamucucu were looking at the vote buying practice as something that happens almost country wide in Uganda, hence the practice had been accepted as part of the 'normal' conditions in Uganda's elections. Indeed, it could be deducted that, the general conditions, which people experience in common, such as vote buying, have a bearing on shaping their beliefs, for instance, people believing that vote buying was a 'normal' phenomenon in Uganda's elections.

4.6 Effect of buying and selling votes on democracy and development

The respondents of the study revealed both democratic and development consequences of buying and selling votes. The effects were said to be both negative and far-reaching.

4.6.1 Democratic effects

Many responses were obtained in regards to the democratic effects of buying and selling votes. These responses fell under what we may categorise as three main consequences. Deprivation of political equality, infringement of voting freedom, and undeserving leaders.

4.6.1.1 Deprivation of political equality

Loss of political equality was one of the most often mentioned perceived consequences of buying and selling votes. Respondents informed that because of the monetized elections, poor people did not have equal chances to compete for leadership with the rich. The rich individuals have money to hand out, and are therefore able to take the leadership positions. Respondents cited cases of poor youths from universities and colleges who have a potential to become leaders in higher political positions, but because of the monetized elections cannot compete for such political positions.

One local commoner who seemed to be having shuttered leadership ambitions revealed that, *“because of money in elections, we the poor can no longer manage to compete for leadership”*. Equally, a youth respondent who said he had lost leadership hopes, had this to say, *“vote rewards have made it difficult for poor youths like me to have hope for leadership in this country. For me to become a leader, it means I have to first work for many years while saving money so that I get what to give to voters during campaigns”*. A wife of a religious leader stressed that the use of money to get votes in the Sub-County had made it difficult for women to compete with men for leadership, because men in Rwamucucu have more access and control of resources than women, given the patriarchic nature of the community.

Also regarding the gender issue, a woman councilor stated that, *“me as a woman I am not shrewd in issuing vote rewards like men, therefore I can only compete for women leadership positions where men are not part of the competition*. In stronger words, one village chairperson stressed that *“with the use of money in campaigns, leadership is now for the rich people”*. With these findings, the sidelining of the poor in leadership, and more so the youths and women indeed encroaches on political equality. The issue of vote rewards causing less chances on the side of the poor to access leadership is hinted on by Bratton (2008) that the intrusion of money into elections undermines democratic norms of political equality by benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor. However, Bratton does not specifically capture that vote rewards also exacerbate gender inequality in leadership as shown in the findings from Rwamucucu. This makes the gender inequality effect peculiar to Rwamucucu hence context specific.

4.6.1.2 Infringement of voting freedom

Interpreting my findings, it seems that freedom of election is at a cross road in monetized elections. One example, after issuing vote rewards, voters who received the rewards were being monitored by the issuing agents up to the polling day. If those rewards were issued by the ruling party's agents, then voters who received the rewards but seemed untrusted to vote in

return, were asked to assume that they had visual impairments or were blind so as to be helped by the agents in casting their votes on the day of the voting. In other words, where a voter was suspected not to vote in return after receiving the reward, he or she had to surrender the voting freedom, or what we could call freedom of election.

Equally, the respondents revealed that some voters could be intimidated upon receiving the campaign rewards. They would be told that in the case they did not vote in return for the reward, something bad would happen to them, especially if that candidate won the election. During my fieldwork, I personally witnessed voter intimidation performed by candidates from the ruling party. They seemed to have extraordinary powers to intimidate the potential voters. In the worst cases, one respondent revealed that in instances where some people refuse the vote rewards from a ruling government's agent, those people were noted as non-supporters and later were likely to lose their jobs, especially if they were employed in government sectors. These findings indeed reveal a breach of freedom of election, and as well show an invasion of the freedom of choice. Indeed, Bratton (2008) asserts that monetized elections undermine political liberty. More still, because of the mentioned intimidation in regard to people's jobs, vote buying threatened the voters' livelihoods especially in cases where they would refuse to cooperate with vote buying agents connected with the ruling government. The threat to people's livelihoods comes out as contextual to Rwamucucu in regard to the effects of vote buying.

4.6.1.3 Undeserving leaders

In general, my findings point to the fact that vote rewards resulted in undeserving leaders. The responders revealed that because the rich people were most likely to win the monetized elections, certain potential good leaders who did not have money to hand out could not win the elective leadership positions. Thus, people got leaders on the basis of resources and not on competence. In fact, one young graduate respondent said *"money for votes has replaced voting by merit"*. Similarly, an opinion leader had this to say *"getting good leaders in Rwamucucu is not easy because people are voting for money not competence"*. A concerned local commoner told me that the buying of votes had made it possible to attract political candidates who are business oriented. This means that in the situation of vote rewards, genuine leaders shy away. Here, the findings resonate with the assertion by Muhumuza (1997, p.177) that "one danger of monetization of electoral process is an unpopular candidate wins an election on the strength of his or her money." Indeed, some respondents looked at political leadership in the country as a business now-a-days. Besides, the issue of vote buying resulting into attracting candidates with a lot of money not only favoured business oriented leaders but also implied that people's power

in determining their own leaders had been compromised. The compromise of people's power could also translate into a kind of leadership that does not portray the local people's interests after the voting. This supplements the position of Stokes (2007, p.132) that vote sellers' votes carry "little information" about their interests. Perhaps, one could say that in an election marred with vote buying, poor people's interests are underrepresented compared to the wealthy class, because, the wealthy people easily get into leadership and spearhead decision making more based on their interest to maximize earnings out of the leadership. The issue of undeserving leaders manifests as a crosscutting effect of vote buying but with a context specific narration as in the Rwamucucu case.

