# Water and Electricity Strategies for Bedouin in Area C, Palestine

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*This Master's Thesis is carried out as a part of the education at the University of Agder and is therefore approved as a part of this education. However, this does not imply that the University answers for the methods that are used or the conclusions that are drawn.*

# Abstract

This thesis discusses development challenges for Bedouin in the so-called Area C, West Bank, Palestine, with emphasis on access to water and electricity, and how the policy makers and civil society are addressing them.

The Bedouin are an indigenous, minority group in the area and face many poverty and development challenges. They are in many ways neglected both by the policy makers in Palestine itself, and by the international community. There are however civil society organisations addressing their challenges and that try to solve their problems despite the difficulties they face, especially as Israel is still in control over Area C. The ongoing occupation cause limitations to what the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) can implement in the area. This means that many Bedouin are denied access to the electricity grid and water networks.

The research was conducted for five months in the West Bank, Palestine, through using qualitative research methodology with an emphasis on interviews. The interviews were done with three groups of actors from the PNA level, the civil society level, and Bedouin themselves. There is also a focus on document analysis, in order to understand the governmental plans.

The findings show two particular challenges for development for the Bedouin, and for Palestine in general. The main problem is the ongoing occupation, which is strangling development through denying building permits, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlements in their territory. The other problem is found within the PNA itself, as the development plans are not considering the Bedouin as an own group, but rather as part of the general rural population.

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# Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **ARIJ** | The Applied Research Institue Jerusalem |
| **Comet-ME** | Comet Middle East |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **GDP** | Gross Domestic Product |
| **GNI** | Gross Domestic Income |
| **ICT** | Information Communication Technology |
| **IWRM** | International Water Resource Management |
| **JSCPD** | Joint Service Council for Planning and Development |
| **MCM** | Million Cubic Meter |
| **MDG** | Millennium Development Goal |
| **NGO** | Non Governmental Organisation |
| **PLC** | Palestinian Legislative Council |
| **PLO** | Palestinian Liberation Organisation |
| **PNA** | Palestinian National Authority |
| **PWA** | Palestinian Water Authority |
| **UN** | United Nations |
| **UNDP** | United Nations Development Programme |
| **UNESCO** | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| **UNRWA** | United Nations relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **WHO** | World Health Organisation |
| **WZO** | The World Zionist Organisation |

# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Background

A human being can live without food for approximately 30 days, without water however, the human body can only survive for 8 days. The importance of water for the human life is unquestionable, and the access to water is crucial for development and the fight against poverty all over the world. Extensive development literature emphasizes the importance of this access and it is stated in numerous human rights programs that water is a basic human right (UNHCHR 2010). Water is even especially protected under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (ICRC 2007).

Electricity on the other hand is something human beings lived without for thousands of years. It is not a tangible object or an object of development, but rather an enabler for other kinds of development (Winther 2008). An estimated number of 1 300 million people live without electricity in the world today (IEA 2011), which limits their access to several objects most people in the world now consider items we cannot live without, such as electric light, mobile phones, and computers.

In Palestine, the water situation is one of the biggest headaches of policy makers, civil society organizations, and of course the affected people. The limitations of access to water in Palestine are tremendous, and affects most peoples daily life as water shortages are common even in the big cities, while the water fountains of Tel Aviv are running year long, the swimming pools are filled in the settlements, and the Israelis are seizing more and more of the water resources in the West Bank. (Isaac et al 2010; Isaac 2000)  For the Bedouin of Area C (see figure 1.1) this is a very real problem, in Area C the Palestinian people are not allowed to build anything without Israeli permissions, which they rarely get. For the Bedouin this means that there is no access to the water and electricity lines that run through their communities to the settlements.

Various civil society initiatives have tried to find solutions to these problems, by building solar panels to provide water and to restore ancient water wells and rain harvesting cisterns. These themes have also been one of the main focuses of international organisations working

in the area; the UNDP (2011) state: "The development of nation-wide networks, in particular for water, electricity and transportation, is essential to service the whole territory, including the Gaza Strip, Area C and East Jerusalem" (UNDP 2011: 29). More than 130 thousand people are not connected to the water network in rural West Bank, (PCBS 2011) and around 8 thousand people are without access to the electricity network (PCBS 2011).

However, due to the lack of Palestinian access and control over the Area C of the West Bank, the development process is slow, with no lack of good intentions from either the government or the civil society. Various organisations try to work out the issues, through supplying electricity, water, and solving other development issues. Facing building restrictions, constant threat of demolition orders, and frequent acts of violence from Israeli settlers, the development projects in Palestine are facing many challenges.

This thesis attempts to assess some of the challenges the modern Bedouin faces in the West Bank, and explore how the civil society and policy makers are working to end their problems. Through interviews with Bedouin, various Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), policy makers and members of the civil society, and observations throughout the West Bank, a picture is formed of a group of people that are being deprived of their land, basic human rights, and hopes of a better future.

## 1.2 Brief Contextual Overview

Palestine consists of the West Bank, which borders to Jordan in the east, and Gaza, which borders to Egypt in the southwest. In addition, there are many Palestinians living inside Israel, 1 252 000 excluding East Jerusalem and Golan Heights (PCBS 2011). Following the Oslo accords in 1993, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) gained power over some of the areas within the Palestinian Territories, but the majority of the Palestinian land is still controlled by Israel.

Prime Minister of the PNA, Salam Fayyad, launched the now famous plan; "Palestine; Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State, Program of the Thirteenth Government" (The "Fayyad Plan" or "State Building Plan") in 2009. The program presented national goals and priorities in order to secure a de facto Palestinian independent state by 2011, without waiting for peace negotiations with Israel (PNA 2009). The plan consists of several dimensions,

including reaching the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) (PNA 2009). Other areas include plans to become economically less dependent on Israel and to develop institutions and infrastructure (PNA 2009). The development problems of Palestine are both present in urban and rural areas, with the rural population especially affected (UNRWA, UNICEF and WFP 2010).

The most severe poverty in the West Bank is seen in Area C, which is home to a substantial part of the Bedouin population. The Bedouin are in many ways a forgotten minority in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, both by the international community, and within Israel and Palestine. Taking into account the limitations of movement around in Palestine, the rural villages, farmers, and especially Bedouin, have an almost mythical and romantic position in the Palestinian society. The reality however, of the Palestinian Bedouin is very different. They are a minority of approximately 27 500 people residing mostly in the so-called Area C (UN 2011), which after the Oslo agreement remains largely under Israeli control. Their lives are often very difficult, isolated from many basic needs as access to a doctor, school, and electricity to charge a mobile phone. They are also among the worst affected by the water situation; about 44% of children in herding communities suffer from water-related diseases. Many survive on 20 litres of water a day, compared to the World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendation of minimum 100 litres a day (EWASH 2012).

**Restriction**

Israeli Closed Military Area
*Access is prohibited*

Existing and Projected "Closed Areas" Behind the Barrier
*Access is limited to permit holders*

**Border**

– – · International Border
Armistice Line (Green Line)

**Oslo Agreement**

Area A
Area B
Area C & "Wye River" Nature Reserves
Israeli Unilaterally Declared Municipal Area of Jerusalem[1]

1. In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and unilaterally annexed to its territory 70.5 km of the occupied area

**Barrier**

—— Constructed / Under Construction
—— Planned

**Oslo Interim Agreement**

Area A : Full Palestinian civil and security control
Area B : Full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control
Area C : Full Israeli control over security, planning and construction

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Cartography: OCHA-oPt –June 2011. Base data: OCHA, PA MoP, JRC update 08. For comments contact <ochaopt@un.org> or Tel. +972 (02) 582-9962     http://www.ochaopt.org

Mediterranean Sea
West Bank
Gaza Strip
ISRAEL
EGYPT     JORDAN

Much of the land behind the Barrier is Area C. In parts that have been declared "seam zone", Palestinians wishing to reside in their houses or access their land in the closed area must apply for a permit from the Israeli authorities.

Jenin
WEST BANK
Tulkarm
Tubas
Qalqiliya
Nablus
Salfit
Ramallah
Jericho
No Man's Land
1949 Armistice Line (Green Line)
East Jerusalem
Bethlehem
River Jordan
Dead Sea
Hebron

Palestinian access to large parts of Area C is restricted (e.g. closed military / "fire" zones, settlement areas, etc.). Palestinian construction is largely prohibited.

Kilometers
0  2.5  5     10

**Figure 1.1:** Map showing Restrictions on Palestinian Access in the West Bank
(Source: UN 2011)

## 1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions

### 1.3.1 Research Objective

This research aims to investigate how the Bedouin of Area C in Palestine cope with development issues, with emphasis on access to water and electricity. I will examine the current challenges the Bedouin face, and the current development efforts that are being implemented through the PNA and the civil society. I aim to assess the situation in relation to the policy makers, through examination of the state – civil society synergy and policy implementation.

### 1.3.2 Research Questions

The following research questions will answer the research objective:

1. How are the Bedouin in Area C coping with development and poverty issues, with emphasis on access to water and electricity?

2. How are the PNA, and the civil society, working to manage the electricity and water issues for the Bedouin in Area C?

3. How do the Bedouin communities participate in the development process?

4. What are the outcomes from the water and electricity projects?

Through answering these research questions I aim to especially evaluate the management and participation aspect of the development process. According to Stiglitz (1998), the key to success of a development strategy is through ownership and participation. The process must however be facilitated by the state and the civil society, especially in taking into account the rights marginalized groups and the environment. In the Palestinian context, as much of problem in solving development issues in Area C is related to politics, not only to domestic, Palestinian politics, but Israeli and international politics, the management issue becomes especially relevant.  The majority of the development projects in Palestine are being implemented by the civil society, even if the government is making the actual policies. It is thus crucial to understand the relationship between the civil society and the state, especially in

seeing Palestinian development in a post-conflict setting, where the civil society fills a role where the government is unable to fill (Hughes 2012). The concept of participation, and how the Bedouin, as a marginalized, indigenous group are participating in their own development will be discussed further.

## 1.4 Clarification of Terminology

**1948:**　　　　The 1948 war. Often referred to as the "Naqba", Arabic word for "Catastrophe". Israel took control over most of Palestine after the war and left 1,4 million Palestinians refugees.

**1967:**　　　　The 6 day war, that left Palestine occupied by Israel the way it is today.

**Area A:**　　　The areas in which the Palestinian National Authority is in full civil control.

**Area B:**　　　The areas in which the Palestinian National Authority has control over administration, and Israel remains in control over the security.

**Area C:**　　　The areas in which are under Israeli control.

**Bedouin:**　　 Ethnic group indigenous to the Gulf region. Traditionally nomadic, they reside in the Middle East and in parts of Africa.

**Cistern:**　　　A hole in the ground with impermeable walls that is used for water storage. It is filled by rainwater or water delivered from other sources (See figure 5.7)

**Coob:**　　　　$1 \text{ m}^3$ of water.

**Dunum:**　　　$1000 \text{ m}^2$

**East Jerusalem:** The parts of Jerusalem that were captured and annexed by Jordan after 1948 and then captured and annexed by Israel in the 1967 war.

**Fatah:**　　　　Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Palestinian National Liberation Movement)

**Governorate:** The West Bank is divided into 11 governorates; Hebron (Al Khalil), Bethlehem, Jerusalem (Al Quds), Ramallah, Jericho (Ariha), Nablus, Tulkarem, Qualqiliya, Tubas, Jenin and Salfit.

**Hamas:**　　　Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement)

**Hamlet:**　　　A small settlement, generally smaller than a village.

**Intifada:**　　 Arabic word for "uprising". Used to describe the uprisings of 1987 and 2000 (the first and second (al-Aqsa) intifada).

**NIS:**　　　　New Israeli Shekel, the official currency in Palestine. The exchange rate for NIS 1 was $ 0.375 in 2012.

**Refugee:** Displaced person, in Palestine refugees can inherit the refugee status. Refugees have refugee ID and their rights are being protected by UNRWA. There are 19 recognized refugee camps, housing an estimated number of 206,123 of the registered 848,494 refugees in the West Bank (UNRWA 2011).

**The Basic Law:** The temporary constitution of Palestine.

**The Oslo:** The Oslo refers to the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993. (Officially named the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement).

**The Wall:** The separation barrier that separates the West Bank from Israel. (see pictures 5.3 and 5.4)

## 1.5 Thesis Outline

**Chapter 1** introduces the research topic, objectives and design.

**Chapter 2** offers an overview of the study area. It will explain the historical, socio economic, and political background of the Bedouins in Palestine.

**Chapter 3** presents the theory and literature review. With emphasis on the importance of access to clean water and electricity in the development context.

**Chapter 4** describes the methodology used in the thesis. It outlines the research process and its limitations.

**Chapter 5** presents the Empirical Findings and provides a presentation of the current situation for the Bedouin in Area C.

**Chapter 6** Analyzes the Empirical data in light of the theory discussed.

**Chapter 7** is the concluding chapter

# Chapter 2: Contextual Overview

## 2.1 Palestine – The West Bank

| | |
|---|---|
| **Location** | Middle East |
| **Borders** | Egypt (Gaza), Israel, Jordan (West Bank) |
| **Total size** | |
| **Size of West Bank** | 5860 km3 |
| **Size of Gaza** | 365 km3 |
| **Total Population** | 4.17 million |
| **Population West Bank** | 2,58 million + 311,100 Israeli settlers (2010) |
| **Population Gaza Strip** | 1, 59 million |
| **Percentage of Refugees** | 43.4% (29.7 % in the West Bank and 67,3% in the Gaza Strip) |
| **Total number of Refugees (including Diaspora)** | More than 6 million |
| **Number of Bedouin in West Bank** | 27, 500 |
| **Population Growth** | 2.098% |
| **GDP per capita** | $2,900 |
| **Industries** | Small-scale manufacturing, quarrying, textile, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs |
| **Land use** | Arable land: 16.9% Permanent Crops: 18.97% Other: 64.13% |
| **Religion** | Muslim: 75% Jewish: 17% Christians and others: 8% |
| **Unemployment** | 23.5% |

**Table 2.1:** The West Bank in numbers
**Figure 2.1:** Map + table over the West Bank
(Source: CIA World Fact Book 2012, PCBS 2011)

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Following the Oslo accords in 1993, the PNA gained power over some of the areas within the Palestinian Territories. The majority of the Palestinian land is however, still controlled by Israel, including Area C, which covers 60% of Area C. The Gaza war of 2008 led to a blockade, and Gaza is now isolated from the West Bank, both geographically and politically. Figure 2.1 shows the areas that are under Israeli and Palestinian control.



**Figure 2.2:** Palestinian Loss of Land 1946 – 2000
(Source: Medicks 2005).

## 2.2 History

The history of Palestine is long and complicated, however I will present an overview in order to provide background information for the ongoing conflict and occupation, and to set the context in which the current development problems for the Bedouin are. As both Israeli and Palestinian Nationalism use history to claim the land, the history of Israel and Palestine is highly politicized and it is difficult to find reliable sources (Farsoun and Aruri 2006).

The troubled history of Israel and Palestine can be traced back thousands of years and the area has been under control by several different peoples. All the peoples that have been in control

have influenced the Palestinian culture. The occupiers include; Ancient Egyptians, Canaanites, Ancient Israelis, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Ancient Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Sunni Arab Caliphate, the Shia Fatimid Caliphate, the Crusaders, Ayyubids, Mameluks, the Ottoman Empire, the British, and the modern Israelis and Palestinians (Farsoun and Aruri 2006).

The first recorded civilization in Palestine is of the Canaanites, which lived in city-states throughout the Middle East in the 3rd millennium BC. One of the city-states was what is now known as in Jericho, which remains today as one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. Jerusalem was also founded at the time. After several different occupiers of the territory, Muslim Persians introduced Islam to Palestine in 638 AD. The Muslim rule lasted for around 1300 years, Jews and Christians were considered "people of the book" and they lived in peace, in what was known as Philistine until Egyptians seized control (Farsoun and Aruri 2006). During the Arab rule, the first Bedouin tribes dominated the plains and valleys of Palestine and most of them converted to Islam (Franzman and Kark 2011).

The Ottoman Turks defeated the Egyptians in 1517, and ruled Palestine, with a few interruptions, until 1917 when it was ruled by the British Mandatory Palestine. The country was divided into districts ruled largely by Arab Palestinians, the decedents of the Canaanites, with largely autonomous Christian and Jewish communities. During the Ottoman Empire, there was a large interest in settling the Bedouin Tribes, and they went from being a dominating group to being a marginalized one (Franzman and Kark 2011). The Bedouin were accused of being lawless and as a threat to the Ottoman authority; the two Bedouin dominated cities of Baysan and Beersheba were established in 1900 (Franzman and Kark 2011). The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 defined all landholdings in Palestine, including restoring the states right to land, this changed the nomadic environment of the Bedouin (Framzman and Kark 2011). Following these rules, the Jewish National Fund, and Arab Effendis purchased much of the land used by the Bedouin. Much of the area went through environmental changes in this period due to increased cultivation and new agriculture (Franzman and Kark 2011).

In 1914, following the First World War, the number of Jews in Palestine increased from around 12 thousand in 1845 to 85 thousand in 1914. The first Zionist congress was held in Basil, Switzerland and issued the program of colonization of Palestine. Britain promised

independence to all Arab areas, including Palestine, under the Ottoman Empire following the First World War. However, the British promised the Jews a national home in Palestine after the Belfour declaration and many Jews started to migrate to Palestine in 1918. During the British Mandate, there were 67 Bedouin tribes within the borders of the British Mandatory (Franzman and Kark 2011). The laws of the Mandate favoured the settled groups over the nomadic groups, as they found it difficult to make the Bedouin fit in to the governance system (Franzman and Kark 2011). In 1942 the Mandate aimed at regulating the Bedouin through a "Bedouin Control Ordinance" which aimed at convincing them to live a more settled life (Franzman and Kark 2011). The Bedouin had became tenants of Jewish or Arab Effendis at the time, as they sold land they were given by the Mandate in the 1920s, due to the long processing of the transfers (Franzman and Kark 2011).

