Reassessment of International Executive Institutions

The Case of the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat

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Masteroppgave i økonomi og administrasjon

Høgskolen i Agder

Fakultet for økonomi og administrasjon

2006

Table of contents

Figures and tables

Abstract

This master thesis focuses on the dynamics within the International Executives (IEs) of International Governmental Organizations: the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). This master thesis has its intention to examine the ways these IEs challenge the principle of sovereignty, why they do go beyond the existing heritage of Westphalia. Dependent and independent variables will be defined in order to examine this matter. The dependent variable is decision-making dynamics that are evoked by civil servants of these IEs. There are four different types of decision-making dynamics: intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic. These dynamics are assumed to be influenced by a number of factors that will be applied in the analytical part of the master thesis. These are organizational properties (H1), recruiting procedures (H2), organizational affiliations (H3), organizational demography (H4) and organizational network (H5). The purpose is to show that the different characteristics of these variables in each case give different combinations of behavioral dynamics within the IEs. In spite of the different characteristics of the chosen IEs similarities of behavior dynamics within the institutions are to be found.

This master thesis shows that IEs are complex structures with the mixture of the decision-making dynamics where the autonomous dynamics, supranational, departmental and epistemic, are more salient than the intergovernmental ones. It also illustrates that the organizational factors play a very important role in understanding the decision-making dynamics within institutions as IEs.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Nowadays we are "moving into an era of "network governance," in which goals are accomplished by the joint effort of many organizations who pool their resources or sovereignty" (Roberts, 2004: 420). This kind of multilevel governance includes the transfer of responsibilities and power from one type of institutions to another. A role of executives in the international arena has increasingly been transferred from national institutions to international organizations. International organizations are "in an era of changing historical structures" (Cox, 2004: 3, title). The importance of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in the international arena has become obvious in the past decades. There is a number of historical developments that contributed this tendency (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). First, the end of the Cold War stimulated activities among international organizations that were rather passive in the period of tension between two superpowers. Second, globalization and growing interdependency between different international actors have made it necessary to revitalize international organizations all over the world. Third, globalization stimulated activity of intermediaries such as non-state actors between domestic and revitalized or emerged international organizations. A number of instruments available to international organizations has increased their efficiency (e.g. the staff of professionals and experts is one of the instruments that give IGOs possibility to influence global governance, global opinion through global mass media and a possibility of alliances between each other becoming more salient in the international arena (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004)).

This chapter will present research question of this master thesis. Further, it will define a dependent variable and give an overview of five independent variables. Further, it will present methodological note. And, at the end, the short description of the chosen IEs and expectations from this master thesis will be presented.

Research question

All IGO's are organized by a plenary assembly and an executive institution. The executive institutions are of special interest as the policies within IGOs are shaped by their executives. IEs are normally represented by the directorate-general, seldom by a political top as in the case of the European Commission. They have always had an important role of initiator and decision-maker.

IGOs are able to influence international arena challenging the Westphalian order and undermining principles of sovereignty. And this issue is going to be discussed in this master thesis with help of factors that contribute to IEs transcending beyond intergovernmental dynamic. Thus, the master thesis has its intention to examine the ways IEs challenge the principle of sovereignty, why they do go beyond the existing heritage of Westphalia.

The research question in this thesis is what decision-making dynamics can be found within such IEs as the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat and what can possibly explain them.

The master thesis deals with three different IGOs. The OECD and the WTO often referred to as classical examples of intergovernmental organizations (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004). When it comes to the European Commission many scholars agree that the European Union has become a complex system of multilevel governance (e.g. Checkel, 2005, Egeberg, 2006c). In spite of the differences some common features could be found among all three chosen IGOs already in their origins: all three international organizations had primarily economic goals when they were founded. However, a role of the European Commission compared to both Secretariats has evolved drastically over time and has become more important in various spheres of the life in Europe. The European Commission has unique features that no other international organization has ever had: it covers multiple policy area, it has unique supranational power delegated by the member states and it has a multilevel union administration across levels of governance (Egeberg, 2006b,c).

I will focus on decision-making dynamics within three IEs. The chosen institutions have both the organizational similarities as a consequence of being executives and differences due to variety in heterogeneity, size, regulatory methods etc. However, due to existence of organizational similarities between these IEs some similar behavioral dynamics within the institutions are expected to be found. Thus, this thesis challenges claim such as "comparing the Commission with international secretariats, as was suggested in the mid 1960s (Siotis 1964)…would be of very limited usefulness now" (Christiansen, 1996: 77). Furthermore, central in this debate will be whether the European Commission is unique and develops own dynamics or if it has generic characteristics. The Commission has been transformed from advisory body to executive body. If

the similarities of dynamics within the Commission and other secretariats are found it could indicate the future potential transformation of other executives. "Europe is thus our laboratory for getting at some bigger issues concerning the relation of institutions, states, and individuals. When do international institutions create senses of community and belonging?" (Checkel, 2005: 802).

Four types ideal decision-making dynamics, the dependent variable

The dependent variable in this master thesis is dynamics observed within IEs and presented by role perceptions and behavior of IEs' officials. Officials have multiple roles in every-day decision-making process. That makes it challenging, but also interesting, to examine which ones of these roles are dominating. This question is of great importance as it will make it clear how decision-making processes within the executives happen, how their preferences are formed and goals are set. The thesis is focusing on four ideal decision-making dynamics: intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic.

Intergovernmental dynamic is the first type of decision-making dynamics. It is characterized by allegiance to national government and home institutions. Intergovernmental behavioral dynamic is characterized by the dependency of officials on nation-state: e.g. servants are appointed to their jobs and being paid by the country of origins. Consequently, nation-state forms officials' preferences and considerations, learns to think locally, i.e. to put the national interests first. Communication is determined by diplomatic ethics, where each official would try to pursue interests of own country. This is a typical situation of a classical international organization that was founded by nation-states in order to reach own goals, autonomy of these organizations is rather limited as autonomy of their officials is decided by their countries of origin. Behavior of officials is determined by the domestic preferences and concerns. In general, member-states are able to influence the officials through different channels. Officials should consider possibility of future employment in national institutions. Thus, officials tend to develop allegiances towards home institutions.

Supranational dynamic is the second type of decision-making dynamics. It is characterized by servants' allegiance to the institutions they work at, i.e. the executives, as a consequence of that officials are mandated and being paid by the executives themselves. The concerns and

preferences are formed in terms of "the common good" (Trondal et al., 2004). The communication is defined by community ethics that is explained by the logic of mutual cooperation in order to solve common problems. This type of dynamic indicates high degree of autonomy of the institutions and independency of decision-making on nation-states. Thus, the supranational dynamic represents the opposite dynamic to the intergovernmental one. There is often tension between these two dynamics when both dynamics can be observed at the same time. The IEs driven by supranational dynamic represent unitary organized structures with autonomous power covering many spheres of sovereignty (Trondal et al., 2004).

Departmental dynamic is the third type of ideal decision-making dynamics. It is characterized by the officials' allegiance to their own portfolio. The departmental dynamic is observed within the various departments of the IEs. The officials get autonomy and well defined responsibilities within own department. They are normally appointed to the position by the department. Officials are to follow unit rules, they are appointed and being paid by the departments themselves. It makes officials think in term of their own department. Consequently, the departmental preferences become dominating in IE's officials' day-to-day life. The dynamic is guided by departmental ethics: it is followed by the departmental rules, interests etc. Autonomy within the department and feeling of belonging to the particular department are the characteristics of this kind of dynamic. Officials guided by departmental dynamic tend to develop more autonomous behavior than the ones guided by intergovernmental dynamic. Officials' behavior is determined by departmental preferences and considerations. The dynamic should be found in organizations with intense interaction within units or departments. Officials have authority within the particular area, they know well their own responsibilities and task to complete.

Epistemic dynamic is the fourth type of decision-making dynamics. It is characterized by the formation of epistemic communities. "An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1992: 3). Epistemic dynamic will contribute to professional perspective on issues, professional ethics, and expertise. It is characterized by loyalty to the discipline one is specializing in, construction of preferences and norms out of professional perspective on the reality. The shared normative principles and beliefs and commonly used set of practices produce interpretations of social and physical phenomena

(Haas, 1992). The experts would normally develop own set of norms and values unconditionally, i.e. in spite of cross cultural differences or own governments' policies. They will be loyal not to particular institution or home government, but to own discipline. Consequently, the epistemic dynamic will be guided by professional ethics. The epistemic dynamic is determined to a high extent by the pre-socialization of the officials, their educational background and the specifics of work. Behavior of officials will be determined by professional considerations and concerns. This will make them consult and interact with professional experts in the same discipline.

All four types of decision-making dynamics are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Dependent variable: Four ideal decision-making dynamics evoked by officials

The Intergovernmental	The supranational	The departmental	The epistemic
- dependency on nation-state, appointment by home governments - allegiances towards home institutions - determined by domestic preferences and considerations - diplomatic ethics	- high degree of autonomy, appointment by the institution - allegiances towards own institution - determined by "common good" preferences - community ethics	- autonomy within the department, defined responsibilities, appointment by the department - allegiances towards own portfolio - determined by departmental preferences and considerations - departmental ethics	- professionalism - allegiances towards own discipline - determined by professional preferences and considerations, network - professional ethics

Source: the table is based on Trondal, 2006a: 148, Table 1

The independent variables

The master thesis will focus on the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and at the WTO Secretariat in order to find and compare dynamics of behavior within the institutions. The chosen executives are analyzed across five dimensions defined as independent variables:

- H1: Organizational properties

- H2: Recruiting procedures
- H3: Organizational affiliations
- H4: Organizational demography
- H5: Organizational network

The choice of variables was guided by the idea that all these variables should be found in all three chosen organizations. H1 is presented by horizontal and vertical specialization of the institution. Horizontal specialization is defined by the horizontal division of labor in the organizational structure (territorial or sectoral). Vertical specialization is to be characterized by separation of powers in the hierarchy. H2 is defined as the type of contracts officials get. It is divided in the short term contracting and permanent positions. H3 looks at the type of the contacts the officials have. There are two types of affiliations: primary and secondary: they are to be found in each IE. H4 emphasizes demographic characteristics of the officials such as education and previous professional experiences and tenure. Finally, H5 defines the network of officials with focus on intensity of IE officials' communication with other actors, both within and outside of institutions.

Methodological note

Data used in this thesis is secondary. The idea is to systematize and analyze available data on the chosen IEs in order to examine the dynamics within them. Found data will be applied to the independent variables outlined above. Literature was chosen to describe the independent variables. However, the availability and access to necessary sources was a big challenge. Unavailability of particular data on one or two of the chosen executives has made it difficult to compare the executives.

There is very little data on how the executives are organized and composed. Most of the literature focused on activities and roles of the institutions in the international arena. Most of the literature on the executives is found in the field of International Relationship theory. Only few scholars have applied organizational theory to analyze IEs. But this area remains under-researched. Therefore, some gaps were found already when presenting information available on the institutions.

There are both advantages and disadvantages with using secondary data. It gives a broad overview of issue. Gathering secondary information requires fewer resources compared to acquiring primary data. However, it does not bring radically new information. It looks at already existing data, analyzes it and finds some tendencies.

The chosen executives

In the past five decades a role of IEs has changed to a great extent: from being passive and serving needs of domestic governments to becoming active and covering more and more areas of international life. Therefore, it could be said, as presented already in the 1970s by Cox and Jacobsen, the dual role of each IGO has been changing from being representative subsystem of the member states to being participant subsystem in the international arena (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). However, there is an obvious lack of studies on internal dynamics within the IEs. Influence of the IEs, central actors forming IGOs' politics has often been underestimated. Consequently, the issue remains under-researched at the moment. The studies on IEs as institutional/social constructivist (e.g. Checkel) and functionalist/neo-functionalist approaches originated by Haas have not provided a systematic insight into the IEs' dynamics. Intergovernmental approach sees IEs as bargaining actors that intermediate between all the parties involved i.e. the member states. Institutional approach considers IEs being autonomous international administrations in many contexts.

There are various opinions on how IEs have changed the Westphalian order in the past decades. Some scholars argue that IEs' activities have weakened the nation-states' influence (e.g. Rosenau, 1997). Some argue that IEs' behavior has strengthened the position of the nation-states and underlined their preferences (e.g. Moravcsik, 1998). Further, IEs' transformation power is often argued about whether IEs are able to dictate the dynamics within the nation-states (Wessels, Maurer and Mittag, 2003) or they are influenced to a high extent by the dynamics at the domestic level (Anderson, 2002). The main debate is on whether IEs represent one of the nation-states' instruments to implement their ideas or IEs are actually able to go beyond the intergovernmental order due to their transformative ability. Institutionalist/constructivist approaches will be presented in the theoretical part of the paper as the important part of the theory needed for the thesis.

These two main literature camps have not been researching IEs enough; neither have they focused on relationship between the organizational structure and the dynamics within institutions. In order to understand the dynamics within IGOs it is important to look both within IGOs and outside of them, i.e. the unpacking of IGOs is required (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 4).

The three IEs were chosen for a number of reasons. First, all three institutions vary across the chosen independent variables (Table 2). Second, the OECD and the WTO Secretariats were chosen as examples of classical international executive institutions. Two examples of classical IEs were chosen in order to get more systematic results. The European Commission was chosen as a special institutional arrangement with the most power among other international executives in order to see whether it is so unique or it shares general characteristics with other executives. And, finally, this master thesis is a part of the project of Department of Political Science and Management at Agder University College that focuses on these three IEs.

All three IEs share a number of common features. And it should not be surprising as they were founded with regards to established policy sectors that were originally taken from the domestic executives. As all the IEs were shaped on the basis of domestic institutions similar dynamics are expected to be found across them. This fact also made it difficult to specify the jurisdiction areas of both international and domestic executives. Many issues are dealt by a number of institutions, both international and domestic, because their areas of jurisdiction often overlap.

However, there are still a lot of differences between the three executives: their regulatory methods (soft vs. hard ones), the characteristics of the top administration (political vs. not political top), the area of application (Europe, economic development or global society), the characteristics of officials (e.g. long term contracts vs. short term contracts) and obviously the size.

The European Union's executive, the European Commission, represents a very special case of IE. The European Commission consists of a number of appointed Commissioners that are on the top of the organizational hierarchy that have formal political power. Compared to other IEs the Commission has much more power: the proposals made by the Commission do not have just an

advisory character, nation-states are obliged to follow directives and regulations originally proposed by the Commission and accepted by the Council and the Parliament.

IEs share a number of common features. As the recent researches on the European Commission point out that nowadays the Commission can be seen as one of the most transformative among IEs (e.g. Egeberg, 2006b). Therefore, it can be expected that the dynamics within the Commission will be stronger pronounced than within other executives. Moreover, if the dynamics are not seen within the Commission they should not be expected within other IEs (Johnston in Trondal et al., 2004). However, we should not forget the complexity and variety of the IEs depending on their size, functions, heterogeneity.

The topic of multilevel governance in the European Union has been one of the most discussed in the past decades. The European Commission has substantial autonomy. It is supposed to be granted by the member states in order to play its institutional role as a policy developer for the whole EU (Egeberg, 1996). However, multilevel governance mode can also bring a problem of power: domestic level of governance can be in conflict with the Commission level of governance. The complexity of the Commission's structure makes it difficult sometimes for national authorities to follow activities of different departments within the Commission. They are directly in contact wit national ministry departments without being supervised by a particular ministry. And the area that has been particularly under-researched is behavior of Commission officials.