4.6.2 Effects on general development

The findings indicate two main effects of vote buying on general development: limited attention to service delivery, and inadequate cooperation in leadership.

4.6.2.1 Limited attention to service delivery


Selling of votes made leaders fail to be concerned with service delivery. Respondents emphasized that many candidates, after winning elections, concentrate their attention first on regaining the money and resources they used during elections. For instance, one respondent said that he knew that their local councilors and MPs usually voted for an increment to their monetary allowances during their parliamentary deliberations - suspecting that this was a way that those leaders used to regain the resources they spend on buying votes during elections. The implication here is that such leaders would have put more attention on service delivery matters instead of discussing their pay rise if it was not for recovering the resources they spent on voters during elections. Similarly, two respondents told me about some candidates who even sold their properties, such as houses and cows, to get money to hand out to voters during campaigns. If such candidates win elections, there is a high likelihood that they put a side service delivery issues and concentrate first on getting their property back.

Equally, the responses indicate that some candidates decide to take up loans to get money to give to voters. When those candidates win the elections, they first attend to servicing their loans and not service delivery issues in the area. Some respondents also thought that such leaders who were burdened with loans were already too troubled mentally to concentrate on planning service delivery for their communities. In a related way, Gonzalez et al.(2014,p.198) point out that, politicians who reap the fruits of vote buying have few incentives to improve public services and the overall living standards of the poor because they benefit by subjecting certain constituencies to a poverty trap. However, for Rwamucucu, the intention of vote buyers seemed

not to subject people to a poverty trap. Rather, the winning candidates got tied up in resettling debts and also found themselves mentally muzzled in thoughts of recovering the resources they lost to vote buying.

This could equally mean that vote buyers were not proud of the vote buying practice but they find themselves constrained to do it anyway. And for vote buyers who do not manage to win the election to regain their lost resources from the leadership, it means they hardly recover the loss. This could retract such individuals back into poverty. Similarly, it was told that leaders who win elections through vote buying, always try to recover the spent resources through means such as increasing their own monetary allowances and pays during their deliberations. Consequently, tax payers' money, which would have been spent on meeting the needs of the poor, such as, providing seedlings to farmers, is spent on amassing more resources by the leaders. To this extent, for the people of Rwamucucu, poverty becomes both a cause, and in part, a resultant of vote buying. I try to illustrate this as below.

The poverty-vote buying nexus



From the above illustration, the upper arrow from poverty to vote buying means poverty is one of the causes of vote buying as evidenced in the Rwamucucu case. But also, the second arrow from vote buying to poverty shows that vote buying in turn contributes to poverty. The side curves show that both poverty and vote buying are intricately interconnected in a recurring way. From the above, the negative effect of vote buying on service delivery surfaces as a crosscutting effect but with unique explanation and implication for Rwamucucu.

4.6.2.2. Undermining cooperation in leadership

The study also indicates that there was failure in cooperation between the villagers and leaders as a result of vote rewards. Respondents told about instances when leaders never came back to them to discuss solutions for the development challenges in Rwamucucu. One local commoner felt that leaders did not value any discussions on development problems with the residents due to the money they had dished out during elections. Similarly, the Bahingi focus group told that they think it was because of vote rewards that leaders after winning the elections did not come back to ask them about their development needs on which to base their political decisions. The failure of such leaders to go back to the people to inquire about their felt development needs meant that such leaders were making decisions based on their own thoughts and interests. This indeed reveals a gap in development cooperation between the leaders and the people. At this level, participatory development becomes eroded as a result of vote buying.

The elected leaders failing to go back to the community for discussions on development concerns could mean that the leaders feel betrayed by voters who voted on the basis of vote rewards. Hence, vote buying costed the local people their power in the development process. Indeed, Nichter (2008) shows that when people sell their votes, they lose power to hold their leaders accountable for development programmes. The loss of power by the people, to hold their leaders accountable for their actions or inaction, could be attributed to the guilt people possess as a result of having voted following the vote rewards instead of merit. The effect of limited cooperation in leadership, as a result of vote buying, comes out as contextual to Rwamucucu but with a general feature when it comes to loss of power to hold leaders accountable.

4.6 Emerging issue - the extended bond of vote buying

There were also a few other key issues linked to vote buying in Rwamucucu. From the interviews held with the 10 politicians, five of them revealed that they were aware that money was used to pay some candidates to stand down for others in the election. One of the politicians gave an example when a popular political candidate was paid off by the incumbent district chairperson to step down for him. The informant narrated that, *“a certain influential man in our community wanted to compete to become the district chairperson but was given money to stand down for the ruling party’s incumbent district chairperson. The man having agreed to step down was later given the job to become the campaign chairperson for the ruling party in Rwamucucu”*. Another political leader argued that, *“the use of money has become chronic in*

our politics, some potential candidates in this community have been paid to step down for others”.