### 2.2.1 Recent History

Unrest between the Arabs and Jews followed the Belfour declaration, and on May 15th 1948 the British decided to leave Palestine. The same day, Egyptian, Transjordanian (now Jordan), Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi troops supported the Palestinians and the first Arab-Israeli war ended with the establishment of a Jewish state and a United Nations (UN) arranged armistice where the Gaza strip was left under Egyptian control and the West Bank was left under Jordanian control. The Arab population in Israeli territory was reduced from 1,4 million in 1 300 towns and villages to 170 000 after the war and marks the end of the Arab majority in the Jewish land. Thousands of Palestinians were displaced from their homes, and about 15 000 were killed (PCBS 2012). 85% of the Bedouin population of the Negev was expelled from the area during this war, and fled into the West Bank, Egypt and Jordan. A large portion of today's Bedouin population of the West Bank is refugees from 1948 (Jordan 2011).

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded in 1964, in order for Palestine to have a genuinely independent body (BBC 2012). The Six-day war of 1967 ended with Israel seizing the control over the Gaza strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Arab East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The Israeli territory grew by a factor of three (see figure 2.1). Following the six days of hostilities, the UN Security Council issued resolution 242, calling for: "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every

State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force" (UN 1967).

The Six-day war was followed by the Yom Kippur war of 1973, where Israel defeated Egypt and Syria, and a wave of unrest where fractions from PLO attacked several Israeli targets. Yasser Arafat also made his first public appearance as the leader of the PLO in the UN. The Sinai was returned to Egypt after the Camp David Accords of 1978, the rest of the areas remain under Israeli control and the building of settlements throughout the territories have continued since (BBC 2012, Farsoun and Aruri 2006).

In the beginning of the 80s Israel attacked Lebanon with the intention of eliminating Palestinian guerrilla bases close to the border. A ceasefire left the Palestinian refugee camps defenceless, as Israel pushed all the way to Beirut in order to expel all of PLO from Lebanon, and the war ended with a massacre killing hundreds of Palestinians on the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps (BBC 2012). The PLO continued to work from Tunis.

The first intifada (uprising) started in 1987, where Palestinians rose against the Israeli occupation. It originated in Gaza, and spread to the West Bank through civil disobedience, general strikes, boycott, and barricades. However, the stone-throwing and heavily armed Israeli Forces got most of the international attention (BBC 2012). The clashes lasted until 1993, with more than 1 000 casualties effectively shifting the focus on the Palestinian from the Diaspora to the occupied territories (BBC 2012). Israel continued to label the PLO as a terrorist organization, but the US started dialogue, which culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accords (BBC 2012).

According to this agreement the PLO gained control over the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in the West Bank and later on they would gain control over other Palestinian areas. In May 1994, the final version of the Declaration of Principles was signed in Cairo (the Oslo II), Israeli military was scheduled to leave Jericho and Gaza within 24 hours (BBC 2012) and the West Bank was divided into Areas A, B, and C. Arafat became the head of newly established PNA, and officially elected president in January 1996 (BBC 2012).

Only months after Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,

violence started in Israel with Palestinian suicide bombers from Hamas (BBC 2012). After signing the second phase of the declaration in 1995, Rabin was assassinated by a right wing Israeli. The Israelis decided to expand the settlements of Arab East Jerusalem in 1996, which caused outrage among Palestinians, in 1998 Nethanyahu and Arafat signed a "Peace-for land" agreement where Israel agreed to relinquish land in the West Bank in return for Palestinian measures against terrorism. Political tension continued, with its peak at the Camp David Summit of 2000, the goal was to try and settle the peace negotiations, as the Oslo summit had not lived up to the Palestinians expectations, and the interim period ended in 2000 (BBC 2012)

After Camp David, and failed negotiations concerning Jerusalem, refugees, settlements and borders, the second intifada that started in 2000 after the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinian viewed this as an insult and as an assault on the mosque and on September 29th 2000 riots started all over the Palestinian Territories (BBC 2012). The intifada lasted for three years, and included the assassination of many Palestinian leaders, attacks and sieges of Palestinian cities, including a 39 days siege of the church of the nativity in Bethlehem, and a massacre in a refugee camp in Jenin (BBC 2012).

The violence finally came to an end in 2003 and the "Road map to Peace" was launched by "the quartet" of international powers; The United States, European Union, Russia and the United Nations. The fist step in the road map included a pause in settlement expansion and end to violence. The following year more Palestinian leaders were assassinated and jailed, and in November 2004 Yasser Arafat died in Paris. Mahmoud Abbas became president and met with Ariel Sharon in Egypt in 2005. By September 2005 Israel withdrew settlements, Bedouin communities and military equipment from the Gaza strip (BBC 2012).

Hamas won the Palestinian election in 2006, which lead to a political crisis within Palestine. It led to a war between fractions from Hamas and Fatah, which ended with Hamas seized control over the Gaza Strip and Fatah over the West Bank. In the winter of 2008-09, Israel retaliated in the Gaza war after numerous rocket attacks from Gaza. The war left Gaza under blockade with multiple long-term economic and medical trauma as tens of thousands civilians were affected, 4 000 homes were destroyed (UN 2009).

Palestine applied for full membership in the UN in the fall of 2011, without success and continues to be a hybrid between a state and occupied territory. The Palestinians continue to be deprived of many basic rights as for example holding a passport and freedom of movement within their own country (UN 2009).

### 2.2.2 History of Water in the Occupied Palestinian Territories

Water management has been an important issue in the Middle East since the beginning of civilisation. Some of the ancient ways of obtaining water are still in use, most notably the water harvesting cisterns, which are widely used by the Bedouin (Koelbel 2009). The issue of water has also played an important part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in the Middle East, together with the issue of oil. The World Zionist Organisation (WZO) stated already in 1919, that the Jewish state should gain control over the water resources, and the actual source of the water under the British Mandate. After the 1967 war, Israel seized control over the water resources in the West Bank, connecting the settlements to the water supply linked to the Israeli water company Mekorot. The Palestinians also lost the water rights to the Jordan River (World Bank 2009)

As the water issue has been an important factor in the conflict, it is also at the centre of the peace processes. The Palestinian National Authority gained control over some of the water resources and responsibilities after the Oslo II agreement (Oslo II 1995). However, the difference in water access for Israelis and Palestinians remain huge, whereas Israel is well known for water infrastructure and management, Palestinians are struggling to attain the minimum water needed (World Bank 2009).

| Box 2.1: Oslo II Arrangements on Water |
|---|

Article 40:

- Set governance arrangements for a five year interim period, notably a Joint Water Committee (JWC) to oversee management of the aquifers, with decisions to be based on consensus between the two parties.
- Allocated to either party specific quantities of the three West Bank aquifers underlying
- both territories - the share allocated to the Palestinian West Bank was about one quarter
- of the allocation to Israel and the settlements.
- Provided for interim extra supplies from new wells and from Mekorot - an extra 28.6
- MCM was to be allocated to Palestinian needs.
- Estimated "future needs" for the Palestinian West Bank at 70-80 MCM.

(Source: The Oslo II 1995)

## 2.3 Socio-Economic Context

The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of Palestine was estimated to be $ 1 639 in 2010 (PCBS 2011). According to UNDP (2011), 34.5% of Palestinian lived in extreme poverty in 2007. In 2011, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that one out of four Palestinians lived below the poverty line; 18,3% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip. The poverty line is set to be NIS 2 237 for a household with two adults and three children (PCBS 2011).

There is also a considerable unemployment rate in both areas, UNDP (2011) estimates that only 41.1% participate in the labour market, leaving more than half the active population outside the labour market, 23.7% are unemployed.

The Palestinian economy is further weakened due to the dependency on the Israeli market for imports and exports and the severe restrictions on movement and trade (UNDP 2011). The

Palestinian trade deficit makes up around 78% of the GDP, and is at a total of $ 3.8 billion, where more than half is in trade with Israel (UNDP 2011).

This especially affects Area C, as the economic development is suffocated by the restrictions and policies and practices by Israel. At the same time, Area C is seen as of crucial importance for the realisation of the future Palestinian State (UNDP 2011).

## 2.4 Palestinian National Authority

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is in many ways a government without a state. However, the Oslo accords established a democratic framework for Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, based on the Basic Law of Palestine (Oslo 1993). The Palestinian government is built up as a multi party democratic state divided into executive and legislative bodies (Brown 2003). The executive being PNA, and the legislative being the Legislative Council (PLC). The system is a hybrid of a parliamentary and a presidential system, as the voters elect both a president of the authority and a parliament made up from legislative districts (Schenker 1999). In addition, there is a strong emphasis on local governance in Palestine, and there are a total of 16 governorates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, that each has an assigned number of seats in the Parliament.

PLO remains as the diplomatic mission to their observer status in the UN and for other diplomatic relations. President Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Mazen, is currently the leader of both the PNA and the PLO, representing the Fatah party. The prime minister, Salam Fayyad was appointed in 2007, and is an independent politician. His politics, through focusing on strong security, good governance and economic opportunity has come to be known as "Fayyadism" (Friedman 2010).

There are mainly two parties that are competing for the power in Palestine, the Islamist party of Hamas and the secular Fatah. After a series of violent clashes between the two after the election in 2006, Hamas is in control over Gaza and Fatah is dominating the West Bank. Hamas was established during the first intifada inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Some states labels Hamas as a terrorist organization, and the aid support for Gaza was massively cut after the organization seized control over the area. Hamas and Fatah continue to disagree, but signed in 2011 a reconciliation deal in Cairo that included a promise of

parliamentary and presidential election within the year (Ma'an News 2012).

Fatah was established by Yasser Arafat, who remained the leader of the organization until his death in 2004. Fatah is the main partner in the PLO, and is considered a left wing nationalist party in Palestinian politics (Bröning 2011). In addition to the contrasting views between Hamas and Fatah, the state building efforts and the rise of non-violent uprisings against Israel are the main trends in Palestinian politics (Bröning 2011). The politicization of the non-violent uprisings in Palestine is considered new in Palestinian politics, and there are now demonstrations throughout the West Bank every Friday in addition to many non-violent actions being done every day, including replacing Israeli flags with Palestinian on roads in the West Bank.

### 2.4.1   Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State

*"Palestine will be a peace-loving state that rejects violence, commits to co-existence with its neighbours, and builds bridges of cooperation with the international community. It will be a symbol of peace, tolerance and prosperity in this troubled area of the world. By embodying all of these values, Palestine will be a source of pride to all of its citizens, and an anchor for stability in this region". (Fayyad in PNA 2009: 3)*

The program for the 13th government of the PNA has the main objective of building strong state institutions despite the ongoing occupation. "It is time for our people to obtain their unconditional freedom and national rights as required by international law" (PNA 2009: 3). The program states that Palestine wants a state within the pre 1967-borders, with East Jerusalem as their capital within two years (PNA 2009). "This government's program seeks to involve all sectors and segments of society in the national drive to develop and advance our institutions" (PNA 2009: 3).

The program lists several national goals including; end the occupation, promote national unity, restore East Jerusalem as their capital, protect and ensure the rights of refugees, secure the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israel, human development, economic independence and national prosperity, equality and social justice, good governance, safety and security and

to build positive regional and international relations (PNA 2009). It lists how they aim to achieve institutional development and how to ensure development of all the main sectors, by listing goals for all the different ministries. The four main sectors identified in the document are: governance, social, economy, and infrastructure (PNA 2009).

The ultimate goal for the state building plan is to build a Palestinian state, where the PNA has full authority over security and basic services within their own territories (PNA 2009). Through working towards this, the PNA also takes responsibility for the development within their territories, including Area C.

## 2.5 Area of Research

The research has been conducted in 7 Bedouin communities in three governorates in the West Bank. Three communities were visited in the south, Hebron. One community was visited in Bethlehem, and three communities in Jericho.

**Overview Over Visited Communities**

| Community Number | Governorate | Population (est) | Electricity | Water |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hebron | 400 | Solar Panels, Wind Turbine | Water harvesting cisterns + water tankers |
| 2 | Hebron | 150 | Solar Panels | Water harvesting cisterns + water tankers |
| 3 | Hebron | 4000 | Connected to electricity grid | Water harvesting cisterns + water tankers |
| 4 | Jericho | 70 | They get electricity from a neighbouring refugee camp. | Water tankers |
| 5 | Bethlehem | 2000 | Solar panels, generators | Water harvesting cisterns + water tankers |
| 6 | Jericho | 50 | Generators | Water tankers |
| 7 | Jericho | 150 | Generators | Water spring |

**Table 3.1:** Overview over visited communities.

### 2.5.1 Area C

Area C is the area in Palestine in which are still under Israeli control, it constitutes to 62% of the West Bank and includes most of the farming and grazing land in Palestine (UNDP 2011). The water resources are also located in Area C, and it is the only area in Palestine suitable for expansion of population centres and for building new infrastructure (UNDP 2011).

According to the Oslo Agreement of 1993, Area C was to be handed over to be controlled by the PNA in 2000 (Oslo I 1993). In 2012, Area C is still under Israeli control. There are more than 200 settlements and outposts in the area, and an unknown number of Palestinians. The UN (2011) estimates that 150 000 Palestinians reside in the area, whereas the World Bank estimated in 2008 that anywhere between 70 thousand and 230 thousand people reside there. There are some villages, farms, herding communities and Bedouin encampments in Area C.

As Israel still have the overall control over Area C, Palestinians are forbidden to build anything on the land without obtaining permissions from the Israeli authorities, less than 10% have been approved in the past few years compared to 97% in 1972 (World Bank 2008). These building permits are very difficult to obtain and Israel frequently issues demolition orders and demolishes on structures that have been built without permits (World Bank 2008). There are also frequent seizing of land by Israel in Area C, predominantly in favour of settlements (expansion or "security" needs), or for military training (World Bank 2008).

There are also restrictions of movement for Palestinians, as many roads are made exclusively for settlers. There are also plans for new roads and train tracks, exclusively for Israelis, effectively cutting the West Bank into two halves, and preventing Palestinians access to Jerusalem (as for example the so-called E-1 plan).

In addition to the Palestinian residents, all the Israeli settlements are located in Area C (see Box 2.1). There are many problems involving the Bedouin that are rooted in settlement actions, there are frequent situations of violence from the settlers, land grabbing, and general obstacles for movement. They have also seized control over several of the water resources in the West Bank, including water springs, which are an important source of water for irrigation (UN 2012).

**Box 2.2: Israeli Settlements**

There are more than 300,000 settlers living in the West Bank (CIA 2012), in 121 recognized settlements and around 100 outposts, which are settlements built without official authorization (B'Tselem 2011). These people live on land that is not a part of the State of Israel, but are still considered, and treated as Israeli citizens (Greener 2010). The settlements are expanding, and have been expanding for more than 40 years, despite the fact that they are considered illegal by international law, according to Article 49 in the 4th Geneva Convention: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies" (ICRC 1949). According to the Oslo Agreement (1993), the question about settlements was to be decided at a later stage, "…issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis." As these permanent status negotiations never took place, the settlements have continued to expand.

There are many issues concerning the settlements that affect Palestinians, some settlers are violent towards their Palestinian neighbours, which often are Bedouin. "As a point of reference, the half a million West Bank Israeli settlers use more water and own more guns than all of the Palestinians combined" (Greener 2010). Three Palestinians were killed and 183 injured by Israeli settlers in 2011. Eight Israeli settlers were killed, and 37 injured by Palestinians in 2011 (UN 2011-1). Around 10, 000 Palestinian Olive Trees were uprooted by Settlers in 2011 alone (UN 2011-1)

Because Israeli settlers are considered Israeli citizens, they are under Israeli penal law. As all settlements are in Area C, their Palestinian neighbours are under Israeli military control (B'Tselem 2011). This means that two different legal systems are operating for people residing in the same area, the nationality of the detainee determines which legal system he or she will be tried under (B'Tselem 2011).

**Figure 2.3:** Israeli Settlement in the South of the West Bank

### 2.5.2 Hebron Governorate

Hebron is the southernmost governorate in the West Bank. It is the largest governorate in the West Bank, both by size and population (ARIJ 2009 - 1). The area is also home to the most Bedouin in Palestine. Following the Oslo Agreement, Hebron Governorate is divided into Areas A, B and C. Area A compromises 24%, Area B 22%, and 48% of Hebron Governorate is in Area C, additionally, 6% is a nature reserve area (ARIJ 2009 - 1). Almost 60% of the communities in the area lack access to the water network (World Bank 2009).

The governorate of Hebron has its administrative centre in the city of Hebron, the biggest city in Palestine, which is home to 700,000 people. The inner city of Hebron is divided into two parts, H1 and H2, after the Hebron Protocol of 1997. H1 is under limited control by the Palestinian National Authority, H2 is under complete Israeli control and home to around 600 settlers, which are being guarded by 2000 Israeli soldiers (ARIJ 2009 -1).

The Hebron area is well known for trade, and is famous throughout the West Bank for spices, ceramics, glass, and leather products, such as shoes.

### 2.5.3 Bethlehem Governorate

Bethlehem governorate is located south of Jerusalem and is home to around 180,000 people (ARIJ 2009). The Bedouin in Bethlehem are located in the desert on the outskirts of the town of Bethlehem. After the Oslo accords, Bethlehem was divided into Areas A, B, and C; Area A

and B make up 13.3% of the area in the governorate, 69.7% belong to Area C or closed military zones, and the remaining 17% are nature reserve areas (ARIJ 2009).