The Secretariat of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) represents a different kind of institution. It creates "good practices" that do not have mandatory power vis-à-vis member-states. The OECD does not have such a binding power as the EU. In spite of the fact that the OECD produces just soft regulatory methods it has managed to create a good system of coordination and control that has been copied by some other international organizations (e.g. the famous open method of coordination in the EU has been applied for more than four decades within the OECD) (Marcussen, 2004: 90). As it represents a less politically strong structure due to non-existence of binding power different dynamics are more likely to be observed within this IE compared to the relatively strong politically European Commission which produces "hard" regulatory methods as a norm.

The Secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO) formally does not have any decision-making power. It does not possess as much of authority as the European Commission. It still represents an executive body that is involved in all spheres of the WTO activity, formulates agenda and improves information flow within the organization (Schemeil, 2004). The decisions made in the WTO Secretariat often have advisory character: member states can choose either to follow or not. However, the WTO has some binding power in a number of cases. Therefore, the WTO does have more power compared to most of other classical IGOs as the OECD. These two organizations do not have as much of authority as the Commission. Thus, the conflict existing between the European Commission governance and domestic governance is not that relevant in the case of the OECD and the WTO.

Empirical expectations from the master thesis

The empirical expectations from the master thesis are to find similarities in the decision-making dynamics within such IEs as the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat as all three executives share a number of organizational aspects. Furthermore, the question of whether the European Commission is that different from other international executives will be relevant. If the European Commission represents something more than an intergovernmental institution and there will be found similarities between it and other IEs it will challenge the rationalist perspective on IEs. It will indicate the potential decision-making ability of the executives.

The dynamics within IEs are dependent upon the "unpacked" content of IEs, i.e. the organizational structure (H1), recruitment procedures (H2), organizational affiliations (H3), organizational demography (H4) and organizational network (H5). Each IE has its own set of rules and procedures; differences are also in size, functions and the heterogeneity of the executive as a unity. That is why there could be also found some differences in dynamics within the institutions.

The organizational structure (H1) will be expected to influence decision-making dynamics within the institution. A number of studies (e.g. Egeberg and Sætren, 1999) pointed at the correlation between the degree of hierarchy and the ability to develop the identification with the

organization. Thus, we should expect the more hierarchical structures to develop more autonomous dynamics, i.e. supranational and departmental dynamiics.

Seconded officials from the national governments are normally hired on the temporary basis (H2). They still get the considerable amount of payment from own governments (Trondal, 2004). They are normally heavily pre-socialized (H4) and have continuous and long-lasting interactions with national institutions (H3 and H5). The reason for that is that even though they are placed under Commissions instructions (Staff Regulations Art. 37), "the Commission should be considered a secondary institutional affiliation to the seconded personnel" (Trondal, 2004: 76). Their national institutions are still their primary institutional affiliation. The seconded personnel will have the future employment in mind: after short-term employment within the Commission or the OECD Secretariat they are to come back to the countries of origin. "Accordingly, the identities and roles evoked by the seconded personnel are likely to be more national than supranational" (Trondal, 2004: 76). The opposite characteristics should be expected to be found in the case of the permanent officials that would be able to develop high degree of identification with own institution.

This master thesis is divided in 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is introduction. Chapter 2 will present a theoretical background and a theoretical model that will include the independent variables. Chapter 3 presents empirical description of the executives and empirical data. Chapter 4 will present the analysis of the independent variables across three executives. Chapter 5 will summarize the findings and present a conclusion.

Chapter 2. The theoretical perspective and the model

This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will cover the theories that are of importance for the thesis, i.e. institutional perspective and the organizational perspective. The second part will present a model consisting of independent variables that will help to compare the executive institutions.

Theoretical background: rationalism vs. constructivism

Behavior of many IEs has been studied from two alternative perspectives: rationalist (e.g. Pollack, 1999) and constructivist (e.g. Checkel, 2005). The first perspective with its statism emphasizes a role of the nation-states in the international arena fails sometimes to explain the independency of IGOs and how their agendas are set (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). It has often been criticized for paying insufficient attention to the institutional rules that guide the whole decision-making process (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996). The second perspective emphasizes an institutional role of IGOs. It focuses on the functional roles of international organizations. However, when IGOs produce inefficient outcomes it is often not able to explain IGOs' behavior and reaches a deadlock (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

The rationalist approach unites the neo-realist and neo-liberal ideas (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). Both consider member states to be the most important actors in forming the international policies. Originally there exists no hierarchy in the international environment; all member states have different interests. The neo-realism considers international organizations to be the tools of the most influential member states, while the neo-liberalism believes in possibility of improvement of the international cooperation by IGOs through reduction of asymmetrical information. The basic principle behind these theories is that international organizations are not able to be autonomous unities. A well-known theory of interplay between IGOs and the member states as principal-agent theory has rationalist origins as it assumes that member states delegate some autonomy to the international actors in order to minimize own costs. This costs-benefits analysis is applied to the analysis of the interdependent relationship between member states and IGOs. M. Pollack (1999), the most salient representative of this theory, underlines that the role of the international institutions like the European Commission is to be varied "across issue-areas

and over time as a function of the varying administrative procedures, oversight mechanisms, and possibilities for sanctioning available to the member governments" (Pollack, 1999: 119).

Constructivist approach emphasizes the role of norms and values in the international environment. They can construct the reality that goes above the anarchical order (e.g. Checkel, 2006). The international actors can possess other motivations than own interests and power balances issue. Domestic organizations and national governments do not always have capacity and resources to be effective in dealing with global problems such as human rights, poverty, environment etc. IGOs are created in order to help national governments to manage particularly sensitive issues that concern many actors at international levels. According to Checkel (2005), what is of particular importance is that they have great socialization potential. Various concerns evoked within IGOs constitute the construction of the preferences in the international decision-making. They acquire legitimacy and have empowering effect on non-state actors that get a chance to influence policy formation (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). Constructivism suggests a different perspective on international organizations' motives compared to the rationalist approach: "international organizations may develop original notions of preferred policy outcomes based on international civil servants' sharing values, norms or bodies of knowledge" (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004) rather than preferred policy outcomes based on the expansion of budgets and influence area.

To sum up, there has always been tension between two alternative perspectives on international organizations, the realist perspective and the constructivist perspective. The first one focuses on the influential power of the member states. The second approach emphasizes a role of international bureaucracies as autonomous decision-making institutions at the international level. The idea of combining both approaches was first enlightened by Cox and Jacobson's studies already in 1973 (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). They argued that it could give sometimes more complete understanding of how international organizations function if we combine two theoretical perspectives. In this thesis the basic assumption is that the international organizations' executives are not just manipulated by member states in making decisions. The formation of own preferences and positions should not be overseen. Endogenous processes presented as the independent variables in the paper are presumed to play an important role.

Organizational theory

Many researches on IGOs have a basic assumption that they deal with bureaucracies (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Bureaucracies acquire autonomy through exercising power given by nation-states. Bureaucracies' impersonal rules can bring both effectiveness and rigidness. In both cases IEs represent permanently changing and often expanding structures that do not always follow interests of their creators. IE officials are supposed to manage the tasks and missions of IGOs by using own resources and capabilities. "IGOs are not black boxes that respond to external stimuli…over time these organizations develop strong bureaucratic cultures that profoundly shape the way external demands or shocks are interpreted and the kinds of responses the organization will entertain and, eventually, implement" (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 9). Bureaucracies limit actions of officials by a set of regulations and norms. The bureaucracies help their officials to deal with a problem of bounded rationality, reduce transaction costs for the different parts.

"Organizational and institutional arrangements are the normative systems that are supposed to influence the structure the occasions for evoking one identity or another" (Egerberg and Sætren, 1999:95). The bureaucracy studies have focused their attention rather on how the structures have evolved and the administration issues than on correlation between these structures and decision-making processes (Egeberg, 2003). "An organizational perspective highlights the role of a decision maker's organizational context … by paying attention to an organization's structure, demography, locus and degree of institutionalization (Egeberg, 2003: 116). In our case much of attention will be paid to the organizational factors: organizational structure (H1), recruitment procedures (H2), organizational affiliations (H3), organizational demography (H4) and organizational network (H5).

Organizational perspective is important in our case as it presumes that "organizations and institutions are capable of endowing individual actors with goals and interests, provided that certain organizational features are in place" (Egeberg, 2003: 16). This basically underlines importance of examining organizations that influence behavior of own servants. IE officials obviously have many roles to play as they are involved in interactions with various stakeholders at different levels of governance. The first level is represented by the country of origin where officials get education and professional experience. The second level is represented by the

executive institution itself where officials develop identification and feeling of belonging to the institution. The third level is represented by officials' department where they spend most of the time. Finally, at the epistemic level officials are able to share professional opinions and expertise.

According to the rationalist theory, international institutions are unidimensional in their nature and dominated by intergovernmental dynamic. However, the executives are complicated systems. They are multidimensional. They can develop different dynamics. The dynamics are often gradually transformed when officials' behavior and role perceptions change from one situation to another. The behavior and role perceptions that are evoked more often will tend to dominate the others. As it is stated in Chapter 1 there are four ideal decision-making dynamics among the officials that we are going to look for in the chosen IEs: intergovernmental dynamic, supranational dynamic, departmental dynamic and epistemic dynamic.

The analytical model

The model consists of five independent variables that are applied. The variables are chosen on the basis of the factors that are more likely to affect the dynamics within IEs.

Organizational properties (H1)

The first independent variable is organizational properties of the IEs. "An organizational structure is a normative (role) structure that imposes codified expectations as regards the decision behavior of the various role incumbents. The logic of appropriateness, incentives and bounded rationality are the mechanisms that are supposed to connect role expectations and actual behaviour" (Egeberg, 2004b: 53).

A typical formal organization is specialised both vertically and horizontally. It concerns both national and international organizations. In fact, they have more similarities in their structure than one might think (Egeberg, 2006d). Vertically organized institutions are the hierarchies that are able to coordinate activities of subordinated civil servants. The basic idea brought up in many organizational studies is that the more vertically specialized organizations will be able to influence decision-making behavior and role perceptions of their officials more adequately than the ones that are less vertically specialized. It will be the case when officials have clearly defined

norms and boundaries of their behavior and are given more autonomy over decision-making within the particular area. Furthermore, they are able to evoke autonomous, supranational and departmental, decision-making behavior. Generally, the study by M. Egeberg and H. Sætren (1999) suggests that we should "expect the 'logic of hierarchy' to lead to a positive relationship between position level and the level of organizational identification" (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999: 97). It basically means that the higher the rank an official has in a hierarchical system the stronger sense of belonging to the organization, identification with the institution as a whole this official develops. Furthermore, it means that top officials are able to develop the higher degree of identification with the organization the more hierarchical the structure of the organization is. Therefore, top civil servants are expected "to be the most eager defenders of their respective institutions" (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999: 107).

Horizontal specialization of IEs is mainly by function and purpose (Trondal et al., 2004). The idea is that international organizations, in our case IEs, organized by purpose and function will tend to evoke decision-making behavior based on the functionality, thus, challenging the Westphalian order. The various departments and units that take care of particular issues are normally established to implement horizontal specialization in organizations. Departmental decision-making dynamic will be evoked. Further, the horizontal sector specialization leads to attracting experts and professionals on particular issues within the department, thus, epistemic decision-making dynamic can be observed: e.g. in the Directorate General for trade more officials with economic or related to trade education can be found.

Recruitment procedures (H2)

The recruitment procedures can influence to a great extent behavior and role perceptions of civil servants within international organizations, and thereby affect degree of organization's autonomy (Trondal et al., 2004). The most important factors here are the time of employment within IEs and whether officials are paid by the organization itself or by the country of origin (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004). Most of civil servants working in IEs have background from national institutions. Thus, many of them could develop a feeling of belonging to the country of origin. A feeling of solidarity could affect many of the decisions being made, especially in the case when officials are still being paid by the national governments they had been working for previously. They are more likely to be influenced by the national governments' interests and policies. This

factor should not be underestimated when finding the decision-making dynamics within executives. The longer civil servants are being paid from the national budget the stronger intergovernmental dynamic of decision-making within organizations, particularly IEs, are likely to appear. And the opposite, civil servants that are paid by the organization itself are more likely to develop a sense of belonging to the organization. Therefore, supranational and departmental decision-making dynamics are likely to be observed within the international organizations and their IEs.

The same strong identification with the organization itself is developed when one has a permanent job in this organization. And that is another important thing connected to the recruitment procedures: permanent job based on the merit principle oppose to temporary contracts based on quota principle. By merit principle we mean that the recruitment is of permanent character and it is based on competence and past achievements of potential officials, whereas by quota principle we mean that recruits are hired on more temporary contracts have on the basis of professional, sectoral or territorial mandates (Trondal, 2006c).

Officials recruited on the basis of quota principle keep strong boundaries with national institutions that prevent them from evoking supranational, departmental and often epistemic roles and behavior. The merit principle is typically applied within the European Commission and the WTO Secretariat, whereas the quota principle applied within the OECD Secretariat (Trondal et al., 2004). The WTO Secretariat has permanent jobs as a normative, whereas the European Commission does have some percentage of short term recruits, at the same time when the OECD typically has short-term officials on the regular basis (Trondal et al., 2004). The basic assumption is that officials working on temporary basis are less likely to develop supranational, departmental and epistemic perceptions due to the limited time they spend within the organization and due to the existence of strong boundaries with national institutions.

Institutional affiliations (H3)

The complexity of relationship within and outside of IEs is obvious due to a big number of counterparts involved in various interaction processes with each IE. One typical thing for all of IEs is that their jurisdictions often overlap with other institutions' area of influence. Conflicts are sometimes unavoidable. The various interactions within and outside the executives make IE

servants have many roles to play. These multiple roles that officials play are of a particular importance. These roles are evoked in various situations: e.g. as many officials spend most of their time within own departments they develop the departmental identity, however, it is just one side of the identity they develop when being a part of IEs. And sometimes it could be difficult to identify all identities as the identities that officials possess become mixed up over the long periods of time and start supplementing each other. Thus "…organizational members often have multiple institutional affiliations that generate multiple cues for action and role enactment" (Trondal, 2004: 81).

IE officials' behavior is guided either by primary institutional affiliations (within the IE) or by secondary institutional affiliations (outside of the IE) (Egeberg, 2006c). The officials' behavior can be strongly guided by primary institutional affiliations if they have intense communication over long period of time with their primary structure, within own institution and scrappy or seldom communication with other institutions.

Furthermore, officials' behavior is heavily dependent on logic of primacy and recency (Trondal et al., 2004). The logic of primacy implies that officials' behavior within their primary organizations is likely to be repeated in relation to secondary affiliations. The logic of recency suggests that newly called up behavior and role perceptions are likely to be evoked again (Trondal et al., 2004). Intensity and length of affiliations within primary and secondary institutions is decisive. Officials spending most of their time within own institutions (often they have long term contracts, but not necessary) are more likely to be guided by the logic of primacy; the officials that spend more time outside own institution do not manage to develop a sense for the logic of primacy and are guided by the logic of recency. The question of correlation between the type of contracting and the behavior of officials is relevant here again, i.e. it comes up in both H2 and H3. In the situation of the permanent struggle between the logic of primacy and the logic of recency the institutional boundaries are decisive: well defined boundaries are likely to evoke the logic of primacy, whereas vaguely defined boundaries make it more difficult for the officials to follow the logic of primacy, thus, they become more affected by the logic of recency (Trondal et al., 2004).

