



UNIVERSITY OF AGDER

Social capital and Rural Producer Organisations

An assessment of the relevancy of social capital in the functioning of Rural Producers Organisations in Bolivia

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This Master's Thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this education. However, this does not imply that the University answers for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the relevancy of social capital in the functioning of Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs). RPOs are made up of farmers that want to improve their economic situation by facilitating access to the market or by for instance refining a product, selling certified seeds, or setting prices etc. In this paper it is investigated whether social capital is an important factor in determining participation in the RPOs. Low membership participation is a problem in the two empirical cases of RPOs in Sopachuy, Bolivia.

Social capital is a concept that has received more attention the last two decades because of its perceived effects on poverty reduction and successful development projects. The emphasis on ties, trust and norms in the communities is also in line with another contemporary concept in development strategies namely participatory development from bellow. The social capital theory used by Ahn & Ostrom (2002) connects social capital with collective action theory since social capital is what makes people act together. According to them social capital is based on the three forms trustworthiness, networks, and informal/formal rules. Through the exploration of these forms of social capital and the effects on interaction among people I argue in this paper that social capital is important to understand when initiating support for these Rural Producer Organisations. When aid is given from NGOs and the state mainly as investments in physical capital and production- related training then this aid can create dependence and undermine self-organisation and the development of networks between people. The members in the RPOs are very much distanced from the management in the organisation and participation is in many instances reduced to receiving information at meetings. This weakens the sustainability of the organisations since members – that are the highest organ for decision making, does not generally know what is going on in the RPO, while the state and NGOs are very much involved. The lack of social capital in the community and in the organisations is acknowledged as a reason for the low participation among members. Other factors are also recognised as important when evaluating participation, such as a changing society towards a money economy, migration, the organisational structure of the RPOs, low levels of human capital and a history of discrimination and marginalisation of the indigenous people in Bolivia.

Participation in development is recognised as paramount as this can create networks among people, a self-initiative, mobilisation, empowerment, human capital and sustainability. Social capital and participation are intertwined and will enhance each other, but in the study area social capital is argued to be especially important in order to create a foundation for action as the members are very isolated from each other.

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Abbreviations and Spanish concepts

| | |
|-------------|--|
| APROCFMI | <i>Asociación de Productores de la Cuenca del Río Milanés</i> – Association of Producers from Cuenca del Rio Milanés |
| AMAS | <i>Asociación Municipal de Apicultores Sopachuy</i> - Municipal Organisation of Apiculture producers in Sopachuy |
| ASOVITA | <i>Asociación de Productores de Alcalá, Sopachuy, Villar and Tarvita</i> – Organisation of Producers from Alcalá, Sopachuy, Villar and Tarvita that work to sell the products of selected RPOs, including APROCMI. |
| CIOEC-B | <i>Coordinadora de Integración de las Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas, Indígena y Originarias</i> – Coordinator of the Rural Producer Organisations in Bolivia |
| Comunero | Spanish word for a person that lives in a rural community. |
| DILPE | The municipal government body that work towards identifying the needs of the RPOS. |
| Mestizo | A person with heritage from both indigenous and Spanish or European ancestry |
| OECCAS | <i>Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas, Indígena y Originarias</i> – Economic Farmer’s Organisations (the term for Rural Producer Organisations in Bolivia). |
| RPO | Rural Producer Organisations |
| Sub Central | In the system of <i>sindicatos</i> the Sub Central is the organisational body that is responsible for all the <i>sindicatos</i> in the Municipality |
| Sindicato | The community organisational system |
| UPEM | The municipal governmental office that works with RPOs and natural disasters. The technician on RPOs works under DILPE and what they decide. |

Definition of concepts

Small scale farmer:

On the high plateau small farmers are defined as those having 3.5 hectares, while in the eastern Bolivia small farmers are defined as those having less than 50 hectares (PRSP 2001:41). The study area is in the Andes so the 3.5 ha definition will be used.

Foreword

The idea for this study came from a personal interest in how small scale farmers can improve their livelihood situation, and the first idea for research was on how Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) could do just that. There is a lot of literature on the benefits from the RPOs on small scale farming, but one issue that was reappearing in the literature was low participation by its members, low rotation of leadership and many had a dependence on NGOs. How the organisations function internally them becomes important, and an understanding of what motivates people to participate is required, as well as of, what kind of relations are counter-productive. Social capital research argues that the relations between people create cooperation which is crucial for any functioning society and market. Ahn & Ostrom (2002) argues that social capital researchers needs to have a clear stand on social action theories since the basic thought of what drives action is important for understanding how people interact and cooperate. This framework is relevant for better understanding how RPOs can have a strong internal functioning, which is the basis for eventual market expansion, transforming products, and making contacts with other RPOs, state, NGOs etc. The purpose of this study is to put focus on the issues of trust in the society, networks and norms between people, and their importance in affecting social organising. This is a study of people's own opportunities and resources, and not just what is needed from outside.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction

For the last five decades investment in physical capital (dams, improved agricultural equipment, roads, factories etc.) has been an important factor in the development strategy in order to spark off economic growth in developing countries (Ostrom 2003). In the mid-1990s other factors started to gain prominence, such as social capital, among scholars but also in institutions such as the World Bank (Hickey & Mohan 2004). The World Bank organised in 1996 a team of researchers for the Social Capital Initiative that was to assess the impact of social capital and projects, how social capital can be increased and how to measure it (World Bank 2011). By labelling the norms and networks we have between us as social *capital* it is made very clear that these are assets that have economic value (Evans 1996). When social capital is recognized as important for development it has two significant effects according to Ahn & Ostrom (2002: 23). One is that it becomes imperative to build strong institutions on local level, and two: it also changes the time dimension of that work since we are constructing capital (Ahn & Ostrom 2002). The construction of local institutions is exactly the focus of this study as it analyses the relevance of social capital in the functioning of Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) in Bolivia. These organisations are multiple and work with many different products, but mainly they are created to facilitate the access to a market for the farmers. But they can also be directed to refining a product, controlling prices, collective buying of seeds, loan services to the members, veterinary service, tractor renting etc.

Many scholars have been writing and are writing on social capital and development. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argued that our access to resources such as networks and acquaintances (social capital) will highly influence our position in the society and economy (Bourdieu 1986). With the book *Making Democracy Work* from 1993 Robert Putnam made the connections between civil society organisations and a well-functioning democracy. The importance of trustworthiness, networks, and norms for constructing local and national development is highlighted in the work of Elinor Ostrom. In her account of local irrigation groups she demonstrates how social capital influences the functioning of these groups and makes them more efficient than donor-funded modern constructions (Ostrom 1999). This study will use empirical data from two Rural Producer Organisations in the village of Sopachuy in Bolivia, exploring the importance of social capital in such organisations. Bolivia

is interesting in the study of social capital since there are communities, especially in the Andes region, that have been very isolated from the state and have traditionally many practices of communal work and norms of reciprocity. Bolivia also has pre-Hispanic community organisations (*ayllu*) that structured people into ethnic units crossing large geographical areas (Rivera 1990). This communal system is in some parts of Bolivia now been replaced by the *sindicato* (a newer organisational system of the communities), but the traditional community organisations led to the facilitation of creating Rural Producer Organisations (de Morrée 2002).

1.1. Problem statement

Low participation among members in Rural Producers Organisations

In Bolivia Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) have been created as a way to improve the livelihoods of the farmers. These organisations can serve as a base for organising work for the benefit of all members, but also to seek financial support, transform a product, and importantly reach a bigger market for the products. But one potential problem is that these organisations can be highly dependent on the financing from NGO's and the technical advice from 'experts'. NGO's and other financing institutions have supported the RPOs in acquiring physical capital such as equipment, storage, machinery etc. and also some human capital i.e. leadership training, but the focus of attention has not been on the general members but on the directive in the RPOs. Some problems of the organisations are low involvement by the members, little rotation in leadership, and low organisational sustainability without external help (Elsner 2004, de Morrée 1998). The purpose of this study is to generate knowledge on important factors that can influence how a civil organisation is working internally, how local relations and bonds may influence organisations, and the relationship between participation and dependency. The precise problem formulation in the study is the low participation and involvement by the members in the RPOs.

All forms of capital, according to Ahn & Ostrom (2002:2) "involve investments that increase the probability of higher returns from individual and joint efforts over a future time period". Social capital is a notion that conceptualises how issues such as culture, structural and institutional aspects of small or large groups will interact and influence economic and political development (Ahn & Ostrom 2002:2). According to Putnam et al. (1993) the trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks in a society is what makes people cooperate and avoid

individual and selfish behaviour. Networks, trustworthiness, and rules will make actors in a group work more towards collective action and mutual benefit (Ostrom 2003). Social capital is a perspective that acknowledges the importance of local participation for development and sustainability. Local participation is a popular notion in the development discourse, and the RPOs are based on this idea of development from below. But what is important is to analyse what kind of participation is happening, since participation can be all from just 'participation as consultation' to 'self-mobilisation' (Pretty 1997). There is no real participation if people are just told what to think and want and just informed of the development plans afterwards.

The contextual setting for this study is the village of Sopachuy in Bolivia, the focus of research is two Producer Organisations in this particular village. These two organisations have been started by NGOs which are financing and to some extent are planning the economics of the organisations. The members in these organisations seem to have little trust in each other and the trust level on a general basis also seem to be low. There are not many networks between people and people prefer to handle their issues individually. The majority of the members in the organisations are not really involved in the organisations; they are more occupied with their private agricultural work. The organisational structure in the organisations is such that the members make up the General Assembly and they are the highest organ in decision-making in the organisation, but many members just come to meetings to listen (and to not get a fine for missing participation) and then they go home. All this makes it difficult to imagine that the organisation will work without the management of the NGO's. This context will then be used to see whether social capital is relevant in the functioning of the organisations.

1.2. Main objective

What is the relevance of social capital in the functioning of Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs), with the cases of APROCMI and AMAS in Sopachuy, Chuquisaca, Bolivia?

1.3. Research questions

1. Do the members have the same expectations of the RPO, and are the activities of the organisation in accordance with their needs?
2. Do the members feel empowered and self-confident to make changes in their lives?
3. To what extent are the farmers involved in the organisations?
4. How are the levels of trust in the community, and between the members?
5. What are the networks in the community and between the members?
6. Is there a difference in trust, norms and networks between the two RPOs?

1.4. Outline of the thesis

Chapter One outlines the problem statement, research objective and research questions, in the following chapter, Chapter Two I give an outline of relevant contextual information, particularly focusing on certain aspects of the Andes culture such as reciprocity, production strategies and community organisation, and I will also introduce Rural Producer Organisations and the specific RPOs in this study. Chapter Three provides an overview of relevant literature for the research objective and problem statement, in the next chapter, Chapter Four I give a presentation of the empirical findings the study. In Chapter Five I summarise the important findings and try to understand these with the help of theory, and in the final chapter, Chapter Six I summarise important findings and give some concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Figure 1: Map of Bolivia



Some dates

Population: 10,461,053
(July 2013 est.)

Independence: 1825
(from Spain)

GDP /per capita: 5000\$
(PPP, 2012 est.)

Life expectancy at
birth: total population:
67.9 years (2012 est.)

Population living on
less than 2 \$/day: 49%
(2010 est.)

Exports: natural gas,
soybeans, crude
petroleum, zinc, ore

(Numbers from CIA
Factbook 2013)

2.0. Introduction

In this part a contextual background into the area of the study is given, as well as the history and cultural traditions that are important to understand the context in which the farmers live. It will start out with a presentation of the geographical area that includes sections on geographic position, climate, population, education, and economy. Then it follows a section on the Andes culture, introduction to the RPOs, and a presentation of the RPOs in the study.

2.1. Geographical area

The study was conducted in the Municipality of Sopachuy which lies in the department of Chuquisaca in the southern part of Bolivia. The Department of Chuquisaca is divided into

three geographical zones; the Cordillera Oriental, Sub-Andean and the Llanura Chaqueña (el Gran Chaco). The two first zones are part of the Andes region and the third is characterised by low altitudes and humid and warm climate (Michel (2011)). The Municipality of Sopachuy is located in the province of Tomina in the centre of Chuquisaca. Sopachuy is located in the valleys of the Cordillera Oriental in altitudes ranging from 1500- 3000 m.a.s.l. (Michel (2011:10), more specifically Sopachuy is situated at 1 850 m. a. s. l. (FH 2010:12).The village and some of the low- lying communities in the municipality are surrounded by two rivers that don't run dry. The Municipality was founded by the Inca Roca in 1831, and was in earlier times called Sopaychuru which means; “The Island of the Devil” (Pasos 2012). The distance from Sucre is 185km, there is access to the village all year around but in the rainy season the road can be temporarily blocked by landslides.

Figure 2: The Departments in Bolivia with Chuquisaca in the south



Climate:

In the Andes region the difference in altitude will lead to a great variety of temperatures since Bolivia is close to the equator, a small variety in altitude will lead to great differences in landscape and climate (John Murra 1972 in Skar 2004:307). Since Sopachuy is located in the valleys the temperature is steadier and does not have the extreme temperature variation between day and night that is the case in the high altitudes (3000-4000m). There is a rainy season in summer from around November/December to March, and a dry season from around April to October

Figure 3: The department of Chuquisaca and the province of Tomina



Population

In the municipality of Sopachuy there are 8811 people (INE 2013, numbers from 2010). The municipality is divided into the village of Sopachuy (often referred to as just Sopachuy) and 24 local communities surrounding the village. In the village there are approximately 1124 people (Interview with the UPEM in the Government of Sopachuy, 2013). The people in this

area are predominantly indigenous and speak the Quechua language. Bolivia is one of the few Latin American countries where the majority of the population is part of an indigenous group (Canessa 2004). The indigenous population were discriminated during the colonial time, and is still looked upon today as less ‘civilised’ and backward (Canessa 2004). Living in urban areas in Bolivia one can often hear that people use the term *indio* (Indian) in a very negative way, and the same term can also be expressed as *campesino* (peasant). The NGO Pasos and the organisation CIOEC-B consequently used the term ‘producers’ instead of *campesino* (peasant) in order to avoid the negative connotations associated with the term.

Life expectancy in the department of Chuquisaca is 64 years for men and 68 years for women (65 and 69 at national level) (INE 2013, numbers from 2001). Coverage of basic necessities in Sopachuy such as good houses, education and health were quite low in the last census in 2001: inadequate houses (bad construction materials): 81 %, inadequate education: 91 %, inadequate health service: 24 %, inadequate water and sanitation services: 90 %, and inadequate energy access: 93 % (INE 2013). On the national level the percentages are lower, in for instance education the level is closer to 50 % (though that is still half of the population). There is most likely a big difference between the town of Sopachuy and the communities in terms of access to these facilities. In the sample in this study no one in the communities had electricity or water toilet.

Education in Sopachuy

In 2006 the national government started a program called *Yo sí puedo* (I can do it) to eradicate illiteracy in the Bolivian population. This program was meant to last until 2008, and was then followed by a new program called *Yo sí puedo seguir* (I can keep going). The course the government offers to the participants runs during the course of 3 months; 5 hours every weekend (interview with responsible for programme in Sopachuy). He tells about the results:

Since 2012 we have made more people literate here in Chuquisaca than other departments. They have made 331 persons (literate) in the municipality (Sopachuy) in 2012. They have to train 300 more in 2013. They have to take an exam at the end of the course. In Jarka Mayo (a community) there have not been any courses because the people live here in Sopachuy (village). But these people enter as well, through the neighbourhood groups (interview with the responsible for the program, male, 40 years old)

According to my informant there were two more communities that did not participate. He claimed that the census from 2001 showed 1381 illiterate and today (2013) they have 300 illiterate in the municipality of Sopachuy. They have 220 people inscribed now in courses, so in other words if they all finish the course successfully there will be around 80 people left that are still illiterate. These numbers need to be taken with some caution. In Bolivia they have a census every 11th where government officials go to every house in the whole country to fill out the questionnaire (it is illegal to be outside the home during the day). So it might be that the government has numbers on how many illiterate people there were in 2001. But the central question lies in what are the criteria for passing the exam and becoming literate. On this issue my informant said the exam centred on tasks such as reading a text and then writing answers to questions posed on that text. My informant said that most people were motivated to go to the course because they wanted to learn how to sign their names on documents. This may then be telling on what the knowledge will be used for. Some of my older interviewees could not read or write though they said they had been offered courses.

The children in the 24 communities have access to primary school (some places secondary school) in their own community or in the neighbouring community. The schools are located in these communities: Cuevas (primary), Pampas Punta (primary, 2 grade secondary), Paslapaya (primary), San Juan de Orcas (primary, 2 grade secondary), Sipikani (primary, 2 grade secondary), San Antonio (primary), Simon Bolivar (primary, 1 grade secondary). In the village of Sopachuy there is a secondary school (District Directive for Education, see appendix). In total, 404 children were inscribed in all the schools in the communities in 2012 and only 14 children (3.4 %) had left school. In the school in Sopachuy village 315 children were inscribed in 2012, 16 of these had left school and 5 had moved away (District Directive for Education 2012).

Almost all the members I interviewed had finished primary school (some had done some years of secondary school), except for the older members who could not read and write.

Figure 4: *The municipality of Sopachuy, view over the community Matela Baja*



(Source: Author, fieldwork 2013)

Economy

In Bolivia 32 % of the population works within agriculture (48% services and 20 % industry), but the contribution to the national GDP is only 9.6 % (services 52% and industry 38%) (CIA Factbook 2013, estimates from 2010 and 2012). The agriculture in the Andes mountains will vary from the agriculture in the lowlands (tropics) in instances such as extreme temperature differences but also land composition: in the Andes the areas are uneven which makes it difficult to cultivate large areas and use for example a tractor, in the lowlands the land is more flat and production on large areas is possible. The Soya or sugar cane plantations that are made for export are located in the lowlands.

In the central provinces in Chuquisaca farming is the main income generating activity of the people (Pasos 2009). The main products are potato, maize, wheat and barley (INE 2013, estimates from 2000). In Sopachuy the farmers also engage in animal production; cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, and poultry (Pasos 2012). The majority of the farmers have small plots of land for food production (on average 2 ha.) that often are scattered around in different areas. Family- land is increasingly being divided up into smaller entities which can cause problems

of insufficient land for the new generation. There is also low productivity that according to Aramayo et al (1998), forces the majority of the people to have other sources of income such as temporal migration and handicrafts etc. The farmers in Sopachuy have two sowing seasons: the first one is in June-August –September which is in the dry season and consequently only the farmers with irrigation can sow at this time. The second sowing period, and also the largest, is in October when there is also more rain

There are no markets in the communities, but there is an opportunity to sell vegetables and fruit to the local stores in Sopachuy. But as my informants told me: the majority of the people there produce the same products and therefore the demand is not so high, but there is a small market demand from the people that only live in Sopachuy village.

The production method of the farmers is mostly manual. They use oxen to plough or just manual equipment. Some had access to a communal tractor. Generally the man and woman worked the land, and the children helped if they were not in school.

2.2. *The Andes culture*

Reciprocity in the traditional Andes culture

According to Skar (2004:307) food and work in the Indian Andes culture is regarded as gifts, and there is a strong morally sanctioned responsibility to give back when you receive. Inside a group of native Andes people there is a strong sense of reciprocity, and the people help each other to perform a variety of tasks. There are different kinds of reciprocity; in close family relations, people help each other in many tasks without the expectation of reciprocity (Skar 1984 in Skar 2004:312). Another form of reciprocity is the exchange of work; a group of neighbours go together to help another neighbour in his field, normally in planting and harvesting. All the neighbours in the group will give and receive help. This system of work is called *ayni* (Skar 2004:312). Some activities are bigger, like constructing a house, and will demand more people. This is called *mink'a*. Here the family will invite a lot of people to work and party; the women will prepare food and beer and this will be traded for the work done. This type of arrangement is open and will gather people outside the normal social circle (Skar 2004:312).

The communities in the Andes can be very isolated and they also exempted from national tax payment. So if a community needs a common house, a water system, school or roads, this is often built by the community members (Skar 2004:312). Maintaining the roads is also done this way. This form of reciprocity is called *faena* (Skar 2004:312). This type of mandatory work must be done by all members or they will be sanctioned. This makes the role of the state quite little in traditional Andes communities. But the communities are also changing, so in the study area the involvement of state has increased (improvement of houses, assistance after natural disasters etc.).

Production strategies

According to Golte & Cadena (1986:11), the farmers cannot produce just one crop since the productivity is too low and that would not be enough to reproduce the production system. The Andes agriculture have limitations such as lack of flat land, poor nutritional soils, lack of water, and a general hard climate (Golte (1980 in De Morrée 2002). The climate in the high Andes vary more between cold nights and warm days than in the valley in the Andes Mountains. Sopachuy is located in the valleys (1850 m.). To cope with these limitations the farmers have a range of strategies such as different production seasons, plots of land in different ecological zones (plains, mountains etc.), crop and soil rotation, rest periods for the soil, social organisation of work, relations of reciprocity and redistribution, social and political organisation, among other (Rivera 2003:24). Golte & Cadena (1986) also argue that the dispersed plots of land (long walking distances) and the management of various production seasons have created a need for cooperation between people. These groups are formed on the basis of kinship, neighbours, religious groups, or as a common relation to a resource (Golte & Cadena 1986: 12). According to Rivera (2003) these strategies made the farmers in the Andes more autonomous and less dependent on the market. It is, according to the author, not a goal for the farmers to gain profits (in the conventional- market- expansion thinking), but to gain self-sufficiency (Rivera 2003: 38).

The cooperation in the system of various ecological production units (that has been practiced for centuries), has also included forms of cattle production. Reciprocity also exists in cattle production as families can take turns in looking after the animals (Golte & Cadena 1986). The entrance of the market has not changed these structures; mainly because the low agricultural productivity (Golte & Cadena 1986). The price the farmers get on the market will not be

higher than the total value of the collective work and the production method together, so the farmers are able to reproduce their system without the market (Golte & Cadena 1986). Since the cattle production requires bigger areas of land this has resulted in collective management of the cattle between families (de Morrée 2002:64). This system needs an organisation that can control damages the cattle can do to the harvests, and an authority that can implement the rules and sanctions. The collective nature of the crop production has also created a complex system that can be managed by families or by a central authority such as the leaders in the community, the *sindicato*, or cooperatives (de Morrée 2002:14).

The organisation of societies in the Andes

In all the communities in the Andes there are formalised ways of organising the society, and two ways of doing this can be the *ayllu* or the *sindicato*. These systems define rules and norms and this is monitored by authorities in the communities (de Morrée 2002:13). In a study of Rural Producer Organisations it is important to have a wide understanding of how the communities are organised since these systems affect networks between people, norms, and the agricultural production. In the study area the communities are organised into *sindicatos*, but there are also areas in Tomina that are organised into *ayllus* (interview with government in Sopachuy, 2013). In the study area there is no general interaction between the *sindicatos* and the RPOs, since, it was claimed by informants, the *sindicato* is not concerned with what the *comuneros* produce and is therefore not involved in the RPOs.

Ayllu

The *ayllu* is an organisational system that dates back to pre-Hispanic times (Rivera 1990). The *ayllu* is an internal organisational system based on groups of kinship that makes larger ethnic units that together organise land and labour (Rivera 1990:100, de Morrée 2002:68). The term has been used on the local groups of people, but also on the old ‘kingdoms’ that controlled vast areas. “The *ayllu*” is not defined by a specific territory, but it had members in different ecological zones, most often in different areas” (de Morrée 2002:68).

Sindicato

The *sindicatos* is a relatively new form of organising in Bolivia (from the 1950s and onward). In this study the *sindicato* is limited to a community and the people in that community can decide to be a member or not. If one is not a member then one will not receive help from the directive when if there is problems with cows destroying harvests, or one will not receive

water pipes if that is a project implemented by the *sindicato*. The municipal government in my study area always worked through the *sindicato* if they had projects to the *comuneros*. The *sindicatos* have three functions: internal government, allocation of resources, and political representation (de Morrée 2002:68). In some parts of Bolivia the *sindicatos* coexist with the traditional form *ayllu*.

Some historical roots of the *sindicatos*

The *sindicatos* was created by the state after the land reform in 1953 to facilitate land distribution. The land reform can be rooted back to the war of the Chaco (1932-35 between Paraguay and Bolivia). In this time there were changes happening in the way the societies were structured (de Morrée 2002:65). Professionals, students, trader etc. revolted against the high class in the cities, and these groups got contact with the farmers in the war and this contact only got stronger during the war. This planted the need for land reform in the countryside (de Morrée 2002:65). The countryside was at this time characterised by large and medium haciendas, native communities and small properties (Ballivián 2009:19). But the haciendas owned much of the land as is shown by numbers from 1950 where 95 % of the cultivable area in Bolivia was owned by 8 % of the agricultural units that had land from 500 ha to above 5000 ha (Hurtado 2006:49). From the 1930s the demonstrations in the hacienda areas started and in the year 1952 the unrest in the country escalated. There were three days of fighting against the government military, and as the farmers were systematically destroying hacienda property, the state was forced to pass a land reform in 1953 (de Morrée 2002:65). With the new legislation from 1953 it was also decided to implement schools in the rural communities which led to the start of constructing schools all over Bolivia for the rural people (de Morrée 2002:65).

At first the *sindicatos* was the pride of the farmers, the instrument which they had used to get back their land. But it became gradually more visible in the years after the land reform that the state was trying to convert the *sindicato* to a tool for the support of the state (de Morrée 2002:65). The highest leaders in the *sindicato* started to adapt a more vertical leader style in order to influence the government (De Jong 1988 in de Morrée 2003:65). The *sindicatos* had organisational structures at the national and department level, and these were more and more taken over by the urban people. The *sindicato* structure at the province level was taken over by mestizos in the village (de Morrée 2003:66). The mestizos used the *sindicato* structure to

dominate the traditional communities (*ayllus*), and used the system as a means to ‘civilise’ and modernise the indigenous forms of political organisation (Rivera 1990:105).

One fundamental difference between the *ayllu* and the *sindicato* is that the base of the organisational system in the *ayllu* is the kinship relations and the informal networks of cooperation, while in the *sindicato* it does not need to be like that (de Morrée 2002:70). In the *ayllu* the leaders are more concerned with internal cohesion and function, while the leaders in the *sindicato* work more on the representation towards the outside (the state, institutions). This also goes well with the way the *sindicatos* follows state delimitations of borders, and *sindicatos* can be seen as a way of the state to control peasants in the countryside. The leaders in the *ayllu* are normally old people that are valued for their knowledge on internal organisation, while in the *sindicato* the leaders are often younger and important values are to be able to read and write since it involves interaction with government and signing of documents (de Morrée 2002:70). Historically the *ayllu* extended over vast areas and crossed the now made limits between municipalities, provinces, departments, while the *sindicato* is the system of each community in a municipality.

Haciendas and colonisers in Tomina

Records dating back to 1699 show how the canton Sopachuy was part of the Tarabuco (now a canton in the province Yampárez) ayllu (Langer 1989:158). After the Spanish colonisation the western side of the province Tomina had haciendas with tenants but also independent small landowners. In the west the people were mainly Indians and the traditions of the Andes of reciprocity were practised, even at haciendas (Langer 1989). In the east there were also haciendas but the population were mainly mestizo and white and Andes traditions were not acknowledged or known (Langer 1989). Though the province of Tomina had haciendas (mostly wine yards, and fields of wheat and corn) the properties were not large in comparison with other provinces such as Yampárez and Cinti in the 16 century (Langer 1989:159). Also the Spanish practiced the dividing of land to all heirs and in the 19 century the areas were relatively small plots of land (Langer 1989:159). Geographically Sopachuy is located just between the west and the east and it is reasonable to believe that the influence from the Tarabuco ayllu could have maintained some traditions from the Andes while influence from mestizos could also have contributed to the weakening of the traditions.

At the end of the 19 century the Bolivian highland silver mining economy collapsed which led to economic decline in commerce. This greatly affected the province of Tomina: trade and markets were critically reduced which led to a collapse of an earlier thriving barter economy. The collapse of the barter economy led to dissolving social ties and relations among inhabitants. The province was then plagued by bandits and lacking social security. Many landowners and merchants were bankrupt and in debt and more and more agriculture production were produced for subsistence only since a limited market led to increased transport prices (Langer 1989:159). In the second half of the 20 century Tomina was heavily poverty stricken and the migration to Argentina, Monteagudo and Santa Cruz increased and is characterised by Langer (1989) as a flood out of the province.