28% of the population in Bethlehem are Christians, making it the centre for Christianity in Palestine. The remaining 72% are Muslim (Bethlehem Municipality 2009). The administrative centre of the governorate is located in the town of Bethlehem, which is closed from Jerusalem by the separation barrier and checkpoints (ARIJ 2009).

Bethlehem is a tourist destination, with many tourists, and pilgrims, especially visiting the church of Nativity.

### 2.5.4 Jericho

The Jericho governorate is situates south of the Jordan River Valley and north of the Dead Sea. Jordan Valley is one of the areas most severely affected by the water issues in Palestine. The region is extremely hot and dry in the summer with temperatures of 50 degrees not being uncommon. It is situated well below sea level, and is the lowest permanently inhabited place on earth (TWP 2010).

The administrative centre is in the town of Jericho, which is believed to be one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. The city of Jericho is situated in Area A, but is completely surrounded by Area C (TWP 2010).

Jericho is famous for growing fruits and vegetables, and attracts tourists that are visiting, the mostly Israeli controlled, Dead Sea.

# Chapter 3: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This chapter aims to give a theoretical background for the analysis of the empirical findings. By first defining poverty and sustainable development, the overall context in which the thesis is written in is set. The first part corresponds to the first research question and the first part of the data analysis. The next parts corresponds to the last three research questions, a short discussion of state building for development will be followed by a discussion of participation and the state civil society synergy in development. The final part of the Literature Review will assess contemporary development issues, with an emphasis on the access to water and electricity in order to provide the theory for the data analysis emphasizing these particular development issues.

## 3.1 Poverty and Sustainable Development

As the empirical data is collected in a post conflict setting, among indigenous people, the Literature Review will aim to clarify the concepts of poverty and development in that setting. By first introducing the concepts of poverty and sustainable development, then by discussing development in a post-conflict setting and sustainable development for indigenous people, the theory will arrive as a tool for the empirical analysis of the indigenous Bedouin to the post conflict situation of the West Bank.

### 3.1.1   Poverty

*"Poverty is hunger. Poverty is lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick and not being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not being able to go to school and not knowing how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at the time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty is powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom"*

*(World Bank 2010)*

This definition of poverty demonstrated that poverty is much more than lack of income. Through seeing poverty as more than a pure economic problem, the World Bank follows the tradition of economist Amartya Sen. Sen (1999) stresses the importance of freedom in development, and sees poverty as freedom deprivation, even if the unfreedoms can be directly

linked to economic development, the freedoms are also important on their own (Sen 1999: 16). In his view, wealth is a freedom that allows us to live the lives we would like to live (Sen, 1999:14). The five instrumental freedoms mentioned by Sen (1999) are political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security. Without these instrumental freedoms, we are according to Sen's theory, unfree and lack development.

According to Sen (1999:40), unfreedom is not being able to participate in politics, not being able to participate in the market, not being able to access social facilities, such as health care and education, not being able to deal with other people under disclosure and lucidity and not being protected against abject misery such as the threat of unemployment or even starvation. The UN also views poverty in the light of unfreedom, especially in the MDGs that have been working as development guidelines in the whole world since they were presented in 2000. The MDGs consists of eight overarching goals with several targets that are planned to be achieved by 2015. These targets include income poverty, hunger, gender equality, education, environment, health and global partnerships (UN 2000). The idea of the MDGs was to quantify development goals that aim to end poverty through a holistic approach to both poverty and development (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009).

### 3.1.2 Sustainable Development

Following the argument of poverty being more than lack of income, development is more than economic growth (Sen 1999). Even if the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is linked to development (Ray 1998), there are many other aspects of development to consider. The Brundtland Commission famously introduced the concept of sustainable development in 1987 as: "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (WCED 1987). Even if there now are other interpretations of the concept, there are some principles of sustainable development that all the definitions still have in common; the importance of including the future, seeing development as a holistic concept, and including three dimensions of capital; economic, social and environmental capital (Adams 2009).

There are two main schools within sustainable development, in regards to how much emphasis that is given to the importance of the environment. The two different schools of

sustainable development are called strong and weak sustainability. The strong sustainability sees the natural capital as essential and impossible to substitute (Adams 2009: 146). The natural capital is not man-made and some of the natural ecosystems are irreplaceable (Adams 2009: 146). In the approach of weak sustainability, natural capital is one of the three dimensions of capital; economic, social, and environmental, and can be replaced either one. In other words, there can be a trade off between natural and human capital in development (Adams 2009: 145). The concept of sustainable development has been widely discussed since the introduction of the concept; it remains however, as one of the most widely used ideas in development theory (Adams 2009).

The development efforts presented in the analysis in this thesis will be discussed with strong sustainability as an overall the overall goal for development in Palestine: "In spite of all Israeli restrictions, and recognizing that sustainable development cannot be attained under the occupation, it is our national duty to do all that we can to pull our economy out of the cycle of dependence and marginalization" (PNA 2009: 11).

### 3.1.3 Development in a Post Conflict Context

As the Palestinian Territories do not have any prior history of statehood, the classification as a post-conflict area is controversial (Brynen 2005). However, even if it is very different from other post-conflict scenarios there is little literature to support the application of any other theories. Palestine is recovering from a conflict, and encounters several of the problems states in a post-conflict situation do. On the other hand, Palestine is still under occupation and the Palestinian people encounter situations that can be categorized as more "conflict", than "post-conflict" on a daily basis. Nevertheless, I will discuss development in a post-conflict context in order to address some of the development challenges faced in Palestine.

Development in a post-conflict context is often compared to the rehabilitation following a natural disaster (Green and Ahmed 1999). The 1948 war is also referred to as "Naqba" in Arabic, a word literally meaning "natural disaster". Even if there are several parallels in the to situations, there are significant differences between the two scenarios. Especially prolonged conflicts can cause severe damages to the society in several ways; namely socially, politically and economically (Green and Ahmed 1999). Basic governmental structures, including law and order, are also typically in need of rehabilitation in a post-conflict setting (Green and

Ahmed 1999). This process may be highly politicized, as there are different interests at work in the development process, both domestically and through international donors.

International aid and support to post-conflict areas, often has other objectives that poverty reduction (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). There is also a risk that the conflict will resume, and through aid this risk may be reduced through growth and poverty reduction (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). As the conflict has been affecting the society deeply, all the levels of the society needs to be assessed in order to achieve development in such societies, this will in many cases rebuilding of the civil society (Green and Ahmed 1999). Another issue in the post conflict setting is the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and social rehabilitation of war victims (Green and Ahmed 1999). This process is much more complex than simply disarming soldiers, in the Palestinian context, many the stone throwers of the second intifada, were born during the first intifada, are now in their early twenties and have already been prisoners of war and know no other life than that under occupation. Hughes (2012) stresses the importance of addressing the impact of violence in people's lives, and the importance of civil society engaging in this both from a female and a male perspective (Hughes 2012): "Insecurity and violence are part of the canvas with which organizations work and need to be considered as a core of programme design" (Hughes 2012:14).

### 3.1.4  Indigenous People and Development

Indigenous peoples can be defined as the native people of an area. They are often threatened by dominant neighbouring cultures and the groups are in danger of extinction as modernization and expansion of populations into their homelands. Their existence is often linked to environmental sustainability, and their effect on modern development theory is linked to protecting species diversity and about adopting greener paths of development (Mardsen 1991).

Indigenous knowledge has come to be central in several sustainable development approaches (Briggs 2005). According to Loomis however, (2000) there are five ways in particular that indigenous people have been overlooked in the concept of sustainable development; they have been typified as "traditional people" clinging to the past; been physically pushed to live in backcountries, such as in jungles and mountainous areas. Briggs (2005) explains this as the western knowledge systems in many ways represents modernity, and the indigenous

knowledge is seen to represent the traditional, "backwards" way of life, often in low- and middle-income countries. In the efforts of actually taking indigenous knowledge into account, many have been relocated to reserves where they can live quaint lifestyles isolated from the rest of the society.

Indigenous people have also often been overlooked in the public debate, or not been invited at all (Looims 2000). He also stresses the fact that even if indigenous people in many cases question the Western ideas, it does not mean that they want to live in poverty, even if they want to live a life more in harmony with nature and the spirit world, in fact a number of indigenous groups are exploring their own ways of holistic development as an alternative to Western models of sustainable development (Loomis 2000). Briggs (2005) also stresses this fact, that there can be a danger of romanticizing the indigenous lifestyle, which can end up being very little helpful despite good intentions. Some of the indigenous people may not think about the divide between the indigenous knowledge and the "modern" knowledge, whereas others utilize both or only want to use modern ways of thinking (Briggs 2005).

Indigenous peoples, and knowledge, are being especially protected under international laws and principles, according to the UN Declaration of Principles of Indigenous Rights (2008);

> *"Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."* (Article 3)

And

> *"Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions"* (Article 4).

Mardsen (1991), however claims that the autonomous management of development of indigenous people will be in conflict with the western liberal economic tradition, as the development of local alternatives will contradict the principles of free market at the importance of the private sector.

Relating the theories of indigenous people in development to the Bedouin in the West Bank is

in some ways challenging, it is difficult to find information about whether the PNA recognize the Bedouin as indigenous peoples in their policies, they are often grouped with the rural population in general. PNA also state that: "In accordance with the law, the minorities must abide by the will of the majority" (PNA 2009:7).

The Bedouin are however, different from the other rural population, especially because they originally were not only Palestinian, the majority of the tribes of the West Bank have members in Jordan, Egypt, and even as far as Qatar and Sudan (Hanafi (ed) 2008). The Bedouin sees themselves as indigenous people, they are often using the Arabic word *Bedú* to describe themselves, rather than *Arab* or *Palestinian* (Hanafi (ed) 2008), and have addressed the United Nations Forum on Minority Issues for help to secure their rights for recognition and protection (Indigenous Peoples Issues 2010).

### 3.1.5 Summary

Through introducing concepts about poverty and development, especially in a post-conflict situation, a picture is formed about some challenges indigenous people face today. Using Sen's (1999) instrumental freedoms as a starting point for analysing the overall situation, it is clear that living under the conditions that are in Palestine today, the Bedouin, as an indigenous people, face many challenges. By living in a post-conflict situation, or rather a conflict situation in many cases, it is clear that the protective security is limited, in addition to the political, economic, and social freedoms.

Following the argument of sustainable development, of a common future, it becomes clear that the situation is complex, and the development for indigenous people under these conditions is very challenging. Especially when the indigenous people have a right, under international agreements, to self-determination and autonomy over their own affairs. To achieve these rights is very tough task, when the post-conflict situation, which has left the whole country in a state where rebuilding and rehabilitation is necessary not only for the indigenous population, but also for the nation itself.

The next part will address some of these challenges by introducing state building as a tool for development in the light of democracy.

## 3.2 State Building for Development

In order to better understand and be able to critically analyze the state building efforts in Palestine, this chapter will introduce theory about democracy and state building. In seeing state building as a tool for development, and democracy as a political human right, it will form the theoretical basis for analysing the empirical findings.

### 3.2.1 Democracy

"Political rights, including freedom of expression and discussion, are not only pivotal in including social responses to economic needs, they are also central to the conceptualization of economic needs themselves" (Sen 1999 - 1: 154). Democracy as a concept has been discussed for centuries, Plato argues that democracies give the political power to those that are good at winning elections, not necessarily to those that are most fit the job, and the wrong people can dominate politics (McKinnon 2008). Thomas Hobbes is afraid that democracy will affect the outcomes of decision making negatively because in a collective decision, no one is left as responsible (McKinnon 2008). However, democracy has been proved to the most suitable way of organizing the society, and it is stated in the declaration of Human Rights that everybody has the right to live in democracy;

> *"(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.*
> *(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.*
> *(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."*
>
> (Article 21, UN Declaration of Human Rights)

Democracy is an important principle in Sen's argument of freedoms, and is also a staple in the notion of public participation, in policy making in general, and in development processes specifically. Human insecurity, thus unfreedom, can happen when people are denied the right to influence their government, and policies (Tadesse et al 2006). The participation in government policy-making is crucial for well-functioning democracy, through elections, multi-party politics, and a free press, the participation forces the government to deliver to its citizens (Tadesse et all 2006).

Following these theories of democracy, the notion of participation becomes clearer, the PNA describes the importance as: "Political parties shall abide by the principles of national sovereignty, democracy and peaceful, regular transfer of authority. The Basic Law safeguards rights of minorities." (PNA 2009:7).

### 3.2.2 State Building for Development

Following classical theorists, such as John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, "the institutions hypothesis" in development studies (Acemoglu et al. in Banerjee et al 2006) argues that good institutions are crucial for development. Acemoglu et al (2006) argue for three crucial elements in good institutions; property rights, constraints of the actions of powerful groups, and equal opportunities. They also state "differences in institutions across countries today account for the bulk of the differences in economic outcomes" (Acemoglu et al in Banjeree et al 2006: 32). This is influenced by new institutional economics, as formulated by economist Douglass North: "The key to positive economic performance is to structure human interaction to reward productivity. Institutions are the incentive structure of societies and therefore it is necessary to understand just "how they work" and why they work "imperfectly"" (North in Swedberg and Nee 2005: 42). This emphasizes the importance of seeing institutional politics as central for economic growth (Evans in Swedberg and Nee 2005).

International plans and goals for development are often created with an assumption of a state structure. However, many of the states in which 'development' is intended for are not fully functioning states (Whaites 2008). It has been suggested that there are over 40 fragile, conflict-affected states that are struggling to reach the MDGs (Whaites 2008). This suggests that state building can be an important tool for development throughout the developing world. State building must not be confused with nation building, however they often happen simultaneously. Nation building is the process of creating a national identity, whereas "State building is the process through which states enhance their ability to function" (Whaites 2008: 4). In other words, state building is about building and developing the visible embodiment of the state such as ministries, agencies and other political bodies with power for decision-making. In order for a development plan in a country to succeed, and implemented through functioning state agencies, active and continuous state building is necessary. It is an ongoing

process, and takes place in all states, as all states seek to enhance and improve their structures and are shaped by the local dynamics within the state (Whaites 2008).

The PNA focus their current political development on state building, trough the state building plan. These theories are thus important in understanding the political processes happening in Palestine. Especially as a post-conflict state, the state building can be an effective way of bringing the people together, through joint initiatives and establishment of institutions and government bodies; "We believe that full commitment to this state-building endeavor will advance our highest national priority of ending the occupation, thereby enabling us to live in freedom and dignity in a country of our own" (PNA 2009:3)

### 3.2.3   Summary

State building could happen without democracy, but democracy is dependent on good institutions on order to function. Following the argument of the UN, that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his or her country, participation at this level would be impossible without proper institutions, as this is what will make the state function.

In the development context, institutions will help achieve economic growth, as they are the enhancing the states ability to function. In the post-conflict, or fragile state setting, the institution building becomes even more crucial, as the institutions often are destroyed in the conflict, or as in the Palestinian context, were never really there to begin with.

Going back to poverty and sustainable development, the institutions can be crucial in the achievement of sustainable development and poverty alleviation. For indigenous people, there could be helpful to be involved in the institution-building process, as they have a right to be involved in decision-making, both as citizens of their country, but also as indigenous people.

The next part will discuss policy-making processes, which should be seen in light of the discussion above.

## 3.3  Policy

This chapter offers a discussion about policy-making processes. It will discuss the stages in a

linear way, although policy processes rarely can be seen as linear (Sutton 1999), but rather as a continuous process involving all parties. Policy will be discussed at three levels, in order to correspond to the three levels of actors discussed in the data analysis; the policy-makers at political level, the civil society as the enabler of policy and the participation of beneficiaries in the policy making process.

### 3.3.1 Policy Making in Developing Countries

Policy refers to the goals, and the plans to reach them (Osman 2002), a public policy can be defined as: "when a government takes a decision or chooses a course of action in order to solve a social problem and adopts a specific strategy for its planning and implementation" (Osman 2002:1). The policy making process is a complex political process, involving negotiations, bargaining, and bringing together many different interests. In developing countries, the policy making process is often coloured by factors that are not present in developed countries, such as poverty, high levels of unemployment, lack of basic facilities such as health care and educational institutions, and general low standards of living.

Even if the government plays a vital role in the policy making process, Klijn and Koppenjan (2000) argue that there is rather a interplay between the various actors, and that the role of government could be working as a facilitator for the network, rather that being the driving force behind the whole process. Still, the government has a special role in policymaking; the government will always have a special role distinct from the other actors due to a number of reasons, especially concerning rules. The government is acting on behalf of the people that elected them (assuming it is a democracy), and have to include care for minorities, guidelines and other criteria for good governance. Other actors are acting from other viewpoints, for example the interests of the donor country, business interests, or strategic intensives (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).

It becomes clear that in order to follow the state building theory, and the importance of good institutions in a democracy in order to achieve sustainable development, it is necessary to look into the policy making process. Assuming that the state building efforts, and the institution building is pivotal for sustainable development, the policy making process must also be sustainable, and legitimate, both accepted by other politicians, and political parties, and by the public (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). This is also in line with Sen's (1999)

instrumental freedom of transparency.

### 3.3.2    State - Civil society Synergy in Fragile States

Civil society has many definitions; shortly described, civil society is what is *between* the state and the individual. Civil society means that the people are active participants in the society, and the decision making in the society. The Ford Foundation (2003) names this "Active Citizenship". Seeing Palestine as a post-conflict state, the civil society should be seen in this context. Hughes (2012) states that working with civil society in fragile states is difficult, and that the traditional ways of working with civil society are not yielding the same results in conflict affected states. She identifies one of the main problems as being "the tendency to work "around" conflict and fragility" (DFID (2010) in Hughes 2012).