It was also mentioned that rewards were being paid to popular supporters of the opposition in the local community to defect. In an interview with an opposition political leader, he said that, *“the government identified residents who are staunch supporters of the opposition and called them in for secret meetings to offer them some money so that they turn around to support the ruling party (i.e. defect). Such persons were given amounts ranging between 50,000 and 100,000 shillings. And for the on-the-ground agents (workers) of the opposition in this community, they would be visited in their homes for a bargain on how much they wanted to defect. These people would be offered amounts ranging from 150,000, 200,000 shillings and more depending on how the bargaining goes”.*

Though the evidence above shows that the ruling party (i.e. the party in government now) to be leading in paying off opposition candidates and opposition staunch supporters, one opinion leader pointed to a former agent of the ruling party who was called in for a secret meeting at night and given a huge sum of money to become a campaign agent for the opposition MP candidate. Indeed, when I contacted that agent, he confessed to have defected to the opposition, but denied to have received money for it. However, later I saw him in the lead of distributing campaign money (from the opposition MP candidate) to local commoners at a rally.

Also connected to the discussion above is a situation where certain respondents informed me that the ruling party pays off persons known as famous chanters not to chant for opposition political candidates. For instance, Mukasa, one of the Sub-County’s technical persons who said I could quote him whenever I wanted, said, *“the ruling party pays off business bodaboda cyclists⁷ (business motorcycle riders) not to lead the chanting of opposition candidates when they have rallies in the Sub-County”.* Similar messages regarding paying off the bodaboda cyclists by ruling party were told by three local commoners whom I noted to be staunch supporters of the opposition in Rwamucucu.

From the findings above, it can be deducted that vote buying in Rwamucucu goes hand in hand with other aspects, such as, for instance, buying potential election competitors, paying off opposition’s staunch supporters and agents, and buying the services of famous chanters. Buying

⁷ In the context of Rwamucucu, the business ‘Bodababa’ cyclists or business motorcycle riders, usually lead political candidates as they drive to rallies, either on voluntary basis or payment. Their various chanting styles such as the continuous hooting, and showing their amazing riding techniques, on the motorcycles, always attract the crowd and is one way of mobilizing political support.

political competitors could be looked on as an infringement of one's right to contest and be voted for. This contravenes the notion by Stokes (2007) that "citizens in a democracy have, or ought to have, political rights and political opportunities in common and in equal proportion". Paying off opposition's staunch supporters and agents to defect also implied a violation of people's freedom to support the candidate of their choice and interest.

4.7 Discussion of arising concern: Is there a meaning of democracy in Rwamucucu?

Despite the compliance with vote rewards by many people in Rwamucucu, they did not stress any positive outcomes of selling votes. They pointed out negative effects of vote buying on democracy, for example, deprivation of political equality and undeserving leaders. Similarly, evidence shows that Rwamucucu people generally held a negative perspective on vote rewards, except if such vote rewards had been of much value to them, for instance, if they were to be given seedlings for crop farming. These negative perceptions about vote buying, amidst accepting the vote rewards (of less value), raised a concern on the meaning of democracy in Rwamucucu, i.e do people see any value in democracy, or do they perceive it as a fantasy? Based on my field experience, the people of Rwamucucu treasure democracy but it looked like they had less control over it. The acceptance of the small vote rewards (such as little money that buys a kilogram of salt) by many residents was out of conditions such the need to survive due to poverty. Also, betrayal by leaders, even during times when people used to vote for them following competence alone, made people desperate and they resorted to taking rewards before giving their votes. In fact, a local political leader in Rwamucucu told that "*the use of money to buy votes has undermined valuing democracy because of leader's record of disappearing from the people after elections*". At this point, it could be realized that the people of Rwamucucu recognize the value of exercising their democratic right of voting for deserving leaders, but they had lost hope for better results even if they were to do so.

Yet still, the findings show that several voters in Rwamucucu, who would receive the vote rewards but seemed untrusted to vote in return, were asked to assume that they had visual impairments or were blind so as to be helped by the vote buying agents in casting their votes on the day of the voting. This implied that a number of people in Rwamucucu understood the democratic norm of exercising their freedom to vote for their favourite candidates, even after receiving the vote rewards, but then they were subjected to surrender their voting freedom upon accepting the vote rewards. In other countries like Sri Lanka where I did quite related fieldwork in 2015, my experience was that many people in Sri Lanka had received vote rewards from vote buyers in the 2015 presidential election, but they managed to vote for their rightful candidates

because they were not conditioned to pretend as being blind to be accompanied in casting their ballots, and were not closely monitored like it was in Rwamucucu. In other words, if people in Rwamucucu were given vote rewards, but remained unexposed to conditions such as close monitoring and threat, they would still exercise their democratic right of voting for their favourite candidates. Indeed, a local commoner told that *“people have lost hope for democracy because they are even intimidated to vote, so better to receive some money from candidates before voting for them”*. In a democracy, an election campaign is supposed to be a peaceful and open discourse of persuasion (Bratton, 2008). Hence, democracy holds a positive value in Rwamucucu but people feel they have lost control over it in the circumstances such as vote buying, poverty and voter intimidation.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESULTING THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

Based on the reviewed literature and identified theories, I had developed a working theoretical framework to the study, as in Chapter two, comprising thoughts or assumptions I would try to assess their relevance to my findings. The discussion of findings has pointed in the direction that my main assumption, i.e. causes and effects of vote buying are contextual to the community, is highly relevant, and in a few cases least relevant. Therefore, this section presents a modified theoretical framework resulting from the findings of this study.