This variable is closely connected to organizational network variable (H5). Networks consist of both primary and secondary structures. The intensity and length of interactions can determine the character of decision-making dynamics within networks.

Organizational demography (H4)

Demographic characteristics as social origins and socialization experiences (education, age, family etc.) are very important human factor that can influence the decision-making dynamics within any organization (Meyer and Nigro, 1976). This factor can become crucial in the case of international organizations as they consist of people with different backgrounds, different nationalities and it can be both exciting and challenging to have such a colorful working collective. The logical assumption could be that officials that have longer tenure are more likely to develop higher degree of identification with the organization they work in than the ones who either have short-term contract or have not been employed for a long period. "*Length of service in a particular department could be related to identification with that department independent of level of position*" (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999: 99, original emphasis). Therefore, long tenure will be conducive to the enactment of supranational, departmental, maybe even epistemic (depending on the issue and department the officials work at) behavioral dynamics. This assumption overlaps with the recruitment variable (H2) which originally defines the possible tenure period within the institution.

Educational specialization of officials can be decisive in fostering epistemic decision-making dynamic. Some fields of activity are more universal than others (e.g. mathematics is an example of this "universal" science where institutional differences between organizations or countries can not prevent experts from understanding each other). Experts in a particular field would find it easier to communicate with others with the same specialization. The more universal language of science they speak the more intense interactions are likely to be observed among them.

Age is also of importance: the younger officials are more likely to become loyal to the organization than the older ones that are likely to have a background within domestic institutions and strong boundaries with the country of origin. Therefore, the younger officials are more likely to develop supranational or departmental behavior compared to the older ones who in most of the cases have a long domestic pre-socialization before entering the international organizations, the

23

IEs. And for people living at the same place for a long period of time it becomes a norm to think "locally". It explains, thus, the difference between the young people that have not had such a long experience within the domestic institutions due to their age and the ones that have a long pre-socialization stage within the national institutions. High education can be assumed to develop epistemic decision-making dynamic among officials.

Finally, the family background is of importance. The multinational family background as well as education from abroad is to reflect the supranational perceptions in officials' behavior. And the opposite, a national family and a national education is more likely to strengthen national identity. Therefore, the pre-socialization of officials has an impact on the development of allegiance towards particular institution, a sense of belonging to it, identification with it. It influences the formation of role perceptions and decision-making behavior of the officials.

Organizational network (H5)

Understanding networks of international institutions is important in order to understand how they work (Shore, 2000: 200). An organizational network can be defined here as all interactions of IE officials with various actors on particular issues. Often it is essential to have expertise from outside and obviously it can be found either within specialized departments of own institution or in institutions that are specialized on it and have professionals: for instance, the need for the trade Directorate-General within the Commission could bring it to consult divisions or units of either the OECD Secretariat or the WTO Secretariat. This variable is closely connected to organizational affiliations variable (H3).

As M. Egeberg (2006b) pointed out that network is very important for the international actors as the European Union, both within and outside of institutions. The intense network within an institution itself is more likely to evoke strong identification with this institution. Consequently, supranational and departmental decision-making dynamics will be salient. Furthermore, intense interaction between these divisions or units will bring experts together in epistemic communities. Intensity and length will define a type of network we are dealing with: either it is a thick network with intensive and long-lasting interactions or a thin network with not intensive and scrappy communication.

This variable should examine how intensive and long-lasting the communication between the divisions is and if it is able to create strong epistemic dynamic within the particular IE. The assumption would be that the density of these kinds of interactions is rather high, i.e. officials from similar departments in different IEs would tend to communicate with each other often in order to examine a problem better and get necessary expertise and evaluation from inside and outside of own institution. It could happen that they also communicate well with institutions concerned with particular issues at the domestic level. However, there is always this choice of expertise given to professionals: they can choose between experts operating at the domestic or international levels and between insiders and experts operating internationally. The choice of the professionals is often determined by the logics recency and primacy (H3) and the intensity of interactions with different actors.

The hypothesis concerning the executives' characteristics can be presented in a Table 2.

Table 2. Hypotheses on the IEs

	The European Commission	The OECD Secretariat	The WTO Secretariat
Organizational properties (H1) - vertical specialization - horizontal specialization	Very high By function and purpose	High By function and purpose	High By function and purpose
Recruitment procedures (H2)	Permanent positions, some temporary contracts	Short-term contracts as a normative	Permanent positions as a normative
Institutional affiliations (H3) - Primary vs. secondary affiliations	Primary combined with secondary	Secondary most of the times	Primary

Organizational demography (H4) - Background: education and earlier employment - Tenure within the IE	High degree of specialization Long	High degree of specialization Low	High degree of specialization Long
Network (H5) - Intensity of interactions - Length of the interactions	Intensive and long interactions with the other divisions of the same character	Intensive and long interactions with the other divisions of the same character	Intensive and long interactions with the other divisions of the same character

Chapter 3. Empirical description of the executives

> The perfect system of the law of nations is to constitute an international association [composed] of delegates chosen amongst the most virtuous and most capable citizens [in order] to apply international good faith and ensure the reign of concord between the States.
>
> (Confucius in Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 32)

Chapter 3 will give empirical description of the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. Data on the chosen executives will be presented in order to see the characteristics of the institutions and overall dynamics within them.

It is necessary to define what is meant by an international organization. Organizational theory identifies three main characteristics of an international organization: "a formal instrument of agreement between two or more nation-states which serves as the constitution of the organization; an international conference where representatives of nation-states convene and take decisions and where representatives of various non-state actors may exert influence; and a permanent secretariat for the performance of ongoing tasks (a bureaucracy led by a secretary-general)" (Judge 2004 in Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004: 12).

The importance of IGOs has increased drastically in the past decades. Their behavior has evolved over time from being rather passive to covering many spheres of international activities and entering the ones that were prerogative of national governments. As argued above this tendency had its roots in the post-war international system when the need for integration and closer cooperation became salient. This cooperation between IGOs goes often beyond national governments. It questions the existing national boarders; and it transcends the Westphalian order. The organizational theory approach is used in order to examine how the executive bodies are able to influence the decisions made within IGOs. IEs can differ in many aspects: e.g. the size, the availability of resources and given power. But all of them represent the policy shaper of IGOs, sharing thus a number of organizational features. They were given power by nation-states for serving certain goals, however, the executive bodies have proven to have own agenda and pursuing own interests, even if they are in conflict with the nation-states' ideas. Furthermore,

their roles often overlap with the domestic executive governments. The power struggle between IEs and domestic executives, as in the case of the European Commission and member states governments, gives an understanding of the special arrangement some executive bodies represent nowadays.

"International organizations cannot function without Secretariats and their international civil servants" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 5). Unfortunately, the role the officials play has been often underestimated. It has been taken for granted that officials possess necessary competencies and stay loyal to the organization they work for. It is likely that the ones that actually do the biggest amount of work (analysis, assessment in provision of technical and professional support, preparation of papers, organization of meetings etc.) do influence the work of organizations to a great extent. Much depends on the invisible hands of these officials. Initiative is born within the executive bodies: they are able to influence the tempo of the organization's work, the signed agreements, and the actors' possession of knowledge. Various instruments are in their hands. I am going to see how the executive bodies' overall dynamics are developed.

There is limited data available on comparative analysis of the chosen executives. There are two studies (by D. Henderson (1998) and R. Blackhurst (1998)) that compare all three IEs in terms of staff and budget. Hence, the data in Table 3 is not up to date. It demonstrates the size of the three institutions, their administrative budget and cost per staff member in 1996 (Henderson, 1998: 102, Table 3.1).

Table 3. Three institutions compared: Staff numbers and administrative budget in 1996

Agency	Staff Numbers	Administrative budget (millions of U.S. dollars, actual exchange rates)	Cost/Staff member (thousands of U.S. dollars, actual exchange rates)	Administrative budget (millions of U.S. dollars, PPP exchange rates)[a]	Cost/Staff member (thousands of U.S. dollars, PPP exchange rates)[a]
The Commission	21000	3400	162	2700	129

The OECD	1700	340	200	260	153
The WTO	510	97	190	55	108

Source: the table is based on Henderson, 1998: 102, Table 3.1
[a]Purchasing-power parity (PPP) are those of the OECD for 1996, and are economywide. For the Commission, the rate for Belgium has been taken; for the OECD, the rate for France; for the WTO the rate for Switzerland.

Table 3 shows that the Commission was already in 1996 the biggest out of three executive bodies in terms of employees and the budget, even though the cost per official are lower than in the case of the OECD, both in the case of the actual exchange rates and PPP exchange rates. The WTO Secretariat was the smallest, both in terms of budget and human resources.

I would like to present each executive, their activities and examine them with respect to the dependent variables in order to being able to analyze and compare the decision-making dynamics across the executives.

The European Commission

The European Union and its executive institution were established already in the beginning of the 1950s, right after the WW II. And already at that point the organizational structure of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first arrangement of the European Union, was a "significant institutional innovation" (Egeberg, 2006b: 2). It had some differences compared to classical intergovernmental institutions like e.g. the OECD or the WTO. As Jean Monnet, the French Foreign Minister's adviser at that time, pointed out it "was the need for an executive body that could act independently of national governments and bring supranational input into the policy process in a systematic manner" (Egeberg, 2006b: 2). It is how the predecessor of the European Commission, the High Authority, was established.

The European Commission is situated in Brussels. It is both vertically and horizontally specialized. There are two main grades within the Commission, administrators and assistances (Hooghe and Nugent, 2006), indicating the vertical specialization of the services. The Commission is headed by the Collegium of 25 Commissioners, one from each member state. The horizontal specialization is showed by the function and purpose formation of the around 30 semi-

autonomous Directorate Generals (DGs) that include many hundred Units. The Commission has similar organizational features, functional and process, as most national executive bodies (Egeberg and Trondal, 1999). The main difference is of course the multinational composition of the Commission.

All IEs to some extent are organized similar to the national institutions. However, the way the Commission crosses sectoral cleavages differs from many other IEs. Figure 1 demonstrates the Commission structure, whereas Figure 2 shows the organization of the typical IGO that is organized according to the territorial principle. As the Commission is organized by sector and function it will have to deal with conflicts between different sectors. In the typical IGO there are differences and conflicts evoked across the countries. There is also presence of a political leadership on the top in the Commission that is shown by a small circle in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The Commission and the related cleavages

European
Commission

Organized by
sector/
function

Sectoral   Nation A   Nation B   Nation C
cleavages

Source: Egeberg, 2006d: 23, Figure 2.5

Figure 2. The IGO and territorial cleavages

There are basically some perspectives on how the European Commission works: the first one would use the rationalist theory as a point of departure emphasizing the multinational composition of the Commission (e.g. Kassim and Menon, 2004), the second one would emphasize the autonomy of the Commission with constructivism as the origins (e.g. Checkel, 2006), the last one would take the organizational theory as the basis for analyzing the Commission (e.g. Egeberg, 2006b).

The analysis of the Commission is an under-studied area. The analysis of behavioral dynamics within the Commission is heavily under-researched as well. A scarce number of studies is basically divided into two groups: there are some scholars that see the supranational dynamics as the ones to dominate (e.g. Shore, 2000, Hooghe, 2005), while others see the departmental dynamics as dominating the officials' behavior (e.g. Egeberg, 2006b, Trondal, 2006c). However, different scholars study Commission officials at different levels: from top officials to part-time participating member-states officials. That is one of the reasons why the findings from these studies may vary. This and the fact that other institutions of the European Union have been more empirically analyzed indicate that the Commission is heavily under-researched. But compared to the OECD and the WTO Secretariats there is much more data available on the Commission. However, availability of data is still a great challenge regarding all of the three chosen IEs.

The European Commission has some special features that make it different from any other international institution: "its legalism, the legacy of its supranational aspirations and its wide-ranging yet sometimes contradictory functions" (Shore, 2000:132). Its legalism is characterized by the existence of a legal base for the Commission's activities. This legal basis is presented by the Treaties signed by the member states. "...it seems that the EU legal process actively promotes the centralization of sovereignty and decision-making at European level" (Shore, 2000:133). This could be an illustration of the predicted spill-over tendency in the European Union.

The second characteristic of the Commission is a claim of being a supranational institution that has authority to make a decision overriding national level of governance within certain areas. The third characteristic is the variety of the Commission's functions. It has executive, administrative, diplomatic, legislative and political functions that were given the Commission by the Treaties. The Commission plays an important role as policy formulator with its monopoly right of initiative. The officials also have to play the management role in the day-to-day functioning of the European Union. They are responsible for the budget implementation. Commission civil servants negotiate in multilateral agreements where the European Union is presented as an actor. They should also represent the European Union on the meetings with the international organization as e.g. the WTO. "According to Delors, a Commission official therefore has 'six professions': policy innovator, law maker, law enforcer, manager of Community policies, diplomat and political broker" (Shore, 2000:143).

Table 4 gives an overview of the number of full-time officials starting from the year 1959 (when it was the Commission of European Economic Community) to the year 2005. The number of officials has been increasing in the past three decades. The need for a strong executive body was first of all connected to the widened range of responsibilities given to the Commission.

Table 4. Commission full-time staff

	1959	1970	1990	2005
Full-time staff in the Commission	Around 1000	Around 5300	16000	24000

Source: the table is based on the data from Hooghe and Nugent, 2006: 149

I would like to look at three different types of officials within the European Commission: the first type is the Commission's top officials, second is the seconded national experts hired on the temporary basis and the third is the officials working in Commission expert committees. It will be done in order to follow and compare the dynamics within the Commission from the very top to bottom of the organization.

Top Commission officials

The study by L. Hooghe (2005) highlights the attitudes of top Commission officials. She bases her analysis on the two surveys of top Commission officials in order to find the ability of the European Commission to socialize its members. Top officials seem to be "significantly more pro-European than either national elites or public opinion across the thirteen policies" (Hooghe, 2005: 874). It was expected that top Commission officials have a guidance to follow:

> "An official shall carry out his duties and conduct himself solely with the interests of the Communities in mind; he shall not neither seek not take instructions from any government, authority, organization or person outside his institution...He shall carry out the duties assigned to him objectively, impartially and in keeping with his duty of loyalty to the Communities" (Article 11 Staff regulations of Officials of the European Communities in Hooghe, 2005: 863).

The study by L. Hooghe (2001) has demonstrated the seniority among top Commission officials and their internal mobility in the Commission (Table 5).

Table 5. DG experience by seniority (percent)

	Seniority in the Commission				
Number of DGs served	Less than 5 years	5 to 15 years	16 to 25 years	More than 25 years	All (n=137)
1	13.1	18.3	5.8	5.8	43.0
2	-	7.3	13.1	7.3	27.7
3	-	3.6	8.1	6.6	18.3
> 3	-	-	6.6	4.4	11.0
All	13.1	29.2	33.6	24.1	100.0

Source: Hooghe, 2001: 56, Table 2.6

The following observations concerning the services for top officials in all DGs were found: tenure within the Commission is rather long and mobility between Directorates is low. 86.9 % have stayed in the Commission for longer than 5 years. Most of the officials spend their time

within one DG (43 %), some worked in two different DGs (27,7 %), 18,3% worked in three different DGs and 11 % in more than three DGs. This finding should have impact on the development of identification with the institution. The longer time officials spend within one DG the highest degree of identification they develop with own DG. The longer experience within the Commission or within different DGs officials have the higher identification with the institution is developed.