Hughes (2012) identifies the state-civil society synergy in fragile states as a situation where the civil society fills roles that the state does not yet fill. As the legitimacy of the state changes, the citizens should look more to the state (Hughes 2012:8). However, this is not a linear process, but the civil society can especially in post conflict, and fragile state settings build bridges between the state and the individual. Another problem is that there seems to be with focus on the state side of development, through focus on constitutional development, or a focus on the participation and civil society, Hughes (2012) however claims that there is need to work across the domains of the state and civil society. Through working this way, one may see that the fragile states are not as fragile as they first appear, as there is no standard constitutional design that all states have to follow.

Traditionally, the civil society has been seen as an advocate for democracy, Hughes (2012) however, claims that the role of civil society in fragile state should be more about state building, and that state building can be seen a tool for peace.

### 3.3.3    Participation

The biggest problem for public participation in policy processes is very often the lack of channels in which they can participate (Tadesse et al 2006). As the participation channels often are limited, the people that are affected by policies are rarely involved in both the policy formulation and the implementation process; this is especially true in post-conflict and

vulnerable communities (Tadesse et al 2006). However, it is not enough that the public merely participate in development processes; it also depends of the extent, and the actual meaningfulness of the participation (Tadesse et al 2006).

Being able to vote in elections is a form of participation, however if this participation is limited to once every four years, it can be questioned how meaningful the participation is, however, by electing a representative government, the participatory democracy is a very common form of democracy. This form of governance implies that politicians, policy makers and bureaucrats have sufficient information and knowledge about the needs for the public, and are prepared to deliver the necessary services (Tadesse et al 2006). In order for this participation to be sufficient for a democracy, Tadesse et al (2006) suggests that there are needs for complete and comprehensive data about the public needs, and a genuine commitment from the politicians, policy makers, and bureaucrats.

Ideally, the participation leads to empowerment of the people, as the transparency leads to information and knowledge transfers (Tadesse et al 2006). However, if the participation is limited to a few people, groups or individuals representing communities, the participation is not complete. The participation has also a tendency sometimes to be manipulated by governments in order to legitimize unpopular policies; the participation will thus have no effect if there are no clear rules and guidelines for the participation. The lack of trust between the public and the policy makers, may lead to political tension and demonstrations (Tadesse et al 2006).

### 3.3.4   Summary

Policymaking processes, are as seen above not a linear process, but rather processes that involve different actors at different levels, at the same time. Seen in light of previous discussions, good policymaking processes are difficult to achieve without good institutions, which again comes back to the state building as a tool for policy making and eventually for development.

As the civil society can fill a role that a government not yet have, especially in post-conflict and fragile state settings, the civil society plays an important part as a link between the public and the policy makers. This is not to say however, that direct participation is not important.

And the participation needs guidelines, which again leads the discussion back to that of democracy and state building.

The discussion will now continue by looking at specific development issues, in particular water and electricity as these issues form the basis for the empirical findings in the thesis.

## 3.4 Development Issues – Water and Electricity

As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, poverty has many dimensions, development also has many dimensions and there are numerous issues that constitute development. There are however, some common problems that several developing countries have in common. The MDGs lists several human rights and needs as the development goals, different issues that are all crucial for achieving development, ranging from the right to secure childbirth to the right to education (UN 2000).

In Palestine, there are many development issues that need to be managed. The most pressing concern is perhaps the highly politicized water situation. The current situation in West Bank and in the Gaza Strip is, and has been for a while, by many been named a water crisis (Isaac 2000). Another important development issue is the access to electricity; while most urban households have access to electricity in their homes, the rural population, especially in Area C, and in the Gaza Strip, suffer from lack of electricity (UNDP 2011).

As both water and electricity are enablers of other kinds of development, they bring forth questions about other development issues, some of which will be discussed in this paper. First, water and electricity will be discussed as important on their own. Secondly, they will both, be discussed as catalysts for other development issues. This chapter corresponds to research questions 1 and 2.

### 3.4.1   Water and Development

The access to water is an important aspect of development, and maybe the most important and pressing challenges we are facing in the world today (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al 2008, UNDP 2004). "3.4 million people, mostly children, die from diseases associated with inadequate water supply, sanitation and hygiene" (UNDP 2004). These figures show that

more people have died from water-related problems than in all conflicts combined, since the Second World War (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al. 2008). Many have predicted that the next great war will be about natural resources, especially water, and it has already become a great part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Isaac in ENCOP 1995). 9% of the population in the West Bank, about one third of the communities have no access to water, most of these communities are located in Area C (World Bank 2008).

Poverty is linked to water scarcity in many different ways and the relationship is complex. Water can be seen both as an economic good, and as a human right (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al 2008). Lack of access to water can also be both a result, and a cause of poverty. As a lot of poor people are deprived of water resources, it can cause poverty for farmers without access to water, thus lacking the capability for generating income from their land (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al. 2008). On the other had, water can be a result of poverty as the economic pressure of buying the necessary water is high (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al 2008). Water is important to humans for many different reasons, besides being a necessity for life in order to hydrate us, Biswas (2004) states "water has linkages to all development sectors and social issues". This thesis will focus on access to clean water and the link to livelihood and health.

The issue of water is included in the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, where they aim "to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water" (UNMD 2000: point 19). This is also included in point 7, about environmental sustainability, in the MDGs, which is one of the most cited goals, but also one of the most difficult to achieve (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al 2008).

As water is crucial in agriculture, both for livestock and for growing crops, the lack of water will result in less productivity in the agricultural sector. This decreased productivity leads to higher unemployment, less income, more food insecurity and increased poverty (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al. 2008). This may also lead to higher food prices, which will not only effect the rural population, but also the country as a whole.

Water-related diseases are the most common cause of death in many places in the world. These diseased include cholera and diarrhoea, which both can originate from unclean water

and are highly treatable with water. These problems are statistically higher in rural areas of Africa, where the access to freshwater is the most difficult. But this is also true for other areas in the world with similar problems, including in Latin America and among the rural population, including the Bedouin, in Palestine (Kulindwa and Lein in Hemson et al. 2008, EWASH 2012).

### 3.4.2 Management of Water Resources

Water resources are of direct interest to all humans. This makes water of direct interest to most development ministries, levels of state bureaucracy, the private sector and NGOs. This same interest can be found in other issues, such as food, environmental issues, health, communication and transportation (Biswas 2004). As the water crisis is growing all over the world, the UN has launched Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as a tool for water management. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has a strong focus on water governance, and sees good water governance as one of the most important tools to eradicate poverty. They also see water governance as important to balance the different, sometimes competing, aspects of water, such as environmental sustainability and economic growth (UNDP 2004). IWRM is based on seeing water as a social and an economic good, as well as an integral part of the ecosystem.

Principles of IWRM:
- *Water should be treated as an economic, social and environmental good;*
- *Water policies should focus on both the management of water (demand) and the provision of water (supply);*
- *Government regulatory frameworks are critical in fostering the sustainable development of water resources;*
- *Water resources should be managed at the lowest appropriate level (i.e., in communities and villages as opposed to in capitals); and*
- *Women should be recognized for and supported in the central role they play in the provision, management and safeguarding of water*

(UNDP 2004)

Biswas (2004), however argues that the IWRM is too fleeting and that there still is no operational water management that is implemented on all levels as there is no way of measure

the effects and that there are too many water-related issues that should be integrated according to this definition. Biswas (2004) also argues that water and energy should be seen together, as water is the main contributor to energy in many parts of the world: "perhaps these two resources can be managed together as integrated water and energy resources management" (Biswas 2004:253).

The water in Palestine is being managed by the PNA run Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). Due to the restrictions on movement and building however, they are not in charge of the water situation in Area C; "The PWA has truly inherited a disastrous situation where occupation authorities had been, through the Civil Administration, domineering the monitoring, supervision and control of the resource management process and/or the process for supplying Palestinian communities with drinking water services" (PWA 2010).

### 3.4.3 Electricity and Development

Electricity is not a tangible good in itself; it is something that is always accompanied by something else, such as a light bulb, in order to make a difference (Winther 2008). When people are without electricity, the electricity itself is the object of interest, however, after a while, the focus of interest changes to the utilities in which uses electricity (Winther 2008). It is objects that use electricity that makes the electricity significant for development, not the electricity in *itself*. Electricity can thus work as a catalyst for development.

Studies have shown that people in poor household use a significant amount of their income on energy, up to 20% of the total expenditure, compared to 2-3% in high-income countries (GNESD 2010), this is consistent with literature from Palestine (Alkhair 2006). Many are also indebted because of unpaid electricity bills (Mitchell 2009). There are thus many incentives for development of the energy and electricity sector in development countries. The UN agency for energy states that:

> *"Energy services such as lighting, heating, cooking, motive power, mechanical power, transport and telecommunications are essential for socio-economic development, since they yield social benefits and support income and employment generation."*

> (UN-Energy 2005)

According to the UN-Energy (2005), energy and electricity are crucial elements in achieving the MDGs. In order to achieve the goal of universal education, they see electricity as important to attract teachers to rural areas. They also identify the need for electric light, in order to illuminate classrooms and enable children to study after sun set. Also, electricity would free up time as many children, especially girls, have to carry water and wood, they do not follow education in order to help the family. (UN-Energy 2005). As electrical appliances may make the work easier for the adults, it can also free up time for the children as electricity increases the productivity of their parents. Electricity also helps the education sector access Information Communication Technology (ICT). ICT is an important part of development, and is impossible without access to electricity. Electricity supply enables the use of media and communication technologies, and helps people access news and educational materials.

### 3.4.4   Management of Electricity

Management of electricity must be seen together with management of other energy sources. In developing countries, the energy consumption at the household level is taking up a larger proportion of total energy consumption than in developed countries (GNESD 2010).   The electricity in Palestine is dependent on imports, but many households, also in Area B, and C have solar power systems to heat the water tanks. In Area C, some of the communities and villages are connected to the power grid. The Palestinian Energy Authority (PEA) is in charge of the distribution of electricity for these areas (Alkhair 2006). However, they have limited jurisdiction of the remote, Bedouin communities in Area C.

The UNDP (2011) states that the biggest problems with access to electricity in Area C of the West Bank, is the lack of regulatory framework, high costs, and insufficient research and training. In the plans from the PNA, they recognize the situation, and state that they aim to help everyone get, especially marginalized communities access to electricity (PNA 2009).

## 3.5  Theoretical Application

From the theories introduced in the Literature Review, with the background information about the situation in Palestine, there is possible to see a theoretical application emerge. The overall research statement is: how the Bedouin in Area C cope with development issues, with

emphasis on access to water and electricity. In order to provide an analysis based on empirical evidence on this topic, it is important to assess the theory in which has been presented in the Literature Review, and how it relates to the situation in Palestine, in which is described in chapter 2.

Assessing how the Bedouin cope with development issues must be seen through the lens of poverty and sustainable development. In order to see how they access water and electricity, the actual accession needs to be seen through the lens of water and electricity management. In order to understand the full picture, the civil society and participation in policy processes needs to be a part of the equation. Both the water and electricity is under control by the government, the PNA. However, in the Palestinian context there is another government, which is very much present, and especially influential in Area C.

In order to paint a clearer picture of how the theory is applicable to the research question, I will present two models, the first representing the first research question, and the second representing research question two and three.



**Figure 3.1:** Model Illustrating Research Question 1 in relation to theory. ("How are the Bedouin in Area C coping with Development Issues, with emphasis on Access to Water and Electricity?")

This model shows the relationship between the theories linking Bedouin to development issues through sustainable development. In order to achieve sustainable development in Palestine, the State-Civil society synergy is pivotal, especially since, the Palestinian Authority in many ways are taken out of the equation due to the restrictions of the Israeli occupying power.



**Figure 3.2:** Model Illustrating Research Question 2 and 3 in relation to theory.

("How are he PNA and the civil society working to manage water and electricity issues for Bedouin in Area C?" and "How do the Bedouin communities participate in the development process?")

This model aims to explain the relationship between the PNA and the civil society in working with development for Bedouin in Area C. As the PNA do not have any direct access to work in Area C, the actual implementation of the policies is made by the civil society.

# Chapter 4: Research Methodology

## 4.1    Methodology in Brief

The primary research was conducted during five months in 2011 and 2012 in the West Bank, Palestine. The research design is mainly qualitative, with secondary quantitative sources to supplement. The methods used are interviews, focus groups, participant observation, as well as document and statistical analysis. The research was conducted in seven Bedouin communities in three governorates, with representatives from the Governors offices, representatives from the Palestinian Authority, and members of the civil society.

## 4.2    Research Strategy

The research strategy is the overall guidelines in which the research follows. The choice of strategy is influenced by several different factors that will be briefly explained before the choice of research strategy for this thesis will be discussed.

In particular, the research strategy is shaped by the desired outcome from the research. Perception of reality is another strong influence of the research strategy. If the reality is seen as a dynamic and subjective construction, it is known as constructivism. Objectivism on the other hand, is a perception that there exists an objective reality regardless of the individuals populating it (Bryman 2008). The third main influence is concerned about how the knowledge is generated. Knowledge can be viewed as human behaviour compared to an external reality as in positivism, or it can be interpretivsm; where the objects of the study shapes the reality in which the study takes place (Bryman 2008). Finally, it must be determined if the research strategy is deductive or inductive. Deductive research refers to research that aims to test existing theories through a series of hypothesis, whereas the inductive approach aims to generate its own theory through the research (Bryman 2008).

There are two different views of research, which can both be in competition, and be complementary to each other. Quantitative research focuses mainly on data that can be quantified and measured. If it can be said that quantitative research focuses on numbers, the qualitative research focuses on words. Qualitative research approach focuses on understanding of people through their own perceptions rather than measuring the effects of something through quantifiable data (Bryman 2004).

### 4.2.1 Qualitative Methodology

The research strategy employed in this particular research was qualitative research, as the aim of the research was to increase understanding of how the Bedouin in Area C cope with development issues. The emphasis of the study is on the Bedouin and their interactions with civil society, and the government. The research involves three groups of actors, on three levels: the Bedouin themselves, members of the civil society, and representatives from the government. The main method of data collection was interviews and observation, with use of census data and government documents to cross reference, increase validity and to gain a deeper understanding.

## 4.3 Research design: Case Study

The research design is the structuring of the research project so it will be able to answer the research problem and research questions. It is an overall framework for data collection and analysis (Bryman 2008). As the topic of this research is interesting in itself, it has a case study design. The case study approach is usually used when the case itself is the object of research, and all complexities within the case is the object if interest (Bryman 2008). This thesis is focused on the interactions the Bedouin have with civil society and the government, and is thus a case study with three groups of actors; the Bedouin themselves, the civil society and the government.

Although the research took place in different communities, that are different from each other, the overall challenges in the different communities are similar. The situation for the Bedouins in Palestine is unique, and the data in this research will thus not likely yield the same results in another setting. However, because the particular case of the Bedouin in Area C is important in itself it can help to generate theory on the basis of the findings.

As seven Bedouin communities were visited there is also a comparative component in the research. Although the communities are similar, they face different challenges that are affecting the communities differently. Also, as it takes place in three different governorates there is some level of comparison on the governmental level as well.

## 4.4    Sampling

The most common ways of purposive sampling in qualitative research is through theoretical or snowball sampling. Purposive sampling is according to Bryman (2008) the recommended way of sampling for qualitative research as the respondents are chosen due to their relevance to the study.

Both theoretical and snowball sampling were employed in this research. I have visited Palestine several times before doing this research, and I visited two of the communities used for the study for the first time in 2009. However, I did not have any contacts in the actual communities, so I started out by researching the Bedouin. Then I conducted preliminary visits to a few communities, through theoretical sampling. I did not do interviews in these visits, but introduced myself, my thesis, and asked some introductory questions. As I had visited two of the communities in the past, I could se changes myself, and asked questions about the changes.

I did not use all of these communities in my final research, but the visits helped me get a clearer picture of the situation. As I was looking for Bedouin communities with water and electricity issues in particular, I did not interview any communities with full access to both. I also only targeted communities where there are or have been some development programs present, in order to answer my research questions concerning participation and the link to civil society and government. As these people were interviewed based on their relevance to the topic, it can be seen as theoretical sampling (Bryman 2008).

With the exception of one, all the visited communities were hamlets, predominantly with tent- and cave dwellers. Some of the communities consisted of several farm-like structures, and one community could be divided into several hamlets of households consisting of up to 40 people. Within each community I started off talking to a community leader, or someone representing the community leader. This initial meeting would also involve a tour of the community and an explanation of the water and electricity issue in particular, as well as other issues they struggle with in the community.

I focused most of the interviews on the household level, as the household can be seen as key unit of social production (Mitchell 2009) and the picture of the situation will be more holistic.

There are also coping mechanisms within a household that will be more clear through widening the focus from the individual to the household they are members of (Mitchell 2009). Additionally, the ways the Bedouin live is very dependant on the family and household. Often, one husband has more than one wife and the largest household unit interviewed consisted of 45 people and the smallest of 5.

When interviewing households, I applied snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is when one respondent refers to the next, and the sampling happens like a rolling snowball (Bryman 2008). I focused on the household level, the interviews varied in number of people present. In some cases, the interview ended up as a focus group discussion as more people, not belonging to the household, showed up. However, this sometimes proved helpful and I let the interview develop into a discussion.

On the civil society level, the representatives I interviewed are from organisations involved in the visited communities. I met some of the organisations by chance in the village, others I contacted after visiting the communities. In some cases I contacted the organisations in advance, and we met in the community. This led to situations where I was able to observe first hand, the interaction between the Bedouin and the civil society organisations that are working with them. I was also referred through some governmental institutions to civil society organisations working in Bedouin communities.