The resulting theoretical framework of the study


Actors(individuals and community organizations)



Electoral transaction(social exchange of vote rewards to individuals and community organizations for vote choices)



Vote buying and selling(contextual reciprocity)



Transactional effects on democracy and development



Contextual and general effects on democracy and social contract



Contextual and general effects on Service delivery & communal values

The above frame work theorizes that, any locality comprises residents (actors) who influence the different aspects of their community including practices, say, in this case, vote buying. These actors are individuals and community organizations such as, for example, churches and schools. During election periods, candidates establish connection with actors through campaigns, breeding the electoral transaction where exchange of rewards for vote choices emanates. It is this exchange that induces, most especially, the contextual reciprocity such as the basic reciprocity, where, although vote rewards may not be to the satisfaction of the recipients the rewards will still induce a response any way-“a present given always expects one in return” (Mauss, 2002, p.3). However, this study found that both crosscutting and context specific causes of this vote buying transaction exist in a community. Such causes include betrayal by leaders, rampant corruption at top levels of leadership, poverty, and use of money as a competition strategy in elections. Consequently, after certain candidates go through as leaders because of the vote trade, the study found that the successful transaction carries both general and situation specific development effects during the course of that leadership. The effects mainly apply to democracy, social contract, service delivery, and communal values. Such effects include deprivation of political and gender equality, undeserving leaders, limited attention to service delivery, and inadequate cooperation in leadership. The findings from the Rwamucucu case confirm the on-ground applicability of the above theoretical framework.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

6.0 Chapter introduction

This chapter presents the conclusive remarks of the study based on the study's main objective and research questions. The remarks also incorporate the key outcomes of the study and their implications, both to the field of development management, to institutional and policy levels, and to the geographical area of study.

6.1 Conclusive remarks

The main objective of this study has been to investigate local people's perception of vote buying and selling, and how they relate it with democracy and development in their community. Using Rwamucucu Sub-County as a case, and the five research questions, I believe the main objective has been vastly achieved, through responses on the magnitude of vote buying, local people's conception of vote buying, the reasons that explain the buying and selling of votes, and local people's narration of the democratic and development effects of selling their votes. The findings categorically revealed that, despite the petty individual benefits accrued from the vote buying practice, at the social level the practice has a negative perception, and its overall effects on democracy and development are negative and far-reaching. Socially, vote buying had resulted into such consequences as deprivation of political equality, infringement of voting freedom and undeserving leaders. The practice had caused limited attention to service delivery and inadequate cooperation of leaders with their people. Such consequences confirm that the underdevelopment of Rwamucucu has connection with the leadership that gets into office through election activities associated with vote buying. Regardless of other possible causes, the public or social amenities in Rwamucucu such as the health facilities, domestic water supply, telecommunication and road network remain wanting in a situation of vote buying. Moreover, in this study, vote buying featured as both a cause and contributor to poverty. These results of studying vote buying in a development perspective bear several implications, first to the field of development management.

Interventions to lessen poverty are key in development management. For instance, Langhammer (2004) shows how aid relates to fighting poverty. Sachs (2005) and Lozada (2003) discuss how globalization, market forces and state interventions link to alleviating poverty. However, some specific issues that may exacerbate poverty, such as, for instance, vote buying, are in many instances left unnoticed. This study found that poverty was both a cause and in part a resultant of vote buying. People sell their votes because of the need to survive. And poverty

results from vote buying because the vote buyers (political candidates) who do not manage to win the elections, hardly recover from the loss and are most likely to relapse into poverty. Also, poverty is worsened by leaders who use tax payers money to recover the resources they spent on buying votes, instead of using such taxes to address the needs of the poor. Hence, it is critical for development management to focus the discourse beyond conventional approaches of poverty eradication such as market forces, globalization and state interventions, but go further to detect aspects such as vote buying in discussing redress to poverty.

Similarly, development management recognizes the pertinent role of human rights in the betterment of social groups or communities. This study found that, vote buying undermines the right to equal opportunity, because the use of money and material rewards in elections enables the rich to easily access leadership compared to the poor. The study uncovered that vote buying contributes to infringement of the voting freedom. This was evident in cases where, for example, vote buyers subjected the vote reward recipients to pretend as being blind so as to be influenced in casting their votes. Also, it was realized that vote buyers subjected vote reward recipients to close monitoring up to the day of the voting. The abuse of voting freedom was being worsened in instances where vote reward recipients were threatened that something bad would happen to them if they did not vote in return of the received rewards. Moreover, there was intimidation and threat to the voters who would shun the vote rewards as they were considered to be uncooperative and in opposition, and often threatened to lose their jobs if employed in government-run sectors. As a result of these human rights violations, the bigger implication was that people could not live in self-determination and exercise their conscience. This is a huge setback in the development process. Hence, development management should integrate peculiar aspects such as vote buying in exploring human rights issues especially in developing countries like Uganda, for the betterment of social groups.