2.3. Introduction to the Rural Producer Organisations

The term

In Bolivia Rural Producer Organisations (RPO) are called Economic Organisations for Farmers, Indigenous and Natives (OECAS *Organizaciones Económicas Campesinas, Indígena y Originarias*). There are many other terms used to describe the phenomenon, such as “Organisations of Producers”, “Groups of Small Scale Farmers”, “Farmers Organisations”, “Groups of Economic Interest”, “Groups of Self-Help” (Elsner 2004:69 translated from Spanish). In this study the term “Rural Producer Organisations” is used since this is a term applied by the World Bank, whereas the term OECAS seems to only be used in Bolivia.

The function of RPOs

The RPOs consists of units of family farmers, and serve to buy and sell collectively, provide information on prices, contribute to commercialization of products and establish contact with bigger buyers regionally and nationally. Largely, the main goal of the organisations is to improve the marketing of products by the members and improve the agricultural production in the area (de Morrée1998:307). The organisations are registered under the civil code in the Bolivian law system since the RPOs are considered to be non-profit organisations with social goals (CAFOLIS 2009). This status results in that the RPO are exempted from paying taxes, or they pay a very small amount to that compared of a profit company (interview with government, Sopachuy, 2013). But the non-profit status can also be a hindrance for production since that also implies they are not subject to credit (CAFOLIS 2009). There is a national organisation that represents all the RPO in Bolivia (CIOEC-B) that gives technical

advice and works to strengthen the commercial, organisational, political and juridical fields to improve the organisations (CIOEC-b n.d.:10). The CIOEC-B defines the RPO as such:

The economic organisations for farmers, indigenous and natives, we are made of families of small scale agricultural producers, artisans, pickers, we associate to develop activities within the agriculture production chain: production, storage, processing and marketing, with the identity of farmer, indigenous and native (translated from Spanish, CIOEC-B n.d. : 11).

There are 633 RPOs in Bolivia, which amounts to approximately 100 000 families. CIOEC-B works directly with around 200 RPOs (CAFOLIS 2009).

The history

In the Andes the peculiar agricultural system that is shaped by access to dispersed land areas, the fragmentation of the land, and the simultaneous management of different agricultural cycles, has also formed the social organisation in the region (de Morrée 2002:13). As was mentioned under production systems, the management of dispersed plots of land has created a complex system of families and groups that can be managed by for example the *sindicato* or cooperatives (de Morrée 2002:14).

The more formal cooperatives of farmers in the whole of Bolivia were started in the 1970s, where many of them got help and funding of the Catholic Church (de Morrée1998:306). In Chuquisaca the farmer's cooperatives were formed from 1968 and onwards and were in 1974 joined under one head cooperative, referred to as AGROCENTRAL which coordinated all the cooperatives (de Morrée1998:306-307). There have been other corporations at department and national level that was to work for the integration and cooperation between the farmers, but many of these was dissolved due to weak management and lack of finances (de Morrée1998:306-307). One of these farmer's corporations was CORACA (*Corporación Agropecuaria Campesina* -Peasant's Agricultural Cooperation) that was formed in the 1980's mainly to ease the access to fertilizers and help farmers in the acquisition of tractors.

Then in the 1980s and 1990s the Rural Producer Organisations were formed. The difference between the Cooperatives and the Organisations is that the latter works with one specific agricultural product; the organisation of milk production or wheat production and all partners are producing the same product. The factors that contributed to the creation of the RPOs are complex and not all authors agree. According to the Bolivian Ministry of Farmers Issues,

Indigenous Villages and Natives (MACPIO- *El Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos, Pueblos Indígenas y Originarios*) the producer organisations were originally started by The Confederation of Farmer Workers in Bolivia (CSUTCB) (Elsner 2004:72). According to de Morrée (1998: 308), the producer organisations were formed by NGO's, the farmers themselves, or as an initiative by the state. Elsner (2004) argues there are many factors that contributed to the creation of the RPO, i: the traditional *ayllu* system that organised communities into groups, and with the land reform the *sindicatos* took the leading role in community organising and with the law on Popular Participation the state granted legitimacy to the territorial organisations. ii: public policies, for example the land reform (gave the farmers citizenship in that they could vote and their organisations were legitimised by the state), the distance between the state and the civil society (during dictatorships, but also during the 1980s) created the need to organise themselves, the law on Public Participation (from 1994) started to decentralise the country and the municipal productive organisations became important, iii: the intervention of the international NGOs: in the 1980s under Structural Adjustment Papers the NGOs increasingly took on the role of the state in providing assistance to the communities. Many RPOs were formed during these projects (Elsner 2004:236). According to de Morrée (1998:308), the Rural Producer Organisations that were formed had an organisational structure that facilitated the realization of projects led by the NGO's. But she also argues that the organisations were also shaped around the concrete needs of the farmers. The relative success the RPOs are experiencing in comparison with the cooperatives is, according to de Morrée (1998), due to their focus on specific products and the financial and technical help from NGO's.

There is also recognised some problems and challenges for the RPOs. Some problems that are mentioned are lack of information- spreading from the directive to the members and low participation by the members (Elsner 2004, de Morrée 1998, FH 2010). This is recognised as serious problems since the needs of the members will not be identified if they do not participate (de Morrée 1998). Other problems are lack of leadership abilities, little degree of leadership rotation, little knowledge on the management of a company, accounting (FH 2010, de Morrée 1998) and finding markets (FH 2010). Elsner (2004) also point to dependency on technicians (agronomists, economists, veterinaries, accounting clerks etc. from NGOs or state). The technicians are very much valued by the RPOs because these people give access to important knowledge, and they also give access to funds from the state or the NGOs (Elsner 2004:110). But in the study by Elsner the leaders of the RPOs have become dependent on the

technicians for creating and managing projects. According to Elsner (2004) the technicians are the leading characters in the RPOs and the organisation is not by itself able to recognise the needs and demands of the member families (Elsner 2004: 110). This is echoed by de Morrée (1998) as she argues that the RPOs lack strategic long term- planning that is caused by low level of training amongst the leaders and this lack is often not recognised by the RPOs since the role is often filled by an external organisation. The RPOs also often have a strong dependency on external financing to operate (de Morrée 1998:335, Elsner 2004:112).

2.4. The RPO in this study

This study will focus on two Producer Organisations: APROCMI and AMAS that are both located in Sopachuy. These two organisations are local RPOs that have members only in the locality and they work towards improving the market access for the members and increasing the income of its members through selling collectively and refining products that increases the price of the product.

APROCM (*Asociación de Productores de la Cuenca del Río Milanés* – Association of Producers from Cuenca del Rio Milanés) was started in 2001 through the initiative of the NGO ACLO(a Bolivian NGO, created by the Jesuits (*Compañía de Jesus*) in Sucre, financed from NGOs such as British CAFODE, and Spanish NGO Manos Unidas). ACLO had implemented irrigation projects in the communities in order to help the farmers produce better crops, and then wanted the farmers to organise into RPOs in order to sell their product. APROCMI has 30 members (man or woman from a family) from 9 communities: Matela Baja, Silva, Sauce Molino, Milanés, San Juan de Horcas, Pampas del Carmen, Alisos, Chavarría and Rio Grande. These communities are located in different parts around the village of Sopachuy, furthest away is Chavarría and Rio Grande (4 hours walking). The last community is part of the neighbour municipality Tarvita.

The members produce maize and amaranth (a plant used for its grains). APROCMI did initially not transform the raw material, but only stored it in tanks. The RPO got financing from various NGOs and others (see below) to build a transformation plant. They now transform the raw material and make products such as Tojorí (maize grains with sugar and cinnamon to make a drink), Amaranth bar, toasted amaranth, red ají in powder (used for sauce), yellow sweet ají in powder (sauce), Api Morado (powder from maize culli, used for

drink), Api Amarillo (powder from yellow maize used for drink), and amaranth cookies. These products are marketed by ASOVITA (Organisation of Producers from Alcala, Sopachuy, Villar and) which is an organisation located in Sucre that also promote the products of three other producer organisations in Chuquisaca centre. APROCMI also sells directly to the municipal government in Sopachuy and Tarvita (the products are used in the school lunch), and they sell to the departments of Oruro and La Paz (FH 2010).

Regarding the organisational structure of the producer organisation the general assembly (all the members) has the most influence and takes the big decisions (such as buying new equipment, taking loans etc.). A step down from the general assembly is the directive that has the responsibility to organise meetings and new activities. The directive is made up of the President, Vice President, Economic Secretary, Secretary of Records, and a person responsible for informing the members of coming meetings. APROCMI has hired a professional administrator responsible for sales and the general functioning of the plant. The administrator needs the approval of the president to make changes, so they should be in contact every week. APROCMI also pays a production leader and a helper in production which does the day to day production on the plant. When it is needed the organisation pays more people to work in production. APROCMI has a sanitation licence by SENASAG (*Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria e Inocuidad Alimentaria* – National Service of Agricultural Health and Food Safety) which means they are approved by the government to sell at the market.

The organisation has received help in organising and financing from different NGOs and the government since its formation. ACLO supported the construction of the plant, and supported courses to operate the machines. This was donated to the RPO in return for a 10 % coverage of the costs by the members. ACLO also donated (100%) to various machines to the plant. The Italian Embassy donated 50 000bs. to the remaining fine work on the plant. The NGO Fundación Contra el Hambre (FH) and PRORURAL (a Bolivian organisation started by the Swiss Agency for Development Cosude, and others) donated 200 000bs. to the construction of the second floor of the plant (Fundación Valles n.d.: 17). The two NGOs, FH (*Fundación contra el Hambre* – a Swiss organisation that has national organisations in many part of the world) and Fundación Valles (a Bolivian organisation that is finances from USAID, Danish Embassy etc.) write financial plans for the organisation; how to expand, calculate how much it will cost, provide a market analysis and study of competitors etc. These NGOs have trained

the members that work at the plant in production, and it is also claimed that 3 members have been trained in elaborating budgets, understanding cost of production etc. (Fundación Valles n.d.). Currently APROCMI receives financing (with a small part paid by APROCMI) from the government and NGOs to buy equipment and machines. At the time of the fieldwork (January 2013) APROCMI received an industrial mixer from Pasos, an industrial mixer from the municipal government, and FH has promised them a donation of 2000\$ if the organisation can provide 2000\$ as well (they then had to take up a loan). This donation is for buying of machines. Pasos has organised a teacher to train the plant workers in using the mixer. FH has made a business plan with the leader of the organisation and APROCMI now needs to take up a loan (36 179\$) to finance the plan. The loan was not approved by the members. Some said they did not approve it because they had no knowledge on how loans worked and others said they were afraid of the consequences. The goal of the directive was to get the approval of the members and they were planning to hold another meeting. FH was helping the administrator (not a member and is paid) to improve the management (register sales, get the sanitation permit etc.) and Pasos is working to find markets for their products and train the directive on product development, accounting etc. All the help the organisation receives is concentrated on the production of the products.

AMAS (*Asociación Municipal de Apicultores de Sopachuy* – Municipal Organisation of Apiculture producers in Sopachuy) is an association of agriculture producers which is dedicated to the production and transformation of honey. Initially there were three organisations that worked with honey production in Sopachuy: *Asociación de Productores Apicultores e Industriales Sopachuy* – Organisation of Producers of Apiculture and Industrial Sopachuy (APAIS), *Apicultores Emprendedores Sopachuy* – Beekeepers Entrepreneurs Sopachuy (AES), and *Asociación de Mujeres Artesanas Frutícolas y Apicultores* Organisation of Female Artisans in Fruit production and Apiculture (AMAFa) that had been started by an NGO (PRODECO – a Bolivian NGO, funded in cooperation with the Danish NGO Diálogos). AMAS was formed in 2008 when these organisations were joined into one group. AMAS have 55 members in 9 communities: San Jose de Matelias, Rio Milanés, Silva, Matela Baja, Sauce Molino, San Antonio, Jarka Mayu, Tambillos and Chavarría. They also have members that only live in the village of Sopachuy.

The farmers in this organisation produce ecological honey and pollen. They also sometimes make shampoo and lip balm. They sell honey to the other organisation in this study

(APROCMI) to be used in the product that is sold to the government project of school lunch in the municipalities in the centre of Chuquisaca. Apart from that, the organisation has no place to sell the honey, so as a temporal solution the president is selling from his house.

The organisational structure of AMAS is almost the same as that of APROCMI: the general assembly (all the members) is the highest organ, below that is the directive which is made up of the President, Vice president, Secretary of economy, Secretary of marketing, and a person in charge of notifying the members of upcoming meetings. AMAS has also received and keeps receiving help from NGOs and the government. The internal documents (rules, sanctions, visions etc.) have been written with help from the NGO Pasos (a Bolivian NGO with financing from a Spanish NGO: *Ayuda en Acción*). The documents are sometimes updated, and when this was done a year ago, the organisation got help from the government to form a committee and then update the document. All the equipment the organisation owns it has received from donors, or it has been given with the demand for a part paid by the organisation. Technical help in the production has been given by Pasos, Cosv-Lider (Cosv: an Italian NGO, Lider: a Bolivian NGO that work in Chuquisaca and Potosi) and the municipal government. Currently another NGO, FAUTAPO (a Bolivian NGO, financed by ANR- the French National Agency for Research) holds courses with the members to train them in the honey production. This help from NGOs has been intensified since the organisation was formed out of the other groups, and now many members have around 8- 10 bee –boxes each in comparison with 2-3 boxes they had before. Pasos has also held courses in management of a company. Cosv-Lider has also held courses in ‘how to refine a product’ and marketing. The courses in organisational management or marketing are for the directive in the organisation.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0. Introduction

In this section I will give a short overview of the different themes and literature that is relevant to the thesis and to my analysis of the findings. The chapter starts with the concept rural livelihoods, then different forms of capital, the concept of social capital and collective action theories, and local participation. These are all important concepts in my framework for analysing the relevance of social capital and a functioning producer organisation. The concept

of rural livelihoods is very helpful in order to understand opportunities and constraints for the farmers which may influence their participation. Social capital is a concept with many definitions and usages so it is needed an overview of some of these views. The concept of participation is commonly used in the literature on development strategies and projects and is

3.1. Rural livelihoods

The term livelihood in its simplest sense is to make a living. According to Chambers and Conway (1991:5) the term Sustainable Livelihoods includes elements such as the ability to perform basic functions, including for instance the ability to be comfortably clothed, to avoid preventable mortality, not live in shame, know what is going on in the social circle and to visit friends. Other elements are the ability to cope with stress and shocks, to use opportunities, accessing and using information, and cooperating and competing with other people (Chambers and Conway 1991:4).

To understand farmer's situations it is foremost important to make an analysis of the livelihood strategies applied by the farmers (Bebbington 1999:2026). Bebbington (1999:2026) emphasise 5 rural strategies which are *capitalized family farms*; farms that have emerged from the medium sized peasantry (which are viable), *rural proletarianisation*; farmers working in capitalist agricultural enterprises such as fruit production, *migration*; temporarily or permanent, can be a survival strategy or an accumulation strategy, *rural industry*; this can be for example shoe, textile and leather factories which is combined with agricultural work, and *rural and peri-urban commerce*; this can involve a family member going off somewhere for a period or permanently to sell products. The way people compose their livelihood strategies in the Andes is multiple, and increasingly non-agrarian (Ellis 1998 in Bebbington 1999:2026). Temporal or permanent migration is a livelihood strategy in the Andes to cope with low agricultural production (Aramayo et al. 1998).

The most viable livelihood strategies is according to Bebbington (1999) dependent on access; to for example credit, land, markets, kin and other networks, social organisation, and labour. This can be divided into five types of capital assets; produced, human, natural, social and cultural capital. Access to knowledge on production and access to land makes a farmer able to construct his livelihood strategy as a farmer. The networks he has may help him construct the livelihood in one direction or the other (new products, ideas etc.). The access then makes individuals able to construct their livelihoods. According to the author, an important factor in

describing poverty is the limited ability people have had to build up and use the networks with civil society, state, and market that would have helped them access and strengthen their assets (Bebbington 1999:2028). The purpose of understanding livelihood strategies is according to Valdivia & Quiroz (2001:5) to comprehend how and when individuals, households, and groups cooperate and negotiate inside their groups, with their communities and the markets, using their assets and abilities. Water, land, crops, and knowledge are vital assets that the rural families need access to in order to shape their livelihoods. “Access, control, and management of these resources contribute to shape which activities are pursued, which goods produced, and the ability to retain the benefits of their labor” (Valdivia & Quiroz 2001:7). Climatic factors are also an important factor that shapes livelihood strategies. Droughts, floods, frosts, and El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) have an impact on the agriculture in the Andes region of Bolivia and Peru (Valdivia & Quiroz (2001:7). The climatic variability strongly influences the livelihood strategies of the highland farmers, which is identified by the mix of activities and the land use patterns.

Viable and non-viable farmers: The debate surrounding the viability of the small scale farming system has been going on for many decades. According to Bebbington (1999: 2024) the debate in the 1990s under neoliberalism tended to go in the pessimistic view that modelled the system as dysfunctional: the farmers could hardly produce enough for themselves and they hold on to land that can be used more efficiently. In the context of neoliberal economic policy and the relationship between the Ministry of agriculture that wanted investment and the Ministry of finance that wanted to limit such investments if it was not profitable – a language developed that separated between viable and non-viable peasants (Bebbington 1999: 2025).

In the light of this and based on his own study on the influence of NGO programs in the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes, van Niekerk (1994: 319 in Bebbington 1999: 2025) concluded that if the market is to be used as the defining principle for rural policy, “Andean agriculture has two possibilities: to disappear, or to modernize violently to achieve competitive levels of productivity and production”. If none of these two alternatives happen, the Andean agriculture is forced to stay in a situation of low yields and migration (van Niekerk 1994). This thesis is not to go into the viability of the Bolivian agriculture, but I mention these discussions to shed light on the difficulties faced by of the farmers and the potential importance of the Rural Producer Organisations. Bebbington (1999) admits there are many limitations to the Andean agriculture, but that changes are taking place. The discussion on Andean agriculture needs to

change its view: less on agriculture per se, and focusing more on the resources, institutional sphere, and market type the families have access to that have made them able to shape their livelihoods (Bebbington 1999).

3.2. *Forms of capital*

The concept of capital comes from economics and has traditionally been understood as for example money or property. But the concept has been widened to include other forms of capital that is not so tangible. One key theorist in this field is Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu's definition on capital is

Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor (Bourdieu 1986:46).

Capital is then in Bourdieu's view different sorts of resources that a person can mobilize in order to obtain different projects and goals (Crossley 2005:29). Capital is according to Bourdieu (1986) inherent in objective and subjective structures, and is also inherent in the principles of the social world. Capital is what makes the rules of the game: without capital, economic action for example would have been a game of chance, a game of roulette. If our world worked according to the principles of roulette everybody could change their status immediately. Capital on the other hand takes time to accumulate, it can reproduce itself in the same form or expanded form, and it is a "force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally possible or impossible" (Bourdieu 1986:46). For Bourdieu the concept of capital is crucial in the understanding of the structures and functioning of the social world, and capital needs to be understood in all its forms, not just economic capital (Bourdieu 1986).

Bourdieu mentions three types of capital: economic, cultural, symbolic and social. Economic capital refers to monetary wealth (income) and other types of wealth such as property and land (Crossley 2005). Economic capital is directly convertible to money, such as property rights (Bourdieu 1986). Cultural capital can embody three forms; the 'embodied' form, which is for example the ability to talk about art or express oneself with the "proper" accent or behaviour, the 'objectified' – which is books, dictionaries, paintings that a person has; and the 'institutionalized' form – which is particularly educational qualifications (Bourdieu

1986:46). Symbolic capital refers to status or recognition. To have symbolic capital is when your own person or work is highly valued by others and this can be used to benefit you (Crossley 2005:31). Social capital is for Bourdieu the resources an individual has from connections and he emphasises the special importance of ‘friends in high places’ (Bourdieu in Crossley 2005:32). The concept of social capital entails a wide debate that will be presented in the next section. Other scholars, such as Bebbington (1999:2022) recognise more capitals, such as produced, human, natural, social, and cultural. Human capital in Bebbington’s terms is knowledge and skills. Ostrom (1999:174) mention three forms of capitals: physical, human and social capital. Physical capital is human made material resources such as roads, irrigation systems, factories, schools, cattle etc. Physical capital needs human capital to operate and social capital if more than one is to use this productively (Ostrom 1999). Human capital is the skills and knowledge an individual has. Social capital is “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of interaction...” (Ostrom 1999:176).

3.3. Social capital and local development

The basic idea of social capital is that one’s family, friends, and associates constitutes an important asset, one that can be called upon in crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and/or leveraged for material gains (UNESCO 2002:22).

In this section I will briefly introduce some outcomes of social capital that is promoted by different authors. The discussion on social capital and development is difficult since there is no agreed definition on the concept, but some examples may highlight why scholars do not so readily dismiss the concept.

An article by Woolcock (1998) begins with describing his arrival in a South Asian town where the airport is chaotic, everybody want to get off the plane before it has stopped, transportation is horribly poor organised, towns people suffer from malnutrition and poverty, teachers and doctors fails to show up at work, and society is plagued with corruption and crime. The author then goes on to argue that these problems are rooted in a lack of social capital that he defines as information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in our social networks (Woolcock 1998:152). He argues that in a society that is plagued by corruption and widespread mistrust it is not difficult to comprehend why the even thoughtful development project fails (Woolcock 1998:152). A report by UNESCO (2002) ties social capital directly

to poverty reduction. First because it is absolutely necessary to mobilise the poor in order to change their living standards and it is equally important that the poor take part in the political life so their voices are heard. For that to happen the poor needs to be part of the civil society. For these reasons it is paramount to increase social capital among poor people UNESCO (2002:14). Social ties among people strengthen the capacity of people and communities to solve their problems, cover their needs and improve the quality of life – elements that are also part of the fight against poverty UNESCO (2002:14).

A commonly used example of organisations that need trust is the rotating credit associations: people get together and everybody puts money into the pot and the money is distributed to one member at a time. There is a risk involved in this system since people can be tempted to leave when they receive their share and thus cheating the rest of their share. And yet these systems flourish in every corner of the world (Putnam et al. 1993). Through a network of people the members can access information about each other and it is preferable to build up a good reputation (Putnam et al 1993). In this way trust can evolve and people that really need that saving can benefit greatly from the system and the social capital created. Another example is given by Ostrom (1999) on community driven irrigation systems: local farmers get together to organise the construction of irrigation channels and has responsibility for the monitoring of the channels and water distribution. The farmers have to distribute tasks and make rules which create networks and trust between them that is beneficial for them and the community. Ostrom (1999) shows how the locally driven irrigation systems are operated much more efficient and sustainable than the donor financed projects that construct modern constructions. One reason for that is that when the locals did not participate they did not have the incentives to work together and the trust and general expectations towards the others in the system were reduced and thus members started to take more water for themselves or the channels were not maintained.

These examples are given to present the concept of social capital and some expected benefits for development. But the difficulty is that the concept entails a wide variety of meanings for different scholars and has been used for different purposes in the economic field, sociological field and political field (Woolcock 1998:155). The next section thus presents the concept and theory of social capital.

3.4. The theory of social capital

Introduction

In this part different views on social capital and theories of collective action are presented. Four central writers on social capital are presented: Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Robert Putnam and Elinor Ostrom. The contemporary pretext of the concept social capital was first identified by scholars such as Bourdieu, but has then later been developed more extensively by scholars such as Coleman and Putnam (Woolcock 1998:156). I will give an overview of the perspectives to highlight how the concept is understood by various scholars and how the concept is connected to theories on social action.

There are many definitions on social capital. The scholars in this field debate on the issues regarding what to include in the definition and importantly what are causes and what are effects of social capital (Ostrom & Ahn 2002:4-5). Rudd (2000:135-136) has divided the definitions into three broad categories: **i**: Social capital is ‘generalized trust’ that is essentially created as a by-product of interactions in voluntary and informal associations. This category is based on the thinking of Tocqueville (1945) and includes Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Inglehart (1997), and Stolle (1998)¹. **ii**: Social capital consists of norms and networks that facilitate collective action (e.g. Granovetter 1985, Coleman 1987, Nee and Ingram 1998, Ostrom 1999, Portes and Sensenbrenner 1998, Burt 2000)², or in a broader sense the norms and networks facilitate influence and control (Coleman 1987, Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and **iii**: social capital consists of the institutional structures that facilitate the creation of trust, cooperation and trade with individuals that without it would have been socially isolated (e.g. North 1990, 1998, Williamson 1994)³.

One of the critical issues the scholars disagree upon is trust; whether it is endogenous or exogenous or if it is a cause or an effect of social capital (Rudd 2000:136, Ahn & Ostrom 2002:4). Putnam (1993) for example regards trust to be exogenous in that the networks of associations create a culture of trust, but the trust also extends beyond the face-to-face

¹ Tocqueville (1945) *Democracy in America*, Fukuyama (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, Inglehart (1997) *Modernization and Post-Modernization*, Stolle (1998) *Making associations work: group characteristics, membership and generalized trust*.

² Granovetter (1985) *Economic action and social structure*, Coleman (1987) *Norms as social capital*, Nee and Ingram (1998) *Embeddedness and beyond*, Ostrom (1999) *Coping with tragedies of the commons*, Portes and Sensenbrenner (1998) *Embeddedness and immigration*, Burt (2000) *The network structure of social capital*

³ North (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Williamson (1994) *Transaction cost economics and organization theory*

collaboration and is a sort of exogenous ‘generalized trust’. Coleman (1987) on the other hand viewed trust as endogenous since trust is dependent on the social structures to create incentives for trustworthy action (Rudd 2000:136).

One of the first scholars in this presentation is Pierre Bourdieu. According to Crossley (2005:287), Bourdieu’s focus lies in the resources an individual have (that will depend on networks) to use to obtain its goals. His focus lies on the actor in the society. This is a contrast to the perspective of for example Putnam that has a more structural approach to the networks, as his analysis in *Making Democracy Work* from 1993 mapped out the different types and amount of civil society groups in a society.

Bourdieu

Bourdieu was a French sociologist and anthropologist. He is especially known for his concept of cultural capital. Bourdieu was interested in how society was reproduced and how the elite stayed in power (Gauntlett 2011). In this reproduction the habitus, cultural capital and social capital are especially important. In his book *Distinction* from 1984 he shows how cultural objects and knowledge, and economics interact with social class relations and thus explains how the elite holds on to their positions (Gauntlett 2011). Bourdieu’s concept of social capital was developed in the 1970s and early 80s and the focus of his analysis lies on conflict and opposing interests, and also how social relations increase and the actors opportunities to increase their power (Siisiäinen 2000:2). Bourdieu defines social capital as

the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 119).

This definition is very similar to other definitions on social capital such as that of James Coleman and Robert Putnam. But whereas other writers use the concept to describe social relations of a integrating network of people, Bourdieu use the concept to describe how it creates social inequality and how the elite stays in power (Gauntlett 2011, Siisiäinen 2000:23). It is not what you know, it is *who* you know. Bourdieu views the structure of the social association – the networks of relationships – as the result of investment strategies that have been consciously or unconsciously used to establish or reproduce the social order (Bourdieu 1986).

Habitus

I will briefly introduce the concept of habitus since this is an important concept in Bourdieu's view on how actors act. A theoretical bridge between the capitals lies in the notion of habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:120). Habitus lies in the 'second nature' – the social world where we socialize and keep control of our "selfish and aggressive instincts" from our 'primary nature' (Crossley 2005:105). The elements from our primary nature thus prevail in the habitus and create tension between impulse and control. This view is evident in Bourdieu's conceptualisation of habitus (Crossley 2005:105).

