Masteroppgave

Cohesion and Defections in the European Parliament
- the Effect of Cross-Pressure

Av

Benjamin Eidem Gregersen

Masteroppgaven er gjennomført som et ledd i utdanningen ved Universitetet i Agder og er godkjent som sådan. Denne godkjenningen innebærer ikke at universitetet innestår for de metoder som er anvendt og de konklusjoner som er trukket.

Veileder:
Jarle Trondal

Universitetet i Agder, Kristiansand

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Abstract

The study on voting cohesion in the European Parliament seems to be heavily influenced by scholars like Noury and Roland, that argues for a very high voting cohesion in the European Parliament (e.g. Noury and Roland 2002). This view is balanced by those who argues that there is a bias in the data that are being used to determine this high level of voting cohesion (e.g. Carruba and Gabel 1999).

There are some that argues that the co-decision procedure leads to a higher interest by the national parties on how their representatives in the European Parliament votes (e.g. Carruba and Gabel in Scully 2001). The more power the European Parliament possess, the more incentives would both the national party and the transnational party group have on the vote, which means that the part that holds the most power over the Member of the European Parliament (MEP), will sway this voice in their favour.

By studying four cases where the co-decision was used, I found that the defections from the party group were generally high, but not conclusive, due to the limited amount of cases. In an effort to compensate for the few cases I studied cases of investiture one procedure, a directive and two regulations, which included both regulatory and distributive policy areas.

I used four variables which I hoped could explain the defections and remain consistent, which included the Governmental status of the national party, the Electoral System, the Policy Area of the Proposal and Political Role and Preferences. The existing literature combined with my results suggests that there are a connection, but the problem with the data material however caused this analysis to be incomplete and the results I found were ambiguous, largely due to this problem. The data on the current members of the European Parliament does however seem to be more detailed and an analysis of legislation from the 6th parliamentary term might be more conclusive.

If suggestions by Noury and Roland (2002) are introduced, regarding increased use of co-decision and Roll Call Votes, combined with Hix and Hagemann's (2009) suggestions regarding independence of the MEPs and “European Issues”, we might be able to analyse the votes without bias and conclude with high voting cohesion.

Foreword

With this paper I conclude my education (so far) and an interesting process is at an end. There has been many frustrating moments in this process, as I tried to make sense of the overwhelmingly large data that is available in the European Union archives. It was particularly interesting moment when the data contradicted each other, but I managed to select the important from the unimportant.

In this process there are people to thank:

Jarle Trondal was helpful, even though my occasional chaotic mind not necessarily made much sense. Jan Erik Grindheim also gave me very helpful tips, on a topic which does not seem to be common knowledge.

My friends and family have all been patient and supportive, despite a sometime absent presence in conversations.

I would also like to thank my grandfather for correcting as much of the language as he could, Sofia for helping me with some of the more difficult German words and my girlfriend Birgithe for extra support and patience.

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Abbreviations

ALDE - Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

CEEC - Central Eastern European Countries

EFA - European Free Alliance

ERA - European Radical Alliance (fr. ARE)

EDD - Europe of Democracies and Diversities

ELDR - European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party

EPP-ED - European People's Party – European Democrats (fr. PPE-DE)

EPG - European Party Group

ERDF - European Regional and Development Fund

ESF - European Social Fund

EUL-NGL - European United Left – Nordic Green Left

I/D - Independence/Democracy

I-EN - Independents for a Europe of Nations (Later EDD)

MEP - Members of the European Parliament

MS - Member State

N-I - Non-Inscrits (Independent MEPs)

P-A - Principal Agent Theory

PGL - Party Group Leadership

PR - Proportional Representation

PES - Party of European Socialist (fr. PSE)

QMV - Qualified Majority Vote

RCV - Roll Call Votes

TEC - Treaty on the European Communities

UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations (Previously UFE/UPE)

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1 – Introduction

1.1 – The Research Question

What influences the MEPs voting behaviour in terms of cohesion and defections?

Hix (2002:692) and Gabel and Hix (2007:26) shows that there are significant heterogeneity on the ideological positions by the members of Party of European Socialist (PES) and the European Peoples Party (EPP) by a self-placement test. This heterogeneity should result in low voting cohesion, but as Noury and Roland (2002) and Hix (2002) demonstrates, this does not appear to be the case and the voting cohesion is getting higher (Lindberg 2008b). On the basis of Carruba and Gabel in (Scully 2001:6) argument that the national parties take more interest in the Member of the European Parliament (MEP) votes, when the European Parliament (EP) has co-decision power, motivated me to perform a study of different cases where the EP had co-decision powers and see if the voting cohesion still was high. Consequently I wanted to explore possible reasons for the different cohesion under the different procedures.

1.2 – Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis is a somewhat complex composition, as I try to combine different approaches of the existing literature on voting behaviour. After the initial introduction of the variables and predictions presented in chapter two, I will discuss the classical understanding of representation, starting with Spinoza (2004) and his theory of representation, continuing with the modern understanding of a liberal democracy by Dahl (1971) and ending up with popular control and especially accountability ideas by Beetham (2003). The accountability is then supplemented by Pitkin and her definition of the accountable representative (in Blomgren 2003).

The reason for starting with the classical view, is to provide an understanding of the underlying factor in the Principal-Agent (P-A), the theory of representation; which is apparent in this thesis in the Principal being represented by the Agent being the representative. The consequence of this in the Principal-Agent theory is that when one actor (individually or collectively) face a situation where there are others who possesses better knowledge on the matter and an Agent is then hired to represent the Principal/-s in the situation (Brennan and Hamlin 2000). In political science this is often referred to when a constituency elects politicians to represent their interest in the government. In this paper the Agent will be the MEP and the Principals are the European Party Group (EPG). Cross-pressure is a central aspect that I will apply in this theory, and the different level of cross-pressure applied on the MEPs by the two Principals.

The first aspect on the Principal-Agent theory I will focus on is the theory by Reif and Schmitt (in Lindberg 2008b) regarding "Second-Order" elections. In many countries there are regional votes between the general elections and one can often see from the results on here what the people think about the incumbents. This also seems to happen in the elections for the EP, but here the citizens cast protest votes for the EP on the basis of how their national government is performing on national issues. The result of these actions is that the Council which consists of the governmental parties and the Commission, where the governmental parties usually nominates one of their own to be a commissioner are facing an opposition in the EP (Braghiroli 2007). If proposals from the Commission are to be voted on in the EP, then the governmental parties would have incentives to pressure their MEPs, which may be in minority in the EP to support the proposal, despite the position of their EPG. This pressure seems to be stronger in cases where unanimity is required in

the Council (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005:220; Jun 2005:16).

The second theory is regarding the Electoral System, which have important aspects in the sanctioning powers, which the national party use to ensure voting discipline. The two factors in this case are 1) Ballot structure and 2) Candidate selection process. The ballot structure varies from a) Closed b) Ordered and c) Open. Of the 27 member states in EU, 19 countries use a closed or an ordered ballot structure, which means that the MEPs are dependent upon their national party's approval in regards of receiving electoral support and a good nomination on the ballot. This leaves only 8 countries that use open ballot (9 including Northern Ireland), which is the structure that provides the MEP most independence on the votes in the EP, as the threat of de-selection is not so strong from the national party, and the candidates have more to gain by promoting its individual candidacy (Hix and Hagemann 2009).

The other factor in this theory is the selection process, which is decided upon by every party in every country. In general this focuses on where and by whom the candidates are nominated on the ballot. If the process is done at local level and or by direct involvement by the voters, then the candidates can seek support from the electorate rather than be dependent on re-election by staying loyal to the national party. As the rules for selection process are so diverse, this aspect can only rely on the general trend that the more decentralised the country, the more decentralised and direct voter involvement there is (Braghiroli 2007).

The third theory is by Reichert (2001; 2004). He argues that when the nature of the policy is regulatory, there is likely to be high voting cohesion among the EPG. On the other hand, if the legislation is on distributive policy, it is likely that there will be large defections from the EPG position and they will vote accordingly to their national delegation. He argues this on the basis that the more attention the national party has on the proposal and the more revenues the MEP can bring home, the more likely it is for the MEP to vote against his or her EPG in order to gain popularity in the constituency, which will increase the chances for re-election.

The final theory which has direct impact on the predictions is largely based on the Political Role theory by Searing (1991). Here I also include the MEP career preferences, as this may correlate

with the fragmented defections in some cases. This part is also strongly correlated to the principles of representation and the MEPs' definition of their political role may influence their choice, when choosing which principal to stay loyal to, if the preferences are divergent. The same principle apply in the career preferences, as those who prefers a national career, vote with their national delegation (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005). Both of these aspects of this theory can be applied in future research on MEP voting behaviour, as new data-set are collecting information of both political status and turnover rates among the MEPs from 2004. In this thesis however, this theory only suggest a possible connection, as there was no possibility to study the individual actions of all the MEPs in these cases.

At the end of the theoretical chapter I discuss the importance of voting cohesion, based on the works of Cox and McCubbins (2005; 2007). They presented a theory that political parties in the U.S. Congress are Legislative Cartels and their function is to aggregate votes so that it can pass legislation. In order to pass the desired legislation, there is a need for mechanisms that ensures voting cohesion. These are either to control the agenda setting, so that proposals that would split the party never comes to vote. The other is to sanction the politician by refusing career advancement in the party or withdraw support for re-election. The latter aspect of the Legislative Cartel Theory is directly applicable to the Principal-Agent theory, as this demonstrates the need for both the national party as well as the party group to assert sanctions on its members, to ensure cohesion so that legislation will be passed.

I conclude the theoretical chapter with predictions that can be drawn from the theories which are provided.

1.3 – Method

As I have mentioned, my motivation for for this study was to check if the voting cohesion was as high in the EP as Noury, Roland and others argued that it was. Carruba and Gabel (199) are some of the scholars that argues that the Roll Call Votes (RCV) data base in which Noury and Roland based their argument of cohesion on, are highly biased (Thiem 2006), and that the MEP voting behaviour might be different in cases where co-decision procedure was used and when another procedure was

used. The biased nature of the RCV is mainly due to that this procedure is strategical requested by the party group leadership, which also result in this procedure is mainly used when the EP have less influence over the final bill. The strategical reasons and connection to the decision procedure will be discussed in chapter 3.

Since the data base of collected RCV is biased, I decided to perform a qualitative research on cases where the co-decision procedure was used. The cases I used were the investiture procedure on the approval of Jacques Santer as Commission president in 1994. The ground provisions of the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), both from 1998. And the first reading of the Services directive, in 2004.

I collected data on the investiture procedure from Simon Hix (1997) and Hae-Won Jun (2005). Unfortunately these data did not provide me with the votes divided on nationality, but I was still able to study the impact of government position in relation to the pressure on the MEPs, as the positions of the EPG and national parties was fairly obvious. The data on the regulations which I used I collected from the Official Journals of the European Communities C and L series (European Commission 1998b and 1999). This provided me with information on the MEPs both in terms of their EPG affiliation as well as nationality. In this, and the following case, the position of the national positions were not clear, but the analysis suggested directions. The votes on the Services directives were from the data base of Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) and was collected and interpreted by Lindberg (2008a). In his description, the members of the two largest EPGs were divided into nationality, and by observing the amount of defections in each national delegation, the national party position could be determined to a certain extent.

Initially I wanted to study the investiture process of Mr. Prodi and Mr. Barroso as well, and compare all three cases. This would be beneficial, as the positions of the national parties would be clear. However, it was a significant shortage of data in both cases, which forced me to de-select these cases.

1.4 – Case Description

Since the basis for this thesis was to check whether or not the level of voting cohesion remained as high in cases where the EP had co-decision powers as in other procedures as Noury and Roland (2002) suggest, I only selected cases where the co-decision procedure was used. I also wanted to check for any differences between the three parliaments I studied.

In the Santer investiture there was a dimension regarding the positions that the national party leadership had taken before the proposal was up for vote in the EP. This lead to severe pressure on the PES members that also were represented in the executive at home.

From table 4.5 one can see the vote on the distributive regulations, and also here it seemed to exist a cleavage within the EPGs on some of the national delegations. The EPP-ED showed the highest degree of defections on both the regulations, while PES voted unanimously on the vote on the ESF, of which both RCV was requested by them. The four RCV on the ERDF was called by EPP-ED, of which two of the amendments were defeated, which is fairly unusual (Carruba and Gabel 1999). In two cases the majority of the EPP-ED also voted with the majority of the PES delegation, which also is unusual in the votes in the EP. According to e.g. Farrel et al. the major cleavage is the Left-Right dimension (2006).

The Austrian delegation appeared to be the most sceptic on the majority of the votes in both EPGs on the vote on the ERDF, with defections on all but one vote. On the votes on the ESF however, both the EPP-ED and PES delegation voted unanimously in favour. This indicates that employment policy is more important in Austria, than what can come from the regional fund. This pattern is to a certain degree repeated in the German and Spanish delegations, where both the EPP-ED MEPs accounts for the majority of the defections on two votes each, while they are far more in favour of the ESF amendments.

On the Services directive there was two noteworthy aspects, one from each party group. In PES (see table 4.6), three national delegations defected by a substantial amount of their MEPs. Six out of 7 Belgian members defected, 30 of 31 French members defected and in Greece the entire delegation

defected. In EPP (table 4.7), there were a different form of defections, as in this party group there seems to be a East-West dimension, as all the defecting members come from the Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC).