On the government level, I applied the snowballing method. In Hebron, an initial meeting at the Governors office led to several meetings with people in the office that are working with Bedouin in one way or another. They also referred me to other people in the municipality that I could talk to. In Bethlehem, I met more casually with a representative from the PNC, and through him I accessed other officials that work with Bedouin in the area.

**Overview of Samples**

| Group of Actors | Method | Sample Size | Codes (see appendix 2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bedouin Communities | - Interviews<br>- Observation<br>- Focus Group discussions | - 7 communities<br>- 30 interviews<br>- 4 focus group discussions | 1.1 – 7.2 |
| Civil society | - Interviews<br>- Observations | - 6 NGOs:<br>- 3 concerning water<br>- 2 concerning electricity<br>- 2 general, or other development issues | 9.1-9.6 |
| Government Officials | - Interviews | - 4 interviews with officials | 8.1-8.4 |

**Table 4.1:** Sample Overview

## 4.5 Data Collection - Qualitative Methodology

The data collection took place during five months from November 2011 to March 2012 in the West Bank. The first month was spent studying documents and literature in order to get a better overview of the situation before doing the primary data collection. I also made the first contacts with civil society organisations, people in PNA and went on initial field visits to find Bedouin communities. The rest of the time was spent collecting data and analysing and comparing the results to literature. The majority of the interviews were carried out either in the respective offices or communities; some were less formal conversations carried out other places.

Within qualitative methodology, there are five main methods for data collection; participant observation, interviews, focus group discussions, discourse, and document analysis (Bryman 2008). When using a case study approach, the qualitative interview and participant observation are particularly relevant methods as they both allow for an extensive

understanding of the topic (Bryman 2008). The methods employed in this thesis are qualitative, with emphasis on interviews, focus group discussions, participant observations and document analysis.

As the research is based on one particular cultural group, the research can be seen as ethnographic. Ethnographic research focuses on the social structures and the routines of the people within their own cultural setting (Fetterman 1998). The research is largely based on the insider's perspective, in this case the perspective of the Bedouin of Area C.

### 4.5.1 Interviews

The purpose of the qualitative interview is to gain information about how people experience and understand their own situation (Thagaard 2003) and was thus the most suitable way to gain knowledge about the situation. There are however, different ways of conducting such interviews. The semi-structured interview consists of some set questions, but the questions are used more as a framework for the interview, rather than as a more formally structured set of questions (Bryman 2008).

Most of the interviews conducted were semi-structured. I had prepared four different interview guides for the different groups of actors. One for the community leader in the community, one for households, one for representatives from the Civil society and one for government officials. Some questions were open-ended, others closed-ended. However, in some cases I did not use the guides, as time was limited (especially with government officials), or what I changed my interview depending on the subject the informant wanted to talk about, especially in the Bedouin communities, where unexpected stories and problems were common. As my focus was on the household level in Bedouin communities, many of the interviewed were conducted with more than one representative from the household present. This worked very well in most cases as they could fill each other in and discuss the questions before giving me an answer.

Some of the interviews became more as conversations, unstructured and open-ended. According to Bryman (2008), this can be disadvantageous as it can generate too much irrelevant information. However, I found it helpful in meetings with members of the civil society. Some of these unstructured interviews happened with representatives from NGOs that

I met by chance in the Bedouin communities, others with people that had a connection to a Bedouin community that I met outside of the actual research setting.

### 4.5.2   Focus Group Discussions

A focus group discussion is a setting where participants are asked questions and can discuss them freely with the other members of the discussion. It is a suitable technique to observe the behaviour between people and underlying causes for behaviour. According to Thagaard (2003), focus group discussions are most suited in situations where the participators are in the same situation, such as in a village. I conducted a few focus group discussions, however some were not planned, but occurred as I shared meals with Bedouin women separate from the men or as several members of the community were present during the interviews, or for part of the interviews.

The discussions were useful in gaining information about certain subjects, especially when asking questions about the future and how they see their own communities. It was also when talking about the interaction with civil society and the government. It was also useful to get more information from women, who were sometimes reluctant to interfere when I was interviewing the household.

### 4.5.3   Participant Observation

Participant Observation is especially relevant in ethnographic studies (Fetterman 1998), and is important for effective fieldwork. It is a method where the researcher actively participates in a groups activities over time in order to be able to see the world through the eyes if the objects of the study (Bryman 2008). The participant observation technique involves listening and to participate in conversation, observe behaviour and interaction (Bryman 2008).

For this research, participant observation was used complimentary to interviews. I visited each community several times in order to gain a deeper understanding of their lives and how they live and how their lives are. Also, as the data was collected over a period of five months, I went back to some of the communities after some time has passed to see how they were coping, if there were any changes, and to ask follow-up questions. This was particularly relevant in one of the communities as they had only had electricity for a few weeks during the

first visit, but after three months they had lived with the solar power system for a while. This technique was also useful as I got to observe how the NGOs worked with the Bedouin, both in meetings and in other interactions.

I also shared meals and drank tea with several of the informants. This lead to more casual conversations, and I could get to know more about the daily life of the Bedouin by observing myself, rather than only by them telling me about it through answering my questions.

### 4.5.4   Qualitative Analysis of Documents

As much of this research is based on official documents from the PNA, time was spent on a qualitative analysis of the development plan and follow up reports from the government. These documents can be classified as an institutional, official source (Holme and Solvang 1996). The analysis has been done through carefully reading the official plans for state building, and development from the PNA. In addition, the follow up reports and literature have been added in order to get a deeper understanding of the "Fayyadism" that is dominating Palestinian politics.

The analysis is being done with the Bedouin in mind, trying to investigate what the official plans for the Palestinian state are for them, and how the plans will affect the lives of the Bedouin in the West Bank.

## 4.6    Interpretation of Data

The analytical approach of this study is mainly inductive, meaning that the research is generating theory base don the empirical evidence (Bryman 2008). The overall goal of the thesis, to study how the Bedouin cope with development issues, with access to water and electricity in particular has been discussed through using grounded theory to create a framework of sorting and analyzing the empirical findings. According to Bryman (2008), this is the most widely used way of interpreting data in qualitative research.

However, the research also has a deductive side, as the findings are being discussed in relation to established theories as presented in the Literature Review and Theoretical Framework in addition to existing research reports. There is also an iterative side to the

research, as new data has been collected and analysed in order to complement emerging theories (Bryman 2008).

More data than is used in this thesis has been collected, but only the relevant data collected has been used and analyzed in order to answer the research questions in the thesis.

## 4.7 Ethical Considerations

All involved parties in the research, including local helpers in Palestine and research subjects were informed about the purpose, methods, and possible users of the research (Bryman 2008: 127) both orally and written through consent forms. However, as a majority of informants were illiterate I focused on oral explanation through my translator. I explained that the participation in the research is voluntary; that the subjects are free to refuse to answer certain questions and that all information is confidential. The issue of confidentiality is extremely important and will be enforced at all times (Bryman 2008), and only the researcher will know the true identities of participants by using pseudonyms and codes.

In addition, in order to ensure integrity, I maintained an impartial view of the political situation, and did not express personal opinions to anyone involved in the research, including translators and other helpers. There was not given any monetary rewards for participation. This is to ensure the integrity, both of the researcher and the research itself (Bryman 2008).

## 4.8 Limitations and Challenges

Apart from the interviews carried out in English, the majority of the interviews the research was carried out using a translator, as my Arabic is limited. This limits the validity of my findings to some degree, however, the translators I used were very professional and I highly trust the translations they made. Also, my understanding of Arabic is good enough to notice the few occasions they did not translate everything right.

I made sure that I transcribed all interviews immediately after the interview was over. Most of the times, I took notes as the interview progressed. However sometimes I did not take any notes during the interview, but rather wrote it down after the interview was over. Especially in

meetings with officials with limited time. I also went through the interviews and the information with my translator after the interviews were over, in order to make sure that I did not miss any information.

The main limitation in the data collection part in this research has actually been the weather, as it was conducted during the coldest winter the area has seen in years. It was cold and muddy which made it difficult to access the Bedouin communities. However, this means that their water cisterns are full and they will have fewer problems because of the water this coming year. I also had to make some practical considerations, as to how we could reach the communities. I went to communities situated fairly close to paved roads, where my driver's car could take us.

Another limitation from the data collection part was that some of the informants answered my questions strategically. These answers were sometimes detected by my translator, as they discussed what to tell me in Arabic within the household, community, or group. Other times several visits to the same community revealed that some of the answers were not truthful. However, after carefully double, and triple, checking the information, I believe that most of the data I present in this thesis reflects the life and the real problems they face.

As Israel and Palestine is such a political tense area, it is very difficult to find reliable sources, even of topics like history. A limitation for this research has been all the time I have spent trying to find reliable sources, reading through articles and books of propaganda from both the Israeli and the Palestinian side. However, I believe that the information presented in this thesis is of a good quality with use of reliable sources.

# Chapter 5: Empirical Findings

This chapter aims to paint a general picture of some of the development issues Bedouin in the West Bank face, based on empirical findings, official statistics and existing literature. The first part will present a general overview of some of the development challenges they face, followed by a discussion of their refugee status and challenges they face living in Area C. The two final parts of the chapter aims to explain the general situation for Bedouin in Area C regarding access to water and to electricity.

## 5.1 Bedouin in Area C: A Status Report

There are about 35,000 people living in 200 vulnerable herding communities and Bedouin encampments entirely in Area C (UNRWA 2010). Farmers and herders residing in Area C score lower than the general population on social indicators (UNRWA 2010). The main reasons for this are that they often live in remote areas, which lack access to public services, such as water, electricity, education, health care and basic infrastructure. As most of the Bedouin live in Area C, they are rarely permitted to build anything on their land, and are thus living in basic shelters such as tents, corrugated tin shelters, and caves (World Bank 2008). As the shelters in the encampments are very basic, they are often not sufficient in the cold winter and hot summers, either for people or animals. One of the interviewed households lived in a cave with their animals until just a few years ago, in order to keep warm in the winter (Interview 1.3). Common problems are rainwater coming into the tents or shelters, the wind bringing the tents down and accidental or intentional fires set by settlers (Interview 1.5).

Many of the Bedouin face problems related to the ongoing occupation, such as proximity to Israeli settlements, land confiscations, home demolitions, building limitations, and general restrictions of movement (Godfrey-Goldstein 2011, UNRWA 2010, UN 2011). Some places, several households share one bathroom, as they are afraid to build their own. They know that they will not get permission from Israel to build anything, and if they build them without permission they fear that the Israelis will demolish it (Interviews 1.5, 2.3). Some places visited, the proximity to the settlements is the problem itself, as some settlers are violent and destroy their homes, uproot their trees and destroy their water sources (Godfrey-Goldstein 2011, Interview 1.2). The settlers sometimes attack the Bedouin if they come to close to the fence, in one community the school bus is too afraid to come the whole way because of the

settlement (Interview 2.1).

The Bedouin have traditionally been largely dependent on livestock, such as goats, sheep, and camels. The Israeli restrictions on their movement in Area C have caused a massive reduction in herds as there is less grazing land available for the animals. 85 percent of the 1.5 million dunums of grazing land in the West Bank is closed to Palestinians due to Israeli settlements, military zones and the separation barrier (UNRWA 2010). This has led many Bedouin into debt, as they have to buy expensive fodder for their animals. They often buy the fodder on credit, and pay back after one year (Interview 5.1). Livestock has become a "financial liability rather than an asset" (UNRWA 2010:10). Several of the informants mentioned this as a major problem, and described it as "paying double", once for the animal and then paying for it again through paying for the fodder (Interview 2.1). "The serious problems here are food for the animals and water" (Interview 2.1) and "we borrowed NIS 4000, but now we don't know how to pay it back" (Interview 2.4).

Access to sufficient food is a substantial problem for many Bedouin. However, NGOs, including UNRWA, have initiated projects that help them with basic foods such as cauliflowers and rice. "Some people don't even have NIS 10 for food" (Interview 3.3). The Bedouin sometimes trade animal products for other food products (Interview 5.1). As the PA has very limited access to giver services in Area C, the access to health services are poor for the Bedouin. In encampments located close to a village or refugee camp, there would be small clinics available close by. However, the clinics are often staffed only once or twice a week, which makes it very difficult in cases of emergency. The ambulances are often stopped at check points and not allowed to pick up patients in time, few Bedouin have access to cars, taxis are reluctant to pick them up because of the location close to settlements, and public transportation in Area C is for settlers, other Israelis, and tourists only (UNDP 2011, World Bank 2008, Ma'an News 2011).

There are high levels of unemployment among the Bedouin, in one visited community consisting of around 2000 Bedouin; the community leader stated that there are 70% unemployment in the community. There are some projects initiated by the UNRWA that are helping them, but it is still a massive problem in their community (Interview 5.0). Another Bedouin explained that he works at farms in settlements. The job insecurity is high, and he

never knows how much he will able to work every month (Interview 4.1). Many Bedouin work in Israel, often without permits and send money back to their communities; "My sons sometimes work in Israel, without permission. There is no wall in the south, so they walk there" (Interview 1.5) another stated that: "If I want a job, I will search in Israel, here in West Bank there are no jobs" (Interview 2.1). This is not without danger however: "They can be beaten and go to prison" (Interview 2.4). They can apply for permits that cost them NIS 2000, but the permission is no guarantee that they will get a job (Interview 3.3).

Most of the respondents have some level of education, and most of the children attend school. The schools are usually located in villages nearby the Bedouin hamlets, the children sometimes walk to school, and other times they have school buses, or someone in the community drives them. In one of the communities it was very difficult for the children to attend school in the winter due to heavy rain and muddy roads (Interviews 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). Some go to university, but as there are high levels of unemployment it is not unusual for the university graduates to work as shepherds (Interview 2.2), or to be unemployed. Some quit university before they graduate, as they cannot afford to continue (Interviews 1.3, 1.5). Many struggle to afford higher education, some get financial support from family or organizations (Interviews 1.1). Of the older generation, several of the respondents were illiterate and had only completed primary education.

"Our lives are very simple, we live from hand to mouth. I can survive on bread and tea" (Interview 5.2)

## 5.2 Refugees in the Desert

65 % of the Bedouin in Area C are refugees (UNRWA 2010). Most of them sought refuge in the West Bank after the Israel's declaration of independence in 1948 (Godfrey-Goldstein 2011). Some of the Bedouin live in Refugee camps, but most of them live in encampments or villages.

Many of the Bedouin interviewed own the land they live on, as they used to be nomads moving to different land depending on the season. Some of the Bedouin encampments were founded as a way to keep their land: "We used to live in the city, but we were afraid that settlers would steal our land so we moved here (...) I'm going to stay here, 1948 is never

going to happen again" (Interview 1.1). One of the PNA officials also stated that this is one of the reasons they consider the Bedouin important for Palestine, because they help keeping the Palestinian land (Interview 8.1) Most of the encampments and villages are now located on areas that used to be seasonal campsites from the time all the Bedouin were nomads.

One community visited is located on the outskirts of a refugee camp, but as they are not considered refugees they are denied access to facilities, such as the water supply, electricity, and the health clinic in the refugee camp. They have family members in the refugee camp: "We lived in the desert, so no one knew about us. My brother was lucky, he bought a piece of land [in the refugee camp]" (Interview 4.1). "We are refugees, but because we are Bedouin, they don't call us refugees" (Interview 2.3).



**Figure 5.1:** Bedouin Encampment in the Desert

## 5.3 Losing their Land. Again.

The not yet finished separation barrier on the West Bank isolates many farmers from their farms, greenhouses, grazing lands and water resources (UNRWA 2010). On completion of the barrier, 15 percent of the agricultural land in the West Bank will be lost (UNRWA 2010). In addition to the separation barrier, the expansion of settlements and violence from settlers, the lack of access to infrastructure, and frequent house demolitions leaves Bedouin in Area C in a

very difficult situation and many are forced to leave their homes and land in order to meet basic needs (UN 2011).




**Figure 5.2:** The Separation Barrier in Bethlehem
**Figure 5.3:** The Separation Barrier surrounding Bethlehem

Several of the respondents feel like they are being forced out of their land: "They [Israel] want to make us so bored here that we decide to leave" (Interview 1.0) "We are sitting here on the land, just to protect it from the settlers." (Interview 1.4) "It is not good. Every two months Israelis come and demolish houses. We have to borrow money to build anything, but in the end they demolish it" (Interview 2.2).



**Figure 5.4:** Bedouin Encampment with Israeli Settlement in the Background

## 5.4 Accessing Water

Access to clean water is one of the main problems for Bedouin in the West Bank. Amnesty International (2009) states that: "Drought, lack of access to water and movement restrictions are having a particularly serious impact on Bedouins, farmers, shepherds and marginalized communities who live in Area C." (Amnesty International 2009: 61) Due to the building restrictions in the West Bank, none of the visited communities were connected, or had access to, water pipes. According to UNRWA (2010) the Israeli and Palestinian public water network services 9 % of the households in Area C compared to 82% in the whole West Bank. "It is a serious problem, in the 21$^{st}$ century everyone have water. It is the modern life, but we are going to suffer a lot. We have to use buckets and donkeys to collect the water. We can't take the car because it's illegal for us. It's not easy" (Interview 2.1).

**Ways of Collecting Water Among Visited Households**

| Collecting Rainwater | Purchasing Tankers of Water* | From Water Pipes or Natural Springs (Refugee camp, settlement, or broken pipelines) |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | 9 | 5 |

**Table 5.5:** Means of Collecting Water Among Visited Households

*Note that **all** the respondents reported to buy tankers of water, as the collected water often is insufficient, the number here are the ones that reported that buying water tankers is their main source of water.*

Among the visited household, the majority had access to water rainwater-harvesting cisterns where they collect rainwater. Some cisterns were located close to their homes others reported to walk more than one hour each way in order to fetch the water. In order to get enough water for the household, they often have to go several times. Some reported to use tractors or donkeys to transport the water. Others reported that they got water from settlements, either by stealing water from broken pipes, or from a shared water pipe located close to settlements. In

addition, all of the households reported that they have to buy water tankers for different reasons. Some places, settlements have taken over cisterns they have been using, other places due to the recent dry winters, there have not been collected sufficient water in the cisterns. Also, because of the building restrictions, they are not allowed to build new cisterns to replace the old ones (Interviews).