Development management treasures participatory development and governance. The involvement of people in development undertakings that affect their lives is a central feature of good governance. Findings of this study indicate that because of using money to get votes, leaders who would win the elections did not value going back to the community members to discuss development concerns. Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) present the participatory means of involving people, such as consultation, collaboration, joint decision making and empowerment. Leaders failing to go back to the people implies that they ignore all these participatory means, which derails good governance. Consequently, people's popular interests get underrepresented in decision making that in the long run has a likelihood of depriving the

people of their meaningful development. Thus, development management needs to be concerned with such issues as vote buying that impact negatively on participatory development and good governance.

In development management, gender disparity is perverse. The essential roles played by women, and of course men, in the development of society are well recognized in the field of development management. For instance, Momsen (2004) argues that women are increasingly looked at as change agents because of the need to minimize losing the human potential in them. The study findings indicate that the use of money to get votes in Rwamucucu made it difficult for women to compete with men for certain leadership positions in the Sub-County. This was because men in Rwamucucu were said to be having more access to and control of resources than women given the patriarchic nature of Rwamucucu community. Equally, the study found that women were not as shrewd as men in issuing vote rewards. This made it difficult for the women to compete for the so called 'traditional' male leadership positions such as the Sub-County Chairperson and the area's Member of Parliament. The women thus resorted to competing among themselves for the female quota leadership positions as granted by the laws of Uganda, such as the Sub-County woman councilor. Indeed, the majority political leaders in Rwamucucu are men. The few existing women leaders occupy leadership slots allotted to them by government in a form of quota. Other potential women leaders are just given petty roles in village leadership committees such as being a local council village secretary. Thus, vote buying denies women fair ground to compete with men for the 'traditionally' male dominated leadership positions and this could mean that the Sub-County loses potential women leaders who could accelerate development in the area. It could also mean that the development aspirations of potential women leaders in Rwamucucu are left unmet. This requires development management practitioners not to isolate vote buying in analyzing concerns on gender inequities. On the other hand, the study's findings bear implications beyond development management, to such areas as the the institutional and policy levels.

In regard to the the institutional and policy levels, the study found that top leadership in Uganda such as the presidency and parliament were contributors to vote buying because of not being good examples against corruption. Hence, there was a synergy between leadership practices at the top level and at the local level. This implies that the top leadership in Uganda ought to revamp its image, by taking an honest lead against corruption and vote buying. This would give strength to the local leadership to also deal with corruption and its related practices such as voter bribery. Equally, the leadership in Uganda, both at lower levels and top levels, needs to

work on reviving people's trust in the leadership. The findings indicate that people now-a-days look at the leaders as business persons, who want to make profit out of the leadership, not serving their people. The responses equally revealed that leaders have betrayed their people, by not going back to the community for consultations on development concerns after winning the elections, and by making empty promises. It could take a lot of effort and hard work to revive this trust but it is worth doing if the social contract between the leaders and the people is to regain its value.

Besides, civil society organizations and related government institutions need to work together to deal with the challenge of vote buying. For instance, the Uganda Human rights Commission should spearhead the campaign against vote buying by presenting the different ways how vote buying contributes to violation of people's rights, as uncovered by this study. The breach of the right to political equality, infringement of people's freedom to vote, and encroachment on the right to self-determination, all were found to be an outcome of the vote buying practice. Other institutions such as the police would also support the fight against vote buying, through investigation of these human rights violations as a result of vote buying. However, this would take genuine will of such institutions as the police, by first sidelining any likely pull-backs, say, of being partisan or complacent in the fight against vote buying. These implications, however, do not stand to exonerate Rwamucucu community in taking its responsibility in the vote buying situation.

The study revealed that the people of Rwamucucu are partly responsible for the occurrence of the vote buying practice. For instance, they were highly receptive to the vote rewards, which was attributed to poverty though. Taking a bold stand to demand for good leadership could help the people of Rwamucucu to achieve a long lasting solution in dealing with poverty compared to the small immediate benefits accrued from selling their votes. This stand would require sacrifice, and not giving up on the push for good leadership even amidst betrayals by some leaders. The people of Rwamucucu would bolster the bold stand by putting a limit to individualism so as to value much the public amenities such as tapped water, functional health centers and good roads. Well-functioning public amenities are only possible through sound leadership and they contribute to long lasting development. Additionally, the people of Rwamucucu need to realize that, by accepting to vote under the influence of vote rewards, they betray their leaders too, which gives the leaders low motivation to come back to them for discussion of development concerns.

Similarly, the political leaders of Rwamucucu need to go back to the drawing board, and vie for leadership in the right way. Vying for leadership by exploiting people's poverty through giving vote inducements was found dangerous for the leaders too. For instance, the political candidates who would lose the election were exposed to difficulties in regaining the resources spent on buying votes, which would retract such individuals to poverty. Moreover, the leaders who would win the election through vote buying would have low motivation to serve their people. As a result, they make leadership to lose meaning. Vying for leadership, following the correct paths would be a great gift from Rwamucucu leaders, as it benefits them too in establishing a working social contract with the people. This would also mean that Rwamucucu leaders should strive to be performers for the development of their community. They should promise the public only what is possible, and always go back to the people to have their input in decision making.

