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Livelihood Strategies in a Context of Chronic Conflict

The Case of Kapelebyong Sub-County,
Eastern Uganda

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Declaration

I hereby declare that the thesis: *Livelihood Strategies in a Context of Chronic Conflict. The Case of Kapelebyong Sub-County, Eastern Uganda* has not been submitted to any other universities than Agder University College for any type of academic degree.

Kristiansand, 7th June 2007

Ingeborg Sæbø

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ingeborg Sæbø". The signature is written in a cursive style and is underlined with a single horizontal line.

Abstract

The livelihoods of people in Kapelebyong Sub-County in Eastern Uganda have been severely affected by insecurity during the last 27 years. This thesis assesses the livelihood strategies currently employed by Internally Displaced Persons in three camps in the sub county, and the effects of insecurity on the livelihood strategies that people pursue. Further, it looks at the environmental and sociocultural consequences of the insecurity and encampment, with particular emphasis on gender. Lastly, the study assesses the relationship between the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs and the interventions by NGOs and government agencies.

The sustainable livelihoods framework is the theoretical framework which has been the point of departure in collecting and analyzing the data. However, this framework does not adequately address the special needs of a population that has lived with chronic conflict for almost three decades. In addition to the sustainable livelihoods framework, the thesis discusses chronic conflict and protracted internal displacement in order to present a more accurate way of understanding the situation of the people in Kapelebyong.

Fieldwork was carried out in Kapelebyong Sub-County in January and February 2007. A qualitative research methodology is used, with emphasis on household interviews, group discussions, key informant interviews and observation.

The study finds that all respondents have lost important assets due to insecurity and displacement, and have restricted access to land, which is their most important productive asset. The loss of assets has resulted in high levels of poverty and food insecurity. Insecurity and encampment has led to sociocultural changes in the society, especially in regard to gender relations and family issues. A few NGOs work in the area with different projects designed to help the IDPs improve their livelihoods. These projects are generally seen as beneficial by the communities, but their scope is limited. The government is responsible for education, health care and security. However, the quality of these services is poor, and thus the population is left to their own devices in order to secure quality health care and education. The constant security threat leads to a very uncertain situation, and the IDPs are not able to utilize their assets effectively.

Vulnerability of the asset base as a result of chronic insecurity is one of the major challenges facing the IDPs in Kapelebyong. As a result of this, people have started employing livelihood strategies which were non-existent or rare earlier. This has led to quite dramatic changes, especially with regard to gender roles. To understand sociocultural change as a result of protracted displacement and chronic conflict is important in order to understand the livelihood strategies available to people. This is an aspect which is rarely discussed in the literature on livelihoods, but which is of major importance in the study area.

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List of Abbreviations

AIDS- Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ARVs- Antiretroviral drugs
CBO- Community-Based Organization
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency
COU- Church of Uganda
DANIDA- Danish International Development Agency
DP- Democratic Party
DED- Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst
FDC- Forum for Democratic Change
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
GoU- Government of Uganda
HDI- Human Development Index
HDR- Human Development Report
HIV- Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW- Human Rights Watch
IDD- International Development Department, University of Birmingham
IDMC- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP- Internally Displaced Person
IDS- Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
IOM- International Organization for Migration
KY- Kabaka Yekka
LC- Local Councillor
LDU- Local Defence Unit
LRA- Lord's Resistance Army
NGO- Non-Governmental Organization
NRA/M- National Resistance Army/Movement
NRC- National Resistance Council
NRC- Norwegian Refugee Council
PLE- Primary Leaving Examinations
RLP- Refugee Law Project
SOCADIDO- Soroti Catholic Diocese Development Organization
TEDDO- Teso Dioceses Development Organization
TIP- Teso Initiative for Peace
UBOS- Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UNDP- United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund
UNLA- Uganda National Liberation Front
UNOCHA- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPA- Uganda People's Army
UPC- Uganda People's Congress
UPDF- Uganda People's Defence Force
UPE- Universal Primary Education
UPM- Uganda Patriotic Movement
Vision TERUDO- Vision Teso Rural Development Organization
WFP- World Food Programme

Ateso Vocabulary

Ajono- local millet beer

Boda-boda- bicycle taxi

Chapatti- Soft, thin bread

Kabalagala- 'pancakes' made with cassava flour

Mandazi- small deep-fried sweet bread

Omena- dried, small freshwater sardine

Waragi- spirit made out of cassava

Teso is the geographical area where the *Iteso*, the people live. Their language is *Ateso*.

Table of Contents

- DECLARATION II**
- ABSTRACT III**
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IV**
- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS V**
- ATESO VOCABULARY VI**
- TABLE OF CONTENTS VIII**
- FIGURES XII**
- TABLES XII**
- PHOTOS XII**
- CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1**
 - 1.1 Background and Rationale 1
 - 1.2 Objective 2
 - 1.3 Research Questions 2
 - 1.3 Methodology 2
 - 1.4 Outline of the Thesis 3
- CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 5**
 - 2.1 Chronic Conflict 5**
 - 2.1.1 Failed or Fragile States 6
 - 2.1.2 War Economy 6
 - 2.1.3 The Role of NGOs in the War Economy 7
 - 2.2 Internal Displacement 8**
 - 2.2.1 Protracted displacement 8
 - 2.3 Livelihoods 9**
 - 2.3.1 Definition of ‘livelihood’ 9
 - 2.4 The elements of the livelihood framework 10**
 - 2.4.1 Assets/Capitals 10
 - 2.4.2 Activities and Strategies 11
 - 2.4.3 Vulnerability Context 11

2.4.4	Policy and Institutional Context.....	11
2.4.5	Livelihood Outcomes.....	12
2.5	Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict	12
2.6	The ‘Relief- Development Continuum’	13
2.7	Stable Situations of Conflict.....	13
2.8	Theoretical Framework.....	13
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY.....		17
3.1	Methods	17
3.2	Selection of Study Area	17
3.3	Camps	17
3.4	Selection of Respondents	18
3.5	Data Collection Methods.....	19
3.5.1	Household Interviews	19
3.5.2	Focus Group Discussions.....	20
3.5.3	Key Informant Interviews	20
3.5.4	Interviews with NGO workers, government officials and local leaders.....	20
3.5.5	Observation and Informal Conversations.....	21
3.5.6	Secondary Data	21
3.5.7	Data Recording	21
3.6	Data Analysis.....	22
3.7	Reflections around the Data.....	22
3.7.1	The Use of Terms.....	22
	Household and head of household.....	22
	Security and Insecurity.....	22
3.7.2	Respondents’ Understanding of Research.....	22
3.7.3	Logistics and Time.....	23
3.7.5	Translation and use of Research Assistants	23
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND		25
4.1	Uganda.....	25
4.1.1	General Country Information.....	25
4.2.2	History	26
4.2.3	Uganda’s Five-Tier System of Governance	29
4.2	Teso Sub-Region and Kapelebyong Sub-County	29
4.3.2	Description of the study sites	30
4.4	History of Teso	31
4.4.1	Karimojong Cattle Raids in Teso.....	32
4.4.2	Rebellion in Teso	33
4.4.3	2003: Lord’s Resistance Army Attacks Teso.....	34
4.4.4	Continued Karimojong Raids in Katakwi and Amuria	35

4.5	The Present Situation in Kapelebyong.....	35
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS.....		37
SECTION 1: PRE-CONFLICT LIVELIHOODS.....		37
SECTION 2: ASSETS		39
2.1	Natural Capital	39
2.1.1	Land	39
2.1.2	Pasture.....	40
2.1.3	Water Resources	40
2.1.4	Wild Animals, Insects and Fruits	40
2.2	Physical Capital	41
2.2.1	Cattle and other livestock.....	41
2.2.2	Buildings and other Productive Assets.....	41
2.3	Financial Capital.....	41
2.4	Social Capital	42
2.5	Human Capital	43
2.5.1	Education	43
2.5.2	Health.....	43
2.5.3	Labour.....	44
SECTION 3: LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES.....		45
3.1	Agriculture	45
3.2	Keeping Livestock.....	46
3.3	Casual Labour.....	46
3.4	Brewing and selling alcohol	46
3.5	Petty Trade.....	47
3.6	Selling Firewood and Charcoal.....	48
3.7	Building Material.....	48
3.8	Various Businesses	48
3.9	Various Crafts.....	49
3.10	Renting out Assets.....	49
3.11	Formal Employment.....	49
3.12	Begging	49
SECTION 4: VULNERABILITY CONTEXT		51

SECTION 5: ECONOMIC, SOCIOCULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES	53
5.1 Economic Change	53
5.1.1 Role of Livestock.....	53
5.2 Sociocultural Change.....	53
5.2.1 Gender.....	53
5.2.2 Early marriages, family break ups	55
5.2.3 The Role of Children	56
5.3 Environmental Consequences.....	57
5.3.1 Deforestation.....	57
5.3.2 Reduced soil fertility.....	57
 SECTION 6: THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NGOS	 59
6.1 Health.....	59
6.1.1 Government Health Care	59
6.1.2 World Food Programme: Food for Health	59
6.1.3 NGOs	60
6.2 Education.....	61
6.2.1 Primary Education	61
6.2.2 World Food Programme: Food for Education.....	62
6.2.3 Secondary Education.....	63
6.2.4 Training.....	63
6.2.5 The Relevance of Education to People’s Livelihoods.....	64
6.3 Infrastructure.....	64
6.4 Security	64
6.5 Agricultural Extension Services	67
6.6 People’s Perceptions of Government and NGOs.....	67
 SECTION 7: CASE STUDIES	 69
7.1: Akello Ann, Oditel Camp.....	69
7.2: Odongo Enoch, Kapelebyong Camp	70
 6. CONCLUSION	 73
 REFERENCES	 77

Figures

Figure 1: The DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

Figure 2: Livelihoods framework adapted to support analysis in situations of chronic conflict

Figure 3: Map of Uganda

Figure 4: Map of Kapelebyong, Amuria and Usuk counties

Tables

Table 1: Number of households having access to various assets in the three surveyed camps

Table 2: Number of households growing the eight most common crops in the three surveyed camps

Photos

Photo 1: Household interview

Photo 2: Women selling fish

Photo 3: Man repairing bicycle

Photo 4: Woman in pharmacy

Photo 5: Children in Nyada Primary School

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study examines the livelihood strategies employed by the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in one conflict-prone area in Teso Region in north-eastern Uganda, and how these livelihood strategies are affected by insecurity and encampment. The study was undertaken in three IDP camps in Kapelebyong Sub County. This area has been plagued with insecurity since 1979, first of all caused by the neighbouring Karimojong tribe, but also at times by different rebel groups and government armies. This constant state of insecurity has led to dramatic environmental, sociocultural and economic changes in the community, and these will be examined and discussed. Lastly, the study looks into the relationship between the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs, and interventions by government agencies and NGOs.

1.1 Background and Rationale

Kapelebyong Sub-County is part of Teso Region in north-eastern Uganda. The people of the region are called *Iteso*. The sub county is located north in Teso, and is bordering Karamoja, where the pastoralist *Karimojong* tribe live. The Iteso and Karimojong are said to be of the same origin, but today, the two groups are quite distinct. The Iteso are sedentary people surviving on a combination of agriculture and livestock keeping, while the Karimojong are pastoralists depending on livestock. As long as people can remember, the Karimojong have moved with their cattle to Teso during the dry season, and for many years there has been a problem of the Karimojong raiding cattle from the Iteso as they return to Karamoja (Lawrence 1957; cited in Omurangi Otim, 2000: 22; Henriques, 2002: 62; Omurangi Otim, 2000: 26-27). For a long time, the problem of raiding was contained by the fact that both groups only had access to home-made weapons. However, from the late 1970s, the Karimojong have accessed modern weapons, whereas the Iteso have remained unarmed. This has been disastrous both for the Karimojong themselves and their neighbouring tribes. The second government of Milton Obote contained the raiding by supporting local militias in protecting the civilians against the raiders (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 72-73). However, the subsequent governments, the short reign of Tito Okello and the 20 years reign of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, have mostly ignored the problem (Henriques, 2002: 211). Recently however, the government has embarked on a disarmament campaign in Karamoja, but so far, this has mainly served to further destabilize the region.

As a result, people have moved into camps for their own security. In addition, the rebel group Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Northern Uganda attacked Teso in 2003, and Kapelebyong was hard hit by the LRA attacks. This led to massive displacement, both of people already in camps, and of people living in their village homes. According to United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), there were 134 000 IDPs in the two districts of Amuria and Katakwi as of July 2006, a majority has been in camps for more than 20 years due to insecurity caused by Karimojong warriors (UNOCHA, 2006: 1). This constitutes almost 75% of the total population in the two districts (Global IDP database, 2005: 44). Thousands of people from Kapelebyong sought refuge in areas outside the district. Since 2005, the majority of the people from Kapelebyong have returned. However, due to the insecurity caused by the Karimojong warriors, they have not been able to go back to their village homes, but stay in camps in the area, from where they can access the land in their home villages.

In recent years, the livelihoods framework has gained momentum in development research and practice. This framework was developed mainly for stable and peaceful situations, and may not be appropriate or adequate in situations of chronic conflict and protracted displacement. At the same time, conventional relief aid may be inappropriate, and even contribute to sustaining the conflict. For interventions to be effective and useful there is a need to understand the complexity of the situation in which the IDPs live and try to secure their livelihoods, and the consequences these livelihood strategies have for the future. When living in extreme poverty and constant insecurity, people often have no options than to pursue livelihood strategies that deplete the natural resources in the local areas. The results can be disastrous: as the natural resource base is depleted: people become more desperate, thus depleting the natural resources further, unless they are given opportunity to pursue more sustainable ways of making a living.

There is some work done on trying to adapt the livelihoods framework to situations of chronic conflict, notably a series of working papers from the Overseas Development Institute. However, there are very few empirical studies done on livelihoods in chronic conflict. Moreover, most of the research examining issues of displacement and livelihoods is conducted in settings where the displaced people live in an area outside their home area, and where the host population is bigger than the displaced population. The situation in Kapelebyong, as in much of northern and north-eastern Uganda is different: there, people are displaced to camps not very far from their own homes, in places which used to be small urban or –administrative centres. The number of people in these centres before the camps were established was small, which means that even the ones who are living on their own land, live in the camp, and are affected by the insecurity and encampment in the same way as those from surrounding villages who sought refuge there. Most of the research which is done in this part of Uganda is humanitarian agencies’ assessments during times of emergency. However, little is known about how the internally displaced secure their livelihoods when the worst emergency is over, yet security is still unreliable. This study seeks to fill part of this knowledge gap, hoping that it can be a contribution towards a better understanding of their livelihood strategies, and that this understanding might translate into well-targeted efforts to improve their lives.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this study is to examine the complex ways in which people make a living in a context of chronic conflict.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the livelihood strategies employed by IDPs in Kapelebyong?
2. How are these strategies influenced by the insecurity experienced in the area?
3. What are the environmental and sociocultural consequences of the insecurity and encampment?
4. What is the relationship between the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs and the interventions by NGOs and government agencies?

1.3 Methodology

The study was carried out in January and February 2007, in the camps of Kapelebyong, Oditel and Apedu, all in Kapelebyong Sub-County. The methodology used to answer the research

questions was qualitative. The main methods were a household survey, focus group discussions, wealth rankings, and key informant interviews.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework of the study, and reviews relevant literature on internal displacement, chronic conflict, and the sustainable livelihoods framework. It then goes on to discuss how the livelihoods framework can be applied to situations of chronic conflict, and explains the framework that will be used as the basis of data collection and analysis.

Chapter 3 is a description of the methodology used in collecting and analysing data for this study. It also includes a discussion of the limitations of the methodology and the methods used.

Chapter 4 provides the contextual background to the study. It starts by giving a historical and political overview of Uganda, and then of Teso region and Kapelebyong Sub-County in particular.

Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings, and the analysis of this study. The chapter is structured according to the research questions. First, there is a description of the pre-conflict context, and then the asset status of the households in the household survey is examined. How people's access to different assets has been affected by the insecurity and encampment they experience, is also examined. This is followed by a section on the livelihood strategies that people pursue given the assets that they have, and the vulnerability context in which they carry out these activities. After describing the livelihood strategies people pursue, the economic, sociocultural and environmental consequences of the insecurity and encampment are considered, followed by a section about the role of NGOs and government agencies. The chapter is concluded by two case studies, which serve to present a broader picture, and link all the different issues together, as they are linked together in people's daily lives.

Chapter 6 is the conclusion, in which the findings of the study are summarized, and discussed in the light of the theoretical framework that was set out in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

The people in Kapelebyong have lived with conflict for almost 30 years, and the situation does not seem to be about to change in the foreseeable future (Miller, 2006: 4). This is unfortunately not a unique experience; according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the average length of conflict that has caused displacement or prevented return was 15 years in 2005. In nearly half of the 63 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) situations identified by the IDMC, the absence of political solutions to the causes of displacement, or lack of implementation of such solutions make it impossible for the displaced to return (IDMC, 2006: 11).

In this chapter I will look at different aspects relevant to the understanding of the livelihoods of the IDPs in Kapelebyong. First is a discussion of issues relating to situations of chronic conflict, such as failed and fragile states, the war economy, the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and protracted internal displacement. Then I go on to look at the concept of livelihoods, the elements of the livelihood framework, and some issues regarding livelihoods in situations of chronic conflicts. The second part of this paper gives a brief overview of the context of the study, with statistics and historical background for Uganda, Teso and Kapelebyong. Lastly, I further discuss the use of the livelihoods framework in situations of chronic conflict, linking it to the situation in the study area.

2.1 Chronic Conflict

The displaced people in Kapelebyong are not displaced primarily because they find themselves in the midst of an outright war. Rather, the government's lack of control of armed groups, and failure to protect the unarmed, has led to the current situation. This is of course a simplification; as we shall see later; numerous historical, political, social, economic and cultural issues have contributed to the persistent problems the area is facing.

The Professional Development for Livelihoods (PLOW, 2006) defines the term 'chronic conflict' as: 'An acute crisis of political authority and governance where 'fragile states' are either unable or unwilling to fulfil core functions leading to a breakdown in the contract between the state and its citizens'. The protracted conflict situation in parts of Uganda can be understood as a case of chronic conflict, where the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil its core functions, such as providing law and order, and protecting its citizens. Although the situation has persisted for decades, it bears much resemblance to what has been termed 'the new wars'. Such wars are not so much about the control of territory or subjugation of enemy population, but rather about gaining access to resources. Today, such wars are perceived primarily as the result of underdevelopment and poverty, although they at the same time are likely to cause more poverty and further underdevelopment (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 4).

The main characteristics of situations of chronic conflict have been identified by Schafer (2002: 2) as:

- A state in which public institutions are seriously weakened or non-existent
- External legitimacy of the state is withheld or contested
- Strong parallel or extra-legal economy
- Existence of, or high susceptibility to violence
- Forced displacement
- Sections of the population deliberately excluded from enjoying basic rights

- Livelihoods are highly vulnerable to external shocks
- Existence of serious poverty

Where one or several of these conditions occur, it is considered that we are talking about a chronic conflict (Schafer, 2002: 2). When there is a conflict over access to natural resources, in a context of a weak or failed state, the results may be disastrous, although they may not affect the whole country. Schafer (2002: 3) states that there are two main characteristics which most observers see as central to the analysis of chronic conflict, and that is the nature of the state, and the nature of the war economy.

2.1.1 Failed or Fragile States

Regarding the nature of the state, Macrae (2000: 21 cited in Schafer, 2002: 3) uses the term 'quasi-states' in situations where the state's control of its territory is fundamentally challenged. The reason for this is not only lack of resources, but also institutional failure. It is often assumed that such a situation occurs due to a power-vacuum. However, Buchanan-Smith (2000; cited in Schafer, 2002: 3) notes that it is more often as a result of competition over power. The term 'state failure' suggests that there were positive intentions to build a state. In reality however, certain groups profit from the situation and thus the situation of state crisis is in some cases intentional (Schafer, 2002: 3). There are a few failed states in the world today, and Somalia is the only state which is considered as a collapsed state. However, many more are fragile or weak states, where many of the characteristics of a failed state are present in parts of the country. Generally, one can say that a nation state exists in order to deliver political goods such as security, education, health services, infrastructure, law and order. When it fails to deliver these goods, then it can be characterized as a failed state. When it fails to deliver some of these political goods, or all of them to some parts of the population, then it can be said to be a weak state (Rotberg, 2002: 85-92).

From the above, we see that chronic conflict is likely to occur in fragile or failed states and that such conflict do not easily arise in strong states. In fact, Rotberg (2002: 85) states that it is not the intensity of violence that defines a failed state, but rather the enduring character of that violence.

2.1.2. War Economy

The second characteristic of chronic conflict is that of the war economy. There is a tendency to consider intra-state conflict as irrational, caused by prejudice and misunderstandings. In reality however, conflicts are often sustained as a rational means to a certain end by powerful people within the country (Schafer, 2002: 3). Or as Duffield, Macrae and Zwi (1994: 225) state: 'the survival strategies of the politically dominant centre on the displacement and impoverishment of the losers, a key component of today's emergencies'.

According to Duffield (1994: 50-57), asset transfer is an important aspect of the economy of what he terms 'permanent emergencies'. He argues that such emergencies have a 'distinct political economy structured by relations of power and gender' (Duffield, 1994: 52). In situations of permanent emergencies, assets are often transferred from the weak to the politically or economically strong. Asset transfer is one of many coping strategies employed by people faced with extreme poverty and famine in situations of conflicts. This has often been understood in light of how it helps the losers in such situations. However, it is important to realize that coping strategies, especially in extreme circumstances, can involve the loss of assets by those in distress, for example by loan, barter or sale. This leads to increased

vulnerability of the poorest, despite the short term benefits. At the same time, better-off people stand to win in such situations, for example local merchants or middlemen, who can buy assets at very low prices.

From this perspective, asset transfers are not only helping the distressed to survive an acute crisis, but is a part of an active process of underdevelopment, as it leads to resource depletion, spread of absolute poverty, greater inequality and the collapse of social and economic infrastructure. However, assets are not only transferred from the poor to the better off through sale or barter, but also by more forceful methods ranging from market pressures to violent appropriation. According to Duffield (1994: 52) 'the more direct or coercive the form of transfer, the more likely it is that winners have mobilised ethnic, national or religious sectarianism as justification for their extra-legal activity'. Facing such illegitimate activities, it is increasingly apparent that the international humanitarian system is unable to respond.