1.5 – Analysis

A large portion of the literature on the voting behaviour is today based upon RCV. The dominant view amongst the scholars that use these sources is that the voting cohesion is high (e.g. Noury and Roland 2002) and that it fits in a socio-economic dimension, with concentration of e.g. the EPP-ED and PES votes on each side of the dimension (Gabel and Hix 2007).

The scholars argue that the voting cohesion is high, but since there are so many contradictory factors that logically would suggest the opposite, I decided to study some cases that might not have the same cohesion and explain why the cohesion one can otherwise observe is not present. The first indication for why the voting cohesion was so high is to a large extent due to the biased RCV, which I mentioned earlier in this chapter and will further explain in chapter 3.

The literature suggested several aspects which may lead to low cohesion within the party groups, of which I found that the following four seemed to explain a large portion of the defections and which were frequently used:

1) The first is the pressure applied to the MEP in regards whether the national party is in government or not and if the party or minister previously have posted their position on the matter. As the elections on the EP continues to be of a “Second-order”, the chances for a “divided government” increases and the risks for conflicts between the national party and the EPG also increases. If the decision is taken unanimously or by high Qualified Majority Vote (QMV), the more pressure will the national party or minister put on their MEP. Which happened in the Santer approval, but not on the Barroso commission (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Jun 2005).

2) The second factor is the *electoral system,* and consists of two parts; 1) the selection process and 2) the openness of the ballot. The selection process is based upon who decides how the list for the election is formulated. As the detailed information on how this is done by every party is too complex, the general rule is that in unitary states the design of the ballot is largely decided by the central party leadership (Braghiroli 2007). And the openness of the ballot is from Hix and Hagemann (2009) which argues that that the less influence the voters have on the ballot, the stronger are the sanctioning powers by the national party and the incentives for the MEP to win approval of the national party leadership also increases.

3) Reichert (2001; 2004) argues that the policy area of the legislation strongly influences the voting cohesion in the EPG. He argues that regulatory bills often are less controversial, and hence the Party Group Leadership (PGL) can more easily impose voting instruction. If the legislation is on distributive policy, the national attention increases and the national party applies more pressure on the MEP to vote with the national delegation. In this thesis I have included both a regulatory and two distributive proposals, in order to see if there is any difference in the cohesion amongst them. The results seem to be ambiguous, as there were defections the regulatory and one distributive. As the Services directive by no means was an uncontroversial legislation, this may be the explanation for this. It does however not explain the very high cohesion I found in the votes on the ESF.

4) Political role and career preferences of the MEP. This is based upon the political role theory by Searing (1991) and the turn-over rates in the EP suggesting that the national office is more desirable (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005). This leads to the assumption that the higher in the hierarchy of the EPG, the more cohesively will the MEP vote. Whether the MEP prefers a national or an EU level career may also influence which principal to side with in case of divergent positions. But due to the lack of information on this aspect, this variable will only provide speculations and suggest further research on the matter.

I conclude the paper by referring to suggestions by Noury and Roland (2002), which can decrease the biased nature of RCV. Hix and Hagemann (2009) have proposals for a more "European" elections with more independently MEPs. And the increased detailed data hopefully make future research more conclusive.

2 – Theory

The main objective in this thesis is to study the voting behaviour and the cross-pressure that influence the MEPs decisions in the European Parliament. As directly elected representatives, they are obliged to represent their constituents, but find their loyalty torn between their EPG and their national party. To study this behaviour I will apply the Principal-Agent theory and the theory of political roles. Within these theories there are certain implicating factors regarding Electoral system (Braghiroli 2007; Hix and Hagemann 2009) and nature of the proposal (Reichert 2001; 2004). Both theories require an understanding of representation, which is why I will discuss the historical approach on this subject and conclude with the modern definition, after an introduction to the variables that I use in this paper. Before the conclusion of the theoretical approach, I will discuss the importance of voting cohesion by any legislation; the Legislative Cartel theory. But first the variables in this thesis.

2.1 - Variables

The dependent variable in this thesis is the Voting cohesion by the various party groupings in the European Parliament. Voting cohesion is very easy to see, if two preconditions are met; 1) the votes are available by RCV and 2) these RCV are all the votes performed in that given legislation or at least a random sample of the total amount of votes. The first precondition is to a certain degree met, as approximately one third of the votes in the EP are done by this procedure. The RCV are however not a random sample (e.g. Carruba and Gabel 1999), which means that one should be careful when using this source, as for example generalisations may be false due the lack of randomness. In addition to this problem, I will go further into other aspects of why RCV should be used with caution in Chapter 4.

Although one can see the actual voting cohesion by assessing the RCV results, this gives no indication on *why* there is or is not voting cohesion. This is why I will have a main focus on the dependent variable, *Cross-pressure.* I will illustrate this cross-pressure with the Principal-Agent theory and discuss different factors that affects the level of pressure from the principal. The cross-

pressure in this theory are present due to the existence of two principals that the MEPs have to relate to, the Party Group as well as the national party (Hix 2002).

There are two main factors that determines the degree of pressure, 1) the political role definition of the individual MEPs and 2) the options the two principals posses to ensure voting discipline. But latter variable has a number of other influencing factors..

1) If the MEP prefers an career in the EU system, the pressure from the EPG may seem stronger, than to a representative that would prefer a career at home, and see the term as "waiting room" to proceed or begin this career path. Despite the desire of a MEP to continue the career in either arenas are dependent on the degree of sanctioning powers (Braghiroli 2007).

2) The possibilities for discipline by the EPG is the threat of limiting speaking time, important committee chairs and rapporteur assignments. In the case of committee chairs, the leadership of the group can only assign this to a national delegation, which in turn decides which MEP to appoint. The PGL also have the ultimate sanction of expelling the MEP, but this is very rare, as this usually would weaken the position of the EPG relative to the other groups and it also require a majority of the MEPs in the group (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005).

The sanctioning power of the national party are de-selection in the electoral process. This may occur if the MEP has a history of defecting and "going native". The dominant view regarding the Principal-Agent theory is that the EPG possesses much disciplinary means, which is visible through the high cohesion in the EP (Noury and Roland 2002). The main reason for defections are then if the national party already has posted their position at an earlier stage in the process. This is suggested by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005:220) and Jun (2005:16), but is contradicted by Noury and Roland (2002:307).

The second variable which I will include is the *electoral system*. The electoral system can be divided in two factors; Selection Process and Ballot structure. The first is not particular suitable in studies that involve as many countries as this paper does, as the selection process is decided by the national parties, and accounting for all the different methods of all the parties in all the member

states, is worth a paper of its own. There is however a general rule which I will use, which argues that the more decentralised state, the more influences does the regional/regional affiliation has or even the electorates can participate. This leads to the prediction that the more decentralised the selection process, the more freedom does the MEP has to defect from the national party, without fearing sanctions (Braghiroli 2007).

The Ballot structure is easier to apply as there is only one in each member state. The ballot may be structure with a closed list, with no possibilities to alter the position of the candidates, or an open list, where there is much to gain for the candidate to receive personal votes. The middle category is ordered lists, where the party pre-set a list and if there are enough votes, the candidates on the list may be moved up or down (Hix and Hagemann 2009).

The final factor is the *type of proposal* and the attention it receives at the national arena, the latter may be due to two factors: the first is that the nature of the legislation may influence the cohesion (which is obviously not valid in the investiture procedures). Reichert (2004) argues that there seem to be less controversy on legislative proposals of a regulatory nature, and this could often lead to high cohesion in the EPGs. If the legislation on the other hand is regarding distributive proposals, then the national parties first become more interested in how the MEP votes, and the MEP would also be more interested in bringing as much as possible back to the constituency, in order to improve his or her position in regards to re-election.

The second source for national attention on the vote is the power of the EP. If there is little attention in the MS, there is also little chance for the national party to involve in the vote. In cases where the EP has co-decision power, the general tendency is that there is a higher level of attention of the vote by the national party and they become more involved (Scully 2001:6). In cases of much attention from the MS, the EPG may fear low cohesion, and hence would not opt for a RCV so the low cohesion is open for other to see (Carruba and Gabel 1999).

The variables that seem most suitable to explain voting cohesion are not particular transferable to a graph, which is why I instead have constructed this table of two situations of two MEPs which face high level of pressure from two different principals. There is little national attention on Proposal A,

which is often a result of little EP influence (Scully 2001) and/or the nature of the legislation (Reichert 2001;2004) and this is the one that is most likely to be decided by RCV (Carruba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery and Schambach 2006).

Table 2.1 – Two Cases of Different Loyalty.

MEP A on proposal A	MEP B on proposal B
Opt for career in the EU arena	Opt for a national career
Other Procedures	Co-decision
Regulatory legislation	Distributive legislation
Sanctioning powers of national party:	**Sanctioning powers of national party:**
-Decentralised selection	-Centralised selection
-Open ballot structure	-Closed list on the ballot
High EPG cohesion is probable	**High National cohesion is probable**

2.2 – Representation

Representation is a term that can be linked back to Spinoza in the 17th century, as one of the first thinkers not to hold the monarchy as superior to democracy. Since direct democracies proved impossible in the (then) newly defined nation states, a form of indirect governance was needed. He imagined a society with a wider suffrage. He would include all that were free, lived respectful and owed allegiance to the country. By this he meant men over a certain age, without criminal patterns and could be considered a citizen within the given border. He wanted a state with these properties, as aristocracy tended to allocate those who by chance were rich and their allies whom they could easily control, and therefore the state would be corrupt (Spinoza 2004:385-386).

As he died without completing his idea of democracy, it took nearly a century before this idea was revived by the French and American revolutions. Although Rousseau is considered to be the father of modern democracy, he believed that there had never been a true democracy and never would be one (Rousseau, 77:2004). This referred however to direct democracy, who among other criteria could only exist in small societies. Representation was something he was extremely sceptical towards; “Any law which the people has not ratified in person is void; it is not law at all” (Ibid, 112-113:2004).

The founding fathers of America feared that what they had been working for would be confused with the old definition of a democracy, and therefore needed to specify their intention with the representative democracy, USA. James Madison wrote in *The Federalist No 10* that states with large territory and population, needed to be governed by representation. The form of government they sought to create and maintain, was "a democratic form of government which is corrected, limited and temperate" (Bobbio, 2006:150).

In my thesis, Robert Dahl works as a bridge from the classical understanding of democracy into what I will use as a definition of a well-functioning democracy. By his time, representation is regarded as a necessity of the liberal democracy. I will, as he; "assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals (Dahl, 1971:1). Both Madison and Dahl believe that it is possible for sovereign people to be represented in a legislative arena, in contrast to Rousseau. As great as Dahl's work may be, I will only focus on one of the aspect of his criteria for democracies, namely the representation and in my context, the representation conducted by the MEPs.

In order to go deeper into the meaning of representation in democracies, I will use Beetham's two main principles in regarding democratic audit; *political equality* and *popular control*. As political equality is not a debate here regarding the EU, I will leave this topic and focus on the popular control. To study popular control, Beetham divides this concept into four dimensions; 1) Free and fair elections, 2) A democratic society, 3) Civil and political liberties and 4) Open and accountable governments (Beetham, 2003:154-156).

Of these dimensions, I will only focus on the latter, as this is the one that is connected to my research question. Rousseau believed the British to only be free during elections, and afterwards they would be enslaved to the members of parliament (Rousseau, 2004:113). Some may still argue for this statement, but within the definition of popular control by Beetham, accountability and responsiveness is also valid between elections. "The fact of the vote casts a long shadow in front of it, as it were. It acts as a continuous discipline on the elected," (Beetham, 2003:42). This argument is also supported by Cox and McCubbins, they argue that one incentive for being responsive to the electorate for a representative (or Agent), is to be re-elected. Therefore it is important for him/her to do well for the represented (or Principal) (Cox and McCubbins, 2007). This is however an argument I will return to later in this chapter, when discussing the Legislative Leviathan.

Pitkin's work on representation shows a broader side of representation (Blomgren 2003), as she makes a distinction between the formalistic view and that one is representative through standing for something. The latter can be divided into two categories. One can either be a descriptive representative for different groups in the society, e.g. ethnicity, gender, class. The second is also about characteristics, but more symbolic, rather than resemblance. This may be a monarch, national sports team/athlete etc. These are not elected nor accountable and in both cases they are only representative through appearance, not actions and will therefore not be used further in this text (Pitkin in Blomgren 2003).

The formalistic view can also be divided into two parts; 1) *Authorisation*, and in this sense the representative acts on behalf of the represented because the latter is incapable of these actions. The representative is in this definition freed from responsibilities, as long as he/she has authorisation to act. 2) *Accountability* is the second, and as in the first category, there is authorisation to act on behalf of the represented due to knowledge on the matter. The difference in this category is that the representative is responsible for his or her actions. This responsibility may only come to show whenever a term is ended, and if the work is unsatisfactory and the representative resign the post, he or she cannot be criticized, as this is playing by the rules (Pitkin in Blomgren 2003).

To conclude the part of representation, I will cite Blomgren: “A representative has the authority to act on behalf on of those he or she represents and is accountable for his or her actions. A person who acts outside these limitations can hardly be called a representative” (2003:22). This is also how I will use the term representative.

On the basis of the modern understanding of representation, I will assume that the MEPs are aware of accountability and responsiveness an election brings. With this in mind I predict that a MEP would do his or hers best to fulfil the responsibility in representing their constituency. Although a MEP is supposed to represent its constituents' preferences, he or she sometime find themselves in a cross-pressure situation between their EPG and National Party's divergent preferences, as it is important for most MEPs to be supported by a collective. I will in the following parts address this issue with the the P-A theory and some of its influencing factors before moving to the political role theory.