The habitus is according to Bourdieu a "feel of the game": we have pre-reflexive knowledge which is a form of competence that influences our action (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). We acquire this "feel for the game" through participation in activities such as trips to museums or soccer matches. We then act automatically when we are in those situations: we don't need to plan or think when playing the game. The concept of habitus reflects the significance of pre-reflexive action and how much our action is shaped by this (Crossley 2005:108). We do not think, perceive and feel out of 'nothingness', our reactions are shaped by mostly unconscious traces of our past experiences. Our actions are then shaped, according to Bourdieu, on the basis of the habitual expectations and assumptions (Crossley 2005:108). Importantly this does not mean that Bourdieu has a deterministic view on our way of practice; we do reflect and chose, but the practice of choosing is underpinned by habitus (Crossley 2005:110). Our actions are not totally free and they are not controlled by external forces; Bourdieu therefore seeks a middle path with the concept of habitus that explains our actions as shaped by our desires and understandings of the world, and also by our situational place in it (Crossley 2005:110).

Human action is not an instantaneous reaction to immediate stimuli, and the slightest "reaction" of an individual to another is pregnant with the whole history of these persons and of their relationship (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 124).

The main purpose with the concept habitus is to break with the specific philosophy of action that states that human action is wholly rational. In his words he wanted to "account for the actual logic of practice (...) I have put forth a theory of practice as the product of a *practical sense*, of a socially constituted "sense of the game"" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:120). According to Bourdieu, the narrow view on human behaviour in the rational choice theory ignores the individual and collective history people have. In this history there are "structures

of preferences” that are made in “a complex temporal dialectic with the objective structures that produced them and which they tend to reproduce” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:123).

Field

The concept field, together with capitals and habitus are the three central concepts in Bourdieu’s thinking and are closely interrelated. Field is used by Bourdieu to conceptualise the different social spaces in our society, for example the artistic field, religious field, or the economic field (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:97). A field can be defined as “a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:97). In a field there are individuals interacting and they have positions in the field that go according to their access to resources and power in that field (Bourdieu in Crossley 2005). How the individuals react and express themselves in the field is also shaped by the structure; norms, codes etc. We all have different access to the field as a whole and to the internal “logic” of the field; this access is determined by our habitus and our capitals. Whether you have a ‘poor’ or ‘rich’ position in important fields such as education will be significant for the rest of your life (Bourdieu in Crossley 2005).

The intellectuals in society were a key focus in Bourdieu’s theories: the important role the intellectuals had in reproducing cultural capital and creating symbolic power (Swartz 1997:4). In this sense Bourdieu highlights the negative sides of social capital, which is very important as well since social capital can lead to the formation of groups that can harm others; such as the Ku Klux Klan, or the exclusion of others such as the elite over the less powerful. The focus on conflict in Bourdieu’s work is according to Siisiäinen (2000) very important since you cannot explain social change in a society without looking at conflict between different actors. The introduction to these concepts by Bourdieu is essential as the notion of field and habitus can be useful in this study as tools in the analysis of the farmer’s situation and actions. The concept of field can give an understanding of what shapes the actions of individuals.

Coleman

James Coleman is an American sociologist. He was writing on social capital more or less at the same time (1980s and early 1990s) as Bourdieu, and they even cooperated on co-editing the book *Social Theory in a Changing Society*. Coleman used the rational choice theory of the economics field and tried to bring that into sociology (Coleman 1988). The concept of social

capital is to Coleman part of a theoretical strategy where he takes the rational action theory as a starting point, but rejects the extreme focus on the individual: “The conception of social capital as a resource for action is one way of introducing social structure into the rational action paradigm” (Coleman 1988:95). This way he sought to mix perspectives of the influences of society with the individualistic rational choice theory (Coleman 1988).

Coleman was the first scholar to really conceptualize the concept of social capital (Ostrom 2003: xxvii). It started as a umbrella concept that viewed society as composed of self-interested individuals who pursue individual goals, but that act in relationships with others and where resources are traded for profit (Crossley 2005:283). It was his work on the connections between social capital and human capital (Coleman 1988) that got the concept recognised for its importance (Crossley 2005). Social capital is by Coleman (1988:98) defined in relation to its functions, it is:

a variety of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they all facilitate certain actions of actors –whether persons or corporate actors - within the structure

Social capital is not inherent in a person; it is inherent in the relations among people (Coleman 1988:98). Social capital is not something you can own, but it can be made accessible to you (Coleman 1988). Coleman gives the examples of the diamond market; the merchant gives over diamond stones to another merchant for examination done at another place. This is done without any insurance. This system of exchange of stones for examination makes the market more efficient. The diamond market in New York is controlled by Jewish families and the trust and relations among them make this transaction work. Without it, a complicated system of expensive bonding and insurance had to be in place (Coleman 1988). Another example is that of neighbourhoods: in a neighbourhood in Jerusalem with a lot of social capital a woman can with greater ease leave her children playing in the street or in a park because the norm is that unattended children will be “looked after” by neighbours.

The views of Coleman led to a wider concept of social capital. Social capital was not only seen in relation to the elite and how it helped them to reproduce their power, but as something accessible for the poor and marginalised as well (Gauntlett 2011). Social capital can be a source of information, but also of norms and sanctions that make a society or organisation work more easily (Coleman 1988:104).

According to Coleman, social capital is very important because of its role in creating human capital (Coleman 1988:109). He gives the example of human capital that the parents in a family have; this human capital is important for the learning process of the child, but only if the family has social capital.

That is, if the human capital possessed by parents is not complemented by social capital embodied in family relations, it is irrelevant to the child's educational growth that the parent has a great deal, or a small amount, of human capital (Coleman 1988:110).

So, if the parent is not an important part of the child's life, then the human capital possessed by the parent will not be transferred to the child. This implies that people need to help and support each other in order to create social capital. What drives people to help each other is not altruistic means, nor the idea of a self-gain, i.e. that I might help you today and contribute with some community values, and then maybe someday that will pay off and you will help me back. The actors, according to Coleman (1988:118) are largely not interested in purposively doing action that creates social capital since "the benefits of actions that bring social capital into being are largely experienced by persons other than the actor, it is often not in his interest to bring it into being". Social capital is then according to Coleman (1988) a "by-product" of other activities. The rational choice theory that Coleman to some extent follows does not allow for altruistic actions, or that people just want to be nice to each other because they like each other (Gauntlett 2011). According to Field (2008:31 in Gauntlett 2011) this is something Coleman has in common with Bourdieu; they do not give much space in their analysis that people can interact (or avoid to interact) because of love (or loathe) for each other.

Putnam

Robert Putnam is an American political scientist. Putnam draws upon the work of Coleman (but also earlier scholars such as Tocqueville), and with the work *Making Democracy Work* (1993) he and his colleagues made the concept of social capital known in wider circles in social sciences (Crossley 2005:285). Putnam et al (1993:167) refers to social capital as trust, norms, and network which are features of social organisation. Trust is in the book referred to as a form of social capital. In his book *Bowling Alone* from 2001 Putnam defines social capital as "connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 2001:19). In this second definition it looks like Putnam defines social capital as connections, and not specifically norms, networks and trust-

they arise from the networks. Unclear definitions on the concept are something Putnam has been criticized for.

Putnam et al. (1993) argue that a society based on reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society. Networks of civic engagement foster norms of reciprocity: I will do this for you now and you or someone else will do something for me later. Putnam's concepts on social capital and trust are directed towards understanding mechanisms to achieve integration and solidarity in society, on what creates consensus and a stable society. This is a rather different perspective than that of Bourdieu that analyses the structures of social organisation by looking at the power and domination structures that are produced and reproduced and destroyed by agents in the game (Siisiäinen 2000:23).

Putnam et al (1993:175) also makes a point that "weak ties" (networks between large amounts of non-family members in society) are more important for the cohesion and collective action than "strong ties" (kinship and intimate friendship). Communities can have stocks of social capital which can be inherited over time. A community with a substantial stock of social capital will facilitate voluntary cooperation and the success of for example a rotating credit association (Putnam et al. 1993:167). A civil society organisation will have something Putnam characterises as horizontal ties which is preferable for cooperation and social capital in comparison with vertical ties that make cooperation more difficult (Putnam et al 1993). But importantly, trust is not blind. You do not trust a person just because he says he will do it. Putnam et al. (1993) cites Dasgupta (2002) that argue that: "You trust him only because, knowing what you know of his disposition, his available options and their consequences, his ability and so forth you expect that he will *choose* to do it". Dilemmas of collective action (more on that below), such as free riding a public service or non-cooperation is according to Putnam et al. (1993) 'rational'. Putnam bases his thoughts on the rational choice theory and game theory that predicts in many cases non-cooperation to be rational, but Putnam explain this choice of not cooperating as a lack of social capital (Putnam 1993:164).

Critics have argued that Putnam does not specify enough his concept of social capital. Galston (2001) in his review on Putnam's *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000), argues for example that Putnam's use of networks is not specified. He asks: are the networks important in themselves or are they just the sources of generalised

trust? This vagueness, Galston argue, is important since Putnam does not really prove a causal relation between networks of civil organisations and generalised trust.

Ostrom

There is one more scientist that I would like to include in this presentation of views on social capital, and that is Elinor Ostrom. Ostrom was an American political economist that has written extensively on the issue of the commons, how to manage them, social capital, and collective dilemmas. Collective dilemmas is something that permeates many aspects of society, for example when bureaucrats are to make budgets, the formation of interest groups, it is at the core of explaining voting behaviour, international relations or the control people have over its governments (Ostrom 1998:1). According to Ostrom, social scientists often lack a clear stand on the theories of collective action, as she says:

If political scientists do not have an empirically grounded theory of collective action, then we are hand-waving at our central questions. I am afraid that we do a lot of hand-waving (Ostrom 1998:1).

Theories of collective action play a key role in how we formulate the concept social capital (Ostrom 2003: xiii). Theories on collective action concern situations where there is a group of people, a common interest among them, and possible conflict between the common interest and the interests of each individual (Ostrom 2003:xiv). The problem is of overcoming selfish incentives and working out a mutually beneficial solution. According to Ostrom the success and failure of collective action is not determined by a single factor but by a complex structure of different factors that she defines as forms of social capital (Ostrom 2003:xvi). Social capital is then a theoretical concept that helps to systemize how communities respond to problems of collective action (Ostrom 2003: xvi). I will come back to the theory of collective action, but first I want to present Ostrom's definition on social capital.

Ostrom firsts acknowledges that there are multiple forms of social capital, just as there are multiple forms of the other types of capitals. But Ostrom has selected three broad forms of social capital that she regards as especially important: trustworthiness, networks, and formal and informal rules or institutions. Ostrom regards social capital as an attribute of individuals and of the relationships they have that make them more apt to solve collective action problems. That social capital is an attribute of an individual is a rather different definition than what Coleman and Putnam argue as they speak more of the structures that create social

capital. For the last to authors, social capital is a by-product of social activities, it is as Coleman (1988:98) points out: “not inherent in an individual “.

Collective action theories

The perspective on how actors act and what stimulates and motivates a person to do a particular thing is important to understand in order to have a definition on how social capital is created. There is a divide on issue between scholars in the economic field and the sociological field. One view, which is held by most sociologists, is that social action as being formed by the norms, rules and obligations of the individual. In this view social action is shaped by the social context (Coleman 1988: 95). In the other view, held by most economists, social action is being formed by self-interested independently working individuals which goals are arrived at independently (Coleman 1988: 95). The two views have their limitations alone; the sociological view is being criticized for not having an explanation for the “roots” of the action; what drives the individual to do action. In this view the individual has no internal reason to do action: action is wholly made by the social context (Coleman 1988: 96). The economic view is being criticized for not incorporating factors from the social context, as explained by Coleman (1988: 96):

persons' actions are shaped, redirected, constrained by the social context; norms, interpersonal trust, social networks, and social organization are important in the functioning not only of the society but also of the economy.

Bourdieu rejects the rational choice theory and argues that the concepts of habitus and field are crucial in explaining human behaviour. Coleman argues in his paper “Social capital in the creation of human capital” (1988:95) that the concept of social capital is a theoretical strategy where he can use rational choice theory as a starting point, but not incorporating the extreme focus on individualism. Coleman wants to unite the two views and use social capital as a tool in that analysis. Putnam also take on the rational choice theory as he claims that game theory is “extremely useful for explaining how perfectly rational individuals can produce, under some circumstances, outcomes that are not ‘rational’ when viewed from the perspective of those involved” (Putnam 1993:164). Putnam here refers to well-known examples from game theory: “The Prisoners Dilemma” (Luce and Raiffa 1957:95) and “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968).

“The tragedy of the Commons” is about common grassland, accessible to all. Every rational farmer would want to maximise their gain from this land and add another cow. The gains

from one cow go directly to the farmer and the negative effects are divided between all the farmers. So the only sensible thing to do is to add another animal and another and another (Hardin 1968). Since every farmer is thinking the same, and if one farmer decides not to add another cow, while the rest is adding, he alone will bear the losses (Putnam 1993: 163). The tragedy is that the grassland is overused and the farmers lose their livelihood.

The classical example of “The prisoner`s dilemma” is a situation where two prisoners are held by the police but the police do not have enough evidence to convict them on the main charge but will convict them on a lesser charge (Luce & Raiffa 1957:95). The two prisoners cannot communicate and have these alternatives: cooperate and keep silent (both will receive light charges), confess and go free while the other prisoner receives a heavy sentence, or both can confess and receive moderate sentences (Luce and Raiffa 1957:95). In other words it is more advantageous to not cooperate with the other prisoner since the game is based on rational choice theory every individual will make the decision that will maximise their outcome.

Rational choice theory is, according to Ostrom (1998:2), one of the most powerful theories in contemporary social sciences. It understands human beings as self-interested short-term maximizers. The actor`s preferences, actors beliefs, and actors set of strategies are key elements in the definition of a system (Ostrom 1998:2). Game theory is a technique for the mathematical study of conflict and cooperation between rational and intelligent actors. It is a study of situations where two or more individuals make decisions that influence each other (Myerson 1991:1). Game theorists use quantitative models and hypothetical examples in their studies (Myerson 1991:1). Rational in this context means that the player makes decisions consistently according to their objective. In game theory a player`s objective is understood as to maximise the outcome of their own payoff (Myerson 1991:2). When game theorists analyse the players and regard them as intelligent it is in the sense that the players know the game and understands the theory of the game (Myerson 1991:4). The theory of rational choice is a part of many models in game theory (Osborne 2004:2). This is clear as the theory sets out the same principles as game theory, in that the actor in rational choice theory chose the alternatives that are consistent with his preferences. The rationality is rooted in the consistency in his choices when he can choose from many alternatives (Osborne 2004:2).

In the game theory examples above, all the actors would have been better off if they could just cooperate. Putnam (1993:164) argues that what is lacking in these examples is credible mutual commitment: in order to cooperate one needs to trust the other person and importantly one also needs to believe that one is trusted by the other. When there is none such mutual commitment, every individual has an incentive to defect and become a “free rider” (Putnam 1993). Hardin (1968) argues that there is no solution to the tragedy of the commons that can come from the participants: the land needs to be privatised and the one that destroys the land must pay (“polluter pays”).

There are many views in the field on collective action and it is preferable to divide the differences into what Ostrom (2003:xiv) presents in her book *The Foundations of Social Capital*: the first and second generation of collective action theories. In the first generation there are authors such as Hardin (1968) and Olsen (1965). They argued that individuals will not achieve collective benefits if all in the end receive the benefits regardless of whether they contributed to the activity or not. The solution to collective dilemmas proposed by the first generation is that of regulation by external authority, provide incentives, or privatise (Ostrom 2003: xiv). The human being is viewed as unable to solve the collective dilemma, because we are atomized, selfish, and fully rational individuals (Ostrom 2003: xv). But, there are many examples of collective practices that do not work according to this logic; the *aiutarella* sharecropping in Italy, collective barn- raising on the American frontier (Putnam 1993:165) and the common grasslands and reciprocity in labour and products in the Andes (Skar 2001:312). Research⁴ on collective action has also shown that these theories do not explain the full picture of all collective action situations (Ostrom 2003: xv). The second generation theories on collective action acknowledge the importance of game theory and so uses the standard non- cooperative game theory, but also the behavioural and evolutionary game theories (Ostrom 2003: xv). It is acknowledged that there are many different types of individuals, not just the rational non-cooperative.

This debate on social action is important to understand in this study on the relationship between social capital and producer organisations, since, as Ostrom (2003: xvi) points out, it

⁴ Examples on research given by Ostrom: Blomquist (1992) *Dividing the Waters: Governing groundwater in southern California*, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition’, Feeney et al. (1990) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty- Two Years Later’, McCay and Acheson (1987) *The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources*, Ostrom (1990) *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*.

is crucial to make clear which theory you use in a research because the meanings of the concepts will change as well. In the first generation, the concept trust is not a fundamental concept that can change behaviour; it can be easily dismissed by incentives. In the second generation incentives are also important, but trust is viewed as something that can be present without material incentives; and that is genuine trustworthiness (Ostrom 2003: xvi). The view on human behaviour will also have implications for the perceptions on how change happen: if one assumes that the individual is helpless and bound to do some sorts of action then the state for instance has a bigger role in solving collective action problems. But if the individual is seen as actively influencing their environment and actions, then the state has a lesser role (Ostrom 1998:18). The view from “The Tragedy of the Commons” is that the individuals are helplessly trapped in the destructive practices until it is imposed sanctions or incentives from outside (Ostrom 1998:3). When policies have been based on this view the majority of projects have not involved the affected people, but has been led by outside control that resulted in more damage than initially (Ostrom 1998:3).

Second generation theory on collective action


All long enduring political philosophies have recognized human nature to be complex mixtures of the pursuit of self-interest combined with the capability of acquiring internal norms of behaviour and following enforced rules when understood and perceived to be legitimate (Ostrom 1998:2)

According to Ostrom our heritage makes us self- interest seeking and at the same time we have the capability to learn norms such as the norm of reciprocity that will facilitate collective action and is crucial in social capital. Remembering Ostrom’s definition of social capital: which is based on three forms of social capital: i) trustworthiness, ii) networks, and iii) formal or informal rules or institutions, I will now present the foundations of that theory. The three forms of social capital are the main reasons that influences whether a person that is trusted by another will reciprocate, and for the trustor to believe the trustee will reciprocate (Ahn & Ostrom 2002:14).

Trust is viewed as an outcome of the forms of social capital, not as social capital, but trust is the key element between social capital and successful collective action (Ostrom 2003: xvi). Ostrom’s concept of trust is in line with what Putnam’s (2000:136 in Ostrom 2003) concept of “thin ties” in society that gives the stranger” the benefit of the doubt”.

Figure 5: Forms of social capital and the link between social capital and collective action

Forms of social capital:



(Source: Ostrom 2003:xviii)

Trustworthiness

Trust, can according to Ostrom (2003: xix), not be wholly explained by the interactions we have in networks or in institutions. Trustworthiness of a person is something that often comes from the characteristics of that person. When people analyse whether to trust a person or not they “depend on their belief regarding the trustee’s motivation (Ostrom 2003: xix). An individual’s core values will be a person’s trustworthiness. What motivates the person, what are the preferences of the person; these issues will shape the trustworthiness of the trustee. From communities to communities, the average trustworthiness of the individuals will differ and it will affect the implementation of collective action. The trustworthiness of a person cannot be explained by the incentives that are given in a structure (Ostrom 2003: xx). Trust and trustworthiness are parts of reciprocity, so a person that reciprocates is trustworthy (Ostrom 2000: xxi). The information received about a person’s trustworthiness is essential if the trustor decides to reciprocate and thus cooperate. Putnam et al. (1993: 172) refers to this as they argue for generalized reciprocity which they regard to be “a highly productive component of social capital”. Generalized reciprocity is “a continuing relationship of exchange that is at any time unrequited or imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future”. When the norm of reciprocity dominates in a society that means that” a significant proportion” of the individuals are trustworthy (Ostrom 2003:xxi).

Networks

When a society has robust networks between its members then there are repetitive interactions between the individuals which are an important form of social capital. In non- cooperative game theory communication is viewed as unimportant: the self-interested actor is expected to

use communication with the other actors in a social dilemma to convince them that cooperation is beneficial, but when the individuals are to make their decisions they will not change their decisions (Ostrom 1998: 6). They have knowledge on the other actor's decisions, so they will not change their own. But as Ostrom (1998, 2000) argue, the empirical studies show that communication face to face between people will increase (there are examples of up to 40 %) the levels of cooperation (Ostrom 1998: 6). Repetitive actions give the incentive to build up a reputation of being trustworthy (Ostrom 2003: xvii) and then communication becomes crucial. Communication also increases the exchange of mutual commitment which increases cooperation (Ostrom 1998:6). Even if the individual is selfish he will have an interest in reciprocating trust since he will gain in the future. Horizontal networks will facilitate the access to information about other individual's trustworthiness, and in that way the network will also create incentives to be trustworthy. Putnam et al. (2000:168) give the example of rotating credit associations where the individuals put money in the pot and they withdraw all the money in rotating turn. Here reputation is very important and the risk is minimized by norms and networks. The dense networks, Putnam et al. (2000:174) argue, will make it more likely for the people in a community to cooperate for a collective gain. This is because the networks will increase the costs of defying since he will lose future benefits. Networks also creates norms of reciprocity, facilitate communication and information on trustworthiness, and networks have past successes of collaboration in the system which creates a pattern for future cooperation (Putnam et al. 1993).

Informal and formal rules –institutions

Institutions are defines by Ostrom (2003: xxii) in broad terms and refers to the “prescriptions that specify what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted, and the sanctions authorised if the rules are not followed”. The rules that individuals in private firms, voluntary organisations or villages make are important social capital (Ostrom 2000:xxiii). The rules that are made to structure the interactions can enhance or hinder the formation of other forms of social capital (Ostrom 2000:xxiii). Individuals that have managed common pool resources have developed common rules so that defectors can get a modest sanction if he does not comply. The sanction is a response from the group that their behaviour is watched by the others. Actors that repeatedly break the rules should be more severely sanctioned and then excluded (Ostrom 1998:8).

Rules meeting these design principles reinforce contingent commitments and enhance the trust participants have that others are also keeping their commitments (Ostrom 1998:8).

It is often difficult to find rules that work in a good way in a long term perspective, and it can take time and conflict to find rules that work, and that are known to all participants (Ostrom 2000:xxiv). Face to face communication is also important in this regard:

When sanctioning was combined with a single opportunity to communicate or a chance to discuss and vote on the creation of their own sanctioning system, outcomes improved dramatically (E. Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992 in Ostrom 1998:8).

Ostrom (1998:8) also show how individuals who are initially the least trusting are willing to contribute to a sanctioning system and thereafter responds more to the system than the more trusting individuals. Rules create incentives to behave trustworthy since they can have mechanisms to reward cooperation and sanctions to punish non-cooperation (Ostrom 2000: xviii). When there are effective formal or informal rules that sanction non-cooperative behaviour, this creates expectations in the trustor's mind about the trustee's future behaviour (Ostrom 2000: xviii).

The rules that are made on activities, from the day to day interaction to the formal organisational structure, will shape the pattern of trust and reciprocity. People learn reciprocity norms and social rules and we respond positive to positive behaviour and negative to negative behaviour (Ostrom 1998:10). Social norms are learned in the social milieu, so they will vary across cultures, across individuals in a culture, across individuals in different situations, and across time in a situation (Ostrom 1999:9). Putnam et al. (1993) also regards norms of reciprocity as one fundamental form of social capital: norms of reciprocity facilitates transaction costs in cooperation and make cooperation much easier (Putnam et al. 1993: 172).

The three components of social capital; trustworthiness, networks, and informal/formal rules are according to theory the three most important factors that influence trust (Ahn & Ostrom 2002). But trust is also influenced by contextual factors (Ahn & Ostrom 2002). In this study the Andes context is important as the cultural and contextual norms in society shape how people interact, work together, plan their production etc. The theory then needs to be understood in relation to the context in the study. The Andes norms and practices are of course in a continual change and some areas are less influenced by tradition than others.

The concept of social capital as understood by Ahn and Ostrom (2002) I think is useful in this study as the authors describe the concept as shaped by both selfish incentives and society structures. This understanding is also very useful in an analysis since the theory thoroughly describes how social capital is created, and it is then more fruitful to discuss the empirical findings against the theory. The view that Ostrom presents is also focused on both the individual and the society (with its culture and norms) and what institutions such as the RPOs can do themselves to support collective action. This view I believe is rewarding in relation to the importance of real participation and local development which is important for the RPOs.

The synergy between state and civil society

Some theorists within social capital will describe the involvement of the state in community organisations as negative for social capital (Evans 1996:1034). One of these theorists, Coleman (1990:321) suggests that state activities will weaken social capital since the expansion of formal bureaucracy destroys informal ties. Putnam (1993:182) argues that strong and effective state institutions can enhance civil organisations and social capital, as well as strong civil organisations can enhance state institutions. This is called synergy between civil society and the state. Coproduction is a concept used by Ostrom (1996:1073) to explain how the relations between civil society and the state are enmeshed together and the production of services or goods happen with the participation of both parties. Ostrom (1996) does not regard state and civil society to be divided into separate spheres, they are enmeshed. The trust and the informal networks are here understood as not only belonging to the civil society, but traversing the relation civil society- state (Evans 1996:1036). The relationship with the state is interesting in this thesis as this can be important to understand in relation to the RPOs, social capital and participation/dependence.

3.5. Local participation and social capital

In the development discourse it is believed that social capital and local management is a better alternative for achieving sustainable development than working through the state and the market (Martin & Lemon 2001:586). This is based on the perception that there is a need to focus on the on the networks and ties in a community that make people collectively productive (Evans 1996). According to Evans (1996:1033) social capital is a crucial ingredient when trying to accomplish sustainable improvements in the lives of the poor, it is not a magic “quick fix” to obtain development, but if people cannot work together and trust

each other, improvements will be very difficult. Community based organisations and participatory approaches towards development are popular in the development discourse (Martin & Lemon 2001:585-586). The discourse of participatory development sprung out of the perceived limitations of the top-down development projects in the 1980`s (Cooke & Kothari 2001:5). Robert Chambers has been one of the influential actors in this trend with his support for Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Cooke & Kothari 2001:5). There have been an increasing number of comparative studies showing that participation in development projects is a critical component of success (Pretty 1997:20).

Some of these benefits mentioned include; a sense of ownership by the stakeholders of project and policies, greater efficiency, social cohesion and increased understanding in the society, cost- effective, increased transparency and accountability, empowerment of stakeholders, and an increased capacity to learn and act (Pretty 1997:20). But the problem, argued by Pretty, is that the popularity has brought the concept into normal parlance of many agencies such as NGO`s, governments and banks, and all of them have participation in their projects.

The term ‘participation’ has been used to justify the extension of control of the state as well as to build local capacity and self-reliance; it has been used to justify external decisions as well as to devolve power and decision-making away from external agencies; it has been used for data collection as well as for interactive analysis (Pretty 1997:20).

Petty argues that there are so many ways the agencies apply the concept that participation should be divided into seven types: ‘manipulative participation’, ‘passive participation’, ‘participation by consultation’, ‘participation for material incentives’, ‘functional participation’, ‘interactive participation, and self-mobilisation’. This means that the term participation should not be used without stating what specifically is being talked about (Pretty 1997:21). The problem of simplifying the term is also proclaimed by Marsden (1991:23) where he states that participation is not merely partaking in events, but that the people define and construct the environment in which these events take place. Another factor that is also important, which is not so present in Pretty’s focus, is own motivation by the locals affected. If they see a real gain from the project or if they don’t, that will be important in whether they participate or not

Another criticism of the participatory development orthodoxy is by Cooke and Kothari (2001) in the book *Participation; The New Tyranny*. They argue that tyranny may be the outcome of

participatory approaches, not empowerment. The tyranny of the participatory development discourse is also systemic, in the sense that the tyranny lies in the system in the development discourse. It does not depend on the techniques employed or the country in question; the discourse itself has the potential for unjustified exercise of power (Cooke & Kothari 2001:4). When the discourse for example proclaim that the use of local knowledge will improve the projects, the practice from the ground shows how local knowledge is often structured by the project process, and local needs are shaped by the perception of what the agency can deliver and provide (Cooke & Kothari 2001:6). There is then not real participation, as Pretty (1997:21) argues, that the people participate in the analysis and the development of plans of action, or that they independently mobilise to take contact with agencies and they remain in control over resources they receive.