2.1.3 The Role of NGOs in the War Economy

Since the late 1980s, NGOs have become increasingly important in the management and targeting of food aid and humanitarian assistance (Duffield, 1994: 58). This has increased as donor governments in the West have channelled more aid through NGOs and less through the state in the recipient countries. This typically involves a contractual relationship between an international bilateral or multilateral donor and an NGO, where the NGO acts as an implementing agent of the donor policy. The government of the recipient country often plays only a symbolic role (Duffield, 1994: 58-59).

The Western interventions in Africa have encouraged the emergence of a neo-liberal, two-tier system of public welfare in many African countries. This has in effect weakened the sovereignty of the states, and led to a loss of revenue, as donors channel aid through NGOs instead of through the state. However, much as a large part of the humanitarian aid is channelled through the indirect and parallel systems developed by the NGOs, the states have indirectly gained from relief operations. In some cases, like Sudan, this indirect gain from relief operations has by far exceeded the loss of development aid, through for example official overvaluing of local currencies, import taxes and so on (Duffield, 1994: 60). Powerful local merchants, commercial farmers and lorry owners also gain from international relief assistance. Humanitarian interventions thus provide significant amounts of political and economic support for the dominant political and economic groups, although it is often indirect. In such circumstances, a relief operation can become an organic part of the political economy of internal warfare, especially when the powerful economic and political groups are involved in a predatory or sectarian structure that is connected with a process of asset transfer and inter-ethnic conflict (Duffield, 1994: 62-63).

At the same time as many of the politically and economically strong gain from relief operations in various ways, the 'losers', the object of the humanitarian aid, often receive very little. It has been estimated that international relief programmes supplied no more than 12% of the required assistance in Darfur during the 1984-85 famine, despite absence of political violence and relatively good operational conditions (deWaal, 1988; in Duffield, 1994: 63). According to Duffield (1994: 63), it is unlikely that the figure is substantially higher in other emergencies. This means that almost 90% of the food needs and other needs are met by people's own coping mechanisms, which include transfer of assets to more fortunate groups in society (Duffield 1994: 63).

One major challenge in situations of chronic conflict is that one is not dealing with a temporary crisis, where people will eventually be able to return to their former ways of life. Rather, a process of sustained asset transfer results in high levels of absolute poverty, and may result in permanent cultural and socioeconomic changes in a community. Relief programmes may help people stay alive, but very often they do not tackle the processes of resource depletion, which is an important factor underlying food insecurity (Duffield, 1994: 63-64).

Duffield (1994: 64) notes a difference between ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ NGOs, in which progressive NGOs attempt to maintain a certain independence in large subcontracting operations, and also try to protect subsistence assets by a variety of means, such as cattle-vaccination, credit schemes, and also pressing human rights issues. Implicitly then, ‘conservative’ NGOs act more as implementing agencies for donor policies and priorities than as independent organizations, and often focus their activities on providing relief food and non-food items, without attacking the underlying causes of the need for relief.

2.2 *Internal Displacement*

When states fail to provide security for their citizens, one result is often displacement. Today, most of the displaced people in the world are displaced within their country of origin, and are therefore not categorized as refugees, but as IDPs (NRC, 2006: 5). Massive displacement of population has been one of the most common consequences of internal conflicts (Luckham et al, 2001: 38). In 2006, there were about 24.6 million IDPs in the world, with 11.8 million of these in Africa (IDMC, 2007: 6). This is partly due to the post-Cold War preoccupation with limiting refugee flows and avoiding long-term settlement, where containment and conflict management are beginning to replace reception and sanctuary in another country. As a result of this, greater effort is put into keeping people within their own countries, although they may not be residing in their original homes (Bennett, 1998: 4).

A working definition of IDPs developed over time by the UN’s Special Representative on IDPs is ‘person or group of people who have been forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid, in particular, the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border’. This definition excludes economic migrants, refugee returnees under UNHCR programmes and those receiving adequate state compensation and protection following natural disasters or relocation for development purposes (in Bennett, 1998: 4).

There is no international institution dealing specifically with IDPs, and thus they are some of the most vulnerable in contemporary crises (Bennett, 1998: 4). Displacement splits up families and communities, and destroys the way of life and the social networks of the displaced. Social networks and households are often irreversibly fractured. The majority of displaced people are women and children, who also face high risks of physical attacks, torture, sexual violence and forced labour (Luckham et al, 2001: 38-39).

2.2.1 *Protracted displacement*

Aid agencies assisting IDPs have often assumed an emergency situation, and responded with humanitarian aid, which is designed to save lives in a situation of temporary threats to livelihoods (Schafer, 2002: VI). However, in many instances, IDPs have been displaced for

years and even decades, and thus there is need for a deeper understanding of the special challenges these people meet when trying to secure their livelihoods. When talking about livelihood strategies, this implies that there is intentionality: people mobilize their resources in order to achieve something in the future. However, for IDPs, the future is uncertain. At the same time as they are carrying a dream of being able to return to their homes, they try to secure their livelihoods in the camp (Brun, 2003: 32-33). Therefore, it is important to understand that displacement is both “discontinuity and continuity, belonging and not belonging” (Brun, 2003: 33).

2.3 Livelihoods

Development theory from the end of the Second World War until the late 1970s centred on economic strategies on the national state level. By the early 1980s, these theories were challenged as many national development strategies had failed, and also because of the penetration of international capital that could not be controlled by states (Schafer, 2002: 13). There were two main responses to this challenge to the traditional development theories. One saw the solution of the ‘development problem’ as arising out of the market instead of the state, thus liberalisation would help poor countries develop. The other response was that development would have to start with individuals, not with states (Schafer, 2002: 13).

On the background of the latter view, the concept of livelihoods became prominent in the mid 1980s, particularly by the work of Robert Chambers and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex (Schafer, 2002: 13). It represented a shift from a top-down to a bottom-up approach. As Johnson (1992: 274) put it ‘if actions from above can not ‘get it right’ (...) it is tempting to think that actions ‘from below’ may have a chance- that the rural poor know what their problems are and seek rational solutions to them’. This view is based on an understanding of the poor as ‘conscious actors’ who are constantly adapting to changing circumstances and actively bringing about change. It also acknowledges that the poor have knowledge and skills that are adapted to local conditions, but often ignored; that the cultural norms and social relations of particular societies have their own validity; and that improvement of livelihoods of the rural poor should be done with respect of local values (Johnson, 1992: 274). The growing body of empirical field research in developing countries also challenged previous theoretical over-simplifications, and supported the idea that reality was composed of a great diversity of living, with complex and locally specific social relations (Leys, 1996: 27; Schafer, 2002: 13).

In this context, livelihood approaches gained ascendancy in the development community, and are now common in both academic analysis and non-governmental agency practice. After the end of the Cold War, focus on strategies for national development became irrelevant in many regions. By beginning with poor people themselves, livelihood approaches fit neatly into this context, where states are often not capable of implementing a development agenda (Schafer, 2002: 13-14).

2.3.1 Definition of ‘livelihood’

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) has defined livelihood as:

‘Comprising the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources), and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base’ (in Scoones, 1998: 5).

Ellis (2000: 10) defines the term differently:

‘A livelihood comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household’

In this definition, social relations are taken to be those of gender, family, kin, class, caste, belief systems, ethnicity and so on (Ellis, 2000: 9).

The term ‘sustainable’ is much used in development studies, and the terms ‘sustainable livelihoods’ and just ‘livelihoods’ are often used interchangeably. In this paper, I will as a rule talk about ‘livelihoods’, as the word ‘sustainable’ is a very wide term which often is rendered practically meaningless (see Ellis, 2000: x).

2.4 The elements of the livelihood framework

The livelihood framework consists of several key elements that together determine the livelihoods of individuals, households and communities. In the following, I will explain the elements in the framework in some detail. Here, I am using the DFID framework for sustainable livelihoods. However, it is important to note that there are several frameworks developed by several authors. The key elements are the same in all of these, but they differ in how the relationship between the different elements is described. One advantage with the DFID framework is that it is not linear, but shows some of the feedback mechanisms. It is however important to recognize that such a model can not provide an exact representation of reality, as livelihood systems in the real world involve innumerable feedbacks and interactions between the components (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000: 29).




Figure 1: The DFID Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. Source: DFID, 2007

2.4.1 Assets/Capitals

In the livelihoods approach, resources are referred to as ‘assets’ or ‘capitals’. These are often categorized as five or more distinct types owned or accessed by family members:

1. Human capital: the labour available in the household, and its education, health and skills.
2. Physical capital: Physical capital is producer goods that are purchased in order to generate a flow of income into the future.
3. Financial capital: money, savings, loan access.
4. Natural capital: land, water, and other biological resources that are utilized by people to ensure means of survival.
5. Social capital: networks and associations, and the claims on which households and individuals can draw by virtue of their belonging to such groups.

(Ellis, 2000; Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 4)

The livelihoods framework regards the asset status of poor individuals or households as fundamental to understanding of the options open to them. On this basis, it advocates that poverty reduction policies should be concerned with raising the asset status of the poor, or enabling existing assets that are idle or underemployed to be used productively (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5). The livelihoods approach builds on the premise that it is crucial to understand the asset status of the poor in order to understand the options open to them; the strategies they employ to obtain livelihoods, and also the outcomes they aspire to obtain and the vulnerability context they operate in. When discussing livelihood assets or capital, one important issue is that of *access*. Access is defined by the social norms and rules that determine the differential ability of people to own, control, or otherwise make use of resources such as land and common property. Access is also determined by social relations, such as gender. It also refers to the ability to participate in and derive benefits from social and public services (Ellis, 2000: 9, Chan, 2002).

2.4.2 Activities and Strategies

The things people do in pursuit of a living are in the livelihood framework referred to as ‘activities’ or ‘strategies’ (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5; Scoones, 1998: 9-11). Such activities includes both nearby and remote sources, so migration and remittances are included here, as well as agricultural production, livestock keeping, and other things such as brick making (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5). Scoones (1998: 9) identifies three broad clusters of livelihood strategies: Agricultural intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification and migration. Ellis, on the other hand, categorizes the livelihood activities available to an individual or household in two broad categories, namely natural resource based and non-natural resource based activities (Ellis, 2000: 40-41).

2.4.3 Vulnerability Context

The livelihood assets exist and the livelihood strategies/activities take place in a ‘vulnerability context’. This means that people’s livelihoods and their access to and control of resources can be affected by events largely beyond their control. Such events are for example droughts, floods, conflicts, trends in population growth, policies, economic shocks, health problems, and agricultural problems such as pests and diseases (Cahn, 2002; Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5). Secondly, the vulnerability context is about how people adapt to and cope with such stresses and shocks which are beyond their control (Cahn, 2002). In contexts of chronic conflict, the vulnerability context often moves to the forefront in livelihood analyses. According to Ellis (2000: 62), vulnerability has a dual aspect: first of all, it refers to external threats to livelihood security due to risk factors such as climate, market and natural disasters, and second it refers to internal coping capabilities which are determined by assets, food stores and support from social networks.

2.4.4 Policy and Institutional Context

The livelihood assets and activities are mediated by the institutional and policy context. These processes mediate people’s ability to carry out livelihood strategies, and achieve different livelihood outcomes (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 4-5; Scoones, 1998: 3). In order to understand the structures and processes through which livelihood outcomes are achieved, a description of the variables (assets and activities) is rather limited (Scoones, 1998: 12). Institutions can be defined as ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic’ (North,

1990: 3). North describes institutions as ‘rules of the game’, and organisations as ‘the players’ (North, 1990: 4-5). The access to, control and use of assets are influenced by the institutional structures and processes (Cahn, 2002). The policy and institutional context consists of formal and informal institutions, such as local and national government, authority, laws and rights, democracy and participation among others (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5). Institutional arrangements, organisational issues, power and policy strongly influence people’s access to livelihood assets (Scoones, 1998: 8). An understanding of the policy and institutional context is therefore crucial to livelihood analysis.

2.4.5 Livelihood Outcomes

Through a range of activities or strategies, people use the livelihood assets or capitals which they have access to, to produce different livelihood outcomes. Such outcomes can be higher or lower material welfare, reduced vulnerability to food insecurity, improving or degrading environmental resources, enhanced wellbeing and so on (Ellis and Freeman, 2005: 5; Scoones, 1998: 6). Although many sustainable livelihood frameworks seem to assume only positive livelihood outcomes, in other words, that people’s livelihoods keep improving (for example Scoones, 1998: 4), it is important to note, especially in conflict situations, that livelihood outcomes can be both positive and negative. In conflict situations, people’s asset status can be undermined suddenly, or insecurity may hinder people in utilizing their assets, and the livelihood outcomes can be increased vulnerability, food insecurity and lower material welfare.

2.5 *Livelihoods in Situations of Chronic Conflict*

Development in situations of chronic conflict faces challenges different from peaceful situations. However, the poorest people and the poorest places in the world today are primarily those that are experiencing chronic conflict and political instability (Schafer, 2002: 1). As the majority of conflicts today are characterized by their chronic nature, the traditional relief responses are inadequate, as these were designed to save lives in face of *temporary* threats to livelihoods (Bunchanan-Smith, 2000: 2 in Schafer, 2002: 1). It is therefore a major question whether and how external assistance can contribute to enhancing the livelihood security of individuals, households and communities in situations of chronic conflicts (Schafer, 2002: 1).

At the same time, the nature of the state in many countries experiencing chronic conflict is, as we have seen, often contested. This makes conventional bilateral assistance problematic, as the legitimacy of the country’s government is contested, and the channels through which such assistance can be channelled are limited (Macrae, 1999). Moreover, the role of humanitarian aid has changed as the situations in which it is given have become more fractioned, and the traditional assumptions about the role of the state in development, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens have changed. Due to these, and related issues, the international humanitarian system has been criticized for being self-serving, and contributing to the problem rather than to the solution of the problem. In sum, there is need for reconsideration of the way humanitarian aid should be given in situations of chronic conflict and political instability (Leader, 2000: 6). According to Schafer (2002: 1), these problems have caused a situation in which those in greatest need for assistance are also those whom the international aid system find hardest to reach, thus there is a need to improve understanding of the particular needs of these populations, and the constraints they face in maintaining their livelihoods.

2.6 *The ‘Relief- Development Continuum’*

Humanitarian agencies have traditionally assumed a dichotomy between relief and development work. From the mid-1980s and the following decade, an understanding grew that there were clear links, both conceptually and operationally, between initial relief operations and longer-term development goals. This was often viewed as a linear process of ‘relief to rehabilitation to development’ (Commins, 1996: 8-9). However, it has become increasingly clear that even this understanding may obscure rather than clarify. In reality, such situations do not develop in a linear pattern, but often cycle back towards emergency response, or gets ‘stuck’ in permanent provisioning of relief (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 5). At the same time, many international NGOs have begun to move towards an understanding of development which is not limited to economic indicators; and the end of hostilities is no longer viewed as a prerequisite for developmental action. Rather, it is realized that local communities have their own resources and priorities in situations of conflicts, and are not helpless victims. In addition, development researchers and practitioners have moved towards a wider understanding of development, recognizing that there are questions of social relations, production relations, gender, and management of human capacity and natural resources (Commins, 1996: 8-9).

2.7 *Stable Situations of Conflict*

Normally, conflict is associated with instability. However, Schafer (2002: 2) notes that some conflict areas are in fact very stable, as the situation is perceived as not likely to change in the foreseeable future. These situations are self-contained political systems, and it can be said that they are stably unstable and insecure (Duffield, 1998: 10 in Schafer, 2002: 2). One of her interviewees mentioned Southern Sudan as an example, and I will argue that the situation in parts of Uganda can also be described as a ‘stable conflict’, as it has persisted for decades, and does not seem to be changing in the foreseeable future (see Miller, 2006: 4). As we will see, this situation strongly affects the livelihood assets and strategies available to the people living there. Such situations may occur in localized geographical areas in states which are otherwise considered as stable, and such pockets of insecurity often present donors and operational agencies working in these areas with the same problems that they face in situations where insecurity is characterizing a whole country.

2.8 *Theoretical Framework*

In this section, livelihoods analysis is referring to ‘differentiated and multi-level research that examines changes over time; it is based on empirical investigations into the livelihood strategies of households and communities, in which micro-level findings are situated within a macro context to explain the social, economic, and political factors relating to poverty and vulnerability’ (Murray, 2001, in Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 12).

As the literature review has shown, development can and should take place even in areas experiencing chronic conflict. As poverty and marginalization often are cited as causes of chronic conflict and political instability (Draman, 2003: 2), one can even argue that one of the most viable ways of ending chronic conflicts is to have economic and social development take place. We have also noted that such development is difficult to obtain in areas with chronic conflict. In the following I will review literature that discusses the implications of applying the livelihood framework in situations of chronic conflict.

Livelihoods approaches were largely developed in stable and relatively peaceful contexts, where overcoming poverty was the primary outcome of interventions from outside (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 1). The livelihoods framework of DFID, presented on page 12 is by many considered inadequate for situations of chronic conflict (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 12). In the following, we shall look at factors that are seen to be of particular relevance to understanding livelihoods in chronic conflicts.

First of all, ‘new wars’ and the growth of the war economies have exposed the affected people to a whole new range of livelihoods risks and vulnerabilities (Luckham et al, 2001: 9). As the chapter on war economy shows, conflict does not only destroy assets and livelihoods, it also redistributes them. Moreover, it is not only financial and physical capitals that is destroyed during conflict, but also more intangible benefits previously provided by the state, such as education and health care, as well as social capital, as the relationships within which people are embedded are destroyed or changed (Luckham et al, 2001: 20).

The fact that people do survive in situations of chronic conflict, suggest that despite the differences between such a situation and a peaceful one, livelihoods analysis can still be useful (Schafer, 2002: vi). Longley and Maxwell (2003: 1) argue that livelihood support have a role to play in assisting people and communities to increase their ability to survive in situations of long-term conflict and instability. Still, aid agencies experience that attempts at providing livelihood support in situations of chronic conflict face problems beyond the capacity of the standard livelihood toolbox. The major challenge in situations of chronic conflict is to overcome chronic vulnerability, and doing this in a conflict situation is distinctively different from overcoming vulnerability in a stable and peaceful context (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 1).

As discussed in the chapter about prolonged displacement, one important aspect in understanding the livelihoods of people in situations of chronic conflict is that of change and continuity, as both factors offer opportunities and constraints to livelihood strategies in such situations. Another important aspect to understand is the resilience of the local population living with chronic conflict, as well as the complexity in which people secure their livelihoods and the dynamics of power relations within a community or a region (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 9 and Pain, 2002: vi). To understand the livelihoods of people in chronic conflict, it is essential to understand the dynamics of vulnerability and power using a long-term perspective which includes the pre-conflict periods. As already mentioned, this is not possible using only the conventional livelihoods analysis, as it mostly treats vulnerability as an external factor. Rather, vulnerability should be understood as linking to people’s own livelihoods, and there should be a stronger emphasis on power relations. Finally, a livelihood framework for situations of chronic conflict should incorporate a temporal dimension, which is not adequately done in the conventional livelihood framework (Longley and Maxwell, 2003: 12-18).




Figure 2: Livelihood framework adapted to support analysis in situations of chronic conflict and political instability. Source: Collinson et al, 2002: 26, in Longley and Maxwell 2003.

The livelihoods framework adapted to support livelihood analysis in situations of chronic conflict has been my point of departure during the process of writing this thesis: from designing questionnaires and determining the issues for discussion in group discussions and informal interviews, to the data. Although this is a complex framework, it is still a model, and as all models it does not capture the full complexity of reality.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The objective of this study is to look at the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs in Kapelebyong Sub County, and how these are influenced by insecurity and encampment; to investigate the environmental and sociocultural consequences of these livelihood strategies; and to look at the relationship between people's livelihood strategies and the interventions by NGOs and government agencies.

As will be presented in this chapter, I chose to use a qualitative methodology for this study. This choice follows the choice of theory, with emphasis on livelihood theory. Using a livelihood framework I have sought to look at the issues at hand in a holistic manner, including the historical, cultural and social context, the assets available to people, the strategies by which they utilize these assets, and the outcomes of these strategies. For this purpose, qualitative research methods are more helpful, as they are flexible and dynamic compared to the quantitative (Mikkelsen 2005: 141-142).

Another reason for the choice of methodology is the fact that there is very little research done in the study area, and so the secondary data available is very limited. For this reason, statistical analysis would not be a reasonable option, and the information available to me before going to the field was not sufficient to design a quantitative research.

3.1 Methods

The main method used in this study is the household interview. Fifty-three households were interviewed in three different camps. In addition, focus group discussions and wealth rankings were conducted, as well as key informant interviews, observation and informal conversations. I also collected some secondary data, although the availability of this was limited, and the quality varied. There are strengths and weaknesses with all these methods, and I have tried to avoid some of the problems associated with a single method by using different methods, often asking the same questions to different people and in different settings. This is known as methodological triangulation (Mikkelsen, 2005: 96-97).

3.2 Selection of Study Area

Kapelebyong Sub-County is a very relevant area to do research when the issue is livelihoods in a context of chronic conflict, as the area has experienced insecurity from 1979 up to today, with only a few years in the 1990s being relatively peaceful. Kapelebyong is part of the Teso Sub-Region, where I have lived and worked for nearly three years in the past. During these years, my interest of the area has developed, and in addition, my knowledge of the area, language, culture and history made it more attractive to do research there, as I was able to go into depth even with little time available.