2.3 – Principal-Agent Theory

The basics of the Principal-Agent theory is when a principal, either individually or collectively, hire an agent which has better knowledge in dealing with the issue or task at hand (Brennan and Hamlin, 2000). This could be hiring a lawyer when facing the judiciary system, as the lawyer has expertise in the laws beyond the layman. In the collective sense, which I will use it in, this can be the voters who votes for politicians to represent them in the legislative branch. The electoral imperative urges the parliamentarians to perform and deliver the services they campaigned for. If the result is found poorly by the electorate, then there is a possibility for the voters to vote for another representation in the next election. In some cases the parliamentarians can find that the job will be better done by delegating some tasks to an agency, in which the parliamentarians become the principals (Weingast, 1984:151-153). I will however focus on the parliamentarians, or more specifically the MEPs, as agents.

This theory is then complicated when entering it to the EU system, as Simon Hix points out with the existence of the two principals in the EU system, the EPGs and the national parties (2002:690). It may seem as the dominant view on the Principal-Agent relationship in the EP is that the ultimate principal is the EPG. This is argued on the basis on the relatively high cohesion of the party groups (Noury and Roland 2002). This is though based upon the results by RCV, which will be debated in chapter three.

One factor which is not something the MEPs can do anything about is the EP elections as second-order elections. The idea of a second-order election is based on the model of Reif and Schmitt (in Lindberg 2008b), which developed the model in the wake of the first directly elected EP in 1979. They expect that the EP elections will have a lower turnout, substantial votes for opposition, minor parties and protest parties. Later we can see that this assumption was correct, as 1) the electoral turnout has declined since the first election, 2) opposition do get many votes, as well as 3) the minor and independent parties and 4) the protest parties (Hix, 1997).

If one compares the national VS the EP elections with national elections VS local and/or regional elections, wee see the same symptoms. The voting turnout is higher in the national elections in both cases, much to do with the, at least perceived, power difference. Protest votes are used in most countries in sub-national elections, if the electorate is displeased with the performance of the

government. When the electorate in a national election cast a vote for the opposition, this opposition is directly linked to the government, which is by far the case in the EP protest votes.

How the incumbent parties do in the EP election are closely correlated with how they perform in the national arena and how far from the general election it is. Another general rule is that the further away in time the general election is, the worse the governmental parties do in the EP elections. I.e. the number of protest votes will grow, and the opposition and different movements will perform well (Braghiroli 2007).

The result is the creation of a quasi "divided government" in the EU (where the Council is composed of governing parties and the EP majority is composed of opposition parties), thereby increasing the risk for conflicts between parties at home and transnational group's leadership in Brussels." (Braghiroli, 2007:9).

Although the EP elections overall focus mainly on national issues, there are a few exceptions. In the late eighties a transnational movement environmental movement emerged and subsequently the Greens achieved a good electoral result in the 1989 election. The newly increased power of the commission president investiture the EP gained before the EP election of 1994, was made a big number out of on all the three party federations' manifestos, PES, EPP-ED and ELDR, but this was largely ignored in the electoral campaign (Hix 1997). Braghiroli mentions two other exceptions of a newer date, which is the draft constitution and the Services directive. Although these two issues have a transnational character, they both lacked transnational co-ordination and were debated with a national focus. It seems as "most of the European citizens vote for Europe, but think nationally" (Barghiroli 2007:9).

The main factor for defections by the MEPs seems to be if the vote is on a case in which the national party already has taken a position, in for example the Council with regard to the nomination of the President. The possibilities for a party or minister "need" to take a position that are divergent of his or her own, is as a result by the "divided government", which is a result of protest votes on the national government in the EP election. The pressure that the national party or a minister apply on their MEP also seems to be stronger when the decision in the Council is taken by

unanimity or a high QMV (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005:220; Jun 2005:16).

The prediction from this view on the Principal-Agent approach is that if the national party has previously taken a position in a case, the more likely will the MEPs also take this position.

2.4 – Electoral System

In addition to the pressure resulting from the "divided government", the *degree* of pressure in regards of the Electoral System is dependent upon two key factors; the ballot structure and candidate selection process. In all MS there are now PR election, but the structure of the ballot still varies, from a) closed lists b) ordered lists and open lists. The majority of the countries have closed lists, which means that the voter can only choose which party to vote for, not the individual candidates. In these cases the party has the most power, and can effectively de-select the candidates they do not want, due to for instance frequent defections in the previous term.

The ordered list, there is a possibility for the candidate to collect enough votes to climb on the list, but this require substantial amount of votes. This will in turn mean that the MEP are more accountable towards the party rather than the constituency in regards of re-election and the voters have little possibilities to apply pressure on the MEPs. The open list, which is a minority of the systems used today in the MS (see table 5.1), there are several candidates in each district and the amount of votes each candidate obtain has direct influence on who gets elected. In this latter category, the candidate does not to the same degree fear de-selection by the party, and the sanctioning power of the party is weaker (Braghiroli 2007; Hix and Hagemann 2009).

In the selection process, it is an advantage for the candidates if this is decided at local level or by direct involvement by the voters. This means that a candidate will have much to gain by interaction with the voters and it will reduce the power by the central party leadership, in case of de-selection. Despite that the selection process seems to be somewhat correlated on the Federal-Unitary dimension, the decision is ultimately taken by the individual party, and hence any correlation conclusion from this variable must be done with caution (Braghiroli 2007).

The debate on openness of the ballot regarding the size of the district is also a influencing factor. As Hix and Hagemann (2009) argues is that an open ballot is not always desirable. In large districts with an open structure, there are great incentives for the candidates to promote his or her own candidacy. This could easily lead to a battle between politicians and not between parties. The parties could end up as very weak and the parliament may end up with millionaires and celebrities and we end up in the scenario that Spinoza feared would happen to Aristocracies. Most political scientist would prefer that the districts in this sense would be relatively small with open ballot structures. This setting would lead to that the voters would have a better understanding of the candidates of the same party, as the candidates would have to perform a campaign differently under these circumstances, than with closed lists (Hix and Hagemann 2009). In addition, the central party leadership would have less influence over the voting in the EP, as the sanctioning power would be weakened.

Based on these arguments of cross-pressure on the MEPs leads to the following predictions: A decentralised constitutional setting, leads to higher EPG voting cohesion. And the more open ballot structure, the higher EPG voting cohesion. This is because this indicates a lower sanctioning power by the national party, and the MEP are more free to take an unpopular position in the eyes of the national party.

2.5 – Type of Legislation

Reichert argues for the importance of policy area of the legislation and its impact on the voting behaviour (2001). He claims that when the proposal is of a distributive nature, the MEPs are more inclined to defect from the EPG position, if this would benefit the revenues he or she may take home to their constituency. On the other hand, if the vote is on a regulatory proposal, the MEPs are likely to vote with their EPG. These assumptions have led to the following hypothesis:

"When considering distributive legislation, MEPs will vote accordingly to their national identity, not ideologically." and "When considering regulatory legislation, MEPs will vote ideologically with their party group rather than according to their national identity." (Reichert 2001:9,11). His following research supported these hypothesises, but there is a need for further study on the matter.

I will use these hypothesises in the study of the Services Directives and the ESF and ERDF, to see if they are accurate. There is however one aspect which is not included in these predictions, and that is the national attention on the legislations. As Carruba and Gabel (in Scully 2001:6) points out, the more influence the EP has over the outcome of the legislation, the more interest the national party take in how their MEPs vote, which in turn probably leads to low cohesion in the EPG.

Based on these two aspects of attention the legislation receive, I predict that in cases on regulatory policy with little EP influence, the MEP votes with their EPG and in cases of distributive policy with more EP influence, the MEP votes with their national delegation.

2.6 – Political Roles

Donald Searing's approaches towards political roles he calls 1) the Structural, 2) Interactional and 3) Motivational approach, which is the one I will focus on. The structural approach focuses on the effect of the institution on the role and the Interactional focuses on the process where the role is learned. The Motivational approach' principal topic is a focus on the content of roles and the goals and incentives within these roles. But it also incorporates aspects of both of the two other approaches as this approach defines political roles as a result of the interaction within the institutional framework and the individual's preferences and learning (Searing 1991).

The institutional framework that shape the role differ in strength, from leaving little room for personal preferences till for instance new MEPs, who may spend some time shaping their role in the EP (Searing 1991; Blomgren 2003). During the MEP's “role defining period”, he or she may define their role as MEP to be more “Europeanised” (i.e. socialise/go native), or a national representative. In many ways one can divide the MEPs into two categories, those who regard their term in Brussels as a long-term career opportunity and those who see the term as a way into national politics, either to begin their career at home or as a “waiting room” if there e.g. was some unfortunately incidents in the national arena (Braghiroli, 2007).

This leads to the assumption that those in the first category would strive more to act loyal towards the leadership of the EPG, in order to obtain a committee chair, be selected as rapporteur and other career opportunities. And then of course the latter category would do more to please the national party, in order to advance in the home arena more quickly. In either cases I would expect neither categories to behave too "extreme", i.e. either always abide either the EPG or the National party, as this might respectively lead to de-selection in the elections or isolation in the EP.

2.7 – Political Parties as Legislative Cartels

I will now turn my attention away from the individual politicians, to the party and how they can achieve voting cohesion and why this cohesion is important. The Legislative Cartel theory by Cox and McCubbins is based on the principles of the Prisoner's Dilemma (see figure 2.1), the issue of trust among the politicians and the strive to act cohesive in a legislative chamber.

In order to achieve any form of legislation, there need to be some collective action of the legislators. This collective dilemma can be solved by the creation of political parties. These parties help the politicians to first be elected through association of the candidate with the party label and then stabilising the legislative arena to achieve enough votes for the paper to pass (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lindberg 2008b).

Although the individual legislators who belong to the same party have at least similar policy preferences, they most likely will differ in some areas. The legislators face a prisoner's dilemma, when there are divergent preferences. In this case the legislator A will gain an advantage if the opposite candidate does not bribe and vice versa. However, if assuming that both are rational actors then they will both bribe, as neither can risk that the other part will refrain from bribing. This means that they end up in a Nash Equilibrium with -1, -1, which is not Pareto optimum (Cox and McCubbins, 2007).

Figure 2.1 – The Prisoner's Dilemma

		Player B	
		Bribe	Do Not
Player A	Bribe	-1, -1	1, -2
	Do Not	-2, 1	-0, 0

Source: Cox and McCubbins (2008:82).

The Prisoner's Dilemma creates a foundation of the following model, but Legislative Cartel Theory does not use a dichotomy, but a somewhat more complex example. This means also that it is somewhat closer to situations one might find in a legislative arena. In this example from Aldrich there are three legislators with three legislative proposals with a pay-off of 3, 4 and -9 and they all have different preferences on all the proposals and if neither proposal is adopted the pay-off is 0. All the proposals will be passed if all legislators vote individually with a majority of 2 to 1. All the legislators will then have a pay-off of -2. This means that there will be a Pareto-superior outcome if none of the proposals are passed, but this will in turn lead to a dead-lock in the legislation (Lindberg 2008b:52).

Figure 2.2 – Collective action and incentives for party formation

		Legislative proposals		
		X	Y	Z
Legislators	A	4	3	-9
	B	3	-9	4
	C	-9	4	3

Source: Lindberg (2008b:52)

If however legislators A and B agrees to vote only in favour of proposal X, these two will have a pay-off of respectively 4 and 3. What the legislators A and B have gained through a collective action in the first case, may though disappear, if they defect from their commitment to only pass proposal X. If legislator A joins with C and passes proposal Y, legislator A would increase the pay-off to 7 and C will have reduced the pay-off to -5. If this happens, then Legislator B has strong incentives to support Legislator C in the final proposal, in order to reduce the pay-off loss to -2 and they all end up with a pay-off of -2. In this case, the individual rational actions lead to a Pareto-inferior outcome (Lindberg, 2008b).

For the political parties, there need to be some mechanisms in order to secure voting cohesion, i.e. make sure that legislator A and B keep their agreement to only vote in favour of proposal X in the example above. This will ensure that the party are able to pass legislation that support their policy. An institutional solution to keep the parties member loyal to the party platform is to establish party leadership who attempts to create high voting cohesion and minimise free-riding and defection from individuals as soon as their goal is achieved through the help of the collective. The party leadership can either try to control the agenda setting in order to avoid a vote for propositions that can split the party (e.g. in Norway the vote for EU membership has been avoided, to preserve a coalition), or it can sanction those who do not vote with the rest of the party by ignoring them in committee assignments or withdraw their support for election (Lindberg 2008b, Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007).

2.8 – Circle of Incentives and Predictions

In a hierarchy of goals for a legislator, one could argue that they are; Re-election, policy and office/ committee (Fenno in Lindberg 2008b; Faas 2002). The reason for hierarchy is quite obvious as there are no possibilities to hold a committee chair, if one is not elected. With the exception of the independent candidates, he or she is dependent of a party to support them first in voter recognition to a familiar policy platform and secondly, offer other support throughout the electoral campaign and to obtain a spot high enough on the party list to have a realistic chance of being elected.

In the case of a national politician, he or she would aim for re-election, once the he or she is in a parliament. To increase this possibility it is important to pass “good” policy (in the eyes of this or hers constituency). In order to ensure that the legislation that is up for vote is what the constituents want, it could also prove very useful to hold a committee chair, in order to try to influence the agenda. This can though usually only be obtained if one has proven loyalty to the party and have a loyal voting record (Cox and McCubbins, 2005,2007). To summarize; 1) the candidate seeks re-election, but 2) needs support from the party. 3) This support is only given if the candidate stays loyal (i.e. maintain voting cohesion). The candidate also benefit from 4) holding a committee chair to influence the agenda, which also require support from the party, and is still only given if loyal.