In the focus on the importance on social capital and community based organisations, one may forget the legal, political and cultural structures in which these new local organisations operate (Martin & Lemon 2001:586). When new community based organisations are set up to form social capital and improve the lives of the poor, the tendency has been that the organisations reproduce and strengthen local social relations and norms (as patriarchy, gender roles etc.) (Martin & Lemon 2001). This can lead to marginalisation of the poor, women, social groups etc. and not *real* participation by different parts of society. The tendency to reproduce the social structure in a community can be explained by the use of the concept *community*. According to Guijt and Shah (1998 in Cooke & Kothari 2001:6), the concept community treats communities as homogenous, static and harmonic where everyone have the same needs and interests.

The focus on local management derives from the thought in the development discourse that development have to come from inside, not from external agents. There is not only one development path, so the thought of just transferring western ideas and technology does no longer hold (Marsden 1991:21). There is also a lot more to development than economic productivity, such as building up the capacity to manage and having institutions that function (Marsden). Apart from all the problems with actually implementing real participation, the focus on local participation is intended to give a voice to the people that have been excluded from the development agenda and to hear their interpretation of the world. The view is that people can design their own socio- economic development if given access to resources and opportunities (Marsden 1991:32). This design and management can happen by the actors

themselves in for example the Rural Producer Organisations as this could be the forum where the farmers themselves analyse their needs and make strategies to solve them.

3.6. Conceptual framework

This section reviews the theoretical framework of the study. In the literature mentioned it is pointed out that the concept of livelihoods can be way of understanding rural poverty. This is a good concept to use as a backbone in the understanding of the members participation.

Different access to the capitals will shape their livelihood and it is believed that a poor access will lead to less participation in the RPOs. Research question one - the member's expectations of the RPO and if the activities are in accordance with their need- is based on an assumption that the member's motivation in the RPO will influence their interaction with the RPOs. Research question two and three - the level of empowerment of the farmers and their participation in the RPO- are based on the discourse of local participation and social capital for development in contrast to external imposed development projects. Based on the thoughts of Jules Pretty, it is vital to understand what kind of participation is practiced to identify if it is real participation or not.

Also as mentioned in the literature review, there are many understandings of what social capital is. In this study I will use the perspectives of Ahn & Ostrom (2002) that describe the second generation theory of collective action on social capital. This is chosen because the theory incorporates the view of selfish motivated individuals and social structures in understanding how individuals act in collective action situations. We are influenced by our own selfishness, but also by culture, experiences, norms and values that are around us. The view sees social capital as formed by trustworthiness, networks and informal and formal rules. Most scholars view social capital as including these elements, but they disagree on whether these elements are part of the concept or a result of the concept, and scholars also disagree on 'what drives human action'. Research question four, five, and six: 'what is the level of trust' 'what are the networks in the community' and 'is there a difference in trust, norms, and networks between the two RPOs' are based on the understanding of social capital as trust, networks and norms.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.0. Introduction

This part will introduce the methodological approach and methods used in the study. It will start out with the reason for choosing a qualitative research method, then the research design, sampling, data collection tools, how to analyse, ethical considerations, and finally challenges and limitations.

4.1. Methodology

A qualitative method is appropriate in this study since a great deal of the analysis of the situation in the study area lies in how people express themselves. For example what kind words are used, how do they explain their relations to other community members and how is trust understood. The qualitative method is more concerned with words than with numbers which is more the domain of quantitative research (Bryman 2008:366). It could have been interesting to do a more quantitative study, such as Putnam et al. (1993) did in Italy, comparing the amount of people organised in civil society organisations or the amount of people that listen to the radio every day in a larger area, but the amount of time available and the restrictions of being just one person, limits the possibility of that method. Also, the theoretical base of the study is based on understanding trustworthiness and norms in the society, so the focus of qualitative research on interpretation of what the participants say about their social world is important (Bryman 2008:366). Another factor in qualitative method is a focus on description and an emphasis on context (Bryman 2008), this I see as very important in order to understand social relations, action and participation in the RPOs. Contextual factors are also important in the theory on social capital by Ahn & Ostrom (2002).

According to Bryman (2008:391) qualitative research can also have some pitfalls, since interpreting the data is emphasised this can lead to subjective decisions on what is important and what is not. Qualitative interviews can also be influenced by the researcher himself as his characteristics (personality, age, sex etc.) affect the interviewees (Bryman 2008). During the fieldwork I tried to participate and be visible in the village so people could recognise me and I could start to build some trust. I also used representatives from an NGO or the government to introduce me so people knew I was at least accepted by these instances. Building trust and holding the interview in a context that creates dialog is important in order to avoid that the

researcher affects the interviewee to great extent. To avoid that my subjective decisions excessively led the research I tried to ask questions on many different factors (economy, product, meetings, relevancy of meetings, human capital, history, traditions etc.) that could have influenced how these RPOs function. During the interview I also tried to respond as little as possible (in the sense of nodding or agreeing) when people talked to avoid giving the impression that I agree or disagree with the statement. These issues are more thoroughly presented under reliability and validity.

4.2 . *Research Design*

To gather data and to systemize it while I collected it, I used a cross-sectional research design. This was appropriate since I looked at two cases (organisations) and because I was interested in whether there were any variation between them (Bryman 2008:44). The data was also collected at a single point in time. But what became apparent during the data collection and comparison of variables (trust, networks, and norms) between the two cases is that there was not really a big difference between the organisations when it came to the variables. It was then not so fruitful to look for patterns of association between the variables and the organisations. I then decided to analyse the variables in relation to the two organisations, and also to include interviews with community members to see whether the data from the organisations were the same as in the community in general. I still see the value of having two organisations as this gives a wider span to the factors that can influence the functioning of the RPOs.

Validity and reliability

Reliability and validity are two important measures in social research to evaluate the quality of the research. These criteria are not so easily used in qualitative research since much connotation is focused on measurement that is not a direct preoccupation of qualitative research (Bryman 2008:376). Alternative measures have been proposed and I find the concepts used by Lincoln and Guba (1985) appropriate. They use two concepts trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness is made up of four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability, all of which parallels criteria in the quantitative research. Credibility entails such methods as inviting the interviewees to look over an account of the results to see whether the researcher has understood their world correctly (Bryman 2008). In this study I tried to ask follow-up questions that were as specific as possible to see whether I had understood the answer correctly. Sometimes I had not understood the answer correctly and the follow-up questions made the interviewee explain

their answer. To confirm that I understood the context correctly I spoke with a local agronomist, the leader of one of the RPOs, and a government official to see whether they agreed on my interpretations. Transferability is whether the results hold in another context or another time (Bryman 2008). This is difficult in qualitative research since it often entails local culture and traditions that can influence the results. This is according to Lincoln and Guba why a thick description of a social world is valuable in itself and what makes other researchers able to judge whether the research is transferable or not (Bryman 2008:378). I believe this study is transferable to other Andean regions where they have the same situations of fading traditions, or other societies that are characterised by traditions of reciprocity but also migration. Dependability means that all phases of the research are kept accessible so others can evaluate the process (Bryman 2008:378). I have all transcripts and field notes but these have not been evaluated by someone else. My supervisor has guided me on data analysis decisions. Conformability means that the researcher has not overtly let personal values or theories colour the research. Regarding this point I do not think I have been overtly led by personal convictions since my initial thought regarding the Rural Producer Organisations before I went into the field was that there existed more trust and cooperation between the members. I also thought the members knew more of what was going on in the RPOs. When faced with the opposite in the field it then became important to analyse the impact of that on the RPOs. Authenticity is the second criteria by Lincoln and Guba which deals with whether the research helps the people in the study change their situation or better understand their situation. This criteria has according to Bryman (2008) not been very influential in research and is controversial as it is more connected to action research. The authenticity criterion is though interesting as it points to whether the research can change something for the people that are researched. I do believe my research is something that can be valuable to the members in the RPO and to the actors that work to make the RPO function.

4.3. Sampling

The main method of sampling that was used in this study is purposive sampling with the snowball technique. Purposive sampling is convenient since it is strategic and it attempts to get a correspondence between research questions and sampling (Bryman 2008:458). The snowball technique is sampling a group but without having a sampling frame. This technique was used because of difficulties of accessing the farmers. I was dependent on an NGO or government employees to take me out to the communities and there we had to go and see if

people were home. The farmers are in their fields all day from early morning to late at night, and at night nobody wanted to drive the 30 min- 1 hour it took to reach the communities. I had three main types of interviewees: members of AMAS, APROCMI or regular community members. To understand relations between the state and the communities I also interviewed government officials, the mayor, NGO's, farmers, leaders in the communities, and members of the Sub Central (*sindicato* organisation at the municipal level).

The sampling size of the main interviewed is: 15 members of APROCMI, 17 members in AMAS, and 10 *comuneros*.

In my sampling frame I have two RPO; APROCMI and AMAS. I chose to study two organisations -one that had a stronger economy and bigger production than the other, to see whether transformation and sales had an impact on the participation of the members. Both of them do marketing and processing of a product. By an NGO (Pasos) that works with the RPO the organisations are characterised as big and small according to their production capacity (if they have many machines to transform for example). The production and transformation ability is viewed as crucial for the success of a RPO by NGOs, government officials, and the national coordinator for RPOs (CIOEC -B). To compare the two organisations I chose two that both had started to transform a product so that the difference between them would not be enormously big. The reason for choosing the two RPOs in the central part of Chuquisaca is because the NGO that first gave me access to information on these organisations works in this area. I was also informed that in the northern part of Chuquisaca which is higher up in the Andes the RPOs do less refinement of the raw material, they mostly sell the raw material as it is. The focus by the actors working with these RPOs on transformation was clear, so I thought it could be interesting to see how the organisations that are working on the 'right track' are working well.

4.4. Data collection tools

To collect data I used semi- structured interviewing, observation, and secondary data and official statistics. By using these methods I think I could get data to answer my research question.

4.4.1. Semi -structured interviews

I started out the data collection in the study area by conducting semi-structured interviews. A semi- structured interview is a good tool to use since that enables me to investigate how for

example people talk about trust and community cooperation. The semi- structure makes the interview flexible and I can come up with questions that are relevant to something the interviewee says. This is a good way to start mapping out the information that is given and to start building trust. The interviews will have a mix of questions that are open, with alternatives, or statements. The open questions are interesting as I as an interviewer can see what the interviewee choses to focus on. Questions with alternatives can be a good way to compare the answers from the members to see for example how many responded they had ‘much’ trust in their neighbours. These questions will be followed- up by a ‘how come’ or ‘why do you say that’ question (see appendix).

4.4.2. Observation

I had planned to participate in the meetings of both RPOs. But AMAS did not have any meetings from the time I could have participated (December – end of February). It turns out they will not have a meeting until possibly in May 2013 (because they then have to choose a new directive). I did get an opportunity to go with a group of members in AMAS when they were harvesting honey from their common boxes and how they worked with it afterwards. I wanted to participate in the meetings to get an impression on issues such as how the members interact, how many express themselves, do people talk to each other in the breaks, and if there dominant figures in the organisation. I did get this opportunity with APROCMI as I went to their meeting when they had a change of directive and I also went several times to the production plant where the occasionally the directive met. APROCMI also held a dinner and party under the carnival week that I went to. I also wanted to observe how the government officials worked with the *comuneros* and RPOs members that came to their office because that can be telling on how people interact with their government. I am off course very aware that the people that go to the office are often the directives and leaders (possibly more resourceful than the general rest), but there were also cases with old women that could not speak Spanish and had no overview of what kind of papers she needed before she could speak of a case. I find this kind of observation important in understanding trust, networks and norms in the society.

I reckon that participatory observation in a longer time span could have given very valuable information on how people worked and interacted with others. I could have tried to live out in the communities to see how the *comuneros* organise their life. This could have been very helpful to understand social relations and trust since actions can be different or show a slightly different picture than what people say in interviews. In order to get a better

understanding of the Bolivian context I went to Sucre and lived there for 4 months. This was very helpful in order to for instance learn expressions that were used and codes of conduct when interacting with people. I also went two weeks into the field before the actual fieldwork in order to get a feeling on how things worked and I also hoped that people would notice my presence and recognise me.

4.4.3. Secondary analysis and official statistics

I have used literature on other RPOs to better comprehend how these organisations are structured, what are their benefits and what are the problems. Literature on the history of Andes culture and different ways of organisation the communities in the Andes has also been important information that I could not have gathered on my own in this study. Secondary analysis is a good way to get information and to analyse data that has been collected by other researchers (Bryman 2008:296). The findings and conclusions by other researchers are also important since this can give new interpretations on the findings (Bryman 2008). Official statistics can be interesting since it can give impressions on trends on certain factors. Important areas I used statistics on are such income, poverty, health and education levels, and size of population in agricultural work. I wanted to use statistics on the size and extent of RPOs in the country, but that proved to be difficult as the state has no official list and the national coordinator on RPOs did not work with all RPOs. I though found a study done by the Andes Institute for Creation of Social Leaders (CAFOLIS) from 2009 that had counted the RPOs in Bolivia. With official statistics it is very important to remember that the statistics may have flaws that one need to be aware of (Bryman 2008).

4.5. *The analysis*

The data from the interviews were systemised into an excel sheet to compare the two organisations on issues such as motivation to be member, level of trust, networks between members, participation in traditional practices (ayni, collective land holding) and migration. This was done to have an overview of the two organisations while I was gathering data. As the comparing of the two organisations turned out to be quite similar I started using only grounded theory to analyse the transcripts from the interviews, fieldnotes from observations and notes from conversations between people. I looked for themes that was especially mentioned by the people or expressions that was used when talked about practices or other people. The data from the fieldwork were finally grouped into categories that stood out as

important in the data. According to Bryman (2008:545), is the purpose of grounded theory is to create categories and then analyse the connection between them.

4.6. Ethical Considerations

There are codes of ethics to follow when doing a social research (Bryman 2008:113). As Johannessen et al. (2006:91) say; all activity that has an impact on people must be evaluated in the light of ethical assumptions. It is therefore the responsibility of the researcher to plan ahead and to avoid action that can cause harm to the research participants. There are varying ethical principles in the social sciences, but some main elements are: avoid causing *harm to the participants*, *informed consent*, *respect of privacy*, and avoid *deception* (Bryman 2008:118). Harm to participants includes elements as physical harm, stress, loss of self-esteem or causing the participant to do bad acts (Diener and Crandall 1978 in Bryman 2008:118).

In the study I do not think there was any risk of physical harm on the participants since the research topic is not of a controversial or illegal nature. But it can be difficult to identify what actions that can cause psychological harm. The first interview I had was with a woman in one of the organisations: I thought that the members in the organisations were more aware and informed about how the organisation was working so I had questions on that and also one concept that were not well known. She became stressed that she did not know the answers and I tried to explain that it was my fault that I had made questions that people did not understand. She gave me a lot honey at the end of the interview maybe because she felt bad, but I felt even worse. After that I changed the focus of some of the questions. This situation only happened one more time when I was to interview the person in charge of economy, but that person did not know much on the economic situation of the organisation which led to unanswered questions and possible stress for participant's side. This could all have been avoided if I had talked to someone beforehand on the level of knowledge that members have on the organisation and not assume.

Informed consent before an interview is very important since it is possible the interviewee feels pushed or made into participating and this may affect the participant negatively and also the research data. Before any interview I asked whether I could interview them, informed about my role as a student, that I had confidentiality on their identity, and that they could

refuse to answer questions. There may be a risk that someone still felt obligated to participate since nobody said no an interview. In some cases this obligation may have been felt because I came with a government employee or NGO workers and the participants may have felt they had to participate in order to benefit in the future. In the majority of the cases I went to the houses of the RPOs members and asked for an interview, this was received very openly and nobody seemed to feel any unease about participating.

A researcher should always respect the privacy of the informants (Bryman 2008). I had been told that I should be careful about asking the name and age of the farmers because they often felt offended I was told. To my interviewees I asked whether I could write down name and age since that helped me in organising my interviews and nobody hesitated to say their name. I was very curious how the interviewees would react to questions on trust and neighbourhood relations and I was careful not to ask too much on an issue they responded did not want to talk about. Some said they did not want to remember when I asked whether they had bad experiences with people. I think it is very important not to push those limits since the participant may feel I am intruding on his personal life.

Another important ethical consideration is that the participants should not be deceived to think the research is about something else or that it is not a research at all. To avoid this I informed before the interview what I was studying, why I was doing this, and what the thesis was about. I did say the research was about how the RPO was working internally, but I did not specify that the research was specifically about trust, norms and networks. I do not think this did any harm and I did it because I wanted the informants to speak about issues such as trust without thinking that I wanted something specific on that. One informant asked me a couple of days after the interview whether I was to fund projects for them. This left me surprised since nobody else had hinted about this and repeated that I was doing a student research assignment. My role clearly was something else for this informant and that may have led him to speak so much as he did on all the questions that I had (it was the longest interview). This only happened one time and he told me this one of the last days of the field work, but I learned that I should be very specific about my role.

Especially in the last case where this last informant spoke for nearly 1.5 hour, but also for all the informants in the research, one important ethical consideration is that of benefits of the research. My gains are more direct since I will gain a master's degree, but the gains for the

informants can only come if somebody takes use of the material to improve the internal functioning of the PRO. I plan to at least send a translated copy of the analysis and conclusions (or a summary) to the national organisation that works with all the RPOs, the NGOs I have been in contact with, and the municipal government so that at least the people will have a chance to access the research about them.

4.7. Challenges and limitations

Accessing the participants

The fieldwork was done in the months of January and February. This is the rainy season/summer so the farmers were much occupied with their agriculture work. In mid-January when I had planned to go into the field there was also a week-long festival for the local saint that postponed my entry one week. In mid-February some of the members I could access in the village of Sopachuy had already migrated and that made my sample smaller. As I was interviewing members of the organisations I first looked for those that had houses in the village because those I could visit without depending on someone taking me. When I had interviewed those I had to find a way to get out into the communities where the farmers lived. This turned out to be more complicated than I thought. There were not so many people that had motorbikes, had the time, and knew who was member and was known in the communities. This made my sample from the communities smaller than that from the village.

Another issue was that the farmers were out in their fields (that could be high up in the mountain) from early morning to late at night, and I could not go at night because the roads were not accessible at night (very bad roads). I then had to depend on chance that some farmers were at home. This challenge limited me from selecting a sample; my criteria were that the person was a member of one of the two organisations. When I was doing interviews with *comuneros* I went to those communities the government were going to or asked people in Sopachuy that also belonged to a community. The bad roads, the lack of transport and difficulty of finding the farmers that were members, all increased the time spent on looking for interviewees.

Language difficulties

In the start I had some challenges understanding what people meant. There were many expressions and some people talked with a mix of some Quechua words. But people always

took the time to explain when I asked and I started to understand more and more as time went by. Almost all the people I interviewed were very good in Spanish and had no problem expressing themselves in Spanish. I had one terrible interview with an old woman in one community: I was supposed to talk to her husband but he was out working, and she spoke only Quechua and nothing of Spanish. The NGO worker left since he had to go to another community and asked a young girl to translate. The girl did hardly translate, she talked more with the old woman than she translated, and she giggled a lot and thought this was very funny. I was able to ask some questions, especially on the relationship with the neighbours in the community, but it was generally very difficult and what was translated I think was very little from what was actually said. This language difficulty kept me from making an effort to go to a *sindicato* meeting in one of the communities. I see now that I could have gained understanding from how *comuneros* interacted in the meeting.

Cultural differences. I was there as an outsider and this can limit the issues they are willing to speak to me about. Since I am a foreign student, I had travelled a long a way to come to them, and I am most likely perceived to be rich, this may all influence how the interviewees respond to the questions. They may for instance think I want certain answers. As I did the first interviews I soon realized that people often answered yes and agreed to the first alternative or assumption I made; for example:

Interviewer: with the neighbours in your community, is the relation good ... (interrupted)

Interviewee: yes, it's very good

Interviewer (continuing the question) or is it not so good?

Interviewee: yes, not so, there are some problems, not all are very nice.

The fact that I come from a rich country and have travelled all the way to visit them may also create some space between us that may affect the degree the informants are willing to open up. Cultural differences may also lead to misunderstandings as I may have a different way of understanding an issue than they do. Different cultures also lead to different values that may be difficult to comprehend if one is not aware of this.

It may also be difficult to ask the staff of the organisations and get a sincere opinion on what the organisation does wrong or if it working properly. This may be because I will be looked upon as an outsider and that I might inform donors or other people higher in position than themselves.

CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL FIELD FINDINGS

5.0. *Introduction*

This chapter presents the key findings of the fieldwork. The study was guided by the main research objective which is:

What is the relevance of social capital in the functioning of Rural Producer Organisations (RPO)? The research was conducted through the use of two different cases: APROCMI and AMAS in Sopachuy, Chuquisaca.

The research questions to help answer the research questions were the following:

1. Do the members have the same expectations of the RPO, and are the activities of the organization in accordance with their needs?
2. Do the members feel empowered and self-confident to make changes in their lives?
3. To what extent are the farmers involved in the organisations?
4. How are the levels of trust in the community, and between the members?
5. What are the networks in the community and between the members?
6. Is there a difference in trust, norms and networks between the two RPOs?

This presentation is divided into different parts. It starts out with an introduction to the basic information about the situation of the farmers such as their land size and production. Then follows Membership motivation and if the RPO work according to their needs, Sense of empowerment, Participation, Level of trust in community, and Networks in the community.

Figure 6: *The village of Sopachuy*



(Source: Author, fieldwork February 2013)

5.1. Farmers in Sopachuy, a general introduction

This part gives a presentation of the farmers that were interviewed, their age, ha of land, bought/ inherited, irrigation, production, collective grassland, migration and education

5.1.1. Age structure and landownership

The age structure of the members is more or less the same in the two organisations. In AMAS, the farmers that were interviewed ranged from 25 – 64 years old with the average being 44 years old. In APROCMI the youngest of the interviewed was 32 and the oldest 67, showing an average of 46 years old. The most active members in APROCMI were those that had other paid jobs apart from agriculture. They were all around 50 years old. The most active member in the organisation was a man (48 years old) that have had many different positions in his community, APROCMI and other organisations. In AMAS the president was 64 years old and not so active. The two members I met that were actively interested in the organisational structure was one young man (27 years old) that was also a teacher in

mechanics, and the ex-president of AMAS that was also working as a government technician towards AMAS (technical advice).

In AMAS the average size of land was 1.7 ha, and in APROCMI it was 3 ha. This is land used for crops. The administrator in APROCMI informed me that the average land size of the members is 1.5 - 2 ha, but they have 2-3 members that own much more land. I spoke to one of them that have 10 ha. That the APROCMI members in my sample on average hold more land can be the result of many causes, but one issue is that most in my sample is taken from members that have houses in Sopachuy (in addition to a house and land in their community). That farmers have houses in their communities and in Sopachuy village was the case with about 50 % of the members in a community according to a government official and leaders in communities. The *comuneros* then went back and forth (the periods depended on the distance from Sopachuy) to their agricultural land in the communities and the house in Sopachuy.

That the majority of the sample for APROCMI was taken from these members that have houses in Sopachuy could indicate that these have a little more resources than the farmers that just stay in their communities. In the APROCMI sample two have positions in the Municipal Council, another is the president of the marketing organisation (ASOVITA) of APROCMI and he also is the president of the highest organ (the Sub Central) that coordinates all the *sindicatos* in the communities, and another works in a government institute in another province. 3 in the sample from AMAS have no ownership of land. Two of these are women that can use the land of their father if needed (had 1 ha), and the last is a man that live in Sopachuy and does not have crop production but can use the land of a Cooperative⁵ (Cooperative San Juan de Obrero) for honey production.

In both organisations, most members have spots of land in different areas and some of the land is inherited and other parts are bought (very often from sisters or brothers that had moved away). There is available land (crop and pasture) to buy in Sopachuy, but the price was said to be very high (1 ha. = 3000- 4000 \$). So even if land is available to those that have very little, the price can make the land inaccessible for them.

⁵The Cooperative San Juan de Obrero was an organisation that had a store in Sopachuy. They were to give cheaper agricultural products to members, and also gave credit on fertilizers. The cooperative had a group that worked with apiculture before and AMAS was made of that group and others working with honey.

I have not found a clear difference in land ownership between the men and women; all members, except one woman, are married or they are in partnerships and the land the couple has could have been inherited from her parents just as it could have come from his parents or a mix of both. Some members are working on the land of their father. The problem is that people inherit very small plots of land since the parents initially had just a few hectares and this is to be divided between all sisters and brothers. This led some member to say that they had bought land from family since they had left due to very little land access. Only a few members in both organisations (9 members) had land titles to their land. But all of the interviewed said that the titles were on their way (stuck in bureaucracy in Sucre) as a result of a project done by the municipal government. The project involved measurement of the land so the owners can receive a land title with clear land limits.

5.1.2. Access to irrigation

Sopachuy village is situated in a valley that has two rivers that go around the little town. The different communities are either in the same valley or situated higher up in the mountains around. In agriculture the production can be either rain fed or it can have irrigation. When the production is rain fed it can lead to a more unstable production since the farmer is dependent on rain. With irrigation the farmer can control the amount of water that is given to his crops. In Sopachuy they had two sowing seasons; those that have irrigation first plant in Jun-Aug-Sept, for those without irrigation they cannot plant at this time since it is winter and almost no rain. The second period for planting is in October and this is called the large planting since here the rain starts, which means that those without irrigation can also plant.

In my sample in Sopachuy, of those that have ownership of land, 61 % have irrigation on their crop lands. The municipal government (the responsible for irrigation) said that they have implemented systems of irrigation and portable water in almost all communities (18 of 24). The irrigation and portable water systems were set up with a committee of *comuneros* in the communities. In my sample there are members from 7 communities that did not have irrigation (6 of these communities were said by the government to have irrigation systems). Some of the communities the government said they had been working with could be a result of NGO work as well. The NGOs Pasos and ACLO have been providing irrigation channels to some communities, and Pasos is still working with this. In February (2013) Pasos was evaluating a new water system in the community Achatalas (a community on the government list of implemented water systems).

Of those who do not have irrigation, the reasons for that vary: Some said their plots of land are situated too high up from the river and it is very difficult to pump water up, another explained that they had irrigation channels before (with help from the NGO ACLO), but the bridge had fallen down and destroyed the channels 6 years ago, or that flood had destroyed the channels. Other explaining factors may be that the state or the NGOs have not implemented irrigation projects in all communities and to all the inhabitants of these communities.

5.1.3. Production

The farmers have mostly small plots of crop land that is divided in two or more parts situated in different places. There is very little variation in what the farmers produced. Their main crops are maize, wheat, and potatoes. Everybody produce this. The majority also said they produce in smaller amounts some or one of these crops; onion, carrots, *aji* (like chilli), peanuts and peas. The majority of the interviewed said they produce only for consumption. 25 % of the members said they sold sometimes, when the product was good and they had extra. The interviewed said the produce was too small or did not have the expected quality to sell it on a market. In the communities that are far from the village of Sopachuy it is also difficult to transport the produce: you have to transport it on horses on stony paths and then ask a passing truck driver if he could transport it to the village. There was also no big market in the village of Sopachuy; there were around 4 small shops that sold vegetables and fruit (some from the communities and some from other cities), and on Sundays there is a market where producers can sell. 3 farmers said they always sell; in Sopachuy and Sucre, two of these said they sell the majority of the produce, little they consume themselves. These two have other paid jobs. The farmers often keep their seeds from the last harvest, but some also buy seeds from seed sellers in the neighbouring municipalities Padilla and Alcalá. These seed sellers get the seeds from big cities such as Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (interview with agriculture technician in government).

All except 2 farmers pay day labourers (*peones*) to work for them during the harvest or when needed. Day labourers are paid for one day at a time and are normally members of the community. Almost all of the interviewees have some fruit production, mostly peach, but some had apples, banana, or citric fruits. The focus on peach may be because the municipal government have provided plants as was pointed out by one farmer. One farmer, that is a

member of both organisations, and also have wage labour in addition to farming, had planted 200 peach trees that he is planning to sell in Sucre. Apart from that nobody said they sold their peaches, they kept it for home consumption. A popular refreshment drink is made from peach, water and sugar. Some complained that the fruit is not maturing because of rain and hailstorms.