3.3 Camps

The three camps of Oditel, Kapelebyong and Apedu were chosen because they represent different types of camps, and also because they were the ones I could access relatively easy. Kapelebyong and Oditel camps were established during the first violent Karimojong raids in 1979-1980. They have been in existence ever since, and especially in Kapelebyong, many people have lived in the camp since then. In Oditel, most people have been able to go back to their homes at different times, only to have to flee to the camp again. Apedu camp was established in 2000 after the Karimojong warriors had attacked. In 2003, the camp and

everything in the area surrounding it was burnt by the LRA rebels. People fled to Oditel or beyond, and the first returnees came back in 2005. The following year more people came back, and at the time of fieldwork, even more people had started building houses in the camp. At the onset, I started with only Kapelebyong camp and Oditel. However, as I proceeded with the household interviews, I realized that the answers from each household were very similar in each camp, but with some interesting differences between the camps. When I got the opportunity to go to Apedu, I decided to reduce the number of household interviews in Kapelebyong, and rather conduct some in Apedu. I conducted 25 household interviews in Oditel, 16 in Kapelebyong and 12 in Apedu. Kapelebyong camp is located where the offices for Kapelebyong Sub-County are. 'Kapelebyong' thus refers to the county, the sub county and one of the camps in the sub-county. Where it is not clear from the context, I refer to the camp as 'Kapelebyong camp', while I use 'Kapelebyong' to refer to the area. When referring to the administrative units such as the county or sub-county, I always specify which unit I am referring to.

During the time of emergency relief in 2003 and 2004, the big camps in the area were divided into cells by the agencies distributing relief items. Each cell is led by a cell leader and a cell committee that are elected by the people in the cell. Although there has been no relief aid the last few years, the cell system is still in place. Oditel and Kapelebyong camps are both divided into seven cells. During the first day of fieldwork, I explained the concept of wealth ranking to the research assistants, and asked them to identify one cell in each camp which was small enough to effectively carry out the wealth ranking exercise. Both assistants were primary teachers, one in Oditel and one in Kapelebyong, so they knew the communities well. There seem to be no systematic differences between the different cells in each camp, and people in each cell are mixed with regards to the villages of origin and wealth status.

3.4 Selection of Respondents

As this study is concerned with livelihood strategies, wealth was the major stratification criteria for selecting respondents. At the onset of the research, I conducted wealth ranking in one cell in each of the two big camps; Inego cell in Oditel and Acomait cell in Kapelebyong. For a wealth ranking exercise, it is important to have reliable, long standing community members, both men and women, and from different age groups.

In Oditel the group also did social mapping. This is an exercise where the group draws a map of the community and plots the households on the map (Mikkelsen, 2005: 107). However, I soon realized that this was very time consuming, and as the map which was produced was not very relevant to my research, I decided to omit it when I went to Kapelebyong. During this exercise the groups first discussed different definitions of poverty, and were asked to identify different wealth categories, and describe the criteria for placing a household in each category. The group in Oditel used three categories; poor, average and rich, while the group in Kapelebyong used four; very poor, poor, average and rich. After the general discussion, the groups were asked to list all the households in the cell. The names of each household were then written on small cards. After this, the names of the household were read out one by one, and the groups asked to place it in one of the categories agreed upon. In Kapelebyong, the group was asked to re-distribute the four categories into three, and they agreed to join the 'rich' and 'average' categories into one. The groups then were asked to go through each pile, discussing whether they were in the right categories, or should be moved. This resulted in a very interesting discussion, where the perceptions of poverty and wealth were discussed in some depth.

As this was part of the sampling process, a number of household from each category were picked randomly. From this I got a list of households with different socio-economic status. We also included some 'reserve' households in case some of the households on the lists were not available for interviewing. As mentioned, the group in Kapelebyong made two groups out of the 'poor', and this proved to be very relevant. In Oditel, 108 out of 164 households were categorized as poor. According to LADDER (2001: 6), 'ideally, no pile should have more than 50% of the households'. As I carried out the household interviews, it became clear that it would have been useful to divide the 'poor' category into 'poorest' and 'poor', as we did in Kapelebyong.

I got the opportunity to go to Apedu only one week before leaving the area. As I still had some work to do in Kapelebyong and Oditel, I did not get time to conduct a wealth ranking here. The households were selected with the help of the camp chairman. We explained to him that we wanted to interview households of different wealth standards. The camp leader understood the concept well and we got to interview a cross section of households in that camp.

One problem in all the three camp was that it was difficult to get the household members at home. Although it was during the dry season, many people still went to their villages during the day, mostly because they were building houses there, hoping to be able to go back at the onset of the wet season. Often we got only the wife or only the husband at home, and other times no one at all. However, with the reserve households in the samples, we managed to interview all the households we had planned to interview.

3.5 Data Collection Methods

3.5.1 Household Interviews



Photo 1: Household interview in Oditel.

These interviews were guided by a questionnaire. However, many of the questions were open, and gave the opportunity to go into more depth in some areas. Each interview took between one-and-a-half and two-and-a-half hours. For the household interviews, I had three research assistants. After a brief training, I started interviewing the households with any one of them as an interpreter. When I felt he or she had grasped the concept and understood the kind of information I was after, and how I wanted them to record the replies from the respondents, I allowed them to do

some interviews alone. This was due to time constraints, and also difficulties in getting transport, especially to Kapelebyong camp. In Oditel, I personally conducted 14 out of 25 interviews, in Kapelebyong 8 out of 16, and in Apedu 4 out of 12. When the assistants had

conducted interviews alone, we always went through them together later, so that I could ask for more information and write it down while it was still fresh in their minds. They always had much more information than what they had written down, so this was very useful.

3.5.2 Focus Group Discussions

In addition to the wealth ranking, I conducted one focus group discussion in Oditel, one in Kapelebyong and two in Apedu. The groups consisted of both men and women, who were known to have a thorough knowledge of the area, and who could express themselves well. These discussions centred on the changes in the communities the last five to ten years, especially in regard to economic activities, gender roles and the natural environment. Another important issue was the security situation in the area, and how they thought the problems of the area should be solved. One of the group interviews in Apedu had only women, and one important issue there was the advantages and disadvantages of living in Apedu as opposed to Oditel, where all of them lived before moving back to Apedu.

The focus group discussions provided me with access to a greater body of knowledge about these issues, and were very helpful in understanding the changes that have taken place in the area as well as some of the causes and consequences of these changes.

3.5.3 Key Informant Interviews

A key informant is a person who is in the position of giving the researcher deeper insight into the issues she's researching (Thagaard, 2003: 67). My key informants included a former Local Councillor 3 (LC3), a well educated peasant, and my three research assistants. Two of these were primary school teachers; one man and one woman, while the third had just finished his Senior 4 (S4). The information from these key informants was very helpful in understanding the life in the camps better, regarding livelihood strategies, but also marriage, upbringing of children, the education in the local schools, the NGOs and CBOs operating in the area, the political and administrative system and so on. Two of these key informants helped me write up a history of the area since the 1950s. As most of the respondents in the interviews did not know the year of different incidences in their lives, this helped me produce an 'event calendar' which was very helpful when trying to map the displacement history of the household.

3.5.4 Interviews with NGO workers, government officials and local leaders

I talked to the camp leaders of each camp. The major objective of this was to introduce myself, my assistants and the research, and ask for permission to carry out research in the camp. I also used the opportunity to ask for some information about the camps, such as population and the general situation at the moment. In addition, I interviewed the LC3 of the area, the secretary of the Sub County Headquarters, the Medical Assistant and Health Information Assistant at Kapelebyong Health Centre IV, the headmasters of Oditel Primary School, Nyada Primary School, Acumet Primary School and St. Francis Acumet Secondary School, the Lay Reader of Nyada Church of Uganda, two members of Teso Widows' Association, the parish coordinator of the Catholic Church, as well as four foreign missionaries in the Catholic mission in Oditel, a social worker in Teso Initiative for Peace, committee members of Kapelebyong Bokora Empowerment for Peace, the Agricultural Programme Manager and other staff of Vision TERUDO, the Member of Parliament (MP) of Kapelebyong and the Minister of State for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, who is also MP of Amuria, the LC5 of Amuria, nurses in Acumet mission clinic, and home carers in the Red Cross home based care programme for AIDS patients. Some of these interviews were formal,

while the majority was informal conversations. In both cases, the interviewees knew that I was doing research, and the topic of the research.

These interviews gave me insights into different issues including the quality of health care and education, different NGO programmes, the workings of different peace projects, and people's perceptions of those, churches and their activities, the local government structures and the organization of the camps, as well as the linkages between the local government, district and central government.

3.5.5 Observation and Informal Conversations

Through observing the life in the camps, I acquired information about the activities people did, and who did what kind of work. This was also a great help when conducting the household interview, as the respondents often used to mention only a few major livelihood activities. By seeing household members carrying out different activities I could ask 'what about...?' By observation and informal conversations with people in the market places, along the road and in their homes I got a lot of information about the daily lives of people in the camps, and about the formal and informal institutions that influence their lives.

3.5.6 Secondary Data

I collected some secondary data from Kapelebyong Health Centre, the Sub County Headquarters, and the schools. The information from the health centre and the schools was updated and of high quality, while the data in the Sub County Headquarters lacked in quality and was not updated. The people working there explained that sometimes population figures were exaggerated because they were used as the basis on which some NGOs distributed relief. Also, as no relief had been given since 2005, the cell leaders in the camps had stopped keeping records. As many people were in the process of going back to the villages during the time of fieldwork, this data was certainly outdated. Still, it does give a clue to the number of people in the area.

3.5.7 Data Recording

During the household interviews, I and my research assistants took notes. When the assistants did the interviews on their own, this was quite time consuming, but when I did the interview with an interpreter it worked very well. In addition I often discussed the interviews with the interpreter after leaving the household, and I used to write down any additional information or reflections that I got through these discussions.

The group interviews were conducted in Ateso with an interpreter, and I wrote notes. This worked well as I do understand quite a lot of Ateso, and so I could start writing when the respondents talked, and then fill in the information when I got the translation.

Some of the key informant interviews and interviews with leaders, NGO workers etc were formal, and then I took notes during the interview. Other times I wrote down the information at a later time. I also kept a field diary where I wrote down the happenings of the day and any new discoveries I made. One of my research assistants in particular was of great help, as we often would sit down in the evening and go through the events of the day. This was very helpful in terms of remembering the information and writing it down, as two brains remember much more than one!

3.6 Data Analysis

The theoretical framework in Chapter 2 is the basis on which the data collection was designed, and also a guide in the data analysis. The framework helped me organize the data into manageable categories, and also to see the linkages between the different categories. Although most of the data is of a qualitative nature, I have chosen to do some simple calculations to give a better overview of some of the issues. In the presentation of the data, I use quotes quite extensively. This is to give more relevance to the data, and present how people in the area perceive the issues at hand. I have chosen to present the quotes anonymously for the individual respondents, to protect them from any kind of sanctions. For official persons I use the title and sometimes the name, as these are people in leading positions in the community, and do not need protection in the same way as individual respondents.

3.7 Reflections around the Data

3.7.1 The Use of Terms

Household and head of household

During the wealth ranking exercises, the groups defined a household as people who live together, work together and eat together. However, as some of the people discussed in the wealth ranking exercises, and was clearly seen when we started doing the household interviews, this was not always straightforward. The term ‘head of household’ was also difficult. First of all, some men have more than one wife, and these often have separate households. Is then the husband head of both households, or only the one where he normally lives, or none of them? What about when a husband dies leaving two widows, are they one or two households? The other main issue was that people live in extended families. Sometimes we came to a home where we had already been. The participants in the wealth ranking had often identified for example a young married couple as a household, but they were still living together with the husband’s parents. Another related issue which occurred once was that some orphans were said to be household members of two different households. The families were related and living next to each other, and probably it was reasonable to say that both families were taking care of the orphans.

Security and Insecurity

The respondents in the household interviews were asked how the economic activities they were carrying out were affected by insecurity. It soon became clear that they understood this as a very specific question: how the activities they do are affected when there is an incidence of insecurity. The term ‘security’ on the other hand, was not understood as the opposite of ‘insecurity’ but mainly as the presence of enough soldiers to protect the area. Most people thus said that they would be willing to go back to the village when the government provided ‘security’, meaning when or if soldiers were posted in their villages. However, when discussing the issue of security further, it became clear that many of the respondents had a much deeper understanding of the term, but usually, ‘security’ could be replaced with ‘enough soldiers’.

3.7.2 Respondents’ Understanding of Research

Many of the respondents had been interviewed before; mostly by NGOs doing needs assessments or other assessments in the camps. Some expressed that they were tired of giving

information and never getting anything back, as many of the NGOs collecting the information apparently had not come back with projects that had benefited them. At the same time there was sometimes a suspicion that the respondents were giving strategic answers, as they believed I would be in position of bringing some assistance to the area. This was mostly felt when they were asked to list the members of the household, and in the questions regarding income and ownership of livestock. My research assistants know the community well and sometimes told me after an interview that 'this person is not telling the truth!' However, I decided that it was more important to make the respondents feel at ease than getting the details of their income, as the major objective was to investigate the livelihood *strategies*, and not income. Other questions also helped me establish the economic status of the household, such as the number of meals eaten per day, and the most important items of expenditure.

I did make an effort to explain the rationale of the research to the respondents, and that it would not be of any direct benefit for them to be interviewed. My assistants did a great job in explaining that I was still '*ikoku yen esomero*'- a child who is still at school, but my skin colour does symbolize wealth in the eyes of the people I interviewed. Most people seemed happy to be interviewed, and as people live close together in the camp many household interviews turned out to be more like group discussions. I however tried to make sure that we got the replies from the household that we were interviewing, and treating any additional information from neighbours as information got through informal conversations.

3.7.3 Logistics and Time

Time and transport were the major practical challenges I faced during my fieldwork. I spent almost four weeks in the camps, and most of the time I stayed in the Catholic Mission in Oditel camp. The major problem was transport to Kapelebyong, which is eight km away. The road was very bad the first time I went, and before the second time work was started on repairing it. They did not finish the repairs as long as I was there, so the road was still difficult to ride or drive on. Sometimes I used *boda-boda*, which simply means sitting on the carrier of a bicycle, and is quite tiresome. Other times I asked some people in TIP for a lift, but as they did not really need to pass Kapelebyong on the way to their project area, I felt I could only do this when I really had no other option. Friends from Vision TERUDO also helped with transport a couple of times when they were doing some work in the area. My assistant living in Kapelebyong used to ride a bicycle the eight km to Oditel to go through the questionnaires with me and pick more, but was not able to do that as often as would have been ideal, which again delayed the interviews in that place more.

3.7.5 Translation and use of Research Assistants

Due to the limited time and the logistic difficulties, I decided to use research assistants, as described above. These did a great job, but there are still some problems related to the use of assistants. First of all, during the interviews that I conducted myself I got a lot of information which was not strictly answering the questions in the questionnaires. When the assistants did the interviews, this opportunity was not there. However, the information I got was still more than sufficient for answering the research questions.

As mentioned, I do know some Ateso, which was a great benefit to me during the fieldwork, and especially the household interviews and group interviews. Much as I can not be sure that completely no information was lost or changed in translation, I do believe that I managed to get most of what the respondents said correctly. Sometimes the interpreters would misunderstand the questions, and then I was able to correct them so that they interpreted

correctly. Other times the interpreters were reluctant to interpret responses which did not strictly answer the question, and I would be able to follow it up. Still, some things are not easily translated. For example, one of the questions in the questionnaire asked ‘how are these activities affected by insecurity?’. ‘Affected’ in English is a neutral word; an activity can be affected in a negative or a positive way. The Ateso word that the interpreters used when translating this question is negatively loaded, and thus we had to probe for any positive consequences of insecurity. This was a very difficult concept for most people, and I believe the fact that there was no satisfactory way of translating the concept into Ateso made it more difficult. People were generally reluctant to mention any positive consequences of insecurity or living in camps, with the common answer being ‘*there is nothing good here, it’s the village which is good!*’. However, when we probed a bit further, almost all respondents were able to come up with a long list of benefits of living in a camp, although these benefits never outweighed the disadvantages.

Chapter 4: Contextual Background

4.1 Uganda

4.1.1 General Country Information

Uganda is a land-locked country in East Africa, bordering Kenya to the east, Sudan to the north, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Rwanda and Tanzania to the south. The total area is 236,040 sq km, with 36,330 sq km of these being water. The country has a tropical climate which is generally rainy, with two main dry seasons, one from December to February, and the other from June to August. There are regional differences in rainfall though, and the north-eastern part of the country is semi-arid (CIA, 2007). The terrain is mostly a plateau, with some mountains, the highest being Mt. Rwenzori at 5,110 m.

The population is estimated at 30.3 million (July 2007 estimate, CIA, 2007). Fifty percent of the population is below 15 years, and the population growth rate is estimated to be 3.6 %. The country has a net migration rate at 0.24 migrants per 1000 people, and the total fertility rate is at 6.8 children per woman (CIA, 2006). The national population density is 124 persons per sq km, but this varies greatly from district to district; Kampala has the highest density with 7259 persons per sq km, while Moroto District has the lowest density with 22 persons per sq km (UBOS, 2002a: vii).

There are more than 50 different ethnic groups in the country. Of these, nine ethnic groups have a population of more than 1 million, and these nine constitute about 69 % of the total population (UBOS, 2002a; UBOS, 2002b). The biggest ethnic group is the Baganda in the central parts of the country, with a population of more than four million, and thus constituting roughly 17 % of the total Ugandan population (UBOS, 2002a). The main religion is Christianity, with the Roman Catholic and the Anglican churches being the biggest, with 41.9 % and 35.9 % respectively. 12.1 % of the population is Muslim (UBOS, 2002 a: 11).

According to the Human Development Report (HDR) 2006, the income per capita in Uganda is 1, 478 PPP, the life expectancy at birth is 48.2 years, the adult literacy rate is 66.8 %, and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio 66.1 %. This results in Uganda being ranked number 145 in the Human Development Index (HDI), with a HDI value of 0.502 (UNDP, 2006).

Uganda has substantial natural resources, one of the most important being fertile soils and regular rainfall. Agriculture is the most important economic sector, employing over 80 % of the workforce, and contributing to 29.4 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee is the major export product, followed by fish and fish products, tea, cotton and cut flowers (CIA, 2007).




Figure 3: Map of Uganda. Source: UNICEF, 2006: 7

4.2.2 History

At the time the first non-Africans arrived in Uganda in 1830s, there were several kingdoms which over centuries had developed well-functioning, sophisticated and highly hierarchical societies. The first outsiders to arrive the country were Arab traders, and they were followed

in the 1860s by British explorers searching for the source of the Nile. In 1877, the first protestant missionaries entered the country, and were followed by their Catholic colleagues in 1879. The Arab traders and the British and French missionaries first arrived in the central parts of Uganda, known as the Buganda Kingdom. In 1894, the Kingdom of Buganda was placed under a formal British Protectorate (US Department of State, 2006). The British used the Baganda, the people of the Buganda Kingdom, as the basis for their subjugation of the areas north and east of Buganda. In order to rule the protectorate, they adapted a 'divide and rule policy' (RLP, 2004: 10).

The kingdoms that the Arabs and Europeans first encountered were all located in the central and western parts of what was to become Uganda. The people living in these kingdoms were Bantu people. In the northern and eastern parts of the country, there were Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic people, with languages and cultures completely different from those of the Bantu kingdoms. The British administrators emphasised these differences, and assigned the different ethnic groups different tasks in the national economy. Generally, the North and East were used as a labour reservoir for the plantations in the South and West, and most of the soldiers in the army were from the North. It was mostly Baganda that were educated and trained to work in the administration. As a result of this, at the time of independence in 1962, quite hostile attitudes had developed between the ethnic groups north of the Nile and the Bantu people south of the Nile, the Baganda in particular (Henriques, 2002: 79-80). The division between the south and west of the country on one hand, and the north and east on the other, is based on real differences in language and culture. However, the colonial administration and the post-colonial governments have used this division to rule, and today, some analysts talk of 'two Ugandas' (for example Shaw and Mbabazi, 2004).

The events after independence in 1962 are well known, and here I will give a brief overview. In 1962, Dr. Milton Obote, a Langi from Northern Uganda, of Uganda People's Congress (UPC) became prime minister of a coalition government between UPC and Kabaka Yekka (KY). KY was dominated by the Baganda, while the UPC was dominated by people from Northern Uganda. The *Kabaka* (king) of Buganda was the president, but the executive powers lay with the prime minister. Already in 1964, however, there were attempts to oust Obote from power, and he responded by suspending the constitution of 1962 and deposing Kabaka Mutebi II from the presidency. In 1966, Obote's forces attacked the Kabaka's palace, and he was driven into exile. Obote's treatment of the Baganda's beloved king increased the hostility between the Baganda and the Northerners (Mutibwa, 1992: 71).

In 1971, Obote was ousted from power by a coup d'état led by Idi Amin, who was the commander of the armed forces. He declared himself president, dissolved the parliament and amended the constitution to give himself absolute powers. In his eight year long rule, between 100 000 and 500 000 people are believed to have been killed, and all Asians were ordered to leave the country. In 1978, Amin attempted to annex the Kagera salient in Tanzania, and Tanzania joined forces with Ugandan guerrillas based in the country. This coalition took over power in Kampala on the 10th April 1979 (US Department of State, 2006; Mutibwa, 1992: 81-83 and 111-114).

After the removal of Amin, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLA) formed an interim government which led the country until elections were held in December 1980. There is little doubt that the elections were rigged, and the rigging might have stolen the victory from the Democratic Party (DP). Another party in the elections was the Uganda Patriotic Movement

(UPM) led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. Although the UPM was a minor player in the 1980 elections, Museveni has stated that these rigged elections as well as the corrupt and military-dominated system which returned Obote to power were the reasons why he formed the National Resistance Army (NRA), and started waging a guerrilla war against the second government of Obote, often referred to as 'Obote 2' (HRW, 1999).

The following period of civil war was characterized by gross human right violations, especially by government troops fighting the NRA. The fighting was particularly brutal in an area north of Kampala known as the Luweero Triangle, where hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Luweero is part of Buganda, and most of them were supporting the NRA's fight against Obote, due to the bad memories from Obote's first government. During this war, the majority of the soldiers in the government army were from Acholi and Lango in the north, but there were also a considerable number of soldiers from Teso in the east (HRW, 1999; Henriques, 2002: 212-213).

In June 1985, after increasing ethnic tensions between the Acholi and the Langi in the army, government troops led by Basilio Okello and Tito Lutwa Okello, both Acholi, deposed Obote, and Tito L. Okello was president of the country until their army was defeated by the NRA on the 26th January 1986 (Mutibwa, 1992:163-167).