In this national arena the interdependence of trust is relatively straightforward, as the candidate only has to relate to one party. In the case of the MEPs, there are two parties, which both hold incentives to stay loyal towards them. The national party holds the strongest card in terms of re-election, since it has strong influence over the nomination or approval of the candidates. The EPG on the other hand is the one who controls the committee chairs assignments and can influence the legislative agenda. This means that the further the national party is from the EPG, the higher the possibility there is for the MEP to have to choose between the national party line and the one of the EPG. He or she faces cross-pressure (Hix, 2002).

When a MEP faces cross-pressure due to a divergent policy line of the EPG and the national party, he or she has to choose. There are four deciding factors are after my view; 1) Where the MEP imagine his or hers career. 2) Which electoral system the MS has in regard of openness on the ballot and selection process (Hix and Hagemann 2009 and Braghiroli 2007). 3) National party office status (Hix 1997) and 4) type of legislation and attention at home (Reichert 2001; 2004).

1)If the MEP wants a career at home and the MS has a closed list, it is more likely for him or her to vote with the national party. If however the MEP wants a career in the EU and there is an open structure in the electoral procedure, it may be more likely for the MEP to vote cohesive with the EPG.

2) If the electoral system favours the party in the selection process and ballot structure, the national party has stronger sanctioning powers, than if the local party group has influence on the bill and the voters can influence the positioning of the candidates on the list. This is most likely to be observed in federal states with an open ballot structure.

3) If the national party is in government there might be a lower cohesion in the EPG. The analysis provided by Noury and Roland (2002), this does not seem to have any effect. However when the vote on a legislation in the Council is by unanimity or a high QMV, is it likely that a minister who supported a proposal in the Council, also put pressure on their MEPs to support this in the EP (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005:220). This is also supported by Jun (2005:16), that argues that a loosing

minority in the Council, will have less incentives for lobbying the MEPs to support the proposal in the EP, or in her case, support the Commission President or the entire commission.

4) The nature of the legislation is the final factor that influence. In the case of distributive proposals, both the MEP and national party may have stronger motives for voting different from the EPG, due to the fact that the MEP wants to gain popularity in front of an election and the national party takes more interest in the vote of the MEP, as they too wants more resources to be allocated in their country. If the legislation on the other hand is regarding a regulation, than it is more likely that the national party would have less interest in how their MEPs vote, and the MEP also have less to gain to defect from the EPG (Reichert 2004).

The result of cross-pressure does not necessarily mean that the MEP vote as the national party or possible minister asks, but abstaining is also an option. This may then not be a sign of indifference of the MEP, but a result of divergent policy between the EPG and the national party (and even their own preference). As Rasmussen (2008) discover in her interviews with the Danish MEPs. They tell that abstention is often used as an option when there is a cross-pressure, but they do not choose which side to vote for. In the Danish cases this is often visible in cases regarding environment, where the MEPs from Denmark (and also to a certain degree the other Nordic delegations and Northern Europe) often wants stricter environmental standards, than the rest of the EPG (and especially the Southern European delegations). Of the Danish MEPs, almost one third report to often abstain from voting when there is divergent positions between the EPG and the national party. One can then argue that abstention in RCV is more an Exit behaviour, rather than indifference. This is also supported by the conclusion of Blomgren (2003).

3 – Method

When studying the EU it is first of all important to choose between a vertical and a horizontal perspective. Since this is a study of the relationship of the MEPs to the national arena and the EP, I will focus on the vertical perspective (Blomgren 2003). This is because I will focus on the relationship between the EP, MEPs and national parties, and not between the institutions on EU level.

In this study of the MEP voting behaviour, I will mainly rely on previous research in form of articles, books and Ph.D. thesis. Lindberg (2008a) provides the data available from RCV on the vote on the first reading of the Services directive. The data on the RCV is collected by Hix Noury and Roland. As the data seemed to be missing on the votes on the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. I have collected the votes on the first reading of the provisions for the funds from the Official Journal C-379 (European Commission 1998b). I then divided the votes from the PES and EPP-ED group into national delegations by comparing the names from the Official Journal to the description of the MEPs on the EP website (European Parliament 2009a). The main work will however be done by document analysis of the previously mentioned sources.

3.1 Descriptive Case Study

I have chosen a case study as the most appropriate way to discover the MEP behaviour, and have chosen four incidents where this behaviour has come to expression, the Santer nomination, the service directive and two regulations, one on the ESF and one on the ERDF. I have found that a descriptive case study is the most appropriate. Yin (in Berg, 2007:293) suggests that these studies should include five central components:

- Study Question
- Study propositions or theoretical framework
- Identification of the units of analyse.
- Logical linking to the propositions and theoretical framework

- The criteria for interpreting the findings

The study or research question can once again be repeated:

What influences the MEPs voting behaviour in terms of cohesion and defections?

In chapter 3 I discussed my predictions and theoretical framework as well as linking them to the cases I have chosen to use, so I will only repeat the main point now. The theory is based upon is the idea of representation and in particular the relationship between the representative and the represented (Principals and Agents). I will argue that the electoral system as it is today promotes loyalty towards the National Party in cases of co-decision and in areas of national interest. Which means that loyalty towards the EPG may be higher in cases where the EP has a consultation or assent role. The last point is something I will answer in the final chapters, which leaves the units of analyse in this sub-chapter; which are the MEPs and their voting behaviour, in addition to the actions available for and exercised by the EPG and national parties in order to influence this voting behaviour.. I hope to reveal some aspects of why they vote as they do and why they defect from the EPG position on some issues. This I hope will lead to some conclusion on their behaviour and incentives.

3.2 - Patchwork Case Study

There are four cases which I will study here. According to the description of Jensen and Rogers (in Berg, 2007:293) I will define this study as a patchwork case study. This is a study when a mix of case studies on the same entity, although the MEPs changes from the the first “snap-shot” in 1994 to the last in 2004, I will still regard this as the same entity, since I am not interested in any particular MEP, but rather their role perception and choices they make. My intentions for choosing such a method is an attempt to create a more holistic picture of the MEPs' voting pattern, i.e. by choosing to look beyond the mere results of RCV.

3.3 - Data

3.3.1 Investiture

I regard the vote for the approval of the Commission president as the most important vote in the context of investiture, which is why I wanted to mainly focus on these. Especially when one consider the difference in votes on Santer and later the whole commission and one can see how much the opposition, and perhaps the intensity, has dropped (Jun 2005:20).

As three presidents has been approved by the EP, a comparison of all cases would mean that possible voting patterns could be revealed, due to the changing in the EP regarding its increased politicisation of the last 15 years (Hix in Lindberg 2008b; Hix 1997; Zürn 2006). There is however a problem with my preference on vote, as the only vote of approval on the president is from the case of Santer. Prodi was approved by the 4th EP (the same as Mr. Santer) (Daily Notebook 2006), and I would be surprised if there were much opposition of a PES nominee in a PES dominated parliament, especially regarding the amount of complaints by the PES by the nomination of a conservative president (Hix 1997). All votes by the 5th EP was only on the Prodi commission as a whole, which I am not as interested in. And the approval of Barroso was done by secret ballot (Daily Notebook 2009b).

The presidency of Jacques Santer is the president there was the most controversy. Both in the appointment process and his resignation. In addition to this being the oldest case, this is probably the reason for why this is the case with by far the most literature on. From the paper by Hix (1997), I have found and used his calculations on the final results, as well as the break-down of these into how the different EPGs voted.

The data on the elections are however quite different. Hix (1997:9) states that 262 voted to support Santer while 244 voted against. Hix, Noury and Roland (2005:251) concludes with 260 votes in favour and 238 against. Jun has the last vote which I will include which is 262 to 245 (2005:20).

I wanted to compare the three investitures, as these were the easiest to determine the position of all the actors in this paper; the MEP, national parties as well as the EPGs. This could however not be done, due to the lack of information on these cases. The endorsement for Prodi's nomination was done the 5th of May 1999 (Daily Notebook 2006). This was by the fourth parliament, and the EP decided that he also needed to be accepted by the new parliament elected in June that year. The first nomination was however approved by 392 in favour, and 72 against and 41 abstentions (Jacobs 1999:15 and Daily Notebook 2006a). As this was by the fourth parliament, and is therefore a vote I am not very interested in, as I want one vote from different parliaments for each president.

Regarding the vote for president Barroso, here too I found only the final result. According to the information I got from the Daily Notebook from the European Parliament, there was a vote by secret ballot (Daily Notebook 2009b). The vote for the Commission as a whole is available (Jun 2005:20; Daily Notebook 2009a), but as the result from the approval of Santer and the approval of the entire commission were so radically different (Jun 2005:20), I decided not to include further investitures.

3.3.2 - Legislation

In this thesis I have also included votes on the legislation, the Services Directive and the vote on the first reading of the ESF and the ERDF. This would give some indication on voting cohesion both in directives and regulations, as well as they also represent regulatory and distributive legislation. The votes on these proposals will also function as a comparison to the investiture vote.

3.3.3 - Services Directive

Lindberg (2008a) has collected data regarding the service directive, which I will use in the discussion on directives. From the first reading of the Services Directive, Lindberg calculated the results from 81 RCV, covering approximately 100 amendments of a total of just over 500. The RCV he used included also the final vote on the amended proposal.

I will not emphasise the committee stage and the appointment of rapporteurs as Lindberg did in this paper. I will rather focus on the East-West dimension of the Services Directive of PES and EPP-ED. The data shows that there is a clear division between the Eastern and Western delegations in the EPP group. The PES members were far more positive to this directive, with notable exceptions in France and Belgium. The national delegations from EPP-ED and PES, there was only the Slovakian representatives that had a lower voting cohesion than the EPG with 71%. In the vast majority in these two parties, the national delegations had a perfect cohesion (Lindberg 2008a:1198-1199).

3.3.4 - ESF and ERDF

The Commission proposed a regulation regarding the general provisions on the Structural Funds (European Commission 1998a). Two of these proposals were on the European Social Fund and European Regional and Development Fund (European Commission 1998b). These two are of the more substantial regulations regarding the ESF and ERDF and the Co-decision procedure was also used (although they initially were coded (SYN) for cooperation, they were changed to (COD) for co-decision later), which is why I want to study these regulations further. I intended to only include the ESF, but as the data material was limited, I decided to also include the proposal on the ERDF.

After the first reading the EP proposed several amendments, but only two of which were by RCV (European Commission 1998b:127). In the case of ERDF, three amendments were decided by RCV and also the Draft Legislative Resolution. Unfortunately I was not able to find these results in the database provided by Hix et. al., but I collected them personally and made the calculations (IBID 1998:317-324). The rest of the amendments were decided upon by EV, or other form of which there are no record of the individual votes.

Based on the arguments by Reichert (2001; 2004), I expect that votes on issues where there are substantial national interest, there is a relatively low voting cohesion. As there are few RCV on such decisions, I have little evidence for such a claim. The fact that there are so few RCV in these cases, support however the theory that RCV are highly biased (Thiem 2006 and Carruba et al 2006), and

in cases where there are national awareness and interests at stake, the EPG may fear low cohesion and therefore chose to vote by other means.

By using the information provided by the Official Journal C-379 (European Commission 1998b) on the individual voting, I used the information provided by the EP (European Parliament 1999; 2009a), in order to divide the MEPs by nationality in EPP-ED and PES. By doing this I was able to see which countries voted most loyal to the EPG (See table 4.7). There were far more defections in the EPP-ED than in the PES, and there were also far more defections in the different votes on ERDF than on the ESF (See table 4.5 and 4.6 as well). The information provided by this table will be used in the discussion on strength and weaknesses in regards to the sanctioning powers by the national parties as well as the EPGs.

3.4 – The Data

Most of the studies on MEP voting cohesion and behaviour are based on the collection of RCV, I will rather try to go beyond these results and focus more on the incentives of the individual MEP to find out why they vote as they do. Despite this, I will to a certain degree use the results of RCV, collected and interpreted by Hix (1997) and Jun (2005) in the case of the investitures, by Lindberg (2008a) on the Services Directive and myself on the ESF and ERDF collected from the Official Journals.

Lindberg and Kreppel (in Lindberg 2008b) argues that increased power of the EP, affected the voting behaviour of the EP. Lindberg uses Hix et al. (in Lindberg 2008b:27) to support the claim of increased cohesion as the legislative power of the EP increased. The table clearly shows that the cohesion among the EPG has increased from the first to the fifth parliament, by 8 percent. PES, Greens and ELDR increased their cohesion with 22, 18 and 9 percentage.

Noury and Roland are also strongly defending the high voting cohesion in the EP on the basis of the results of the voting behaviour of the MEPs by analysing the RCV and finds that the major cleavage is on the socio-economic Left-Right cleavage (Noury and Roland 2002:311-312). In Noury and

Roland's database, the amount of RCV on co-decision procedures, is 25% or approximately 275 votes of the 2291 legislative votes, which means 4.3% of the 6473 of the total votes in the database (IBID:286). Co-decision was used as a dummy variable in the work of Noury and Roland, but this variable was however not significant on party discipline, but was significant and positive on the level of participation. The variable on participation was significant and indicated that increased participation lead to higher party discipline (IBID:307).

Noury and Roland summarise the paper by arguing, amongst others, that increased party cohesion is connected with mobilisation and co-decision is leading to increased participation. And concludes the paper with *"Our empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure in the EP."* (Noury and Roland 2002:312).