All of those that owned land were also involved in animal production, except one woman who is looking after the animals of others. The majority of the farmers have cows; ranging from 5 to 45 animals with an average around 10 cows. These cows are used for milk and cheese, and sold when needed at the cattle market that is held once a year in Sopachuy. Two said they sell every year at the market in Sopachuy. Most said they sell when the cow is mature. One man (33 years old) from the communities, that was working as a technician (government position) for AMAS, but is now the leader of a community said:

Generally the livestock her, is like, if it was a bank. There you have your livestock right, when you really need money, you will sell one. Like that. But only like that when you really need it. The calves are like, the interest that the bank pays you. Invest over there, and over there is your livestock. When you really, really need it, you sell. If not, you do not. And of course, while you have them there, you have milk, cheese.

5.1.4. Collective land organisation

I wanted to find out if the farmers in these communities organise themselves into groups that manage a collective land area. This is interesting since it is a traditional system in the Andes, and I wanted to map out the persistence of the practice in the study area. This is also interesting in relation to social capital and participation since the persistence of these collective systems could be a part of the analysis on networks and trust between people. It was quite difficult to ask about collective land, some answered right away, others didn't understand what I meant. I tried to explain that land was someplace owned by the community or some families. I asked some informants if I should use a different term to explain my question, but they said the term was used in Spanish. That some people did not understand me too well may be one explanation for the different responses I got: In one community 3 *comuneros* said that yes we have collective grassland that is accessible for all, the second said; no grassland, but a small collective area for growing, and the third said there was no collective land at all, nothing owned between families. Having that in mind, of all the

interviewed (members and comuneros), 27 % said there was collective grassland in their community (one reported collective cropland) and only 15 % said they were part of it.

Normally it was said to be 3-6 families owning the grassland together, but in one community it was 10-15 families managing the land. This was explained by a local agronomist as being because some communities are located high in the *Cordillera* – the Andes mountain range, which meant large areas of land that was good for grazing. But normally collective land is owned between 5 families (that are in the same family) (Interview with local agronomist, age 37 of age). By my interviewees it was mostly said that “yes there are some families that own land collectively, but most is individual”.

One farmer told the story of collective land owning in her community:

There was, like, all the comuneros went to plant in one area, all of them. There they harvested potato, and wheat, but now, regrettably, they are all dead. Now there is nothing. He has bought it all, the same cruceño (a man from Santa Cruz). Now they are not planting. Before they planted.

Interviewer: *when did this change?*

Since the moment I have lived with my fathers it has been like this for ever; like, of all the brothers and sisters, this is for him, this is for her. They all plant the small parcels. But the pasture is for all. Only the family.

From the response of this farmer it seemed like collective crop production is a thing of the past, but she is now part of collective family grassland.

5.1.5. The importance of migration as an income generating activity

I wanted to know how many of my interviewees that migrated, since it can be a factor that influence networks and norms in a locality. In the municipality of Sopachuy some farmers chose to go to the big cities (mainly Santa Cruz) and work 2-3 months. The replies varied when I asked them when they went. Some said February and some said June/July, but generally they went in the winter months (June/July) so that they could come back with money for the big planting in October.

Of the 10 APROCMI members that had houses in Sopachuy and that I was looking for, 2 had left in early February for Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz is a large business city in the south of Bolivia (lowlands). In the lowlands in the department of Santa Cruz there are plantations of for example cane sugar. The men that are migrating said they were going to work/or look for work in agriculture, the women that had went before had worked as housemaids.

Of all the interviewed (members and comuneros) in my sample 20 % said they were going to migrate this year (2013). Of those that said they were not migrating this year, 43 % had migrated in the past. They had then mainly went to Santa Cruz, but some had also gone to Sucre (other city in Bolivia, but smaller than Santa Cruz) and to Argentina. These results could be shaped by the fact that in the group of interviewed members, 70 % had a house in Sopachuy (in addition to house in community). So it might be different for those that stay only in their community. That 43 % of the interviewed in my sample, and my sample is only 42 people out of 8811 (2011 numbers, INE 2011), said they had migrated before in the past show a tendency that migration is not an unusual strategy. Migration is viewed as a means to earn money since their agricultural crop production does not produce a lot of money (it is mainly for consumption).

There were some few people that said it is very important to stay and make the community grow. When one migrates you miss out on information and you are outside of the community and organisation it was said by one. One leader of a community that had migrated before said he did not migrate now because he wanted to show people that one can also live here: *“A lot of people have this concept that it’s not possible to live here. They go to other places, and, I do not want to do that”*. This was echoed by some of the other informants that felt that local people did not give the place a real chance. A member in APROCMI was very clear in his perception that all people go away from Sopachuy, nobody stays:

Every year we go to Santa Cruz, because here you cannot earn much money. There is not a lot of work. I am going at the end of carnival (end of February), in March I’m going, the tenth I think.

Interviewer: *The majority leaves at that date?*

Yes, in February they leave. I was also going in February, but, I think, I’m going in March. After carnival, silence, only women, old people. When carnival passes, all the people leave.

The picture that this farmer draws is maybe a bit exaggerated since there are farmers and others that stay in Sopachuy all year round. But this feeling he has that everybody leaves is important since it may say something about an atmosphere of migration that may be very strong around this man and his family. I asked whether some in his family migrated, and he answered that they are all in Santa Cruz, his brothers and sisters, they are all there, he is here

alone (with his wife). Of all the informants, only one informant did not have family members that have moved to Santa Cruz, Sucre, or other cities.

Many of my informants were in their 40- 50s, which may have had an impact on how the migration rate was presented. The majority of those I spoke with were now older and thought they rather stay. In one of these communities (Jarka Mayo) they particularly had a problem of people moving out of the community (this was verified by the education office that did not have any literacy program there because the majority lived in Sopachuy village). One woman in this community said very ironically to the question if they had a cemetery: *“Yes we have, but there are no more people to bury! Hehe”*. In this community it was said by one government employee that there were about 40 families before, but 15 have moved out, and half of that again has a house in Sopachuy so they only come to plant/ harvest, and come to meetings.

Figure 7: Government project to improve houses in the communities

| Government project on house improvement | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Community | How many live there (families) | How many accepted the project |
| Rodeo | 32 | 23 |
| Jarka Mayo | 26 | 17 |
| San Blas | 38 | 30 |
| Milanes Alto | 26 | 7 |
| Cuevas | 42 | 32 |
| San Isidro | 38 | 30 |

(Source: Interview with government employee working with the project and normally with the communities)

When I asked how many does really live in the communities, he said he did not know; there is no one counting this because they are still registered in the community if they live in Sopachuy village, but come to meetings in the community. But he explained that:

The majority (70 %) of comuneros have a house here in Sopachuy. They come here so that their children can study. In the communities there is only primary school. In some communities they have secondary school. The comuneros that have a house here in Sopachuy are mainly going to their communities for the harvest and the meetings.

This was verified by other leaders of communities. On the project of improving the houses in the communities I went with them to Jarka Mayo. In all the communities that were part of this improvement, many of the *comuneros* had gone to their house in the countryside just to be registered in the project. The three women of the households I spoke with that day were 63, 66, and 72 years old. Their children had moved away. On average, the age of the interviewed *comuneros* that were in their communities was 60 years old. One of the interviewed, had migrated 2 years ago, but would not go this year, said this when asked whether his children in Santa Cruz were coming back to Sopachuy:

No. why should they. There is no life here. We plant, but it goes to nothing. Look, the maize is going bad. So beautiful it was, but with the wind and too much humidity they are falling down. And that's what we are going to be left with. They do not want to come back, the children.

Interviewer: *Is there something that can be done with the humidity?*

No. Beg to San Pedro that it won't rain

This was a very pessimistic voice among the *comuneros*. But it was a trend among my informants that the children went out for study or work. The statistic on those coming back I do not have, neither had the government.

This introduction to the farmer's situation is important as there are factors in the way they organize their communities that can affect networks, trust and norms, and participation. That most farmers have small plots of private crop land and private grasslands can be important in order to understand how much they really interact with each other. Most farmers said they work all day until late at night. The produce is also often for consumption and that excludes possible contact with other farmers that trade, other traders, truck drivers etc. A part of many farmers' economic strategy has been or was to migrate temporally. Even though that in my sample the percentage migrating this year is not so large (20%), 43% had migrated in the past. The issue of migration is important to include in the analysis since it brings in new practices (money economy) to for example the traditional system of collective work which can be thought to be important for the present ties, trust and norms in the community. The less interaction, it can be thought, the less trust and norms of reciprocity.

The following section is presented according to the research questions, first starting with Membership motivation and perceptions on RPOs activities, and then Sense of empowerment, Participation, Level of trust in community, and lastly the Networks in the community.

5.2. Membership motivation and perceptions on how RPO work according to the members needs

In this section I present the reasons for why people decided to be members of the organisations, and if the activities of the organisation are according to the needs of the members. This is important to understand in order to know if the members are working for the same aim, and what are they expecting from the membership. If members have very different aims and expectations in an organisation this can affect the cohesion of the group, and it can also explain why some are willing to give a lot of time to the organisations and others do not. If the activities of the organisation are not in accordance with the needs of the members, this can influence the participation which is the part that follows.

AMAS

When asked about why they joined the organisation the majority of my informants related this to the fact that the organisation works with apiculture and that they like to work with this particular activity. Some of them mentioned that their fathers had been working with apiculture as well, but then with much less equipment than they use now. One added to this that capturing bees and taking the honey is a cheerful job. Half of the informants mentioned that they were already a member of the Cooperative San Jose de Obrero which formed alliances with other groups of apiculture and finally made AMAS. The second cause that was mentioned was that they could get boxes for the apiculture. One replied that his motivation to join was to make money.

When asked about what one wants the organisation to offer its members I sometimes had to rephrase because I was not understood, and say; what do you want the organisation to give to you as a member? My purpose with the first question was to ask what their “vision” of the organisation was, how could it serve them, but as I was not able to make myself understood, the easier question of what do you want the organisation to give you as a member I think was interpreted in very material terms by the interviewees. This can be explained by their direct focus on their production, but also that NGOs and the government is providing material to these organisations. Most answered that they want access to a market; being alone makes it very difficult to sell the honey. The market in Sopachuy is small and transport to Sucre costs money. The second most responded need was that the organisation must provide the protection-clothing to every member. Everybody must have their own set of protection

clothes. Some answered mainly according to their own individual needs: a machine to dry the pollen, a centrifuge for the honey, a machine that filtrate the honey, a separate room apart from their house where they could manipulate the honey, or a room in their house where they could store all the equipment. One answered that “the organisation does not help with anything, it is only a help that we can deliver the product to them”. This view may be explained by that the member had not received any training on honey production (such as the others, but he has the option to enter the new course starting that is organised by an NGO) since he had entered after the last course, and he was frustrated because the organisation did not help him to buy the protection-clothing you need. Everything costs money he repeated many times.

Activities and needs

The question `if the activities of the RPO are in accordance with the needs of the members` is important to understand because one would think the participation of the members would depend on the relevance the organisation has in their life. The members can deliver their honey to the organisation and the president sells the honey from his house. This is just a temporary option since they have no place to sell it. The farmers were much occupied with their production and most of their answers on the operation of the organisation were understood as being about their production. If they were discontent with the organisation it was because the bees were not producing well enough. There were problems with low production, ants, and bees leaving the boxes. As one farmer explained:

We are getting demoralised. The ants are there. I do not know how we are going to get ahead. We do not produce much, with the money we have, we do not produce much.

This woman did not see a solution to her problems. She wanted the organisation to grow, but with the low production and low resources she thought she had it was very difficult. This focus on little capital may indicate that she was looking for a solution in the help from NGOs or the government. So the needs of the farmers are very much related to their production. They need more training. Some members mentioned this when talking about how the organisation could become more important to them; more training on what kind of diseases exist, how to fight them, until what month do we give them alimentation etc. It should be mentioned that there is also the impression that not all were willing to invest time in the honey production. One of the representatives of the NGOs working with AMAS on training said some think the production is done by itself. So they leave the boxes alone. Then the bees leave as well. One farmer said this:

There are some that have the interest of working others are demoralizing, I don't know, there is no trust you see, in this. Or the same person just leaves. Some leave their boxes and say they will not go, and that way loses. In that way the association is not going to get stronger.

This statement says something about the problem the organisation has to motivate people to invest time in the production. But members in the organisation do not meet continuously to seek advice and identify common problems and the meetings are every third month or less.

APROCFMI

When asked about why they entered into the organisation the majority answered that individually it is difficult to sell raw material so forming a group to enter into the market is much easier. Some of the founding members explained that producing and selling raw material individually can be nothing more than loss. That is why the organisation was started; to gather raw material, store it, transform it, and sell it. The organisation is an opportunity to transform the product. Another important factor that is mentioned by almost all is that the organisation pays more for the raw material given by the members than others. Others just replied that it would improve the lives of their families, without specifying how.

When asked about what you want the organisation to offer to you as a member I had the same problem of members not understanding my question as with AMAS members. So it was often rephrased to: what do you want the organisation to give you as a member? On this question the members gave more varied answers than those from AMAS. Some stated that they want the organisation to help them more; to support them economically. They were asking for some kind of incentive. This may be because the organisation has been working since 2001 and has economic capital. As this one member from APROCFMI said:

We want some distribution, but they do not distribute yet. But always we the members want this, at least something. It does not need to be money, just something. That they give us, in that way there is more encouragement as well. So when there is nothing like this, we are a bit demoralised. Sure, also when we do not go, meetings are as well.

When they call us (for a meeting) and there is not this help from the organisation, so we get a bit annoyed. This we think as members.

Money is not necessarily what is called for, but some sort of resource transfer or incentive. If they could get an incentive from the organisation they claim that they would be more motivated. Why there was no type of redistribution was explained by one of the leaders to be

because the members did not deliver raw material. He explained what he meant was the biggest challenge of APROCMI:

The members are not empowered. They do not feel the association is theirs. They feel this because the profits are not distributed yet, and because the member does not deliver the raw material in 100%. The organisation has to buy from outside. Why do I say there is no empowerment? Because they only want to make money but they do not permit the organisation to grow stronger. People are very much lacking training and there is low leadership and capacity to manage. This is the biggest weakness we have.

What I think is referred to here is that the members do not invest their time and interest into the organisation they only want quick money solutions. When he says that “they do not permit the organisation to grow stronger” I think he refers to that *he* wanted the organisation to be a small company with profits and knew there had to be some investments to make that happen. The leader has worked out a financial plan with an NGO (FH, *Fundación contra el Hambre*) to increase sales, but they need a loan and the members do not want to take up that loan. This lack of will to investment he connects to lack of capacity and empowerment by the members.

Other important issues for membership are: access to certified seeds (the organisation provides seed and the members can pay with money or product), transformation of product, a higher price, and a secure market. One said that the organisation gives representation at the national level as well as pride. In that way the producers felt a little more strengthened as producers from the area. One old woman told me that she had heard that sick and old people will get back the money they have put into the organisation when they leave. She wanted that. The benefits of being in a group to be able to access the market is dominant in the answers from the members in both organisations.

Activities and needs

It does look like the organisation provides the most important issue for the farmers: market and transformation. APROCMI has a big market: the sell their product to the governments in Sopachuy and the neighbour municipality Tarvita (school breakfast), to the market in Sucre, and to the departments of Oruro and La Paz. But there is still the problem of production. A reason for this as presented by some of the leaders is that the average farmer have very small plots of land; 2 ha. Some have only 0.5 ha. According to leader in APROCMI it is needed at least 1 ha to produce 5 *quintales* (500kg) which is the minimum they have to deliver. On the plot of land the people need a share for their own consumption as well. One farmer talked a

lot about the problems of production when I asked whether he receives any services from the organisation:

Well, for the members, at this point, no. The machines that we have at the plant are only for transforming raw material. Now we need a combined harvester for amaranth, threshing machine for amaranth, and maybe a tractor for the members, because sometimes the work with the oxen, we do not go forward. There is a difficulty of time.

In 2012 some farmers had lost their production (bad season it was said) and could not deliver to the organisation. Because of this problem the organisation buys the raw material from other producers in other municipalities as well. One farmer talked about the soil and production was not as good as before:

It doesn't pay up anymore. The harvest is not as it was before, so I think Mother Earth, you know because we Bolivians don't have this device to analyse the soil. Maybe there is much disease, we do not know. Even you put good seeds, if you have disease in the field, it will not be fruitful. Look, this year and just like last year, I planted potatoes in the field with irrigation, but what has happened; good seeds I have bought, but the potato has come out very bad, I have not sold a single one.

He is here saying that the soil is not as it was before; the production and the quality have gone down. And I think he wants the NGOs to invest in some equipment so they can take a soil analysis since he knows farmers do this in other countries. This frustration could be interpreted as that the organisation does not have anything to contribute with in this respect. He said they had talked about the problem in the association and that they as members need an analysis of the soil, maybe with help from financial institutions and organisations. This approach I think could be very helpful for the organisation, that the farmers get help organised by the organisation but that the organisation itself gets some funding from other institutions. The members will maybe feel that the organisation is more theirs if it is involved in their production. But one issue, that is important regarding AMAS as well, is that of motivation and sustainability in an organisation that is so heavily influenced by donating institutions. The NGOs or the government give them equipment and materials (sometimes in exchange of a percentage the organisation has to pay), training, and financial plans for the future. These issues could be crucial for the organisation to «get up on its feet» but the question is whether this affects motivation and participation by the members, and thus the sustainability of the organisation.

To sum up, in both organisations the members have problems with their raw material production. In AMAS the members had received training in bee-keeping, but did not know why the bees left, why they produced so little, or how to deal with the ants that were eating up all the honey and chasing away the bees. In APROCMI, some members said they have low production and problems with humidity

5.3. Sense of empowerment

The sense of empowerment for the members is interesting since I want to understand how people talk about themselves in relation to change, if their thoughts were important or not, or if they see authority figures as repressing or not. This is understood as important since it may affect if people see themselves as change agents or not. If people feel empowered they may go against the government if they feel they lack a service for example. For the organisations it becomes very important since they need input and work from their members. Also if the general view is that action comes from outside, then local action becomes difficult.

Some of the questions that I asked were: do the police need more power to effectively do their job? Do the majority of the people in power try to exploit you? Do you feel part of or separate of what is happening around you? Do you feel that your opinions are important? Do the government care for what happens to you, your family and the agricultural producers? These questions are inspired by Putnam et al. (1993). According to the authors, people that live in societies with low social capital (trust, networks and norms) they tend to want the police to take more control as compared to societies with more social capital where they tend to want the police to have less control. The other questions in the interview guide such as “what do you think can improve the organisation” or “what do you think is needed in the meetings” are also important questions on the general understanding of how the members understand their role in the organisation. The replies to these questions are very much the same in the two organisations. The majority said the police did not need more power. This is not so surprising since Sopachuy had almost no crime, and in the communities the people used the *sindicato* when they had problems or the Sub Central⁶ if the problem could not be solved. Those that expressed themselves said that the police should use the power they have to do something productive, not just using people. Corruption was very often mentioned.

⁶ The *Sub Central* (Spanish) is the highest authority over the *sindicatos* in the municipality. The Sub Central in the municipality of Sopachuy has a comity of 12 persons and one executive. They are meant to be “social control” and to watch over the government, be an access point between the government and the communities and help resolve disputes in the communities (interview with the executive of the Sub Central, 2012).

I asked whether people think the authority figures (government, *sindicatos* etc.) always try to exploit you. This is to see the power relations in the society and how equal the people in the communities feel towards one another. How one speaks of domination or equality can be important in the understanding of empowerment. To this question there are more people admitting that yes it happen, but it has almost gone away. Before they said, when their parents were working (20 years ago some said), they were abused and worked without pay. As two members said:

That has mostly gone away. Now it is more equality. Before there were the patrons, now you hardly see it, but there are some cases.

It still exists. Maybe not like before, now it's just a little, it can hardly be seen. The people are also learning, the people know the politics, but in some how this still happen

These two statements came from two men that where mostly same age (45 and 48). I guess it depends on who you meet and how much you interact with authority figures. An interesting conversation on this topic was going on between my interviewee that was a directive of a community (that came by the government office quite often to make his claims) and my contact in the government:

Leader of community: *No, that was before.*

The government employee: *Before it was like that. 20 years ago, the people from the countryside worked all day. Now it is not like that, there is respect in the authorities from the communities. It do not exist this power to say: do that or do that.*

Leader of community: *What is still missing is the respect from both sides*

The government employee: *of course*

Leader of community: *There are still people in the village that does not respect the people from the countryside. Once with shoes, shit, they treat us as like any campesino (farmer). This is still lacking. The people respect the authorities, but the authorities are still not respecting the people.*

This leader of the community was pointing to discrimination of the farmers and he used the symbol of the sandals. I also heard other farmers speaking about government officials that did not regard them as equals because they were wearing sandals and not proper shoes. As mentioned in the context chapter the indigenous population have been and still are discriminated and their culture is regarded as inferior to the mestizo and white population (Canessa 2004).

All the members (except two) feel they are part of what is happening around them, in their communities. The *sindicato* is a way people can get information on how the government is

working and other types of info they need. Many mentioned that people know more now than in their parents' generation. They are more part, and the government cannot do what it wants to. Just one member said she do not think her opinions are important. One other woman said she feels they are important, but people did not always think that. The majority is also quite content with the national/ municipal government when I asked whether the government is preoccupied with their situation. They said they now receive irrigation, bee boxes, and other equipment, and there are projects to improve the seeds, the cattle, that did not exist before (before Evo Morales). There were some that said the government do not care, such as two members from AMAS: *"They do not care. Now the river has taken half of my land. They do not help me"* *"I'm sure they are not preoccupied with me as a producer, but for the whole of Bolivia. The producers? No, because we have so little land"*. The first one is angry since she has lost agriculture land because of the river expansion in the rainy season and there is no help from the state. She interpreted the question very specific to one incidence. The second statement may be because he interpreted the question as very big: that the state did not worry about the small producers.

Relations to the municipal state

In APROCMI the majority of the members know that the municipal state is buying their product for the school lunch, and they therefore said the relation was good. In AMAS the majority said *"good"* because they had received bee boxes from the state and they had never received anything before. Apart from these two practical examples the majority of the people asked did not have strong opinions on this. If I then asked if there are some kind of contact between the community and the municipal state I normally got the answer: yes I think so. The few that expressed themselves said the relationship was good; they receive projects, though sometimes after a very long time. The three interviewed leaders of communities complained that the government promise this and that, but in the end there is no money. A member of the Sub Central complained that the government did not have enough time to handle all communities: *"They have only one man to go around and check if there have been a natural disaster, and one agronomist, one or both should be at some of our meetings in the community, but they don't come"*. When it came to politics it was said by some of the most active persons that the state only gave preference and benefits to the people of their political party.

Even though there was criticism I felt no hostility from the farmers towards the municipal government. The farmers have some tools to watch over the government; the *sindicato* and the Sub Central. The Sub Centralia is to watch over how the state uses their money and if they did what they were supposed to do. The mayor is elected by the *sindicatos* and this is thought to give the mayor more legitimacy. This could be used by the government as well to get control over the communities through spreading their political perceptions. At least at the province level and above (department, national) the structures that have been created as a result of the *sindicatos* in the communities are said to be just tools for the political party in control to get influence over the farmers (de Morrée 2003). It may be the case that the structures above municipal levels (province, department, national) could be dominated by political interests and urban interests. But at least the three members I spoke to in the Sub Central (municipal level) was not a member of the government party as was quite critical to what the government did for their community. As highlighted in the study done by de Morrée (2003) as well, the direct influence of the *sindicato* structures from above municipal level was very small. But she adds that there could be large demonstrations organised by the higher levels that the farmers join.

In Sopachuy there is also a committee (called the vigilant committee) that receives complains from the *comuneros* when the state has not provided what they promised. This seemed to be mostly used by the directives in the communities and the Sub Central. The vigilant committee is to watch the budgets of the state (the promised amounts of capital to projects) and the real amount spent (interview with leader of the committee). They receive some funding from the state, but it was so little that the work was mostly voluntary. As an observation I spent some time writing in the office of the UPEM in the government which was the office that worked with the RPOs and natural disasters. They had people from the communities coming in quite often. Some *comuneros* had a very relaxed and joking attitude to the government workers, which they responded to in the same way.

5.4. Participation in the RPO

That the farmers actively participate in the RPO is important for the organisation to work, especially in AMAS since they do not have a paid administrator. The issue of participation/active involvement is highly related to the questions above on the reasons for membership and the relevancy of their activities. Participation is interesting in the context of social capital since it is perceived to contribute to make collective action work better and

minimize free riding (Putnam 1993). This section will give a presentation of the empirical findings on participation in the two organisations, and that will be seen in relation to the theoretical literature in the analysis chapter. Questions that were asked on this topic were: how important is the organisation to you? How frequently do you participate in meetings and is it something missing for the meetings to work better? How content are you with the organisation in general and the leadership?

All the members (except one that had a conflict with the leadership) stated that the organisation they are part of is important in their lives. This was because of the above mentioned causes (access to market, access to boxes, access to seeds etc.). Yet the low participation was said to be a problem by the leaders of both organisation. The majority did not contribute with time and thoughts.

Attendance at meetings:

APROCFMI

The organisation has 30 members. In all meetings there is recorded who is present: at the start of the meeting and at the end. If a member comes late he or she will be recorded as *missing* in the book. If one does not come to a meeting he is given a fine of 10 bolivianos (about 1.5 \$). There were only 4 members that had perfect attendance in the 6 meetings that were held in one year (January 2012 to January 2013). Four more had just a few late comings or they went with excuse in the evening. But the rest have generally at least two missed meetings, and many have the *L* written at 2-3 meetings, which meant they had asked for permission to leave (*licenciado*) since they had to do something (see appendix).

Figure 8: Meeting attendance APROCFMI

| Meeting attendance 2012 & 2013 APROCFMI | | | |
|---|------|----------------|----------|
| No of present members ⁷ | % | % ⁸ | Meeting |
| 10 | 33 | 63 | 9/1-12 |
| 13 | 43 | 70 | 11/2-12 |
| 14 | 46 | 73 | 10/6-12 |
| 17 | 56.6 | 96.6 | 16/9-12 |
| 18 | 60 | 70 | 21/10-12 |
| 21 | 70 | 70 | 26/1-13 |

(Author compilation of record book and meeting attendance records 2012-2013)

⁷ Members being present during the whole meeting

⁸ Members present and including those coming late or leaving during meeting

Since there are so many members that left during the meetings I have made two columns where the percentage of members that showed up is calculated. The numbers change quite dramatically when one includes members that did not stay during the whole meeting. The organisation have meetings every third month so if the members do not stay during the whole meeting they miss out on the only information channel between organisation and members. The meetings attendance say something about how many take the time to go to a meeting, but it does not say anything about real participation (expressing themselves at the meeting, to give time and energy when needed etc.). But still the records are important for my study since it gives an impression on the participation level in the organisation.

The meetings in APROCMI last normally the whole day: they are to start around 09.00 AM, but it is generally accepted that people come around 1-2 hours late. When the majority is there and the meeting starts, they start to note down people that come late. The meetings can last until around 7 PM. The meeting I attended (26/1-13) was to start at 09 AM, but did not start until 12 midday, there was lunch (at the plant) around 2 PM and the meeting lasted until 7:30 PM. The program for that meeting was as follows:

- 1: Counting the present
- 2: Summing up the last meeting
- 3: Information from organisations and Institutions present
- 4: Information from the directive in APROCMI
- 5: Information from ASOVITA
- 6: Reorganizing the directive (election)
- 7: Other

This was a template for meetings used for most normal meetings (not extraordinary), just that the institutions present could change.

AMAS

According to the lists of members from the meetings there are 55 members in AMAS. The record books on the meetings are not updated or well organised. The record books that are to inform about the context in the meetings they had do not correspond with records made on meeting attendance. The last meeting is not recorded, but I was told by the secretary that it was in November 2012.