The civil society organizations in Rwamucucu such as the community based groups, religious organizations and schools should support campaigns against vote buying in their respective capacities. For instance, Churches should educate their congregations about the effects of people selling their votes, as brought forward through this study. The selling of votes has costed Rwamucucu well deserving leaders and effective service delivery. It has undermined political equality in the locality by allowing only the rich people to access leadership, which disadvantages the poor and other groups such as the women and the youths. Therefore, the findings from the study bring to the fore that, dealing with vote buying is critical to accelerate democracy and development in Uganda, especially in rural communities such as Rwamucucu.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Permission Letter with Approval of Local Leadership



To whom it may concern

Dato: 18. Des, 2015

Gimlemoen 26
Phone: + 47 38 14 16 20
Fax: +47 38 14 10 26

CONFIRMATION COLLINS KWARISIMA

I can hereby confirm that Mr. Collins Kwarisima is enrolled in our Master programme in Development Management at the University of Agder, in Norway. In connection with his master thesis, he is planning to do a field work in Uganda during January-February 2016.

We would be most grateful if he could be rendered any necessary assistance during the period of his fieldwork.

Best regards,

Siv Iren S. Kolstad
Academic Adviser
University of Agder



E-mail: Siv.I.Kolstad@uia.no

*Reported on 04/02/2016
please LC members assist the bearer of
this letter*



Tosha Bonwe Justus

Appendix 2: Semi-structured interview guide for Sub-County technical staff

Consent brief

Dear respondent,

This interview is intended to establish perceptions about development in your community. You have been selected to participate in this research and kindly requested to provide response to questions. The information you give will be handled with confidentiality. Your name will not be used to present information given unless you give permission to do so. And you are free to withdraw from the study at any point of the interview. As a researcher, I cannot give any monetary or material benefits. By participating in this study, you help me to get my degree after completion of my programme at University. Some questions to be asked might be politically sensitive hence you can choose not to respond to those that you deem injurious to your privacy. Thank you.

Consent choice

(a) I accept to be interviewed

b) Do not want to be interviewed

Respondent's personal and socio-demographic data

1. Sex a) male.....
 b) Female.....
2. Age a) 18-29..... c) 30-39.....
 b) 40-49..... d) 50 and above.....
3. Marital status a) single..... c) Separated/divorced.....
 b) Married..... d) widowed.....
4. Educational level a) primary..... c) tertiary.....
 b) Secondary..... d) Any other.....
 e) No schooling at all.....
5. Parish of stay in Rwamucucu.....

What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying?

1. Could you have heard about distribution of rewards to voters by candidates during campaigns?

2. If yes, please share how this happens?

5. How is issuing of voter rewards done; openly or private/concealed way?

6. What are those things people or groups receive as rewards?

To which extent (according to local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?

11. Is the issuing of campaign rewards a common talk during elections in your community e.g in local news, meeting places, religious places, local daily chats/talks etc.

If yes, please share what people talk about those campaign rewards

12. Which category of people in your community have you heard receiving campaign rewards most? The poor, rich, women, youth, elderly, persons with disabilities?

13. Compared to elections twenty years back in your community, do you perceive the giving of campaign rewards to be increasing, reducing or both?

E.t.c

How do the local people explain causes of selling votes?

14. In your own view, why do you think people like receiving campaign rewards? Is it because of poverty, ignorance, etc ?

What do people use received campaign reward for? Do they save such received money, buy house assets, or drink soda etc ?

18. Do you think some people receive campaign handouts but still vote based on merit?

19. Would you say people still have hope in leadership even if they vote following received rewards? Please share more about such hope

How do the local leaders explain reasons for buying votes?

16. Why do you think candidates decide to concentrate on campaign materials or money, not presenting conceived measures for development to people?

19. What happens if a contesting candidate does not give campaign rewards to people?

23. Do you think voters in your community would actually give votes in response to given vote rewards?

30. Could you say giving people rewards is a powerful strategy to win an election in your community?

How do the local people narrate the democratic effects of selling votes in their community?

23. Do you see any gains or losses to this community as a result of people who vote leaders following received rewards? Please share more about your answer

How has voting based on campaign rewards affected service delivery by leaders in your community?

24. Do you think voting based on campaign handouts still makes it possible for people to vote leaders of their choice? Please share more about your answer

25. In own view, would you say voting based on campaign rewards promotes equality in access to leadership? Please share more about answer

Thank you for the responses

Appendix 3: Semi-structured interview guide for political leaders

Consent brief

Dear respondent,

This interview is intended to establish perceptions about development in your community. You have been selected to participate in this research and kindly requested to provide response to certain questions. The information you give will be kept with confidentiality. Your name will not be used to present information given unless you give permission to do so. And you are free to withdraw from the study at any point of the interview. As student, I do not promise any monetary or material benefits. By participating in this study, you help me to get my degree after completion of my programme of study. Some questions to be asked might be politically sensitive hence you can choose not to respond to those that you deem injurious to your privacy. Thank you.