**Figure 5.7:** Water Harvesting Cisterns

## Hours Spent Collecting Water Among Visited Households



**Figure 5.6:** Hours Spent Collecting Water Among Visited Households

All the respondents reported that they sometimes have to buy water. They usually buy water tankers that costs around NIS 250 for 10 coobs, one water tanker lasts a family with animals for about 2-3 days. According to local sources, this is more than 10 times the price that the households that are connected to the water grid in the rest of the West Bank have to pay. The water they get is often not suitable for drinking; they need water purifiers in order for it to become drinking water. The Bethlehem governorate provide some water purifiers for Bedouin in the Bethlehem area, and some others get purifiers from organisations (interviews).

The impacts of lack of access to water are many. Water is linked to several development issues as mentioned in the literature review, and for Bedouin in Area C there are various problems connected to the lack of access to water. The World Bank reports that water borne disease is common in small communities not connected to the water network (UN 2011). Other problems include lack of water for the animals, water for growing vegetables and crops. This in turn lessens income, "Last year we didn't get any water from the rain, and all of our crops died" (Interview 6.2).

## 5.5 Accessing Electricity

**Access to Electricity among Visited Households**



**Figure 5.8:** Access to Electricity among Visited Households

All of the visited communities have some access to electricity, but only one of the visited communities was connected to the electricity grid. One community got access to electricity from solar panels one month before the research took place, and several of the households are use aggregates. The majority of the visited households had access to electricity from solar panels (Interviews). In one visited community they accessed electricity through a wind turbine in addition to the solar power, but none of the interviewed households received electricity from the turbine. "Some foreign people [Israeli] helped us get electricity. We get it through a cable in the ground from the solar panels. We have to hide the cable from Israelis." (Interview 1.3)

All of the respondents had access to a mobile phone, the ones that did not have access to electricity in their household go to the nearest town or village to charge their phones. The majority of the households had access to a radio, however, most of the radios used batteries and can be used without access to electricity. The households with no access to electricity used kerosene lamps for light, and some used generators to get electricity. The generators however, are very expensive: "It is more expensive than owning a car" (Interview 7.1). He stated that it costs NIS 1 000 to repair it if something goes wrong.

**Overview over Electrical Appliances Available in the Visited Households**



**Figure 5.9:** Overview Electrical Appliances Available in Visited Households

As figure 6.9 shows, the households had access to a variety of electrical appliances. In some communities they shared some of the appliances, such as TV ("The only problem is what to watch" (Interview 2.6)), refrigerator, and washing machine. In the community that recently received electricity, there were few appliances at the time of the interview, however when a visit was made two months later; they shared 12 refrigerators and 8 washing machines in the community (interview 1.6).

The fear of demolitions also affected this: "We have lights and a TV, but we don't want any more [electrical appliances] in case Israel demolish our home" (Interview 1.3). One of the respondents were interviewed only a few days after her house was demolished, she lived in a house next to the ruins of her old house; "I have a TV, some Israeli activists gave me one today" (Interview 2.3).

## 5.6 Summary

As this chapter shows, the Bedouin face many challenges and are deprived of many of the rights and access to objects people other places in the world, including in the rest of Palestine, take for granted. The lack of access to water especially has many side effects that make it a substantial problem in their daily lives. The amount of time spent collecting water for example. Access to electricity is also a major problem, as many daily tasks will have to happen during daylight. The overall fear of, and actual demolitions, and threats from settlers are also major problems in many of the communities, and affect the access to water and electricity.

# Chapter 6: Analysis

## Part 1: Policy

### 6.1 Background: Investigating the State Building Plan as a Development Plan

The state building plan "Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" was introduced in 2009, aiming to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders in two years. The document is based on the Basic Law, resolutions from the PNC, and the PLO (PNA 2010). Seeing the state building plan through the lenses of sustainable development and development as freedom poverty, it is necessary to go back to the Literature Review, and the theories presented there. Looking at the development, and state building plans for Palestine, they are all committed to sustainable development and all the freedom criteria as listed by Sen (1999); political, economic, social, transparency guarantees, and protective security.

The state building plan lists several target areas that the Palestinian National Authority planned to work on during the two years from 2009 to 2011. The PNA applied for full membership in the United Nations in September 2011. They were denied full membership, despite diplomatic efforts, and support from several countries. They did achieve full membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), which is not recognition of them as a state per say, but it is a step on the way for full recognition of Palestine as a state. "Our ultimate objective, a free and independent Palestinian State in the territories occupied in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital, has not yet been realized. But we have created an environment, recognized by the international community, in which we, Palestinians, are now prepared for such statehood" (PNA 2011: 7).

The state building plan emphasizes the building of state institutions in order to provide for the needs of the Palestinian people regardless of the ongoing occupation, which has left Palestine lacking several of the services people in other countries take for granted: "It is time for our people to obtain their unconditional freedom and national rights as required by international law" (PNA 2009: 3). "The conditions under which the Palestinian people now live are probably the harshest ever. Witnessing forced migration, displacement, imprisonment, assassinations, impoverishment and deprivation, Palestinian families and society are suffering

terribly" (PNA 2009: 24). The government is aiming to "Contributing to providing basic needs of citizens, including implementation of social aid programs" (PNA 2009: 28). This commitment is made for the geographic and political area of the State of Palestine, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip "without distinction of the untenable divisions between the so-called 'Area A', 'Area B' and 'Area C'" (PNA 2010: 2). However, the main efforts are being made in the West Bank (PNA 2010), through improved social services (PNA 2010). The efforts are also difficult to implement for the PNA in Area C due to the restrictions by Israel (Interviews).

In addition to a focus on state building, the plan also consists of several development goals, despite the difficulties of obtaining sustainable development under occupation; "it is our national duty to do all that we can to pull our economy out of the cycle of dependence and marginalization" (PNA 2009: 11). There are several development issues that can be identified in the document; "Shelter, education and health insurance are basic rights which will be preserved and protected by the state" (PNA 2009: 7). There is also an overall emphasis on developing the economy of Palestine in order to reduce the current aid-dependency (PNA 2009) and in the follow-up report of 2010, the PNA states that they "are making progress towards reducing reliance on external aid" (PNA 2010: 3), the budget deficit has been reduced from 25% in 2009 to 15% in 2010, including by raising taxes (UNCTAD 2011). However, Palestine was also affected by the world wide financial crisis, and the planned reduction could not be met (PNA 2011). Some of the people are not happy with the taxes however, a community leader in a Bedouin community stated that: "We need support from them, not to take money from us" (Interview 3.0).

There is also a focus on water and electricity access: "In the 21st century, the lack of water, electricity networks, and roads in certain marginalized Palestinian communities is almost beyond belief. The Government will strive to build infrastructure in the in rural and marginalized areas, thereby advancing social justice, equitable distribution of resources and citizens' steadfastness on their homeland" (PNA 2009: 35).

Development of the local government is stressed throughout the plans, and on how the local government cooperates with the private sector and civil society. "Encouraging the private sector and civil society organizations to cooperate with local government units to implement

development projects" (PNA 2009: 21) and "The Government is committed to developing the capacities of local government units, promote their participation in the development process, and help them attain financial and administrative independence" (PNA 2009: 17). Through partnerships between communities and government, more than thousand community-based initiatives were being implemented within the first year (PNA 2010). Much of the implementation goes through the local civil society:  "The PNA give projects to us, and we implement them" (Interview 9.6).

The Bedouin Community is not mentioned in the document, but there is mentioned how there is a plan to support minority groups: "In the face of restrictions imposed by the occupation regime, the Government struggles each day to deliver support and assistance to our citizens, especially isolated communities and other marginalized and vulnerable groups." (PNA 2009: 12). "The Government will provide a social safety net to bring short term relief from the occupation regime's impact. In the medium term, following establishment of the Palestinian state, the social safety net will provide social protection to marginalized and deprived social groups" (PNA 2009: 24).  The government also aims to "provide quality education and health care to all citizens regardless of social class" (PNA 2009: 24). An interview with a government official confirms these efforts, he also states that the PNA is dependent on donors, and the policies from the PNA regarding the Bedouin are influenced by what the donors have planned (Interview 8.2). He also states that "The Bedouin have different needs than others, but they are being treated like everyone else in Palestine" (Interview 8.2).

However, there are mentioned groups that the government plan to give cash transfers to: "severely impoverished families; families affected by the occupation regime's policies in Gaza, areas adjacent to the Separation Wall, Jerusalem, and in the Jordan Valley; and, to orphans."(PNA 2009: 24).  And: "Promoting, in cooperation with other relevant bodies, steadfastness of citizens living in uniquely threatened areas, such as Jerusalem, communities affected by the Wall and settlements" (PNA 2009: 25). It is difficult to know if these mentioned groups include some Bedouin, but there are many Bedouin that are severely affected by the wall, settlements, and that live in the Jerusalem-area. The plan also states that the government will help poor communities by "Providing food packages to families amongst the poorest 60% of Palestinian families which do not receive cash assistance and to pregnant and breast feeding mothers within the poorest 40% of the population" (PNA 2009: 24).

However, according to interviews with Bedouin, they have not received such help from the Government. They have however received some food support from organisations such as UNRWA (Interview 9.6 and interviews with Bedouin). A local government official stated that: "They give food and simple things, it's not a lot, but at least it's something" (Interview 8.3). In the follow-up document of 2010, the Bedouin are still not mentioned, but the PNA states that they will "focus projects on marginalized areas and Area C, especially in the Jordan Valley, southern Hebron, Wall-affected areas" (PNA 2010: 37). It also states that the PNA will "Provide legal services and support to farmers affected by the Wall and settlements." (PNA 2010: 37).

The state building plan identifies the main source of the development problems within the Palestinian territory as rooted in the ongoing Israeli occupation: "Rebuilding the Palestinian economy is critical to our goal to establish an independent Palestinian state. This requires the lifting of the burden of restrictions and sanctions imposed by the occupation regime on the Palestinian economy. These include closures, military checkpoints, and other arbitrary measures which fragment the Palestinian territory and impede movement of people and goods" (PNA 2009: 30). In addition, as Israel remains control over Area C, which covers 60% of the West Bank, there are severe difficulties in building or implementing anything in the area, as they must apply for permission from Israel, which they rarely get (PNA 2011, World Bank 2008, UNDP 2011). Not only is it difficult to obtain the permissions, Israel also demolishes many existing structures, in addition to the ones that are made without permission. In an area on the outskirts of Bethlehem, Area C, 8 streetlights were illegally installed in the winter of 2012, Israel responded by demolishing 52 streetlights, three houses and a Restaurant in the area (Local source, Ma'an News 2012-2).

In the follow-up document, this described as follows:

> "Real impediments, however, remain obvious to us and all donors involved in Palestine. The Israeli occupation remains the major obstacle to establishing the State of Palestine and the territory remains fragmented into areas designated as "A", "B", and "C" under the Oslo Accord. There is no territorial link between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, or contiguity within the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Israeli restrictions on movement and access, including their full control of external border crossings into the West Bank and Gaza, continue to be real obstacles to establishing the state. The West

*Bank's natural resources, such as land and water, are predominantly out of reach for Palestinians. The political climate remains unstable, which stifles growth and hampers business confidence. The occupation is curbing foreign investment and business partnerships, which undermines the integration and competitiveness of the local economy"*

<div align="right">(PNA 2011: 12)</div>

Going back to Sen (1999), all the instrumental freedoms can be identified in the original state building plan. The PNA aims to increase the political freedom by: "Promote democracy, transparency and civil society participation" (PNA 2009: 20). The economic freedom can be seen as they aim: "To initiate a sustainable economic recovery and to rebuild the national economy" (PNA 2009: 30). They also target social freedom through: "Preserving social cohesion (…), Providing social protection (…) Preserving cultural heritage (…) Promoting equal opportunities" (PNA 2009: 24). The transparency guarantee is secured through: "…develop effective institutions of government based on the principles of good governance, accountability and transparency" (PNA 2009: 3). The last principle of protective security is also being fulfilled: "The state of Palestine respects human rights and guarantees equal rights and duties for all citizens. Its people live in safety and security under the rule of law, safeguarded by an independent judiciary and professional security services. (PNA 2009: 6).


## 6.2 Water Access Strategies in Area C

As water is one of the key concerns for Palestine in general, and for Bedouin communities specifically, there are numerous strategies for dealing with the issue. The PNA and the civil society both have plans for development of the water sector. However, Israel remains in control over water resources in Area C, which in many places are large uninhabited areas. These areas are places where the PNA would like to initiate "large infrastructure projects, such as wastewater treatment plants, landfills, water pipelines, and main roads" (PNA 2009: 35). These areas are also often grazing areas for Bedouin, or zones that are turned into national parks, so called Green Zones. It is uncertain how these projects will benefit the Bedouin in Area C, due to the severe restrictions on building and movement.

As Israel denies PNA developing of such projects in Area C, many donor-funded projects are completely stopped, or indefinitely suspended (PNA 2009). Some well drilling projects have been initiated, but the Israel restricts how deep they are allowed to drill for water, and how

much water they can access (Interview 9.5). The PNA works with the international community to put pressure on Israel in order to get projects started again. Recently, the EU decided to invest in Area C, regardless of the restrictions from Israel (EU 2012).

The water-projects in Area C are mainly by the civil society. There are several NGOs working in the area, with international funding. As the PNA are unable to work in the area, the civil society works with the local government and the beneficiaries in order to execute the plans. The civil society however, is also restricted by Israel, and is in many cases threatened by demolition orders, attacks from settlers and logistical problems due to the occupation. The Government states in its plans that they plan to build water harvesting cisterns, water pipes and wells (PNA 2010).

The water supply infrastructure has been improved overall in the West Bank in the past few years, and the majority of the Palestinian households are connected to the water supply networks. This does not however, mean that they all have access to water. There are frequently severe water shortages all over the West Bank, including in Area A. The total supply of about 85 Million Cubic Meters (MCM) (2010 est) is 42- 145 MCM per year less than the WHO standards (PNA 2011-2).

### 6.2.1   Water Strategies in the Palestinian Authority

Following the Oslo Agreement, there should be a joint initiative between Israel and Palestine, called the Joint Water Committee (JWC). The JWC however, does not function as intended. Mainly because of the fundamental asymmetries regarding power, capacity, information, and interests (World Bank 2009).

PWA manages the water sector in Palestine; they have adopted the principles of the IWRM as discussed in the Literature Review (Awad and Höllander 2010). However, both empirical evidence and literature suggests that the PWA is in a difficult situation, due to the ongoing occupation (Amnesty International 2009, The World Bank 2009, interviews).

The PWA is dependent on international donors for funding, and this have to follow donor's priorities in many situations, and are largely not in control of the water resources they are supposed to manage (World Bank 2009, Interview 8.2). Amnesty International (2009)

suggests that that the poor coordination among donors and internal divisions due to poor management and allegations of corruption has added to the difficult situation regarding water in Palestine. The result of these problems, both the problems due to Israel and the internal problems within Palestine itself, has left the PNA and PWA unable to overcome the obstacles they face regarding water in Palestine. These problems are not only visible in Area C, both even in Area A, where the PNA and PWA have the authority for law enforcement (Amnesty International 2009).

The water strategy for Israel has been to limit the water available water for the Palestinians in order to supply Israel. The restrictions for water access for Palestinians are so severe that it has "severely impaired realization of the Palestinians' right to adequate food, health, work and to achieve a decent standard of living" (Amnesty International 2009). This has especially affected the marginal communities in Gaza, East Jerusalem, and in Area C, including the Bedouin.

The original state building plan does nevertheless include some specific goals for developing the water sector:

- *Ensuring that all Palestinian water rights are secured.*
- *Developing regional cooperation in the management of water resources.*
- *Developing effective water management methods.*
- *Developing legislation to protect and preserve water resources.*
- *Ensure that water-related services are delivered to all residential locales in Palestine through:*
    - *Developing main water networks and pipelines, and digging new wells.*
    - *Developing and implementing a program for the maintenance of wells and water networks on a regular and emergency basis.*
    - *Concentrating on supplying water to rural areas, remote and marginalized areas, and areas affected by the Separation Wall.*
    - *Devising plans and studies for constructing water purification plants in the Gaza Strip*

*(PNA 2009: 38)*

### 6.2.2   Water Strategies in the Civil Society

The water strategies in the civil society are closely connected to the strategies of the PNA and face several of the same challenges. The empirical evidence suggests that the main strategy from the civil society organisations working with Bedouin, the strategy is often to distribute water tankers, water filters and financial help to buy water (Interviews). However, there are some more elaborate projects, such as creating wells and water harvesting cisterns.

A field visit was conducted to one of the wells in the outskirts of Bethlehem, to a new water well project that consists of 58 wells throughout the West Bank (USAID 2011). The project is initiated through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in cooperation with the PNA. There are several such wells in development throughout the West Bank, and there are high hopes of getting water from these sources, water can be seen pumping from the ground in the desert in these areas. However, as these water sources belong to the PNA, they are being used to supply Areas A and B in Bethlehem and Hebron, there is confusion if these projects will actually benefit the Bedouin, living right next to the plants, in Area C. One informant from a Bedouin community close by stated that they would be given access to the water from the wells, but a Bedouin leader said that they will not benefit from this water as it will go to exclusively to Area A and B.