Figure 9: Meeting attendance AMAS

| Meeting attendance 2011 & 2012 AMAS | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| Present members | % of all members | % exclude Chavarría | Meeting |
| 38 | 69% | 86% | 20/11-11 |
| 26 | 47% | 59% | 3.18.2012 (recorded wrong) |
| 32 | 58,1% | 72% | 26/ 6-12 |
| 37 | 67% | 84% | 15/8-12 |

(Source: Author compilation of record book and meeting attendance records 2011-2012)

There were some members (12) in AMAS that came from the community Chavarría that is a four- hour- walk from Sopachuy, they were therefore given a representative and they did not need to be at the meetings. I therefore made two different columns with calculated percentages of members present at meetings. The difference in attendance at the different meetings can be caused by a multitude of reasons, but when the members (in both organisations) were asked about this they said: other crossing meetings, or other obligations. Some of the leaders and one member said the people that did not participate at the meetings are just lazy.

The difference in meeting attendance between the two organisations is not very big if one calculates the members that were present in APROCMI meetings but did not stay during the whole meeting and excludes Chavarría members in AMAS. Since AMAS did not have that detail recorded I find the comparison just (since they as well may be leaving during the meeting but it is not recorded).

How is the organisation working?

A conversation with one of the leaders in AMAS:

Interviewer: *Does she have a responsibility in the organisation?*

Yes, she is responsible for the marketing of the products.

Interviewed: *What does that responsibility include?*

You are responsible for the marketing, selling the product, mixing the ingredients in for example the shampoo etc. But she does not do this. One time she sold honey in the plaza, but I have to sell the honey. She is all the time in the field (in her community), if she didn't have the time she shouldn't have taken the responsibility. I have to go around nagging people if we are gathering, to make the energizer, or the shampoo,

men nobody has the time. But when I am to distribute the money we have earned (when product is sold), ooou, then they come running.

When I asked the members how content they are with the organisation in general and the leadership many answered they are content because the bees are producing honey or they are discontent because the bees are not producing and they have problems with ants. I had to ask again specifically about the president or repeat the question to get an answer on the leadership or how the *organisation* worked. This focus on their production may indicate that they are more occupied with their production than how the organisation is functioning. When members had an opinion on the organisation and the leadership it was quite divided. Some are content and meant the leadership is doing a good job since they inform at the meetings, they were leading the organisation etc. One female (38) member in APROCMI stated:

Because they are always watching everything, they are surveilling the organisation. It seems they no more know what is happening. They are mobilizing, how the organisation is to work. Afterwards the members,, Every time there is a meeting, we are there no more.

One male (25) member in AMAS expressed similar feelings about his satisfaction with the leadership:

Content. They are there because they have the brains, they inform us. They explain what they know. This they explain at the meetings.

These answers were common among those who were content. Or they just said the leader did their job. Among those who were discontent it was often said the organisation/ leadership was lacking coordination. When I asked one male (53) member of APROCMI if he thought the directive could lead the organisation forward he said:

I hope that every time and when they meet, they will coordinate between the directors, sometimes they do not coordinate and everything is in the head of the president and at his style and taste he will lead. That is bad.

What he may be referring to is that in APROCMI there is a strong leader-figure that has been active in the organisation since its creation and has had many positions in the leadership. Some few people mention this as a problem. They may feel that they do not have a voice in the decisions. One of the female (36) members of the directive in APROCMI said this:

We are not able to coordinate. We can say that we are not working very well. Lack coordination. We say that we are going to have a meeting, and nobody comes, sometimes I don't go. We live far from each other, in different parts.

She was here talking about meetings the members of the directive have. People do not always show up when they say they are coming. She also admits that she does not always come to meetings either. This happened when I was to meet the members of the directive for the first time; I was told by the administrator that they would meet because she needed to talk to them. We waited. Nobody came. That was typical she said. The administrator explained that when she needed to make fast decisions, and could not reach the other members of the directive, she just called the president. People normally backed the president, so that was fine. When I asked one member of the directive in AMAS if she was content with the directive she said:

Me and the secretary and the president work better, we live closer to each other, we communicate, we are more content.

People seem to be putting a lot weight on if they live close or far from each other. If they live close then cooperation is easier. This is understandable since people in Sopachuy are known (by themselves) to be unpunctual and if they have to walk long hours then maybe the unpunctuality increases. One peculiar answer about the directive I got from one of the members in AMAS which was also part of the directive (but was accused by the president and other members for not doing the job):

Interviewer: *How content are you with the president?*

Interviewed: *With the president we are regular (this expression was used to say “acceptable” “or ok”). Not more than regular. He is not agile. He is there no more. He starts to complain no more (hehe). We live in the countryside (the communities), so we are not here continuously right, he (the president) does not work in the countryside, he works here no more. “You give me all the work” he says. He starts to complain no more. He is not agile to go forward.*

Interviewer: *Why is the president complaining?*

Interviewed: *He thinks that we leave everything in his hands. When they (institutions/ government) come from there, boxes and everything, “you are not animated, you don’t come” (president saying). He is a half idiot. For that reason, sometimes, we cannot go forward. We are only in the countryside so we are not helping. All the time the members have to be looking for him. For anything that comes up, he has to take that.*

This attitude by the member of the directive could be interpreted as quite passive. The president should lead the organisation forward because the rest don’t have time. Both the president and the secretary of marketing are criticized by the members for not doing their job. But this criticism can also be a result of the challenges the organisation has in terms of

distributing responsibility and organising themselves. The secretary of marketing has a pretty big task on herself to sell the honey while she is away all day in a different community.

Quite many members in both organisations only responded “content” on the question how content they were with the organisation. They could not say why. I suspect they did not know very much on how the organisation was functioning, or that they may be just were a bit indifferent to the whole thing. One female (64) member of AMAS said she was discontent because:

They don't arrange meetings. One has to be content with what they are doing, something that we have to do, in the meetings we talk.

Interviewer: *when was the last meeting?*

I do not remember, a long time ago.

When I asked the same member how content did she thinks the other members were:

How would they be doing, I don't know

Interviewer: *But when you meet someone from the organisation, do they speak good or bad about the organisation?*

No, we have not been meeting each other as always.

This member expresses something that many in both organisations said; the members don't normally meet, so how could they know anything about them. Generally when members were asked what is the most important thing for an organisation to work they said “a good directive/leadership”. Some put a lot of weight on the leadership and in that way less responsibility on the members. Some women in AMAS, when asked about the relevancy of the meetings, they said: “I am base no more, so I just go”. This has to do with the structure of the organisation; the division of work and responsibilities. The leadership has all the responsibilities and the rest of the members have none. One female (65) member of APROCMI when asked if she was content with the directive said this:

I do not know much. Sometimes I go, sometimes my daughter, sometimes my husband. The last one my daughter went.

She is here talking about the meetings. She may be feeling that the meetings do not regard her so much. That the organisations permit other people in the family to go to the meetings instead of the member is to give flexibility to a family. But the information from the meetings must be passed on the member/ family.

Some members had more active responses:

One male (55) member in APROCMI:

Coordination, contact, everybody has to come to the meetings.

Another male (56) member of AMAS:

It would be that the members control. When we have meetings they are just sitting there quiet. There is no opinion.

When asked about the reasons for low participation it is mentioned: lack of training and knowledge, lack of time, and/ or long way to walk. Lack of attendance at meeting is said to be because they have little time, the general lack of participation is said to be low levels of knowledge (did not know what to say and mean at the meetings). Lack of training and knowledge is lack of human capital, lack of time is lack of economic capital (according to Bourdieu). APROCMI have a rule that there have to be a woman in the directive, but they have problems nominating women because they generally do not want to be part of the directive. In both organisations there are difficulties in getting people to take on the responsibility of being in the directive for 2 years. This may be because they feel they are not able to do the task.

There are many difficulties in the participation in both organisations. The organisation may need to be structured in another way so that the members have some sort of responsibility and do not feel that the organisation is not theirs. In AMAS for example, the inactivity of the marketing secretary was “solved” by that the president sold honey from his house. But the dividing of responsibility then went back to the president. One male (27) member said that “we need to pay someone that can work with marketing all the time; we all have other jobs so we cannot do it”. The only problem is when they do not have the economic capital to rely on this. Also when the ties and networks between the members are loose, a difficult task such as marketing can become unmanageable for one person. I’m sure if the members went together to discuss ideas there are some solutions: make groups that can organise the selling on the Sunday market, a group that can organise when and how to make the different products they sell, a group that can talk to relatives that live in other cities and try to send the products there as well. But of course to do this people have to meet. And they have to meet more than once every 3-4 months.

5.5. The level of trust between members and in community

The level of trust between the members is a crucial part of analysing the role of social capital in the well-functioning of the RPOs. This is because trust is an outcome of the three forms of social capital: trustworthiness, networks, and norms/institutions (Ostrom 2003).

Trust between members

One male (50) member in AMAS when asked how much he trusted the other members:

The members, we are not from the same place. We do not know each other well. We are dispersed from various communities, places, sectors, so we meet no more in the reunions, in the events. That is a bit of distrust.

The overwhelming majority said they have regular trust in the members. This was often complemented with “*there is not so much trust here*”.

The members in both organisations say they do not normally meet the other members in the organisation. The farmers explained that their work in the field is individual and they spend most of the time there. The normal interaction seemed to be mostly with close family. One issue though seems to separate the two organisations to some extent; in APROCMI no one expects to receive any help if they need so from other members (except for one that said yes, but I would say that was a political response since he was in the government). In AMAS more members said they sometimes go to other members to ask for help or advice with the boxes. Some go together to capture bees. The general reply was that they do not work together and help each other out, but some members had that option open. One interesting issue is also that in AMAS there is a group that works together on harvesting the honey from bee boxes they have on the land of the Cooperative San Juan de Obreros. These four members are generally more positive than others on the issue of expecting help from the members when such help is needed. They knew each other a little more. But the group did though not score higher on the trust issue. The rest of the AMAS members did not either.

The “leadership figures” in APROCMI interpreted the question on trust between members as an issue of low participation. They said they have low trust in the members because they did not give of their time, because members were not preoccupied with how the organisation was going. In this way they felt a bit of deception from the members.

..even though the administrator is doing wrong, the members say: “no, it’s ok”. They do not analyse properly, so they are favouring the failure of our organisation. That is why is say I do not trust the members so much.

In general in the organisations, my impression is that there was not so much difference in the level of trust and how people thought about trust in the organisation, between them, or compared to the rest of society. People did not seem to have more or less trust in the members than their neighbours. So I will treat the rest of this part on trust as in the community.

Trust in the community

Almost all of the interviewed said they have regular trust in the members/ neighbours. Very few said they have a lot of confidence.

Some explained this to be because of the practical issue of not controlling the animals at your land. The cows go into the land of the neighbour and eat his maize or other products. One male (33) leader of a community explained this:

Between neighbours we always have discussions and conflicts between neighbours because of the damage caused by the animals. And they start saying different things to each other (speaking badly) and in that way the trust goes away.

Some explained this situation to be pretty bad. People could come over and scream at you or maybe hit you. The majority said these conflicts are resolved by an intermediary from the *sindicato* that measure the damage and set a price. But it seems the damage between the people had been made.

Other responses that were more common went on the character of the people. The most common response to the question on how much you trust the members/ neighbours was this:

Regular. Also not much confidence. We don't know what is inside. We are not the same the people, we are very different, we do not trust each other much. We have different opinions. If I trust them, and then they will say things to me, for that reason.

Many use the expression "We are not the same". I first thought they were talking about some socio-economic situation, but it was clear they talked about character, values and opinions. Men and women trace this mistrust to the problem of not knowing what the person really wanted, or what they are really saying. A lot of lies they say. I asked whether generally you think you can trust people or generally you have to be careful in the interactions with people. Four of my respondents said you can generally trust people. The response of one of them is really interesting, he (37) said:

There are people of confidence. Some say there is not, but for me there is confidence. It depends on how you talk, it is not like if I talk about the person I will not talk to him

as well. I will give you my confidence we say and they start to tell me their situation, but I will then not tell it to someone else.

But the general majority do not have this opinion. The general view is that you have to be careful “because if you give away trust to someone, they can harm you”. The personal interests go before the intention of thinking of the other. One male (43) member in APROCMI gave a quite scaring image of the people and how you had to be careful:

You have to be careful. Not trust too much in the neighbour. Anytime it can fall. He will always play you around (siempre te va a jugar). Some are like this. From you are little they will gain your trust, more and more, and at the end he will not give up this power, and he feels like the owner. Then they will say what they want (ya te muestran cara), they want to hit you, they then dominate. They don't respect. So for this it is better to don't give much confidence. If you trust him, you lost.

This is only one member, but the idea that people have bad intentions is quite widespread among the persons interviewed and other conversations. This harm seems to be rooted in two causes; one is that people talk behind your back and the other is jealousy.

People talk a lot about each other and many complained that people will not say it to your face but behind your back. They even invent things it was said. One of the young single mothers I spoke with hated the people in the village because she could not even walk down the street with a friend without people talking bad about it. In a conversation I had with a single mother (divorced), she said people speak bad about her because she has no husband. This leads neighbours to not want to talk to other neighbours on important issues, it's better to keep them at a distance. What is interesting is that people had no problems talking about trust or if they had or have bad neighbourhood relations. I had some interviews with people in the main square, or around other members in the organisations and it did not seem to be a problem to say to me (an unknown foreigner) how much they distrusted other members or neighbours or why people were bad. Of course it is easier to just criticize others than if I had asked about their weaknesses for example. But the point is that people were not suspicious towards me. One woman that I interviewed while she was waiting to talk to the government office for environment said “*that people in the community just go to the next house and tell everything, imagine if the government people did that, here at least the information stays*”. It can be that foreigners were looked upon as different as well.

The issue of jealousy was mentioned a couple of times. It is said that people are always jealous of those that do something good so they will try to copy it or get ahead of the other. One member in AMAS complained that people are so jealous they did not want to share their knowledge with him so that he could also go into production. One government employee explained the term “we are not same” and said people do not trust each other because of insecurity.

You are not sure what people want. So it's better to keep the people at a distance, not so close. Because here you see the jealousy. One neighbour that work and the other that does not work, the neighbour that is not working will look to take down the other. So they are selfish.

Interviewer: *But what does that have to do with that people are different?*

Interviewed: *some are lazy*

So when people want to do different things, such as working extra, he meant the people will look bad at you (have a negative opinion outwards). A former male (51) leader of a community talked about jealousy when I asked about the relationship to the neighbours:

With my neighbours? Sometimes the neighbours are, well, we cannot understand each other. Some are half, how can I say it, jealous. Some think about leading the community, but they don't come to that, and they start hating each other. When you are a leader of a community the work is social, so it's for the whole community, but there is always some that always come with fights and talk bad. When one is leader of a community some are always jealous. That's how I see it. There is little coordination, little cooperation between the neighbours. You end up having enemies. Many people are like this.

This issue of interaction and cooperation led me to ask whether it was normal to go and visit the neighbours. Among some people it is, especially in one community where the houses were quite close. I asked that to the former directive from the quote above, he said no, it takes 30 minutes by foot to walk to the nearest house. Some neighbours visits each other, but it seems that it is more normal to visit the houses of the family than just neighbours. I also asked where people got their information from (agriculture, cooking etc.). Important tools for the farmers are the radio and the meetings in the community on getting information on what happens around them. For agriculture most people go to the agronomist in the government to ask for advice. When asked whether it was possible to ask a neighbour for advice, almost all said yes. Nobody though said this without me asking specifically about it. Most women said they will mostly ask a family member for advice on something, for example cooking, than a neighbour. One male farmer (54) when asked about whether he could ask a neighbour on production he said:

Exactly, this we talk about, in the meetings in the communities. Between just families we do not talk. Why am I going lie. No.

5.6. Networks in the community

The networks in the community are important since networks are a form of social capital and are important to understand in order to analyse the interaction between the people. It is presented here groups and organisations in the community, political party affiliation, and some traditional community practices.

Groups and organisations in the community

58 % of the members (both organisations) are part of another organisation or group. Three members are members of both APROCMI and AMAS. In APROCMI the percentage of the members that are associated with other groups is 66 % and in AMAS it is 53 %. The difference is not so big. I will therefore treat the issue of networks more generally in the society than comparing the two RPOs. The difference between the RPOs may lie in the fact that I interviewed more people in AMAS that was living in their communities and therefore were not part of neighbourhood groups or the Cooperative San Jose de Obrero since these only existed in Sopachuy village. Most common is to be a member of the neighbourhood group in your area in Sopachuy village, the Cooperative San Jose de Obrero in Sopachuy, and organisations of milk producers. There is a milk program in two communities that is to organise the cow farmers in an organisation so they can sell the milk. Two women are part of groups in their community between women to grow vegetables and sell them (this was started by an NGO), another woman is part of a group of traditional medicine that gets help from an NGO to make creams and sell it. The neighbourhood groups are only in the village of Sopachuy, they work with issues important to the neighbourhood. The group has meetings every month. Sometimes selected members can go to courses that are arranged and they transmit the knowledge to the group. In one neighbourhood group there could be around 180 families.

Of the *comuneros* asked (members of communities and not the RPOs), 3 out of 10 were members in groups. One was member of a group that managed a common tractor between them, another a representative from the community in the Subcentralia, and the third a women`s group in a health post.

Political party affiliation

12 % of all the interviewed was a member of a political party. 4 of them to the government party MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*), the last one was part of another party. Politics and politicians were not well perceived by my informant: either people said politicians just lie, or they said politics is not for me: “I don’t know anything about it” or “it is not interesting”. When I asked if politicians come to the communities most people responded like this male member: “*Not much. They come a short while when there is elections, but we have nothing to do about it*”. Some men were more critical and talked in a joking way, like this man (34):

ooou, when there is election they are everywhere, worse than a fly. They give coca, with coca they are having their campaign. Every meeting in the community they come like sheeps. Hee.

The coca leaves is a very popular among the farmers and they use them during the whole day. All the women said they didn’t know anything about it, except for one strong character in APROCMI that said: “*yes they come to our communities, but they can’t reach me! Hehe*”.

Traditional community practises

Collective work

The interviewed members and the *comuneros* come from 17 different communities. In all these different communities there is only one community that do not work together in some way (most often fix the road). The leader of this community said that the community is accessed through the main road into Sopachuy so the government take care of fixing the road. In the rest of the 16 communities they organise at least once a year to clear the road of rocks that have fallen throughout the year. This is organised by the *sindicato* and the *comuneros* are given a fine in either money or that they had to work double if they did not participate.

Ayni

Ayni (*Quechua*) is an old practice in the Andes which means that one neighbour can work the land of the other and this is reciprocated later by the other. Around 40 % of the interviewed said that yes they still have ayni, but not all participated. Around half of those that said yes also said that it is diminishing. This was a strong practice before, it was said, when their parents were alive and working. Some responded that “they (the others) don’t know ayni, we don’t know to help each other, we work individually”. The majority do not have any thoughts on why this was disappearing. Those that did express themselves said that now you have to

pay people to work, if not they will not work. On the question when and why did this change, one of the new male (43) leaders in APROCMI said:

Interviewee: *before this existed, we worked in groups. When we were children this still existed and our fathers knew ayni, but not now. We try, but it is not possible.*

Interviewer: *why is it not possible?*

Interviewee: *I don't know... Sometimes there is no time, sometime one travels and come back with money, oou, shit, they look for people and pay.*

Interviewer: *Has a lot of people travelled from the community?*

Interviewee: *yes. They leave. Soon come back with money. Santa Cruz, Argentina; temporal.*

El trueque

The term trueque (Quechua) is also a traditional practice in the Andes. People can exchange products between neighbours in the community and/ or with other communities. In my sample this practice is more present than the ayni (70 % said they practiced) among the interviewed. In the two communities people mostly said the practice was disappearing (or some said it had disappeared), it could be as a result of the relative closeness of the community to the village of Sopachuy. In the communities further away people said they traded mostly with other neighbouring communities or they traded with communities in other provinces higher up in the mountains. As explained by this male (42) farmer:

Yes, this we do practice. Almost the majority. Some live in low zones, some with irrigation, and some in the altitudes. In the low zones they produce the product early, and in the altitude, temporal more than everything, they produce later. For that reason we have a variation in products. For that reason we do this trueque. It is the ayni in products.

Help when a community-member die

This is another traditional way of reciprocity in the communities in the Andes. The closest *comuneros* (meaning those living close) had to visit the family and give some potatoes, maize or something, and if possible help to move the body to the cemetery. This is practiced in all communities (17) where I had interviews. Most said that this practice has not disappeared, and they seemed quite proud of this. “Yes of course, we have to help when someone dies” or “we have to have solidarity when someone loses their loved ones”. It was said to be a strong custom by one male (50) interviewee:

That is sacred, it is a custom. If you do not go, “these people are never going to die” they say

Though the real solidarity was questioned by one farmer saying that there are many old people living alone, families that have lost their “bread father”, and people do nothing, but when there is a possibility to drink, they come (it is served *chicha* (local made alcohol) at the wake.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

6.0. Introduction

This chapter presents a discussion and analysis of key findings in the study. The discussion and analysis is centred on the components of social capital and participation to answer the research objective: what is the relevancy of social capital in the functioning of the RPOs. To understand how social capital can be created I mostly apply the term as understood by Elinor Ostrom and T. K. Ahn as they have incorporated aspects of the rational choice theory and the social context (culture, experiences etc.) in their use and understanding of this concept. I also find their approach very useful since they explain how social capital is created. Not all scholars are very clear in their description of how social capital is created, such as Putnam, Coleman etc. Regarding the effect of social capital I will use scholars such as Putnam, Coleman and others.

Ahn & Ostrom (2002) argue that trustworthiness, networks, and formal and informal rules are the three main ways that affect if the trustee reciprocates, and that the trustor believes the trustee to reciprocate – in other words whether people cooperate and trust each other. Apart from these three forms the authors also recognise that contextual factors are important in shaping trust (see figure 5). According to Ostrom (1998:3), most of the focus of public policy analysis, especially since Garrett Hardin`s (1968) much cited work “The Tragedy of the Commons”, have been focused on how individuals are unable to act collectively unless there is an external agent intervening with sanctions and incentives. In the theory of Ahn & Ostrom (2002) this ‘control’ is intrinsic in the trustworthiness, networks and rules themselves.

The social dilemma that is the focus of theories on collective action is a situation where a group of people have a common interest and there is a potential conflict between the common interest and the interest of each individual (Olson, 1965 in Ahn & Ostrom 2002: 4). The conflict is then between self-benefitting alternatives or an alternative that will benefit all if

enough people follow it (Ostrom 2003). Classical examples of collective action problems are “the prisoner’s dilemma” and “the tragedy of the commons” (Putnam et al. 1993). Collective action problems exist everywhere and at all the different levels of society from the village to the international society. According to Ostrom (2003), the ability the individuals have to solve these dilemmas is a crucial component of economic and political development. By using the definition of a social dilemma by Olson (1965 in Ahn & Ostrom 2002:8) the collective action problem in this study could be framed as this:

Theories of collective action concern social dilemma settings in which there is a group of individuals (in my particular case APROCMI and AMAS), a common interest among them (a functioning RPO that improve their livelihood), and potential conflict between the common interest and each individual’s interest (a wish for a well-functioning RPO against a stronger interest in own agricultural activity or other activities).

The goal of this chapter is to critically analyse the empiric field data through the lens of social capital theory. The chapter is firstly divided into the three components of social capital- trustworthiness, networks, and formal and informal rules - as these categories are also the main findings in the empiric material. I will discuss the empiric situation with the help from the theory on social capital. The next part of the analysis is centred on the relations between RPOs and NGOs and the state against issues of dependency and participation that is also connected to social capital.

6.1. *Trustworthiness*

In the empirical data collected in this study, and as presented in Chapter 5, it is clear that the level of trust between members of the organisations and generally in the societies where this research took place is not very high. The informants expressed that ‘not all of us are the same’, a statement that I have interpreted as implying that there are some people that have bad intentions and hence it is best to keep a distance to all in order to avoid problems. This distrust between people was seldom connected to personal experiences, though most of my informants had heard (and maybe also spread) the gossip that existed. This distrust is interesting to understand in the light of Ahn & Ostrom’s theory of social capital since it can help understand why it exists and what it can do to cooperation.

Ahn & Ostrom (2002) distinguish trustworthiness as a form of social capital, since they do not agree that trust is only the result of networks, rules and norms. Trustworthiness, they say, can also lie in an individual's preferences – or intrinsic motivation. Trustworthiness is thus often something that can come from a person's characteristics. One example they give is of a lost traveller that asks a local villager for help. In this situation there are no networks, repetitions, or sanctions (factors that the majority of the scholars agree on in terms of what affect trust). The villager then has to decide if he trusts the traveller and that assessment will depend only on the trustor's belief in the trustee's motivation. A trustor in this example can use the trustor's characteristics (appearance, dress, language etc.) to decide the trustee's trustworthiness (Frey and Bohnet 1996 in Ostrom 2003:xix). Trustworthiness is then an independent reason for deciding to behave cooperatively. Ostrom (200:xix) state that "While trustworthiness is an effective term to refer to the characteristics of individual preferences in a collective action situation, different terms may be used in other contexts such as 'habits' or 'values'". This I interpret as that the values and habits of a society will shape the values of the individuals.

When looking at the empirical findings I find this way of distinguishing intrinsic motivation in the theory as very fruitful since it can help understand why people decided to trust someone and not someone else. But, in the study the informants generally regarded other people's intrinsic motivation to be selfish and not good. This can be understood in the light of the 'habits' and 'values' in society which also reflect the same images. There is also little interaction and therefore also little communication between members in the RPOs. Communication, preferably face-to-face, is explained by Ostrom (1998:14) as being very influential in improving trust. This is important since individuals that don't know each other will use tools such as evaluating face expressions and listening to how something is said to determine the trustworthiness of a person (Ostrom 1998). When there is little interaction and communication, my informants will not have this type of opportunity to evaluate the trustworthiness. Ahn & Ostrom (2002) do not go deep into the discussion of what shapes our intrinsic motivation. It can then be valuable to use the concept habitus as used by Bourdieu. Bourdieu argue that our actions, thoughts, and feelings are shaped by traces of our past experiences which lead to a pre-reflexive character on most of our actions (Crossley 2005:108). For Bourdieu the concept also inhabits a tension between our first nature (for ex. aggressive or selfish impulses) and our second nature (norms, control). This tension gives room for the individual to act as he is not overly controlled by the norms in society (Bourdieu

in Crossley 2005:105). Bourdieu reminds us with the concept that the society we live in affects how we think, perceive, and act. Since many of my informants did not have personal bad experiences with people (but they had heard stories of others who had), the actions of the people in the study turns out more understandable when viewing their actions according to values, habits – trustworthiness and habitus. The informants in the study talked about a recommended caution towards other people because if the wrong people get too much trust they will abuse it. This thought can maybe be understood as traces from the realities in Bolivia; the Andes have had widespread haciendas that created a power relationship between patron and tenants. My interviewees explained that their parents (around 1950s) was heavily exploited by the patron and could work whole days without salary. Corruption in the state and police was also regarded by my interviewees to be a problem in society, though the municipal government was regarded as less corrupt than the national government. These are factors that can have influenced norms in society about distrust and caution.

How can trustworthiness have an impact on cooperation between people? According to Ahn & Ostrom (2002:21) trustworthiness make people reciprocate action (instead of acting non-cooperatively) even in situations where there are no networks or institutions that can give incentives. This means that people can deal with other people without the need for a repetitive network (people meeting more than once) or without incentives. Cooperation between people means to avoid selfish action that does not benefit the common interest. Building on Mark Granovetter (1986), Putnam et al. (1993) argues that:

Fabrics of trust enable the civic community more easily to surmount what economist call “opportunism”, in which shared interests are unrealized because each individual, acting in shared wary isolation, has an incentive to defect from collective action.