Table 6 compares the identities evoked by top Commission officials and average citizen (public) (Hooghe, 2005: 874, Table 2).

Table 6. National and European identities among Commission officials and the public (percent)

National attachment	Not at all attached	Not very attached	Fairly attached	Very attached	Don't know
Public	1.4	8.0	38.1	51.7	0.7
Commission	3.3	10.9	46.7	39.1	0
European attachment	Not at all attached	Not very attached	Fairly attached	Very attached	Don't know
Public	9.4	27.4	41.7	18.1	3.4
Commission	2.2	19.4	50.5	24.7	1.1
European or national identity	European only	European and national	National and European	National only	Don't know/ Refuse
Public	3.4	5.8	45.3	42.4	3.1
Commission	2.2	43	38.7	0	16.1

Source: Hooghe, 2005: 874, Table 2

Table 6 demonstrates top Commission officials' attachment to own country and to the European Union and its institutions. The table shows that Commission officials tend to develop much more European identity compared to the public. The question on recognition of identity (European or national) gave interesting results: just 5.8 % of the public felt European and national afterwards, while there was 43 % of officials that did so. National identity was evoked by 42.4 % of public and 0 % of the officials. One more finding was that 16.1 % of officials actually refused to choose between the two identities. The findings should have impact on the loyalties towards institution. The higher percentage of officials who feel more European than national the higher degree of

allegiances developed towards the Commission. Furthermore, the same effect can be seen from the earlier study by L. Hooghe (2001) that examines the time budget of a typical top Commission official (Table 7).

Table 7. Time budget of a typical top Commission official (%)

Total administrative activities in-house	42
Supervision, organization, coordination in DG (including personnel)	34
Coordination with other DGs	8
Total policy activities in-house	15
Preparation of documents for higher authority	10
Promotion of policies in-house	5
Total outside activities	38
Promotion of new policies	9
Public relations	14
Negotiation of legislative acts	7
Solving implementation problems	8
Various other	5
Total	100

Source: Hooghe (2001): 62, Table 2.10.

Table 7 demonstrates that top Commission officials spent more time on the internal affairs compared to percentage spent on policy-related activities with actors outside the Commission: 60 % versus 38%. The table shows the potential implications this can have on the formation of top officials' allegiances. The more contacts officials have within own institution compared to the ones outside the institution, the more loyal they are likely to feel towards own institution.

Seconded national officials

Unfortunately, the analysis of seconded national officials (SNEs) is an under-researched area of the European Union. Previous studies have primarily analyzed permanent officials within the Commission (e.g. Hooghe, 2001, Hooghe, 2005). It is a big loss for European studies as the SNEs bring a great input to the Commission's day-to-day decision-making. The study by J.

Trondal (2006c) on seconded national experts shows that seconded personnel tend to manage multiple roles. And role perceptions evoked by the officials are not mutually exclusive, but are partly complementary.

Table 8 presents the answers of SNEs on the following question: "When working as a seconded national expert in the Commission, whom of the following do you feel an allegiance to (identify or feel responsible to)?" (Trondal, 2006c: 36, Table 3).

Table 8. Percent of SNEs feeling an allegiance (identify or feel responsible to) towards the following (absolute numbers in parentheses)

	Fairly strongly or very strongly	Both/and	Fairly weakly or very weakly	Total
Intergovernmental allegiance: - Towards the government of the own country	5	19	77	100 (65)
Supranational allegiance: - Towards the EU system as a whole	63	23	14	100 (64)
- Towards the Commission as a whole	69	22	9	100 (67)
Departmental allegiance: - Towards their own DG	84	9	7	100 (68)
- Towards their own Union	84	10	6	100 (68)
Epistemic allegiance: - Towards their own professional (educational) background and expertise	76	16	8	100 (67)

Source: Trondal, 2006c: 36, Table 4

Table 8 demonstrates that allegiances evoked the most are departmental ones. Epistemic allegiances come on the second place. On the third place there are supranational allegiances. And at the end we have intergovernmental allegiances. Moreover, the difference between supranational and intergovernmental allegiances is big compared to the difference between three allegiances ranked highest. Departmental allegiances dominate, therefore, among SNEs' allegiances. Officials will first of all consider own department's interests, then epistemic

communities' interests, then, the EU or Commission's interests, and after that they will maybe consider interests of the country of origin. Furthermore, the study by Trondal (2006c) reveals the contracts ranked by SNEs themselves (Table 9).

Table 9. Percent of SNEs who have the following contact patterns (percent)

Intergovernmental contacts:	
- with the government of their country of origin	9
- with the governments of other countries	14
Supranational contacts:	
- with the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of their DG	5
- with Commissioners of other DGs	5
- with the Council of Ministers	6
- with the European Parliament	2
Departmental contacts:	
- with the Director General of their DG	3
- with the Director General of their Directorate	18
- with colleagues within their Unit	97
- with colleagues within other units in their DG	56
- with colleagues in other DGs	27
Epistemic contacts:	
- with individuals inside the Commission whom they respect for their expertise	36
- with individuals outside the Commission whom they respect for their expertise	27
- with the Commission expert committees	22
- with universities or research institutions	25
Mean N	100 (67)

Source: Trondal (2006c): 33, Table 1.

Table 9 demonstrates that departmental contacts have a mean of 40 %, epistemic contacts have a mean of 28 %, intergovernmental contacts have a mean of 12 % and supranational contacts have a mean of 5 %. Departmental contacts seem to dominate the others, consequently, the officials will tend to take into account first of all interests of own department when making a decision. An interesting observation concerns the officials' interactions with other countries: they are more intensive compared to the country of origin. This fact is difficult to explain by the rational choice theory, but it is possible to understand when applying the supranational perspective. The officials tend to consider interests of the whole society rather than own governments' interests and preferences.

Commission expert committees

Commission expert committees are one type of the EU committees that "are a vital component of a parallel community administration that cross-cuts the existing administrative boarders of the member-states and the EU" (Trondal, 2006d: 8). The committees are represented a number of external specialists helping the Commission in preparing initiatives, drafting optimal policy proposals, finding stable equilibrium between participants' interests and creating preferences (Trondal, 2006d). Furthermore, it can be seen as a socialization instrument that makes participants redefining their roles and allegiances (Checkel, 2005).

Unfortunately, there is a scarce amount of the empirical studies on Commission expert committees. The study by J. Trondal (2006b) shows that the institutional autonomy of Commission expert committees is stronger than within other EU committees (Council working groups and comitology committees). The study by M. Egeberg, G. Schaefer and J. Trondal (2006) compares Commission expert committees with the other type of EU committees. Both studies suggest that while Council working groups and comitology committees are strongly intergovernmental, Commission expert committees seem to be more multi-faceted (Egeberg et al., 2006). I would like to present a table that summarizes the answers of officials that attend Commission expert committees (Table 10).

Table 10. Percentage who to 'a great extent' feel allegiance to (identify with or feel responsible to) the following when participating in committees

	Commission expert committees
My own government	65
My own ministry, department or agency	74
The requirements of the policy arena in which I am working	58
My own professional backgrounds and expertise	60
The committee or group in which I participate	39
Total (N)	106

Table 10 shows that the allegiances evoked by experts in Commission expert committees are given first of all to own ministry, department or agency (74), secondly to intergovernmental allegiances (65), and thirdly to professional allegiances (60) that are very close to intergovernmental ones. The allegiances help officials to rank own priorities and, therefore, they tend to influence officials' decision-making behavior. The departmental allegiances seem to dominate others. Officials will tend to make decision by paying particular attention to own department.

Table 11 demonstrates the coordination behavior of officials before participating in committee meetings and the consideration taken into account by the officials when making a decision.

Table 11. Percentage of officials who coordinate their position 'most of the time' before participating in committee meetings and considerations taken into account

	EC
I have to coordinate with the foreign office or another central coordinating body	20
My position has in fact been coordinated with all relevant ministries	28
My position has been coordinated with all relevant departments in my own ministry	38
I have clear instructions about the position I should take	28
I take the position I think is in the best interest of my country	63
I take a position I think is best on the basis of my professional expertise	43
If I have no instructions, or if the question is not important for my country, I take the position I think is the best for the member states as a group	52
Total (N)	110

Source: the table is based on Egeberg et al. (2006): 83, Table 5.13   Note: EC = Commission expert committees

The table shows the coordination behavior as well as various considerations emphasized by officials when making a decision. Many take into consideration the interests of the national governments (63%). 52 % supports supranational dynamics, but only conditionally: just in the case where there are no instructions and own country's preferences the position that is best for the member states as a group is taken. Professional expertise as a consideration got 43%. The position is coordinated often with relevant departments in own ministry (38%), 28% is

coordinated with relevant ministry. The considerations taken into account and the coordination of officials' position should have impact on the formation of loyalties of the officials. The coordination behavior seem to be high with own departments in the relevant ministry. The considerations of own country's interest should give impact on the formation of intergovernmental dynamic.

To sum up

The European Commission represents a special case of transformation of executive governance among IEs (Egeberg, 2006b). There are definitely many common features between it and classical IGOs. The reason for that is that the structure of every international institution is based on the structure of national executive institutions. The Commission has a number of characteristics that makes it very different from a classical international executive: its multipurpose, supranational power and multilevel administration. Having a high degree of autonomy and responsibilities the European Commission has a small number of incumbents. The statutory staff sometimes is not able to cope with all various issues simultaneously. This is one of the reasons why the Commission imports seconded personnel. There are different types of officials working within the Commission. I have tried to summarize the studies on these three levels of the Commission. Top level officials tend to evoke more supranational dynamics than the other officials. The seconded national experts and the committees' expert tend primarily to evoke the departmental dynamics. However, the epistemic dynamic play an important role as well.

The OECD Secretariat

After the World War II the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was found in order to coordinate the Marshall Aid for Europe from the United States. In 1961 OEEC was replaced by the OECD. It included not just European countries, but also the United States and Canada. The main goal of the organization is to secure sustainable economic development around the world, i.e. growth and employment, financial stability, coordinate economic aid.

The structure of the OECD Secretariat is demonstrated in Figure 3. As in the case of the European Commission it is organized by the sector and function. However, it does not have a political leadership on the top as in the case of the European Commission. The potential for

conflicts across nations is much higher in the case of the OECD compared to the Commission. It is demonstrated by the thicker vertical lines in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The OECD Secretariat and the related cleavages

Due to limited data available for analysis of the OECD Secretariat compared to the Commission, more general information was used in order to find characteristics and decision-making dynamics within the institution.

The OECD does not produce any directives or regulations as does the European Union. The organization does not possess so many financial instruments. This fact makes it different from many other international organizations as e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The OECD does not dispose the resources for implementing the positive (pay-offs, financial support) and negative (sanctions) incentives in the international arena. Consequently, it is not supposed to have much authority compared to international organizations such as the European Union. However, social constructivism and organizational theory have another perspective on how the institutions can have a say in the formation of international norms (Marcussen, 2004). Without real economic power the OECD is still being listened to. One of the explanations is based on how the OECD positions itself in the international arena. It can be analyzed by social constructivism theory emphasizing an important ability of international institutions such as the OECD to socialize the actors involved.

One way of conceptualizing what an organization such as the OECD is actually doing, is to argue that it is playing an *idea game* through which it *collects and manipulates data, knowledge, visions and ideas and diffuses them* to its member countries and, to an even greater extent, to a number of non-member countries. (Marcussen, 2004: 91, original emphasis)

The OECD is able to produce just soft regulations. It is the way the OECD tries to influence member states. It is an idea game (Marcussen, 2002a, 2004). Soft regulations include information gathering and data processing, comparative analysis, distribution of visions and ideas. And these are exactly the functions OECD Secretariat officials have. There are many proofs that the principles of good practices worked well in practice. The thing that was so attractive for many countries was that the framework and ideas developed within the OECD are supposed to be implemented in each country. But the freedom of choosing the ways of bringing theory into practice was left to the national governments. This way helped to avoid the problems connected to the differences between countries in institutional background, culture etc. The success of the soft regulation method has been proved by other organizations' application of this method to own practices. One of the most known examples is the European Union. The European Union uses both hard and soft regulatory measures. The soft regulatory measures are also known as open method of coordination (OMC). Its application in other institutions is probably the best proof that invented by the OECD method works (Marcussen, 2004: 90). The reasons for the OECD's strategy success: "...it produces outcomes even in controversial policy areas where hard law would be difficult and ... the decentralist nature of soft law implementation is both flexible and considered legitimate" (Marcussen, 2004: 102).

The OECD can not be said to be an agenda setter in the international arena nowadays. Competition among the IGOs is too hard. The OECD had to find its own role in the international idea game. M. Marcussen (2002a) suggests that it should take a role as an ideational artist and arbitrator, a role the OECD had before 1990s. The organization's first Secretary General, T. Kristensen, by a role as an ideational artist meant the ability of the OECD to involve national governments in new political and economic debates (Marcussen, 2004). The ideational arbitrator is supposed to socialize national civil servants, making them able to get new ideas and visions to the country of origin from their experience with the OECD.

The original vision of the OECD as an ideational artist and arbitrator was redefined already in the 1990s: "The OECD is often described as a think tank or a generator of important and analytical studies, with little or no attention to its *raison d'etre* as an intergovernmental organization ... The OECD Council, composed of experienced Ambassadors, was not established to preside over think tank and data collector!" (OECD, 2001 in Marcussen, 2002a: 229). The whole principle of the OECD has suddenly been changed from being a generator of ideas, driven by the professional dynamics to becoming a classical intergovernmental organization. Previously, the OECD had a chance to follow the professional opinions that were born within the institution (epistemic dynamics) and the community interests (supranational dynamics). At present the OECD primarily reflects the intergovernmental dynamic by focusing on member states' interests. Such an important thing as budgeting of the OECD should be looked at. It is not possible to ignore the fact that 60 per cent of the OECD budget is coming from three countries: the United States, Germany and Japan (Marcussen, 2004: 100). The OECD had to follow some of the requirements from the sponsors. The OECD started playing role not just as an ideational agency, but also an ideational agent for particular countries as the United States (Marcussen, 2004). This of course influenced the OECD's possibility to play the idea game in the international arena.

The OECD has to be careful and consider preferences of all member states. The OECD does not have binding power on member states. Nor has it resources to provide negative or positive incentives. And the money issue is one explanation of the OECD's limited opportunities compared to European Union and the WTO. The resources that the OECD had in the beginning of the 1990s are not there at present. That is one of reasons why the OECD Secretariat was re-organized. It did constrain the OECD Secretariat in many ways. The officials had less opportunity to produce something new, discuss controversial issues as the member states are supposed to be listened first. The organization had to adapt to new conditions. At the same time the international environment was changing: a number of IGOs was increasing at a high speed and the OECD was not any longer alone in the market for inventing ideas.

Great competition from the new IGOs was increasing very fast. The fact that many of these institutions had various resources behind the ideas was a harsh waking reality for the OECD. Some of those organizations gained binding power (e.g. the WTO). Combined with financial

support it gave them an international authority. The OECD became more dependent on member states' preferences and needs in order to compete in the new environment with more influential organizations. It could not keep up a role as a trend setter and became a trend follower. It became an ideational agency that could sell ideas that were of interests to member states (Marcussen, 2002a).