But the use of RCV have important weakness, such as that RCV are not a random sample of the votes in the EP and the requests for RCV are strategical called by the party group leadership (Carruba et al. 2006). Noury and Roland argues rather that: "*Drawing on a unique data set that covers all recorded votes by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) between 1989 and 1999, we are able to concisely document how the EP has operated".* (Noury and Roland 2002:282).

In the article by Carruba et. al. (2006), they show that of 4,668 votes collected from the first year of the fifth EP (July 1999 to June 2000), 1,297 of these are by RCV. Of these there are only 173 regarding legislation, the rest on resolutions. Of these again, 103 RCV are on consultation and one on assent procedure. This leaves 69 RCV on the three co-decision procedures compared to 1,232 votes by other procedures. This is only one year compared to the 10 years of RCV that Noury and Roland (2002) are referring to, it may not be that 1999-2000 is a representative year for the votes taken in the EP, but in both cases this group of votes are fairly small and the fact that the co-decision variable was not significant, I believe that the generalisation claim should be done with caution.

Another point made by Verdier (Noury and Roland 2002:315), is that the EP does rarely have co-decision power on country-specific policy areas, such as Foreign policy and on the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). This could have the consequence that the MEPs are more likely to vote

with the party position, when the result of the vote does not have much impact on their country as the EP does not possess decisively powers on these issues.

The vast majority of the RCV are called by the leadership of the party groups, and this has led to the conclusion by scholars that there are two main motivations for RCV to be called, Disciplining and Signalling. When it is to discipline the members, the PGL want voting discipline from its members, under the threat of e.g. speaking time, committee and rapporteur appointments etc. When it is for signalling, it can be that the EPG that called the RCV wants to signal a certain policy or embarrass another party for having low cohesion or an unpopular policy (Carruba et. al. 2006:694).

The last caution in this paper is when using RCV is to understand voting behaviour, that though it might be easier and seem more useful to look at the RCV on the finally adopted text, it actually may be more interesting to study the votes on some of the amendments. Especially if one of the amendments were of particular significance, but this require a great deal of knowledge of the issue (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton, 2005:168-169).

By merely study the results of RCV there are also several aspects of the MEP voting behaviour we cannot see. It is for one thing impossible to say whether a MEP wants a career in EU or at national level, which can be one motivation for defecting from one or the other group. The sanctioning powers are also different in the different countries. As Braghiroli (2007) and Hix and Hagemann (2009) points out, the size of the constituencies and openness of the ballot have impact on how much the national party are able to punish disloyal behaviour.

The MEP political role identity and career preferences are hard to measure with the data material that is available in such old cases that I use. www.votewatch.eu provides very detailed information on all the votes by the MEP and also the turnovers. Both these factors are important when defining a MEP preference. The voting history of a MEP is important with regard to see how far from the median of the party he or she is on the socio-economic dimension and how the position in the party affects the voting pattern (Hix 2002; Gabel and Hix 2007). The turnover by the MEP are significant when determining whether or not the MEP prefers a national or an EU arena career.

The data in this database only dates back to 2004, which means that the majority of the MEPs that are studied here would not be included. The consequence this has for this paper, is that the political role preference is a weak variable, and as this variable may or may not contain information on the MEP preferences, the details from www.Votewatch.eu would be a valuable asset in further study of MEP behaviour of the present parliament and onwards. This apply also for the turnover, of which I was not able in this paper to study the turnover and re-elections of all the MEPs in the three previous parliaments.

3.5 – Concluding Remarks

The data that I use in this paper do not provide me with any hard evidence that can prove my predictions. Despite this I still believe that it is important to look behind the numbers and figures, that for instance Noury and Roland use RCV to argue for a claim that cohesion is high and will remain so if co-decision will be set as the normal decision procedure. I intend to show with this thesis that the voting behaviour and defections are of a very complex nature, and conclusions are virtually impossible to draw, especially when based on a biased data foundation, which RCV by many scholars is argued to be (e.g. Carruba and Gabel 1999).

4 – Case Descriptions

In the following chapter I will focus on the president election of Santer, as this is the most clear-cut divisions in the socio-economic dimension and the president Santer (although only de facto) needed the approval of the EP. The data on the two other investitures were, as noted in the previous chapter, too inadequate to perform the desired analysis, and hence they will not be paid attention to.

The other cases which I will use is the following legislations; two regulations, the European Social Fund and the European Regional and Development Fund and one directive, the Services Directive. I include these to study if there are any differences between the president approval and other forms of legislation in regards of voting cohesion. In all of the latter cases the decision is taken by the co-decision procedure. The fact that the EP has actual power in the cases I have chosen is of vital importance, as it is possible that the MEP would behave differently if their decision do not carry any substantial weight.

4.1 – Investitures of the Commission Presidents

The three last presidents of the Commission I wanted study are; Jacques Santer, Romani Prodi and José M. Barroso. These three presidents was chosen as these are so far the only ones who needed to be accepted by the EP. Although the decision of the EP could be ignored in the case of Santer, it is very likely that the EC would in fact withdraw this nomination or he himself would do so, if there was not a majority in the EP supporting him (Jacobs, 1999:7).

Due to the far more controversy regarding the investiture of Santer, the literature on this case virtually dwarfs the amount of the others. The approval of Prodi and Barroso did not gain as much attention, but the situation of the MEP are still the same and the secretive nature by the Council in its nomination process is unchanged, except that the EC dis not require unanimity in the nomination of Barroso, as he was elected by QMV under the Nice Treaty. Prodi was then the only who was nominated and approved under the Amsterdam Treaty procedures, which was the same as Santer, except the right for the EP to approve was formalised (Hix, Noury and Roland 2004:6).

The EP lobbied the EC in the 1984 "Draft European Union Treaty" to increase their influence of the selection in the nomination process of the Commission president, and hoped this would have a positive effect on the electoral turnout. In the subsequent Treaty on the European Union, it was confirmed that the EP should have a more influential role in the process. In the treaty it is stated that the EP shall be consulted before the MS appoint a new President of the CEC. The EP interpreted this to state that if the nominee was not supported by a simple majority in the EP, then the Council would find a new candidate. This interpretation was accepted by the Council though. As the President-in-office, Kinkel wrote to Hänsch, President of the EP, where he stated that the Council would find a new candidate, if the first candidate was rejected by the EP. In the following Amsterdam Treaty the article was changed, and said that the nomination shall be approved by the EP (Hix, 1997:2).

At the Corfu summit on the 24th-25th June 1994, the UK delegation vetoed the preferred candidate of Kohl and Mitterand, the Belgian Christian Democrat and Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaene, because he was too federalist. Following the rejection of the nominee, which all but John Major decided upon, there was called an emergency summit the 15th of July. Here the heads of government unanimously decided upon and persuaded Jacques Santer, the former president of the EPP and Prime Minister of Luxembourg, to be the next candidate for the Commission president (Hix 1997, Hix, Noury and Roland 2005).

The day before the vote by the European Parliament, Santer went to the two largest EPGs, PES and EPP. At the EPP meeting, his nomination was well received, as the members wanted "one of their own" to be president, after ten years of Delors. The president of the EPP went far in pressuring the members to support this nomination. The PES group was on the other hand far more sceptical to a candidate who they perceived as the lowest common denominator. Since the left side had won the majority of the EP, they would prefer to see a PES candidate, as this was what the European people voted for. They were also quite angry of the secretive process the EC had used in deciding upon Santer, as the new investiture procedures gave the EP more power (Hix 1997; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005).

Table 4.1: EPG positions on Santer the day before the vote of approval

		Seats			Seats
FOR Santer (Right)	European People's Party (EPP)	157	**AGAINST Santer (Centre, Left &Anti-EU)**	Party of European Socialists (PES)	198
	European Democratic Alliance (EDA)	26		European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)	43
	Forza Europe (FE)	27		European Unified Group (GUE)	28
	Europe of Nations Group (EN)	19		Group of the Greens (V)	23
				European Radical Alliance (ERA)	19
	non-attached members	14		other non-attached members	13
	Total	**243**		**Total**	**324**

Total MEPs 567

Source: Hix 1997:1 (of the appendix)

In the final vote however, Santer managed by a very small margin to win over the EP. The final results varies somewhat on this vote, but I will use Hix' result (1997:9), which shows that he was elected by 18 votes (262 votes against 244, and 22 abstentions and 39 absentees). If the all the MEPs had voted along the EPG lines, Santer would have lost, as there was a total of 56 MEPs that defected from the party line (IBID).

Table 4.2: The Winning Coalition: 'European Council Plus EP Right'

	For Santer	**Against Santer**	**Total**
European Council Plus EP Right	**245**	**3**	**248**
	48.4% *	0.6%	49.0%
Non-European Council Plus EP Left	**17**	**241**	**258**
	3.4%	47.6% *	51.0%
Total	**262**	**244**	**506**
	51.8%	48.2%	100.0%

Source Hix 1997:2 (of the appendix)
*Amount of Explained MEP Behaviour: 96% (significant at the .001 level)

As the nomination required unanimity in the EC, the socialist governments had already accepted the nomination of Santer, which led to the leadership of the national parties used the party whip, to ensure that the voters saw a uniform European policy. The head leader of the Spanish delegation said that the Spanish PES would abide the leadership of the party and support Santer. According to Hix, this probably also happened in the other governmental delegations of the PES group. In

addition to this, the Portuguese delegation supported Santer, but this was more due to a fear that a failure of appointing a president, would lead to a postponement of the EU enlargement of countries who would be net-contributors to the Cohesion fund (Hix 1997).

In the EP election in 1994, the "pro Santer" was the right side parties and including the right side non-attached members, the total number of MEPs were 243. The centre-left side was against Santer and, including the leftist non-attached, this side had 324 MEPs (see table 4.2). This concludes that it is very beneficial to have the MEPs of governmental parties on "your" side, as the winning coalition was the "European Council plus EP Right". This coalition structure explains 96% of MEP behaviour, which is is 7.1 % more than only a Left-Right dimension, and the Portuguese delegation account for much of the remaining 4 percent. (Hix 1997:9; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2005:251).

As the conservative Santer had to cooperate with a centre-left dominated EP, the leftist Prodi had to do the opposite and cooperate with a right side domination of the EP (Although Santer had a larger coalition than Prodi much due to a larger number of "governmental opposition MEPs"). This is largely due to the fact that the nominations in the EC had to be unanimously, and as a portion of the EP election is based on protest votes against the national government, the majority of the two institutions varied in both these terms (see Chapter 2.3). The Prodi Commission was far more a "divided government" (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005,251) along the lines of the "Co-habitation" in the French system, when the president and PM comes from different parties.

So far the only president elected by the procedures of the Nice Treaty, Barroso was not nominated unanimously by the EC. In addition there is also a centre-right majority in both the Commission and The EP, which results in a more "united government" (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005,262). The EPP-ED (268) and ALDE (88) alone held in the new parliament 356 seats of 732 (Daily Notebook 2009c). The new procedures are now concluding that all commission president votes are done by secret ballot (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 2005:169), which mean that the interesting votes on the Santer approval would have been impossible to asses. Barroso had though far more problems with approving the college of commissioners. Largely due to the proposed Italian Commissioner Buttiglione, who had extremely unpopular views on immigration, women's rights and homosexuality. As the EP could not reject one of the commissioners, the entire commission looked to be rejected. In contrary to the 1994, where the governmental parties were successful of lobbying

their MEPs to side with the Heads of Governments, the MEPs did not back down this time. This is an indicator that the transnational party groups managed to act cohesive, despite the pressure of national parties (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005:2-3; Jun 2005:16).

4.2 - The European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional and Development Fund (ERDF)

4.2.1 – General on the Funds

I have chosen to study the proposal for a regulation from the Commission on the general provisions of the structural funds (Commission 1998a), and more specifically in this proposal, I will focus on the proposals on the ESF and the ERDF. The literature on this proposal is mainly gathered from primary resources from the Commission and EP web pages and Official Journals L and C. If one consider the importance of a legislation by the amount of resources of the case, these two cases make up a considerable portion of the EU budget where the EP also have power of co-decision, which is why I ultimately chose these funds.

The main finding I did in this case, is that very little of the voting was done by RCV, two of 48 on the ESF and four of 37 on the ERDF (European Commission 1998b). This supports the theory of Reichert (2004), that the more important a legislation is to a country, the more power the EP has and the more revenues it can bring back to home, the more likely it is that the MEPs would defect and vote with the national party. This will often in turn lead to that the procedure be by electronic vote or some other form, in which individual votes are not registered (Hix 2001:667). Within the proposal from the Commission on structural funds, only two amendments on the ESF proposal was voted by RCV. The proposal on the European Regional and Development Fund only decided upon three amendments by RCV (European Commission 1998b:123). It was therefore not much more data to obtain in regard to the votes in these cases, but this supports the argument of biased RCV data base and the strategical RCV requests (Carruba and Gabel 1999).

4.2.2 – European Social Fund

The ESF is the oldest of the structural funds, and was set up the Treaty of Rome (Article 123). the fund's purpose is to help the citizens finding, keeping or regaining work. The ESF funds programmes intending to provide people with work-skills and adaptability in the job market etc. In order to prevent long-term unemployment, the ESF funds programmes that; 1) prepare the young for a working life, 2) help people adapt to a change in the workplace, to avoid unemployment, 3) intervene as early as possible for those who loose their job and 4) programmes that provide the long-term unemployed with a clear path back to work. The ESF is also working for equal access to employment, regardless of gender, disability or minorities (European Commission 1998a:10, 14).