I view this this isolation as easily cumulative (people get more and more distanced) and it is easier for the members to act individually than collectively. I believe trustworthiness is something we can relate to an individual without the need for networks or sanctions, and that the general distrust in society influences collective action among people and participation in the RPOs. But to really understand how social capital can be related to participation it is necessary to explore the two other components as well: networks and informal/formal rules.

6.2. Networks

Networks are regarded as for example the exchange of advice, favours, information etc. (Briggs 1997:113). Between the members in the Producer Organisations in my study there are

few of these networks. The majority knew the names of most members, but they generally did not meet or have any kind of interaction with each other. In APROCMI there are members from 9 communities and there are mostly 3-4 members from each community. AMAS as well have members from 9 communities + one group of people that live in the village of Sopachuy. Little interaction and few networks in the organisations are understandable since they rarely meet, but one would maybe expect that the members from the same community would interact more. But that do not seem to be case. It does not seem that the networks or size of the networks between the members in the two RPOs were different.

According to Ahn & Ostrom (2002:15) trustworthiness will increase when social exchange is repeated or if it is part of a network. It is according to Ahn & Ostrom (2002), not necessary for the trustee to have trustworthiness in order to avoid exploitation; it is the repetition of the interaction that is important for cooperation. This repetition will create a network which shapes ways to access information about other people's trustworthiness and positive experiences will shape interaction in the future. It is important that the information is reliable (Ostrom 2003). Coleman (1988:104) also stresses this as he argues that information will provide "a basis for action".

That my informants seemed to be interacting very little with other people (in terms of depending on each other for advice, knowledge, experiences and/or facilitating agriculture production or types of work), this could be part of the reason for why people regarded other people's trustworthiness to be low. The repetitive interaction is stressed because with repetition there is an incentive to build up reputations for being trustworthy since actors want to gain from the network in the future as well (Coleman 1988, Putnam et al. 1993, Ostrom 2003). This means even a very selfish individual will less likely defy the trust in such situations since he has a selfish incentive to stay in the network (Ostrom 2003: xvii). This perspective makes it easier to understand the seemingly lack of trust in Sopachuy; the lack of repetitive interaction do not create the need for building reputations. As the information channels are weaker, it is more difficult for people to know other people's trustworthiness or motivation. As my informants told me many times "it is best to keep a distance, because you cannot know what is in their heart"- a statement I understood as meaning you do not know what really motivates people.

When the networks are dense, they are often associated with norms of reciprocity (Putnam et al. 1993, Ostrom 2003), and if a society has what Putnam calls ‘weak ties’, or as Ostrom terms ‘trust’, then society will have a general layer of trust and the expectations of the individuals will change. People will then expect that favours are repaid in the future. Coleman (1988:97) cites Granovetter (1985 in Coleman) on this issue, as he stresses the importance of personal relations and networks in creating expectations, trust, and how it creates and enforces norms (norms and rules frame how people should act and should not act). According to Ostrom (2003: xviii), when a society has effective (in the sense of sanctioning opportunities) formal and informal rules, this will affect how the trustor think the trustee will behave in the future. And for norms and rules to be effective these needs to be incorporated in networks that are channels of information and incentives that builds reputations.

In the field study the ties between people were mostly between close family members. People met and exchanged more with family in the place they lived than generally with people in the society. The RPOs are constructed of people form 9 different communities and as far as I know members were not closely related. Because of lack of trust there may be a norm in the society that it is preferable to make ties with family than with neighbours. Putnam et al. (1993:175) echo the argument by Granovetter, that there is a difference between ‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’. The first is kinship and close friendship and the second is memberships and acquaintanceship. According to Putnam et al. (1993) ‘weak ties’ are much more important for community cooperation than ‘strong ties’ since the first goes across different groups and can create cooperation on a wider scale. I think Putnam et al. (1993) has a point in distinguishing between two sorts of ties since if people have networks with different kinds of people that are not from the closest family this may give access to different ideas or contacts with a wider group of people. For the RPOs it could be beneficial and inspiring for the members to meet other RPOs to share knowledge and ideas. This is an activity that could be beneficial for the whole group of members as they then meet people they may be regard as more ‘equal’ than the expert technicians.

That the informants in my study normally had networks with close family rather than neighbours can be explained by lack of social capital, but it can also be shaped by the way the farmers in Sopachuy live and produce. The farmers live far from each other and have small plots of land that are often worked by the family alone. If agriculture occupies a great deal of the daily hours (as I was told by my informants) there is not much time or reason for creating

networks. This production strategy can then be a reason why people interact so little and so influence participation in the RPOs. The RPOs could therefore be a space where networks could be created, and participation fostered.

There may as well be unequal relations between the members in the RPOs that can influence how the members participate. On this issue neither Ahn & Ostrom (2002) nor Putnam et al (1993) analyse power and domination within social organisations. Putnam et al. (1993:173) do make an interesting distinction between horizontal networks – networks of “equivalent status and power” and vertical networks that link “unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence”. Almost all networks are a mix of these two forms (they give the example that bowling teams have captains) (Putnam et al. 1993). But Putnam et al (1993:173) claim that networks of civic engagement (cooperatives, sports clubs, choirs) are horizontal dense networks that increase the likelihood of people cooperating for a common benefit. In vertical networks it is more difficult to sustain cooperation since the sanctioning by lower members of the leaders is less likely (Putnam et al. 1993). But what Putnam’s analysis does not incorporate, and which is important in this analysis, is the domination and hierarchy in the civil organisation itself. In my empirical findings I would argue that in the RPOs there are people that have access to more capitals (human, physical, social) and this can constrain cooperation since it can create an environment where the persons with the most capitals will dominate and those with less capitals will let themselves be dominated. I think it is easier for members that have low levels of knowledge on loans and markets, to just leave the thinking and management to those they perceive have this knowledge. Different people have access to varying amounts of the different capitals and this shapes a person’s livelihood in positive or negative terms (Bebbington 1999). It is useful to use the concept of “field” as used by Bourdieu. Bourdieu (in Crossley 2005) defines field as a social space (mass media, church, family etc.) where people interact, but in that space the people are positioned according to their access to the different capitals. These capitals lead to different access to resources and power within that field. The position a person has in important fields such as education and economy can shape that person for the rest of his life (Bourdieu in Crossley 2005). In APROCMI there are around four people that have more resources than the general majority (in the form of capital form other jobs and interacting with people from the government or other institutions as part of their jobs). It is reasonable to assume that these relations affect how the members participate in the organisation. In AMAS there are also around 4 persons (two of those in APROCMI) who are in the same position of those in APROCMI. For the

networks then to create cooperation and trust, the members need to become more equal in the sense of their access to the capitals. More people need to be trained in organisational work, management, leadership, accounting etc. in order to have knowledge and skills for this type of work, as it would create a situation where people had more equal access to resources and power. In the meeting of APROCMI for instance, I assume that a part of the explanation for the inactivity in the meetings (someone looking to ceiling, others to floor, others sleeping) is lack of understanding of issues brought up. The financial plan done by an NGO and the leader in APROCMI did not create much enthusiasm by among the members and they voted no to the loan that was needed. This is not strange since the members had not participated at all in the plan, they did not know about it, and they were not trained on issues such as loans, interest rates, etc. Low levels of human capital (knowledge and skills) can then have a great impact on the participation in the RPOs. What investment in social capital could do is to create that foundation for the members to mobilise to identify needs, how to get these changes they need, and what kind of knowledge they need training on.

Ostrom (2003: xxv) argues that human capital is “by itself important in understanding social capital”, since the act of constructing and using physical, human, and social capital is intertwined. Coleman (1988) gives examples of this in his article “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” as he states that the social ties and connections to institutions that parents have will influence the level of human capital their children have. Networks can also increase the human capital that individuals have. When the members in the RPOs stay isolated they have no foundation where they can foster ideas and learn from each other. Dasgupta (2002:326) states that the memberships the individuals have in networks are components of human capital. Dasgupta cites a study by Burt (1992) and Burt et al. (1998) on American business firms: the individuals that had strategic positions in networks were also those that were highest compensated. Here it is important here to have in mind that it is very difficult to determine the causality of capitals; whether it was social capital that lead to increased human capital, or if it was the human capital the individuals had that made them access these networks and then benefitted. There are also probably big differences between studying social capital in a business firm and social capital in the rural Andes. For example in the Andes a lot of responsibilities and ‘duties’ are taken on voluntarily and therefore they have no expected material gains. But the point is to identify how human and social capital is intertwined.

6.3. *Formal rules and norms*

In the two RPOs in my study they both had internal documents that made clear the responsibilities of the members and the rules in the organisation. Some of the rules were: deliver product to the organisation, comply with the activities of the organisation, attend meetings, and if you do not attend three following meeting the directive can expulse you etc. In the two RPOs, the arenas where the members meet are the meetings that are held (normally) every 3-4 months. If the members don't talk at the meetings, there is no other current arena for face – to face communication. When I asked the interviewees whether the organisation has internal rules they mostly responded that they get a fine if they don't come to the meetings. The two RPOs do not have very effective rules and sanctions. An example can be the late comings of some members when a meeting is held; members could come 2 hours late and the meeting did not start before the majority were present. These late comings are connected to the norms in society that accept and almost make late coming into a rule, but I was also told by my informants that in the *sindicato* meetings it was much stricter: if you came a bit late they would fine you for each minute. When I attended the meeting of APROCMI there were many members opposing to pay the fine for not attending previous meetings because they had not been notified. I do not know if there is a real problem with the notifications, but half of all the missing attendances were erased. Why there is a difference between the *sindicato* and the RPOs can be, as I was told as well, that the RPOs are afraid of sanctioning too much so that the members leave the organisation. It can also be related to how these two systems are viewed by the members; the *sindicato* is the organisational structure where people live and it can be perceived as an obligation to go, and the RPOs can be perceived as more voluntarily. But even 'volunteer groups' can create the sense of fulfilment and obligation by its members and I think part of that lies in proper norms and rules (that other members care).

Both Putnam et al. (1993), Coleman (1988), Ahn & Ostrom (2002) and Ostrom (2003) mention norms to be an important component of social capital. Though the last two focus more on how formal and informal rules can create cooperation in concrete organisations. Informal and formal rules are defined by Ostrom (2003:xxii) as institutions which are “prescriptions that specify what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted, and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed”. We make rules on every level in our society; from households to international cooperation, and these rules are to shape us to act in a reciprocal way (cooperate) (Ahn & Ostrom 2002). Formal and informal rules are

therefore an important part of social capital and an institution needs to invest in devising their own rules that all members agree on, and there needs to be effective sanctions for those that do not comply (Ostrom 2003, Ahn & Ostrom 2002). Ahn & Ostrom (2002) argue that the rules and norms will often facilitate collective action, but a central problem is to make rules that work and to have an appropriate sanctioning system that do not sanction unjustly. In institutions the members depend on how collective action problems are solved, and since we are not all altruists we need commitments that are credible (Putnam et al. 1993). I think the lack of an integral focus in the RPOs on what kind of action is required, prohibited, and permitted can limit the participation since the members only relate to the fine they get when they don't come. The organisations need a wider approach where trustworthiness, networks, and rules and norms are vital elements.

Many interviewees suggested raising the fine as a solution to the low participation so that people would calculate themselves that to miss a meeting is not beneficial. But as Uphoff (2000:228) argues, when cooperation is “motivated by norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes that create reinforcing expectations” it will be a much more efficient and less costly social organisation, than an organisation that needs to use material gains or force to get this cooperation. In collective action dilemmas there has been proposed the solution of ‘third-party enforcement’, where for example the state should enforce commitment. Dasgupta (2002:315) for example claims that one of four principles for an agreement to be kept is an “external enforcer of the agreement”. Putnam et al. (1993) argue that this solution is not very helpful, because firstly it is very expensive and secondly one may ask who can ensure the trustworthiness of the neutral party. I agree with Putnam on this issue, since it seems very unreasonable that an external party is needed to ensure trust and cooperation among people. Ostrom (1998) states this very nicely:

Without individuals viewing rules as appropriate mechanisms to enhance reciprocal relationships, no police force and court system on earth can monitor and enforce all the needed rules on its own (Ostrom 1998:16).

So what do these rules do? According to Ostrom (2003), the rules will give an expectation by the trustor that the trustee will behave trustworthy even though he does not know the trustee. For this to be effective the rules need sanctions. In this way rules and networks enhance each other: if A expects a transaction from B and B does not deliver, that can be a crime depending on the transaction, but it can anyhow be sanctioned. If A and B are part of a network where C and D will potentially cooperate with B, then B has an incentive to not disappoint A since

then the future gains with C and D will be lost (Ostrom 2003: xviii). The networks and the rules structure the incentives that the participants face and if the network is repetitive the members will know the incentive structure of the others in the network (Ostrom 2003: xviii). In the RPOs, these rules and networks can increase people's participation since the members will have a greater perception of the others in the organisation and their motivation. An organisation that for instance has different groups or assigns task to its members, it is my experience that people feel more obligated and will have more will to do the task when they expect that others also comply. According to Ostrom (2003) face to face communication is vital in this process since when people interact they will increase the ownership of the rules and also the compliance of the rules. An interesting claim by Ostrom (1998:8) is that in her study using an experimental design, the results show how the initially least trusting individuals contributed to the sanctioning system and they cooperated more than those people who were more trusting in the first place. Rules are important for the functioning of the RPOs, but I think foremost the RPOs in the study need to become more relevant for the members in order to make these rules work properly. In the case of APROCMI the activities and services of the organisation should include a focus on the needs of the agricultural production of the members. And in both RPOs the organisations should distribute much more responsibility as this would make the organisation more important for the members. Responsibilities can be put on the members in areas that they themselves propose as important (e.g. manage a rotating credit system, tractor service etc.). Since AMAS is smaller than APROCMI, it could benefit from more distribution of responsibilities since one person responsible for sales can make the task very difficult and lead to passivity.

Norms of reciprocity

The norms in the society are part of shaping what we as individuals expect from others (Putnam et al. 1993, Ostrom 2003, Ahn & Ostrom 2002). As Coleman state "many norms are learned from interactions with others in diverse communities about the behavior that is expected in particular types of situations" (Coleman 1987 in Ostrom 1998:9). Interestingly, my empiric material from the communities shows how the communities have the norm that people should take on community responsibilities (such as being the leader of the community) as that shows membership to a place and you will receive honour in return. This is a traditional practice in the Andes communities according to Rivera (2003). Putnam et al. (1993) argues that the norm of reciprocity is especially important in creating social capital. Putnam has special focus on the norms of reciprocity and sees them as one of the three forms

of social capital (the other being trust and networks). This is because norms of reciprocity can make actor A do work for actor B, and A will expect B to reciprocate in the future. In my empiric case some of the historical norms of reciprocity such as *ayni*, *faena*, *mink'a*, and collective grassland were not being practiced by all. The reciprocity practices were losing ground my informants said; some don't practice it at all. There can be many reasons why these practices are disappearing, and to fully grasp the factors and effects of this change in practises it is needed another study. But I will shortly go into some factors that can be important and that can affect social capital and participation. According to Rivera (2003) these practices are part of the Andean way of living and producing; reciprocity is a way of building sustainability, production, social cohesion, and status as community participants. Diminishing norms of reciprocity can then shape how people interact and how they perceive interaction (if it's possible or not).

Rivera (2003:113) mentions an interesting fact; that farmers in the Andes have very scattered parcels of land and very often in different ecological zones. That the land plots are scattered between different ecological zones makes the production dependent on work between community members necessary since it takes a family very long time to walk between these plots (de Morrée 2002 and Golte 1980 in de Morrée). The study Rivera did was undertaken in the Quechua highland community Raqaypampa.

Figure 10: Number of parcels according to crops and ecological zones, Family 1: 1999 - 2000

| Cultivos | Pampa | | Monte | | Total | |
|----------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Nro. parcelas | Superficie (ha) | Nro. Parcelas | Superficie (ha) | Nro. parcelas | Superficie (ha) |
| Papa | 3 | 0,50 | | | 3 | 0,50 |
| Maiz | 2 | 1,00 | 8 | 2,06 | 10 | 3,06 |
| Trigo | 2 | 1,15 | | | 2 | 1,15 |
| Total | 7 | 2,65 | 8 | 2,06 | 15 | 4,71 |

(Source: Rivera (2003:113). *Cultivo*-product, *pampa*- pampas, *monte*- mountain, *nro. parcelas*- no of parcels, *superficie* – surface)

In Sopachuy the farmers have dispersed plots of land, but the parcels are close to the family house (interview with local agronomist). The maximum length between different parcels is 2 km., but most families have the parcels closer than that. According to a local agronomist, the

parcels are not located in different ecological zones and the parcels, as far as he knew, were not so before (50-100 years ago) either. In Sopachuy the size of the production can be quite small; a farmer can have for instance $\frac{1}{4}$ of one ha. with potato, $\frac{1}{4}$ of maize and 300 m² with fruit production. Sopachuy is in an area with altitude differences, but why the farmers do not practice production in different ecological zones may be because of different practices in high Andes regions and valley regions in the Andes. The production system in Sopachuy is then to have small plots of land that is connected to each family, and some families have collective grassland between them. It is essential to recognise that the context will always have an influence on local structures, norms, networks, and trust. This is also acknowledged by Ahn & Ostrom (2002) as they see contextual factors are one of the components that influence trust (see figure 5), and the social milieu shapes norms and formal rules (Ostrom 1998:9).

One factor that was mentioned by my interviewees for the disappearing practices of *ayni* and *mink'a* is migration. What is important to understand about livelihood strategies in the Andes, according to Bebbington (1999) is that they are multiple and increasingly non-agrarian. Temporal or permanent migration is a livelihood strategy in the Andes to cope with low agricultural production (Aramayo et al. 1998). According to Bebbington (1999:2027) there have been many projects in the Andes that have tried to stop this temporal or permanent out migration, but these projects have largely failed. One reason for this, according to the author, is that migration has been part of the livelihood strategies in the Andes for a long time. Bebbington (1999) echoes Preston (1997) that regards migration as a strategy that makes rural people's livelihoods viable. The importance of remittances can be very high for families that stay behind, but I would argue that migration can be an important cause to explain why the norms of reciprocity are weaker now than just one generation ago. A local agronomist in Sopachuy claimed that permanent migration to for example Santa Cruz has left the communities with less people and it is therefore more difficult to organise collective work. The permanent migration out of the province of Tomina increased in the 1950s and 1960 and was characterised by Langer (1989) as a flood towards Argentina, Santa Cruz, and Monteagudo. The communities in Sopachuy have very scattered houses that can be quite far from each other, and when the communities lose people it becomes more difficult to maintain community practices of collective work and land. There is also migration from the communities to the village of Sopachuy as about half the people in the communities also have houses in the village of Sopachuy. Another factor is that migration to bigger cities opens up to influences from the modern money economy where the barter economy is not present. Some

of my informants explained that young people come back from the cities and they now wear shoes (sandals is related to the 'peasant'), and do not want to work without getting paid. This can be understood as that the society in Sopachuy is changing and slowly moving towards the modern money economy.

Norms of reciprocity can shape how people conceive of the idea of working/cooperating with others since with a 'strong' norm people will more likely expect others to contribute. I would argue that the fading norms of reciprocity in Sopachuy will influence how the members in the RPOs conceive of their part in the organisations. If collective work is not so common, then maybe it is easier to look for action from outside. There are many factors that influence norms in a society, but to invest in networks between people in the RPOs could maybe increase the sense of working together which would impact participation.

Social Capital - as trustworthiness, networks, and informal/formal rules

Trust is according to theory an outcome of trustworthiness, networks and informal/formal rules. Whether a person decides to trust another depends on the trustor's belief in the trustee's behaviour which is a "configuration" of the intrinsic motivation, social structure (networks) and rule enforcement (Ahn & Ostrom 2002:22). The trustee will use the same tools to decide whether to reciprocate or not. This expectation of a given behaviour was generally very negative among my informants which I think then affects interaction. The low trust between members in the society in Sopachuy seems to influence how people envision situations, cooperation and conflicts to be solved. As Dasgupta (2002:312) argue, the presence or absence of trust will influence what choice you make and what actions you can and cannot do.

A low level of social capital (trustworthiness, networks, informal/formal rules) can reduce the commitment to participate since they do not expect others to participate or reciprocate cooperation if they take the initiative. Interestingly with the analysis on social capital and collective action is that trust is not blind; you will not trust someone just because he says he will do something. Or as Dasgupta (2002:313) argue "You trust him only because, knowing what you know of his disposition, his available options and the consequences of his various possible actions, his knowledge base, ability, and so forth, you expect that he will chose to do it". The informants in the study had little interaction and what they heard from other people

(about other people) could according to them be made up. There was therefore little information flowing that can be used in building trust.

The relevancy of social capital in the functioning of the RPOs is argued to be the role trustworthiness, networks, and informal/formal rules have in creating a foundation for interaction between people. In traditional Andes communities where practices of collective work and reciprocity still stand strong this foundation for interaction is stronger than what is the case in Sopachuy. Once this foundation is created then social capital can reinforce itself and contribute to a stronger participation. But it is equally important to incorporate in the analysis such factors as a changing society towards a modern money economy, migration, the organisational structure of the RPOs (activities and responsibilities), and human capital levels. Also the relation to the NGOs and the state needs to be considered when analysing participation and social organisations

6.4. The relationship between the RPOs and the NGOs and the state

APROCFMI and AMAS receive support from NGOs and the state. As explained in the contextual background APROCFMI receives support from NGOs to finance equipment and machines, training in how to use the machines, look for markets, financial and product plans, and support in administration work. The municipal state supported with buying their product and sometimes financing equipment. AMAS also received support from NGOs in training to manage the bee production, buying bee boxes, financial and product plans, and looking for markets. From the state AMAS received bee boxes (the members had to pay a small amount). The government office DILPE - which is to work directly with all the RPOs in Sopachuy and help them with their needs - did at the end of 2012 partly finance (70 %) an industrial mixer for APROCFMI's production. At this point I was told that the members most likely did not know they were getting a mixer, because APROCFMI had not had a meeting.

In a conversation with one of the NGOs I was told that they would like to know why APROCFMI still applied for financial help since the NGO had supported the organisation in so many ways and had an expectation that it was to become sustainable. According to representatives of this NGO a successful RPO depended on the product and the market; they need a refined product and a secure market. Another representative from the NGO said they were from now on (2013) not financing any more equipment, but were only going to focus on

training: to improve or create new products, and accounting. This training will be given to the members of the directive and the workers at the plant.

If we set aside the social side of the RPOs, the two organisations APROCMI and AMAS are very different. APROCMI has a transformation plant that produces products that are sold nationally, an administrator with a salary, and production workers with salaries. AMAS on the other hand does not have a plant where they could make products, administrator or production workers. APROCMI had existed since 2001, AMAS since 2008. The selection of the two RPO was made, among other things, according to their production and refinement of products since this was seen as very relevant for a functioning RPO by NGOs, CIOEC- B, and government officials. The general social and human capital among the members of the two organisations seemed very much the same.

An interesting link that requires attention is that between NGOs / state and RPOs in terms of economic dependency and its impact on social capital, participation and the functioning of the RPOs. In my study the NGOs and the state are donating (one small part being paid by RPOs) equipment and machines (physical capital) to the RPOs and training (human capital) the members in personal production or the directive on management issues. One important question in this regard is whether social capital and then participation are hindered or destroyed that process.

According to Ostrom (1999:182) the state can facilitate or destroy social capital in a civil society. The state can facilitate the creation of social capital by giving space to self-organisation, Fukuyama (2001) express this as property rights and public safety as he argues that these public goods are indirect social capital. Or the state can destroy social capital if for instance it takes control over all forests or schools that had been driven by religious groups Ostrom (1999). With reference to my case, the question here is whether the state leaves any space for civil society to organise and manage resources. The donation of physical capital (money, equipment, machines etc.) to civil society group without the requirement to pay this back will reduce the incentives and structures the members have to mobilize people for short term labour (Ostrom 1999:192). Ostrom has studied irrigation systems and gives the example of local irrigation groups that have received physical capital from the state but it resulted in a reduced recognition of an internal dependency between the group's members and reduced structures of reciprocity which then resulted in less functioning groups. A lot of the literature

on social capital at the local level is focused on irrigation systems or rotating credit associations. Regarding the example above I think it is reasonable to believe that the changing structures of dependence and reciprocity due to donation can also happen in the RPOs. This is reasonable because the RPOs are also composed of groups of members that are members because they want to improve their situation, and the logic of organising can change into getting the leaders to look for finance and help externally. This is happening in both RPOs in the study. Following this argument Fukuyama (2001:18) argue that the ability to cooperate is based on habits and if external agents are organising everything the people become dependent and lose their ability to spontaneously work with others. This is linked with the bigger debate on development aid and the influence of NGO's and states on local initiatives and dependence (See for example the book *Dead Aid* by Dambisa Moyo). When actors in society become dependent this reduces their ability to be entrepreneurs and create capital (Ostrom 1999:182). When I talked to government officials during the fieldwork they often commented that the members of the communities just sit there and wait for their help when a natural disaster had happened. I asked two leaders of communities about the community's response to natural disasters and they said they wrote a document to the state describing the harm to their crops and land and then the state were to come to compensate. As far I know the communities did not have groups that worked with mitigation and alleviating the effects of the natural disasters (in this area most droughts and hailstorms). When interviewing members in the RPOs it was also clear that a very important role of the leader was to find finances to buy equipment for the production. The members delegated a lot of weight to the leadership when they talked about the future of the RPO or what was important for a functioning organisation. As presented in the empiric chapter, the RPO needs to distribute responsibilities between the members in order to incorporate them in the organisation. The low involvement by the members can then be a response to lack of use of the members. The NGOs and the state are given much importance by the members themselves and the leaders, and this has centred the activities of the RPO on physical production (that often demands physical capital investment) and not on the organisation as made up of members. The leaders of the RPOs said the problem of the organisation was that the members did not conceive of the organisation as theirs. I therefore argue that the RPO need to widen their goals and include aspects in their activities that directly affects the members: communal tractor service, training to the members not only the directive, rotating credit system, etc. Social capital would have facilitated the organisation of such activities, but so would other factors such as increased human capital, change agents, and a participatory relationship with NGOs and state.

Assistance from the state to the rural areas does not seem to be a long tradition in Bolivia. Schools in the rural areas started to be built after the National Revolution in 1952 (also land reform) (de Morrée 2002:65). International presence has been important in shaping development in Bolivia (Elsner 2004:236). In the 50s and 60s the most important donor was United States under the banner of the ‘fight against communism (Elsner 2004). The lack of presence from the state and the persistent rural poverty mainly led to the surge of NGOs in the 1960, where the NGO ACLO was one important actor in Chuquisaca that was created in 1966 (de Morrée 2002). In the 1970s (during dictatorships) the international NGOs were active in providing humanitarian aid and condemning human rights violations by the state (Petras 1997:10-11). In 1982 democracy was restored and civil society organisations re-established (Arze & Plaza 1996:2). When the state introduced Structural Adjustments in 1985 this led to the withdrawal of the state from basic services (health, education, credit: projects that started in the 60s and 70s) and the role of the NGOs became more important (de Morrée 2002:105). In the years that followed there was a continuous debate on decentralisation which led to the law on Public Participation in 1994 that decentralised government power down to municipal level (Danier & Marcondes 1998). Under this new law the municipalities are to receive 20 % of national taxes and control- committees were set up in the municipalities to monitor the state (with members from the communities) (Danier & Marcondes 1998:1). The *sindicatos* and *ayllus* were under this law formally legitimised as a proper organisation and they could apply for funds for their communities from the municipality (de Morrée 2002:106). At the time this law came, the presence of the state in the rural communities were either at minimum levels or non-existent (Arze & Plaza 1996:9). During these years and until now the expectation that the NGOs are to provide effective services has just risen and risen (de Morrée 2002: 107). This development can have shaped the emphasis the RPOs put on external assistance.

One interesting study was done by Masooda Bano (2008) on 20 NGOs and 20 voluntary organisations in Pakistan. Bano distinguishes between the two groups because the former receives development aid while the latter receives domestic funding. Her study shows how NGOs that receive international development aid are dependent on that aid and they had almost no volunteer mobilization (Bano 2008:2303). The voluntary organisations received aid from domestic or local donors and all of them had a core group of volunteers. According to her, the real volunteers leave when money comes into the picture and it becomes harder for

the organisation to mobilize people. One example she gives is also of a Community Based Organisation that had accepted international aid and the members started to refuse to pay the membership fee: one argument being that they received money, and they did not know where all of this money was.