Almost immediately after taking over power, Museveni announced that there would be a transition period of not more than four years, and during this period, political party activity would be suspended. A coalition government, the National Resistance Council (NRC) was put in place, including members from different political party and rebel groups. This coalition however grew narrower over time. Despite the promise that the NRC would not hold office for more than four years, Museveni in 1989 decided to extend the interim period for another five years. During the first years of the National Resistance Movement (NRM, the political wing of the NRA) rule, the government faced rebellion in the north, east and southwest. In fighting the insurgents, the NRA detained thousands of civilians suspected of supporting the rebels, and opponents and critics of the NRM government faced harassment and arrest. The tactics used by the NRM/A to repress political activity revealed a readiness to use strong shows of force, and had a long-lasting chilling effect on Ugandan's willingness to challenge restrictions on political activity (HRW, 1999).

In 1995, a new constitution was written, and in 1996 the first presidential and parliamentary elections held, with Museveni and his supporters as clear winners. The national army was in 1995 renamed Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) (Nannyonjo, 2005: 476). Both the elections in 1996 and the next in 2001 were held under the 'Movement system', which Museveni and his allies have called a 'no-party system'. Many critics however argue that this system is nothing less than a state sponsored one-party system. In 2005, a referendum was held to amend the constitution to allow political parties participate in the elections (Africa Confidential, 2005: 3). The results were according to the will of the president, and in 2006 he stood for his third term as elected president, in a multi-party election. The elections were marred by violence and the prosecution of Kiiza Besigye, leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and Museveni's main opponent (HRW 2006, pp 6-7), and the incumbent won the elections.

4.2.3 Uganda's Five-Tier System of Governance

During the early years of the NRM regime, an elaborate system of five tiers of Resistance Councils was established. The Resistance Councils were later renamed Local Councils, and are commonly referred to as LCs. This system was initially established to help maintain security and distribute essential commodities, but also to give people at the village level greater voice in decision-making (IDD 2007). The highest unit in the LC system is the district, followed by county, sub-county, parish and village.

The following description of the workings of the different local councils is based on the information I was given by key informants in Kapelebyong, and is thus describing the way the system functions there, and not necessarily how it is intended to function. The LC I council is the smallest, representing one village. This council consists of nine members, and its role is to handle development and security issues in the village, link the village to other institutions such as NGOs and government sectors, and settle minor conflicts. When the LC I council fails to settle a conflict, it can either forward the case to the police, or to the LC II, depending on the nature of the case. The LC II represents the parish, it is a less active council than the LC I, and the main role of this council is in practice to settle cases which have not been solved by the LC I. The members of the LC I and II are directly elected by the people in the village and parish.

The LC III is representing one sub-county, and the members of the council are elected directly by the people living in the sub-county. Its roles include lobbying for funds from the district authorities, central government and NGOs; allocate resources, and controlling security. It is for example the LC III council that decides where security personnel should be located. The LC III chairperson is also the security chairperson of the sub county. The LC IV represents the county, and consists of people from the LC III councils in the county. This seems to be a 'sleeping' institution though, and none of my informants could give any accurate information about the roles of this council. On district level is the LC V. In each sub-county, an LC V councillor is elected. These councillors form the LC V council. In addition, one LC V chairperson is directly elected by the people in the whole district, and is the leader of the LC V council.

4.2 Teso Sub-Region and Kapelebyong Sub-County

Kapelebyong is a sub-county in Amuria District, which is part of Teso Sub-Region in Eastern Uganda. Teso comprises the districts of Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberemaido, Kumi, Bukedea and Amuria. The majority of people in the region belong to the ethnic group known as *Iteso*, while there are some other groups in part of the region, particularly the *Kumam* in Kaberemaido and Soroti Districts, as well as some from different Bantu tribes along the shores of Lake Kyoga. The major town in Teso is Soroti, with a population of about 40,000 in 2002 (UBOS, 2002c). The total population of the five districts in Teso was 1,190,050 in the 2002 census (UBOS, 2002c).

The Iteso are Nilo-Hamites, and their language, *Ateso*, is mutually intelligible with the languages of the Karimojong in Uganda, the Turkana in Kenya and the Toposa in Sudan (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 22).

According to the 2002 census, the Iteso was the sixth largest ethnic group in Uganda with about 1,568,763 persons (UBOS, 2002b). Most of the Iteso live in Teso sub region, but there

is also a considerable number of Iteso in Tororo District in Uganda as well as some in Western Kenya (Henriques, 2002: 58).

Kapelebyong Sub-County is located in the very north of Teso, and is part of Kapelebyong County, in Amuria District. Kapelebyong County consists of the sub-counties of Obalanga, Acowa, and Kapelebyong. Kapelebyong County is bordering Amuria County to the south, Usuk County to the east, and Moroto and Lira districts to the North.

Kapelebyong Sub-County has an area of 1344 square kilometres, and 672 of these are under cultivation (Amuria District Local Government, 2007). In the 2002 census, the population of the sub-county was 11011, and the average household size was 4, 5 persons per household (UBOS, 2002d). The landscape is generally flat, at an altitude of about 1030 metres above sea level. The annual rainfall in the sub-county is estimated to be between 1000 and 1500 mm. As there is no rainfall gauge in the sub-county, this is a rough estimate. The soils are sandy or clay, with the areas where clay is prevalent experiencing problems of water logging during times of heavy rains. The vegetation is tropical savannah (Amuria District Local Government, 2007).

The main religion is Christianity, with 65% of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, and 30% to the Anglican Church. The majority of the remaining 5% belong to other Christian churches. In Oditel there are a few Muslims; according to one of my informants they could be about six persons. The nearest Mosque is in Amuria. More than 99% of the population is Iteso. The remaining 1 % belongs to different ethnic groups, such as Langi, Acholi, Karimojong and Nyakwai, and most of them are either women married to men from the area, or civil servants who have been employed there (Amuria District Local Government, 2007).

The main economic activity in the area is agricultural crop production. This is seriously hampered by the fact that on average, there is only one ox for each ten households (Amuria District Local Government, 2007). The majority of the population in the sub-county live in camps for internally displaced people. This has had severe negative impacts on food security and economic development.

4.3.2 Description of the study sites

This study was conducted in three of the major camps in Kapelebyong Sub-County. These are Kapelebyong, Oditel and Apedu. Accurate population statistics were hard to obtain, but International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted a survey in January 2006, and the data from this survey is the newest data available for Oditel and Kapelebyong camps. In Apedu, the camp leader was keeping records, and this seemed to be updated at the time of fieldwork. In January 2006, there were 1995 households in Oditel, with a total population of 8315 people. In Kapelebyong, the number of households was 1150, and the total population was 5377 (IOM, 2006: 10-12). However, since this survey, many people had moved from these big camps to smaller camps nearer their homes, and some had gone back to their village homes. These figures are thus not very accurate for the time of fieldwork, but they do give an idea about the size of the population. In addition, such population figures tend to be exaggerated, as population data is normally collected when a relief agency is giving out relief aid. In Apedu, the number of households was 133, while the total population was 739. In all the camps, the housing conditions are poor, with most people living in huts with grass thatched roofing and walls made of mud blocks. The houses are small and close together. At

the time of fieldwork, there was no relief aid in the area, but some organizations had different development projects in place, as will be discussed later.

There are no statistics available on how big a percentage of the population in Kapelebyong Sub-County live in camps. However, it is clear from my own observations in the area that the great majority are displaced. The few who live in their homes have recently returned from the camps. It is particularly people from the areas south of Oditel who have been able to go back to their homes, while people from areas nearer the border to Karamoja do not feel it is secure to go back yet. Still, almost everybody I spoke to had concrete plans about going back, and most of them had started building houses in their villages, or in smaller camps nearer their village homes.




Figure 4: Map of Kapelebyong, Amuria and Usuk counties. Source: Katakwi District, 2006

4.4 History of Teso

According to oral history among the Iteso, they originated from Southern Ethiopia, and started migrating southwards due to famine there. Lawrance (1957: 7-8) writes that this was probably between 1700 and 1800, and that the migration lasted for six generations, or ages. According to Omurangi Otim (2000: 20), the oral history of the Iteso unanimously point to the belief that they were one with the Karimojong, and that as they moved southwards, the Karimojong remained in what is today Karamoja. Today, Karamoja comprise the three districts of Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit. Part of the group however continued further south, and settled in present day Teso (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 20). Originally, the Iteso were pastoralists, as the Karimojong still are. As they moved southwards, they found that rainfall was reliable, and adapted a sedentary life with a combination of cultivation and livestock keeping. From contact with Bantu groups across Lake Kyoga and the Luo groups to the north, they got iron hoes and new crops like sweet potatoes and groundnuts in exchange for their

own produce. Despite the influence from these other ethnic groups, it is believed that by the time the colonialists came to Teso in 1897, there was still a feeling of oneness between the Iteso and the Karimojong (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 26-27).

During the colonial times, the British used the Baganda people to 'civilize' the eastern and northern parts of Uganda. The British and the Baganda knew Eastern Uganda as '*Bukedi*', meaning 'the land of the naked people', and they considered it in a state of warfare and anarchy (Henriques, 2002: 7; Kasamba, 2003). At that time, Teso was an egalitarian society, where the age set groups were the most important organizational institution, followed by the clan. The Baganda's 'pacification' of Teso, and later the British colonial administration, led to a series of important changes in the social organization and the economy of the Iteso. The Baganda divided the area into administrative units similar to those of Buganda, which was a highly centralized state. To weaken resistance to the new rules, the age set initiation ceremonies were abolished, and were never revived (Pirouet, 1978).

The British were interested in Teso mainly for the opportunity to grow cotton, and in 1912 Teso District was created and a native organization put in place. It was the opening up of Teso for cotton growing that eventually made the Protectorate profitable for the British (Vincent 1982: 170). By this new organization, a former loosely connected group of different clans were made into a tribe and put under the same label, 'the Iteso'. At the same time they were separated from the Karimojong, who were never effectively included in the colonial administration (Mirzeler and Young, 2000: 413).

In the north-south divide that has characterized much of Ugandan politics both before and after independence, Teso had a special position. It was the biggest cotton and cattle producing area in the country, and the Iteso as a group did not partake much in national politics. Cotton gave each household access to money, and as a result the educational standard of the Iteso was relatively high at the time of independence. The cotton business was also the main reason behind investments in infrastructure, and at the time of independence, only Buganda had better infrastructure than Teso (Henriques, 2002: 82-86).

4.4.1 Karimojong Cattle Raids in Teso

For many years, there has been a problem of cattle raiding in the border areas between Teso and Karamoja. This problem was long contained as both groups only had access to home-made weapons such as spears, bows and arrows. In the late 19th Century, firearms made their first appearance in Karamoja, brought there by ivory hunters and traders (Quam, 1996). After the British established their administration in the area, the guns were handed in, and they continued using their indigenous weapons and military tactics until the 1960s. At that time, Turkana from Kenya and Toposa from Sudan were heavily armed, and started frequent incursions into Karamoja. The different governments' response to this situation was not helpful to the Karimojong, and in the early 1970s they started fabricating their own home-made guns, believing that self-help was their only rescue from the raiding by the neighbouring tribes. When Amin's regime collapsed in 1979, the government army fled. Many of the soldiers sold their weapons on their way back to their home areas. As they fled, the regional army barracks in Moroto was left unguarded, and local people broke into the armoury and carried rifles and ammunition by the donkey-load (Quam, 1996).

The fact that the Karimojong were now well armed with modern weapons led to a series of raids in Teso and other neighbouring districts. During the second government of Obote, Local

Defence Units (LDUs) were created in Teso, Lango and Acholi to protect the civilians and their livestock from the raiders (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 72; Quam, 1996). During the short reign of Tito Okello, the Karimojong raiding increased as the militias were not allowed to carry out their duties (Omurangi Otim, 2000: 73). In addition, the soldiers in Okello's army caused a lot of havoc in Teso, and many people lost all they had as the soldiers looted in the whole area.

4.4.2 Rebellion in Teso

When Museveni and his NRA/M came to power in 1986, the people in Teso welcomed the new regime, and helped the NRA to hunt down Acholi soldiers who fled towards Acholi through Teso, hoping for protection against the Karimojong warriors. However, the NRM did not perceive the Karimojong raids as a threat to national security, and concentrated on the rebellion going on further north. As a result, the raiding was left uncontrolled, and soon the warriors reached places like Soroti, Serere and Kumi, where they had never reached before.

As a result of the raiding and the inaction of the government, a rebel group was formed with the aim of fighting both the Karimojong and the government. A number of Iteso had been soldiers in the armies of Amin and Obote 2, and many of them had not surrendered their weapons when their governments were overthrown. In addition, there were some NRA deserters, soldiers from the now defunct LDUs, former police men and government officials from former governments. There were thus a considerable amount of guns in the area, and the initiators organized these in groups on sub-county level. At first, the group was called 'Fight Obote Back Again', but later it changed name to 'Uganda People's Army' (UPA). At first, they enjoyed the support of the civilians, especially as they in some cases followed the cattle raiders and recovered the cattle, and brought it back to the owners. However, people soon lost confidence in them as they started killing civilians, raping, and forcefully recruiting new soldiers into its ranks. The UPA did not have any religious or political agenda apart from overthrowing the NRM/A government. It did not take long then, until the UPA was the primary concern of the NRM/A. As the UPA was caught up fighting the NRA, the raiding was left uncontrolled (Henriques, 2002: 211-214; Omurangi Otim, 2000: 73). After a few years, the Iteso had lost literally all their cattle. But by the time there were no more cows for the Karimojong to take, the UPA and NRA were deep into fighting, and this continued until the early 1990s (Henriques, 2002: 212-214).

The UPA insurgency in Teso brought about death and destruction on a scale never experienced before. Both the NRA and the UPA committed gross human right abuses, and the war led to a dramatic drop in agricultural production; hundreds of thousands of people were living in IDP camps; young people were abducted; people's movements were restricted and many were killed in roadblocks put up by the rebels, or by the NRA, as they often accused local civilians of supporting the rebels (Henriques, 2002: 212-220; Obore, 2003). In some areas, people would be accused for being rebels or rebel supporters if they moved outside the IDP camps. Thus the choice was often between dying of hunger in the camp, or being killed in the fields trying to find some food. When the war finally ended, almost everybody in Teso apart from a few in the urban areas had lost literally all they had. Omurangi Otim writes that *'literally to all Iteso, life started afresh after the insurgency, none of my informants at Komolo had any livestock when they returned, not even poultry'* (2000: 74).

The war between the rebels and government forces was 'very serious' for about three years in the whole of Teso. In 1990, Teso Peace Commission was formed. The commission mediated between the UPA and NRA, and it was decided that the rebels would be offered amnesty if

they surrendered. The rebels who surrendered were reintegrated by different means; some were given animals or farm inputs to start doing agriculture; some were recruited to the police or government army; and some of the leaders were given positions in the government. Some church leaders also played an important role in the peace process, and especially Bishop Geresom Ilukor of the Anglican Church is still remembered for risking his life on several occasions, as he went to the bush to talk to the rebels, trying to convince them to surrender.

Peace came at different times in different places, and Kapelebyong was one of the areas where the rebels surrendered lastly. As a result, the area was not peaceful until 1994. The improvement was gradual, and in 1995, people started to move from the IDP camps to their homes. Although the rebels had surrendered, the threat of cattle raids was still present, and one of the ideas of the Peace Commission was to establish Local Defence Units (LDUs) to protect the people against the raiders. The LDUs were put in place in Kapelebyong in 1994. From the end of the insurgency until 2003, most of Teso enjoyed a period of peace and development. However, in Kapelebyong and the other areas bordering Karamoja, the peaceful period ended in 2000. After 1995, many people had gone back to their villages, and others had gone to live in small camps nearer their homes, so that they could access their gardens relatively easily, thus being able to grow more food. During this time, there was a problem of cattle theft by the Karimojongs, but this was not violent, and sometimes the Iteso could follow the Karimojong up to their place, sit down and discuss with them and recover the cattle. There was also some peaceful interaction between the two groups, and some Iteso even lived in Karamoja. Apart from the LDUs, there were no soldiers in the area. In 2000, a group of Karimojong warriors raided cattle in Obalanga, and some of the people there decided to report the incidence to the UPDF, who followed the raiders and intercepted them after they had crossed the border back to Karamoja. This sparked off a series of attacks on the Iteso living in Karamoja, who were chased away. The warriors did no longer come to Teso just to steal cattle, but they started killing, raping, burning houses and destroying crops and other property as well. As a result, the people who had gone back to their homes were forced to flee to the IDP camps again.

The magnitude of this problem is big, and according to DANIDA, over 150,000 people in the areas bordering Karamoja have stayed in camps intermittently since the early 1980s (DANIDA, 2005: 9). In many of the areas with IDPs, this means that all people in the area are displaced, and have been so for decades. Most of my informants in Kapelebyong camp had lived in camps since 1979, or were born in the camp and never stayed in the village. In Oditel and Apedu the majority had moved between different camps and the village homes several times, but spent more times as IDPs than as peasants living in their own homes. This mass displacement has had severe impacts on the socio-economic infrastructure in the region, especially due to the loss of livestock and restricted access to agricultural land as a result of conflict and displacement (DANIDA, 2005: 9-10).

4.4.3 2003: Lord's Resistance Army Attacks Teso

The situation further deteriorated in 2003, when the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Northern Uganda attacked. Amuria, Kaberamaido and Soroti districts were attacked, and over 400,000 people in these areas fled their homes, including many who already lived in camps due to the insecurity caused by Karimojong attacks. The time the LRA rebels were in Teso was extremely difficult for the civilians, as the group is known as the most brutal rebel group in Sub-Saharan Africa (Nannyonjo, 2005, 476). The rebels abducted many children; some estimates talk about 2000 children only from Amuria District. Some of these children

managed to escape and have been brought back home, while many are still missing. As the attack came just as the harvest was starting, people had no food stores, and the entire harvest was lost. Roads became impassable a few days after the first attack, and the people who did not manage to go to Soroti or other places were left completely on their own; many were killed by the rebels or died from disease or hunger. Even those who managed to seek refuge in Soroti or other towns faced a very difficult situation. Many lived on pavements in the towns or just in the open for several months. Schools, churches and offices were crowded with IDPs, and education was severely affected, even for children who were not displaced. Water, food, clothes and medicines were scarce, and many of the IDPs returned home as soon as the security situation allowed. The LRA insurgency left the population traumatized. As one woman in Oditel told me *'you know, we the Iteso have suffered a lot, at the hands of Karimojong raiders, UPA rebels and government soldiers. But none of these things can compare with the time when Kony¹ came. The suffering we experienced then was beyond all the other times that we've suffered'*.

In 2003, Amuria District was part of Katakwi District, and 75 % of the people in this district were displaced (UNOCHA, 2005: 4). In response to the LRA incursion to Teso, a local militia was created, which, together with the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) succeeded in driving the LRA out of the region, and by the first half of 2004 the area was generally peaceful. As the situation normalized, many of the LRA-displaced returned to their homes, or have at least moved to camps nearer their homes, so they can cultivate their land again (DANIDA, 2005: 10).

4.4.4 Continued Karimojong Raids in Katakwi and Amuria

Despite this, the Karimojong have continued raiding in Katakwi and Amuria Districts, and are posing a persistent security threat to the IDPs in the sub counties bordering Karamoja. The local militia, known as the Arrow Boys, that was formed to fight the LRA has largely been dissolved, and the UPDF has not been able to ensure the safety of the Karimojong-displaced population. At the same time, many of the international and local aid agencies, as well as the government, have phased out the programmes aimed to assist IDPs in Teso. It appears that the Karimojong-displaced to a large extent have been left to their own devices (DANIDA, 2005: 10; Miller, 2006: 2).

4.5 The Present Situation in Kapelebyong

The main concern of the IDPs displaced by Karimojong warriors is insecurity. UNOCHA (2005: 3) reports that during an assessment done in June 2005, Karimojong incursions were reported 'more or less on daily basis along the borders of Teso and Karamoja region'. At the time of fieldwork, a couple of months had passed without an attack. However, people still feared that it could happen any time, as the men who had volunteered to join the Arrow Group with the purpose of providing security to their people and property were often relocated from their home sub-counties to other places. This led to greater vulnerability of the IDPs, as

¹ Most people in Teso refer to the LRA as 'Kony', after its leader, Joseph Kony

soldiers from other places were reluctant to provide security (UNOCHA, 2005: 3). The general opinion seemed to be that the soldiers in the area were too few to be able to protect them in case of an attack, and so the relative peace at the time would end as soon as a group of warriors would decide to cross the border to Teso to raid. This situation meant that although it was a relatively peaceful time, people still left the camps late and came back early as a security measure. A few weeks after I finished my fieldwork in the beginning of February 2007, I got reports that Karimojong warriors had been observed in the area outside Apedu and Oditel camps, and this caused a great deal of fear among the IDPs. On 18th of April 2007, the local newspaper Etop reported that four people had been killed by Karimojong warriors in Bukedea district, and one person had been killed in Obalanga, which is neighbouring Kapelebyong (Etop, 2007).

As a result of the insecurity, the displaced people have limited access to agricultural land, as they have to walk from the camps to the village every day. The insecurity also means that the farmers leave the camps late in the morning, and have to come back early as a safety measure, thus reducing productivity further. The remoteness of the camps and the low income levels there make the market for labour small, and the IDPs are left with few options to secure their livelihoods (UNOCHA, 2005: 9-10). In addition to subsistence production, the main sources of income were reported to be casual labouring, brewing alcohol, selling of produce and burning charcoal. The report also noted that some women had resorted to selling sex. The income levels in the camps are generally very low, and the Inter Agency Assessment reported that 'most of the IDPs lived on far much below half \$ per day' (UNOCHA, 2005: 7-8). As we will see, these findings correspond closely to my own findings in the area.

The Government of Uganda (GoU) is currently carrying out a disarmament exercise in Karamoja. This exercise is carried out by the UPDF, and has met a lot of resistance among the Karimojong. As a result of the disarmament exercise, many armed Karimojong warriors have fled to neighbouring areas, including Kapelebyong, where they attack the local population and steal cattle and crops (UNOCHA, 2006: 1).