Table 4.3: RCV on ESF proposal: (in parentheses the EPG that called RCV)

EPG	Amendment 35 (PES)			Amendment 47 (PES)		
	Yes	No	Abstain	Yes	No	Abstain
ERA	9	0	0	10	0	0
ELDR	32	0	0	31	1	0
EPP-ED	137	2	1	1	145	0
Green	14	0	4	18	0	0
EUL/NGL	18	0	1	20	0	0
I-EDN (EDD)	0	3	7	2	9	0
N-I	7	7	7	7	10	4
PES	164	0	0	167	0	0
UPE (UEN)	22	0	1	22	0	0
Total	403	12	21	278	165	4

Source: European Commission 1998b:322-324

4.2.3 – European Regional and Development Fund

The ERDF shall according to the EC regulation 1260/199 "(...)promote economic and social cohesion by correcting the main regional imbalances and participating in the development and conversion of regions" (European Commission 1999:2). More specifically the fund shall help to create and sustain employment overall. In Objective 1 regions the fund shall further invest in infrastructure in order to connect the region to central regions, when this can help development. This is particular acute in regions which are held back in their development due to a structural

obstacle, e.g. island or being in the periphery. In Objective 1 and 2 regions as well by community initiatives, the ERDF shall help develop declining economic and industrial sites and improve access, renew depressed urban areas and infrastructure in rural areas and areas that are dependent on fisheries. The fund shall also help the enterprises in these areas by assist in management, research and giving out loans (European Commission 1999).

Table 4.4: RCV on ERDF proposal. (in parentheses the EPG that called RCV)

EPG	Amendment 59 (EPP)			Amendment 61 (EPP)			Amendment 38 (EPP)			Draft Legislative Resolution (EPP)		
	Yes	No	Abs.	Yes	No	Abs.	Yes	No	Abs.	Yes	No	Abs.
ERA	8	0	0	1	7	0	0	8	0	8	0	0
ELDR	30	1	0	29	3	0	6	20	1	32	0	0
EPP-ED	108	36	0	59	88	0	100	39	2	131	2	17
Green	4	12	0	17	0	0	0	18	0	5	0	13
EUL/NGL	2	17	4	1	18	4	5	16	2	19	0	4
I-EDN (EDD)	0	2	11	0	10	3	3	10	0	2	7	4
N-I	6	11	0	4	12	0	2	16	0	9	8	2
PES	18	127	2	9	138	2	148	5	1	153	1	1
UPE (UEN)	0	20	0	0	21	0	0	20	0	24	0	0
Total	176	226	17	120	297	9	264	152	6	383	18	41

Source: European Commission 1998b:317-321

4.2.4 – Concluding Remarks on Funds

According to my calculations (see tables 4.4 and 4.5) on the RCV on the ESF and ERDF, there is very high cohesion on the two RCVs on the ESF. PES has perfect cohesion on both, and it was also PES that called these votes. On the ERDF there are more defections, and the cohesion drops in varying degree by most party groups. All four RCVs were called by EPP, and this is the party group with the lowest cohesion, and on two of them, the majority is the same as on the PES party group. This may have been a misjudgement of the EPP, and a failed attempt to discipline the MEPs. On the RCV on the Draft Legislative Resolution however, the cohesion increases significantly. This support the suggestion of Corbett, Shackleton and Jacobs (2005:168-169), that the more interesting votes may be on the amendments, and when time has come to the adopted text, the members may for example have agreed on a compromise and the final result of the RCV show a much higher voting cohesion.

Table 4.5: EPP-ED and PES MEPs defections by national delegations in the ERDF and ESF cases.

National Delegation	EPP-ED							PES				
	ERDF				ESF		TOTAL	ERDF				TOTAL
	Am. 59	Am. 61	Am. 38	RES.	Am. 35	Am. 47	MEPs	Am. 59	Am. 61	Am. 38	RES.	MEPs
Austria	0	6	1	6	0	0	**7**	3	*6*	*3*	1	**7**
Belgium	1	1	0	0	0	1	**6**	0	0	0	0	**5**
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	**1**	0	0	0	0	**3**
Finland	0	2	0	1	0	0	**5**	0	*3*	0	0	**3**
France	3	0	0	0	0	0	**15**	0	0	0	0	**22**
Germany	1	*35*	3	*10*	0	0	**53**	0	0	1	0	**33**
Greece	1	5	6	0	0	0	**9**	*6*	0	0	0	**9**
Ireland	2	0	0	0	0	0	**4**	1	0	0	0	**1**
Italy	1	3	2	0	1	0	**32**	*8*	0	0	0	**17**
Lux.	0	2	0	1	0	0	**2**	0	0	0	0	**2**
Neth.	0	3	0	1	0	0	**9**	0	0	0	0	**6**
Portugal	7	0	7	0	0	0	**9**	0	0	0	0	**12**
Spain	*20*	1	*21*	0	2	0	**29**	0	0	0	0	**24**
Sweden	0	1	1	0	0	0	**7**	2	2	1	1	**6**
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	**36**	0	0	1	0	**30**
Total	**36**	**59**	**41**	**19**	**3**	**1**	**224**	**20**	**11**	**6**	**2**	**180**

Source: own calculations based on European Commission (1998b), European Parliament 1999; 2009a

This table shows that in EPP-ED, Germany accounts for the majority of the defections on the vote on amendment 61 and on the resolution as a whole. The Spanish delegation accounts for the majority of the votes on amendments 59 and 38. The PES party group votes far more cohesively on both the regulations and on the vote on ESF they vote unanimously (which is why these votes are not included in this table). The largest defections by the PES members are the Greek and Italian delegation on the vote on amendment 59, and the Austrian delegations has a relatively low cohesion in both the EPGs. It is important to note that defections are calculated on what the majority voted and the result is the two other options the MEP could vote for. The total amount of MEPs are also referring to how many are represented in the EP, and not how many that actually was present. This is important to make a note of, as there can be many absent and also many present, but without voting (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006).

4.3 - The Services Directive

In the EC summit in Lisbon March 2000, it was decided that the EU should be the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world. The EC therefore wanted the Commission to set out a proposal to remove the barriers of services. This is an industry which counts for approximately 66% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 75% of all the jobs, this was a massive reform. It took the Commission nearly four years of consultation before the proposal for the Services Directive was forwarded to the EP and the Council in February 2004. The directive was based on the article 55 and 47.2 of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC), this was to be decided by the co-decision procedure (Lindberg 2008a:1185,1189).

This is clearly a highly politicised directive, and therefore one would expect much debate over the compromise, which also was the case. In the first reading of the proposal there were tabled approximately 500 amendments, in which 81 votes, regarding over 100 amendments, was decided by RCV. This also included the final vote on the amended proposal. The final proposal after the first reading was a compromise by the two largest EPGs, PES and EPP-ED (Lindberg, 2008a,1196).

The compromised proposal was not agreeable for all the national delegations though. In PES, the French and Belgian delegations voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, with one in favour, 29 against and one abstention and one in favour and six against, respectively in the two delegations. They turned down the proposal because they felt the directive went too far in scope. The Greek delegation neither seemed pleased with the directive, as all their MEPs abstained in the vote.

Table 4.6: Voting record of the national delegation of the PES group in the final vote oft the first reading of the services directive

	National Delegations	For	Against	Abstain	Voting Cohesion
West European Delegations	Austria	7	0	0	100
	Belgium	*1*	*6*	*0*	*86*
	Denmark	4	0	0	100
	Finland	3	0	0	100
	France	*1*	*29*	*1*	*94*
	Germany	22	0	0	100
	Great Britain	16	0	0	100
	Greece	*0*	*0*	*8*	*100*
	Ireland	1	0	0	–
	Italy	10	0	0	100
	Luxembourg	1	0	0	–
	Malta	3	0	0	100
	Netherlands	7	0	0	100
	Portugal	11	0	0	100
	Sweden	5	0	0	100
	Spain	17	0	0	100
East European Delegations	Czech Republic	2	0	0	100
	Estonia	3	0	0	100
	Hungary	5	0	0	100
	Lithuania	2	0	0	100
	Poland	10	0	0	100
	Slovakia	3	0	0	100
	Slovenia	1	0	0	–

Source: Lindberg 2008a, based on roll-call data on the first reading of the services directive received from the European Parliament.

In the EPP-ED case there was a more East-West dimension in the voting pattern, as many of the CEEC representatives voted against or abstained in the voting. Slovenia which have the strongest economy supported the proposal, as well as the one MEP from Estonia and a majority of the Slovakian MEPs (five in favour, two against) (Lindberg 2008a). Why the latter MEPs supported the proposal, I do not know. One possibility is the peculiar cleavages in Slovak politics. Although the Mečiar VS anti-Mečiar cleavage eventually has eroded to a large degree, the state-church cleavage is for one still very apparent (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008). This may cause the three Slovak parties in EPP-ED to stray from the average policy line in the party group, and ultimately be the reason for

this defection.

Table 4.7: Voting record of the national delegation of the EPP-ED group in the final vote of the first reading of the services directive

	National Delegation	For	Against	Abstain	Voting Cohesion
West European delegations	Austria	6	0	0	100
	Belgium	6	0	0	100
	Cyprus	3	0	0	100
	Denmark	1	0	0	100
	Finland	3	0	0	100
	France	15	0	0	100
	Germany	45	1	0	98
	Great Britain	19	0	2	90
	Greece	11	0	0	100
	Ireland	5	0	0	100
	Italy	14	0	0	100
	Luxembourg	3	0	0	100
	Malta	2	0	0	100
	Netherlands	7	0	0	100
	Portugal	7	0	0	100
	Spain	21	1	0	95
	Sweden	5	0	0	100
East European Delegations	Czech Republic	2	0	12	86
	Estonia	1	0	0	–
	Hungary	0	12	0	100
	Latvia	0	3	0	100
	Lithuania	0	1	0	–
	Poland	1	12	2	80
	Slovakia	5	2	0	71
	Slovenia	*4*	*0*	*0*	*100*

Source: Lindberg 2008a, based on roll-call data on the first reading of the services directive received from the European Parliament.

4.4 – Concluding Remarks

With this chapter I have summarised all the important aspects of the cases I have chosen to study in this analysis of MEP voting behaviour and cohesion. The cases were chosen in a manner to ensure that I would have a somewhat long timespan and inclusion of the three latest parliaments to date, which are also, so far, those where the co-decision power predominantly has been used.

The empirical facts that can be drawn from these cases is that there might be large defections in the EPG on policy areas such as both regulations, directives and investiture processes. Unfortunately one cannot study defections in the investiture processes or other nomination processes, as these now are by secret ballot (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 2005:169). As further studies of the investiture processes were impossible, I chose to study the ESF and ERDF from the fourth parliament and the Services directive from the fifth parliament.

5 – Analysis

In the beginning there was direct democracy, but as the constituencies grew there was a need for change. Despite sceptics of this representation (E.g. Rousseau), representative democracies started to appear. There are several debates on whether the EU should obtain legitimacy through the principals of traditional representative democracy or that it should function like other intergovernmental organisations like NATO. Andrew Moravcsik is one of the foremost advocates of the latter. Others argue that as EU evolves to become more political and partisan politics, the EU system needs to be democratised in order to be legitimised (Hix 2008; Zürn 2006). This can be done by e.g. an independent and directly elected parliament, with actual power.

As there now are a directly elected parliament, with actual power, I would argue that there is some legitimacy through representation in the EU. The complete debate on the degree of legitimacy I will leave to another time, but I will focus on the independence of the EP as one expression of legitimacy. If the EP are not free in making their own decisions, the legitimacy is again threatened. From the work of Pitkin (in Blomgren 2003), I will define the MEPs as accountable representatives, which means that they are accountable to the constituencies. When considering the MEP survey of 2006 by Farrell et al.(2006:24), the MEP considered the people of their constituency as the most important group to be represented, the people of its member state came second, while the people voting for their party came third.

5.1 – Literature Review

The study on the European Parliament accelerated along with its increased power. And the idea that political parties should be devoted attention and considered central actors in the EU politics, has gained territory the last decade (Hix 2008:1254).

As the EU becomes increasingly more politicised and many argues that this coincide poorly with the decision making processes. The EU needs to be democratised in order to gain legitimacy (Zürn 2006). Noury and Roland (2002) believes that the best way to do this is to further increase the power of the EP and introduce RCV as the standard voting procedure. They argue that due to the vast content of the RCV so far, provides strong indications that the voting pattern in the EP would

also persist if the use of co-decision were to be extended. On the other side, Majone would disagree that the increasing politicisation is desirable as this might affect the credibility of the regulatory policies (Majone 2000; 2002).

Kreppel (in Lindberg 2008b) argues that the change in the legislative powers of the EP have affected the voting cohesion. With both the Single European Act of 1986 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, the EP has gained co-decision powers with the Council. Lindberg argues further that the data provided by Hix, Roland and Noury supports this theory, as the voting cohesion since the first directly elected EP in 1979 has increased by 8 % (Lindberg 2008b:27). I would argue that one has to be careful when one argues that cohesion and increased power has a direct link, when the cohesion is based upon the biased data that the RCV provides and mainly on proposals where the EP has little power.