The RPOs in this study did not receive direct money from neither the NGOs nor the state, they received either loans to buy a specific machine or they got financed equipment and other materials. The above mentioned study is interesting as it indicates a possible outcome of what can happen when civil society organisations receive international financing and what can happen to membership mobilization. The NGOs in Bano's study was not able to mobilize members when they needed them and few of the NGOs that had members before they received international aid actually lost them when they started to receive aid (Bano 2008:2303). Putnam et al. (1993) argue that regions in Italy that are 'more civic' (Putnam's own term) are those that for instance have more civic associations, less influence of religion, more newspaper-readers, no patron-client relations in politics etc. But the citizenship in civic regions is first of all identified by active members. This civic-ness is explained by Putnam et al. (1993) to be determined by social capital (trust, norms and networks). Though the measurement Putnam et al (1993) use to determine civic-ness (newspaper readers and low importance of religion etc.) can be questioned and is perhaps not so transferable to the rural context of Bolivia, one important factor remains, the importance of active citizens for participation.

Based on my fieldwork findings I find that there is reason to claim that there is a link between NGO and state investments in the RPOs and lack of membership participation. This link calls for awareness when analysing the functioning of these farmer's organisations. In the case of APROCFMI the NGOs were a very important part of the set-up of the business and the source of new machines, products and markets. In AMAS the contribution of boxes, financial plans and technical advice may as well give the impression to members that all the organisation needs is more contacts with NGOs that can help them out of their difficult situation. I do not argue here that the equipment and machines are not necessary for the RPOs in their production, they most certainly are. However, -my point is that the basis of the organisation - the mobilization of the members- is weakened through the uniform focus on physical capital investment. Rather one should be building a strong organisation out of organising the members as a group. Whether social capital can be created or not by outsiders is a matter of

debate and space constraints whether I go into that here. But shortly Fukuyama (2001) and Ostrom (1999) argue that social capital is very difficult for outsiders to create. According to Ostrom (1999:181) a donor can invest in materials and technicians to build an irrigation system, but to invest in social capital so the farmers can operate this system together requires knowledge on local practices and local organisational structures. Maybe a solution to this could be to train what is called 'change agents' from the stock of members in the PRO. The change agents could be the start of motivating the members to form groups and identify what they need training on. This process could possibly create more ties between members and they could get attention on the issue of what they need to better participate in the organisation. The ways to do that and the benefits and problems is not the focus of this study, but importantly, social capital is a key component of cooperation and participation, and increased human capital can lead to empowerment and an even stronger organisation. This issue brings me back to my initial discussion on participation by stakeholders, a discussion most relevant in development activities and projects. As Pretty (1997) argues many projects led by NGOs and other agencies and governments claim to have included participation by the beneficiaries, but there is a variety of interpretations what that really mean. As outlines earlier, Pretty (1997) argues that the term participation can be used by many purposes and can be divided into seven types. I do not claim to have a full overview of how the participation has been over the years from the funding and until now, but some important issues can be mentioned: the two RPOs have been started by NGOs (the NGOs started the idea and started to mobilize people) and the business expansion is highly influenced by NGOs (help in producing new products, plans to increase production etc.). The idea has maybe been to create a strong organisation through securing physical equipment and training members to be leaders or deal with accounting, but forgetting that members need to be able to mobilise and have a reason to interact. This focus on equipment and production training was exactly what the leaders in the RPOs and some members expressed as necessary for the future of the RPO. In other words, the participation in building and constructing the organisation has not been strong – which may be the reason why it is not functioning better today and why the members to not recognise their own participation as important.

Participation in projects can be very unequal and the poorest are often not part of projects because of the difficulties they have to give time and resources, but also to access the people that lead the projects (de Morrée 2002). During the fieldwork one of the agronomists in Pasos was acknowledged by the state (in an evaluation meeting) as especially important in the work

the NGO did in Sopachuy because he was from the village. The people in the local communities do not readily trust technicians from NGOs or the state that are not from the locality or that do not speak Quechua. According to de Morrée's (2002) study from Chuquisaca, participation is claimed by the majority of the big NGOs to be an important focus of their projects, but this is in practice just a mechanical process that involves a presentation in the community. In her study she argues that in practice most of the relations between the technicians and the community members are uncomfortable. The reason for this is mainly an attitude of superiority of most technicians, but also unfulfilled promises by NGOs and also by the *comuneros* (de Morrée 2002). An attitude of technical superiority can have been shaped by Bolivia's history of colonialism and discrimination by the Spanish. From then and even today the indigenous and rural population are still viewed as backward and less 'civilised' (Canessa 2004:188). This does not need to be the case in Sopachuy, though some *comuneros* said that discrimination from the state still existed as they were perceived as 'just peasants' and were not taken seriously. But importantly these types of perceptions can have resulted in the focus on equipping the RPO with physical capital and training on production (issues the NGOs are good at) instead of on mobilizing the farmers to form a strong foundation where their thoughts are viewed as important. The combination of low human capital among the rural indigenous population and a history of discrimination can make it even harder for some people to actively participate in the organisations. I remember one farmer told me that in Sopachuy the people view external actors are more knowledgeable than local technicians and the same with products and goods; if it is produced in Chile or Europe it is better than if produced in Bolivia.

Synergy with the state

The debate around social capital and development includes different views on the relationship between civil society and the state (Evans 1996). The state has been viewed by some theorists as for instance Coleman (1990) as destructive for social capital since a state bureaucracy disrupts informal ties. Others, such as Evans (1996) argue that social capital can be produced in the links that are created between civil society and the state. According to this view both actors together can contribute to the well-functioning of a service. The latter view depends on two concepts: complementarity and embeddedness. Complementarity is when the relation is mutually supportive but that civil society and the state has a clear division of labour (Evans 1996b: 1120). Embeddedness is when the ties that connect civil society and the state are more meshed together. When these types of relationships are brought together the link is

characterised by something Ostrom (1996) and Evans (1996b) call coproduction.

Coproduction can maybe be understood as an ideal situation. The two spheres state and civil society can be influenced by NGOs as they can take over the role and services of the state in their wish to support civil society. Linera (2011) argue that some NGOs in Bolivia override the state and have relations with the civil society that creates dependence and what he terms neo-colonialism of the mind. As also mentioned the state in Bolivia has been absent from the rural areas up until recently and the NGOs have provided services to the rural population.

The rural communities in the study area are claimed to have become more aware of their rights and are more active in claiming their rights towards the state (interviews with *comuneros*). In my study the state is involved in projects in the communities (provision of schools, and has now a project to improve houses). The municipal state coordinated their projects with the Sub Central because that made the projects easier to implement (the Sub Central have contact with all the leaders in the communities) (interview with government official, 2013). The concept of coproduction is to describe how a service (e.g. garbage service) is produced by a variety of actors in different spheres (state, civil society, and market) (Ostrom 1996). This process will be positive for the quality of the service and for the strength of the state and the civil society (Ostrom 1996). The concept is interesting as it can highlight the intricate relations in a society and how both actors are important for the production of community services and how this can create social capital. But in the rural community in my study area the relationship between the state and the civil society is not, in my view, intertwined. Most of the interviewed members and *comuneros* said they had very little contact with the state; if a conflict for example needed to be resolved this was done in the community. Some informants had received bee boxes or water pumps from the state and were very thankful for that, but I do not see how that can create ties with the state. There may be more cooperation with the state in the future. During the fieldwork the NGO Pasos and the state held meetings with the communities in order to map out natural disasters and to create groups in the communities to handle natural disasters. If these groups are really created and they get guidance and advice from government officials then there can be created what Ostrom (1996) calls coproduction.

According to Evans (1996b:1122) social capital is created when officials in the state become thoroughly part of the project in the community and it creates networks of trust that goes across the public-private divide. The level of social capital in the community is clearly a

benefit for this relationship to thrive, but it is not a decisive factor (Evans 1996b). It is more important that the social capital in the community is scaled up to create organisations that are big enough to pursue development goals (Evans 1996b:1130). The projects the state have with the RPOs in my study does not require coproduction since the projects are mainly the provision of equipment or machines to the RPOs, a services which requires limited interaction. The leaders of the RPOs submit the needs of the organisation to the government office (DILPE) that deals with the RPOs if the demand involves equipment then the municipal state can evaluate if they themselves want to finance this or look for co-financing with an NGO. There is a connection between the RPOs and the state, but since the projects does not involve planning or long term management and monitoring I do not see how there is a continued interaction between the two actors. There is one project between the municipal state and APROCMI that involves more than buying equipment and that is the provision of APROCMI's products to the municipal school lunch. But I still do not think this relationship involves intricate contact between the two actors as the state is in this sense a client that buys a set amount of products and it does not demand any continual contact that involves embedded work tasks between members and state officials. The ties with the municipal state are concentrated on few people in the RPOs. When the fieldwork was undertaken (Jan-Feb 2013) there were one member of APROCMI and one member of AMAS that were also members of the government office (DILPE) that worked with the RPOs. These people and the leader in the RPO will have most contact with the state. The well-functioning of the RPOs, I would argue, can gain from having a mutually dependent relationship with the state, but then the RPOs need to have a stronger social organisation with members that participate.

This discussion have highlighted that social capital is fundamental for people to start interacting and to sustain interaction. If the members met more often and interacted they could have demanded more from the organisation, for example buying a communal tractor that they had to manage the use of collect the rent. Investment in human capital will also be more successful if the members have networks, trustworthiness and rules/norms. This influences participation. But social capital is not the only factor that is relevant when analysing the RPOS. Different access to the capitals and domination can lead to less participation internally in the RPO, but also if external actors do not recognise the value of indigenous participation in the projects. The history of discrimination towards indigenous people and the consequent low education and schooling of these people can lead to less participation by themselves since 'their' views are not as important as the 'expert' views. Not

all members in the RPOs could read and write and this can affect how external actors view the members, and also how the members view themselves. Real participation from below is a very good concept that should lead the direction for investment in development projects since participation can identify the needs of the beneficiaries and makes the project more sustainable. Social capital and participation in development projects are very much intertwined, but I see them as distinct concepts since in a study area such as Sopachuy where people have low social capital, investment in trustworthiness, networks and rules can create an important base for participatory initiatives.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the introductory chapter I presented social capital as an issue that has become more important (especially since the 1990s) among scholars and policy makers when evaluating what aspects are vital in a development strategy. Social capital rapidly gained prominence and some scholars called it ‘the missing link’ in development (see Grootaert 1998). The concept has received a lot of criticism, of which some of it focuses on the lack of a clear definition on the concept which makes it easy to talk about important social relations without agreeing what exactly is important. The vagueness of the term also makes it difficult to separate between what social capital is and what social capital produces. From the 1990s and until present time, other factors such as locally driven development, participation, and community based organisations are equally perceived as important for development and as argued in this paper are also interrelated with social capital, as the theory of social capital emphasise the ties between people in society. Therefore any kind of development project that envision local participation, organisation and monitoring should implement a social capital focus in their plans.

7.1. Relevancy of social capital

My research objective for this thesis was to explore the low membership participation in Rural Producer Organisations (RPOs) and to understand the relevance of social capital in the functioning of the RPOs. I used a qualitative method with semi-structured interviews in order to gather data on the research questions. The theory of social capital has contributed in better understanding the social dynamics in a group and understands what makes people act together. In the thesis the definition by Ahn & Ostrom (2002) has served to analyse how

social capital can be created and its benefits. They define social capital as composed of trustworthiness, networks, and formal and informal rules. These components have been discussed as influencing the participation of the members and thus also the functioning of the RPOs. Through the use of qualitative interviews it has been important to ask about local practices and organisational systems in the community in order to get a 'thick' description of the field. The theory of Ahn and Ostrom (2002) can explain why there is little interaction and trust among the people in the study, but we also need to include specific contextual factors such as traditional practices and migration as this widens the understanding of the social dynamics in a specific place.

The members in the two RPOs generally regarded the trustworthiness of others to be low or people did not have an interest in finding out the nature of that motivation. Ahn and Ostrom (2002) use the term trustworthiness since they argue a person can be trustworthy based on own characteristics, not just external incentives. Other scholars such as Putnam et al. (1993) and Coleman (1988) see trust as something that can only come as a by-product of other activities. This concept in itself I think can be useful in analysing how people behave towards others when little is known of the other person. But in Sopachuy the general perception of other people's trustworthiness was quite low, so the component trustworthiness in itself will not change those relations. But as Ahn & Ostrom (2002) argue the belief about other people's trustworthiness will also be shaped by networks and informal/formal rules. The networks can be people that meet to interchange advice or experiences or that work together. These networks ease the flow of information and if they are repetitive they create incentives to build up a reputation. Repetitive networks also create norms on what kind of behaviour that is accepted and rules can be crafted. Networks and informal/formal rules interact and enhance each other as for instance networks facilitate the flow of information that is necessary for rules to work. These components of social capital are argued to influence participation in the sense that the lack of social capital can lead to less communication and interaction and it would be hard to mobilise people to participate (RQ 4, 5 and 6).

Contextual factors must be included in an analysis of social interaction and participation since people are influenced by the context where they live. The production system in Sopachuy is organised individually and each family has their own plot of land close to the house. Some farmers had access to collective grasslands. Migration to bigger cities brings changes in the social organisation of the society as money for work becomes important. It seems that

individual production together with migration that brings in modern money economy is contributing to the reduced importance of *ayni*, collective crop and grasslands, and *mink'a*. This can lead to less interaction and therefore less trust and norms of reciprocity, but also less participation. The activities and the distribution of responsibilities in the RPOs also need to be more directed towards the members (RQ 1). In APROCMI's case the organisation could benefit from having activities that are also directed towards the agricultural production of the members. Both organisations need to distribute more responsibility. The members do not necessarily need to find markets and make business plans, but their role inside the RPOs needs to be increased. In other RPOs in Bolivia the organisations have a veterinary service, a common tractor, a credit system with loan opportunities or a common truck that can transport products of the members. The goal of the RPOs is to increase the livelihoods of the members and if the organisations provide services that directly affect the members it can increase participation and sense of ownership of the organisation. But if the members in APROCMI and AMAS are to come up with, organise, and manage such services they need to work as a group and members need to feel they can express themselves.

Generally the members in the RPOs were quite passive and claimed they lacked human capital on production (mostly in the case of AMAS) or knowledge on economy, leadership, marketing etc. (both organisations) that restricted their participation (RQ 3). Lack of human capital can greatly reduce participation in an organisation since the members do not feel they can contribute. This is also connected to the question above on the activities of the RPOs that are highly focused on receiving information or receiving physical capital from the NGOs or the state. A focus on investment in social capital could be the foundation that can create mobilisation for other activities. Low human capital is argued to be interlinked with lack of social capital since these capitals enhance each other, but so do other factors such as discrimination, poverty, and access to education. Increased social capital is believed to increase the access to information, knowledge and people that can improve your situation.

Participation by the members is a vital component in the well-functioning of the RPOs as this can shape the activities of the RPOs towards the needs of the members and sustain the organisation in the long run. Participation by the local community in a project is important as Ostrom (1999) claim that lack of this can result in a reduced recognition of an internal dependency between the group's members and reduced structures of reciprocity which then results in less functioning groups. The recognition of an internal dependency between the

members is something that can be reduced when external actors provide a service and the receivers become more depend on them than on the social group. This is shown in both RPOs as the members put more weight on a leader's ability to find support from NGOs than on the ability to mobilise the members. This is very understandable since there is no immediate need for the members. Why should they then be mobilised if they are only to receive information? This is an issue of sustainability and increasing the abilities of the local people to change their situation, and not to just wait for help from outside. It is very important that this is not understood as just critique of the investments done by the NGOs and the state, but rather as recognition that there is a need for a wider investment and much more responsibility must be put on the local level. Here the concept of participation from bellow and social capital is intertwined as they are both needed in order to mobilise members and create strong social groups.

Access to different forms of capitals can enhance or limit a person's livelihood as expressed by Bebbington (1999). It might also be just as important to understand aspects of domination and power in a social group since this might limit the participation of all. As explained by Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992) with the concept field they argue that there are different social spaces in our society and the access to these fields is determined by our habitus and our capitals. In the two RPOs there is no direct domination in the group but the domination is more indirect as some members have higher human capital, more access to physical capital (money) and social capital. When also most of the issues dealt with at the meetings are issues done by NGOs (new products, business expansions, loans, donations) or the paid administrator in the case of APROCMI (sales/ incomes/expenses) it is not strange that many members looked uninterested or maybe did not dare to express themselves. The domination can also be practiced by the NGOs and the state officials as they are conceived to have more knowledge and resources than the average member. This can create an unequal relationship where participation is discouraged (RQ 2). Here it is important to remember that the indigenous population has been and are still being discriminated by the non-indigenous population (Canessa 2004) which can affect the space given to local participation and also how the indigenous people see their own role. If participation could be increased in the RPOs then maybe there could be created more projects with the state that demand more activity from both sides. This could create a situation of coproduction as argued by Evans (1996) and Ostrom (1996) that is important in strengthening the state, the civil society and the service produced.

As showed in this study there are many factors to consider when analysing the functioning of the RPOs and participation. Social capital is one of these factors that can create a foundation for mobilisation in the organisations and which may stimulate participation. In a society where the physical distances between people are long and trust seems low, understanding and building social capital to enhance cooperation is clearly important.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interviewees

1.1. Categories and number of people that participated in the study

| Category | Participants |
|---|--------------|
| Members of APROCMI | 15 |
| Members of AMAS | 17 |
| Local community members and leaders in communities | 10 |
| The municipal mayor | 1 |
| Technician in DILPE | 1 |
| Leader in DILPE | 1 |
| The president of control committee in Sopachuy | 1 |
| Technician in government towards RPOs | 1 |
| NGO Pasos | 3 |
| Responsible for the Government Secretary of Productive Development in the Department Chuquisaca | 1 |
| Technician in CIOEC | 1 |

Appendix 2: Interview guide

2.1. Interview guide for members of RPO

| Interview guide members of RPOs | |
|--|-------|
| What year did you enter the RPO? | |
| 1. Why did you enter the RPO? | |
| 2. How important is the organisation to you? | |
| Very important | ----- |
| Important | ----- |
| The same | ----- |
| Little importance | ----- |
| Very little importance | ----- |
| 3b. Could you explain why? | |
| 3. What is needed in order to make the organisation more important for you? | |
| 4. Does the organisation offer any services or rental of equipment to you? | |
| A: How often do you use the services? | |
| Every time I need the service | ---- |
| In the majority of cases when I need the service | ---- |
| Less than the majority of cases when I need the service | ---- |
| Never | ---- |
| 5. How often do you participate in these meetings? | |
| Every time | ----- |
| Almost all | ----- |
| Under half | ----- |
| Never | ----- |
| 6. How important are the meetings? | |
| Very important | ----- |
| Important | ----- |
| The same | ----- |
| Little importance | ----- |
| Very little importance | ----- |
| 7b. Could you explain why? | |
| 7c. What is needed to make them more useful for you? | |
| 7. How do you think we can motivate the members to participate in the RPOs? | |
| 8. What do you want the organisation to offer you as a member? | |
| <i>Networks, obligations, expectations</i> | |
| 9. Do you know all the members in the RPO? | |
| 10. Do you expect the members to help you out in some way if you need it? | |
| 11. Do you do any kind of work together with other members in the RPO? | |
| Why/why not? | |
| 12. Have the members done some work together before? | |
| 13. Are there rules and norms in the organisation | |
| 14b. What kind of norms and rules are there? | |
| 14c. Do you have sanctions? What type of situation would be sanctioned? | |
| Sanctioned anybody in the past? | |
| 14. Could you tell me how it is to live in a community? | |

| |
|---|
| 15. Do you know you neighbours in the community? 16b. How do you know them? |
| 16. Do you expect you neighbours to help you out in some way if you need it? |
| 17. Do you do collective work in the community? 18b. What kind of work? |
| 18. Does everybody participate in this collective work or are many people not participating? |
| 19. Do you have the exchange of work in the community? - For example ayni? 20b. Why/ why not? |
| 20. What does the community do when a community member dies? |
| 21. Do you have the <i>trueque</i> of products in the community or with other communities? 22b. Why/ why not 22c. How does it work? |
| 22. How is the relationship with the neighbours? 23b. How come? |
| 23. How do you get information on issues that are important to you? |
| 24. Are there norms and rules in the community? 25b. How do they work? Working properly? 25c. Do the people normally follow the rules in the community? |
| 25. Does the destruction of crops by animals exist in the community? 26b. What do you do about it? |
| <i>Trust</i> |
| 26. Some people say you can normally trust people, others say you have to be very careful with other people. What is your opinion? |
| 27. How important do you regard trust to be for the functioning of the organisation? 28b. Why? |
| 28. How much trust do you have in the members in the RPO? Very much ----- Much ----- Acceptable ----- Little ----- Very little ----- |
| 29b. How come? |
| 29. How much do you trust the leadership? 30b. How come? |
| 30. "The police should have increased power in order to secure the law" |
| 31. "The government does not do enough to secure citizen security" |
| 32. "In these days people do not respect authorities" |
| |
| 33. "The majority of the people in authority positions try to exploit you" |
| 34. Do you feel part off or separate from what is happening around you? |
| 35. "What you think does not really count" |
| 36. "The government is not really preoccupied with what happens to you" |
| <i>Attitudes towards the RPO</i> |
| 37. How content are you with the organisation in general? 38b. How come? |

| | |
|--|-------|
| 38. How content are you with the directive/leadership? | |
| 39b. How come? | |
| 39. How content are the other members in the organisation? | |
| Very satisfied | ---- |
| Satisfied | ----- |
| Regular | ----- |
| Dissatisfied | ----- |
| Very dissatisfied | ----- |
| 40b. How come? | |
| 40. What is most important for an organisation to function well? | |
| <i>Networks</i> | |
| 41. Are you a member of any other organisation, group, institution etc.? | |
| 42b. What does the group do? Name | |
| 42. Are you a member of a political party? | |
| 43b. Why/why not? | |
| 43. How is the relationship between the RPO and the municipal government? | |
| 44b. How come? | |
| 44. How is the relationship between the community and the municipal gov.? | |
| Very good | ----- |
| Good | ---- |
| Regular | ----- |
| Bad | ----- |
| Very bad | ----- |
| 45b. How come? | |
| <i>Personal questions</i> | |
| Name | |
| Age | |
| Married | |
| Community | |
| 45. Do you have land for agricultural production or pasture? | |
| 46b. How much? | |
| 46c. How much is used for crop production? | |
| 46. How have you got this land? | |
| - Heritage, bought, rent | |
| 47. Do you have irrigation on you land? | |
| 48b. How much land is with irrigation? | |
| 48. Who in the family works the land? | |
| 49. Do you need agricultural workers? (<i>peones</i>) | |
| 50. What do you produce? | |
| 51b. Do you have fruit production? | |
| 51. Are the production for own production/sales/both? | |
| 52. Do you have animal production? | |
| 53b. What types | |
| 53c. Do you sell animals? When | |
| 53. Do you have collective land in the community? | |
| - for pasture/crops | |
| 54b. Do you use this land? | |
| <i>Migration</i> | |

| |
|---|
| 54. Do you migrate to other places? 55b. Frequency/when/type of work/duration |
| 55. If you do not migrate now, have you migrated before? 56b. Frequency/when/type of work/duration |
| 56. If no migration, would you like to migrate? |
| 57. Anybody in family has migrated/migrates? 58b. Frequency/when/type of work/duration |

The interview guide for local community members were generally the same as for members of RPOs, but excluding the questions on the RPOs

Appendix 3: Meeting attendance

3.1. Records of member participation in meetings APROCMI

| Meeting attendance APROCMI | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Members | 9.1.2012 | 11.2012 | 10.6.2012 | 16.9.2012 | 21.10.2012 | 26.1.2013 |
| 1 | M * | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * |
| 2 | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * |
| 3 | Accident | Accident | Accident | * * | * * | * * |
| 4 | * * | * * | * L | * * | * * | * * |
| 5 | * * | * * | * * | * * | M M | * * |
| 6 | * M | M * | * L | * M | * * | L L |
| 7 | M M | M * | M M | * M | M M | M M |
| 8 | * * | * * | M M | * * | * * | M M |
| 9 | M M | * M | * * | * L | M M | * * |
| 10 | M M | M * | M * | * * | * * | * * |
| 11 | M M | M M | * * | * * | * * | * * |
| 12 | M M | M * | * * | * L | L L | * * |
| 13 | M * | * M | * * | * M | L * | M M |
| 14 | * M | L * | M * | * * | * * | * * |
| 15 | M M | L M | * * | * A | * L | * * |
| 16 | * L | L M | L * | * * | * * | * * |
| 17 | M * | * M | * L | * * | * * | * * |
| 18 | * * | * * | * M | M M | * * | * * |
| 19 | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * |
| 20 | A | A | A | * A | M M | M M |
| 21 | * * | * * | M L | * A | * * | A M |
| 22 | * * | * * | L L | * * | * * | * * |
| 23 | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * |
| 24 | * M | M M | * * | * * | * L | M M |
| 25 | * M | M M | * * | * M | M M | M M |
| 26 | M M | M M | * L | * * | * * | * * |
| 27 | M * | * * | * * | * * | L L | M M |
| 28 | M M | M M | M M | * A | M M | * * |

| | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 29 | M M | * * | M A | * A | A A | * * |
| 30 | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * | * * |

Comment: * =present, M = missing, L = licence to leave, A (*ausente*) = sick

(Source: author compilation or records from meeting attendance and meeting summary, 2013)

Comment: this table in the original book was written for hand, the dates were almost impossible to read (I had to find the summary from the meetings in another book that was just as chaotic), and it was not structured from first to last meeting.

3.2. Records of member participation in meetings AMAS

| Meeting attendance AMAS | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| Member | 26.6.2012 | 15.8.2012 | 20.11.2011 | 3.18:2012 |
| 1 | L | * | * | * |
| 2 | * | A | * | * |
| 3 | * | * | * | * |
| 4 | * | * | * | * |
| 5 | * | A | * | L |
| 6 | L | * | * | M |
| 7 | M | * | M | M |
| 8 | * | * | * | * |
| 9 | M | M | M | * |
| 10 | * | M | * | M |
| 11 | * | * | * | * |
| 12 | * | * | * | M |
| 13 | * | * | * | M |
| 14 | * | * | * | * |
| 15 | A | * | * | M |
| 16 | A | * | * | A |
| 17 | * | * | * | * |
| 18 | * | * | * | * |
| 19 | * | L | * | A |
| 20 | * | * | * | * |
| 21 | * | * | * | * |
| 22 | * | * | * | * |
| 23 | L | * | L | * |
| 24 | * | * | * | * |
| 25 | * | * | * | L |
| 26 | M | * | L | * |
| 27 | * | * | L | * |
| 28 | * | M | * | L |
| 29 | * | * | * | * |
| 30 | * | * | * | * |
| 31 | * | * | L | * |
| 32 | M | * | F | A |
| 33 | * | A | * | L |
| 34 | M | M | F | M |
| 35 | * | * | * | * |

| | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| 36 | A | M | * | M |
| 37 | * | M | * | * |
| 38 | M | M | L | M |
| 39 | * | * | * | * |
| 40 | * | * | * | L |
| 41 | * | L | * | M |
| 42 | * | * | * | * |
| 43 | M | * | * | M |
| Chavarría | | | | |
| 44 | | | | * |
| 45 | | | * | |
| 46 | | | | |
| 47 | | | | |
| 48 | | | | |
| 49 | | | | |
| 50 | | | | |
| 51 | | | * | |
| 52 | | | | |
| 53 | * | * | * | |
| 54 | | | | |
| 55 | | * | | |
| Comment: * =present, M = missing, L = licence to leave, A (ausente) = sick The members from Chavarría were not obligated to come to the meetings if no 53 was present | | | | |

(Source: author compilation of meetings attendance book and meeting records AMAS 2011-2012)