The displaced population in Kapelebyong as well as the rest of Amuria and Katakwi district are sometimes called the 'invisible' or 'forgotten' displaced. There seems to be a feeling of neglect, both from humanitarian organizations and government agencies (Miller, 2006: 2). This observation is in line with my own observations in the area. People feel neglected, and at the same time, it is clear that people living outside the Teso region have very little knowledge about what is going on there, and the fact that a large portion of the population are still displaced, almost 30 years after the first time they had to leave their homes to seek refuge in the camps.

Chapter 5: Empirical Findings and Analysis

Section 1: Pre-Conflict Livelihoods

Before the Karimojong acquired modern weapons and started raiding in Teso in 1979, people in Kapelebyong lived in their village homes and practiced a combination of crop growing and livestock rearing. Although livestock was, and still is, of great importance both culturally and economically, the major income for most families came from growing crops. Even before the cattle were stolen, people normally used the surplus of crop production to buy animals. At the same time as crop growing enabled people to buy livestock, livestock, and especially oxen, also enabled people to grow more crops. The general impression after talking to several older people in Kapelebyong is that during this time, most people had what they needed. The herds of cattle were big; it was not unusual for a man to have 200 head of cattle in his herd.

Before the insecurity started and people came to live in camps, the people in the area used to live scattered in their home villages. Each family would build a home on their own land, and when a son in the family got married, he would build a new home on the family land. The gardens where they grew their crops would thus be just outside the homestead, and during the busy rainy season they were able to start working in the garden early in the morning, go home to eat, rest or do other work in the middle of the day, and go back to work in the evening. Most families had at least one pair of oxen, and so they were able to produce enough crops for both home consumption and for sale.

In this setting, children grew up working closely with their parents and learning the work they were supposed to do as adults. Many of my respondents emphasised that it was ‘easy’ to bring up children in the village; neighbours were far, and everybody in the extended family helped in the upbringing of the children. Therefore, the children were disciplined and learnt to obey and respect their parents and elders. Formal education was not high on the agenda in most families, as they knew they had cattle so that the sons could get married, and the land was enough to feed a growing family. The girls would get married and leave the natal home, so it was considered as a waste of time and money to send them to school.

Before the cattle were taken, livestock provided a very important form of saving and investing. For example, one could buy a young cow, and then later it would produce a calf, and they could get more cows or oxen, or sell one when they needed something they did not produce at home. Some people who sent their children to school would buy a young cow or bull, and by the time schools started it had grown, and they could sell it and buy another young one or even two, and still have a surplus for paying school fees. In this way, they kept increasing their herd, at the same time as they were able to get the money needed for school fees. Other animals such as goats, sheep and chicken were also important, and these were kept by the women, while the cattle were kept by the men. These smaller animals could be sold when the household needed money quickly, and were also important as food for social functions. Chickens were important in that they provide eggs, and also when an important visitor came, a chicken would be slaughtered to welcome the guest.

The most important social function of livestock was and still is related to marriage. When a boy wants to get married, he comes to the girl’s home together with his brothers, uncles, father and friends. After the girl has confirmed that she accepts to marry the boy, the male

relatives on both sides sit down to discuss the bride price that the boy has to pay the girl's family. Cattle are the main component of the bride price, although goats and cash are also included. This is given to the family of the bride as a gift, but the main rationale behind it is that the girl's family is losing her labour power, and thus the bride price is a compensation. This exchange also establishes ties between the two families, and a security against divorce, as her family would then be asked to pay back the bride price.

When living in the village, people had access to many free goods, such as green leafy vegetables, termites, white ants, fruits, nuts, berries, roots etc. These were important nutritional supplements to the major foods that they cultivated.

When looking at the livelihood strategies that the people in the area employ today, it's important to have this background in mind. As already mentioned, insecurity started in 1979. Although there have been a few short periods of calm since then, life never came back to the way it was before 1979. During these 28 years, the situation has kept changing. Some of the activities which are common now have grown to become more common at different times during the period. I still think it is useful to consider 1979 as the 'great schism' in people's livelihoods. In the following, I will describe the livelihood strategies employed by the people in Kapelebyong today. Although many of the informants do not remember the time before 1979, there seems to be a general feeling that the life I have described above is the normal and desirable way of life for most people. The strategies they are using in order to make a living are strongly informed by this ideal, and the major aim is to be able to go back to the kind of life that was before. At the same time, the uncertain security situation makes it important for them to secure a living in the camp as well, and many now see education of children as a way of securing their future livelihoods, as agriculture and livestock keeping have become extremely uncertain ways of making a living.

The livelihood strategies available to people are determined by the assets they have access to. Cattle raiding, insecurity and displacement have led to loss of some assets, and restricted access to others. This is fundamentally important for understanding the livelihood strategies they employ, both short and long term. In the following, I will therefore first give a brief overview of the asset status of the households in the area, based on the household interviews that were conducted. Then I will go on to describe the most important livelihood strategies, and how these have been influenced by insecurity and encampment.

Section 2: Assets

In the following sections I will go into some detail on the asset status of the households in the area, and how access to the various assets has been influenced by insecurity and displacement.

Table 1: Number of households having access to various assets in the three surveyed camps.

Asset	Oditel (N=25)	Kapelebyong (N=16)	Apedu (N=12)
Land	24	16	12
Cattle	10	6	6
Goats	6	3	2
Pigs	3	4	1
Poultry	7	6	3
Bicycle	10	5	10
Loans and savings	6	2	2
Group membership	15	12	8

Source: Household survey

2.1 *Natural Capital*

2.1.1 Land

In rural areas like Kapelebyong, land is the basis of livelihood and identity, and the most valuable economic resource owned or accessed by people. When people are forcibly replaced, loss of land or restricted access to land represents a huge obstacle to their livelihoods (Jacobsen, 2002: 106).

Apart from one old widow without any children, all the interviewed households had access to land. The great majority of the households owned the land they used for cultivation, while others cultivated on land belonging to their clan, land borrowed from friends or relatives, or rented land.

Although almost all the households had access to land, most of them were not able to utilize it effectively. Most people had sought refuge in the camp nearest to their village homes, and so all households apart from three were able to access their own land. For those three households the distance from the camp to the land was the reason why they did not access it, and for one the distance was coupled with AIDS, as she assumed she would have been able to cultivate her own land if she had been healthy. These three household accessed land which they had rented or borrowed from others. However, even for the great majority who did access their own land, the distance from the camp to the land resulted in significantly reduced crop production. A few people in Apedu and Oditel could reach their gardens within 30 minutes, while the majority reported that they used one or two hours to walk to their villages, and some as much as between three and four hours. All these are estimates though, as none of the respondents had watches or knew the exact distance from the camp to their villages.

Apart from the distances people need to cover to access their land, insecurity further restricts access. At times with rumours about Karimojong being present in the area, most people remain in the camps. As one of the respondents said '*when you hear a gunshot, you just stay at home that day*'. In periods with heightened insecurity, people wait for the soldiers to patrol the areas before they leave the camps for the village, which delays them even more. Even

without the patrolling, people normally do not leave the safety of the camps before 7am, and those whose villages are in the areas bordering Karamoja come back as early as 10-11 am. Others come back later, and those in the most secure areas do not need to go back to the camp until 5-6 pm.

All this means that most people only spend a few hours in the garden every time they go. It also means that children and older people, who would contribute in cultivation in the village, are not able to do so. Thus the labour force available is reduced, and some parents also expressed concern that the children are not learning how to cultivate. As a result, they are not able to cultivate as much food as they need. Due to the distance, people do not go to the garden every day. As one of the respondents said '*sometimes you just feel tired to go to the garden, so you remain at home*'. Moreover, as another respondent said '*you reach the garden when you are already tired from walking and the sun is hot, so you are not able to do much work*'. Another problem is that as the camps are far from the gardens, they are not able to go to the garden if there is something they need to attend to in the camp that day, for example a meeting, communal work, business or other work.

The distance also means that people are not able to rotate crops or to let the land lie fallow. This has resulted in low yields, and different pests that destroy crops altogether. In addition, as people live far away from their gardens, the crops are left unguarded, and a common problem is that crops are stolen or eaten by cattle while still in the garden. It seems that the thieves are most often Karimojong, but sometimes other IDPs from the area.

2.1.2 Pasture

Cattle are taken to graze outside the camp every day, and are allowed to graze everywhere apart from on cultivated land. This means that pasture is quite abundant, but the herdsmen have to take the cattle far away from the camp to find pasture. Goats and other small animals are kept around the camp, and many people complained that goats were eating food which was spread to dry. Goats graze the land around the camp, and thus cultivating near the camp is not a favourable option, as the goats often eat the crops in the gardens.

2.1.3 Water Resources

In Apedu, there is a valley dam, which people use for fishing. The dam also provides a water source for the cattle and for the people when the borehole breaks down, as it does from time to time. Apart from this, there are no lakes or rivers in the area. Dried fish are bought from the weekly markets in Obalanga, Acowa or Amuria, and a few people buy fresh fish from other lakes in neighbouring areas and sell in the camps. In each camp, there are boreholes, and access to drinking water was one of the things the respondents often mentioned as one of the benefits of living in the camps as compared to the village. In Apedu however, there is only one functional borehole, and whenever this is faulty, people collect water from the dam, which is not safe for consumption.

2.1.4 Wild Animals, Insects and Fruits

Although rare, some people reported that they were hunting wild animals. Some also collected termites and sold as snacks in the bars. During the wet season, people collect and eat white ants. During the season for mangoes, from April to June, people pick mangoes, although many trees have been cut down so the availability of mangoes has been reduced. Green leafy vegetables are an important part of people's diet in this area. While in the village, these could be picked in the gardens and swamps, but in and around the camps they are

scarce. This leads to poorer nutrition and also increases the financial burden on families as they need to buy food that they earlier accessed freely.

2.2 *Physical Capital*

2.2.1 Cattle and other livestock

As the historical background has shown, most people lost all their animals during the cattle raids and insurgency in the late 1980s, and again in the cattle raids which started in 2000, and the LRA insurgency in 2003. In addition, the crowded conditions in the camps have led to spread of diseases, and many have lost their animals through different animal diseases. The lack of veterinary services has worsened the situation. Especially poultry has been affected by different diseases. Whereas most people said that they kept chickens when they lived in the village, now only 16 out of the 53 households had any chickens, and of these, six households only had one, while only five households had more than five chickens. In Apedu, three households had 10 chickens or more, which could be because they live closer to their village homes, and that the number of people living in the camp is considerably smaller than in the two other sites. Thus it seems to be easier to keep chickens there than in the big camps. Out of the 22 households having cattle, only five had more than two animals. As many as 17 out of the 53 interviewed households did not have any animals or chickens at all.

2.2.2 Buildings and other Productive Assets

People have not only lost their livestock due to the conflict and displacement they are experiencing. Many people lost everything they had first during the Teso insurgency in the late 1980s, and then when LRA attacked. Apedu camp was burnt down, and people lost their houses as well as everything they had not managed to carry with them when they fled. Most people fled the area on foot when the LRA rebels came, and could only take with them what they could carry; mostly some food and saucepans as well as jerricans for water. When they came back, most people found their houses destroyed and everything they had left had been looted by rebels or by people who had remained. Hoes, ox ploughs and other productive assets were lost. Many of my respondents were telling me that they lacked the most basic items needed in a household, such as saucepans, cups, plates, jerricans, basins, blankets, mats or mattresses, and clothes. Buying such items was a heavy burden on many households. Many of the things were seen to be completely out of reach, at least in the short run. Lack of bedding and clothes also contributed to poor health, while loss of hoes and ox ploughs led to low agricultural production.

2.3 *Financial Capital*

As shown in Table 1, few people had access to loans or savings services. In Oditel, 24 % of the respondents had access to such services, while the figures in Kapelebyong and Apedu were 12 % and 17% respectively. The most common way of accessing a loan was through membership in a group. Others received loans direct from an organization, while others again could borrow money from individuals like friends or relatives. Not all the people who had access to such services had actually utilized them; many respondents expressed fear that they would not be able to pay back a loan if they got one. The uncertain security situation in the area contributes to this, as people feel another attack can come at any time, and they will have to flee their homes again. They have seen people in the area losing assets such as animals or land, or even being arrested for failing to pay back a loan, and they feel that the risks are too

high. At the same time, several respondents said that the business opportunities in the camps were limited, and they could not see any profitable ways of utilizing a loan.

2.4 Social Capital

In 35 of the interviewed households one or more of the household members were members of at least one group. There are two main categories of groups. One is a so-called 'tear group', or funeral society, where families from the same village or the same clan go together and help each other when someone dies. Some groups had purchased items such as saucepans, cups and plates to use during burials, while others contributed money or food every time a family in the group had lost somebody. As a burial presents a huge economic burden to an individual family, these groups function almost like insurance, so that each family can be able to bury their dead in a culturally appropriate way without having to sell off all their assets.

The second main type of groups includes farmers' groups, women's groups and groups doing revolving funds. The formation of such groups is often encouraged by NGOs, CBOs or churches. Most of the farmers' groups are supported by an NGO, and given inputs such as seeds and hoes. They then plant the seeds in a garden belonging to the group, and share the harvest between the members, as well as keeping some for seeds. Some groups are given goats or cows, which are then kept by one of the members. When these produce, the one who kept it is given the offspring to own. The cow or goat is passed on to another member of the group, who again passes it on when it has produced another young one. Many women's groups work in the same way as the farmers' groups, with the difference that all members are women. Some women's groups do other income-generating activities such as knitting tablecloths or keeping poultry. Some farmers' and women's groups are also involved in revolving funds in addition to their other activities, while some groups have specialized in revolving funds. This is the same as what is sometimes referred to as credit and savings groups. Most of these groups have been formed the last ten years, and are such a rather new type of social capital. As people lived in camps, some NGOs came and encouraged people to form groups, and most development assistance is given through such groups. There have been trainings on group dynamics, income-generating activities, revolving funds and other issues, and as the members of these groups have benefited, more people joined the groups, and new ones were started. Today, 30 of the interviewed households had at least one person who was a member of such a group.

Another form of social capital is networks with people outside the area. Many of the respondents fled to Amuria, Soroti or other places outside the area during the LRA insurgency in 2003, and during this period many people made friends with people in the places where they sought refuge. Others have relatives who fled and have settled permanently in the places they went to. It thus seems that insecurity and displacement have expanded most people's social networks. Still, as most of the relatives and friends outside the area are displaced and poor, the remittances most people receive are often small. Some people who have relatives or friends that have employment or do well in business or agriculture in more peaceful parts of Teso receive more remittances, both in cash and in kind. However, it is mostly those households that are relatively well off that have well-off relatives and friends outside the area. Some of the households did not have anybody they knew who lived outside the area and others had some, but they rarely or never visited, and if they did, they did not bring any assistance.

2.5 Human Capital

2.5.1 Education

In the 53 households that I interviewed, there were 150 persons above 15 years. Of these, 36 (24%) had never gone to school. Of the 114 people who had started school, 38 (33%) had completed Primary 7 and completed the national Primary Leaving Examination (PLE), while 15 (13%) were still studying in primary school. Out of the 38 who had done the PLE 23 (60%) had started secondary education. Fifteen of these are still studying, three dropped out, three have completed O-level but not gone for further studies, and two have gone for post secondary education.

The quality of the education is poor, as discussed later. As a result, many children learn very little during the years they spend at school. When asking parents about why they send their children to school, a common answer was that they learn how to read, which is good because they can then read signposts when travelling, and help their parents read letters. Secondly, they learn how to count and do simple arithmetic, which would help them doing business, and avoid being cheated when buying things in the market. Third, children learn ‘good manners’ at school; they learn to respect their parents and do as they are told. Many parents hoped that with education, their children would be able to get jobs in the future, and in that way have a better life than they have now. Many wanted to send their children for secondary education, but were worried that they would not be able to pay the fees. The education the children received did not seem to be directly relevant then to the daily life of the children; for example, nobody mentioned that the children learnt about agriculture, arts and crafts or other activities that could potentially help them make a living.

The education children receive is affected by insecurity in different ways. Poor nutrition makes learning difficult, and the poverty and insecurity scare away teachers, so it is only teachers hailing from the area who work in the schools, and they are not many. This will be further elaborated in the last section of this chapter.

2.5.2 Health

Many of the IDPs suffer from poor health and malnutrition. The most common diseases are malaria, acute diarrhoea, intestinal worms and respiratory diseases. Each month a number of dysentery cases are reported, normally between 10 and 15. HIV/AIDS is another serious health problem in the area, although it is difficult to know the exact number of people infected. According to the health information assistant at Kapelebyong Health Centre, four out of 103 pregnant women who tested for HIV in December were positive. In addition, 15 men and 111 women came for an HIV test during that month; of these, one man and four women were found to be positive. However, many people, especially men, fear to be tested, so the actual number of people living with HIV is difficult to establish.

Health care is one of the major items of expenditure for the majority of families in the area; 85% of the interviewed households mentioned medical care as one of the five most important items of expenditure, while 64% mentioned sicknesses as one of their major worries for the future. Many of the households reported that they ate one meal a day. For some, children were given porridge in the morning, while in other households even children ate only once a day. Many households would eat twice a day for some time after harvesting, and then reduce to one meal a day as the stores of food were reducing. Others said that they used to eat one meal

on the days they were going to the village and two on Sundays and other days when they remained in the camp. The wet season is the most difficult time for people, and one of my informants said that every year someone dies of starvation, especially in May, June and July.

2.5.3 Labour

As people depend on agriculture for survival, the labour available to a household is an important determinant of how much they are able to produce. Polygamy is practiced in Teso, and one of the characteristics given for a rich person in the wealth ranking exercise was that 'he is able to marry many wives', while a poor man may not be able to marry at all. The importance of marriage is clearly shown in that many men use all the animals they have for paying the bride price. Although there are emotional and social reasons for marriage, the fact that a wife contributes to the labour force of the household, as well as the prospect of children, who in turn will increase the number of hands, is important. One young man who felt that his wealth status had actually improved in the camp compared to when he resided in the village explained: *In the village I was poor, because I was just starting. I got married in the camp, and now we are like most people. This is because when I was in the village I had no wife, but now I have a wife and so we can work together*'.

The poor health status in the camps, as well as a high mortality rate has resulted in less labour being available for cultivation and other income-generating activities. In most families the number of young children is high, and this further increases the burden on those who are able to work.

Section 3: Livelihood Activities

3.1 Agriculture

As land was the most important asset for most of the respondents, agricultural crop production is correspondingly the most important livelihood activity for almost everybody. Of my respondents, only three households had a more important source of income than crop production. One was a businessman who ran a retail shop, and whose wife ran a pharmacy. The second one was a widow who ran a restaurant. Even for those households, agriculture was still a very important part of their livelihood portfolio. The third was a very old widow who had no children and did no agriculture or other work at all, but depended on begging from her neighbours.

Kapelebyong was the camp with fewest types of crops being grown. People in Oditel seemed to have the opportunity of growing a few more crops, such as maize, sesame, rice and bambara nuts. In Apedu, some people were living close enough to their gardens to be able to cultivate fruits and vegetables in addition to the crops mentioned already. For those having this opportunity, the list of crops grown showed a great variety, including tomatoes, onions, cabbages, oranges, pineapples, pumpkins, and cucumbers, in addition to the common crops listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Number of households growing the eight most common crops in the three surveyed camps.

Crop	Oditel (N=25)	Kapelebyong (N=16)	Apedu (N=12)
Groundnuts	22	13	12
Green gram	21	12	10
Sorghum	21	15	12
Cassava	18	13	11
Millet	11	5	8
Cowpeas	12	9	10
Maize	5	1	2
Sweet potatoes	12	1	10

Source: Household Survey

The amount of food produced varied greatly from household to household. For example, one household harvested 20 sacks of ground nuts during the last harvest, while some of the worse off only got a half sack or less. The factors hindering some people to grow more food included long distance to the gardens, lack of seeds and planting material, lack of oxen, poor health, few household members who could help, having to do casual labour to get food during the rainy season, and pests. Especially in Kapelebyong there were many people whose cowpeas were destroyed by pests last year, and did not yield anything.

All households sold some of the food they produced in order to get money for other kinds of food, medical treatment, school materials, clothes and other household items.

3.2 Keeping Livestock

As mentioned above, livestock has traditionally been a major source of income and economic security for the people in the area, but today this type of asset is significantly reduced as explained above. Most people expressed a wish to have more animals than they had at the moment, but the money needed to purchase one was far beyond what they could manage to raise. The major reason for keeping animals was ‘to sell in an emergency’; ‘to keep so it produces more’, or for milk or draught power in the case of cows and oxen respectively.

3.3 Casual Labour

In 35 out of the 53 households one or more of the household members were engaged in casual labour. The payment for a day’s work is fixed at 1000 shillings (0.6 USD). However, the long distances to the gardens mean that a day’s work is normally reduced to a few hours, plus the time it takes to walk to the gardens and back to the camps. Some people were also paid in kind, mostly in the form of foodstuffs that they had not grown for their own household. The people who employ people in casual labour are local people who are better off than the average, such as people with formal employment, and people who do well in business.

Doing casual work was seen by many as both an advantage and a disadvantage of living in the camps. Many people said that they would never work for others for cash when they lived in their village homes, and felt that having to do this was a sign of deterioration in the situation of their households. At the same time, under the circumstances where they were not able to grow enough food for their families on their own land, the availability of work in other people’s gardens was appreciated as a way of avoiding famine, and getting some cash for buying for example school materials.

Most of the demand for casual labour was in the wet season, being the busiest time of the year. This meant that the people dependent on working for others in their gardens were not able to work in their own gardens, and thus would not be able to grow enough food. Thus they are in a vicious circle, where they have to work for others during the rainy season in order to get food for their families. As a result, they fail to grow enough crops, so that next year again at the time the rains start, they will be out of food and have to work for others. Some work was also available during the dry season, such as peeling and slicing sweet potatoes, moulding mud blocks or helping with building.

3.4 Brewing and selling alcohol

For many women in the camps, brewing beer is a major source of income. *Ajono* is a local beer made out of millet, and is very popular among the Iteso. For 21 out of the 53 households brewing *ajono* was a major source of income. Traditionally, this brew was not made for sale. It would commonly be brewed for social functions like marriages and burials, as well as when people had joined hands to work in the garden of one family. Then, the women in the household would brew enough *ajono* for all the workers to sit down and drink at the end of the day. Today this has by and large ended; now people are paid in cash or with food when they work in someone else’s garden. *Ajono* is still very popular though, and for many women and families it represents a major income generating activity. Most women engaged in this business would brew between once a week and once a month, with a profit of typically 5000 shillings (2.9 USD) each time. However, some women did not own the equipment needed to do the brewing, such as a saucepan, plastic buckets and pots. They then used to rent this equipment from others, and the profit would be less.