The most surprising factor which does not seem to have any influence on the cohesion is the increased ideological heterogeneity in the party groups. The result from Hix' (2002:692) and Hix and Gabel (2007:) analysis of the ideological self-placement test, the respondents from PES and EPP show that there are MEPs in both party groups that are closer to the median of the other. The results of the ideological position were then compared with the results of RCV . By doing this, they showed that despite the heterogeneity in the party groups, there was still high cohesion and the votes of the two groups were highly distinctive. The conclusion one can draw from this is that the EPG manages to apply strong pressure on their MEPs and achieves high voting discipline and the outliers of the two EPG most likely vote against their policy preferences (Hix and Gabel 2007:15). Since this cohesion is yet again based on the use of RCV, I would argue on the basis of arguments by among others Carruba et al. (1999), that this only shows that there is high voting cohesion on the particular votes where RCV is frequently used.

The paper by Gabel and Hix (2007:26) establishes that there are fairly high heterogeneity in the EPG and despite this there is a high voting cohesion (at least in cases where RCV is frequently called), this cannot all be explained by party group cohesion. It is important to distinguish between party group cohesion and party group discipline. In cases where there are high cohesion of votes, most likely then there was some form of party group discipline, which is supported by the MEP survey by Farrell et al. (2006:20), which demonstrates the frequently use of voting instructions to the MEP compared to the other actors. As long the ideal points of the party group leader and the

MEPs, it is impossible to know how much of the cohesion is due to the disciplinary actions and how much is due to the coinciding preferences (Carruba and Gabel 1999:25).

The fact that partisan politics within the EP have increased over the last decade, would indicate that there also would be an increase of voting cohesion within the party groups over the national delegations. However, as I argued in chapter 2, there are many factors of cohesion that play a significantly larger role in the EP, than for the parliamentarians in the member states, with the strongest one being the cross-pressure from the EPGs and the national parties and effect of threat of sanctions from both sides.

5.2 – Two Principals and an Agent

The dependent variable in this thesis is voting cohesion and I will try to apply the Principal-Agent theory in order to demonstrate how the cross-pressure from the two principal results in cohesion amongst either the EPG or the national delegation. As I discussed in chapter 2, this is determined by several factors. The party group leaderships and the national parties have different means in order to obtain voting discipline and the MEPs have different preferences regarding their political roles, e.g. a MEP in the PGL is more likely to vote cohesively than one who waits to go back to national politics, but this has been discussed in chapter 2, so I will not repeat more of this here.

The Principal-Agent theory is based on that the the Agent does what the Principal wants and as there are two Principals the MEP has to relate to, the important aspect here is to determine which of the two Principals are the dominant or ultimate. The dominant view on this is that generally the EPGs are regarded as the ultimate principal, unless the party is in governmental position at home, in which there is chance for defections, and even higher possibilities if the proposal was approved in the Council unanimously and the party in this sense already posted its position. Noury and Roland argues in their article “More Power to the European Parliament” (2002) that the voting cohesion is very high in what is available in the collection of RCV by Hix, Noury and Roland. They strongly suggests that the EPG is the ultimate Principal and that the leadership is able to achieve high levels of cohesion. They argue further that this voting pattern can be believed to be accurate also in other areas of voting in the EP.

Carruba and Gabel see this differently (in Scully 2001:6) "The more influence the EP has over the final bill, the more likely a national party is to care about how its MEPs vote". This suggests that the ultimate Principal is not set, but varies accordingly to other factors. Since there are several procedures of passing legislation and resolutions in the EU, it seems that there is a correlation between requests of RCV and type of procedure and type of proposal. Carruba and others (1999:700) studied the difference in frequency of RCV requests and type of motion from one year of the fifth parliament. They showed that of the 2,232 motions for legislation, there were only 7 percent of these which were determined by RCV. Of these 7 percent, only 41 percent were by the co-decision procedure. In total this means that of 2,405 votes on legislation, only 69 of these votes were by co-decision and recorded by RCV. I believe that this shows that one should be very careful if one wants to generalise from the high level of cohesion of votes on resolutions and votes done by consultation, assent etc. to the overall voting pattern of the MEPs.

The key issue is, as mentioned, to find the "ultimate Principal", and there are numerous factors that influences this. The factors are being discussed in the following sub-chapters, and I will focus on the governmental parties in this section. In cases of national interest and the national party is part of the government, there may be a shift of principal. The pressure of the national party increases if the decision in the Council was taken by unanimity, since a divergent position on the vote would indicate a divided view on European policy (Hix 1997; Scully:2001).

How the national party sanctions the disloyal MEPs, if any, may be assessed when looking on the ballot for the following election. If one only look at the re-election, one might miss the possibility that the party declines in the election. In order to see if the EPGs have sanctioned the disloyal MEPs, one can compare the number of rapporteur assignments and committee chair before and after such an act. It can however be difficult to be certain on this, as the EPG only assign a rapporteur to a national delegation, and actually has very little influence over who is eventually given this. The committee chairs are only assigned once each term, so if this sanctioning will be used, it would probably be as a result of continued defections over the entire term.

Defections of the PES members in 1994 are the main reason for why Santer was elected president. This argument is based on the fact that 56 MEPs defected from their party group position and Santer was elected by 18 votes. And if all MEPs had voted according to the EPG position, he would have lost by 81 votes. As Hix demonstrates that the "right plus governmental coalition" explains 96% of the MEP voting behaviour, and much of the remaining was the Portuguese PES MEP (Hix

1997).

The Portuguese delegation in the Santer investiture defected as previously mentioned due to the fear that without a new Commission President, the enlargement would be postponed and EU would miss large donations to the Structural Funds, which Portugal was a net beneficiary of (Hix 1997), and this case must be looked at isolated.

The EPG party discipline was demonstrated by the EPP-ED president, which threatened to expel those who did not vote in favour of Santer. Although Santer was the former president of the EPP, he was still considered as a weak president, and the lowest common denominator, whom even UK could accept. Most of the EPP MEPs was satisfied by the fact that they would have a centre-right president, so the threat by the party group leadership probably was unnecessary (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005).

The outgoing president Barroso is so far the only one who was not the leader of a "divided government", as both Santer and Barroso was. He is also the only one elected by the Nice Treaty rules of procedure, which has the implication that the need for unanimity in the Council has been eliminated and the vote of approval by the EP is done by secret ballot (Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton 2005). As unanimity is no longer required in the Council, the pressure from the governmental parties would most likely decrease (Jun 2005:16), as they no longer necessarily has given their approval on a candidate from an opposing party. The fact that the vote is done by a secret ballot also gives the MEPs more freedom on the vote.

In the PES group, there were three delegations that defected in the vote on the Services directive, this indicate that the national party leaderships do have substantial power of sanctions in these parties, related to de-selection. The Greek delegation did not vote against, but merely abstained, this may indicate that the cross-pressure is of a different character here, than in the other cases. I would assume that the more divergent the policy line between the EPG and national party is, the more pressure they would put on their MEPs. This may indicate that the Greek did not put as much pressure on their MEPs, as in the French and Belgian case or there is a ideological particular trait in this region. There should then be some signs in the rest of Benelux, but if it is an agrarian cleavage, this is not necessary.

Turning to the EPP-ED case, there is as mentioned a cleavage between the eastern and western

countries. In this case the ideological divergence seem more plausible, as they all border to one or more of the other. The defections may be a result of different cleavages in these post-communist countries. as mentioned in the Slovakian case where the main cleavage for a considerable time was due to their Prime Minister, to mention one peculiar cleavage of one of the countries (Hloušek and Kopeček 2008).

In cases where the entire national delegation defect from the party group position, this may be due to either that the national parties achieves high voting discipline through threat of sanctions or that the politicians in the country may all have divergent ideology than the rest of the EPG. As Carruba and Gabel (1999) explains regarding the uncertainty of what is the result of party group leadership discipline and what is due to common preferences in the EPG. Rasmussen (2008) gives examples of the latter in the interviews of Danish MEPs, where they say that in e.g. environmental issues, they tend to defect from the EPG position. To return to the Services directive, the entire Greek delegation in PES defected on the voting on the Services directive, which could indicate that both the MEPs and the national party had a divergent ideological preference from the EPG. The same can be said about the Hungarian delegation in EPP-ED.

5.3 – Type of Legislations

Reichert (2004) argue that directives are less controversial, and that one can expect higher EPG cohesion in these cases. And when the proposal is regarding distributive policy, there would be higher cohesion within the national delegations. This is largely due to that all politicians wants to bring home as much resources as possible. This could often mean divergent preferences of the EPG, and the national party (and the MEP), and may be done as the more he or she manages to bring back home, the more this strengthen the chances for re-election. This would suggest that the policy line between the MEP and the national party is fairly similar, and the defection may not be due to a threat from the national party (Reichert 2004).

The Services directive was far from uncontroversial, and this is also reflected in the voting cohesion. In both PES and EPP-ED the voting cohesion was nearly 15% lower in the voting on the Services directive, than in the overall voting cohesion in the fifth parliamentarian term (Lindberg 2008a:1196). Based on this case, the prediction of high EPG cohesion on regulatory legislation is

not accurate and nor support the theory of Reichert.

The results on the regulations included in this paper are more ambiguous, as the votes on ESF are highly cohesive (see table 4.4). Both the RCVs were called by PES, which had no defections. EPP-ED as the second largest group had three and one defections on the two votes. This is may be due to that the nature of the amendments were not beneficial of any one particular member state, but in depth analysis on the importance of amendments is not something that the scope of this paper allows. From the table 4.4, one can by counting the votes which were opposite to the majority in the EPGs, see that there were 12 defections in the first amendment and four defections on the second (not including the independent votes). This is by no standards low cohesion, and thus this case neither supports Reichert theory, and may be the result of uncontroversial amendments.

There were however far more defections on the votes on the ERDF regulation (see table 4.5). The RCVs were in this cased called by EPP-ED, and they were also defeated in one amendment. This may be on purpose, if they only wanted to demonstrate their support of one amendment. The fact that they called an RCV on amendment 61 is more puzzling, as there were almost none cohesion amongst the MEPs, with 59 in favour and 88 opposing. Regardless of the motives of EPP-ED, this case demonstrates that the national parties seem to have strong disciplinary means, and as the only legislative case, this supports the theory of Reichert.

The reason for larger defections in the ERDF over the ESF, may be caused that the revenues from ERDF are larger. According to EP website (European Parliament 2009a) the total of 75 billion € will be distributed to the MS between 2007-2013, while the website of East of England Development Agency (EEDA 2008), states that the ERDF programmes distributes a total of 308 billion €. Following the arguments by Reichert (2004), the probability for defections from the EPG line is higher when one can bring something "back home". Although he argues that this is valid for all distributive legislation, I would assume that the higher the revenues, the higher chances there are for defections, which these two cases indicates. The other possible explanation is that the votes on the ERDF may have been far more controversial, than the ones on the ESF.

One of the most striking features of both these two regulations, is the few cases of votes by RCV. This further strengthen the argument of scholars like Carruba and Gabel, that voting cohesion does not explain voting cohesion of all votes in the EP, as they are to a large degree absent in cases of co-

decision on legislative votes. Despite how many RCV and MEPs that are represented in the database of Hix, Noury and Roland, as long as these are not representative for all types of votes, the claim for generalisation should be done with caution.

In conclusion there seem to be some connection between the nature of the policy, but a more suitable variable might be the level of national attention on the bill. This is though harder to measure, but one indicator is the level of influence the EP holds over the final bill, determines the level of attention, which is suggested by Carruba and Gabel (in Scully 2001:6).

5.4 – Electoral System

Even though all the MS now have PR elections, this does not mean that the electoral processes are uniform. Two factors of major importance in this sense is the selection process and the openness of the ballot. The selection processes are in all countries decided at party level and it is too large of a task in this context to go into details on this on every party in every country. The general rule is however that the more decentralised the constitutional settings, the more decentralised selection process (Braghiroli 2007). This means that party leaderships in Denmark would have more influence over the selection process than in Germany and Belgium. Since however the rules of selection processes are decided by the party itself and constitutional settings only give an indication of the process, this variable must be regarded as fairly weak. This would however indicate that it is more likely for a Danish MEP to defect, due to higher de-selection power by the national party, than a German, where the national party leadership might have less power of the selection process.

The second factor is easier to asses, since this only include one element for each country. In countries where the ballot is closed, there is no room for a candidate to promote individual attributes, as the voters have no means to influence his or her place on the party list. By these procedures, there is only a battle between party list. In the ordered lists, there are possibilities for the voters to alter the positions of the candidates, but this require a large portion of personal votes, and the high threshold is hard to overcome in order to alter the positions on the ballot. In open ballot structures there is possibilities for the voters to vote for individual candidates, which weaken the national party's sanctioning powers (Braghiroli 2007; Hix and Hagemann 2009).

This leads to the following prediction: Decentralised constitutional settings leads to higher EPG voting cohesion.

If the determining factor for defections within the national delegation is the openness of the ballot, then we would expect to see the majority of defections from the national position in column C, where the ballots are open, and to a lesser extent in column B, where there are ordered ballots. And finally very few defections from column A, with closed ballots.

The second prediction is that the more open ballot structure, the higher EPG voting cohesion.

Figure 5.1 Electoral systems used in the 2004 EP election.