The way the idea game is played by the OECD is heavily dependent on the work of the OECD Secretariat. Unfortunately, there has been given too little attention to the OECD Secretariat in the studies on the OECD itself. The OECD Secretariat consists of temporary contracted officials. The OECD's structure can be presented by two levels (Marcussen, 2004): the political and the administrative. The political level consists of the Council and the various committees. This level has advisory function: the representatives from the member states meet in the committees and the working groups. The administrative level is known as the OECD Secretariat. This level has an analytical function. The first level is closer connected to the OECD's role as an ideational arbitrator. It is described as so-called "permanent intergovernmental conference" defined by the OECD itself (Marcussen, 2004: 94). It consists of 42 committees and 98 working groups that work with data analysis provided them by the OECD Secretariat or member states.

The secretariat is assisted by a number of committees as in the case of the European Commission where Commission expert committees play this role. One such committee is the PUMA committee. It stands for the Public Managements Service and the Public Management Committee. It consists of the representatives from member states. Additionally PUMA gathers groups of national experts. The committee meets twice a year where the reports prepared by the secretariat and other groups are discussed. The activities are supervised by the OECD Secretariat itself "who also prepare and follow up the activities by producing documentation and publishing reports" (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000).

PUMA is responsible for collecting and processing of data. It also prepares basis for the final reports produced by the secretariat. It provides overview of improvement of particular areas of the public sector in member states. "PUMA formulated and transmitted standards rather than providing examples or advise for particular countries" (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Member states choose themselves to either follow these standards or not as in the case of all standards produced

by the OECD Secretariat. PUMA tried to set standards by its reports (e.g. *Governance in Transition: Public Management Reforms in OECD Countries* (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000)). It does not make specific recommendations to particular countries. It defines universal and general rules. Thus, the PUMA committee is an example of how international organization such as the OECD are able to set normative standards, even though they were just intended to be an arena for exchanging ideas and experiences.

There is no systematic study of how OECD Secretariat officials perceive their job and who they feel responsible for. And this is a big hindrance for the thesis as it prevents us from getting more systematic results. The OECD Secretariat consists primarily of A-category officials as policy-making requires academic education. Table 12 gives an overview of the number of A-category officials from 1960 until 2005.

Table 12. Development in the number of OEDC-officials (A-category)

	1960	1991	1995	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total number of the employees (A-category)	135	643	761	755	797	839	874	870	898	921
Average age	-	45	45	44	44	44	45	45	45	45
Average tenure	-	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4

Source: Marcussen, 2002a: 50, Table 2.10 and Marcussen, 2006, Table "Udviklingen i antal OECD-ansatte (A-grad)

As we can see a number of officials has been increasing. The organization has been growing as new members were joining and organization's responsibilities were widening. The average age of employees has not changed that much. The average tenure has decreased from 6 years in the beginning of 1990s till 4 years in 2005 (Figure 4). Hence, tenure is rather low.

The OECD represents a classical intergovernmental organization where there are member-states' interests to be discussed. The logical assumption would be that OECD officials tend to develop intergovernmental behavior. However, lack of primary data prevents us from concluding it with certainty.

Figure 4 demonstrates the average tenure among officials within the OECD Secretariat as it was for year 2000. Most of officials spend less than five years within the OECD.

Figure 4. Years of employment in the OECD, A-category officials, 2000

Source: the figure is based on Marcussen, 2002a: 61, Figure 2.4

The table indicates that the average tenure was rather low in the OECD Secretariat. More than 50 % of officials did not stay longer than 5 years within the institution. It will have implications on formation of allegiances towards the instituion among officials, they are able to develop some loyalties towards own institution and act in the interests of own institution.

I would also like to mention officials working in the OECD delegations in order to show the attitude of member states to the OECD. The number of representatives sent says something about how serious and important they consider the OECD to be. Table 13 (Marcussen, 2002a: 61, Table 2.17, own translation) gives an overview of the number of national representatives from different countries (just for Denmark the author used a number of full-time officials).

Table 13. The officials in the OECD delegations in Paris

Country	Officials	Country	Officials	Country	Officials

EU Commission Iceland Ireland Luxembourg Slovakia	4	Belgium Canada Holland Italy	9	Spain	15
Denmark	4,5	Finland Greece	10	USA	16
Sverige New Zealand Check Republic Hungary	6	Australia Norway	11	Germany	18
France Switzerland Austria	7	Mexico	12	Korea	26
Portugal Poland Great Britain	8	Turkey	14	Japan	42

Source Marcussen, 2002a: 61, Table 2.17, own translation

The table shows the distribution of the places among member-states. The European countries still tend to get in touch with the OECD by staying "at home", just sending some officials when necessary (Marcussen, 2002a: 61). The idea of having a contact with the OECD through delegations indicates the existence of intergovernmental principles lying in the foundation of the institution.

To sum up

The role of the OECD has been changing over time: from being an idea innovator and a think tank to becoming a trend follower. A role of an ideational artist and arbitrator requires that OECD Secretariat officials follow their professional expertise and are creative in applying their knowledge and competencies. Officials should feel demands of the international society and closely cooperate with experts both from national and international institutions in order to create something original. And this role was stimulating epistemic dynamic to a high extent. Furthermore, supranational dynamic should have been observed as a consequence of institution's independency on member states. However, the function of the OECD Secretariat has changed considerably. The OECD became an ideational agency for member states. And the fact that the OECD produces soft law and does not really have a financial reserve to back up own ideas with made the institution to follow member states' interests. This observation demonstrates that the OECD Secretariat tends to show intergovernmental dynamic as typical IGOs. However, lack of

data has not allowed us to get more explicit information about which dynamics are evoked within the institution.

The WTO Secretariat

The origins of the WTO lie in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that came along already in 1947 after the World War II. All big IGOs were actually founded right after the World War II when the weakened nation-states needed cooperation and expertise from non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

As in the case of the OECD Secretariat, due to limited data available for analysis of the WTO Secretariat, more general information was used in order to find characteristics and decision-making dynamics within the institution.

The GATT was actually an agreement signed between member states, not an organization in its original meaning. Today the WTO is not a treaty any longer, but an organization in its own right where ministers meet on regularly basis, with a better organized administrative level than before (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 253). The GATT and its successor, the WTO, have had some great goals to achieve: free and fair trade through opening the economies, encouraging economic reforms, competition and undermining the protectionist perspective on trade issues.

A big difference between the WTO and the OECD and the similarity with the European Commission is the possession of some binding power on its member states. The famous dispute settlement processes that take place when some country violates signed agreements are an example of punishment power the WTO possesses. The WTO has own instruments for member state compliance. It can set technical regulations and standard that members are supposed to follow, tariffs and quotas and other non-tariff barriers, percent of import in each country, subsidies for agriculture production etc. Common basic rules have covered areas that were originally outside the WTO's authority. The WTO has suddenly gained attention from all over the world. It is a main indicator of the influence the WTO. "Other international organizations look to the WTO as a model to be copied, with a desire to have the same weight and authority" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 3).

Basically, there have been two alternative attitudes towards the WTO. Many have looked at the WTO as the organization that through the trade issues has been able to bring prosperity and reduce the poverty rates in the world through higher economic growth, make people recognize human rights issues, help the ones that are worst off, bring fairness in the world trade system, make people aware of the environmental problems etc.

However, the opinions on the WTO have not always been positive. There are many that criticize the WTO. The basic critics are that the WTO is a puppet in the hands of a powerful group. The WTO was accused in taking into consideration just interests of the transnational corporations and influential member states, making the poor even poorer and the rich richer, harming environment, contributing to higher unemployment rates etc. The issue of national sovereignty has been discussed as well: whether the WTO undermines national sovereignty of member states or not. "The WTO is described as the most visible symbol of the unregulated economic globalization and the worst offender in damaging the interests of developing countries" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 2).

The WTO is "seen as so powerful that it can either cause al those political, social and economic ills, or alternatively bring the world together" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 2). It feels like it can not be anything in-between. It can indicate that the organization has authority and influence in the international arena. The WTO "has more authority over national policies than any other international economic organization ... the WTO's judicial and regulatory powers are unprecedented for an international organization" (Gilpin, 2001: 382). "With ... unprecedented powers, the WTO, to some is able to approach the neo-liberal ideal by constraining the behavior of all states, the rich and the poor alike, while, to others, to impose what the rich want on the poor" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 3).

There are 149 members in the WTO, i.e. the WTO includes 90 percent of the countries all over the world. They meet at the Ministerial Conferences to negotiate new arrangements. And it is actually amazing that the regular staff of less than 600 people is able to assist and manage a great amount of preparation work. Already in the past decade, when the GATT became the WTO, there was a discussion on whether the Secretariat has been just too small to manage the increasing workload.

The office is situated in Geneva and has in total only 594 officials of around 70 nationalities. The WTO Secretariat is headed by the Director General, Paskal Lami. The WTO Secretariat officials do not have any decision-making power. Still, their role should not be underestimated. They are responsible for gathering, processing data and especially the shaping of proposals can be very influential.

Similarly to the European Commission and the OECD Secretariat, the WTO Secretariat is organized by sector and function as it is demonstrated in Figure 5. However, similarly to the OECD Secretariat it does not have a political leadership on the top as in the case of the European Commission. The potential for contestation across member states in the case of the WTO is similar in the case of the OECD. It is demonstrated by the thicker vertical lines in Figure 5.

Figure 5. The WTO Secretariat and the related cleavages

The WTO
Secretariat

Organized by
sector/
function

Sectoral   Nation A   Nation B   Nation C
cleavages

It is acknowledged that the WTO is a member-driven organization. However, the interpretation of the WTO Secretariat is varied (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004). What is actually meant by the phrase "member-driven" if there are 149 member states involved? If there are 149 member states, then, consequently, there are 149 opinions involved that often either overlap or contrast to each other. Of course the decisions are made by member states, but it is more to it than just the process of signing an agreement. And it is where WTO Secretariat officials play the main role. The interviewed officials formulated the principle of their work as following: "None of Secretariat would deny the delegates the right make the decisions. But experience tells them that

50

there is a need for oil to grease the wheels to allow negotiations to proceed, for the occasional steering and assistance in the drafting and sorting ideas" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 264).

Table 14 demonstrates the WTO Secretariat's capacity in terms of human and capital resources.

Table 14. The WTO Secretariat's staff and budget 1999-2006

	1999	2000	2003	2005	2006
The WTO Secretariat Budget In mill CHF	120,2	125,4	152	164,1	170,3
Number of employees	533	534	596	630	635,5 (594)
Nationalities	About 60	61	About 60	About 70	About 70

Source: WTO Annual reports from WTO publications

635,5 (594) indicates the budget posts consolidated in 2006, with some posts not yet filled

The WTO Secretariat has had limited resources, especially the human capital. The regular staff of 594 at the moment has to deal with continuously increasing workload. The positive thing is that budget of the WTO Secretariat has increased.

As in the case of the OECD Secretariat here is no systematic study of how OECD Secretariat officials perceive their job and who they feel responsible for. It is possible to find data on the staff and the budget of the institution. And the comparative data was presented in Table 3.

Table 3 in this chapter shows that the WTO staff in 1996 was the smallest among the three institutions, whereas the Commission has more than ten times officials than the OECD. The budget of the Commission was much higher compared to the OECD and the WTO. However, the costs per staff member were the highest for the OECD, both in the case of the actual and purchasing-power parity exchange rates. The statistics reveals that already in 1996 the WTO Secretariat was very small. Ten years later the situation did not changed significantly. The WTO Secretariat has staff of only 594 officials; the budget is 170, 3 millions of Swiss Francs (Table 14). It is around 136 millions of the U.S. dollars in 2006. The budget has increased significantly compared to 97 millions in 1996 (Table 3). The increasing budget could indicate "the continuing need, as in case of the OECD also, (1) to ensure and to demonstrate that the secretariat is well

managed and maintains high professional standards, and (2) for member governments to see it that national delegations likewise are effectively staffed and run" (Henderson, 1998: 124).

The small number of staff could be a sign that the WTO Secretariat has managed its role, maybe not perfectly, but sufficiently as it has not been re-structured. The GATT's transformation to the WTO did not bring about big changes; the officials did not get very different functions. It indicates that the work of officials was satisfying and that officials managed to use their education and professional experiences to coordinate the WTO Secretariat in day-to-day decision-making.

To sum up

The WTO Secretariat is very small in terms of size and regular staff considering the fact that the organization unites 90 percent of the world. A number of issues being transferred in the WTO Secretariat's responsibility has been growing. The WTO has always played a role as a classical intergovernmental organization. The role of the WTO Secretariat's staff itself has often been underestimated, primarily because the decisions are to be taken by member states. But it is like a part of an iceberg that you see above the sea surface: what about all the preparations, analysis, researches, proposals, and advices? Who helped and assisted member states, regulate the conflicts between 149 countries, facilitate negotiations? It is a stab of less than 600 people that are able to keep things running. The institution seems to have more intergovernmental features. However, the problem connected to limited data available on the WTO Secretariat does not allow us to get deeper insight in the decision-making dynamics within the institution.

Chapter 4. Reassessing international executive institution. A comparative analysis

This part of the thesis has intention to compare the decision-making dynamics across three chosen executives. The differences and similarities are analyzed by systematically comparing the organizational characteristics of the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat.

Decision-making dynamics are going to be analyzed through independent variables across the executives. Civil servants tend to evoke multiple preferences, identities and different role perceptions (Egeberg et al., 2006: 77). The multiple identities and role perceptions are not mutually exclusive. Different institutions and different tasks make officials accept the diversity of interests and allegiances. Particular identities and decision-making behavior tend to dominate in some cases (March and Olsen, 1995).

For analyzing the dynamics within the three IEs a number of studies was used. The findings of L. Hooghe (2001) and J. Trondal (2004) are of importance when analyzing the European Commission. L. Hooghe (2001) in order to find out what the motivations and preferences of the top Commission officials. Hooghe (2001) combined two approaches to human motivation: one that takes origins in the sociological values and a second one that is based on the paradigm of utilitarian self-interest (Rhinard and Vaccari, 2005). The findings showed that role perceptions of top officials were more varied than it was expected and that "top officials' preferences are better explained by formative experiences outside the Commission (nationality, political party, profession, etc.) than by experiences within" (Rhinard and Vaccari, 2005: 388). The importance of organizational structure and political system is conducive to the formation of actor preferences. J. Trondal (2004, 2006c) focuses on seconded national experts in the Commission and their role perceptions. His analysis suggests that individual loyalties are dependent on a number of factors as officials' affiliations, pre-socialization and recruitment procedures (Rhinard and Vaccari, 2005). The study by M. Egeberg et al. (2006) were used in order to see which variable influence behavior of Commission experts committees' officials.

The findings of M. Marcussen (2002a) are of importance when analyzing the OECD Secretariat. The dynamics within the institution were primarily connected to the changing role of the OECD itself. The OECD's role as an ideational actor and arbitrator changed to an ideational agency. It had some effect on all five variables we have defined; those influenced the dynamics developed within the OECD Secretariat.

The analysis of X. Yi-chong and P. Weller (2004) and D. Henderson (1998) are of importance when analyzing the WTO Secretariat. The studies managed to compare the WTO with other with other IGOs and give understanding of what factors influenced decision-making dynamics among within the WTO Secretariat.

Organizational properties (H1)

"In an administrative setting...identification with a particular organizational unit could mean that his unit's goals, objectives, norms and ways of doing things are the value-indices which more or less automatically guide an official's proposals and decisions" (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999: 94). There are many similarities across the chosen executives with respect to organizational properties. The European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat are all specialized, both vertically and horizontally.