**Figure 6.1:** Small water tanks, used for collecting water from wells and cisterns.
**Figure 6.2:** Water tanker

## 6.3 Electricity Strategies in Area C

The public infrastructure, including access to electricity varies greatly in Palestine. This is due to the distribution of population and the limited financial resources, but also the Israeli restrictions. The PNA (2010) identifies infrastructure as means to achieve social and

economic development and electricity is thus a priority for the government. However, as the remote communities in Area C are being denied the access to the electricity grid, there is not much the state can do about the situation (Interviews). They are supportive of civil society initiatives, such as solar and wind turbine power projects (Interviews).

### 6.3.1 Electricity Strategies from the Palestinian National Authority

Despite clear strategies from the PNA regarding electricity and other energy and infrastructure issues, there is still lack of proper infrastructure many places in Palestine. In Areas A and B, there is now a unified electricity tariff system that is being implemented, including prepaid electricity meters. Due to the restrictions of building in Area C however: "we were prevented from (…) establishing regional connection points for our electricity network to serve communities in "Area C" " (PNA 2011: 57).

However, the state building plan stated clearly what objectives the PNA have regarding the issue of electricity in Palestine:

> *Ensure that the electricity supply is delivered to citizens through:*
> - *Developing and rehabilitating internal electricity networks and main electricity lines.*
> - *Completing the Rural Electricity Project to provide electricity to all citizens, with particular focus on locales affected by the Separation Wall and other marginalized and remote areas.*
> - *Rehabilitating the Gaza electricity generation station."*
>
> *(PNA 2009:37)*

### 6.3.2 Energy Strategies in the Civil Society

Due to the restrictions of building and developing Area C, the civil society organisations working with electricity for Bedouin focuses on community based solar panels and wind turbines rather than connecting them to the electricity grid.

Empirical evidence was collected from two organisations; Comet-ME and ARIJ, which in particular work with implementing solar power and wind turbines for Bedouin in Area C. They have different strategies, but the main concern for both organisations is the danger of

demolitions (interviews 9.1 and 9.2). Comet-ME stresses the importance of providing remote communities, including Bedouin, with electricity and how it helps them: "The refrigerators help them, now they can store the meat from the sheep rather than give away the meat because they cant store it" and "An old man thanked us, because now he can keep his insulin in a refrigerator. He used to go to the village [half an hour away] to get it" (Interview 9.1).

ARIJ, which is a bigger organisation and research institute has a little different approach: "This is not what is needed in Palestine, to support 30-40 Bedouin with light (…) The Bedouin only want a TV" (Interview 9.2). These differences may also be seen in the strategies for implementation of electricity. Whereas Comet-ME has an aim of providing everyone with electricity (Interview 9.1), and works in several communities, to provide electricity for *everyone* in the community, ARIJ focuses on the households. They let the communities decide who will get electricity.

Both organisations state that they have a good relationship with the PNA, and that they work together. However, as the PNA has no jurisdiction over Area C, they cannot help them with much other than political support, even regarding the demolition orders (Interview 9.1).



**Figure 6.3:** Solar Panels in Bedouin Encampment

## 6.4 Summary

As this chapter shows, there is no lack of good intentions either in the National Plans from the PNA or in the civil society sector. However, due to the severe restrictions of movement, and the difficulties of obtaining building permits for Area C leaves many Bedouin communities on the outside of these projects.

There are also differences in the strategies concerning the Bedouin. The national plans for the PNA seems to be without specific strategies for the Bedouin, which they have a right to as indigenous people. The civil society organisations interviewed also had different views on this, whereas bringing electricity to remote communities is a plan for a long-term solution, with plans for the system to last more than 10 years, bringing water tankers to remote communities cannot be seen as a long term development-effort, but rather as a short-term improvement of a bad situation.

# Part 3: Practice – Implementing Development Strategies

As shown above, the implementation of development strategies in Palestine is largely done by civil society with support from the PA. Especially in Area C, where the PA has no real power to change the currently situation. The Bedouin in Area C identify problems themselves, and suggest for the governor through their own hierarchal system development issues they want help to solve. For the governor's office, the Bedouins requests are being treated like other suggestions, and as their needs often are different from other communities, the Bedouin themselves and the civil society organisations interviewed found it challenging to meet the needs. As demolition orders from Israel is threatening a lot of the development efforts that are being made, such as destruction of solar panels and water cisterns, the PA and civil society also need to plan in case such events occur. In late 2011, a change happened, as the EU decided to invest in Area C, with this political decision, the EU is challenging Israel's occupation, and even though there have been increased investments, there have also been increased demolitions and violence.

## 6.5 The Palestinian National Authority as Bystanders to own Development

The Oslo agreements, that divides the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, was never meant to last forever. It was intended as an interim agreement, that would give more control to the Palestinian National Authority as development of the initial Areas A and B progressed. However, these boundaries continues to create headache for the PNA, as the Area C is home to the most of the rural population, including Bedouin, that lack basic needs such as adequate shelter and access to water. As a result of this, the civil society is filling a missing role in the Palestinian society, as they can implement development efforts in Area C. This is consistent with theory of development in post-conflict societies, as discussed in the Literature Review, that the civil society fills a role that the state yet cannot fill (Hughes 2012). One of the respondents from a civil society organisation stated that his organization work closely with the PNA, but as they are restricted from doing anything in Area C, it does not help that much "They make policies, but don't implement them, because they cant" (Interview 9.2).

As the PNA has very little control over what happens in Area C, as they have problems implementing development strategies in the area. One government official states that "the Bedouin are always in our minds" (Interview 8.1), and that they are very important for the PNA, as they refuse to leave their land and continue to live in the areas. These are the areas Palestine is likely to lose because of the ongoing occupation and continued expansion of existing settlements and outposts. However, due to limited economic resources, continued threats of demolitions and restrictions of movement in the West Bank, Bedouin are struggling to keep the areas they currently live in.

However, the PNA give funding for village councils, in line with the State Building Plan in strengthening Local Governments, and for build up areas, and areas that are both in Area B and Area C especially, the interests of all the members are well looked after regarding school, health etc. However, this does not stop the building restrictions in Area C, and paved roads finish after Area B, electricity and water is only for the part of the community on the Area B side. One local government official stated that much of the problems with Area C and the PNA lie in the complicated bureaucracy, both in relating to Israeli authorities and to the PNA itself (Interview 8.5).

The PNA is also helpless when it comes to the demolition orders: "We focus on the legal

aspects, and give some financial support as compensation" (PNA 8.4). However, several of the Bedouin complained that they have not seen the financial support, only heard promises of it. Especially concerning detainees (Interviews).

In a Bedouin village on the outskirts of Bethlehem, located partially in Area B and Area C, there are some houses intended for Bedouin moving from Area C to Area B. These houses however are empty, as no one wanted to live in them. "We tried to live there for 10 days, but it was like a prison cell" (Interview 5.2). It is unclear who started this project or what the intention was, but in Israel there have been a political strategy to move Bedouin into certain areas, sometimes referred to as townships (Interviews).



**Figure 6.4:** Housing Project for Bedouin in Area B

## 6.6 NGOs in the Field: Addressing Development Challenges

The NGOs interviewed work in implementing water and electricity projects in Bedouin communities. They work differently, but the common denominator is what seems to be strong connection to the PNA on the one side, and to the communities on the other side (Interviews).

The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) is an NGO that work especially closely with the PNA as they also work as a research institute. They help the PNA make plans and policies related to development. However; "If they do wrong, we criticize. I don't care" (Interview 9.2). They also stressed that they are not a part of the PNA, but rather that they work together. They see this as a win-win situation, as the PNA have difficulties implementing what the

NGOs can. They don't particularly prioritize Area C, as they work in "All Palestine, we don't care about Area A, B and C" (Interview 9.2).

There are also other development problems in Palestine, and they are not all related to the occupation: "Because of the occupation there are a lot of problems. But there are a lot of problems within the Palestinian society as well. People are narrow minded and think only about their own family. Not about the community. They want to just stay in their own city, they are not interested in developing other areas. For example in Bethlehem, where there are no sidewalks and rubbish everywhere, but people have big houses and new cars." (Interview 9.1)

There are also challenges in working with the Bedouin community, as most of the NGO workers (Interview 9.3) are not from Bedouin communities they find it difficult to work in the communities, due to cultural differences. Especially regarding women issues, and men working with women issues are very uncommon among the Bedouin. One representative from an NGO stated, that these issues were resolved as time went by, but that it was still challenging. I could also observe some of these challenges first hand as I made my interviews with Bedouin, during meals women were separated from the men, and in community meetings there were only men present.

## 6.7 Solving Water Issues

As perhaps the most obvious development challenge in Palestine is the lack of access to water, this is something several civil society organisations are working on. The restrictions in Area C make the work very challenging. Many of the NGOs focus their water efforts on donating water tankers, however some oppose this strategy "this is stupid, going back to your roots is better than anything else" (Interview 9.2), and suggest that the efforts rather should be focused on building wells and water collecting cisterns.

A representative for the Joint Service Council for Planning and Development (JSCPD) states that the water tanker-projects have worked well, as it has encouraged more Bedouin to move to the area where they distribute the water tankers. They also provide water tankers to remote areas, where they have no other option of accessing water. They also make water harvesting cisterns, as are other organisations, for example the YMCA (Interview 9.4). They expand

already existing cisterns and build new ones (Interview 9.4). This is the traditional way that the Bedouin and other communities used to collect water for themselves and their animals.

The problem of water is however divided in two. On the one hand there is a problem with accessing water, on the other hand there is a problem of debt because of water. Many places, the Bedouin have to buy water tankers, at 10 times the price than in other areas, and with little income, they buy the water on credit. This creates a cycle where they become indebted in addition to still lacking water (Interview 9.3).

## 6.8 Solving Electricity Issues

The two different NGOs interviewed, that deal with electricity issues among the Bedouin have different strategies as discussed above.

They also have different strategies in choosing who the beneficiaries are going to be. Comet-ME work with whole communities and their strategy and overall aim is that everyone should have access to electricity. They had to start somewhere, which is why they started in South Hebron Hills. They work not only with Bedouin, but also with other rural communities that lack electricity. In some areas they provide wind turbines, in other areas they provide solar power. Their biggest challenge is the constant struggle with Israel, as they continue to issue demolition orders on their systems (Interview 9.1).

ARIJ provide solar power on the household level. Some households are very large, so the solar panel serves can benefit 40 people all belonging to the same household. The organisation has meetings with the different households and chooses who gets the electricity. They experience a lot of problems with nepotism within the Bedouin community and if they cannot agree on who gets electricity they pull out of the projects. They always agree in the end, but it can be challenging to work with Bedouin. They sometimes bring government officials to make it easier. Comet-ME also reported some difficulties working with the Bedouin. Some of the challenges could be related to the fact that Comet-ME is being run by Israelis (I experienced some of these challenges first hand in a community meeting).

Comet-ME does not charge the communities for the installation of electricity, but is funded by donors. They do however, charge the communities for the power they use. The money will

be placed in an account, which will be used to pay for repairs and changing of parts that will be necessary in approximately 10 years, which is the expected life for the system (Interview 9.1). ARIJ do however not charge the Bedouin for installation or electricity, and sees the support as in-kind help (Interview 9.2).

Comet-ME makes electricity stations for the whole community, this makes the electricity stronger and it can support more appliances than at the household level. One of the strongest criticisms towards the household level electricity is that the panels are barely enough to have light in the tents (Interview 5.1, 8.1). On the larger electricity systems however, they can share refrigerators and washing machines in the community. Some claim that the Bedouin only wants TVs anyway, so the electricity provided is enough. But according to Comet-ME, there are many other benefits from electricity, as they now have lights for the animals, which help them when they need attention after dark. They can have refrigerators, which help them store food and keep water cold. They can also have washing machines, which free a lot of time, especially for the women in the community (Interview 9.1).

As Comet-ME installs electricity systems for whole communities, sometimes as big as hundreds of households, the systems are fairly big. In some communities there are several systems, in order to reach all the members. It is very unsure what the fate of these systems will be, and there is a date in the court at June 6th 2012 (Interview 2.6) where they will find out whether the systems in one of the communities will be demolished or not. In one community, the solar panels were located one of the few buildings in the community without demolition orders, and thus have no problems with this: "I'm sorry to hear about the demolition orders in other communities" (Interview 2.1). In another community, the control room is located under the ground, and camouflaged so the Israeli soldiers would be unable to see it (Interview 1.0). The organisation work with the PNA and the EU in this issue, but as the control over Area C remains with Israel; there is little they can do. ARIJ have not had any demolition orders on their systems. Neither of the NGOs applies for permission from Israel to build the electricity systems "We will never get any approval anyway" (Interview 9.2).

## 6.9 Summary

As this chapter shows, the implementation of development strategies in Area C is virtually impossible for the PNA. The civil society organisations have taken over much of the

responsibility in implementation. However, this does not mean that the PNA is detached from the process, as the civil society cooperate with the authorities and in most cases work towards the same goals.

# Part 4: Participation

## 6.10 Are the Bedouin Communities Active Participants?

### 6.10.1 Motivation for Participation

The communities visited were all highly motivated for participation in water and electricity projects. Most of the Bedouin interviewed stated that water was their main concern, and that they welcome projects that make it easier to access water, both for drinking and sanitation.

However, one respondent states that he have some ideas as to how to solve the water issues in his community, but organizations do not listen to him. Several of the Bedouin interviewed had similar ideas and solutions on how to help their own communities that they feel like no one listens to (Interview 2.1, 7.3). Another stated that "Some [members of the same community] get solar panels, but it seems like it's for selected people. We don't know why we don't get it" (Interview 5.1).

In installing electricity, the communities visited that had access to electricity were very happy with the participation in the projects. The communities without access to electricity had to rely on expensive generators in order to access some electricity when the needed, or to get electricity from other sources, such as stretching an electricity wire from a nearby refugee camp. In some of these communities, there were other development projects which they welcomed. All the communities visited were overall very positive to help from organizations, however they live in Area C and know about the difficulties related to helping them in their area of residence.

### 6.10.2 Planning Processes

The majority of the civil society organizations interviewed stressed community participation (Interview 9.1, 9.3, 9.4). The official documents from the PNA do not show any emphasis on

community participation in the planning process, but official sources state that the Bedouin are involved in the planning process (Interviews 8.1, 8.2).

Both Comet-ME and JSCPD conduct field visits where they find out through the Village Councils what the needs of the community are (Interviews 9.1 and 9.3). Comet-ME also have a social researcher in their team, that assess the situation before implementation, and monitors the effects during and after implementation (Interview 9.1). After assessing the needs, the organizations will try to address the problems. For some organizations, the funding is already there, but the way it is going to be implemented in the particular community is being assessed. For others, there is need for funding for the projects, the planning process happens with the community and then they apply for funding (Interview 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3).

The PNA has been critized, both by their own reports and external reports, for neglecting the community participation in planning and implementing projects, especially concerning marginalized groups (PNA 2010). In several of the communities it also appeared to be poor understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the PNA and the civil society "We asked the governor for a new tent, but he gave us nothing" (Interview 2.4).

In the official documents for development of the water sector, the PNA lists several strategic objectives, and after identifying participation as a weakness they state that "Enhancing and maximizing the participation of all civil society segments in the decision making process" (PNA 2010: 14) is one of their main objectives.  They want to obtain this in order to strengthen the water and wastewater institutions through involving the civil society in desicionmaking and planning. They also aim to focus on water awareness among the people (PNA 2010).

However, as all the planning regarding Area C has to go through the Civil Administration in order to get the Israeli permissions, the public participation is sometimes impossible as the process is being done even without representatives from the PNA: "the planning approval is (…) without public participation or representation by Palestinians, using outdated regional plans, and as though the land and water resources were the property of the Israeli state" (World Bank 2009:58)

Several of the Bedouin interviewed suggested that they want their own representative in the senate, in order to be able to participate more, and to influence policies that affect the Bedouin. Several of the Bedouin interviewed stated that they feel overlooked in the planning process, both in relation to the PNA and to the civil society (Interviews).

### 6.10.3 Implementation

Comet-ME stresses participation in the implementation process, and the whole community is involved in the installation of the electricity systems. The communities cannot be involved in the actual electrical work, but they help with digging and preparing. They are all involved in getting the electricity to their homes (Interviews). "We worked together, like one hand, it never happened before" (Interview 2.6). Comet-ME states however, that there is not always easy to get the community involved, and some are reluctant to help (Interview 9.1). When implementing the water cistern projects, the Bedouin are highly involved. "They [the Bedouin] are the one who dig it, prepare it and manage it" Interview 9.3). The organisation work as a facilitator, they map the situation, and apply for the funding, but the actual making of the cisterns is being done by the Bedouin themselves.

### 6.13.2 Monitoring and Follow-up

The follow-up of the projects are an important part of the projects. Comet-ME sees their projects as a continous process, they og back to the communities on a regular basis, this is confirmed by the communities: "They are the best, they come every two weeks to check for things that need fixing" (Interview 2.1). Their visits include to check for maintenance, billing or general upgrades of the system. In order to do this, they need to have a good relationships with the communities. They also monitor how much electricity that are being used in the communities, sometimes to find out the system is being pressured too much by overusing of electricity. This can cause problems for the electricity access in the night. They have to teach people about electricity use, and show them how much electricity a washing machine use for example. The continuous relationship means a continuous evaluation process (Interview 9.1).

One PNA official stated in an interview that they would like to have more follow up of the projects implemented by NGOs, but that there is no funding for it (Interview 8.1). They do however have monthly coordination meetings with the organisations operating in the area.

They do not have a specific plan for the Bedouin, but they might create one in the Hebron area (Interview 8.4).