Five households also reported that they were distilling a local spirit made out of cassava, known as *waragi*. The process of distilling is more complicated than the process of brewing beer, and also needs more sophisticated equipment. The profits the women distilling spirits would report were typically higher than the profits made from brewing beer, often between 8000 and 10,000 shillings (4.7- 5.8 USD) each time they distilled.

Brewing thus contributes significantly towards the household income in those households where one or more of the women are brewing. Although it is not normally the single most important source of income, McCall (1996: 31) writes that it provides higher levels of income than any other business or employment for rural women in Africa. At the same time, men spend much of their income on beer; according to a study in Kitui in Kenya, rural males there spent three-fifths of their weekly income on beer (McCall, 1996: 30). However, in Kapelebyong, some women also spent money on beer, but the men were always the majority of customers in the drinking places. Brewing thus provides a venue where money is transferred from men to women, and according to my respondents, the brewing business and the profits derived from it is normally controlled exclusively by women. In Kapelebyong, as in much of Uganda, excessive consumption of alcohol is seen as a problem by many. In addition to the direct cost of purchasing alcohol, it also leads to loss of labour, and thus it is one of the major causes of poverty. At the same time, the difficult living conditions are a cause of excessive alcohol consumption (Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005: 71).

3.5 *Petty Trade*

Omena is a dried, small freshwater sardine that provides an important source of proteins to many of the people living in camps in Kapelebyong. Eight of my respondents reported doing business with this fish. They buy the fish in Obalanga, which is another camp about 15 kilometres from Oditel. In Obalanga, there is a weekly market every Tuesday. This market is bigger than the market in Oditel, which is every Saturday. In Kapelebyong and Apedu there are no weekly markets at all. Some people buy fish from Amuria, but because of the distance this is only possible for those with a bicycle, which means mostly men. The women dealing in *omena* normally walk on foot to Obalanga and back on market days.



Photo 2: Women selling dried fish in Oditel Camp.

In Oditel, which is much busier than Kapelebyong and Apedu, there were at the time of fieldwork about 10 women selling dry fish in the small, daily market. Such small markets exist in all the camps. In addition, some women went to Obalanga and bought tomatoes, onions, cabbage and tamarinds, and sold in these market.

Different types of small ‘bread’ have also become popular, and every day there was a line of about eight people selling *kabalagala*, *mandazi* and *chapatti* in the market in Oditel. There are also people in Apedu and Kapelebyong doing the same business. Many of these were children, who were trying to make some money for books, pens and uniforms before the schools opened again the first week of February. The profits made from selling these breads varied from 500 to 3000 shillings per day (0.3 and 1.7 USD).

3.6 *Selling Firewood and Charcoal*

In Oditel and Apedu, a number of people reported they were selling firewood. These were mostly men who had bicycles. In Oditel, they would typically collect firewood when they had gone to the village to do garden or building work, and transport it back to the camp to sell it there. In Apedu, people would collect firewood from their villages and bring it to Oditel to sell it there. One bundle of firewood is sold at 500 shillings (0.3 UDS).

The charcoal from this area is known to be of good quality, and six of my respondents burnt charcoal for sale, all of them young men. The profit is 6000 shillings (3.5 USD) per sack, and often one burning can produce two sacks. Most people in the area cannot afford to use charcoal for cooking, but it is popular among NGO workers and others who work in the area and often travel to town, as the price of charcoal in Soroti is almost twice the price in Kapelebyong. Some people said that they would like to burn charcoal for sale, but that the government had become stricter in enforcing a ban on cutting down trees.

3.7 *Building Material*

As I did my fieldwork during the dry season, this was the time of the year when many people were building houses. Some built in their villages, hoping to be able to go back by the onset of the rains. Others built in smaller camps which are being established, while some built in the camp they already lived in. In Oditel, some people were being chased from their houses as the owners of the land wanted it back, and so they had to build in another part of the camp. Others again were building a shade for doing business such as a bar or a butcher. All the people I interviewed who were building were using mud bricks for the walls and grass for the roof. Many women cut grass which they sold. They were paid 200 shillings (0.12 USD) per bundle, and were normally able to cut 10 bundles in a day.

Many young boys were using their school holidays to make money by moulding mud blocks. Some worked in someone's village and were paid per day, while others used the land of their families and sold the bricks. Those working for others were paid between 1000 and 2000 shillings (0.6 and 1.2 USD) per day. Those making blocks and selling could make between 10,000 and 16,000 (5.8 and 9.3 USD) during the holiday.

A few people made burnt bricks. This is a more complicated and capital intensive process, and the profit made is relatively big. One of my respondents burnt bricks once a year, and made about 200,000 shillings (116 USD) from this. Another person worked as a casual worker for someone making bricks, and was paid 2000 shillings (1.2 USD) per day.

3.8 *Various Businesses*



Photo 3: Young man repairing a bicycle in Apedu.

Two of the households I interviewed ran a retail shop, selling sugar, salt, sodas, beer, exercise books, pens, biscuits, maize flour, beans and other similar items. The wife of one of those shop-owners ran a pharmacy, locally known as '*clinic*'. One lady ran an eating place, locally known as '*hotel*'. The number of such businesses has increased sharply over the last few years; according to the participants in a focus group

discussion, there were no such eating places in the whole sub-county ten years ago, but now there are five in Oditel and three in Kapelebyong.

One respondent was doing business with cattle. As cattle are sold at a much lower price in Karamoja than in Teso, he made a profit of about 50,000 shillings (30 USD) per month from buying cattle in a cattle market in the border area, and selling in markets inside Teso. One man had been trained as a veterinary, and made money from treating animals. Other businesses included buying goats in order to sell the meat, buying pork to roast and sell in drinking places, buying fresh fish from the lake or game meat to sell in the weekly markets.

3.9 Various Crafts

A few people made some money from different crafts. These include knitting tablecloths, mending jerricans and other plastic items, mending bicycle tubes and repairing bicycles. Some women were employed by others to thatch houses, and there were some men who worked as blacksmiths.

3.10 Renting out Assets

As many people had lost all their assets, and have not been able to replace them, people who own a bicycle, saucepans, pots, frying pans or plastic drums for making alcohol, oxen or an ox plough, often rent out such assets to those who don't have. There seemed to be no fixed prices for hiring such items, and people rented out to people they knew. When it comes to oxen, some of the poorest households were not able to pay for hiring. Some still had an option in helping an ox-owner to drive the oxen while ploughing, and then he would be given to use the oxen to plough his own land for some time.

People owning land suitable for agriculture in the proximity of the camps sometimes rented out gardens. The people renting gardens were normally people whose own gardens were very far, or the soil in their gardens did not allow for certain crops which are important in people's diet, such as cassava, sorghum or groundnuts.

3.11 Formal Employment

Five of my respondents in Oditel camp had some kind of permanent employment, where they were paid a monthly salary. One of these was a headmaster, three were working as home carers in the Home Based Care programme for people living with HIV/AIDS (Red Cross), and one was a soldier in the Arrow Group. The major institutions employing people in the area are the schools, the health centres and some of the NGOs. Most of these jobs require secondary education followed by a course in teaching or nursing. Apart from the Red Cross programme, no NGOs were employing local people on a permanent basis, but some NGOs, for example Concern, had a team of people whom they would pay 5000 shillings (2.9 USD) per day when they needed help from local people in mobilizing, collecting data or other activities.

3.12 Begging

A few respondents said they begged food from others. These were mainly old widows with no children who could take care of them. One young lady who had lost both parents and was sent to live with relatives in one of the camps also said that she mostly survived by begging from relatives. In the case of the old women, everybody in the community knew them and knew that they only survived on what they received from their neighbours.

Section 4: Vulnerability Context

As mentioned in the literature review, vulnerability refers to both the external and internal threats to livelihood security. In Kapelebyong, the external threats include insecurity, climate, market, and animal diseases among others. These threats to people's livelihoods occurs to everybody. However, each household reacts to these threats in different ways, depending on the household's internal coping capabilities. In an agrarian society like Kapelebyong, the household's access to labour is of paramount importance. Sickness or death of one of the adults in the households can severely impact the household's ability to secure their livelihood, as the labour this person provided could represent the difference between being able to grow enough food, and being forced to resort to other strategies such as casual labour for survival. For example, the head of household in one of my respondent households fell sick during the previous growing season. This was a young couple, who had just had their first baby, and in addition were taking care of the wife's seven-year old niece. As the husband was in hospital, and the wife had to be there to look after him, they were not able to plough or weed, and so the harvest was affected. When the husband was told not to do heavy work for three months after being dismissed from the hospital, this further led to loss of income. As a result, they were not able to grow enough food for the family, and had to resort to other means of making a living, such as casual work. Thus the husband's sickness and the pregnancy of the wife resulted in far lower income, and a poorer standard of living than if they had both been healthy. In this case, the negative impact on the livelihood of the family was reversible; as they were young and still strong, they would probably be able to increase agricultural production the following year, and even diversify their livelihood portfolio. However, when people grow old, they are again very vulnerable, as they are no longer able to work as much as when they were young. The most vulnerable category of people in such a community is widows who do not have children. Two of my respondents were in this situation, and they were among the most vulnerable, as they were very old and not able to work, and had no one to take care of them. These widows survived by begging from their neighbours. Also women who are married but do not have children are vulnerable as they grow old. One of my respondents was in this situation. The husband had another wife who had produced children, and stayed with her, and only occasionally came to see the older, barren wife. Although the husband was still alive, this old woman was in almost the same situation as the widows. A third widow had many children and grandchildren staying with her, and although she was old and not able to work a lot, she was far better off than those with no children. Other younger widows were in a different situation, as they were able to work. However, the issue of land is a complicated one for many widows, as the husband's family may not give her to cultivate the land of her deceased husband, and she may not be allowed to return back to her natal home.

Orphans are another vulnerable category of people in the camps. Orphans are normally taken care of by relatives. However, when the parents die, the relatives in many cases take advantage of the situation and take the land that the children were supposed to inherit after their father. In this way, many orphans are deprived of access to land, and thus they are in a very difficult situation, even when they grow old enough to take care of themselves.

Due to insecurity and sicknesses, especially HIV/AIDS, the number of orphans and widows have increased. Correspondingly, the number of female headed households and child headed households has also increased. The increase in the number of female headed households was also attributed to the general social and cultural breakdown, which will be explored in the

following section. Many girls get pregnant outside marriage, and decide to start their own household. Sometimes this is because the father of the children is not willing to marry her, other times women feel they are better off staying alone. While the parents of the girl would normally take care of her and the baby until she gets married, many girls in this situation now prefer to manage on their own, instead of giving the parents the extra burden of another mouth to feed.

In addition to the importance of human capital, the asset status of the households as regards to financial, physical, natural and social capital is very important when threats to livelihoods occur, such as insecurity or draught. Households with many animals can sell off some to be able to get enough food during crises, while families without animals will have to reduce their food intake. According to one of my informants in Kapelebyong camp, there are deaths due to starvation every year in that camp, especially in May, June and July, before the harvest is ready. In times of extreme crises, for example when the LRA attacked the area, this trend is exacerbated, and people who would normally cope, are no longer able to secure their livelihood. Most people who were able to flee the area during the LRA insurgency were destitute, living in schools, churches or out in the open, and surviving on relief food and food given by members of the host community. However, those who had some assets they could sell for money were able to rent a room in town, and often to start doing a small business there. Others who had relatives or close friends living in peaceful areas were able to go and stay with these. Although the situation during the LRA attacks impacted negatively on all households, the assets and social networks of each household determined how they were able to cope with this shock. In the same way, the constant insecurity in the area affects every household, but the way a household is able to respond to the different situations is dependent upon the assets and networks they access.

Section 5: Economic, Sociocultural and Environmental Consequences

Insecurity and encampment have led to several changes in Kapelebyong; economic, environmental and sociocultural. In the following, I will describe some of the most important aspects of these changes. My fieldwork clearly demonstrated though, that the number of changes is great, and although many of the changes are similar in all the sites and the different households, it is important to be aware of differences between the three camps, and also that the insecurity and encampment have influenced each household differently. Some households have experienced a change for the better during the last years, while the majority has seen their livelihood platform shrink, and their wealth status decrease. In the following I will describe some of the changes that appear to be most pronounced. When the focus groups were asked about how life has changed over the last five to ten years, the list of issues they mentioned was very long, and I will not be able to describe all those in details. Still, a few prominent changes were quickly identified by all the informants, and these are the ones I describe below.

5.1 Economic Change

As we have seen, the livelihoods of people in Kapelebyong have changed dramatically due to the insecurity in the area. People have lost important assets such as livestock, either through raiding, disease or distress sales. In addition, people have only restricted access to land, which is the most important productive asset in the area. People's ability to work on the land has been reduced by diseases and malnutrition, as well as lack of tools such as hand hoes and ox ploughs. All this has led to a serious decline in agricultural production, and as a result, people are not able to produce enough to cover their basic needs. There is a general perception that people have become poorer, and that life generally is harder than it used to be before the insecurity and encampment.

5.1.1 Role of Livestock

One of the major changes is related to the role of livestock. Although crop production was the main source of income even before, livestock had a greater place in the economy. As cattle are no longer a secure investment, people prefer to invest in other ventures such as businesses or buildings instead of increasing the number of animals. While earlier, a man would try to acquire as many animals as possible, the desired number of cattle has reduced to what is necessary for doing agriculture effectively, and milk supply. This means two or four bulls for ploughing and a few cows for milk. In addition, families with sons need some cattle for paying dowry so that the sons can get married. One could say that before, cattle was the major form of economic security, but now people prefer to spread the risks by keeping fewer animals and rather invest in business or agriculture.

5.2 Sociocultural Change

5.2.1 Gender

Life in camps in an insecure environment has led to a number of changes in gender relations. Women now do work which used to be only for men, and men do work which used to be regarded as women's work. The most significant change is that women now engage in income generating activities outside the home. As one of the participants in a focus group discussion said; *'culture barred women from doing many activities. Women had the responsibility at*

home and men the responsibility of getting money'. This has changed to the degree that today many women are the main breadwinners in their households. The people I talked to all said that this change started when the cattle were taken. Before that, most income was from cattle, and when a woman needed something in the house, she would tell the husband, who would sell an animal, and bring what was required. Most households were self-sufficient in food, and people had many animals, so this seemed to work well.

However, when insurgency struck the area and people moved to camps, life became very hard. Most households were not able to grow enough food, and there were no animals left which could be sold to purchase food, or to buy seeds and pay labour in order to increase food production. In this situation, engagement in various businesses provided a way of making a living. However, as many men joined the UPA rebels in the late 1980s, it was the women who remained at home and so they took over much of the role of the husband, including making money. At the same time, travelling was risky as the army had roadblocks many places, and the rebels often ambushed people on the roads. The army and the rebels mostly abducted men, while women could travel relatively safely. So even in families where the husband was at home, women started doing business. Before this, very few women did any kind of business, and those who did were not seen as respectable women, as this quote illustrates; *'when women did business people would say that you are mishandling the husband's property'*.



Photo 4: Woman running her own pharmacy in Oditel.

People also pointed to the gender sensitization by government and NGOs as one of the major reasons towards the change of gender roles. Policies for gender balance ensure that there are women in all local councils, and most groups working with NGOs. This has led to changed attitudes towards what women can do, and many people have realized that *'women have different approaches, they are humble, and when a woman is given a task, she does it with one heart'*, as one of my informants

expressed it. Also in churches the changing role of women is seen, and many informants emphasised that women are now allowed to preach, and that in the protestant churches there are now female lay readers and reverends.

At the same time as many of these changes in the role of women are explained by local factors, it is interesting to note that this development in Kapelebyong is happening parallel to similar developments in much of Africa. Especially in situations of conflicts, women are often left to support their families on their own (Akinboade, 2005: 260-261).

Paralleling to the changing roles of women, the roles of men and boys have also changed during the time since the cattle were stolen. Some men have managed to remain the main bread winner in the household even without cattle, but many men have lost this position in the family. Technological change, together with the difficult life in the camps, has made men do tasks which were formerly seen as women's work. For example, many of the men in the camps fetch water and firewood. In the case of firewood, there seems to be two major reasons why men have started doing this. First of all, firewood is found far away from the camp, and women are vulnerable to attacks and rape, and so, as one of my informants said: '*men thought it wise to help women fetch firewood*'. When it comes to water, the boreholes in the camps are few, and the line is often long. As women feel bad seeing a man waiting in the line, they tend to let him go in front and fill his jerricans so that he can leave, and thus men fetch water in a much shorter time than women. At night the borehole becomes a gathering place for young men, and so if a household needs more water at night, most people feel it is not safe to send the girls or women, and the men go to fetch. However, while women carry water and firewood on their heads, men do not. They either use a bicycle, or they carry the jerry cans of water in their hands if the distance is short. Grinding cereals was another task only performed by women. With the introduction of grinding mills however, men have started helping by taking the grain to the mill and transport it back home.

In agricultural work, men used to clear new land and plough gardens, while women would plant, weed and harvest. Today, women sometimes help the men opening land, while men help in planting, weeding and harvesting. This is mostly due to the long distances and short time spent in the garden every day. In order to be able to grow more food, all able bodied persons in a household need to participate in all tasks. When it comes to transporting the produce from the garden to the home, this also used to be a task performed only by women. Now the distance from the garden to the home is very far, and women often complain about backaches when doing this work. Men have thus started helping, although they do not carry on their heads, but use bicycles or oxen to transport the crops.

Despite these changes, women's workload is much heavier than that of the men. Staff in Vision TERUDO estimated that on average in Teso, women work eighteen hours a day while men work eight hours a day. Many men spend much of the day drinking *ajono*, which, as we have seen, provides a significant source of income for many women. At the same time however, it also represents an important item of expenditure for many households. As mentioned, many men have lost their position as the main bread winner in the household, and it seems many have resorted to drinking as a way of 'forgetting' and escaping from their difficult situation. Our experience on the last day of household interviews in Oditel may serve as an example. The day before, there had been two marriage ceremonies going on in Inego cell. People had been drinking to late at night and continued the following morning. By the time we came to interview the remaining households on our list, we found that in all those households the husband was too drunk to be interviewed, while the wife had gone to the village to work.

5.2.2 Early marriages, family break ups

Traditionally in Teso, people did not get married until they were grown up; typically boys got married at about 25 years of age, and girls at about 20 years. This started changing in the early 1980s when the cattle raids started. For some time, it was common that a family would marry a girl at the age of about 10 years, and then they would keep her in their home for some years until she was considered mature enough to live with the husband. This was done as the family

of the boy knew that their cattle could be taken any time, and so they needed to secure a wife for him so that he would not end up not getting married at all. As one *boda-boda* (bicycle taxi) rider told me: '*any time the Karimojong can come and steal your cattle, but they will not steal your wife*'. The practice of child marriages have reduced now, as the government is trying to enforce the laws on defilement, under which sexual relations with anybody under the age of 18 years is a criminal offence. Still, many young people, especially girls, are much younger than 18 by the time they get married. In addition to the problem of the cattle rustling, poverty is encouraging parents of young girls to marry off their daughters, as it brings them livestock and some cash. Another reason for early marriages given by the respondents and informants was that as people live close together in the camps, young people meet and fall in love, and the parents are not able to control their movements as they would when they were living in the villages. Many of the child marriages in the camps are thus not arranged or forced marriages, but still the problems of early marriages are many and important, especially with regard to the girls' reproductive health.

Many of my respondents mentioned divorce as one of their major worries for the future. In the camp, people live close together, and many expressed that '*it's easy to get attracted*' to other men or women. While extramarital sexual relations were relatively easy to control by family members in the village, this is difficult in the camps. Both men and women expressed concern that they could easily end up sleeping with someone other than their spouse, and mothers of teenage girls often expressed great worry that their daughters would become pregnant before finishing school and before marriage. In addition to the fact that unfaithfulness alone could lead to divorce, many also mentioned the fear of HIV/AIDS in this regard.

These findings are in line with those of Nannyonjo (2005: 481) who writes that 'the conflict situation has led to a breakdown of social cultural values in Northern Uganda. Displacement and resettlement in camps caused a degeneration in social values and orders, resulting in such behavioural changes as neglected responsibilities, increased crime rates, high rates of alcohol and drug consumption, and lack of respect for traditional values'. My respondents and informants mostly attributed these changes to living in the camps, but other factors such as extreme poverty, trauma, hopelessness and a feeling of neglect may also be important in explaining these changes. When the family structures are disrupted, it reinforces the above mentioned problems, and so it seems that there is a vicious circle, which may not be broken unless people are able to go back to their homes and start what they consider a 'normal' life. However, if another generation grows up in the present conditions in the camps, the perceptions of 'a normal life' may change drastically.

5.2.3 The Role of Children

Children in Kapelebyong used to help with the tasks the parents did in the home. Girls would stay with the women in the household and learn how to do whatever the women were doing, while boys would be with the men and learn the men's work. In the camps in Kapelebyong, the situation today is different. First of all, the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) means that most children are at school five days a week most of the year. This, together with the long distance from the camps to the villages, means that children mostly participate in agricultural work during weekends and holidays.

It seems that the situation of children is quite different between Oditel and Kapelebyong camp. In Oditel, the informants emphasised that children are participating in income

generating activities, which they never did in the village. Many children have more responsibilities in the camp than was usual in the village. Both boys and girls find ways of making some money, for example by making blocks, doing petty businesses or fetching water for the commercial eating places. Young girls also help their mothers in the brewing business, making them vulnerable to sexual abuse. In Kapelebyong camp, most of these small business opportunities were not there, and so the people there emphasised that children were idle, often left alone as the parents went to the gardens. They thus do not learn how to cultivate, and instead learn 'bad manners' from their peers. In all the camps, parents felt that it was very difficult to raise their children in the camps, as they spent much time alone with other children, and did not learn to respect their parents, and many engaged in petty theft, commercial sex, and drinking.