		Ballot structure		
		Closed	**Ordered**	**Open**
District size	**Average District Size <10**	France (9.8)* UK-Britain (6.8) Poland (4.2) **Total MEPs = 207**	Latvia (9)* Belgium (8) Slovenia (7)* Cyprus (6)* **Total MEPs = 46**	Estonia (6)* Luxembourg (6)* Malta (5)** * Ireland (3.3)** UK-N. Ireland (3)* **Total MEPs = 33**
	Average District Size >10 & <20		Sweden (19)* Austria (18)* Bulgaria (18)* Slovakia (14)* **Total MEPs = 69**	Italy (15.6) Denmark (14)* Finland (14)* Lithuania (13)* **Total MEPs = 119**
	Average District Size >20	Germany (99)* Spain (54)* Romania (35)* Greece (24)* Hungary (24)* Portugal (24)* **Total MEPs = 260**	Netherlands (27)* Czech Republic (24)* **Total MEPs = 51**	

Source Hix and Hagemann 2009:19

Notes: The average number of MEPs from each district is in parentheses.
For Italy, although MEPs are presented in regional districts, seats are allocated on the basis of national vote shares (Hix and Hagemann 2009:19).
* Member state with countrywide single electoral constituency (Braghiroli 2007:11).
** Ireland and Malta uses STV, the other PR (Braghiroli 2007:11).

In the case of the investiture of Santer, the Spanish PES delegation voted in favour of him, despite their EPG's position to vote against Santer. As Spain is quite federal with the Catalan and Basque regions for one, one could assume that they would use a decentralised method of selecting the candidates for the elections. But Spain also use a closed list for the EP elections (Braghiroli 2007), which may indicate that this factor is decisive in this case. Spain is the only case where one can be sure that the MEP voted against the EPG line. As Hix further claim, "We can reasonably assume that this was repeated for all parties who had been in the European Council" (Hix 1997:9). In Denmark and Greece, there were also Left side governments, both countries are unitary, but only Greece has a closed list (Braghiroli 2007). Without certainty on the Danish and Greek votes, this variable cannot be fully explored in this case.

On the votes on the two regulations in this paper, The numbers of defections by the national delegations in EPP-ED and PES are available in table 4.6. It seems as there were only the Luxembourg delegation that entirely defected in the EPP-ED group and the Finnish delegation in PES. As the amount of absentees and MEPs present without voting is not included in the data, I cannot be certain of that these are the only two cases. The fact remains however that a substantial amount of MEPs defected in these delegations. This is contradicting the prediction that there would be higher EPG cohesion in delegations that use open ballot structure, as both these countries use open ballots.

The Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian delegations of EPP-ED and the PES Austrian and Greek delegations there were major defections in one or more of the votes on the regulations. Apart from Austria, the other countries use a closed list and are unitary, which strengthen the . Austria is more federal which suggests that the central party is weaker in the selection process and the system is by ordered ballot. Both these factor would increase the probability that the MEPs would vote accordingly to the EPG. As mentioned, the number of personal votes required to alter the list is substantial, which means that in practical terms, the sanctioning power of the national party might be similar to the ones with closed lists. And the connection between a federal state and the selection process is weak, this does not then necessarily weaken the prediction significantly.

The detailed results on the Services Directive is available by Lindberg (2008a) and of the national delegations that defected from PES, there is defections from France, Greece and Belgium. As both

France and Greece are unitary states with a closed ballot structure, major defections are not surprising. What is more surprising then is that there were two French MEPs that defected from the national position. According to the EP (European Parliament 2008), there was only one French party in the PES group, so divergent party position is ruled out. The Greek delegation abstained in the vote, and as mentioned by Rasmussen (2008), this is often a result of cross-pressure. The pressure may have felt substantial as Greece is a perfect description of a country where the party leadership holds the most sanctioning power over the MEPs in regard to the electoral system. The Belgian delegation also defected, but this is a federation and they use the ordered ballot. These two factors should indicate that the MEP would be more free to act independently and not fear as much pressure from their national delegation, but rather take notice of the pressure from the PGL. One could argue that electoral system seem to explain more of the defecting Belgian MEP, than in the French case, but this does not indicate any strong correlation.

In the EPP-ED group on the same vote, there was as noted an East-West dimension, where the CEE member states seem to be more negative towards the directive. Of the total defections in the group, only the Hungarian delegation defected in its entirety. This is according to predictions, as Hungary uses a closed ballot. What this variable cannot explain though is the defections in Germany, Great Britain, Poland and Spain, which all have closed lists, and to a lesser extent Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have ordered lists.

In conclusion there does not seem to be any strong indications for this being a decisive factor in the cases included here. The defections which are fully supporting this variable is the Spanish defection in the Santer investiture, the Hungarian EPP-ED delegation and the Greek PES delegation in the Services directive. A number of other defections can to a certain degree be explained here, while the Finnish PES and Luxembourg EPP-ED delegations defections on the regulations, clearly contradict the predictions.

5.5 – Political Roles

According to Searing, there are different political roles one can have at all levels, and also in the EP. As Braghiroli (2007) points out, the are mainly two types of MEPs, one who wants to pursue a career at the EU level and others who wants to move "back home". This can be discovered by looking at turnover of the MEPs, but this method would be immensely time consuming, if one was to look at all the MEPs vote and take into consideration each MEP that did not finish the term. This is then a variable that most likely does explain some of the fragmented MEP voting behaviour, but is impossible to conclude with with the data available.

In cases where there are only one or a few defections, this may be a result that these have different preferences regarding their career than the majority. If the majority votes along with the EPG, it may be an expression that most of them wants a EU career. On the other hand, if the majority votes with the national party, it may be a sign on that most of them prefers a career at home. It is however difficult to objectively rate the different positions a politician can obtain, as this is obviously highly individual. The last example seems to be the most frequent one. In general the executive offices are more preferable than legislative office, due to the agenda setting powers. It also seems to be more desirable to hold positions in the national level office, when one compares similar offices from the EU level to the national level. This may however not be the case in smaller countries. (Hix 2008:1260).

On the vote on the ESF and the ERDF (see table 4.6), there were many cases of defections, but rarely did the entire national delegation defect from the EPG position. The only cases were the Luxembourg EPP-ED delegation on the ERDF amendment 59 and the Finnish PES delegation on amendment 61. There were however other delegations, where a large majority defected, and the remainders could have been absentees. Of the data that is available, there seems to be that the role definition might have been a strong factor in this vote.

In the Services directive there were three PES MEPs in the French and Belgian delegations that did not follow the rest of the delegation in the vote on the Services directive, this may be politicians that prefers an EU career over a national. Also in the EPP-ED group there were defections from the EPG position, but these were more fragmented, and they were all in the CEE member state. This may be

due to the different preferences regarding career opportunities.

5.6 – Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have tried to account for the defections in the EP. There are two reasons for why I am not able to conclude on all the cases. 1) I have chosen the variables which based upon the previous research seem to explain much, but most likely not everything. 2) Some of the variables are of practical reasons impossible to obtain all the necessary data, e.g. the individual preference on career and political role, the different selection systems within the national parties and the ideal positions on votes by the EPG, national party and the MEPs. What was possible to do however was to use the existing literature and variables to see if these might explain more of the total picture of MEP voting behaviour, than only the effect of the PGL disciplinary powers, which seem to be the predominantly focus area of the study on voting cohesion.

The social-democratic governmental parties in the Santer investiture obtained high national voting cohesion, divergent to the position of the PES (Hix 1997). The Finnish and Luxembourg delegations in PES and EPP-ED, respectively, also managed this in the two different votes on Regulation (table 4.5). In the Services directive, the PES Belgian, French and Greek also obtained nearly perfect cohesion (table 4.6). In the EPP-ED (table 4.7), this was done in Hungary and Latvia, and to a lesser extent Czech Republic (Lindberg 2008a). These results strongly suggest that the national party has been seen as the ultimate principal or a national divergent ideological preferences. Unfortunately one cannot be certain on which factor was the dominant one, as the positions of the different actors on the legislations, are unknown, except for on the vote on Santer, where the leader of the PES Spanish delegation announced this position on instructions from Madrid (Hix 1997:9).

Reichert (2004) claims that the *Type of proposal* is an important factor when considering the cohesion. If the legislation is on a regulatory policy, there is likely to be higher cohesion, than if the policy is more distributive. His research (2001) has supported this argument. In the regulative legislation in this thesis the cohesion was far from high, and in PES and EPP the cohesion was even 15 % lower than the average cohesion (Lindberg 2008a:1197). The vote on ESF revealed a very

high cohesion, which also contradict Reichert's argument. Finally the vote on the ERDF showed low level of cohesion, which supports the theory. As the results in this paper is so ambiguous, the key factor is perhaps more that the level of attention on the national arena the bill receives. The attention is often correlated with amount of influence the EP has on the final bill. Of the cases that Reichert studied, the procedure may have more often been by consultation or assent, which is likely if he used RCV to study this. The fact that the cohesion was so different on the two distributive legislations I included, may be the result of the few RCV was less controversial on the ESF, or that the funding were far greater in the ERDF (EEDA 2008) than in ESF (European Parliament 2009b)

There are also different consequences for the MEP to defect from the national position due to the difference in *electoral systems*. In eight member states plus Northern Ireland, there are open ballots to the elections for the EP. In these countries there are higher possibilities that a poor position on the ballot can be reversed by personal votes. This is to a lesser extent also true in states with ordered structure, but the threshold is usually very high. The results showed that although there were cases that were completely correlating with the predicted outcome, there were others again that did the opposite. Of the majority of the cases however, there was not possible to conclude with neither a particular good fit, nor a particular bad fit.

In the cases of fragmented defections, this may be due to *political roles and preferences* of where the MEP wants to pursue his or her career. The MEP may define its role as socialised in the EU setting or to be a national representative, wanting to pursue a national career. This factor may explain defections, when one or a few MEPs defect from the dominant national position. In order to be certain on the career preference one would probably need to analyse all the votes by all the MEPs that did not finish the term, and compare this to the national and EPG position. This is beginning to be possible with the data provided by www.votewatch.eu, but this database only goes back to 2004, and since three of the cases in this paper pre-dates this, I was not able to fully take advantage of this.

6 – Conclusion

The papers by Hix (2002) and Gabel and Hix, they show that by surveys on MEPs, there are clear overlaps on the Left-Right dimension by the EPP and PES members. As these are both transnational party groups, this is not particular strange, as the different party traditions are many.

This heterogeneity in the EPG should by logical sense manifest itself by low voting cohesion in the groups. This is however not the case, argue amongst other Noury and Roland (2002) and Gabel and Hix (2007). The reason for this high cohesion as they point to may be in the frequently voting instructions issued by the PGL (Farrell et al. 2006)

The conclusion one can draw then is that the EPG holds great power of sanctions, if the MEP does not stay loyal. I have separated four factors that might influence the power relations between the two principals. These are the Governmental Status of the national party, Electoral system, Type of Legislation and Political Role and Preferences. All these variables have been thoroughly debated throughout the paper, so I will not repeat them here.

I can however conclude with the findings from these variables. The governmental status seem to have a major impact on the vote on Santer, but the data in this case is limited, and the conclusion will have to rely on Hix' word (1997:9), that the Spanish delegation received voting instructions from Madrid, and they followed them. This means that the Spanish PES members disregarded the instructions from their EPG, which is according to the arguments by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005220; Jun 2005:16). This contradicts however the arguments by Noury and Roland (2002), arguing that the governmental status had no effect. In the other cases in this paper, the national party position is not known, and therefore the analysis cannot be completed.

The Electoral System suggests that in MS with more closed ballots and a centralised selection procedure, the national party seem to have stronger sanctioning powers, which would lead to defections from the EPG position in cases of divergence. In the cases where the data on the MEP showed the party affiliation by nationality, the results did not provide any conclusions on this

variable alone. There were national delegations that did support the theory, but there were just as many that did the opposite.

The third variable was regarding the policy area of the proposal. I chose to study the votes on ESF, ERDF and the Services directive. According to Reichert (2001; 2004), one could expect to see lower EPG cohesion in regulatory proposals, than on distributive proposal. The vote on the ESF is the first that contradicts this theory, as there were near perfect cohesion in both the votes. On the ERDF, there were voting accordingly to the theory, and there were defections in almost all the EPGs on all votes. The difference between these two cases may be the result of the nature of the votes, as the amendments on the ERDF were more controversial than on the ESF. Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (2005) are arguing that it takes great knowledge on the subject to know which of the votes that are important. In these cases there were very few, which made the selection easy. The few cases of votes makes it very difficult to draw conclusions on this basis, but it supports the arguments by Carruba and Gabel (1999), on the biased nature of the RCV.

To collect and interpret all the preferences and status on the MEPs would require far more time and resources that this thesis does. I included this variable on the account of the high degree of fragmentation of the defections. With new databases appearing, e.g. www.VoteWatch.eu would make it possible for future research to fully explore this variable. The mentioned database only include the present parliament, which is barely used in this paper.

As none of my variables are able to explain more than by use of RCV, I could argue that neither approaches are good to explain voting behaviour. If a study by RCV, I believe that the use of RCV must be used as frequently as it does in e.g. the USA. By applying RCV on all the votes and introducing the co-decision procedure as the normal decision making process, as Noury and Roland (2002) want, would after my view lead to a significant drop in EPG cohesion, as there would be more votes on country specific areas where the EP previously did not have decisive powers.

Hix and Hagemann (2009) suggests a shift in the electoral processes in order to make the EP elections more genuinely "European". Some of the suggestions are the ones I have discussed in this paper, and is basically removing the influence of the national party, by introducing smaller electoral districts, more open ballots and trying to steer the electoral issues to be of a European character, rather than the traditional "t(..)vote for Europe, but think nationally." (Braghiroli 2007:9).

If the increased use of co-decision and RCV is introduced, as Noury and Roland (2002) are suggesting, I believe that there would be a more accurate result of the MEP voting cohesion. If also the suggestions of Hix and Hagemann (2009) are successful, I also believe that the cohesion in the EPG may not decline, too much.

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