The European Commission functions according to non-territorial dynamics, "although the procedure for appointing commissioners and the geographical quota system for recruiting personnel to the services may point the opposite direction" (Egeberg, 2006c: 22-23). "The essentially sectoral and functional directorate general (DG) structure probably explains why patterns of cooperation and conflict at the Commission so often seem to follow sectoral rather than territorial lines" (Egeberg, 2006d: 23). The non-territorial organization of the Commission is demonstrated in Figure 1 in Chapter 3.

"...Deep integration of a system built on territorial components, as in the EU case, would presuppose some system-wide institutions structure by non-territorial criteria" (Egeberg, 2006d: 20). The study by M. Egeberg (2006b) suggests that the executive politics within the EU is characterized much more by sectoral and functional portfolios than by territorial ones and external party of belonging. Hence, departmental dynamic is evoked within the Commission.

Furthermore, often the specialization of the units requires professional assistance of departments and units. Therefore, epistemic dynamic is evoked in the Commission as well as a consequence of the existence of horizontal specialization within the institution. In the case when territorial criteria are put aside in an organization the basic idea is to consider the "common good", thus, supranational dynamic could be seen as well. At the same time, there are still some matters that evoke intergovernmental dynamics, e.g. the budgetary issues and personnel policy (Egeberg, 2006c). Therefore, departmental, epistemic and supranational dynamics evoked within Commission DGs and units are to be seen together with the intergovernmental dynamic on some matters.

Structure of the OECD Secretariat was copied from ministerial level in member-states as it was done for all international institutions. Nothing new was invented here. The Secretariat is specialized both horizontally and vertically. The same is often done at the domestic level in order to displace regional tensions within the country (Egeberg, 2004b). Horizontally it is specialized into eleven functional directories/departments. The biggest directorate, both in terms of officials and financial support, is the Economics Department. Head of departments are responsible for work of particular directorates and departments that represent vertical specialization of the secretariat. The divisions are headed by the Heads of Division. There are also six semi autonomous bodies involved as e.g. the International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency.

At the administrative level the biggest directorate, the Economics Department, is divided into the Policy Studies Branch and the Country Studies Branch that is involved in a surveillance process. Policy Studies Branch's concerns are the general studies and analysis at the macro-economic level; where as the Country Studies Branch's specializes on the countries, both members and non-members of the OECD. The Economic and Development Review Committee is of importance at the political level of the organization. It works with surveillance issues in particular countries. The functions of the committee are to plan the survey's topics, to collect information, to make a survey and to publish the final survey. The whole multilateral surveillance process is more about experience and information sharing, discussions that include the experts both within own institution and outside of it (H3 and H5) and the politicians in the country being "reviewed". It makes people discuss issues at the professional level contributing to

the formation of epistemic logic. The intensity of the communication, thus, is supposed to be high. And length of interactions is supposed to be long due to basic idea of this communications: to keep each other informed by continuous information sharing.

There are more than 900 officials employed to which we should add half thousand that could be employed for special purposes. The vertical specialization presented by the hierarchy. There are many levels, maybe even sublevels, involved in developing one project or signing the document. Horizontal specialization is mainly by function and purpose in order to operate more efficiently. The hierarchical structure (vertical specialization) and horizontal specialization by sectors are likely to give more executive autonomy, to the departments, thus, evoking departmental decision-making dynamic among officials. And similar to the Commission departmental dynamic is likely to appear as a consequence of specialization. Furthermore, departmental logic stimulates the concentration of sectoral specialists within the departments. It indicates the existence of epistemic dynamic.

The WTO Secretariat is both horizontally and vertically specialized. The WTO Secretariat functions are of a different nature. The WTO Secretariat provides committees and working groups with professional support and updated data and analysis of the world economic developments and tendencies. Moreover, it administers agreements and communicates with public and other international organizations. It also organizes conferences and provides legal assistance to the negotiations with potential members. Therefore, in order to provide efficiency the WTO Secretariat is split up by function and purpose into nineteen divisions that can be compared to the European Commission and some divisions that cover information tasks and support functions. The divisions' Directors report to the Deputy Director-General or to the Director-General himself. This indicates high degree of vertical specialization. The WTO Secretariat horizontal specialization by purpose and function and not by territoriality indicates the likelihood of development of departmental dynamic. Whereas high degree of vertical specialization may foster departmental dynamic as high degree of hierarchy makes a person conscious of that s/he belongs to the particular organization with norms and rules.

Therefore, all three institutions are horizontal specialized by purpose and function. Now another characteristic of organizational property, vertical specialization, should be analyzed.

The vertical specialization is higher within the Commission. The Commission is the executive body with wider range of responsibilities. What makes it also special compared to the OECD and the WTO Secretariats is the existence of a political top in the institution. Top Commission officials develop higher degree of identification with the whole organization compared to SNEs. "Due to their structural positions, senior officials are, compared to their subordinates expected to have a sense of belonging to more inclusive units, thus, to take a wider range of concerns into account when making decisions" (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999: 97). It basically means that top Commission officials tend to care of the "common good", to be more independent in decision-making. Consequently, they will tend to evoke autonomous dynamics: supranational and departmental dynamics.

Therefore, in spite of the fact that the three IEs share organizational similarities some differences in officials' preference formation and decision-making behavior are found. The similarities are found in the horizontal specialization of the institutions. The dynamics within the IEs are shown to be mainly departmental and epistemic; supranational dynamic can be observed as a consequence of putting aside territorial criteria in organization. The existence of a political level in the Commission gives it more power and authority. This should make the institution better fulfill its responsibilities when organization has wide jurisdiction as it is shown in the example of the European Commission. Higher degree of vertical specialization can be found in the Commission compared to the OECD and the WTO Secretariats. As a consequence of horizontal and vertical specialization departmental dynamic is evoked within the three institutions, whereas supranational dynamic appears mainly within the Commission, primarily at the top level.

Recruitment procedures (H2)

The recruitment procedures are the second factor that can influence personnel's identification with a particular institution. The basic two types of recruitment procedures, merit and quota principles, are used in order to re-socialize the officials, to create allegiances towards either primary or secondary structures. The recruitment procedures applied within the Commission, the OECD and the WTO Secretariats differ. Consequently, decision-making dynamics to be found within the institutions are likely to vary as well.

The Commission seems to strengthen its independence from member states over the years (Egeberg, 2004). The recruitment procedures played their role in the Commission's transformation. In the very beginning, when the Commission was just founded, most of the work was done by temporary personnel from the member states administrations (Egeberg, 2006b). This contradicted an idea of the federalist J. Monnet. His idea was all about building a new European order with "the emergence of a new type of supranational being, or 'European Man'" (Shore, 2000: 177). In order to get independent officials "Monnet rejected the model of delegated or temporary and seconded national civil servants typical for most other international organizations…" (Shore, 2000: 177). Nowadays permanent positions with life-long careers at the European Commission are quite common (Egeberg, 2006b). Officials are recruited on the basis of merit. And this of course has a great impact on the civil servants' loyalties (Egeberg, 2003, 2006b). They tend to develop a sense of belonging to the whole organization. They tend to evoke allegiance towards own institution and department. Therefore, we can observe supranational dynamic within the institution according to Shore (2000) and departmental dynamics according to Egeberg (2003, 2006b). Table 4 in Chapter 3 shows that a number of full-time officials has increased considerably in the past two decades.

The idea of employing temporary officials could be interpreted as follows: "The employment of temporary staff encourages an intermingling of national and European administrators which itself has the potential to provoke a sort of process of Europeanisation at the national and sub-national levels" (Cini, 1996:121). For the Commission it can be one way of "promoting" itself, sharing with others accumulated knowledge, making others interested in being part of so-called multilevel Union administration (Egeberg, 2006b).

There are more permanent positions in the Commission than temporary ones. However, due to the increased amount of tasks the number of seconded officials from the national administration is still there. "Today, few international organizations have institutionalized a parallel administration to the same extent as the European Commission" (Trondal, 2004: 70). The Commission is obviously understaffed, the workload has increased and the Commission needs to get some external help. It gets help through comitology, a special phenomenon that is found within the European Union, and through external help of non-permanent officials (Trondal, 2004).

Compatible with the wishes of Jean Monnet when staffing the High Authority, temporary officials provide the Commission with additional expertise, supply of learning across levels of government, secure the Commission with the more flexible workforce hired through a fast-track recruitment system, and officials with added experiences (Trondal, 2006c: 14).

Already in 2001 there were about 16.000 permanent positions and over 4.000 non-permanent positions (Trondal, 2004: 70). The fact that the number of the permanent positions is couple of times as high as the number of temporary positions should indicate some success of Monnet's plan of having the independent civil servants acting in the interests of the Community. From Monnet's perspective "the parallel administration of the Commission represented a 'Trojan Horse' threatening the coherence and autonomy of the core executive body of the emerging European Community" (Trondal, 2004: 70). But is it actually true? Do seconded officials tend to disturb the incremental development of supranational dynamics within the institution?

Do the recruitment procedures influence role perceptions of officials? As Egeberg (2004) showed in the study of top Commission officials that they are chosen on the basis of merit, not according to the necessity of having people of particular nationality. It "seems to be that the tendency to attach national flags to top posts at the Commission almost has come to an end, and that the strict geographical quota system practiced formerly has been abandoned" (Egeberg, 2004: 11). The merit principle of recruitment indicates open competition for vacancies. Therefore, the merit principle is outside of member states' influence. Thus, it gives more authority to the Commission. Consequently, it fosters supranational decision-making dynamic among officials.

Seconded national experts are recruited by a "submarine principle" (Trondal, 2006c). It means that the vacancies are not actually opened for competition. It is particular DGs and the Heads of Units that finalize the recruitment decision. Moreover, the personal initiatives of potential officials play an important role. In the interview by C. Shore (2000) many new recruited officials stated that their first jobs in the Commission were a result of lobbying of Heads of Units by cultivating contacts. The "submarine principle" indicates the existence of departmental dynamic within the Commission.

Commission expert committees that provide support to the Commission are represented by national civil servants. The fact that committee participants are actually employed in the country of origin should indicate existence of intergovernmental dynamic. However, the data does not confirm it. Table 10 in Chapter 3 shows that departmental allegiances are evoked more often (74%), then intergovernmental and epistemic ones (65 and 60 % accordingly).

Thus, the recruitment procedures in the Commission indicate the existence of supranational dynamic going side by side with intergovernmental dynamic. Furthermore, departmental dynamic could be developed as the seconded experts are recruited according to the "submarine principle", where the Commission's departments play a decisive role. The professional expertise is an important factor for recruiting the officials to Commission expert committees.

Recruitment procedures in the OECD are characterized by the secondment system. Short term contracts are the norm and the average seniority within the institution is four years. It influences directly civil servants' loyalties (H4). In general, the size of the countries and the number of representatives from the countries are correlated. Also, there is a number of nationalities that are favored. The fact that the majority of the OECD Secretariat officials is seconded from the member states on temporary contracts make it possible to describe the entire OECD Secretariat as a parallel administration (Trondal et al., 2004). The secondment system as recruitment procedure together with "favored nationalities" principle will evoke intergovernmental decision-making dynamic within the institution. Furthermore, the secondment system could also stimulate departmental and epistemic dynamics as in the case with the European Commission. Officials are hired to represent their portfolios and area expertise.

In international organizations specialized on technical matters the officials are employed on the basis of merit and also with some consideration to regional representation. The WTO is no exception. WTO Secretariat officials are supposed to be hired on the basis of merit. The vacancies are open for competition. However, there is some discrimination to be noticed. The recruitment procedures within the WTO Secretariat are described as follows: "Where equally qualified applicants are competing for the same position, preference is given to candidates from under represented countries or region" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 49). Thus, regarding the

officials' formation of identification with organization, the recruitment procedures in the WTO Secretariat foster intergovernmental dynamic.

The studies by L.Hooghe (2001) and J.Trondal (2004) were focusing on two different types of civil servants within the institution. This is one of the biggest differences between the European Commission compared to the classical examples of the OECD and the WTO Secretariats. The Commission consists of permanent officials combined with non-statutory staff seconded from national governments. And it is not that there is no such a thing as combination of these two types of officials within other organizations, but that the number of them and the dependency on their activities are different.

The OECD Secretariat is represented mostly by seconded personnel from the member states and by the extended formal network of the OECD Secretariat, i.e. supportive committees as PUMA, while the majority of the WTO Secretariat officials have permanent positions. The European Commission's statutory staff has to be assisted by the seconded personnel. The reason is of course that the Commission is understaffed compared to its increasing number of responsibilities and issues to take care of. The OECD Secretariat seems to have no need for permanent positions as there is an obvious dominance of national ministries and agencies that participate in the formation of the institution's policies. The OECD Secretariat does not have an opportunity to influence the decisions, does not have binding power towards all member states, the whole activity has advisory character. As its decisions are not necessary to be implemented, then, the need for control is much less compared to the European Commission.

Even if we compare the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat the difference can be noticed: the WTO has been getting somewhat more power from the member states. The WTO was started with the purely economic issues. But it got some binding power towards member states. And it has been getting more authority connected to the areas outside their original responsibilities, e.g. trade in services (GATTS). With regard to history of the institution, when the GATT was transformed to the WTO the need for restructuring was not necessary and many positions still remain the same.

In sum, the recruitment procedures influence decision-making dynamics within the institutions differently. The European Commission officials at different levels evoke different types of decision-making dynamics: at the top level supranational dynamic is evoked, at the level of seconded national experts departmental dynamic is seen, and, finally, at the level of Commission expert committees departmental dynamic also seems to be salient. However, the OECD and the WTO Secretariats do not have a multilevel structure within the organization. OECD Secretariat officials develop intergovernmental dynamic through the recruitment procedures and the "favorable nation" principle. The WTO Secretariat has a combination of dynamics: supranational dynamic is evoked as a consequence of the merit recruitment procedure that makes officials developing the identifications with the whole organization and intergovernmental dynamic is evoked as a consequence of applied principle of preferable nation.

Organizational affiliations (H3)

> Organizations that require participation on a full-time basis ('primary structures') and that provide permanent posts are more likely to significantly affect participants' interests and loyalties than organizations made up of part-timers ('secondary affiliations') and temporary positions (Egeberg, 2006c: 53).

The socialization logic predicts that the officials that spend most of their time within institutions would tend to internalize institutional values and evoke decision-making dynamics accordingly (Hooghe, 2001: 99). The organizational affiliations will define norms and restrictions to follow for officials.

Behavior of the officials is dependent on a logic of primacy and a logic of recency. In relation to these two types of logics we have to take the institutional boundaries as a decisive argument for evoking either one or another type of logic. The European Commission has well defined institutional boundaries that help the officials to operate within the logic of primacy.

Officials at the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat evoke the logic of recency. Their tasks and roles have been changing: the OECD had to change its role of ideational actor and arbitrator while the WTO had to deal with some areas outside of its responsibility. The officials are more likely to evoke recent experiences when making a decision. This could indicate that blurred institutional boundaries would contribute to the formation of the logic of recency as it is easier for the personnel to follow the behavior they have used recently instead of trying to figure

out the organizational rules. The logic of primacy is evoked by officials that spend most of their time inside the institution. The logic of recency is evoked primarily by officials that spend time outside of own institution and that have secondary affiliations dominating the primary ones. The logic of primacy is more likely to be noticed in such a highly vertically integrated body as the Commission, whereas the logic of recency is more likely to be evoked within the OECD and the WTO Secretariats.