Consent choice

(a) I accept to be interviewed

b) Do not want to be interviewed

Respondent's personal and socio-demographic data

1. Sex a) male.....
b) Female.....
2. Age a) 18-29..... c) 30-30.....
b) 40-49..... d) 50 and above.....
3. Marital status a) single..... c) divorced.....
b) Married..... d) widow.....
4. Educational level a) Primary..... c) Tertiary.....
b) Secondary..... d) Any other
e) No schooling at all.....
5. Parish of stay in Rwamucucu.....

What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying?

1. There are talks saying political candidates give rewards to voters during campaigns. Have you heard about this? Please share your experience

2. If issuing of rewards takes place, please share your experience how you have heard it being done e.g nature of items or money given

4. Do you think campaign rewards are given to all voters or certain groups, and why?

To which extent (according to local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?

11. How big is the giving of campaign rewards to voters in this community? Is it done by many candidates, few of them or all candidates?

12. Compared to 20 years back, do you think the giving of handouts to voters during campaigns is increasing or decreasing? What reason do you give for your response?

By which means do you get information about vote buying? Could it be through observation (e.g of neighbours or friends?), etc

13. How often is vote buying talked about in Rwamucucu e.g in local news, meeting places, religious places, local daily chats/talks etc.

14. Does the issuing of voter rewards take place in all villages of this Sub-County or only few ones?

How do the local leaders explain reasons for buying votes?

15. From own experience, why do you think certain candidates decide to give vote rewards to voters during campaigns?

Would you say candidates have less chances of winning if they do not issue out rewards to voters during campaigns? If yes, why?

Given that bribing voters is illegal, why do you think giving of vote rewards in campaigns continues to happen?

Appendix 4: Semi-structured interview guide for opinion and religious leaders

Consent brief

Dear respondent,

This interview is intended to establish perceptions about development in your community. You have been selected to participate in this research and kindly requested to provide response to certain questions. The information you give will be handled with utmost confidentiality. Your name will not be used to present information given unless you give permission to do so. And you are free to withdraw from the study at any point of the interview. As student, I do not promise any monetary or material benefits. By participating in this study, you help me to get my degree after completion of my programme of study. Some questions to be asked might be politically sensitive hence you can choose not to respond to those that you deem injurious to your privacy. Thank you.

Consent choice

(a) I accept to be interviewed

b) Do not want to be interviewed

Respondent's personal and socio-demographic data

1. Sex a) male.....
 b) Female.....
2. Age a) 18-29..... c) 30-39.....
 b) 40-49..... d) 50 and above.....
3. Marital status a) single..... c) divorced.....
 b) Married..... d) widow.....
4. Educational level a) primary..... c) tertiary.....
 b) Secondary..... d) Any other
 e) No schooling at all.....
5. Type of work a) civil servant..... c) peasant/ farmer.....
 b) Business..... d) Religious leader
 e) Any other
6. Parish of stay in Rwamucucu.....

What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying?

1. How are campaigns going on in your community?
2. I have heard certain people saying they received some money from candidates, have you had chance to receive some yourself or your friends?
3. Do candidates give out other important things other than money to people when campaigning?
2. What feelings do you have on these campaign rewards, do you feel positive or negative about it?

To which extent (according to local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?

9. Have candidates been giving out campaigns rewards in all elections or only this one?
12. Please share your experience or what you have had about issuing campaign money e.g how it is done, who receives and who does not etc.
13. Compared to 20 years back, do you perceive money and material rewards to be increasing or reducing in elections?

How do the local people explain causes of selling votes?

In own opinion, what causes people to concentrate on receiving rewards from candidates during campaigns?

Do you think many people would vote someone if he does not give them something during his/her campaigns? If no, why?

16. From own experience, when people receive campaign money, how do they use it? To buy house items, save it or buy drinks etc.?

How do the local leaders explain reasons for buying votes?

15. From own experience, why do you think certain candidates decide to give vote rewards to voters during campaigns?

Would you say candidates have less chances of winning if they do not issue out rewards to voters during campaigns? If yes, why?

Given that bribing voters is illegal, why do you think giving of vote rewards in campaigns continues to happen?

How do the local people narrate the democratic effects of selling votes in their community?

In what ways do you feel voting leaders based on rewards affects development in your community?

Do you think issuing of voter rewards in campaigns still enables people to freely vote their leaders?

32. How does the voting based on vote rewards affect the way people work with such leaders when they go through? For instance, do people team-up with leaders in decision making processes, etc?

33. In own view, how do you think voting under influence of rewards affects equality in leadership in your community?

Thank you for the responses

Appendix 5: Semi-structured interview guide for local commoners

Consent brief

Dear respondent,

This interview is intended to establish perceptions about development in your community. You have been selected to participate in this research and kindly requested to provide response to certain questions. The information you give will be kept with utmost confidentiality. Your name will not be used to present information given unless you give permission to do so. And you are free to withdraw from the study at any point of the interview. As student, I do not promise any monetary or material benefits. By participating in this study, you help me to get my degree after completion of my programme of study. Some questions to be asked might be politically sensitive hence you can choose not to respond to those that you deem injurious to your privacy. Thank you.