5.3 *Environmental Consequences*

5.3.1 Deforestation

Due to the constant demand for wood for building, firewood and burning charcoal, deforestation is a serious problem in the areas around the camps. In Kapelebyong, people have to move seven to ten kilometres in order to find firewood, while in Oditel the situation is slightly better, with people reporting to move about three to four kilometres outside the camp to fetch firewood. In Apedu, this problem is less, as people have just come back, and the number of people in the camp is considerably smaller than in Kapelebyong and Oditel camps. Grass for thatching houses is another environmental resource crucial to the livelihoods of people in the area, but now it is getting harder to find this near the camp, and people have to move long distances in order to find suitable grass. The same is true for trees that can be used for building houses.

Cutting of trees has not just led to fewer trees, but also to less variety of tree species. Today, the most common tree is the shea nut tree, which has been spared because it gives nuts which are used for making oil.

5.3.2 Reduced soil fertility

When people live far away from their villages, they are not able to rotate the crops in the gardens, or to leave the land fallow for a period, and as a result, the land that people access is overexploited and losing fertility. This over-exploitation of land has also led to a number of pests attacking the crops. On the other hand, the land that people do not access is very fertile, so people in the area hope that when they go back to their villages, their crops will produce good yields. The land around the camp is also degraded as it is being cultivated every year. Overgrazing is another problem causing land degradation. Another problem relating to soil is soil depletion. As people dig out soil for making bricks to use for building houses, deep pits are being created. Water collects in the pits which provide breeding grounds for mosquitoes, and thus the malaria burden intensifies.

Section 6: The Role of the Government and NGOs

6.1 Health

6.1.1 Government Health Care

The government health system is following the five tier system of local government in Uganda. In each district there is supposed to be a Health Centre V, which is a hospital. However, in Amuria District the main health centre is still grad IV, which means that the nearest hospital is Soroti Regional Hospital, about 50 kilometres away. Then each county is to have a Health Centre IV, each sub county a Health Centre III, each parish a Health Centre II and each village a Health Centre I. The Health Centre I however is not a physical building, but a team of village health workers. These teams are trained in first aid and primary health care, with emphasis on malaria control and sanitation. They also collect data on latrine coverage, general housing conditions, prevalent diseases and disease outbreaks in the community. In addition they record information on deaths and births, and submit this to the nearest health centre.

The health services in Kapelebyong County have been severely affected by the insurgency. Out of the 13 health centres, only five are operational. In Kapelebyong Sub-County, two out of five health centres are operating. One is Kapelebyong Health Centre IV, which is serving the whole county. This is a government health centre, supposed to have 42 medical staff and treat patients without charging a fee. At the moment however the number of staff is eight, and lack of medicines is a recurrent problem. Often they have to write a prescription and send the patients to buy medicines in private pharmacies.

In addition, there is a health centre III in Oditel which is run by the Catholic Mission. This has six staff and patients are required to pay for the medicines they get, while the salaries of the staff are covered by the Catholic Church. The Health Centre I also functions in the parts of the area, and reports to the nearest functioning Health Centre. They are supposed to report to the Health Centre II, but none of these are functional in Kapelebyong Sub County. This means that people living in the smaller camps, like Apedu, do not have any government health services nearby.

Due to understaffing and fees, many people prefer to go straight to private ‘clinics’ in the camps. These ‘clinics’ are simply small pharmacies, and the people running them have little or no medical training. They do give people medicines for the common diseases, and seem to be functioning well for minor cases. However, for complicated cases the ‘clinics’ and the health centres do not have the personnel or equipment to treat the patients successfully. In such cases, they need to go to the health centre in Amuria, or the hospital in Soroti or even Kumi. Many people are not able to find the money for travelling to these places, and therefore remain at home.

6.1.2 World Food Programme: Food for Health

In an effort to boost mother and child health, the World Food Programme (WFP) has started a maternal child health nutrition programme called ‘Food for Health’ (WFP 2007). It started in Kapelebyong Health Centre IV in May 2006, and is supposed to start in the other health centres in the area later this year. Under this programme, a package of 6.4 kg soya flour, 0.8

kg sugar and 0.8 kg cooking oil is given to pregnant mothers when they come for antenatal check ups, when they come to give birth in the health centre, and when they come back with the baby for check ups and immunizations according to a programme recommended by the Ministry of Health. The mothers are supposed to take the children until they are two years old.

The effects of this programme, locally just known as ‘soya’, have been encouraging. The number of people coming for antenatal care has increased, so has the number of deliveries in the Health Centre. Correspondingly, the number of deliveries at home has declined. Most encouraging are the results of the growth monitoring, where children are weighed at birth, at six weeks, ten weeks, fourteen weeks and nine months. In May 2006, when the programme started, 100% of the children were underweight. By June, 25 % of the children were normal weight, and in September 99% were normal weight. The programme has also helped the health staff encourage pregnant women to test for HIV, and the number of women who tested shot up from 20 in April 2006, to 130 in June the same year. However, as the programme had not started in the health centre in Oditel, many women walked the eight kilometres from Oditel to Kapelebyong to go for check ups and even to deliver.

6.1.3 NGOs

The health centre in Oditel is run by the Catholic mission, and although it is part of the government structure and classified as a health centre III, it is run without funding from the government. This health centre is commended by most of the people in the area, and many of the respondents said that the nurses were friendly and treating them well and without keeping them waiting for long. Although they charge a fee they are normally willing to treat a patient ‘on credit’, and some of the poorest of my respondents reported that they receive treatment free of charge.

Some of the NGOs that operate in the area also work with health issues. Concern Worldwide has a big project in Amuria District called Amuria Decentralization Support Project, which is a joint project between Amuria District and Concern Worldwide. It started in 2005 and is to be phased out in 2009. Concern is thus the biggest organization in the area, with the headquarters being in Amuria. The organization has different programmes related to health, including provision of safe water, hygiene and sanitation. During the 2003 insurgency, it provided latrines in the camps, and now they focus on sensitizing the people on hygiene and sanitation issues. Concern also has a programme on malaria control, and HIV/AIDS awareness.

The Uganda Red Cross Society has quite an extensive programme on HIV/AIDS awareness, and home based care for AIDS patients. At the time of fieldwork, 400 patients in Kapelebyong Sub County were being served by the home carers. One of the home carers estimated that this represented less than 50% of the AIDS patients in the sub county. The patients who are in the programme are visited by the home carers, and given counselling, food, and medical treatment for opportunistic diseases. The programme does not administer antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to the patients. The Red Cross carries out HIV testing in the camps four times in a year. This is done by staff from the regional head quarters in Soroti.

In addition, other NGOs have trained people on different health issues such as HIV/AIDS counselling and awareness. These NGOs have now left the area, but the people who were trained still work in their communities.

Following the LRA attacks in 2003, a number of international aid agencies distributed relief to the IDPs. The WFP distributed food, while other agencies, both local and international, distributed both food and non-food items. By the time the situation was calming down, some of the agencies distributed seeds and other farm implements. By the time of fieldwork however, the international agencies had phased out their programmes, apart from WFP and Concern, which had also reduced the efforts compared to the period from 2003 to 2005.

6.2 Education

The Ugandan school system is structured in a hierarchical manner, starting with 7 years of primary school, then 4 years of secondary 'O-level', 2 years of secondary 'A' level, and then tertiary education. At the end of each stage, there is a national examination, and the best students can continue to the next stage, if they are able to finance further education (Aguti, 2002: 1).

6.2.1 Primary Education

In 1997, the Government of Uganda introduced the Universal Primary Education programme (UPE) (UNESCO 2000). At the beginning, this programme was to provide free primary education to a maximum of four children per family, but has now been expanded to benefit all children of school going age (Aguti, 2002: 3). Under this programme, the pupils do not pay school fees, while they still have to buy uniforms and school materials. As the number of pupils has increased much faster than the number of teachers and classrooms, many schools, especially in urban areas, charge extra fees in order to be able to employ more teachers than those whose salaries are paid by the government. In the villages, and especially in poor and conflict prone areas like Kapelebyong, the parents are not able to pay fees, and as a result, the quality of the education is poor. This is seen each year as the results of the national Primary Leaving Examinations (PLE) are released.

The major challenge to the schools in the camps is the lack of teachers. In Oditel Primary School there were in 2006 13 teachers and 1694 pupils, while in Kapelebyong there were about 2400 pupils and 27 teachers. This gives a teacher: student ratio of 1: 130 and 1: 88 respectively. This is much higher than the national standard of 1: 55. As Amuria District was carved out of Katakwi District in 2005, teachers from Katakwi went back, and the new district did not manage to recruit new teachers for 2006. The headmasters in the different schools were hopeful though that they will be given more teachers in 2007. However, some teachers who are posted to the area never report, or they come and leave after a short time due to the insecurity and poverty experienced there.

In Kapelebyong Sub County there are 11 primary schools. However, due to the insecurity the area has experienced, the schools have been 'displaced' just as the children and teachers. Last year, there were two primary schools in Oditel and one in Kapelebyong. In Oditel, Oditel Primary School accommodated the pupils and teachers from two other schools, while the second school, Acumet Primary School accommodated the pupils and teachers from one other school. In Kapelebyong, six schools had been put together into one. As the number of children increased, Primary 3 and 4 were moved to another school within the camp, but still under one administration.

As people have started moving back to their villages, or to smaller camps nearer their village homes, the district authorities are trying to re-open some of the schools. Apedu camp is

located in Nyada Parish, and Nyada Primary School opened in February this year, after it had been abandoned since LRA attacked the area in 2003. However, two weeks after the school year started in February 2007, the school had 212 pupils from P1 to P4, and only two teachers. The two teachers both live in Oditel, four kilometres away. All the ‘displaced schools’ in Oditel were supposed to start operating in the village in 2007, but the situation in all these schools is the same as in Nyada Primary School. Some parents said they would rather let their children walk back to Oditel every day than send them to schools in the village where there are no teachers, while others are happy that the schools are opening, so that the children can continue schooling when they move to their villages. The situation in Kapelebyong camp is the same, and it was not clear by the time I was there whether the schools in the villages would start operating in 2007, or whether they would continue operating in the main camp.



Photo 5: Children in Nyada Primary School helping to sort out the book as the school is reopening, three years after the LRA burnt down all buildings in the area, apart from the school.

The UPE programme is very popular among most of the IDPs, and they are happy to send their children to school without having to pay fees. However, some of the parents who are educated or doing well in business expressed concern about the quality of the education the children get in the schools in the camps, and those who can afford it prefer to send their children to schools outside Kapelebyong, mostly Amuria and Soroti.

Most people in the area send their children to school when they are between six and eight years old. The statistics at the schools clearly showed that the number of pupils dropped steadily from P1 to P7. Children start dropping out from school especially from P4. The majority of the drop-outs are girls, but many boys also drop out before completing primary school. The main reasons for girls’ drop out are marriage, pregnancy and having to work at home. Boys too drop out due to getting married and/or having to work, and a number of boys also join the army before finishing primary school. In the 53 households I interviewed, there were 129 children between seven and sixteen years. Only ten of these did not attend school, and apart from one, they were all between seven and ten years old, and their parents said they planned to send them to school, but they felt they were still small².

6.2.2 World Food Programme: Food for Education

Another problem facing the education of the children in the camps is that they normally do not eat breakfast, and up to now have not been provided with lunch at school. With no food

² People normally look at the physical size of a child to determine whether he or she is ready to start school.

from morning until the school close at 5pm, learning is difficult. As a response to this, a programme by the WFP called 'Food for Education' (FFE) was about to start at the time of fieldwork. Under this programme, WFP is supposed to supply the food needed to provide all the pupils with breakfast and lunch, and the community is to provide the cooking equipment such as saucepans and a store for the food, and salaries for the cooks. This means that the parents of the pupils will have to contribute some money, but the headmasters I talked to in the schools thought that they would be happy to do so. Especially during the rainy season there is lack of food, and as the headmaster of Oditel P/S said '*parents will be relieved when the children are fed at school*'. This programme is planned to be in place for two years, benefiting 105 out of the 108 primary schools in Amuria District. The remaining three schools have not been affected by the insecurity.

6.2.3 Secondary Education

There is one secondary school in Kapelebyong Sub County; St. Francis Secondary School Acumet in Oditel, with 436 students and 19 teachers in 2006. The school was opened in 1992 as a joint effort by the community and the Catholic Mission. In 1995 the government started grant aiding it, so that it is now the government which pays the teachers' salaries and school materials. In this school, the students have to pay fees. During the LRA insurgency the school operated in Soroti, and the students were not able to pay. The government came in and covered the fees for the students already enrolled in the school. As the school started operating in Oditel again, the students started paying about half the fees, and starting from this year they have to pay the full amount, like they did before the LRA attacked. The fees then will be 34,800 shillings (20 USD) per term, and there are three terms in a year.

During the presidential campaigns in 2006, President Museveni promised that if he won, he would start a programme called Universal Secondary Education. This programme is starting 2007, and Acumet SS have been told to enrol 240 students in S1 who will study without paying fees. However, the money the government gives the school per student is less than the fees the other students pay, so there is a fear that this programme is going to reduce the quality of the education. When I visited the school early February 2007, two weeks before the S1 students were supposed to report, the classroom block that was to accommodate the increased number of students was not yet roofed, and none of the five new teachers the headmaster was hoping to get had not yet been seen.

In addition to St. Francis Acumet Secondary School, a new secondary school is under construction in Kapelebyong camp, and by the time of fieldwork there were high expectations in the community about this school, which was to start operate from February this year. The building of the school is supported by an American NGO called Hands in Service. However, there are no schools offering A-level in the sub county. The nearest school with A-level is in Amuria, 18 kilometres from Oditel.

6.2.4 Training

There are no vocational schools in the area. However, some local initiative exists, for example a community based organization called Kapelebyong Child and Mother Development Association, which provides vocational training on tailoring for young mothers, and also training in carpentry and building. The demand for such training is high, but the organization faces a problem of lack of funds, as the beneficiaries are not able to pay for the costs. In addition, a local NGO called Vision TERUDO (VT) has trained ten Community Animal Health Workers; these are now providing much needed veterinary services, as there are no

such services in the area. They were given skills and a starting kit, and charge a fee for treatment so that they are able to continue buying the medicines needed. The services they offer are in high demand, also outside the project area of VT (Vision TERUDO 2007). VT and other NGOs, such as Concern, have also trained people on group dynamics, leadership, revolving funds, post harvest handling, income-generating activities, peace building, gender and other issues.

6.2.5 The Relevance of Education to People's Livelihoods

The education provided by the government does teach children some skills, like reading, writing, English and mathematics, which will help them in the future. However, it does not provide much practical training to help the pupils and their families improve the common livelihood strategies such as agriculture, livestock keeping and various businesses. The school system is mainly focusing on taking the pupils to the next level of the hierarchy. As most children do not proceed from primary school, and even those who do rarely go for post secondary education, this is a major weakness with the educational system.

The training offered by different NGOs is as a rule much more relevant to the livelihood activities that people in the area do. Although literacy often is a prerequisite for attending the training, it seems that a cross section of people benefit. The training and workshops organized by the NGOs are normally focusing on issues that have been identified by the community as important, and people are encouraged to discuss and reflect on their own community. Many times, training accompanies other projects, so that for example training in post-harvest handling will be given to farmers' groups just around the time of harvest, while training on income-generating activities will be given together with opportunities to get loans or grants to start such an activity. Such training is thus more 'hands on', and gives benefits to the people in a more direct way than formal education.

6.3 Infrastructure

Both government and NGOs provide infrastructure in the area. The government is responsible for the maintenance of the major roads. At the time of fieldwork, roadwork started on the main road from Amuria to Kapelebyong via Oditel. This road had been neglected for a long time and had become impassable for most cars, and even riding a bicycle was problematic. Concern Worldwide also work with road construction under the joint programme with the district. Concern has also provided boreholes in several camps, and Teso Initiative for Peace has facilitated the reconstruction of valley dams on both sides of the border between Teso and Karamoja.

The cell system in the camps was initiated by Concern during the 2003 crisis. The camps were divided into cells, and the people living in each cell selected a cell leader and a cell committee. There are seven cells in both Oditel and Kapelebyong camps. The cell leaders were trained in different areas, for example sanitation and hygiene. It was also the cell leaders who collected population data which were used by Concern and other organizations during relief distributions. Although there are no more relief programmes, the cell system is still functioning in the camps.

6.4 Security

One of the major roles of any government is to provide security for its citizens (Rotberg, 2002: 87). As seen in the historical background, the security situation in Kapelebyong has

been very uncertain the last 27 years, with times of crisis and times of relative peace. Today, almost all the households mentioned insecurity as one of their major problems and worries, and although there were no instances of Karimojong warriors entering the area during the fieldwork, I was told that *'they can come at any time. They could even be sneaking around in the bushes outside the camp right now'*. Just a few weeks after I finished the fieldwork I got reports that Karimojong warriors had been observed in the areas around Apedu and Oditel. They did not attack or steal cattle this time, but their mere presence brought a lot of fear, and is likely to hamper the process of going back to the villages.

The number of soldiers in the area was not sufficient to hinder a major attack, and they were poorly equipped. I was not able to establish the number of soldiers in the big camps, or in the sub county as a whole, but in Apedu there were five soldiers. They did not have any radio communication so that they could get help from nearby army detachments in case of an attack. Also, they were not paid in time, or sometimes not paid at all, so at times they would leave the camp in order to go to work in someone's garden and get some money for food and other necessities.

The Arrow Boys who were recruited to protect their home areas following the LRA incursion to the area in 2003 were working well for some time, and the president himself promised that he would not disarm the Arrow Boys until the problem of the Karimojong warriors had been solved. However, at the time of the fieldwork, there were very few Arrow Boys left. Some had been recruited to the UPDF and transferred to other areas, while some had joined the police force and also been transferred to other places. As they had not been paid their monthly allowance of 60,000 shillings (36 USD) since January 2006, many decided to leave the force and rather concentrate on agriculture or other ways of making a living.

The IDPs expressed frustration at this situation, and many felt that the government intentionally neglected them. One old man said: *'They could send soldiers to Congo, and now they have decided to send soldiers to Somalia³, but they can not send enough soldiers to protect us from the Karimojong. The government doesn't care about us. If they cared, they would send more soldiers'*.

When asked, people had many ideas on how to improve the security situation. The first thing most people mentioned was that the government should send more soldiers. However the major concern of people in Kapelebyong was how to make lasting peace with their neighbours in Karamoja. As they have lived with this conflict for so many years, people had a number of ways in which they thought the problem could be solved. First of all, many emphasised that the ongoing disarmament exercise in Karamoja should continue, as the fact that the Karimojong are armed is seen to be at the core of the problem. Secondly, the majority

³ Uganda sent 1500 soldiers to the African Union peace keeping mission in Somali in the beginning of March 2007 (see for example Voice of America 20th March 2007). The issue was hotly debated in the Ugandan media at the time of fieldwork.

of people seemed to have faith in the peace building effects of increased interactions between the Karimojong and the Iteso, and suggested that markets should be opened in the border areas, that roads be built across the borders, that children from both sides should study together, that peace talks be held, and that the Karimojong should be allowed to enter Teso for peaceful purposes such as visits or trade, as long as they do not carry guns. The fact that Karamoja is plagued with poverty, hunger and insecurity was also appreciated by many of my informants, and some suggested that the government should guarantee the safety of the Karimojong and their animals, and that those who do not have cattle should be helped to make a living through other means. Finally, the frequent movement of soldiers was mentioned as a problem. Many attacks happen when soldiers have just been moved away from a place, and thus it was considered to be helpful if the government could keep the location and number of soldiers relatively constant. Lastly, some suggested arming the Iteso, so that they could protect themselves, for example by forming a new group similar to the Arrow Group, and keep it permanently in the area.

While it is only the government that provides soldiers and carries on the disarmament exercise in Karamoja, some NGOs work in other areas relating to security. For example the Teso Initiative for Peace (TIP), a local NGO supported by DED (Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst), Christian International Peace Service and some CBOs work for peace by different means. Talks are organized between community leaders on both sides. TIP was at the time of fieldwork preparing a day of games and sports for youth from both sides, and similar activities were planned by some of the CBOs. The main problem the CBOs faced was lack of funds. Due to the distance and insecurity, people from one side of the border would have to be given motorized transport to come and attend such an event on the other side, and this cost was too high for these organizations.

TIP also had a programme on reconstructing the valley dams in both Teso and Karamoja. In addition to the physical benefits of providing water for cattle, the organization emphasised that Karimojong and Iteso should work together on these projects, on both sides of the border. The labourers were paid with food. However, only a few Iteso were willing to go to Karamoja to work, as the rations were small, and also due to their fear of the Karimojong. By the time of fieldwork, TIP was preparing to start working on the valley dam in Apedu, and much as people were happy that the dam would be improved, many people were very sceptical to having Karimojong coming to stay in the area and work with them. When I asked them why they feared this, when the Karimojong would have to come without weapons, this was the response: *'these people are very dangerous. They can come today as your friend, but they will see our cattle and when they go back they will tell their friends that 'the Iteso now have cattle again' and come back to attack us'*.

This deep seated suspicion between the Iteso and the Karimojong might be the biggest hindrance to a peaceful coexistence, and the work that the NGOs do in peace building is thus vital. Considering the history, many people do not believe the government will provide the needed security. One man in a group discussion said: *'soldiers are always deployed and removed at any time, so deploying more soldiers is not a permanent solution'*. Thus the best solution would probably be for people from both sides to realize the high costs of the present situation, and sit down and resolve their differences and start peaceful interactions. This could also have positive economic consequences for both groups of people. However, the situation is highly complex, and linked to many factors outside the control of the two groups, such as

the attacks from neighbouring tribes on the Karimojong, the arms flow from Sudan and Somalia and the climatic conditions.

6.5 *Agricultural Extension Services*

There are no government agricultural extension services in the sub county. However, some of the NGOs that operate in the area provide extension services. VT and Concern both provide farm implements and planting materials like improved seeds and cassava cuttings of improved varieties of cassava, as well as goats. Some other NGOs have provided planting materials, although on a smaller scale. As already mentioned VT trained community animal health workers as there are no other veterinary services. Christian International Peace Service, Soroti Catholic Diocese Development Organization (SOCADIDO) and Action Aid have also provided goats, cows and oxen to people in the area. Some of these NGOs have accompanied the provision of these implements with training in food storage, food reserve handling and post harvest handling. As the produce the last years have not been enough, one major challenge faced in such programmes is to ensure its sustainability, as people are likely to consume all the harvest and not keep enough for seeds the following season.