Officials with a long time of employment (H4) in one institution are likely to develop intensive primary organizational affiliations with the departments and units. Therefore, officials in permanent positions will tend to have stronger identification with the whole institution and own department than outside of the organization. This is the case of the European Commission. The WTO Secretariat has permanent positions, but it does not have capacity to manage the workload. The secretariat involves member states by getting them to take part in analyzing the current situation of the countries.

We should consider officials' interactions with other sectorally organized institutions, i.e. secondary institutions, national institutions and international organizations. Top Commission officials spend almost 60 % of total time on internal Commission affairs, i.e. on their primary affiliations, while just 38 % was spent on policy-related activities with actors outside the Commission, i.e. on secondary affiliations (Hooghe, 2001: 60-61) (Table 7 in Chapter 3). The intergovernmental interactions are still a big share of top officials' affiliations. These findings indicate that top officials spend much more time within their primary structure, the Commission, developing stronger primary affiliations. Furthermore, it should stimulate the development of identification with the organization as a whole, supranational decision-making dynamic. Furthermore, 34 % of the time was spent on supervision, organization and coordination, i.e. administrative activities within DG. It demonstrates the existence of departmental dynamic. Moreover, actors that top officials interact most with are likely to be specialists in a particular area. Interaction between experts within the same area is likely to evoke epistemic dynamic.

The density of interaction between the different actors was found among Commission's SNEs. The study by Trondal (2006c) presented in Chapter 3 reveals the contacts ranked by the SNEs themselves: departmental contacts have a mean of 40 %, epistemic contacts have a mean of 28

%, intergovernmental contacts have a mean of12 % and supranational contacts have a mean of 5 % (Table 9 in Chapter 3). The departmental contacts are managed within Units and DGs. The departmental dynamic is followed by the epistemic ones (28 %) as the officials are assigned to particular portfolios that need a professional treatment.

Commission expert committees' officials have their home institutions as their primary structures and the Commission as a secondary structure. In spite of the intense work for the Commission in a specific period of time the officials do have stronger relationship and connections to their home institutions (Egeberg et al., 2006). Often their positions are coordinated by the national governments before entering the committee (63%) (Table 11 in Chapter 3). At the same time many of officials are guided by supranational principles (52%). 43 % of officials are guided by professional expertise. Thus, taking into consideration the fact that expert committees have the Commission as a secondary structure, and intergovernmental contacts still play an important role in expert committees' work. This role is bigger at Commission expert committees' level than at any other level within the Commission.

Commission expert committees' officials tend to develop a mixture of dynamics as a consequence of interactions with different institutions. Table 10 in Chapter 3 shows how officials from expert committees rank their loyalties. The departmental allegiances are evoked by 74 % participating in the committees, the intergovernmental allegiances are evoked by 65 %, and, finally, the epistemic allegiances are evoked by 60 %. From that we can conclude that most interactions happen either within the department or with own government (or with experts, possible from own governments).

The OECD Secretariat provides the organization with technical and professional support, assists the political level of the organization in administering the OECD day-to-day operation. Also the OECD Secretariat is responsible for public relations including relations with member states and communication with other international organizations. The role as ideational artist and arbitrator can be shown by taking one of the OECD's well-known activities - multilateral surveillance with peer review. The multilateral activity is supposed to help discovering the network of the OECD Secretariat officials and the type of institutions civil servants tend to interact more with (H5). In

order to understand the mechanism of the OECD multilateral surveillance it is necessary to present the basic organizational structure.

The multilateral surveillance is one example of how the OECD Secretariat still keeps up with the organization's vision. It is able to set the agenda in the countries with peer review. Cooperation between the OECD experts and national experts are continuous, dialogue is not supposed to be stopped. The secondary institutions, consequently, seem to have more influence on civil servants than the primary ones. Moreover, exactly these kinds of interactions could contribute to the constructivist's idea of gradual learning and socialization (Checkel, 2001). And that is a special role that international organizations as the OECD have the potential to play. However, the decision-making dynamics within of the organization prevent it from reaching its vision, at least at the very present moment. Officials at the OECD Secretariat would still have their home institutions as a primary structure and, thus, tend to evoke intergovernmental dynamic to a high extent.

The WTO civil servants are often asked for advice or assistance by member states as the delegates from member states can not cover all the specter of issues, be on all meetings or predict the consequences for their national economies (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 265). These kinds of interactions contribute to the development of dense secondary affiliations. It always requires trust from member states' side, confidentiality from officials' side. Depending on the issue, communication can get very intense and long-lasting (H5). The long-lasting dense secondary affiliations (both with country of origin and other member states) would favor intergovernmental dynamic. The long-lasting intense communications of officials with national experts support epistemic dynamic.

Commission officials seem to spend most of their time within the institution. Just Commission expert committees' officials could have the Commission as its secondary affiliation. And in spite of that the dynamics observed are departmental combined with intergovernmental and epistemic. The same concerns the OECD officials: they have the secretariat as their secondary affiliation as they spend just limited time within the institution (up to four years). However, the intergovernmental dynamic is combined with epistemic dynamic. For WTO Secretariat officials the WTO Secretariat represents their primary affiliation. However, the size of the institution and

the number of officials do not allow the organization to operate as the Commission with its multi-level administration. The WTO Secretariat has to turn to national administrations for help in gathering and analyzing data that could be compared and applied later by the secretariat. Therefore, intergovernmental dynamic is mainly developed.

Organizational demography (H4)

Tenure within particular institutions, previous job experiences, educational background are demographic factors that would influence role perceptions and behavioral dynamics of officials.

The thing that is noticeable when looking at the Commission personnel compared to officials from the OECD and the WTO is that officials have been given "explicit political power and influence over the decision-making process" (Shore, 2000: 143). "The Commission's complex functions, its legal status and the ambiguity of its role as a political broker and bureaucracy have important implications for the identity and self-image of its staff" (Shore, 2000:144). Officials at the OECD and the WTO Secretariat do not have such a decision-making power. In spite of that their role should not be underestimated. They are responsible for gathering, processing data, especially shaping of proposals can be very important. They are able to use their influence.

The educational background of officials seems to be highly specialized, for both permanent employees and national experts. "A university degree is a formal entry requirement for all policy management positions in the Commission (A-level in Commission jargon)" (Hooghe, 2001: 53). The education is of importance as well as the previous occupations. In 2001 there was just 18 of top officials that had the Commission as their first working experience, 37,6 % were coming from other institutions, both national and EU, and 38,4 % had been experts for different organizations before joining the Commission (Hooghe, 2001: 57, Table 2.7).

Most of top Commission officials are cosmopolitans, e.g. nearly 40 % have got their education abroad (Hooghe, 2001: 54, Table 2.5). They have been connected to the European Union through either their multinational families or interests in European Union (Hooghe, 2001). The percentage of experts among seconded personnel is likely to be even higher than among the statutory staff as they are normally employed to deal with particular issue that is within their field. High specialization is more likely to evoke epistemic decision-making behavior among

officials within the institution. The experts share a core set of values, ideas, perspective on life etc. And cosmopolitanism, that would mostly characterize top officials, is to indicate the existence of supranational role perceptions and behavior among officials.

Education and experience are the factors influencing behavior of officials. Officials before recruited to the Commission are pre-socialized. It concerns both statutory and non-statutory staff. The statutory staff that has been staying long with the Commission can become more re-socialized (Trondal, 2004). It is able to develop higher degree of identification with own department, own institution. Therefore, there is a potential for development of departmental and supranational dynamics.

The tenure of officials within the Commission is long. Table 5 in Chapter 3 shows that more than 86,9 % of top officials have stayed within the institution 5 years or longer (Hooghe, 2001: 56, Table 2.6). The mobility between the Directorates is shown to be quiet low. This can stimulate the formation of officials' allegiances towards own department.

Table 6 in Chapter 3 demonstrates that top Commission officials' own perception of their loyalties. The national attachment is fairly and very high for both the public (89.8%) and the Commission (85.8%). Public feels much more attached to the national government than the Commission. European attachment is fairly and very high for the Commission (75.2%) compared to 59.8% for public. Top Commission officials feel that they have both European and national identities (43%) (Hooghe, 2005). 42.4 % of public felt just national identity, while none of Commission officials felt this way. This study indicates that officials are more likely to identify themselves with the Europe. There is "considerable support among officials for the Commission norm of supranationalism" (Hooghe, 2005: 875). Table 6 L. Hooghe (2005) shows that supranational behavioral dynamic among top Commission officials tend to dominate over intergovernmental dynamic.

For seconded officials a contract period is not that long. Normally it would depend on the matters officials work on. The common rule for them is the tenure of not longer than four years (Trondal, 2006c). This is the thing that makes seconded personnel to keep contacts with national institutions where they are more likely to continue working. Thus, the tenure among permanent

officials makes them develop allegiances towards organization as a whole and own department. Consequently, this evokes autonomous role perceptions and behavior, i.e. supranational and departmental dynamics. Seconded officials are expected to foster intergovernmental dynamic. The data shows the opposite (Table 8 in Chapter 3). The results presented in Table 8 indicate the following ranking of the loyalties among SNEs: on the first place we have departmental allegiances, on the second place we have epistemic allegiances, on the third place we have supranational allegiances, and on the last place we have intergovernmental allegiances. The difference between supranational and intergovernmental allegiances is big compared to the difference between three allegiances ranked highest. The whole study underlines the co-existence of multiple allegiances among officials.

Table 10 in Chapter 3 shows that 74 % out of 106 of Commission committees' experts emphasize the allegiances towards own ministry, department or agency, when just 39 %, not even half of the respondents, identify themselves as being loyal to a committee or a group in which they participate. It can be explained by the mobility of experts who could have worked in different EU committees. Allegiance towards own government comes next (65 % of respondents). Loyalty to the professional background share 60 % of the respondents, 58 % name the requirements of the policy arena in which they are working. Therefore, the study shows the dominance of departmental behavioral dynamic among Commission committees' experts. The intergovernmental dynamic is be still strong, stronger than at any other level within the Commission as the national experts would tend to consult their primary institutional affiliation more extensively. The study by Egeberg et al. (2006) shows that "… national officials attending EU committees spend most of their time and energy in national administrations" (Egeberg et al., 2006: 77).

The multilateral surveillance is supposed to indicate a great independency of the OECD Secretariat as it can analyze the situation in a particular country and also criticize it. But it goes by hand with the political side of the coin: "The main policy guidelines are formulated from above, in the end by the Secretary General and the ministers at the annual Council of Ministers" (Marcussen, 2004: 99). Thus, the organization can not be free from the political context, political issues are still there, OECD experts can not write down guidelines based solely on their professional opinions.

These guidelines are, of course, political in nature and, consequently, the OECD Secretariat is far from able to act as a self-governed epistemic community on the ground (Marcussen, 2004: 99).

The OECD activities as multilateral surveillance would not have been possible without officials and their input. They possess all the characteristics for becoming the ideational artists. Very good education supported with active present publications, long term experiences, both at home and abroad, knowledge of several languages, training in diplomacy – these are the main attributes of an average official at the OECD (Marcussen, 2004). Obviously, they are the capital for the organization that can be used in many ways. Table 12 in Chapter 3 shows that the number of officials has increased from being 643 in the beginning of 1990s till being 921 in 2001. The fact that the average age of the employees of A-category is 45 years says something about the existence of previous experiences, i.e. pre-socialization before entering the OECD. However, a big disadvantage is a high turnover in the organization: it is just four years in average. As it is demonstrated in Figure 4 in Chapter 3 most of officials spend less than five years within the organization (Marcussen, 2002a: 51, Figure 2.4).

Moreover, Chapter 3 shows that the average tenure within the organization has decreased from being six years in 1991, five years in 1995 and just four years in 2005. Officials are not able to develop identifications with the organization. Therefore, this fact does not help to develop more autonomous dynamics. Intergovernmental dynamic is being developed within the organization. Educational background among officials fosters epistemic dynamic within the institution due to the specialization of officials on the particular issue.

Thus, we have seen that OECD personnel is very well educated, experienced and is able to influence member states e.g. through questionnaires made by the experts in order to attract attention to specific issues that the OECD Secretariat itself wants to bring up.

And at the same time, the OECD civil servants can not be apolitical or not influenced by home governments as most of servants will return to their home countries after some years of employment in the OECD. They can not just "burn all bridges behind themselves" (Marcussen, 2002a: 50, own translation). And this is one of those things that make it so complicated for the OECD to play the role of the ideational arbitrator and artist. Officials in spite of the best

qualifications and experiences are not able to act independently and follow professional perspectives on things (Marcussen, 2002a). They have to remember that sooner or later, no matter how much they try to do as experts or as officials of the IE, they will have to go back to home countries that will be the place for their employment. The contact with the country of origin is assumed to be intensive as officials have to keep good contact with the previous place of employment. If every official knows that s/he is going to be in the OECD Secretariat just for four years an interesting question is how s/he defines their employment at OECD: is it a primary institution or is it a secondary institution that is just a part of her/his career ladder? The OECD Secretariat can be seen as a secondary structure as the officials spend just limited time within the institution.

In spite of all constraints that are connected with the fact that the OECD has been losing its previous role of ideational actor and arbitrator, the OECD is still playing an important role as a stimulator of political debates in the member states. OECD Secretariat officials have found themselves in a lock-in situation where they are not able to be creative and work for the overall good applying own knowledge. But the characteristics of an old, more creative secretariat are still there: the organization does have experience and the necessary professional competencies. "It should use the skills of its highly qualified employees to help constrained national political actors think the unthinkable" (Marcussen, 2004b: 125). The professionals themselves have been influenced to a high extent by member states' interests. Once again, this works in favor of intergovernmental decision-making dynamic.

"The transition from the GATT to the WTO did not bring about significant changes to its Secretariat in terms of personnel as well as its function" (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004: 5). Permanent positions and long tenure of officials within the WTO Secretariat (H4) will stimulate the development of officials' identifications with the institution as a whole as well as with their own department. Thus, it will evoke autonomous behavior, supranational and departmental dynamics.

Civil servants at the WTO Secretariat are very well educated (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004). Most of officials have economic high education and professional experiences from the country of origin. Officials at the WTO Secretariat are either economists or legal experts (Yi-chong and

Weller, 2004: 49). They need special competencies in that area in order to get a permanent position. Some years of experience from the country of origin are normally an important aspect when evaluating potential vacancies.

Highly specialized background of officials across the three IEs supports the development of epistemic dynamic. Officials are representatives of their own portfolio; this contributes to departmental decision-making behavior. However, the different pre-socialization of the personnel will constitute the development of other dynamics combined with epistemic one. Top Commission officials' cosmopolitan point of view will tend to support the supranational dynamic. The limited tenure for SNEs in the Commission and the OECD officials should foster intergovernmental dynamic. However, data proves the opposite for SNEs. SNEs do not develop intergovernmental dynamic; departmental dynamic is being developed to a high extent. With regard to long tenure and professional specialization the WTO Secretariat will tend to develop epistemic dynamic combined with supranational and departmental dynamics.

Organizational network (H5)

The structure of the Commission based on the non-territorial principles could help to create a network between the similar sectors of national administrations (Egeberg et al., 2006). "This kind of sectorally or functionally based administrative network across levels of governance is certainly not peculiar to the EU, but can also be found, for example, in the OECD" (Egeberg, 2006d: 23). It can also be found in the WTO Secretariat. And these three executives differ from classical IGOs that they do not have this sectorization counterbalanced with the territorial organization of the institutions (Egeberg, 2006d).