Consent choice

(a) I accept to be interviewed

b) Do not want to be interviewed

Respondent's personal and socio-demographic data

1. Sex a) male.....
b) Female.....
2. Age a) 18-29..... c) 30-39.....
b) 40-49..... d) 50 and above.....
3. Marital status a) single..... c) divorced.....
b) Married..... d) widow.....
4. Educational level a) primary..... c) tertiary.....
b) Secondary..... d) Any other
e) No schooling at all.....
5. Type of work a) civil servant..... c) peasant/ farmer.....
b) Business..... d) Any other
6. Parish of stay in Rwamucucu.....

What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying?

1. How are election campaigns going on in your community?
2. I hear some people are receiving campaign rewards from candidates, have you received some yourself, your friends or neighbours? If yes, what are those rewards received?
3. How big are the rewards? For instance, do they give much or little money?
4. Do those rewards help people to do developmental things? e.g buying house items or making savings?

Do you think people really vote based on received materials or money?

What happens to a candidate who does not give people money or other rewards during campaigns?

To which extent (according to local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?

10. Are campaign rewards given to all community members or few individuals?

Compared to 20 years back, do you feel voter rewards during elections are increasing or reducing?

How do the local people explain causes of selling votes?

114. From own experience, why do people like receiving campaign rewards?

Do you think people would vote a candidate who does not give them rewards first? If no, why?

Do you feel people still have development hopes in their leaders by wanting rewards from them before voting?

How do the local people narrate the democratic effects of selling votes in their community?

25. From own experience, how do leaders who go through after giving out a lot rewards behave?

Have you seen any candidates who have development skills and knowledge but have nothing to give also going through as leaders in this community?

26. Do you feel that even when people receive campaign rewards, they go ahead to freely vote leaders of their choice? If no, why?

28. How is the working relationship of people with their leaders who go through using campaign rewards? For instance, do they involve you the local people in decision making, in consultation e.t.c

Thank you for the responses

Appendix 6: Semi-structured interview guide for focus groups

Consent brief

Dear group,

This interview is intended to establish perceptions about development in your community. As a group, you have been selected to participate in this research and kindly requested to provide response to certain questions. The information you give will be kept with confidentiality. Your names will not be used to present information given unless you give permission to do so. And you are free to withdraw from the study at any point of the interview. As student, I do not promise any monetary or material benefits. By participating in this study, you help me to get my degree after completion of my programme of study. Some questions to be asked might be politically sensitive hence you can choose not to respond to those that you deem injurious to your privacy. Thank you.

Consent choice

(a) We accept to be interviewed

b) Do not want to be interviewed

Socio-demographic data of group

1. Name of group.....

2. Sex composition by number a) male.....

b) Female.....

3. Age composition by number a) 18-29..... c) 30-39.....

b) 40-49..... d) 50 and above.....

4. Marital status by number a) single..... c) divorced.....

b) Married..... d) widowed.....

5. Educational level by number a) primary..... c) tertiary.....

b) Secondary..... d) Any other

e) No schooling at all.....

6. Type of work by number number a) civil servant..... c) peasant/ farmer.....

b) Business..... d) Any other

7. Group activities by number a) Farming..... d) trade....

c) Savings and credit service.... e) any other...

6. Parish of stay in Rwamucucu.....

What is Rwamucucu people's conception of vote buying?

As a group, have you received political candidates coming to ask you votes during your meeting sessions?

Some candidates do give materials or money when asking for votes, have you received some as a group? Please share about what you have and how you received if it is there

Do you feel campaign rewards from candidates are good for development? Please share with me your views about this

To which extent (according to local leaders' and local commoners' perceptions) is vote buying a common phenomenon in Rwamucucu Sub-County?

As a group, do you expect candidates to give you rewards during campaigns?

Looking 20 years back, do you think giving money or material rewards during campaigns is increasing or reducing?

Do all candidates issue out vote rewards in their campaigns?

Has the issuing of vote rewards been happening in the last two general elections in this community? If yes, please compare with this election in terms of where much rewards have been issued out to voters

11. Which places in your community would you say receive vote rewards most? And if so, why?

Have you heard certain in this community receiving vote rewards from candidates?

How do the local people explain causes of selling votes?

As a group, why do you think people like to receive vote rewards during campaigns?

14. Does receiving money and material from leaders still mean that people have development hopes in their leaders?

Of what use do you think campaign handouts help people in their daily live?

Are there people who do not accept campaign rewards? If yes, why are such people able to refuse the rewards?

If a candidate does not give out rewards during campaigns, do you think people would vote for him based on his/her leadership qualities?

If no, why would people not vote someone who has not given then rewards?

How do the local people narrate the democratic effects of selling votes in their community?

19. Based on your experience, what are the gains and losses to a community that votes leaders based on material and financial rewards?

How do leaders win elections through vote rewards behave in terms of working with people in the community?

Do you feel that issuing of vote rewards still enables people to freely vote their leaders as it should be?

In which way do you feel the use of rewards in campaigns has affected poor persons with leadership ambitions in your community?

If a candidate has no money and materials to give but has leadership good skills, does he or she stand equal chances of going through as candidates who have rewards to issue out?

End. Thank you for your responses