# Part 5: Outcomes from Water and Electricity Projects in Bedouin Communities

## 6.11  Is it Possible to Achieve Development in Area C?

Development in Area C is challenging, both for the PNA, the Civil society and the residents. As Israel seizes more and more land for expanding settlements, the residents are often forced to relocate and it is virtually impossible for many to obtain building permits in order to accommodate the increase in population and to improve basic services.

Contrary to what many urban Palestinians believe, many Bedouin are not satisfied with their lifestyle, none of the interviewed Bedouin were happy about there situation. One respondent said that: "No one deserves to live here" (Interview 1.4) and others stated that: "Every year is worse than the one before" (Interview 5.2) and development was explained as: "All the time you go back" (Interview 2.3).

Following the institution-building theory for development, in order to achieve development through state-building there are some criteria that needs to be filled; property rights, constraints of the actions of powerful groups, and equal opportunities (Acemoglu et al 2006) as mentioned in the literature review. For many the Bedouin in Area C, none of these are fulfilled.

They rarely own the land they live on: "God owns this land" (Interview 4.2). If they do own the land, it is often not recognized by Israel as they did not register their land ownership before Israel seized control after the 1967 war (World Bank 2008). The World Bank (2008) states that the system of land registration and the way the property rights work in Area C results in: "a system that suppresses rather than promotes Palestinian development" (World Bank 2008:13).

As the Bedouin are systematically oppressed by Israel, especially by the settlers, and due to the difference in rights in Area C in comparison to Area A and B, there is no doubt that they

are subject to suppression by powerful groups and lack equal opportunities. One of the communities interviewed has even been moved, due to settlement expansion, the whole community have been relocated and now several of the inhabitants face demolition orders on structures they built after they were moved, including on water harvesting cisterns and solar panels and wind turbines for electricity (Interview 1.0).

Following this argument, it can seem like development in Area C is impossible, especially concerning water and electricity. Even with initiatives and financial support from international organisations, including the EU and UN agencies, it seems like development initiatives for the Bedouin residing in Area C is systematically being stopped by Israeli Authorities through refusing to give permissions and demolitions of structures. However, the EU has since 2011 decided to invest in Area C, without waiting for the permissions from Israel and there are several Civil society organisations that are working for development in the area. Many of the Civil society Organisationss also work on behalf of the PNA and are thus implementing plans the government are unable to implement themselves (Interview 9.2). There are also lawyers and organisations ready to help the Bedouin face the demolition orders. One of the communities visited during the research for this thesis are currently (May 2012) in court trying to save their solar power systems.

## 6.12  Community Development

As development strategies for Area C can be difficult to implement, many civil society organisations focus on community development. The PNA is also supporting the Bedouin communities, through supporting village councils as part of their effort to strengthen local governance. Comet-ME emphasizes community development when implementing their strategies in Bedouin communities and involves the whole community in installing the solar power systems.

Comet-ME also contributes to local capacity building and community development through providing some training so the Bedouin can diagnose problems and do maintenance work with the solar-power systems, however, Comet-ME solve the problems if there are any serious problems: "We are very happy with the organisation, they come the next day and fix the problems if we call them" (Interview 2.2). They do however, train people in Palestine in Solar Energy and have workshops on how to make wind turbines (Comet-Me 2009).

The outcomes of having access to electricity also contribute to community development in itself, as more people can follow the news, use computers with Internet, and children can do homework after sunset. "Children can study in the light, they used to go to the fence of the settlement to use their streetlights to do their homework" (Interview 2.3).

As the water projects visited mainly focused on distribution of water tankers, the projects have not contributed to community development in the same way.

## 6.13   Short Term vs Long Term Effects

There are several effects from implementation of water and electricity strategies in Bedouin communities. Several respondents reported different ways their lives had changed, especially after accessing electricity. The water projects that have been initiated contribute to better access to water, through providing the water tankers and in some cases helping with the rainwater harvesting cisterns. However, there are limited outcomes from such help, as it is more of a band-aid than a holistic development effort.

### 6.13.1  Short Term Effects of Electricity Access

There are many short-term effects of accessing Electricity. As discussed in the Literature Review, as Electricity is not a good in itself, it is the electrical appliances that make the development-difference. Short-term effects include access to TVs for entertainment, the immediate effect of lights and the access to cold water for Ramadan. "The lights are good, I can see what's around me. The children have nothing to do, they are always inside, now they can watch TV" (Interview 1.1) and "Life is better now, we can use a fan in the summer. In the summer it is very difficult here. We have light in the dark and cold water for Ramadan" (Interview 4.2). "I used to go to [a city one hour away] to charge my phone" (Interview 1.2). This was also stressed in one community where a follow up visit was paid after they had electricity access for about three months: "Before, we had to go to [a city one hour away] to get cold water for Ramadan, this year will be better" (Interview 2.6).

**Figure 6.5:** Satellite dish in Bedouin encampment.
This photo was taken about 1 month after they first installed electricity. ("They have satellite dishes the day after we install electricity" (Interview 9.1)).
**Figure 6.6:** Electric light in a cave utilized as kitchen.

### 6.13.2 Long-Term Effects of Electricity Access

The long-term effects of electricity access are many, as discussed in the Literature Review. Comet-ME sells energy efficient, subsidized refrigerators and washing machines to the communities they install electricity in. The power in the communities is not enough to sustain a refrigerator or washing machine for each household, but they share them in the community (Interview 9.1). "Life is easier with a refrigerator" (Interview 2.6). The washing machines especially, frees up time for the women in the community, and more women, "even widows" (Interview 2.6) have time to work than before.

The access to electric lights makes it easier for children to do homework, and to do good in school. This has a long-term effect as it can contribute to raise the general education in the community. Another long-term effect connected to electricity is that of ICT. Access to computers can be very important for development, especially concerning education. Several of the Bedouin interviewed attended university through online studying; this will be enabled much easier with electricity access and computers in their homes.

Another long term effect is the benefit of electrical appliances especially relevant for their lifestyle, such as butter churners and yoghurt machines. The electrical versions of these tools frees up a lot of time compared to using the manual tools (Interviews).

**Figure 6.7:** Bedouin Assembling the Family's new Yoghurt-maker

### 6.13.3 Effects of Water Access

As none of the communities visited during the research had sufficient access to water, it is difficult to see the short-term vs the long-term effects. Some of the civil society organisations nevertheless saw some effects. One important effect of the water access is that the Bedouin stay in the area. As the Bedouin are important for keeping the land in Area C (Interview 8.1), it is in the interest of Palestine that they stay in Area C and protect the land from confiscation and settlement expansion.

In the communities however, there were not much optimism to be seen regarding the water projects. They need water, and get easier access makes life easier for them, but there are still many problems. As the water is not clean enough, they have to use purifiers in order not to get sick from the water.

However, one visible long term effect of water access, is that the Bedouin stay in the area: "Water free of charge help them stay in the area where they are, you know that they are Bedouins and lack of water will cause them to search for somewhere else to live" (Interview 9.3).

# Chapter 7: Conclusion

The overall impression of the development situation for the Bedouin is divided in two. The first impression is that development is very difficult under the current situation of occupation. The other impression is that some of the problem lies within the PNA itself.

The problem with the PNA seems to be that even if the state and development plans for Palestine are text-book examples of sustainable development and poverty theory, it does not necessarily mean that all the plans are being executed the way they should be. This problem relates to the civil society, and the role they play in the development. Even if one should recognize the role the civil society must fill as the PNA lack resources to actually do anything in Area C, the fact that there are no plans that are targeting the Bedouin specifically is a major problem. The civil society organizations and Bedouin interviewed shared this view, and asks for more participation for the Bedouin in Palestinian politics, and the political system. They are somehow neglected in the development plans and continue to be a minority that the civil society takes responsibility for.

The strong civil society can be seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution. As the PNA has little power of Area C, the civil society becomes extremely important in the development issues, however, as many of the organizations focus on refugees, it means that many Bedouin without the refugee status falls outside of the development efforts. Even if both the water and electricity strategies from both the PNA and the civil society is showing results, the projects are still too new to see the long term effects. There is also a danger that these efforts are not addressing the root cause of the problem, but rather the symptoms.

As Israel still have so much control over Area C, and seem unwilling to contribute to change the situation, through refusing building permits and continued threats of demolition, the development seem in many ways impossible to achieve. The lack of Palestinian control over their own resources makes development extremely challenging, in general, and more specifically in Area C. The other side of the problem with Israeli occupation is the settlers, and the continued harassment of many of their Palestinian neighbours, which in addition to the direct impact leads to fear in the Bedouin societies, fear of building a solar power system,

fear of going to school, fear of getting water from the cisterns, and a constant fear of someone demolishing their homes.

I will let the a quote from the PNA sum up the findings of the thesis:

> *"Realistically, genuine and sustainable development cannot occur without ending the occupation and establishing an independent, sovereign, and viable State of Palestine"*
>
> (PNA 2011: 57).

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# Appendices

## Appendix 1: Interview Guides

### 1. Interview Guide 1 - Households

| General/Background | |
|---|---|
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| Could you describe your household? How old are the members? | How many people are there in the household? |
| What is the main source of income? What kinds of work do the different members of the household do? | Do you get support from other places? (Scholarship for schools, support from family living elsewhere?) |
| What is the level of education among the family members? | How does the children get to school and university? |
| What kind of shelter do you live in? | Tent/ Corrugated tin shelter/Cave/House? How many people share? What kind of facilities do you have access to? |
| For how long have you lived here? | Do you own this land? Where did you live before you moved here? Why did you move here? |
| Do you feel that the community has changed during the past few years? | How has it changed? How was it before? |
| **About Water** | |
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How do you access water? | For drinking? For cooking? |

| Can you estimate how much water you use per day? | For sanitation?<br>For cleaning?<br>For the animals? |
|---|---|

| **If they have water facilities in the community:** | |
|---|---|
| How did you get access to water?<br><br>Who helped you get access?<br><br>How did the access to water change your daily life?<br><br>How did your consumption of water change after gaining access in the village? | Were you involved in the process?<br><br>For drinking?<br>For cooking?<br>For sanitation?<br>For cleaning?<br>For the animals? |
| Do you have to do any maintenance or work related to the water? | Do you know how to fix it if something goes wrong? |

| **If no water facilities in the community:** | |
|---|---|
| How do you get the water you need?<br><br>How many hours per day do you spend getting the water?<br><br>How many people are involved in the process of getting water? | For drinking?<br>For cooking?<br>For sanitation?<br>For cleaning?<br>For the animals? |

| **About Electricity** | |
|---|---|
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| Do you have electricity in your household?<br><br>How many electrical appliances do you own (including mobile phones)?<br><br>Can you estimate how much electricity you use each day? | |

| **If they have access to electricity in the community:** | |
|---|---|
| How do you get electricity?<br><br>Who helped you get access?<br><br>Do you have electricity every day? | Were you involved in the process?<br><br><br><br>All day? |

| | |
|---|---|
| Do you have to do any maintenance or work related to the electricity? | Do you know how to fix it if something goes wrong? |
| How did your every day life change since you got access to electricity in your house? | |

| **If there is no access to electricity in the community:** | |
|---|---|
| How do you access electricity when you need it? | Charging mobile phone? |

**Other Development Issues**

| Questions | Probe Questions |
|---|---|
| **ICT** | |
| Do you have access to a mobile phone?<br><br>Computer?<br><br>Internet?<br><br>TV?<br><br>Radio? | |
| **Unemployment** | |
| Are all the members of the household employed?<br><br>Have you experienced difficulties related to your livelihood and/or employment situation? | |
| **Health services:** | |
| How do you access health services? | |
| **Politics:** | |
| How do you feel that the PA is working for your cause?<br><br>How do you feel about the international awareness? | Does it in your opinion, help you? |

| Other: | |
|---|---|
| What do you think will happen to your community in the future? | What are your hopes for the future of the community?<br><br>Household? |
| Is there anything else you would like to tell me about in relation to what we have been talking about? | |

## 2. Interview Guide 2 - Community Leader

| General/Background | |
|---|---|
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| What is the population of the community?<br><br>How big is the area?<br><br>What is the main livelihood among the population?<br><br>What is the general level of education?<br><br>Where do the chidren og to school?<br><br>How is the access to health services and facilities? | How many people are there in the household?<br><br><br><br><br><br>How does the children get to school and university? |
| What is your role in the community? | How did you get that role? |
| **About Water** | |
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How is the community being supplied with water? | For drinking?<br>For cooking?<br>For sanitation?<br>For cleaning?<br>For the animals? |

| If they have water facilities in the community: | |
| --- | --- |
| How was it funded?<br><br>How was it started? | Were you involved in the process?<br><br>Who is in charge? |
| Have you noticed any changes in the community after the access to water improved? | |
| How is the situation with demolition order on the system? | Has it been demolished? |
| **If no water facilities in the community:** | |
| Why is there no water supply for the community? | Are there any plans to get it? |
| **About Electricity** | |
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How is the community being supplied with electricity? | |
| **If they have access to electricity in the community:** | |
| How was it funded?<br><br>How was it started? | Were you involved in the process?<br><br>Who is in charge? |
| Have you noticed any changes in the community in relation to the elctricity project? | |
| How is the situation with demolition order on the system? | Has it been demolished? |
| **If there is no access to electricity in the community:** | |
| Why is there no electricity supply for the community? | Are there any plans to get it? |

| Other Development Issues | |
| --- | --- |
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| **ICT** | |
| How is the access to mobile phones, computer, internet, radio and TV in the community? | |
| **Unemployment** | |
| Has there been any problems with unemployment in the community?<br><br>Loss of livelihood? | |
| **Health services:** | |
| How does the community access health services? | |
| **Politics:** | |
| How is the relationship with the PA?<br><br>How is the relationship with Israeli authorities?<br><br>How is the relationship with national and international NGOs? | |
| **Other:** | |
| What do you think will happen to your community in the future? | What are your hopes for the future of the community? |
| Is there anything else you would like to add or tell me about? | |

3. **Interview Guide 3 – NGO**

**General/Background**

| Questions | Probe Questions |
|---|---|
| Can you tell me about the history of the organization? | Why did it start?<br>How did it start?<br>Who were involved? |
| How are the projects funded? | |
| How do you become involved in a community? | For how long have the organisation worked on projects in the area? |
| Have you experienced any difficulties/challenges? | What kind of difficulties?<br><br>How do you respond to these?<br><br>Is there something you would (and could) have done<br>differently? |
| What do you think are the main development challenges in Palestine are today? | Why? |
| What impact do you think you have on the communities? | |
| How do you define sustainable development? | |
| **About Water** | |
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How do you bring water to the community? | |
| How does the community participate in the process? | Do you teach them how to fix it if something goes wrong? |
| Have you noticed any changes in the community since they got access to water? | |

| About Electricity | |
|---|---|
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How do you bring electricity to the community? | |
| How does the community participate in the process? | Do you teach them how to fix it if something goes wrong? |
| Have you noticed any changes in the community since they got access to electricity? | |

| Other Development Issues | |
|---|---|
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| Do you help the community in any other way? | ICT?<br>Unemployment/livelihood?<br>Health services? |
| Have any projects been easier to implement than others? | Why? |

| Politics: | |
|---|---|
| How is the interaction with the Palestinian Authorities?<br><br>How is the interaction with the Israeli Authorities? | |

| Other: | |
|---|---|
| How do you see the future of the organization? | |
| Is there anything else you would like to tell me about in relation to what we have been talking about? | |

**4. Interview Guide 4 – Government Officials**

| General/Background | |
| --- | --- |
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| Can you tell me about your position? How did you get this position? | What do you do? Why did you want to do this job? |
| How do you become involved in a community? | For how long have the organisation worked on projects in the area? |
| How are the projects funded? | |
| Have you experienced any difficulties/challenges? | What kind of difficulties? How do you respond to these? Is there something you would (and could) have done differently? |
| What do you think are the main development challenges in Palestine are today? | Why? |
| What kind of projects are PA involved in Area C? | For the Bedouin? How is the situation with demolition orders? How does the PA deal with the demolition orders? |
| What impact do you think you have on the Communities? | |
| How do you define sustainable development? | |
| **About Water** | |
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |

| How do you work to bring water to the community? | |
|---|---|
| How does the community participate in the process?<br><br>How do you think their life changes after gaining access to water? | Do you consult them before starting a project? |
| Are there any governmental plans for access to water in Area C? | Especially for Bedouin? |

| **About Electricity** | |
|---|---|
| **Question** | **Probe Questions** |
| How do you bring electricity to the community? | |
| How does the community participate in the process?<br><br>How do you think their life changes after gaining access to water? | Do you consult them before starting a project? |
| Are there any governmental plans for access to water in Area C? | Especially for Bedouin? |

| **Other Development Issues** | |
|---|---|
| **Questions** | **Probe Questions** |
| Do you help the community in any other way? | ICT?<br>Unemployment/livelihood?<br>Health services? |
| Have any projects been easier to implement than others? | Why? |

| **Civil society:** | |
|---|---|
| | |

| | |
|---|---|
| How do you work with the NGOs? | With foreign donors? |
| How is the interaction with the Israeli Authorities? | |

| **Other:** | |
|---|---|
| How do you see the future of the Area C? | |
| Is there anything else you would like to tell me about in relation to what we have been talking about? | |

## Appendix 2: Codes

| 1.0 – 1.6 | Bedouin Community 1 |
|-----------|---------------------|
| 2.0 – 2.6 | Bedouin Community 2 |
| 3.0 – 3.4 | Bedouin Community 3 |
| 4.0 – 4.2 | Bedouin Community 4 |
| 5.0 – 5.4 | Bedouin Community 5 |
| 6.1 – 6.2 | Bedouin Community 6 |
| 7.1 – 7.2 | Bedouin Community 7 |
| 8.1 – 8.4 | Government Officials (PNA) |
| 9.1 – 9.6 | Civil Society Organisations |