"Issue-specific networks consisting of national agencies and the Commission or an EU-level agency as a kind of hub can be interpreted as a further step toward the development of a genuine multilevel Union administration" (Egeberg, 2006b: 9). Figure 6 demonstrates such a network (Egeberg, 2006b: 9, Figure 1.1).

Influence area of the Commission is very wide, thus, the Commission needs to get help from both the EU-level agencies and national agencies. Direct interaction between the Commission and a particular ministry would not have been that easy and that efficient. Both institutions

represent bureaucracies and the simple things as e.g. who to contact in order to get necessary information will take time to find out. In this sense small agencies are more efficient and impartial.

"In order to enhance the degree of constituency and harmonization across the Union the Commission would benefit from being able to interact directly wit parts of national administrations that enjoy a certain leeway for independent action" (Egeberg, 2006b: 9-10). In this sense the Commission acts as a single actor and gets involved in a close cooperation with agencies both at the EU and national levels. Interacting with the agencies in stead of ministries is effective: the agencies with their specialized area could be able to help the Commission more efficiently. Furthermore, experts from the Commission would be able to take direct contact with experts from the agencies. Therefore, Commission officials would tend to develop departmental and epistemic dynamics through their network.

Figure 6. The 'double-hatted' national agency in a multilevel Union administration

European
Commission

Agency

EU LEVEL

NATIONAL
LEVEL

Ministry

Agency

Source: Egeberg, 2006b: 9, Figure 1.1

Therefore, national agencies are de-coupled from the ministry level. Moreover, they are able to re-couple again, but at the EU-level, in our case with a particular DG in the Commission. This stimulates the development of a bilateral network both across countries and across levels of governance.

According to the functions signed to the European Commission by Treaties, it is responsible for having contacts with other institutions. Thus, the contacts happen on regular basis, their intensity depends on the issue. The network among officials within the Commission is quiet tight as well. There exist three concentric circles of actors that top officials deal with (Hooghe, 2001): the first circle consists of civil servants directly connected to top officials' policy area, the second circle consists of the EU institutions and some national institutions and, finally, the third one consists of regional civil servants, weaker societal and institutional actors (e.g. Committee of the Regions in the European Union). The Commission has a special network; it is much wider than networks that other two executives have. It involves more levels of organizational cooperation. It represents multilevel union administration (Egeberg, 2006b).

I would like to look at Hooghe's study (2001) of top officials once again. Top Commission officials' primary affiliations constitute almost 60 % of their total time. It basically means that interactions between actors within the Commission are dense. The type of network that is created as a consequence of continuous interactions can be defined as thick with intense and long-lasting interactions. Now the question is how often they meet different actors both inside the EU and outside of it. An interesting tendency can be tracked. The most frequent contact they have is with civil servants (both national and regional). Then, they interact less often with the different institutions of the EU and societal actors. Less contact the have with own ministers (Hooghe, 2001: 62-64). The more frequent connections with national civil servants could indicate the existence of cooperation between top officials and national and regional civil servants. The contacts are most likely to be based on the area of specialization of officials. Thus, it can indicate the development of epistemic dynamic. Furthermore, more frequent contacts among civil servants are with national officials that could try to render some influence even if they are not allowed to do so. Therefore, intergovernmental dynamic can be observed as well. Connections and tight networks between the different institutions within the EU could point at the existence of supranational decision-making behavior within the Commission.

As it was predicted by M. Egeberg and H. Sætren (1999) high rank of officials in hierarchy would tend to develop the identification with the institution because the network within the institution is more integrated and developed than outside of the institution. L. Hooghe (2001: 62-63) was studying frequencies of top officials' contact with different actors inside the Commission. The findings showed that top officials have much more contact inside own DG than with other DGs (several times a week vs. 1-2 times a month). The formation of the dense interactions within own department should indicate the development of departmental dynamic. Thus, a thick network can be observed among permanent officials specializing within the same policy area, both within the institution and outside of it. It indicates development of departmental along with epistemic dynamics within the institution. Basically, officials have close contact between each other, often within the same department, developing epistemic and departmental dynamics. Interactions with experts from other institutions evoke epistemic dynamic due to specialized knowledge that officials share.

OECD Secretariat officials have a complex network. The network variable is closely connected to variable of organizational affiliations (H3). OECD Secretariat officials do not actually perceive the OECD Secretariat to be their primary institution. It is connected to tenure of officials (H4) that is actually just four years in average. The primary connections are national ones. This is a big difference compared to the Commission where officials are able to develop identification with their own institution. OECD officials will tend to balance between all actors involved in interaction, trying to find a stable equilibrium. OECD Secretariat officials' network would include own governments or other member states' governments. And it is different from what was before when the OECD had a role as an ideational artist and arbitrator: at that time the institution was able to follow officials' professional expertise. Therefore, OECD officials have changed the decision-making behavior: it can not any longer follow their professional opinions, but it has to consider various preferences of the member states. Thus, this indicates the development of intergovernmental dynamic.

As Commission and the OECD Secretariat officials at WTO Secretariat civil servants are responsible for contacts with other institutions. Officials have a number of functions connected to that, e.g. balancing negotiations and dispute settlements. In order to be able to fulfill their

responsibilities they have to have interactions with member states. In the case of preparation of a new regulation officials have to contact the member states in order to get particular information or analysis.

The professional background indicates that the WTO Secretariat officials have a "specialized knowledge" and this "invisible college" is linked by "everyday intersocial skills" (H4) (Haas, E. in Schemeil, 2004:82). Therefore, we deal with "'transnational epistemic community', which shares a cores set of normative principles, practical know-how, scientific beliefs..." (Haas, P. in Schemeil, 2004: 82). This means that WTO officials' interactions are based on their backgrounds indicating strong professional and sectoral affiliations (H3 and H4). Furthermore, shared values and professional language used by experts all over the world will stimulate contacts with experts from other institutions. It indicates the existence of epistemic decision-making dynamic within the WTO Secretariat.

The character of the regulations taken by the WTO Secretariat could influence density of actor interactions. The network will be defined as thick with intensive and long-lasting interactions between the actors. As officials represent the transnational epistemic community, then the communication with other experts, from member states, will strengthen epistemic decision-making dynamic that the officials tend to evoke. In favor of epistemic decision-making behavior points the fact that there are 149 member states and if one of the representative within the secretariat will try to protect interests of own country it will make it very difficult for the whole organization to function and help member states reaching the consensus.

The dynamic within the OECD Secretariat and the supportive committees are intergovernmental as the officials seem to be less attached to the institution itself and much more to the national governments. The WTO Secretariat because of its permanent positions has managed to create epistemic community. However, the intergovernmental contacts are still playing a big role. Unfortunately, data simply does not exist yet either on the OECD Secretariat or the WTO Secretariat. The Commission is the institution that was researched much more. However, it remains under-researched. Top Commission officials tend to evoke supranational dynamic. SNEs develop departmental decision-making dynamic. Expert committees' officials would have

already existing networks from home country before participating in committees, and of course these networks will have professional character.

To sum up

I would like to present a summary of analysis across the three IEs. A mixture of dynamics was found within each institution. All four types of dynamics are not mutually exclusive. It proves that IEs are complex structures and can combine different decision-making dynamics.

The European Commission

The European Commission represents a more complex structure compared to other international executives. There are some differences between three types of officials within the Commission (top Commission officials, seconded national officials and Commission committees' experts). At different levels officials have different role perceptions and decision-making behavior. The statutory staff evokes more autonomous dynamics within the institution. With regards to SNEs, in spite of existing connections to national institutions the SNEs with committees' experts tend to evoke a mixture of all four types of decision-making dynamics where departmental dynamic dominates the others (e.g. Table 8 in Chapter 3). Commission expert committees were expected to be more controlled by national governments than they really are. As example we can compare Commission expert committees to Council and comitology committees: expert officials within Commission expert committees tend to evoke more multifaceted and expert-orientated roles and they are less likely to be coordinated by national central authorities (Egeberg et al., 2006).

Different decision-making dynamics were evoked by the officials at different levels within the institution. In general, departmental dynamic has proven to be more salient at all three levels within the Commission. The analysis has shown that at the top level of Commission officials tend to develop more of supranational dynamic. Epistemic dynamic plays more important role at the level of SNEs and expert committee. Finally, even though intergovernmental dynamic was better seen at the bottom level of the Commission, at the expert committees' level, it has proven to be less important within the European Commission.

The dynamics within the Commission are explained by a set of organizational factors. The Commission is highly specialized, both vertically and horizontally (H1). The recruitment

procedures depend on the types of officials: merit principle for permanent positions and quota principles for temporary positions (H2). Depending on the type of officials they have the Commission either as their primary structure or their secondary structure (H3). The Commission officials have professional backgrounds and different tenure within the Commission (H4). And, finally, officials create networks both within and outside the Commission. These networks can be characterized as long-lasting and intense (H5).

The OECD Secretariat

Compared to the Commission officials the OECD Secretariat represents a simpler structure with less power and responsibilities that it was delegated by member states.

There were different dynamics evoked by officials within the OECD Secretariat. The more salient one has been intergovernmental dynamic. Then, epistemic and departmental decision-making dynamics were also found within the institution. The domination of intergovernmental decision-making dynamic was expected as we defined the OECD Secretariat as a classical example of intergovernmental institution.

The characteristics of the OECD Secretariat have proven that the institution represents an intergovernmental institution. The independent variables contributed to the formation of the decision-making dynamics to a different extent. Together they have been of a great importance in explaining the dynamics within the institution. The organization is vertically and horizontally specialized (H1). The recruitment procedures to be applied are temporary positions (H2). for OECD Secretariat officials the secretariat represents a secondary structure, i.e. secondary affiliation (H3). The officials' background indicates high degree of specialization within particular field (H4). The network with other actors could be defined as thick, i.e. long-lasting and intensive (H5).

The WTO Secretariat

Similarly to the OECD Secretariat the WTO Secretariat is a simpler structure when compared to the Commission, it is given less power by member states. However, its area of influence has been widening (e.g. GATTS).

77

The epistemic and intergovernmental dynamics were proven to be the most salient in the WTO Secretariat. The departmental and supranational dynamics were seen to a lesser extent. In this sense the WTO Secretariat was different from the OECD Secretariat, even though both institutions represent purely intergovernmental organizations.

Therefore, the characteristics of this institution were not expected to be the same when compared to the OECD Secretariat. The WTO Secretariat is specialized both vertically and horizontally (H1). With regards to the recruitment procedures permanent positions seem to be a norm (H2). The WTO represents a primary structure to its officials (H3). There is a high degree of specialization among the officials combined with a long tenure within the organization (H4). Officials have managed to create a dense and long-lasting network primarily with member states governments (H5).

Chapter 5. Conclusions

The Westphalian order has been challenged by international organizations in the last five decades, by some more than the others. The European Union is the best example of one IE that has managed to challenge the principle of sovereignty the most (e.g. Shore, 2000).

This master thesis had its intention to reassess the ways IEs challenge the principle of sovereignty, why and how they manage to go beyond the existing heritage of Westphalia. The executives analyzed were the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. In spite of the fact that the European Union is one of the most influential bodies in the international arena it does not have to mean that its executive body, the European Commission, is more influential than the executives of the OECD and the WTO. There is a complex mixture of dynamics within every executive institution. It has greater impact on the institution than International Relationship theory assumes.

International Relationship theory looks at the macro level of IGOs. It does not unpack IEs in order to understand their functioning. It underestimates the importance of the meso level and micro level of the IE. Organizational theory helps to look at what influence the dynamics within the organization and how they are developed. This is a maturing field that has a lot of explanatory potential. Organizational theory helped to answer the research question of the thesis: what dynamics developed within the three IEs and what can explain them. We can observe different dynamics within the IEs as a consequence of: organizational properties (H1), recruitment procedures (H2), organizational affiliations (H3), organizational demography (H4) and organizational network (H5). Along with differences some similarities were found across the executives in decision-making dynamics.

All four types of dynamics, intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic, are not mutually exclusive. The IEs have proven to have a mixture of decision-making dynamics with some dynamics being more salient than the others. Data reveals that supranational decision-making dynamics are salient at the top level, in our case the Commission top level. As it was expected, permanent officials tend to develop more autonomous behavioral dynamics. The factors that influence autonomous behavioral dynamics that were found in the Commission are

high issue specificity and hierarchy (H1), merit recruitment principles (H2), the executive being officials' primary affiliation (H3), long tenure within institution and professional background (H4) and intensive and dense interactions among officials within the institution (H5). The expectations are not fulfilled with regard to the seconded personnel. It was expected that SNEs developed intergovernmental dynamics (Trondal, 2004). But in fact SNEs within the Commission tend to develop more autonomous dynamic, departmental dynamic. Even periphery Commission expert committees have managed to show more autonomous decision-making behavior. This underscores the autonomy of the Commission.

OECD Secretariat seconded officials have proven to develop more intergovernmental decision-making dynamic due to secondment (H2), the executive being the secondary structure (H3), heavy pre-socialization of officials from their country of origin (H4) and created network (H5).

At the same time WTO Secretariat officials have proven to be guided more by epistemic dynamic. Intergovernmental dynamic plays still an important role. Epistemic dynamic is a consequence of the secretariat's structure (H1), the officials' professional background and experiences (H4), officials' network mainly composed of experts (H5) and the fact that the secretariat is officials' primary affiliation (H3).

The variables are correlated in one or another way and it is rather difficult to say which variables are more important in determining the dynamics within the institutions. They contribute to the explanation of the dynamics in different ways.

It has been challenging to find all necessary data of the chosen executives. That it is the reason why the empirical analysis is not complete for all three executives. There are some gaps as there has been no systematic study of all executives. The lack of comparative analysis is obvious. Different studies focused on different things within each of the executives. The proposition for the future research would be to collect systematic data on IEs in order to manage to compare the institutions systematically.

Next issue that deserves attention is how autonomous in general IGOs actually are. As we have seen a lot of things are dependent on how the IE of the IGO works. Classical intergovernmental

organizations are controlled and coordinated by member states. However, recently IGOs have been given increased number of responsibilities. In many cases they are supposed to work across the borders in order to reach the desired results. The role of IEs is huge as they shape and direct activities of IGOs themselves.

The European Commission has been proven to have some special characteristics due to development of autonomous dynamics. But does it mean we have a *sui generic* problem and the findings can not be generated? As we have found out all three executives share a number of similarities. The most important is that any IE was built on the principles of the national executive institutions. The European Commission was not given that much authority originally; it had rather limited area of influence. The incremental changes have brought the European Union to the point it is right now. And most importantly, if other IEs share similar characteristics with the European Union, the most transformative IGO, then these institutions have the potential of developing similar decision-making patters to the ones that can be found within "an emerging multilevel genuine *Union* administration" (Egeberg, 2006a: 200, original emphasis).

> The political systems that acquire similar institutional and organizational features to those of the EU at the system and sub-system level would probably have a larger propensity than others to develop similar patterns of executive politics as well (Egeberg, 2006a: 200).

This finding is of great importance. It should be possible to apply it beyond the three executives, both nationally and internationally. The common application for testing the transformative potential of the executive institutions can be developed in the future.

This master thesis has shown that IEs are complex structures with the mixture of the decision-making dynamics where the autonomous dynamics, supranational, departmental and epistemic, are more salient than the intergovernmental ones. It has also illustrated that the organizational factors play a very important role in understanding the decision-making dynamics within institutions as IEs.

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