6.6 *People's Perceptions of Government and NGOs*

When asking the respondents in the household survey 'how would you like to see your problems solved?', it was interesting to note that about 74 % of the respondents mentioned assistance from NGOs or churches, while just about 32 % mentioned assistance from the government. The government assistance that was most frequently mentioned was regarding health care or education. In addition, 43 % of the respondents said that security was needed in order for them to have their problems solved. The majority expected the government to provide security, but some people also mentioned that NGOs and churches should be involved in peace talks between the Iteso and the Karimojong, and that the churches should take responsibility of '*educating the Karimojong on issues of peace*'. As mentioned, government services such as security provision, education and health services are poor, and some people suggested that NGOs should work together with the government in order to improve these services. During the focus group discussion in Kapelebyong camp, the participants clearly expressed the view that the NGOs do better work than the government, and that NGOs are more helpful. They were saying that much of the work done by government is shoddy, due to corruption. They also mentioned that NGOs always monitor the work they do, while the government does not, and so the results of the work done by the government are not satisfactory.

Although having more hope in NGOs than in the government, most people expressed the need for something to help them get started, so that they could be able to take care of themselves. Thus the majority who mentioned that they saw provisions from NGOs or the government as a solution to their problems, thought of this as a help to get out of the extreme poverty in which they were living, for example by being given a loan so as to start a business, or animals for ploughing, or planting materials so that they could increase agricultural production. Most people were of the opinion that if there was peace, and they could go home to their villages, they would only need help to get through the first difficult year, and then they would be able to produce what they needed.

Section 7: Case Studies

7.1: Akello Ann, Oditel Camp

Akello Ann is a young woman of 20 years. She comes from Apopong village in Kapelebyong, but was born in Kumi, as her parents were displaced there during the Teso Insurgency in the late 1980s. They later went back to stay in the home village. In 1999, the Karimojong warriors attacked the village, and they all fled to Oditel. In the beginning, they stayed in Acumet Primary School, but later on built a hut where they stayed. By the time the LRA attacked in June 2003, they were still living in the camp in Oditel. Again they had to flee, this time to Soroti, where they stayed in a school until they came back to Oditel in 2005. Life in Soroti was very difficult, as diseases were widespread, and it was very difficult to get food and water.

The same year as she came back to the camp in Oditel with her parents, she got married. The husband is a soldier in the UPDF, and shortly after the marriage, he was posted to Moroto. She says he comes home just about twice a year. So she stays alone in a small grass thatched hut in the camp, taking care of three of the husband's younger siblings, as well as their own son, who is two years old.

She has no cattle or goats, but does have two hens, both with their chicks. When she needs money, for example if someone in the family falls sick and she needs to get treatment, she sells one of the chickens. Sometimes they slaughter and eat one. She would like to have more animals, like goats and cows, but they are expensive, and she is not able to save the amount of money required. Also, she is afraid that if she gets some animals, the Karimojong will come and take them, like they have done before.

She accesses the land of her husband, which is in Mabasa village, two miles from the camp. She goes by foot to cultivate the land, and spends about one hour walking to get there. She grows green gram, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame, millet, cassava and sweet potatoes. Some of the green gram, groundnuts and millet she sells, while keeping the rest for home consumption and seeds for next season. If she had oxen for ploughing the gardens, she would have grown more crops, but as per now she's only able to do what she is already doing. Not only is the lack of oxen for ploughing a problem, the distance from the camp to the village means that she starts work late, when the sun is hot and she is already tired from walking. In addition, cattle often destroy the crops as she is in the camp and the gardens in the village. Another problem is that the Karimojong at times come to uproot and steal cassava from the gardens.

In addition to cultivating, she makes money through several means. Twice a month she brews *ajono*, the local millet brew, and sells it. Each time she brews she makes a profit of about 3000 shilling (1.7 USD). During the dry season she goes to Obalanga about once a week to buy *omena*, a small fish, which she sells in the market in Oditel. For every trip she makes a profit of about 2000 shillings (1.2 USD). During the wet season she normally spares about one day a week to work for other people in their gardens, and is paid 1000 shillings (0.6 USD) per day. She is also a member of Mothers' Union, a group in the Church of Uganda. In the group she has learnt how to knit table clothes. They sell these together, and distribute the profit between the members. Mothers' Union is also keeping some poultry, and sharing the profit they get from selling eggs and chickens, and it was from this group she got a loan of 10

000 shillings (5.8 USD) to start doing business with *omena*. In addition to Mothers' Union, she is also a member of a group in a local NGO called Vision TERUDO. This group has 22 members, and grows cassava, green gram and groundnuts, as well as rearing goats. The harvest they get is distributed between the members, and some is kept for seed.

In addition to the things she is doing to make a living, the oldest brother-in-law who is staying with her makes mud bricks during school holidays. From this, he makes about 10,000 shillings during the long holiday.

She has an aunt who lives in Soroti and visits around every three months. When she comes she brings some sugar and soap for the household. In addition, the husband normally comes with some sugar and 20,000 shillings (12 USD) when he comes twice a year.

She feels life is difficult. Although she is used to poverty, being the head of the household is a new experience, and she finds it challenging. There are so many problems in the camp, especially diseases and food shortage. In addition, the crowded conditions in the camp lead to lots of quarrels between neighbours, and other people's goats keep eating food when she spreads it to dry in the sun. Also, there is no government health centre in the camp. The one which is there is run by the Catholic Church, and patients have to pay to get treatment. When she does not have money she has to go to Kapelebyong Health Centre, which is about eight km away. Other times she buys drugs in private pharmacies. The children she takes care of study in Oditel Primary School. She feels the education they receive is good, as they learn about hygiene and keeping the camp environment clean. She also hopes that if they continue studies, they will get jobs in the future.

Akello is hoping to be able to go back to the village soon, and they have houses there. Still, she feels it's not secure enough, but during the last wet season they used to sleep in the village when there were no rumours about insecurity. Hopefully this year, she will be able to stay in the village so that she can grow more food for her family.

7.2: Odongo Enoch, Kapelebyong Camp

Odongo Enoch is a 45 year old man living in Kapelebyong camp together with his two wives and seven children. Odongo himself has completed primary school, while his first wife only went to Primary 2, and the second wife to Primary 4. Both Odongo and his first wife came to stay in the camp in 1980, after violent raids by the Karimojong. In 1981, they got married. The second wife came to the camp in 1985, and got married to Odongo in 1990. The household stayed in the camp until 1999, when they went back to the village since peace had been restored. However, in 2002, they had to flee their village home, and went back to the camp. At the time LRA attacked in 2003, they were still in the camp. During the peak of the LRA insurgency, the wives and children went to Soroti and stayed with a relative, while Odongo remained in Kapelebyong to keep the family's cattle. After three months in Soroti, the family came back to Kapelebyong, as it was extremely difficult to get food and water in town, and there was a lot of disease. Moreover, they wanted to be in their own home, although they knew the security situation was not stable.

Odongo and his family are quite wealthy by local standards. They have two oxen, three cows and three calves, and five chickens. In addition, they have land in the village, a bicycle and a retail shop. The bicycle helps the family in many ways, for example in fetching firewood and

water, going to the market to buy things for the shop, and transporting produce from the village back to the camp.

Odongo has been able to make use of micro finance loans at two occasions. The first was in 2001, when he got a loan from a government microfinance initiative known as KASO (Katakwi Soroti). He used it to buy and sell cattle. Then again in 2002 he got a loan from Teso Dioceses Development Organization (TEDD), which is part of the Church of Uganda. He used the loan for starting his shop, but then the LRA came and the business was spoilt. He then used the money for helping his family during the insurgency. Despite the problems he encountered, he still managed to pay back the loan, and thus he is hoping that he might get the opportunity to get another loan later.

The main economic activity of the family is crop production. All the grown up members of the household participate in this, and the children help them during weekends and holidays. The land is quite far from the camp, and they use about one and a half hour walking there, or forty five minutes if riding the bicycle. On this land they grow cassava, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, cowpeas, and green gram. Apart from sorghum and cowpeas, they sell part of the produce, and keep the rest for household consumption. Last year they harvested 18 sacks of groundnuts, one sack of sorghum, two sacks of millet, one basin (plastic bowl) of cowpeas, and had a garden of two acres with cassava. Although this is more than most of their neighbours, the family still feels that it is not adequate for covering all their needs.

The first wife of Odongo brews *ajono* as a way of increasing the income of the household. During the dry season she brews twice a month, and during the wet season once a month. Each time she brews, she makes a profit of about 5000 shillings (about 3 USD).

All the activities that the family does in order to make a living are affected by the insecurity in the area. Even during times of relative calm *'we can not go to the gardens when we are happy. There is a lot of worrying, and sometimes we work only one hour before we return to the camp'*, explains Odongo. At times with insecurity or rumours of insecurity, he is not able to go to the markets to buy goods that he sells in the shop. In addition, the insecurity has left the area marginalized, and one result of that is poor infrastructure. As a result, even when there is some calm and vehicles from town come all the way to Kapelebyong, the prices are high.

The family has some relatives who are living outside the area. Six of Odongo's cousins settled in Serere after they initially came there as displaced persons. When someone in the family dies, at least one of them comes to attend the burial, and contribute some money. In addition, one of Odongo's sisters lives in Kampala, and visits about twice a year. When she comes, she brings soap, and clothes for the children. Odongo and his wives are active members of the local community, and Odongo is a member of Savings and Credit Cooperative Society (SACCOS), which is a CBO. Both wives are members of a group which is doing savings and revolving funds. The group is called *Atamakisi*, meaning 'let's try'. In addition, the family is a member of a group called *Atukot na akio*, literally meaning 'group of tears'. Eighty families are members of this group, and they help each other by contributing in cash and in kind when someone in the groups die.

Odongo and his two wives are worried that the education in the school in Kapelebyong is of poor quality. In addition, children in the camps spend most of their time with their peers, and

do not do homework. For these reasons, they struggle to make enough money to take their children to better schools. The oldest boy is in Teso College, which is a boarding school, and known as one of the best in the region. The oldest girl is in Soroti Demonstration Primary School, and the younger ones are in the local school in Kapelebyong. They prioritize the education of the children, and hope that they will be able to get jobs in the future. In addition, by studying outside the area, they get friends from outside the area, who may be of help later in life.

But the insecurity of life in the camp does not only affect the household economically. As he says, *‘living in the camp brings idleness, and you fail to plan for the future’*. Another problem is quarrels between neighbours. As people live close together, and each family is struggling to make ends meet, disagreements are frequent. One of the biggest worries though, is that some men, and especially soldiers, give young girls money in exchange for sex. Many girls get pregnant while they are still in primary school. Even grown ups are facing challenges as they live close together, and as Odongo says *‘one can easily give out love to someone other than the wife or husband’*.

Odongo believes most of the problems the family is facing can be solved if there is adequate security so that they can go back to the village. Then they can grow enough food, and get enough surplus to send the children to school, and buy all the other things the household needs. However, they have not yet started building houses in the village, although they are very willing to go back. Some soldiers have recently been sent to the area where their village home is, and he is hoping that this will bring adequate security. As a first step, they want to build one hut so that part of the family can stay there during the rainy season and thus be able to grow more crops. If the security situation is good, they can build more houses, so that the whole family can move back home. However, his experience is that the government tends to deceive people by saying that they will provide security, but then they don’t fulfil the promises, so he does not think the family will be able to go back to the village permanently for a long time yet.

6. Conclusion

This study has assessed the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs in Kapelebyong, how these strategies have been influenced by the insecurity in the area, the environmental, economic, and sociocultural consequences of the insecurity, and the relationship between the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs, and the interventions by NGOs and government agencies.

The sustainable livelihoods framework has been the point of departure in this study. In this framework, people's assets determine the livelihood strategies available to them. In Kapelebyong, people have lost important livelihood assets as a result of the insecurity. Most important, most people have lost their livestock, and many do not have any animals at all. Even the better off members of the community have relatively few animals, compared to what they used to have before the insecurity. Furthermore, all my respondents had restricted access to their land, which is their most important asset. Assets such as ox ploughs, bicycles, houses, household items, hoes and other agricultural tools have also been lost. Human capital has been destroyed, as people's health has deteriorated due to insufficient food, poor health services, and spread of communicable diseases in the camps. Children do no longer learn from their parents in the way they used to, and may grow up lacking crucial knowledge in how to make a living in the area. On the other hand, most children now go to school, and learn how to read and do simple arithmetic. However, the quality of education is poor, the drop out rate high, and the curriculum is not very relevant to the children's daily lives. As a result of the insecurity, social networks have been destroyed, while new networks have been created. The formation of groups that work with NGOs has been attributed to the insecurity, and is one example of new social capital that has been formed as a result of insecurity and displacement. As people live close together in the camp, they also get to know many people compared to when they lived scattered in the villages, and during times of displacement to other areas, people have expanded their social networks.

The changing asset base as a result of the insecurity has lead to changes in livelihood strategies. Despite loss of livestock and restricted access to land, agricultural crop production is still the most important livelihood strategy for the great majority of people in the area. However, most people are no longer able to grow enough food for consumption and sale to cover their basic needs. As a result, many people have started employing different livelihood strategies, most importantly casual labour and petty trade. Brewing of alcohol has become an important commercial activity, providing many families with an important extra income. Other livelihood strategies common in the area include selling firewood, charcoal and building materials, renting out assets, and doing various businesses.

As we saw in the literature review, one of the major challenges in situations of chronic conflict is to overcome chronic vulnerability. The vulnerability of the livelihood assets of the IDPs in Kapelebyong is a major constraint in their pursuit for a better life. It is not only the fact that they have lost many assets which represents a hindrance to a better life, but also the uncertain future they face. As we have seen in the case studies, people continuously seek to balance the wish and need to go back to their village homes, with the safety of the camp, and the income-generating opportunities that exist in the camp. This however is done in a situation where they don't know whether the next year will be peaceful, or whether new violent attacks from the Karimojong will occur. Thus, people have to balance their need to

build their asset base by for example getting more animals, building houses or increasing agricultural production, with the possibility that these assets will make them more vulnerable to attacks. However, as we have seen in Chapter 4, Section 3, the majority of the IDPs in the surveyed camps were unable to invest in such assets, as they repeatedly had lost all they had, and remained with less than what they needed to cover their basic needs. For these people, the only probable way of improving their situation would be by external support in the form of productive assets, and security, so that they could utilize these assets. These findings agree with Brun (2003: 33), who says that it's important to understand displacement as 'discontinuity and continuity, belonging and not belonging'. The IDPs in Kapelebyong live in what might be called a 'stable situation of conflict', and this gives rise to different problems than people living in peaceful areas face. Although the livelihood framework can be useful to understand the problems of the population, this aspect of their livelihoods is not well addressed, yet it is one of the most important determinants of their livelihood security.

As a result of the insecurity, people have, as we have seen, started employing livelihood strategies that were non-existent or rare some years ago. Especially women have started income-generating activities outside the home, which was almost unheard of before the insecurity started. The break-down of the social and cultural order, have led many young women to prefer staying alone with their children, and not getting married. Women have also started doing business, such as commercial brewing, petty trade and business on a larger scale, such as having a retail shop or a pharmacy. In this way, many women have become more independent, and many married women are the main breadwinners in the household. There are several factors that have contributed to these changes. First of all, when the cattle were taken, the men lost their most important assets, which did not only give them economic security, but also status in the family and in the community. Secondly, during the Teso insurgency, women could travel more freely than men, and took over much of the trading that men had been doing. Many women were also left alone at this time, as their husbands joined the rebels. Thus they became the head of the household, and had to learn much of the work that had traditionally been performed by men. Third, the Government of Uganda and several NGOs have implemented gender policies in the community, for example by gender sensitization, and by making sure that there is at least one woman in each of the local councils. Paralleling the change of women's roles, the men's roles have also changed. It is interesting to note, that the difficult life in the camps has made men perform tasks that were traditionally assumed to be typical 'women's work', such as collecting firewood. It is also interesting to note that the technological changes that have taken place in the community, such as the introduction of bicycles, grinding mills, and plastic jerricans have made it possible for men to do work that was previously reserved for women, without 'becoming like women'. One example is that men fetch water, but that they never carry it on the head like women, but use a bicycle, or just carry the jerricans in the hands.

The changes in gender roles are seen as positive by the majority. However, the insecurity has also had several negative sociocultural impacts. As people live close together in camps, and the majority in absolute poverty, there has been a breakdown in social and cultural values. People get married much younger than before, and divorce and extra-marital affairs are seen as consequences of living in the camps. Most parents expressed concern that the children growing up in the camps learn 'bad manners', and engage in drinking, petty theft and commercial sex, while they do not learn to do the tasks that they traditionally are assumed to learn as they grow up.

The sociocultural changes brought by the insecurity are important determinants of the livelihood strategies available to people, as clearly seen in the livelihood framework adapted to situations of chronic conflict. Sociocultural change is thus not only a consequence of changing livelihood strategies caused by the insecurity, but also a cause of changes in the livelihood strategies of the IDPs in Kapelebyong. It is therefore clear, that the insecurity which has plagued the area for almost 30 years has led to dramatic changes not just in the economic status of the people in the area, but also in form of cultural change, especially in areas related to marriage, gender and family. At the same time, Kapelebyong is part of a greater area, and some of the changes that are seen in Kapelebyong are also present in more peaceful areas. One example of this is the gender sensitization that has taken place, and the gender balancing policies which are ensuring that women are represented in the local government councils. Still, much of the change that affects people's daily lives directly, are seen as results of the insecurity in the area by most of my informants there.

The issue of sociocultural change as a result of protracted displacement and chronic conflict is important to understand in order to understand the livelihood strategies available to individuals, households and communities. This aspect is rarely discussed though, and not adequately incorporated in the conventional livelihood framework. It is also rarely addressed by relief agencies, which, as we have seen, often assume an emergency situation when assisting IDPs, although the IDPs might have been displaced for decades, as is the case in Kapelebyong.

The last research question in this study is asking about the relationship between the livelihood strategies employed by the IDPs, and the interventions by NGOs and government agencies. The main responsibilities of the government are health care, education, infrastructure and security. However, as the study has shown, the quality of these services is poor in Kapelebyong, and this affects the livelihoods of the people negatively. Two WFP projects are channelled through the government structures. One is the 'Food for Health' programme, which is aiming at improving the health of pregnant women and babies. This programme started in May 2006, and by the time of fieldwork, the results were impressive. The second programme is called 'Food for Education', and at the time of fieldwork, the schools were preparing for this programme to start as the schools opened in February 2007. The programme aims to improve the nutrition of children in primary school, and this is hoped to improve the pupils' learning. As this is likely to improve the children's health, and their ability to concentrate in class, it might not help improving the standard of education, as the biggest problems facing the schools are lack of teachers, classrooms and teaching materials.

The poor quality of government services are understood to a large degree as being a result of the insecurity. For example, teachers and health personnel are posted to the schools and clinics in the area, but do not accept to work there, due to the situation. However, there was also a feeling among many of the respondents and informants that the government deliberately neglects the area. As the literature review showed, one characteristic of a fragile state is that the state is 'unable or unwilling to fulfil core functions' (PLOW, 2006). This corresponds to what we saw in the literature review, that chronic conflict is likely to occur in fragile or failed states. Although the local government structures are in place, these are under-resourced as the tax-base is very limited, as is the transfer of funds from the central government.

The NGOs that are presently operating in Kapelebyong are mostly local, but many of them receive funding from international agencies. The only international NGO which is present in the area now is Concern Worldwide. CBOs and churches also have development or humanitarian programmes in the area. However, much of the activities of the NGOs are focused on provision of farm implements, health care, livestock, or loans. These programmes are important for many of the households that benefit, for whom a goat or one more sack of groundnuts may mean a real difference. However, few NGOs are dealing with the underlying causes of the problems in the area, although an overwhelming majority of my respondents and informants were convinced that the most important issue to be solved was that of insecurity.

A few CBOs and one NGO work with peace-building between the Iteso and the Karimojong. Apart from the NGO programme, which is funded by DED and WFP, the efforts of these groups were severely hampered by lack of resources. As far as I could establish during my fieldwork, none of the NGOs or CBOs did any kind of lobbying to make the government change its approach to the security problems in the area. Duffield (1994: 64) noted a difference between what he called 'progressive' and 'conservative' NGOs. In Kapelebyong, most of the NGOs seem to be somewhere between the two extremes. Many of the NGO programmes do try to increase people's access to important assets, and to utilize the ones they do access more effectively. Examples of these programmes are food security programmes, credit schemes, and livestock programmes. However, the NGOs are as a rule not addressing some important problems that are causing the insecurity. Those who are addressing these issues are few and under-resourced, and are only targeting the local aspects of the insecurity, while the national and international aspects are not addressed. The main reason for this is probably that the NGOs working in the area are small, and do not have the financial nor human resources to work on these issues at macro-level.

This study has shown how chronic conflict has devastated a community, and left the majority of the people in absolute poverty, as they have lost most of their productive assets. It has also shown that the conventional livelihood framework does not adequately address the special needs of the people in this community. The livelihood framework is a useful starting point when trying to get an overview of the livelihoods of people and households in the area, but some of the issues that are at the forefront in real life are not emphasised in the framework. Vulnerability and sociocultural changes are very important issues to understand in order to understand the livelihood strategies available to the IDPs in Kapelebyong. In order to be able to target interventions that are aiming at improving the livelihoods of people in the area, it is of crucial importance for the different agencies to understand the complexity of the situation, and the changes that the insecurity has caused in the community.

Lastly, it is clear from the study that security is the most important issue for people in Kapelebyong. Without security, efforts at improving livelihoods, both by people themselves, and by NGOs or government agencies, will be very vulnerable. As seen in the historical background, the issue of security is not only local, but also linked to events and policies at the national and even international level. Although much can be done by local efforts, there is need for a wider regional approach in order to ensure security in Kapelebyong and the neighbouring areas.

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